



**NATIONAL  
PREPAREDNESS  
COMMISSION**

An Independent Review of the  
**Civil Contingencies  
Act 2004 and its  
Supporting Arrangements**

Bruce Mann, Kathy Settle, Andy Towler

**EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

March 2022

The preparation of this report was supported by sponsorship from the

**STRATEGIC  
ALLIANCES  
NETWORK**

Principles. Policy. Strategy.

INQ00015154/1

INQ00015154\_0001



---

## CONTENTS

---

<b>OUR SCOPE AND APPROACH</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>FIT FOR THE PRESENT? FIT FOR THE FUTURE?</b>	<b>4</b>
<b>OUR FINDINGS</b>	<b>6</b>
What is Resilience and a Truly Resilient Nation?	8
Who Should Be Involved in Building UK Resilience?	9
Duties Under the Current Civil Contingencies Act	12
Structures	16
Excellence	22
Validation and Assurance	28
Accountability	30
<b>SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS</b>	<b>34</b>
Chapter 3: What is Resilience and a Truly Resilient Nation?	34
Chapter 4: Involving the Whole of Society	34
Chapter 5: Who Should Have Duties?	37
Chapter 6: Duties Under the Current Civil Contingencies Act	38
Chapter 7: Structures	42
Chapter 8: The Pursuit of Excellence	45
Chapter 9: Validation and Assurance	48
Chapter 10: Accountability	49
<b>ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS</b>	<b>51</b>
<b>REFERENCES AND RESOURCES</b>	<b>52</b>

---







---

## OUR SCOPE AND APPROACH

We were asked by the National Preparedness Commission:

*“To review the implementation and operation of the Civil Contingencies Act 2004, of the civil protection structures it introduced and its associated Regulations, guidance and key supporting enablers; and to make recommendations for improvements.”<sup>1</sup>*

This scope deliberately covered not only the content of the Civil Contingencies Act (‘the Act’) itself but also the supporting arrangements which give it real-life effect, on the ground, in delivering the intent of the UK Government and the UK Parliament. This report therefore intentionally has an operational focus.

In the same operational vein, we have also sought to build on experience and learning. The UK has experienced a wide range of emergencies over the last 20 years and gained a rich body of learning. So a major focus of our work was discussions with those on the front line – statutory bodies in England and Scotland, including inputs from all 38 English Local Resilience Forums; The Executive Office in Northern Ireland; regulated utilities with duties under the Act; businesses; voluntary and community groups; and dedicated individuals – to gather their operational experience of delivering the Act and its intentions, and of preparing for and responding to emergencies. We also gained valuable insights from discussions with a wide range of other bodies including Parliamentarians, Councillors, the National Audit Office and Information Commissioner’s Office, regulators and inspectorates, sector representative bodies, practitioners from other countries, the BBC, consultancies and higher education institutions. In total, we conducted 130 interviews with some 300 people. We also received 29 written submissions and 31 other pieces of evidence.

We have been inspired by the way in which so many people gave up so much of their time to contribute their experience and ideas for improvement – and by the passion and commitment they showed to making those improvements. That gave us great hope for the future. We wish to extend our thanks to everyone who contributed at a time when they were under great pressure.



---

## FIT FOR THE PRESENT? FIT FOR THE FUTURE?

We shaped our work around two fundamental questions.

First, drawing on the evidence we received and other research, we reviewed the way in which UK resilience arrangements have developed since 2004, to enable us to reach a judgement on where resilience in the UK stands today and whether the original intent of Government and Parliament has been met.

Second, we reviewed whether the Act and its supporting arrangements would provide a solid legal and operational platform for building and sustaining the resilience of the UK over the next 20 years. We did so against the Government's ambition to "make the UK the most resilient nation"<sup>2</sup>.

Before reaching conclusions, we went back to the fundamentals. The world has changed over the past 20 years. So has business, the economy and society. They will change much further over the next 20 years. In particular, the risk picture the UK faces is less benign now than in 2004 and is likely to get worse.

So what should we be seeking to achieve in building UK resilience over the next 20 years, to address the challenges the UK is likely to face and the characteristics, attitudes and expectations of society? Who should be involved? Specifically, who should have legal duties? Which legal duties are relevant today, and in the future world? And what structures are needed to bring together the actions of the wide range of organisations and people – at national, regional and local levels, across the public, private and voluntary sectors, and in communities – into a cohesive whole in support of the shared endeavour of avoiding or minimising harm and disruption.

Although machinery and process are important, people are everything. Skilled, competent and confident people are the foundation of effective risk and emergency management. So we had a key focus on the pursuit of excellence. Are the skills and competences needed – by individuals and teams – well-defined? Do those involved have the level of skills and training they need to do a good job? What arrangements are in place to check that people do indeed have the skills they need and can demonstrate their competence, especially in the management of major emergencies?

And more broadly, what are the systemic arrangements for building and sustaining excellence in all resilience-building activities? What quality standards have been set? How are they applied? What are the arrangements to provide validation and assurance of the work done, at all levels? Do senior leaders of Resilience Partnerships<sup>3</sup> have a good picture of the quality of the work of the Partnership? Does the Government have a good picture of the quality of resilience in the UK overall? Are the accountabilities of senior leaders for the quality of the resilience-building work of their organisations clear? And are the arrangements in place for providing information and support to political oversight and scrutiny mechanisms – at all levels – adequate?





---

## OUR FINDINGS

**The Act and the transformed resilience arrangements it introduced were a vital step down the road to building a Resilient Nation. They have served the UK well over the past 18 years. They provide a sound basic framework for emergency preparedness, response and recovery. And we were impressed by the quality of what local statutory bodies and Resilience Partnerships have delivered and are seeking to achieve in future, despite very limited levels of resourcing.**

**But the pace of development has not been sustained over the past decade. In some important areas, quality has degraded. As a result, UK resilience today has some serious weaknesses. It is not fit for future purpose in the world the UK is moving into.**

The lack of development in the resilience field is in sharp contrast to the continuing positive development in other national security fields, especially cyber security and counter-terrorism, which was warmly commended by many of those we spoke to. It is also in sharp contrast to the progress made by a wide range of other countries over that time to build their risk and emergency management systems. **Resilience in the UK has suffered strategic neglect.** As the National Audit Office has observed:

*“... [the] government’s operational management capability has changed little over the past 10 years. Government has often operated in a firefighting mode, reacting in an unplanned way to problems as they arise and surviving from day to day. Our evidence suggests that a fundamental shift in capability, capacity and resilience may be needed to cope better with future emergency responses.”<sup>4</sup>*

**Recovery will need action at two levels. First, there is a need to improve the quality and sustainability of current arrangements. Then we believe that there will be a need to undertake a further transformation, on broadly the same scale as that made after 2004, if UK resilience is to be fit for the future the UK faces** – and to match the ambition that the UK is a truly Resilient Nation.

Our most significant diagnostics and recommendations<sup>5</sup> for the actions that should be taken are set out below, in seven key areas which form the structure of our main report. None are new. They cover areas where resilience capability and capacity has degraded over



the past decade, projects which have been started but have not progressed, good practice in other national security sectors which can be imported, programmes which are being pursued in some localities on their own initiative and which could be implemented more widely, or good practice in other leading countries which could readily be adopted by the UK.

