Report: Local Authority Emergency Preparedness Interim Assurance Report

Executive Summary

This report provides an overview of the capacity and capability of London's councils to provide an immediate response to civil emergencies. The findings of this report are based on the results of the *Interim Assurance Process,* comprising of individual council self-assessments and collective peer challenge against 32 emergency response standards carried out between October and December, 2018.

This report finds a generally positive position of London's councils' preparedness for emergencies, overall meeting 70% of standards set in the Interim Assurance Process. Clusters of excellence and good practice have been found throughout the city. Where areas for improvement have been identified, councils and sub-regions are planning for and driving improvements.

However, capabilities are inconsistent across councils, sub-regions and standards. There are examples of councils that face greater challenges in implementation of the standards that will likely struggle to effectively manage more serious major emergencies without the collective support of partners in their sub-regions and London.

Councils generally appear strong in tactical arrangements, such as incident command and control, and activation and notification arrangements. However, there are consistent areas for improvement shared by the majority of local authorities in standards relating to some of the most fundamental operational response capabilities. Collectively, local authorities share lack of established capabilities regarding operational responders, humanitarian support services and community engagement. Improving these areas should be a priority for all. Whilst the successful delivery of the *Standardisation Programme* will inevitably bring improvements to many of these areas, this can only be achieved with the application of sufficient resources and organisational support to meet responder recruitment gaps, provide training and redevelop procedures.

Organisational ownership and corporate support has been a key indicator of progress throughout this review. Positively, corporate support and interest has increased across all sub-region, with Chief Executives particularly noted as more engaged. Translating this increased corporate interest into increased response capability is the next phase in meeting this challenge. Successful councils achieve this by driving organisational ownership of resilience and response planning, ensuring that practitioners are not left isolated in driving capabilities and ensuring organisations play a full part in developing, implementing and delivering response services.

In the light of ongoing resource limitations and increasing demands, practitioners, councils and sub-regions will likely need to think innovatively and creatively to drive improvements. Councils working in partnership to adopted supportive and collective approaches, matched by internal corporate support and organisation engagement appear to achieve higher compliance scores. Examples of councils working in partnership successfully include the North East London tri-borough partnership and West London Alliance.

Collaborative regional initiatives have been initiated that aim to support all London Borough Councils in their pursuit of resilience and emergency preparedness. Such initiatives include the development inter-borough press/media management and public communications support, guidance and training for Members, and engagement with HR directors to establish core emergency response roles and skills requirements.

Finally, Councils must remain critical of their own capabilities, questioning what they can and cannot deliver. There are indications from the review of self-assessment returns and peer challenge feedback that some councils have been optimistic in self-assessments without sufficient evidence. Where this has occurred councils may give a false representation of capabilities, and fail to identify vital improvements. Councils should be encouraged to view *'developing'* capabilities as a positive indicator of continuous improvement when it existing in an environment of organisational ownership, corporate support and collaborative improvement.

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Introduction

1. Background

The report: *An Assurance Framework for London – Providing Individual and Collective Assurance* (also known as the *Sean Ruth Report*), February, 2018, identified a need for enhanced assurance of London's local government's preparedness and capability to respond to and support the public during emergencies. LAP approved significant changes to the existing *Minimum Standards for London* (MSLs), seeking to replace these with *Resilience Standards for London* by autumn, 2019.

While new standards are developed, the Local Authorities' Panel agreed to an Interim Assurance Process (IAP) to provide a credible interim assessment of councils' capacity and capability to provide an immediate response. The Resilience Support Team were instructed to design and facilitate an *Interim Assurance Process* to provide a credible assessment of councils' capacity and capability to provide an immediate response to civil emergencies based on a *self-assessment* and *peer challenge* model. An independent consultant was commissioned to design the Standards, which were then approved by LAP.

2. Process

The findings of this report are based on self-assessments submitted by individual councils in November 2018, and self-moderation following sub-regional peer challenge workshops in November/December 2018. This report should be read in conjunction with:

- **Peer Challenge Session Headlines Reports** - provides outputs from each sub-regional workshop, designed to prompt discussion, explore capabilities, provide challenge and seek improvements

- **Sub-Regional Interim Assurance Reports** – an assessment of sub-regional emergency response preparedness based on self-assessments and peer challenge specifically tailored to each sub-region.