Given the comparative lack of development of UK resilience over the last decade, our recommendations cover not only areas for direct improvement but also proposals for building in continuous improvement and the pursuit of excellence – and validation and assurance, accountability and political scrutiny arrangements which detect and arrest drift and decay.

Some of our recommendations are capable of being implemented quickly. Others will take time, especially as some will require new or amended legislation. And some will require modest investment: we estimate the aggregate cost were all our recommendations to be fully implemented at some £30-35m per year including contingency.<sup>6</sup>

**Recognising the need to prioritise, we have set all of our recommendations against six tests of operational- and cost-effectiveness:**

1. They would make a material contribution to building a more Resilient Nation, one which properly protects the safety and wellbeing of its citizens, its economic development and the environment.
2. They would in particular make a substantial contribution to the management of future ‘catastrophic’ emergencies with national or wide-scale consequences.
3. They would embed arrangements which provide clarity on what good looks like, and enable the identification for scrutiny and action of areas where quality was weak or degrading so that improvement action was needed.
4. They are what the public and Parliament would reasonably expect.
5. If extra resourcing would be required, the investment would be reasonable and proportionate to the operational value gained.
6. They are practicable and deliverable.

We have used our discussions with statutory bodies, businesses, and voluntary and community groups not only to gather their experience and ideas for improvements but also to test with them the practicality and deliverability of our proposals. We have been struck – and inspired – by the consistency of view across front-line organisations about the improvements needed, and by the ambition we have heard for future resilience in the UK. On the basis of those discussions, **we believe that all of our recommendations would make a significant contribution to effective risk and emergency management in the UK. And we believe them to be deliverable, if the political will is there.**

## What is Resilience and a Truly Resilient Nation?

**The current scope of ‘Resilience’ in the UK covers only part of the job. It has insufficient emphasis on preventing emergencies arising in the first place or at least reducing their likelihood, or of proactively designing resilience in to all aspects of our society and economy.** The past 20 years has seen the development of international agreements – especially the Hyogo and Sendai Frameworks<sup>7</sup> – and good practice in international bodies and in leading countries in developing risk reduction policies and programmes. But with some welcome exceptions, especially on climate change, current legislation, policy and operational practice covering the building of UK resilience remains focused on emergency preparedness, response and recovery.

A number of Resilience Partnerships have undertaken their own local risk reduction activities over many years, operating outside the terms of the Act. More recently, Resilience Partnerships have been asked by the UK Government to undertake risk reduction work in tackling supply chain and other issues which had the potential to cause serious harm and disruption. And there has been inspiring work in some parts of the UK – especially London, Greater Manchester and Hampshire – to build ‘Resilient Places’, using policies with a medium- and long-term horizon to tackle vulnerabilities, reduce the risk of emergencies arising and ‘design resilience in’. But those remain glorious exceptions, not promoted or pursued more widely. And there has until now been no systematic work to build the strategic resilience of the UK overall.

We recommend that **risk reduction activities should be put onto the same legal and operational basis as emergency preparedness, response and recovery.** The resulting new resilience framework for the UK should be fully aligned with the Sendai Framework. That should include putting in place mechanisms to gather the metrics recommended by the Sendai Framework to allow progress in building UK resilience to be tracked. We hope that the forthcoming Resilience Strategy will reflect that intention.

All Resilience Partnerships we spoke to would welcome the expansion of their work into this area. We believe that doing so would be feasible and cost effective, subject to:

- The scope being clearly defined
- Boundaries being placed around the new activity so that they do not become absorbed with tackling longstanding chronic issues in public service delivery
- The collaborative definition with the UK Government of expectations on how the new role should be delivered
- Sufficient resourcing

Therefore, we recommend that **an amended Act or future legislation should include a new duty on risk reduction and prevention.** Its execution should be covered in new, dedicated statutory and non-statutory guidance. And new arrangements, including fuller government support to Resilience Partnerships, should be put in place to encourage and



support localities in the development of Local Resilience Strategies which seek to build deeper societal resilience across the medium- and long-term. The role of Resilience Partnerships in leading or providing substantial support to the development of Local Resilience Strategies should be recognised in statutory guidance.

## Who Should Be Involved in Building UK Resilience?

**Current resilience-building arrangements in the UK fully involve only some of those who could contribute**, mainly confined to local statutory bodies, some government agencies and the regulated utilities. Arrangements for involving the voluntary sector do not fully recognise or capture the contribution they can make. Arrangements for involving the business sector are weak. And, despite good work over more than a decade on enabling communities to build their own resilience, Resilience Partnerships are struggling to make significant progress.

The Act, in creating new duties and structures rooted in the public sector, tackled the easier part of building UK resilience. The harder part – of engaging the ‘whole of society’ – remains more said than done. Yet the response to the COVID-19 pandemic showed once again what has been seen in previous major emergencies: the huge appetite and willingness on the part of individuals, communities, voluntary organisations and businesses to make a contribution – of time, money and materials – and how powerful that contribution can be when harnessed.

**We propose three guiding principles for new arrangements which move the phrase ‘whole of society’ from being a cliché into having real operational meaning:**

- 1. ‘Putting People First’** – extending emergency planning as a matter of routine into the identification of the consequences for people, taking account of the different vulnerabilities of different groups in each area, to provide the basis for developing a fuller and more detailed assessment of their potential needs. Needs-based planning will provide a basis for dialogue about how best to meet those needs and who is best placed to do so, whether from statutory bodies, businesses or groups in the voluntary and community sector (VCS). In particular, it would enable the involvement of a wider range of local organisations in building local resilience. And it would provide a focus in emergency planning for the populations most vulnerable to, and most disproportionately affected by, the consequences of emergencies because of their income, geography or other characteristics.

2. **Proper planning and preparation.** This can build on good work in some Resilience Partnerships to develop arrangements for capturing the contribution which VCS organisations, businesses and communities might make, and integrating that activity with the response of statutory bodies into a cohesive response framework, ensuring that important safeguards are met and that contributors are trained and plans are tested in exercises involving the organisations concerned.
3. Undertaking this work in a spirit of **genuine partnership**, most often judged through actions rather than words.

This revised approach would require the revision of current statutory guidance on emergency planning. But the changes needed properly to involve the whole of society go much wider.

For the VCS, we believe that the current ‘have regard to’ formula covering their involvement in resilience-building activity is not working and should be abolished. The response to the COVID-19 pandemic has shown once again the powerful contribution that local and national VCS organisations can make, including the ability to draw on their networks for knowledge and insights which can be used in the development of plans; important assets and capabilities; and, in many cases, the delivery of support to those directly or indirectly affected by an emergency. **VCS organisations should have true partnership status** in the resilience-building activities of local bodies, Resilience Partnerships and central government departments. This should be based on arrangements which provide clarity about which VCS organisations will provide which skills and capabilities in what circumstances, and confidence that those skills and capabilities can be mobilised quickly and effectively if necessary and integrated cohesively into the emergency response. It should also include arrangements for joint training and exercising where relevant. Engagement of the VCS should be captured in a new Resilience Standard.

The full involvement of business is another fundamental plank of the whole of society approach to building UK resilience. And yet, the vast majority of the businesses and business representative organisations we interviewed had had almost no engagement with the UK Government on resilience matters in the years before the pandemic. Many observed that levels of engagement had declined sharply from those of a decade ago, although for most the position improved during the response to the COVID-19 pandemic. There was a strong sense of the UK Government viewing engagement as something that ‘needed to be done’. This showed in the clear perception of there being an absence of thinking in government about the needs of business in resilience planning, let alone a readiness to give business a voice. As a result, there was a widely-held view that the government did not have a good understanding of business resilience, especially the resilience of supply chains. Even in cases where businesses had sought advice, several felt that the government did not wish to listen or engage.

The absence of routine engagement on resilience matters between government and business at national level was well behind access and engagement arrangements in other national security fields, which were widely praised. There was a widely-held view that more and better progress had been made on building a whole of society approach to addressing physical and cyber security threats than on building resilience.

Filling this gap is vital. And the appetite for greater levels of engagement is there, provided that it is attractive – properly managed, value-adding and operationally-focused – rather than a ‘talking shop’. The aim should be to improve the precision and quality of planning on both sides, thereby creating greater certainty where at present there is uncertainty. To achieve this, we believe that **the relationship between the UK Government and business on resilience matters should be placed on a formal partnership footing with the creation of a Business Sector Resilience Partnership**, with wide participation, supported by a dedicated team in the Civil Contingencies Secretariat. This would supplement existing business engagement arrangements managed by individual government departments within their sectors, and focus on national risks with wide-scale consequences and common and cross-cutting issues. Its work should be operationally-focused, and cover the assessment of risks and their consequences, risk reduction, the mitigations which might be put in place to address the impacts of emergencies on businesses, and the contribution which businesses might make in the response to major emergencies. A key feature of the new arrangements should be the greater visibility and approachability of officials towards the business sector.

Two early priorities for the work of the Partnership should be:

- The involvement of businesses in risk assessment, drawing on their knowledge and expertise; and the co-development of information and advice on risks, consequences and plans targeted on meeting the planning needs of businesses
- Capturing the contribution which businesses are ready to make to the response to a major emergency

The new arrangements should be set out in a new chapter in statutory guidance dedicated to business involvement in building the resilience of the UK. And engagement of the business sector in resilience-building should be captured in a new Resilience Standard.

There has been good developmental work over more than a decade on community resilience. Some areas are making good progress: some of the tools and techniques they have developed are good practice. And the recent creation of the National Consortium for Societal Resilience [UK+] involving over 60 bodies to support and enable future progress is very encouraging. But, despite this promise, many Resilience Partnerships are struggling. So we sought to identify where the blockers to progress lay, and what could be done to accelerate progress.

We judge that the development work has borne fruit: the most suitable approaches to involving and empowering communities are understood and being adopted. Some limited but important work is needed to provide Resilience Partnerships with the tools, templates



and other resources they need. We recommend that the UK Government should pursue, including with the National Consortium, how Resilience Partnerships can be provided with practical hands-on peer support and advice to help them adapt and implement tried and tested approaches in their areas. And there would be significant benefits in integrating community resilience activity into multi-agency training and exercising.

It is clear that the major blockages are resourcing, and the commitment of senior leaders in local bodies and the UK Government to making progress. On the former, we recommend the creation of a Community Resilience Co-ordinator post in each Resilience Partnership dedicated to the engagement of VCS organisations, businesses and communities. On the latter, after detailed discussion with Resilience Partnerships, we recommend that **an amended Act or future legislation should include a new duty requiring designated local and national bodies to promote and support community resilience**. The new arrangements should be captured in associated Regulations and a new dedicated chapter in statutory guidance. And the current Resilience Standard should be updated.

## Duties Under the Current Civil Contingencies Act

**The current duties in the Act remain broadly fit for purpose**, subject to some updating, and with the extension of the emergency planning duty to support needs-based planning as described above.

**But there is a pressing need to modernise some duties** and substantially improve arrangements for their execution.

### Risk Assessment

Too much time and energy is spent on risk assessment processes which can be better devoted to improving the quality and depth<sup>8</sup> of analysis. **The whole risk assessment process needs to be radically re-imagined, simplified and digitised**, in close consultation with Resilience Partnerships. That will create capacity for much needed improvements. In particular, we believe that the recent move to focus on only a two-year time horizon in the National Security Risk Assessment (NSRA) is a mistake which should be reversed. A two-year horizon does not provide a sound platform for planning and capability-building for emerging societal hazards, especially those with complex cascading and compounding effects across multiple sectors. It does not address chronic risks which might worsen over time and reach a tipping point where the impacts become intolerable. And it does not provide an adequate basis for the work on Local Resilience Strategies we describe above. We recommend that **risk assessment should be returned to the previous practice of having separate assessments that look ahead for five years and twenty years respectively, to enable longer-term prevention and preparedness activity**.

New arrangements also need to embed concurrency, reflecting the changing future risk picture. And they need to provide for greater agility. We hope that the UK Government will use the new Situation Centre in the Cabinet Office as the hub of a network providing relevant, rapid and dynamic analysis of emerging and changing risks not only to UK Government departments but also to Resilience Partnerships and the Devolved Administrations.

The understandable need to protect genuinely sensitive information has been allowed to mushroom so that it has become an unnecessary barrier to sharing information in the National Security Risk Assessment (NSRA) and hence to resilience-building activity in Resilience Partnerships. This could be substantially fixed by simple process improvements – the classification of individual passages; and the inclusion of handling guidance within the NSRA – which should be pursued as a matter of urgency.

---

## Public Awareness Raising

**The duty in the Act to raise public awareness on risks, consequences and emergency plans is being met in only the most tokenistic way**, substantially reducing the effectiveness of resilience activities across the business and voluntary sectors and in communities. In part, that stems from the provisions of statutory guidance which limits the information which Resilience Partnerships are required to publish to only Community Risk Registers. Much more could and should be published. There is also a widespread perception of the cultural reluctance of the UK Government to share information widely with the public, even on hazards where there are few, if any, national security sensitivities. This is in sharp contrast to the way in which the provision of public information has been tackled in the cyber security and counter-terrorism fields, which was widely commended by those we spoke to for finding the right balance between publication and protection of information.

We believe that the current culture needs to be turned on its head – **there should be a presumption of publication** of material on risks and their consequences, including that in the National Security Risk Assessment, and on national and local emergency plans, **unless there are clear and justifiable national security or commercial reasons not to do so**. We make detailed proposals in our main report for the public information actions that need to be taken.

---

## Information Sharing: The Sharing of Personal Data

We received compelling evidence from public, private and voluntary sector organisations of the way in which **actual or perceived restrictions on the ability of organisations to share personal data meant that those affected by emergencies, especially the COVID-19 pandemic, had not received support which was as effective or as timely as it should have been**.

This is not a new issue. It arose in the immediate aftermath of the 2005 London bombings, after which the UK Government published guidance setting out a number of key principles

to guide emergency planners and responders in their decision-making on information sharing. That has been superseded by more recent guidance issued by the Information Commissioner's Office on the principles to be used in decisions on data-sharing in emergencies. But the organisations we interviewed felt strongly that legal restrictions in primary law on the sharing of personal data trumped guidance with non-statutory force. This was especially the case in circumstances where decisions on the sharing of personal data were being made by relatively junior staff in highly-pressured circumstances. Many made the argument that the absence of an explicit exemption in the Data Protection Act 2018 for the sharing of data in such circumstances reinforced the presumption against sharing.