- **Sub-Regional Action Plans** – produced by councils forming each sub-region. These action plans identify activities taken by councils to drive improvements, including any improvements made between November 2018 and February 2019 (the publication of this report)

3. Timelines

- Launch of Interim Assurance Process – **September, 2018**

- Councils completed self-assessment of capabilities against standards submitted - 2nd **November, 2018**

- 6 Sub-regional peer challenge workshops completed – **November/December, 2018**

- Opportunity for councils to re-assess self-assessments and resubmit - **December, 2018**

- Peer challenge headline reports submitted to Chief Executives of each sub-region completed - **January, 2019**

- London Assurance Report (this report) – **February 2019**

- Sub-Regional Assurance Reports and Action Plans – **February, 2019**

4. List of Annexes

A. Interim Assurance Process Standards

Results

5. London's assurance score

Councils self-assessed capabilities for emergency response against 32 standards. Each standard included a description of the capability and relevant evidence required for demonstration of capabilities (a full list of capability standards are provided in Annex A).

Compliance with the standards were graded as:

Developing	*Does not yet meet expectations and work in progress to develop capacity/capability to at meet expectations*
Established	*Meets the required capacity or capability with example evidence to support this position*
Advanced	*Council has exceeded expectations and has capacity or capability over and above the IAP standard*

The term '*in place*' capabilities is used as a combination of *established* or *advanced* capabilities.

On average, London's **Local Authorities have achieved the 70% of capabilities**, with a further 30% in development.[1]

Total number of Established/Advanced capabilities
(amalgamated across all standards for all councils)

Positively, all boroughs are working towards full compliance and all sub-regions have or are developing collective action plans that identify both individual council actions to drive improvements and collective shared actions to address sub-regional weaknesses where there is benefit in doing so.

In the months between self-assessment submissions and the publication of this report councils have been working to improve scores. These can be identified in the sub-regional action plans.

A significant number of *developing* capabilities should see improvement to *established* over future months with the completion of several projects established within the regional LAP Business Plan. Most significantly is the implementation of the *Standardisation Programme*, a major piece of work that requires considerable procedural redevelopment and training of responders to improve operational response capabilities and interoperability/mutual aid, which directly influences compliance with 4 standards of the IAP.

6. Sub-Regional assurance scores

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[1] Calculated as a sum total of all standards across all councils

There are clear disparities between sub-regions, with some sub-regions achieving higher levels of compliance according to self-assessments than others.

Key		
Low (>=)	(<) High	
56%	60%	
61%	65%	
66%	70%	
71%	75%	
76%	80%	

Compliance averages per sub-region (based on individual council self-assessment scores)

When averaging compliance scores to the Interim Assurance Standards across sub-regions three tiers of preparedness can be identified:

A. **West, Central** and **North East** all represent the highest average capability scores of between 75% (Central) and 78% (West)

B. **North Central** and **South East** form a second tier, with an average capability score of 65%

C. **South West** form a third tier with a capability score of 56%, considerably lower than the rest of London. Reasons for this may include lowest recorded levels of corporate support and organisational capacity[2] and lowest number of Emergency Planning Practitioners[3]

Indications of probable success factors within high scoring areas include high levels of corporate support, organisational ownership driven through director level engagement and co-operative cross boundary collaboration.

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[2] According to Emergency Planning Managers and Directors with responsibility for organisational resilience as recorded at peer-challenge sessions, see *Corporate support and organisational capacity for preparation and response* section

[3] See *Emergency Planning Monitoring Report* produced by London Resilience Group

7. Capability strengths and weaknesses

The self-assessments revealed a wide range in capability delivery across London's councils, with some capabilities in place across 100% of councils, while others are present in as low as only 12% of councils.