Although there would be value in better training on the new guidance, and in the development and use of Priority Service Registers, we do not believe that they will meet the humanitarian need. The uniform view of interviewees was that the sharing of data in an emergency should be covered by a specific exemption in the 2018 Data Protection Act, capable of being used quickly and with confidence by operational staff facing the urgent demands of meeting people's needs. We share that view and believe that **a further exemption in the Data Protection Act should be created which allows for the sharing of personal data in cases of 'urgent humanitarian necessity'**. This formulation is intended to provide a legal 'triple lock' against misuse of the exemption. Those citing the exemption in the formal recording of their decision to share personal data in the response to an emergency would be required to demonstrate that the need to do so was:

- Urgent, as would be the case in an emergency;
- Intended to meet identified humanitarian need, most likely by reference to the identified or anticipated consequences of the emergency for the physical or mental well-being of those affected; and
- Necessary, to enable the provision of support which would not otherwise be provided, or of support where the actions of two or more agencies working together would result in a material difference to the quality or timeliness of the support provided.

An ideal opportunity exists to pursue this change as part of reforms to the UK's data protection regime on which the UK Government has recently consulted.

---

## Business Continuity Promotion

**The duty on local authorities to promote business continuity is of a past age and should be abolished.** The objective of seeking to improve the resilience of businesses and voluntary organisations remains worthwhile. But **the best means of promoting organisational resilience needs to be rethought from first principles**, including the standard to be promoted, the audiences that are best placed to receive and act on advice, the wide range of channels (including government bodies) for reaching those audiences, and the most efficient and consistent way of providing advice across those channels.



## Who Should Have Duties?

**There is limited need for change to the list of those bodies with the full suite of duties** placed upon them (the so-called ‘Category 1 responders’).

Despite best intentions in 2004, it is clear that the distinction made in the Act between statutory bodies with the full suite of duties and the much lighter set of duties placed on the regulated utilities and others (‘Category 2 responders’) no longer works. The involvement of Category 2 responders in the risk assessment, emergency planning and public communications work of Resilience Partnerships is vital, especially against the future risk perspective. But, although engagement by some utility sectors remains good, in others it has eroded over time, with damaging impacts on the quality of risk assessments and emergency planning and hence the response to emergencies. And **there is a clear and growing sense that Category 2 responders are ‘second-class citizens’**, eroding the sense of partnership on which resilience depends. We believe that **their full engagement is best achieved by their designation with the full range of duties in the Act**. We recognise the additional costs this will entail, but judge these to be small and heavily outweighed by the benefits for public safety which will be achieved. The administrative burden could, however, be reduced by engaging Category 2 responders at regional level; mutual cross-working, where one company effectively represents the interests of others in the sector; and the greater use of virtual attendance at meetings.

The Joint Committee which reviewed the Civil Contingencies Bill in 2003<sup>9</sup> recommended placing duties on the UK Government and the Devolved Administrations as well as local bodies, to create a clear national civil contingencies framework. The then Government rejected that recommendation. Experience since 2004, and especially over the past decade, has shown that decision to be fundamentally wrong.

Effective resilience must be a shared endeavour. As recent experience has shown, **UK Government departments have to carry their share of the load and have vital leadership, operational and enabling roles to fulfil**. We heard powerful evidence of weaknesses in the discharge by UK Government departments of their responsibilities during the response to the COVID-19 pandemic. And many interviewees brought out the inherent double standard of the model of ‘do as we say, not as we do’. We recommend that **the full suite of duties should be placed on the UK Government**, and that Regulations and statutory guidance should provide a clear definition of the roles, responsibilities and accountabilities of relevant departments and agencies in the implementation of those duties.

## Structures

### Resilience Partnerships

**The basic governance and collaboration structures introduced by the Act, founded in Resilience Partnerships at local level, remain a sound platform for the future although, drawing on experience, we would suggest that there would be value in the Scottish Government reviewing the roles and responsibilities of Partnerships in Scotland at local, regional and national levels, drawing on learning across the four UK Nations.**

We have considered whether Partnerships should be given legal status but believe that doing so would risk legal confusion in an area where clarity is vital, erode the vital spirit of partnership on which resilience-building depends, and bring added cost and bureaucracy, and thus be counter-productive. But **there is a need to give the Chairs of Resilience Partnerships ‘teeth’ in tackling under-performing organisations** which are clearly not fulfilling their responsibilities. Some of this will come through tighter arrangements for the validation of performance and for bringing home the personal accountability of senior leaders which we cover below. But stronger arrangements for administrative escalation to, and timely intervention and enforcement by, the UK Government are clearly needed. It was disappointing to hear that, in those rare circumstances where local persuasion had not worked, the Chairs of the Partnerships involved had rarely felt able to escalate issues with under-performance to the relevant national authorities and that, where they had done so, the relevant UK Government department had conspicuously taken no action.

The recommendation above that resilience-building activities in the UK should in future cover risk reduction and prevention would in itself represent a substantial broadening of the role and workload of local bodies and Resilience Partnerships. But we believe that future governance and collaboration structures need also to reflect three further significant shifts.

First, a future risk picture which is markedly worse than in 2004 when the structures in use today were established. Resilience Partnerships will need in future to be capable of planning for and managing more emergencies on a national scale; more emergencies with cascading and compounding effects, with more wide-spread consequences for people’s wellbeing and way of life; and more concurrent emergencies.

Second, moving from the current rhetoric to an effective whole of society architecture for building resilience in the UK on the lines we propose above will need good, local leadership by public bodies working collectively.

Third, the expectations of the UK Government, which has over the last five years significantly shifted its expectations and use of English Local Resilience Forums (LRFs). One part of the shift has seen the greater engagement of LRFs in risk reduction and prevention activities. A second has been that the UK Government is increasingly looking to LRFs to act as a single collective, to receive and undertake tasks set by the UK Government and to report back as an entity.

These changes mean that **Resilience Partnerships are in a fundamentally different position to that envisaged in 2004** and set out in Regulations and guidance. We therefore discussed with local bodies and Resilience Partnerships whether current structures remain the best vehicle for building UK resilience. It is notable that the almost unanimous view of those we interviewed was that **current structures on the current geography are fit for future purpose**, and that continuity – of securing and then building on what has been achieved over the past 20 years – is important. We share that view. But if local bodies and the governance structures within which they operate are to be capable of fulfilling this wider and more challenging role, they need clarity about their future role and the expectations on them. And they need the tools to do a bigger job.

We recommend that **the UK Government should as an early priority discuss and agree with Devolved Administrations and English LRFs a formal document which sets out the future role of local bodies and of Resilience Partnerships, and expectations on the way in which they will discharge that role**. It should subsequently reflect the revised framework in an amended Act or future legislation, associated Regulations and supporting statutory and non-statutory guidance.

**Designated local bodies and Resilience Partnerships are operating at levels of resourcing which are unsustainable** even for achieving today's ambitions, with significant impacts on staffing, skills development, and training and exercising which are causing real damage to their operational effectiveness. Current resourcing levels are insufficient to deliver existing policy let alone the additional tasks that come with the ambition of the UK being the most Resilient Nation. The key resource deficiencies which need to be addressed are at the heart of the work of the Partnership itself. We have identified five posts<sup>10</sup> which are central to enabling a Partnership to fulfil its current and future roles, addressing the systemic weaknesses we identify in this report and taking on the new tasks we recommend.