Capability assessment for all London Councils against IAP standards (from self-assessment scores)

■ Advanced   ■ Established   ■ Developing

7.1. Regional strengths

There are 9 capabilities with high levels of compliance across London, where 90% or more of councils have met the standard at *established* or *advanced* levels:

a. **Director ownership**

> ✓ 1.2 The authority has a **Director-level lead for delivery** of the EP2020 targets. (100%)

b. **Monitoring and activation arrangements**

> ✓ 3.1 The authority is able to **maintain a 24/7 watching brief for signs of an incident.** Including a 24/7 single point of contact for notifications of emergencies issued by other agencies. (100%)
>
> ✓ 3.2 Prior to activating its emergency response arrangements, the authority can **gather information about a potential (nearby) incident** and, where required.
>
> ✓ 3.3 Following declaration of a Major Incident, the authority can **escalate its operational arrangements to Level 3 'Incident Response and Coordination' within 120 minutes/2 hours.** (91%)

c. **Emergency centre locations identified and mapped**

> ✓ 3.12 The borough has identified **suitable emergency centre locations** across its area and has in place arrangements to use these locations (100%)

d. **On scene partner liaison and co-ordination**

> ✓ 3.19 **LALO is empowered to represent the organisation** and is suitably competent to coordinate on-scene local authority resources (94%)

e. **Communications**

> ✓ 3.21 The authority has a **communications strategy to enable the scaling up of communications** arrangements for the purpose of warning and informing members of the public about the risks of the emergency and the available (council) support services using a range of media. (94%)[4]
>
> ✓ 3.22 The authority has the means by which it ensure **senior politician(s) are notified of and can remain sighted on the incident** impact and the borough's response (91%)

f. **Community tension monitoring**

> ✓ 3.27 The Prevent Lead or equivalent is able to **monitor, identify and report on community tension** (91%)

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[4] 3.21 has been identified as an area for specific focus by Chief Executives. Further assessment of communications capabilities is available in Section 9 of this report.

Local Authority Resilience Support Team

7.2. Standards requiring improvement

There are 9 standards where more than 50% of councils has self-assessed as *developing* and as yet have not met this capability.

These developing capabilities can be broken down into 3 themes:

a. Operational responders and delivery of the *Standardisation Programme*

- × 2.1 Corporate Management Board has **approved the transition to a standardised approach** (52%)

- × 2.2 The authority has **sufficient local resources to deliver the transition activity** (for Standardisation) within the timetable agreed by the Local Authority Panel (LAP). (43%)

- × 3.11 The authority is able to maintain a **sufficient number of staff for core emergency response roles to respond for 48 hours.** These staff are suitably trained, equipped and empowered to fulfil their respective role. (31%)

- × 3.13 The authority is able to **open and operate a Rest Centre**, and support the Police in their operation of a Survivor Reception Centre and Family and Friends Reception Centre (FFRC), for 48 hours. (34%)

- × 3.18 The authority is **able to coordinate convergent volunteer council staff** and re-task staff to support the emergency response. (48%)

The establishment of trained and deployable operational responders is a capability requiring further development for most councils. These standards relate to the deployability of operational staff and services to deliver operational response activities.

Peer Challenge workshops indicated that the key challenge for meeting these standards relate to the requirements of the *Standardisation Programme*. This programme necessitates considerable procedural redevelopment and retraining. Compliance with these standards should see significant improvement with the expected completion of the *Standardisation Programme* set for September 2019.

However, the two key pre-requisites in delivering the Standardisation Programme: 2.1 *corporate approval for the transition to standardisation* and 2.2 *sufficient resources to deliver the programme*, are also not yet in place across the majority of councils. This brings into doubt the likelihood of delivery of the Standardisation Programme on time and to expectations.

Despite this, most councils across London are confident in their ability to deliver an effective operational response to an emergency using existing/legacy arrangements. However, this limits the capacity for sharing operational responders and the effectiveness of mutual aid, essential in limiting the impact of capability weaknesses and, therefore, unsustainable in the longer-term.

b. Humanitarian/community support

- × 3.13 The authority is able to **open and operate a Rest Centre**, and support the Police in their operation of a Survivor Reception Centre and Family and Friends Reception Centre (FFRC), for 48 hours. (34%) *(mentioned above)*

- × 3.14 The authority is able to **open and operate a Humanitarian Assistance Centre** within the agreed timescale of 72 hours (31%)

- × 3.16 The authority is able to process the receipt, storage and onward dissemination of **physical**

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> donations. (12%)
>
> × 3.17 The authority is able to complete a **Humanitarian Assistance Impact Assessment** (33%)

Supporting the public during emergencies lies at the core of Local Authority emergency response and therefore the recorded low levels of *established* capabilities regarding these standards poses a significant risk to Councils. Once again, these largely relate to the deployment of operational response services.