But having the people is not enough. Clearly, they need to be trained, competent and confident in their roles. Much of this will lie with individual organisations. But there is one area – multi-agency exercising – where collective funding is needed, where the training is vital to operational effectiveness but where the impact of budget reductions over the past decade means that insufficient training has been undertaken.

We judge that **the sustainable long-term funding package provided by the UK Government to English LRFs<sup>11</sup> should cover as a minimum the costs of the five core posts identified above plus one major multi-agency exercise per year in each LRF**. This should be provided by the UK Government as either ring-fenced funding or specific grant, so that the sums available are visible to all partners. The UK Government should also fund the consequential increases to settlements for the Devolved Administrations. The UK Government should also develop and publish a standard funding formula for the top-up contributions made by those bodies designated as Category 1 responders under the Act. It should be based on the partnership principle that all Category 1 responders contribute their fair share calculated under the funding formula.

---

## Metro Mayors

The Act, its associated Regulations and supporting guidance are silent on the role of Metro Mayors of combined authorities in local resilience-building activity. That is unsurprising, given the relative newness of devolution settlements. But **Metro Mayors are here to stay and have a valuable role which needs to be recognised**. Mayors provide a clearly visible point of local leadership, with significant local agency and authority. They are a major point of democratic accountability. And they have an important role in the work described above on 'Place Based Resilience'.

Every devolution settlement, and hence the powers and responsibilities of each Metro Mayor, is different. And the devolution proposals in the Levelling Up White Paper<sup>12</sup> will add more variation. It is therefore unlikely that there is one solution to how best to recognise the role of Mayors in legislation. But it is important that that is done.

---

## Regional Resilience Structures in England

Arrangements put in place after the abolition of regional resilience structures a decade ago are insufficient to capture the operational and efficiency benefits that could be achieved through cross-border collaboration between Resilience Partnerships, especially in the response to a national emergency such as the COVID-19 pandemic. It is clear that, over the past decade, regional collaboration has progressively eroded. Despite good support from individual Regional Resilience Advisers in DLUHC<sup>13</sup>, which English LRFs were keen to praise, the systemic support provided to regional collaboration by DLUHC is seen as weak.

There are effective regional collaboration arrangements in some parts of England (eg. the South West and North East), but not all. **There are clear operational and efficiency benefits to putting regional collaboration arrangements onto a consistent, secure footing**, underpinned by Regulations associated with the Act and supporting statutory guidance.

---

## UK Government

**The current distribution of stewardship responsibilities for resilience across UK Government departments is widely seen as weak and confusing – and operationally damaging in the response to a major emergency.**

The majority of the VCS organisations we interviewed were clear that DCMS<sup>13</sup>, who have stewardship in the UK Government of the involvement of the VCS in building resilience, have not acted as an effective bridge between government and the VCS on resilience issues. Several pointed out that DCMS officials were recruited and trained for a different set of attributes and skills. Most significantly, however, VCS organisations believed that having an intermediary layer between the Cabinet Office and VCS organisations would always impede operational clarity and effectiveness at the time it was most needed, in an emergency.



Opinion was divided on whether the role should sit in future with DLUHC or the Civil Contingencies Secretariat. But the compelling need for operational clarity in the response to an emergency meant that the majority of interviewees in the VCS and in Resilience Partnerships concluded that **stewardship of the involvement of the VCS in building resilience should be moved from DCMS to the Civil Contingencies Secretariat.**

Similar issues arose in respect of the stewardship role fulfilled by DLUHC of the work of LRFs in England. Effective local-national resilience arrangements need an ‘expert centre’ in the UK Government, with officials who have the knowledge, skills and experience to enable them to interface effectively with staff of LRFs; who have the convening power to join up Whitehall, bringing together and rationalising if necessary commissions from several UK Government departments rather than each sending its own request separately to LRFs; and who, where necessary, have the authority (and courage, built on competence and experience) to intervene with local bodies or Resilience Partnerships who are under-performing. This would include receiving and acting on issues escalated by LRF Chairs, as described above.

Some interviewees saw advantages in keeping the role within DLUHC given their local government stewardship responsibilities. But others pointed out that membership of Resilience Partnerships went well beyond local government, and that other policy priorities would always command greater attention within the department. And here, too, there was a strongly-held view that having an intermediary layer between the Cabinet Office and responders would always impede operational clarity and effectiveness in the response to a major emergency. We believe that **stewardship of local resilience activity in England should be moved from DLUHC to the Civil Contingencies Secretariat.**

The transfer of stewardship roles would go some way to reducing the perceived fuzziness of responsibility and leadership in the UK Government. But there is further to go. A wide range of interviewees, from across all sectors, contrasted the clear vision, visible leadership and drive provided in other areas of national safety and security, especially in cyber security and counter-terrorism, with the more opaque arrangements for the leadership of resilience-building work at UK Government level (although interviewees did comment favourably on arrangements in Scotland). Unfavourable contrasts were also drawn with arrangements in other leading countries, especially the United States, a wide range of EU members and countries in the Asia-Pacific region.

The Scrutiny Committee which considered the draft Civil Contingencies Bill recommended that the then Government gave careful consideration to the establishment of a Civil Contingencies Agency. The Government did not proceed with the recommendation. With the benefit of learning and hindsight, we believe that judgement to have been wrong. We believe that **the time has come for the creation of a single government body which should provide a single, visible point of focus for resilience in the UK. Its leadership should be clear and credible**, visible to those working on resilience in all sectors and to the public, both in normal circumstances and in the leadership of a national emergency. **It should have a clear mandate, with the authority, drive and resources to build UK resilience** across all areas of risk and emergency management.

The precise form of such a body would be for the Prime Minister, acting on the advice of the Cabinet Secretary. It need not follow the form of the National Cyber Security Centre, or of Emergency Management Agencies in other countries, although those have been praised by those we have interviewed. But its desirable attributes would be likely to mean that it was a self-standing body rather than a secretariat of the Cabinet Office, with staff drawn not only from the Civil Service but also from all sectors, who are knowledgeable, experienced and credible with their stakeholders. **It will need the authority, credibility and convening power to join up work across government departments.** It should have corporate governance mechanisms which design in the full and effective involvement of the Devolved Administrations and of representatives of all sectors, as well as providing for independent Non-Executives with substantial experience in risk and emergency management who can provide experience and challenge. Its culture will need to reflect the operational imperatives of risk and, especially, emergency management: agile, flexible, data driven, and delivery- and outcome-focused. And **it should have a demonstrable passion for the pursuit of learning, improvement and excellence.**

**The new body should build two important cultural underpinnings to its work.**

First, a demonstrable desire to reach out to gather and share wisdom and experience, going much wider than the UK Resilience Forum<sup>15</sup>. This is about more than creating ‘talking shops’: **it will be important that the voice and contribution of front-line responders, VCS organisations, businesses and those affected by past emergencies is embedded in the development of policy and operational practice, so that they are grounded in reality and people’s needs.** Counter Terrorism Policing has shown what can be done, in a highly-sensitive area, to reach out not only to statutory bodies but also to VCS organisations, businesses, academics and, most importantly, people who have been personally affected by terrorist incidents, to give them a voice and enable them to make a contribution in the solving of problems, and in the shaping of policy and operational practice. If this can be done for counter-terrorism, we are certain that it can be done for the much less sensitive field of UK resilience.

Second, **the body, and especially its leaders, should seek to rebuild and sustain with stakeholders the spirit of partnership in a shared enterprise.** We heard too many times for comfort that that spirit had been seriously damaged in recent years. We hope that it can be rebuilt.

---

## Doctrine and Guidance

**Effective partnership working between organisations at national, regional and local levels rests heavily on a good understanding by everyone involved of what is to be achieved, and how that should best be done.** Achieving a consistent approach and maximising the effectiveness and efficiency of the combined efforts of everyone involved is fundamental, especially, in the response to an emergency.

**A major contributor to achieving this is having doctrine and guidance that is up-to-date, incorporates good practice, and that all organisations are aware of** and can easily access and navigate. So **it is gravely disappointing that so much of the key resilience doctrine and guidance has not been updated for a decade**, especially the two major pieces of statutory and non-statutory guidance accompanying the Act: Emergency Preparedness<sup>16</sup> and Emergency Response and Recovery<sup>17</sup>. Similarly, Responding to Emergencies: The UK Central Government Response. Concept of Operations<sup>18</sup>, a critical document which sets out UK arrangements for responding to and recovering from emergencies requiring co-ordinated central government action, has not been updated since April 2013.

**Single- and multi-agency doctrine and guidance which act as the spine of coherent resilience-building activity across the resilience community need urgent – and then regular future – updating to ensure that they reflect developments in policy and operational practice and learning.**

The volume of statutory and non-statutory guidance available to local bodies and Resilience Partnerships has grown significantly in the last decade. The absence of a central directory of all the guidance now published by the UK Government and other key bodies means that planners struggle to keep track. The UK Government should develop and publish digitally for use by local bodies, Resilience Partnerships and government departments, a simple map of current doctrine and guidance.

Legal and other developments over the last decade may mean that some areas of non-statutory guidance should now be made statutory. It is clearly important that the way in which services are delivered to meet people's needs are compliant with current law and meet professional standards in the way in which they are delivered. Our judgement is that there is a strong case for substantial changes to the legal status of some doctrine and guidance. One example is whether the emergency co-ordination structures set out in current non-statutory guidance<sup>19</sup> should be made statutory. **The UK Government should examine whether legal and other developments, including the recommendations of public Inquiries, mean that some areas of non-statutory guidance, especially on safeguarding, humanitarian assistance and emergency co-ordination structures, should now be made statutory.**

Terminology – including that which covers important principles and operational practices – varies across the wide range of single- and multi-agency doctrine and guidance. Since 2007, the Civil Contingencies Secretariat has helpfully led on production of a Lexicon of Civil Protection Terminology<sup>20</sup>. But this has not been updated since 2013, is not being used consistently and has become unmanageable and not user-friendly. We recommend that the Lexicon should be refreshed, made a more accessible, user-friendly, reference document, and then used consistently to inform the writing of all single- and multi-agency doctrine and guidance.

## Excellence

We note above that resilience capability and capacity has degraded over the past decade, projects have been started but have not progressed, and good practice in other national security sectors has not been imported. Quality has suffered.

### Skills and Training

Although there is good practice in some sectors, especially the police and fire and rescue services and the NHS, it is clear from our research and interviews that **current arrangements for the definition of the competences<sup>21</sup> required of individuals and teams engaged in resilience-building activities are inconsistent and fall well short of what is needed.**

That is not a position that can continue. In our view, it is the development of human capabilities which will make the greatest contribution to improving UK resilience. **We have therefore identified the need for development of a Competence Strategy and associated Resilience Competence Framework for use by everyone with a substantial role in building UK resilience.**

The Framework would need to cover both individual and team competences and could sensibly build on the previously-issued but rarely used National Occupational Standards, although these would need substantial updating and alignment with competence standards already in place in other sectors and regulatory regimes, and to be made more useable in front-line organisations. Once developed, the Framework should be subject to regular review.

We believe that the task of developing and promoting the Competence Strategy and Framework would, in the short term, fall to the Cabinet Office, working with stakeholders from all sectors, professional bodies, employers and the higher and further education sectors. However, we also recommend that the UK Government should pursue with existing professional bodies whether they would, collectively, wish over time and with Government support to create a governance and regulatory body for UK resilience.

**Implementation of the Competence Strategy and Framework will need the provision of sufficient, high-quality, accredited training to enable individuals and teams to undertake the necessary professional development, along with arrangements for them to demonstrate and validate their competences on a regular basis.** There is a culture of well-structured training and continuous professional development in the emergency services and in the health sector. But this is not seen in all designated local bodies. And often this training is, for understandable reasons, focused on the needs of a particular sector, with limited focus on multi-agency working.

The resilience training that is carried out is now mostly undertaken in Resilience Partnerships. That has many strengths. Training can be locally contextualised. It enables the provision of training to participants whose commitments would otherwise make



it difficult for them to attend training courses at remote establishments. It means that training can be delivered to entire teams. It enables the provision of training to those (eg. in VCS organisations) who would otherwise struggle to arrange or afford their own training. And it is more cost-effective. It is clear that Partnerships are all striving to offer good training on these lines, despite having very limited resources. But they are caught between two areas of UK Government neglect. Despite their best efforts, they cannot on their own and at current levels of resourcing equip everyone with a significant resilience role with the competences they need. But the Government has failed properly to recognise and support the shift to in-house resilience training. The result is a training system that falls a long way short of what is needed, including in the content, quality and format of training offered by the Emergency Planning College which is clearly not addressing the needs of front-line organisations. Each Partnership is developing its own training programmes and materials, with risks of inconsistency as well as the obvious inefficiencies. And there are no arrangements for checking that the training provided is compliant with legislation and doctrine and is up-to-date.

We believe that **there is a compelling need for a fundamental ‘reboot’ of the current resilience training ecosystem, including a fundamental reboot of the Emergency Planning College.** That should be led by the UK Government and be set against the goal of providing the necessary training and development opportunities to allow everyone with a significant resilience role to develop the competences and confidence they need. It should build on good practice seen in other national security fields, including the use of modular courses and digital delivery, and the provision of training to organisations outside the public sector. It should have a heavy emphasis on training being provided in local areas to make it easier for individuals and teams to undertake training and development. That will need to be supported by the provision to Resilience Partnerships of centrally-produced and maintained – and accredited – core training materials which they can adapt and use. And it should be underpinned by a national register of recognised trainers and subject matter experts which Resilience Partnerships can call on.

Similarly, **there are weaknesses in the provision of training to those with senior leadership roles,** covering not only the work they do as individuals but also when working together as a team in the multi-agency leadership of the response to a major emergency. Not all Resilience Partnerships have the resources and capacity to undertake the training they would wish of their command teams. There is no requirement in some sectors for those likely to fill senior leadership positions in the management of an emergency to undertake the necessary training. And **there are no arrangements to assure the collective competence of the command teams whose decisions will have direct consequences for the safety and wellbeing of the people affected by a major emergency.**

**The public will rightly expect the team managing the response to emergencies to be individually and collectively competent in fulfilling its role.** In our view, the National Police Chiefs’ Council has set the benchmark, under which all police forces must have the capability and capacity to deploy trained and approved strategic commanders for

civil emergencies. We recommend that the same standard be applied to all other sectors, so that **senior leaders from Category 1 responder bodies who are expected to be core members of Strategic Co-ordinating Groups in the response to a major emergency should be required to attend a strategic emergency management training course every three years, and subsequently undertake annual CPD<sup>22</sup>, in order to be assessed as ‘approved’ to fulfil that role.** This obligation should be mandated in an amended Act or future legislation and supporting statutory guidance.