This can be partly, but not wholly, attributed to the challenge of meeting the *Standardisation Programme* that build on the recommendations from the 2017 incidents, especially regarding staffing and Emergency Support Centre operations. However, not all of these standards relate to or are linked to the Standardisation Programme.

Nearly all councils have assessed their ability to manage physical donations as a *developing* capability, with only 12% indicating they have an established capability to meet this requirement.

c. Community engagement

> × 3.28 The authority has a plan for how it would **engage with and support a community response** (41%)

Engaging with and supporting a community response is also identified as an area of development, with only 41% of councils self-assessing this has been *established*.

Councils that have achieved the most success in this area have sought to engage *community engagement/development teams* into this process, utilising the wider skills and knowledge contained within councils to work with communities in supporting them prior to and during emergencies.

There are several examples of councils successfully engaging with the third sector to take a lead in developing the communities' ability to withstand and effectively self-respond and recover from emergencies, complimenting the council's response.

In boroughs that are striving to meet the standard, and where activity has taken place, it is often highly reliant on emergency planning teams working largely in isolation to navigate, engage with and support highly dynamic and complex community networks. This is often in addition to other wide ranging resilience planning demands.

8. Corporate support and organisational capacity for preparation and response

During the Peer Challenge workshop sessions, all attendees (Directors with responsibility for organisational resilience/emergency preparedness, and Emergency Planning Managers) were asked to anonymously answer two questions, providing a personal opinion of organisational support for emergency planning and response.

1. *What is the level of corporate support in your council for emergency preparedness and response?*

2. *How engaged is the organisation in providing resources and capacity to respond to emergencies?*

The results are collated and mapped below. Results are colour coded by sub-region:

- 28 - **ideal capability zone** (high corporate engagement and high organisational capacity)
- 27 – **in the** *'we'll cope'* **zone** (mid-level organisational engagement and capacity, likely to rely on few individuals for core response with some organisational involvement)
- 8 - **in the 'danger-zone'** (low levels of corporate interest and/or low capacity for response, highly reliant on small teams of responders)

8.1. Corporate Support

Strong set of results indicating *good-* to *excellent-* levels of corporate engagement and support across London's councils. Attendees commented on marked improvements over previous 18 months to 2 years, with top management (particularly Chief Executives) increasingly interested, aware and engaged in emergency planning and response arrangements.

There are some concerns that this increased corporate support may be short lived and that interest may reduce over time. Practitioners referenced experiences following previous high-profile major emergencies in London.

This increased corporate interest from Chief Executives and senior management teams hasn't always translated into increased capabilities. In some cases practitioners referred to increased demand from the most senior levels that had reduced rather than increased wider capabilities. Peer challenge session attendees often referred to the *"treacle layer of management"*, specifically referencing Director and Head of Service layers of management where there is little support despite positive contributions from Chief Executives and top level management.

Several councils felt they had overcome this challenge through several approaches:

- Creation of 'corporate resilience boards' or similar, chaired by a director, with director level representation from across the organisation. These groups are responsible for driving and overseeing organisational ownership of risk, resilience development and capability deployment (Ealing, Hounslow, City of London, Lewisham)

- Capabilities (including plan development) assigned to particular services/directors who are held accountable (Croydon)

- Inter-borough partnerships that combine limited resources to fill gaps and create deployable capabilities (Barking and Dagenham, Waltham Forest, Redbridge)

8.2. Organisational Capacity to prepare and respond

Attendees generally regarded operational capabilities as reducing across London. This was largely attributed to budget reductions and organisational transformation/downsizing. For many, this is expected to continue.

Attendees at peer challenge workshops commented on responses that rely more heavily on fewer responders as services are stripped back or outsourced, often with little regard to the effect on response arrangements. This has particularly effected emergency planning practitioners who are drawn into closing capability gaps that appear as a result of organisational change.