We recognise that this will generate a significant increase in the training requirement. We applaud what has been done by the College of Policing to adapt their command team training courses and boost capacity to meet the needs of Resilience Partnerships. In the belief that they (and we hope other accredited training providers so that the provision of training does not rest on a monopoly) will generate sufficient capacity, we recommend that the new training obligation should be phased in over a three-year period. In recognition of the mutuality of the benefit gained, the UK Government should provide specific, time-limited co-funding of the costs.

In other public safety fields, command teams are subject to external assessment and validation regimes. We believe that to be a discipline which should have equal applicability for those managing the response to major emergencies which could cause at least as much, if not more, disruption and harm. We therefore tested with interviewees across a wide range of local bodies whether command teams should be formally ‘accredited’ for their demonstrated competence in the management of the response to major emergencies.

We share the view of the majority of interviewees that there is a need for arrangements by which the collective competence of command teams is demonstrated and assessed. But we suggest that the journey to formal accreditation should be taken as a number of steps. In the near term, the weight of evidence, and what we believe to be reasonable public expectations, point to the introduction of arrangements which stop short of formal accreditation but which do provide for the external assessment of the collective performance of command teams. We therefore recommend that an amended Act or future legislation and supporting statutory guidance should mandate that **core members of Strategic Co-ordinating Groups should undertake at least one command team exercise per year, externally observed and assessed by independent external assessors** against the requirements set out in the Resilience Competence Framework. If collective performance is assessed as being seriously weak in any areas, Resilience Partnerships should be required to put in place an improvement plan and to evidence improvement in the areas that fell short of the expected standard within a given timeframe.

There is an obvious need for civil servants in government departments performing resilience roles to have the knowledge, skills, attitudes and experience – including in emergency management – to perform their roles and to enable them to interface effectively with Resilience Partnerships. The need is given urgency by the substantial evidence we received of serious weaknesses in the competence of staff of UK Government departments engaged in the response to the COVID-19 pandemic, especially their lack of basic understanding of resilience structures and the basic principles of emergency management.

These weaknesses have been identified and are being addressed as part of the work of the Government Skills and Curriculum Unit in the Cabinet Office. However, as with local bodies, it cannot be left to 'best efforts' and chance that at least the core members of departments' emergency management groups, and those who are expected to participate in cross-government emergency management groups, are individually and collectively competent to fulfil their leadership role in the management of major emergencies. **The same disciplines of building and demonstrating individual and collective competence should apply as much to civil servants in UK Government departments as they do to staff of local bodies.**

We therefore recommend that the Resilience Competence Framework described above should set out the competences required of civil servants with resilience roles. Training to allow individuals to achieve those competences should be incorporated into the training provision of the Government Skills and Curriculum Unit and, potentially, the new Leadership College for Government.

As with local bodies, departments must have the capability and capacity to deploy trained and approved civil servants for emergencies requiring a single department or cross-government response. So we recommend that **senior leaders of departments who are expected to be core members of their emergency management groups should be required to attend a strategic emergency management training course every three years, and subsequently undertake annual CPD, in order to be assessed as 'approved' to fulfil that role.** This should be mandated in an amended Act or future legislation and supporting statutory guidance.

These should also mandate that **core members of departmental and cross-government emergency management groups should undertake at least one command team exercise per year, externally observed and assessed by independent external assessors** against the requirements set out in the Resilience Competence Framework. Again, if collective performance is assessed as being seriously weak in any areas, an improvement plan should be put in place with improvement evidenced in the areas that fell short of the expected standard within a given timeframe.

We were particularly mindful of the critical role played by Government Ministers and Special Advisers in the response to emergencies. It is vital that they too have a basic understanding of resilience structures at national level and the role and status of Strategic Co-ordinating Groups at local level, along with the basic principles of emergency management. We therefore recommend that **the UK Government should consider how best to support Ministers in the development of the emergency management competences they need to lead a single department or cross-government response to a major emergency. Identified Ministers should also ideally undertake at least one cross-government command team exercise per year.**

## Links with Academic Institutions

Higher education institutions (HEIs) have an important role to play, in the education of people who work, or wish to work, in the resilience field, and in the contribution they can make from their research to the development of policy and operational practice. We therefore interviewed a number of HEIs on the courses they taught, the research they conducted, and especially the level of their engagement with the UK Government and Resilience Partnerships, to establish whether there was an effective two-way flow of information and learning.

HEIs consistently identified two areas of concern. First, the lack of a national Resilience Competence Framework for use in the development of courses and materials was seen as a barrier to ensuring that students were equipped with the right skills and knowledge to meet the needs of their future employers. Clearly, the Resilience Competence Framework, once produced, should be made available to HEIs to inform their course design and teaching.

The second and more significant gap was the absence of any meaningful engagement by the UK Government with HEIs. As a result, HEIs were not always sure, and felt unable readily to check, that their materials were up-to-date with government policy thinking or operational good practice. And **the UK Government is clearly not exploiting the contribution which HEIs can make through their research to the development of policy and operational practice. We recommend that the Civil Contingencies Secretariat should establish and promote a formal engagement mechanism with HEIs** seeking advice on current resilience policy and operational practice, or who wish to pursue or promote research of benefit to UK resilience.

In contrast, the evidence from our interviews suggested that contacts between HEIs and Resilience Partnerships are stronger. There has been an observable recent development in linkages between Partnerships and HEIs in the same local area. But there was a general acceptance that there was scope for doing more, especially in areas where HEIs can offer analytical expertise in the development of risk assessments and emergency plans to more fully reflect local demographic, socio-economic and other data and information which they hold.

HEI research leads also noted that there was no single government department collating data on research topics which the UK Government and local bodies wished to see pursued, and then working with research funding bodies to commission this research. We recommend that the Civil Contingencies Secretariat should collate from across central government departments and Resilience Partnerships a list of those UK resilience issues which would benefit from further research and pursue this with HEIs and research funding bodies.



## A Centre of Resilience Excellence

One clear overarching conclusion, drawn out in interviews across all sectors, is that, in the resilience field, the **UK Government has focused heavily over the past decade on processes and products at the expense of people**. It has not sufficiently invested in the knowledge base, occupational competence instruments, quality mechanisms and – above all – the visible signalling which encourages the pursuit of excellence in UK resilience. We have therefore tested in interviews the value of adopting in the resilience field the mechanism classically used in other fields, including other areas of national security, which wish to pursue and embed professionalism and quality – the creation of a Centre of Excellence.

### **We believe there is a pressing need to create a Centre of Resilience Excellence (CORE).**

We found widespread support for this concept. Its functions could include: leading the development of the Resilience Competence Framework and the fundamental transformation of the resilience training ecosystem we recommend above; providing specific training courses and command team exercising; more broadly, overseeing the availability of training courses and command team training and exercising across all providers in the UK; developing and making available to Resilience Partnerships a national register of recognised trainers, subject matter experts and providers of multi-agency emergency management training; facilitating mentoring, coaching and secondment opportunities; acting as a point of engagement for HEIs, including making connections between HEIs and Resilience Partnerships; collating and promoting ‘Areas of Research Interest’ and analysing, synthesising and disseminating the findings of relevant UK and international research and lessons identified reports; creating and maintaining doctrine and guidance and a Knowledge Hub of reference materials; and providing thought leadership on resilience in the UK.