Changing culture had particularly affected councils operating volunteer response arrangements. Loss of goodwill amongst council staff meant that volunteer response arrangements were becoming more difficult to maintain at a time when the standards and expectations demand more robust and complete response capabilities. Practitioners are experiencing difficulties recruiting and retaining volunteer responders, leading to an over-reliance on too few individuals who have less surplus time for additional training and emergency response.

Some councils feel increased corporate support has mitigated organisational capacity reductions by ensuring organisation ownership of resilience and response arrangements (e.g. Central London Sub-Region).

Conversely to capacity reductions, demand has increased. This is not regarded as a result of increasing numbers of incidents, rather greater expectations of the quality of a response from corporate management, politicians, the public and from partner agencies.

Key concerns of LAP Chief Executives

During the design of peer challenge sessions, Chief Executives of the Local Authorities' Panel identified their key concerns requiring additional exploration during workshops challenge session. Identified concerns were mapped against IAP standards, providing a sample set for challenge focus. Feedback on these standards were provided to Chief Executives in sub-regional challenge session headlines.

Consistent observations from across all sub-regions are provided below for further assessment:

9. Communications and media management in response

In addition to standard regarding communications strategy[5], Chief Executives wished to explore the capacity of Councils to manage the media demand generated from major incidents with national level interest.

- 94% of Councils self-assessed to have *established* the requirements of standard 3.21.

- Further examination of evidence appeared to provide little evidence in demonstrating this capability.

- The majority of Directors and Emergency Planning Managers that attended Peer Challenge Sessions indicated generally low levels of confidence in ability to manage the significant media/press/social media demands with available in-house resources, especially regarding 'getting on the front foot' for communication messaging and managing social media.

- However, some councils were highly confident in their ability to meet the standard as well as meeting the needs of a significant media interest without any external support but provided little in evidence that this capability is available. In some cases this included councils retaining small communications teams with very limited resources.

- Whilst some councils are actively working in partnership with neighbours to enhance collaborative capacity, many were resistant to such activities.

- Examples of collaboration between Communications Teams include:

  o West sub-region agreeing to explore opportunities for closer support between communications teams (West London Alliance)

  o An arrangement driven at Chief Executive level across Barking and Dagenham, Waltham Forest, and Redbridge that's seeks to enhance collaboration through shared training and exercising of communications officers, allowing them to work across boundaries in support of each other during emergencies

A regional initiative has been commissioned via the Resilience Support Team to assist councils in building capacity to manage significant media interest and communicate with the public during emergencies. The approach aims to encourage collaboration across Local Authority communications teams, build shared skills and provide a mechanism for councils to seek support from other councils when needed.

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[5] *3.21 The authority has a communications strategy to enable the scaling up of communications arrangements for the purpose of warning and informing members of the public about the risks of the emergency and the available (council) support services using a range of media*

10. Response staff

Chief Executives expressed concern regarding the availability of appropriate numbers of identified, trained and deployable staff to deliver emergency response services.

- This concern has been corroborated through self-assessments and peer challenge sessions

- Majority of councils operate volunteer response programmes. These are highly reliant on goodwill of volunteers, often without recompense or rotas. These arrangements are coming under increased strain as a result of loss of goodwill, organisational downsizing and changing cultures.

- Significant challenges in recruiting sufficient numbers of volunteer staff, and retaining existing responders.

- *Standardisation Programme* is regarded as worthwhile and positive, An alarming number of councils do not feel they have the resources to implement to programme to expectations or timeframes committed to by LAP. This is relevant for both implementation through design and training, and in seeking additional and sufficient numbers of responders to fill required roles.

- Most boroughs feel they have the responder capacity to deliver the initial response as is, but would need external support beyond initial 24 hours.

- Some boroughs are seeking to write response role requirements into Job Descriptions. This is already the case for most councils for Gold and Silver management roles, however, such arrangement have not extended to operational responder roles at this time.

11. Humanitarian support

Supporting the public during emergencies is regarded as a core responsibility of councils by Chief Executives, and likely to represent how councils are judged by the press/media and the public.

- Humanitarian assistance identified as an area for improvement in every sub-region through self-assessments and peer challenge sessions.

- Limitations go beyond the implementation of the Standardisation Programme, extending to procedures and plans for more complex humanitarian response roles.

- Councils are struggling to recruit, train and retain volunteer responders (there appears to be a high reliance on volunteer responders for this criterion set)

- Some examples of Councils investing in this service with regular training, incentives, support, and providing extensive and challenging training and exercising. In these cases there is usually a dedicated emergency planning practitioner to manage this process.

12. Governance

Appropriate internal governance is key to driving organisational ownership and implementation of resilience and emergency planning capabilities.

- Some excellent examples of corporate governance structures that drive ownership and responsibility across organisations, especially where executive director led 'corporate resilience groups' drive the resilience agenda and hold directors to account.

- Members engagement in most boroughs, but not all – mixture of reports to leaders/cabinets, scrutiny groups and portfolio leads

- Many areas reliant on line-management reporting hierarchies and reporting lines. These examples seem to exhibit challenges in implementing organisational change and creating capabilities – often describe their situation as having good buy-in at CE/corporate management level who agree with reports and recommendations, but implementation often left to small teams of overworked practitioners with little organisational engagement or support.

- Wide differences in roles of emergency planning practitioners:

  - **Strategic resilience advisors:** Some councils (often where there is a highly corporate approach to resilience planning) employ Emergency Planning practitioners in strategic *'resilience advisor'* type roles; guiding, advising and overseeing resilience development, supporting services in development of their capabilities. Often removed from emergency response directly.

  - **Operational responders:** a large number of councils employ and specifically recruit EP practitioners into highly operational response teams. These teams are largely focused on managing incidents and developing the operational skills to respond effectively with minimum involvement of, or impact on, the wider organisation

  - Several practitioners feel they are split between the two styles, leading to over demand.

- Some areas highly reliant on personal relationships between individual managers and Chief Executives. Whereas this can work in the short term, lack of formalised governance around resilience leads to risk and uncertainty, especially during restructures or changing personalities.

Civil resilience guidance, training and other support arrangements for councillors in London local authorities is being developed via the Resilience Support Team on behalf of all London Borough Councils

13. Community and voluntary sector engagement and management

Ability to successfully engage with and harness the potential of the community during incidents to enhance the collective response to emergencies, rather than seeing communities as a challenge to be managed.

- Engaging with the community seen as a challenge for most. Often, responsibility for engaging with highly complex communities is left to Emergency Planning practitioners working in isolation with few resources to dedicate to the task.

- Higher performing councils tend to deliver through specialist teams of community engagement/ development/ partnership services who have the knowledge, skills and networks within the community to build relationships.

- Good examples of partnering with community and voluntary sector groups to engage with the public and drive the resilience and preparedness message and work collaboratively in emergencies.

- Most areas have good relations with recognised voluntary organisations that operate regionally and locally, inviting and involving these at Borough Resilience Forum levels and in exercises

A regional initiative to support local authorities in developing community engagement and resilience promotion strategies is now underway through the commissioning of direct support to the Community Resilience Steering Group.

Conclusions

On average London is 70% compliant with the Interim Assurance Standards, with sub-regions developing and delivering improvement plans to drive compliance with the remaining 30% of *developing* capabilities. However, capabilities are not uniform or consistent across the city, with weaknesses in sub-regions, individual councils and along specific capabilities.

London should be concerned with driving improvements especially with regards to core operational capabilities, including:

- Operational response arrangements and response staff

- Humanitarian and community support

- Community engagement

The interim assurance process has highlighted the importance of the *Standardisation Programme* to closing some of the largest and most pressing gaps in capabilities. This can only be achieved with corporate support and approval for transition, not only in giving permission, but in identifying responders as traditional volunteer programmes struggle to recruit, train and retain responders in more lean organisations.

Corporate support and organisational engagement for the ownership of resilience planning and emergency response appears a central theme throughout the assurance process. Increased corporate support is evident throughout London's sub-regions, although, it appears this is rarely successfully converted into capability improvements. Practitioners indicate the demand generated by increased corporate interest often leads to capacity reductions as they are pressed to meet the strategic demands of corporate management and operational demands of developing and delivering operational emergency response capabilities. The challenge for senior management and corporate strategy is how to capitalise on this increased corporate interest to drive capacity and capability improvements.

The successful development of capabilities requires sufficient resources for its implementation. The assurance process has highlighted practitioner and organisational resource limitations. While additional resources are unlikely to transpire, councils will need to be innovative, creative and collaborative in how they develop and implement capabilities, as is the case in several parts of London.

Councils should embrace collaborative approaches to capability development. Examples across London demonstrate how sub-regions and individual councils have chosen to cooperate successfully in a range of collaborative approaches to addressing resource and capability gaps.

L A P
Local Authorities' Panel

Annex A – Interim Assurance Standards

#	Requirement
1.1	The authority has taken to Corporate Management Board a paper that outlines how it will improve resilience, taking into account the EP2020 targets
1.2	The authority has a Director with responsibility for resilience
1.3	The authority has a suitable governance structure for resilience, under which it can implement resilience across the organisation
2.1	Corporate Management Board has approved the transition to a standardised approach
2.2	The authority has sufficient local resources to deliver the transition activity within the timetable agreed by the Local Authority Panel (LAP).
3.1	The authority is able to maintain a 24/7 watching brief for signs of an incident. This includes a 24/7 single point of contact to whom notifications of emergencies may be issued by other agencies.
3.2	Prior to activating its emergency response arrangements, the authority can gather information about a potential (nearby) incident and, where required: - assess the strategic impact and brief Council Gold; - give an early warning to its services; and - share information about the incident with partner organisations (local and regional)
3.3	Following declaration of a Major Incident, the authority can escalate its operational arrangements to Level 3 'Incident Response and Coordination' within 120 minutes/2 hours.
3.4	The authority is able to deploy core departmental services in response to an emergency for at least the first 48 hours of an incident
3.5	Gold and Silver levels can make and record decisions in a consistent manner
3.6	The authority maintains personal logs for decisions and actions
3.7	The authority is able to maintain an incident (BECC) log, detailing key events and actions for the organisation during an incident.
3.8	Council Gold is able to set, monitor and amend a working strategy for the emergency response.
3.9	Council Silver is able to set, monitor and amend a tactical plan for the emergency response.
3.11	The authority is able to maintain a sufficient number of staff for core emergency response roles to respond for 48 hours. These staff are suitably trained, equipped and empowered to fulfil their respective role.
3.12	The borough has identified suitable emergency centre locations across its area and has in place arrangements to use these locations
3.13	The authority is able to open and operate a Rest Centre, and support the Police in their operation of a Survivor Reception Centre and Family and Friends Reception Centre (FFRC), for 48 hours: • SRC, staff deployed at earliest opportunity, maximum deployment-to-site time of 3 hours • RC, open within 3 hours • FFRC, timings in line with opening of the Police Casualty Bureau
3.14	The authority is able to open and operate a Humanitarian Assistance Centre within the agreed timescale of 72 hours
3.15	Able to identify vulnerable people or other special interest groups who require targeted information
3.16	The authority is able to process the receipt, storage and onward dissemination of physical donations.
3.17	The authority is able to complete a Humanitarian Assistance Impact Assessment
3.18	The authority is able to coordinate convergent volunteer council staff and re-task staff to support the emergency response.
3.19	LALO is empowered to represent the organisation and is suitably competent to coordinate on-scene local authority resources
3.20	The authority is able to establish and maintain a control centre for the duration of an incident.

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3.21	The authority has a communications strategy to enable the scaling up of communications arrangements for the purpose of warning and informing members of the public about the risks of the emergency and the available (council) support services using a range of media.
3.22	The authority has the means by which it ensure senior politician(s) are notified of and can remain sighted on the incident impact and the borough's response
3.23	The authority has the means by which it can communicate at any time of the day or night with all staff about an incident
3.24	The authority is able to make an appropriately authorised bilateral or multilateral mutual aid request within 2 hours of identifying the need for support.
3.25	When sharing staff with other authorities, the authority is able to quickly confirm the training history its staff
3.26	The authority has agreed its approach to using voluntary organisations as part of its response to emergencies
3.27	The Prevent Lead or equivalent is able to monitor, identify and report on community tension
3.28	The authority has a plan for how it would engage with and support a community response