It would be wrong for the CORE to operate within its own silo. It needs to work with HEIs and a wide range of government training institutions, including not only the Emergency Planning College, College of Policing and the Fire Service College but also, for example, the Defence Academy and the Diplomatic Academy. There is clear value in drawing on academic teaching and research disciplines, as well as cross-fertilisation of training between different institutions and cultures, especially between the ‘civilian’ and ‘military’ fields, and between ‘home’ and ‘overseas’ experience and practice.

That means that it is unlikely that a Centre of Resilience Excellence could become self-financing. But, whilst it would need a small physical ‘head office’, we believe that, as well as its digital presence, its ability to draw on geographically-distributed hubs – both government sites and possibly those of HEIs – would sharply reduce costs whilst radically increasing engagement.

**Creation of a Centre of Resilience Excellence would provide the visible signalling which encourages the pursuit of excellence in delivering the resilience agenda.** In that vein, we believe that the creation of the CORE as part of the newly-created UK College for National Security<sup>23</sup> would be highly beneficial, provided that it was genuinely open to and

able to meet the needs of all sectors – public, private, voluntary and community – and not just the UK Government as the current proposal implies. It should also be able to build strong linkages to, and possibly joint ventures with, HEIs not only on teaching but also, and especially, on research and learning.

---

### Building a Learning and Continuous Improvement Culture

We heard from a wide range of interviewees that **there is limited evidence at a national or local level of a learning and continuous improvement culture**. This was sometimes portrayed as being due to a lack of time and resources. But, more worryingly, it was also attributed to a fundamental lack of desire to disturb the status quo, or to a perception that there was nothing to learn from others, including from international experience.

Interviewees particularly expressed their frustration that, despite the creation of Joint Organisational Learning (JOL) Online, which aims to collate and highlight lessons from exercises and emergencies, **there is still not a systematic process to make sure that debriefs consistently take place following exercises and emergencies, that lessons identified are shared widely, and that they are then adopted and embedded in all relevant organisations and operational practices**.

The development of a culture of continuous, systematic learning and improvement is well-trodden ground in other fields, with substantial experience which can be drawn into UK resilience. We recommend that, as the first two steps in turning perceptions around, **the Cabinet Office should signal the need for, and encouragement of, a learning and continuous improvement culture; and demonstrate that commitment by putting in place systematic arrangements for its promotion and pursuit, led by the Centre of Resilience Excellence**.

### Validation and Assurance

The need for effective validation and assurance arrangements in an area of such significance for people's safety and wellbeing has been widely accepted over the past 20 years. There is established practice in some risk areas, and in some sectors. But those arrangements do not cover all local bodies, all risks, or Resilience Partnerships as a whole.

Our interviews with front-line organisations and Resilience Partnerships brought out clearly that they would welcome arrangements through which it was possible to assess their performance and identify areas for improvement. And there was widespread agreement on the need for the results of all those assessments to be brought together by the UK Government into an overall assessment of the quality of resilience in the UK, areas of best practice on which Resilience Partnerships could draw, areas for system-wide improvement – and, especially, of how ready the UK is to tackle risks and respond effectively to emergencies.

**Current validation and assurance arrangements are wholly inadequate** against those goals. Performance standards have progressively developed over the period since 2010 but, critically, have no teeth. There are no current systematic, routine arrangements to monitor the performance of all bodies with legal duties, and of the way in which those bodies act in partnership. As far as we have been able to establish, at no stage has the UK Government used its powers in law to take formal intervention action with a designated local body or with a Resilience Partnership overall on performance grounds. And **there are no systematic arrangements in place to generate an assessment in the centre of government of the overall quality of resilience in the UK, for use by UK Government Ministers and the UK Parliament.**

We recommend improvements in two areas: to Resilience Standards, so that they are crystal clear about ‘what good looks like’; and more significantly on performance monitoring arrangements.

### Resilience Standards

The National Resilience Standards published in 2020 have been widely welcomed. It is clear that they are being used in self-assessment by Resilience Partnerships and local bodies. They provide a sound basis for assessing performance. But they could usefully be crisper. And they need to be precise on the legal force of each of the three sub-sets of performance measures (“must/should/could”) against each Standard. Once revised, they should be adopted consistently by HMICFRS<sup>24</sup> and CQC<sup>25</sup> in their inspection regimes.

The fundamental gap which needs to be addressed is that, in the same way as UK Government departments do not have resilience duties in law, so there are effectively no standards governing their performance. This weakness matters and needs to be addressed, especially given the widespread criticisms we received about their competence in the management of the response to the COVID-19 pandemic. We recommend above that departments should be subject to the same set of legal duties as local bodies. We can see no valid reason why the performance of UK Government departments against their duties should not similarly be assessed against defined standards, which capture their vital leadership role in many areas of risk and emergency management. We recommend that **the UK Government should develop and publish additional Resilience Standards covering the performance of UK Government departments.**

The Act has provision for both the monitoring of performance and enforcement. But they are limited in their scope: statutory guidance supporting the Act makes clear the expectation that the powers would be narrowly and infrequently used. Unsurprisingly, as far as we have been able to establish, they have never been used.

Although useful, self-assessment by local bodies, Resilience Partnerships and UK Government departments against the Resilience Standards is simply not sufficient. As many front-line organisations have pointed out to us, there is a risk of organisations ‘marking their own homework’. And the single-agency inspection regimes managed by HMICFRS

and CQC, although valuable, do not provide an assessment of the performance of all designated bodies acting in partnership. Ultimately, **a genuinely rigorous performance monitoring regime requires external, independent review**, drawing on people with expertise and experience, looking across the activities of the entire Resilience Partnership or government department, against well-defined standards.

We therefore recommend that **multi-agency validation should be undertaken by a new team hosted by the Civil Contingencies Secretariat, staffed by experienced, knowledgeable practitioners who will carry credibility with those with whom they deal**. The team need not be large. The focus of validation reviews should be on learning and improvement, with reviews conducted in a spirit of collaboration with the Resilience Partnership or department so that recommendations are more readily accepted and acted upon. Reviews would thus ideally be conducted at the request of and in support of the Chair of the Partnership or head of the government department concerned, **with each Partnership or department being the subject of validation at least every three years**. The local government Sector-Led Improvement model most closely mirrors the improvement regime we recommend.

In the same spirit, the reports of validation reviews should be provided in narrative form. And the multi-agency team should not walk away after their reviews but should instead be capable of providing support to Resilience Partnerships and departments in their improvement programmes, especially in signposting sources of best practice or expertise.

**The Standards and their associated validation and assurance arrangements should be given status in law so that they provide a sound basis for assessing performance against legal duties and for driving improvement, and provide a stronger underpinning to the current weak provisions for monitoring and enforcement in the current Act.**

## Accountability

To support the increased emphasis on quality, **there is a compelling need for greater clarity on accountability for quality**, not only to political oversight and scrutiny arrangements at local and national levels but also to the British people and to future Inquiries.

**There is a substantial ‘democratic deficit’ in the resilience field.** The Act provides for only UK Government Ministers to have monitoring powers. There is an absence of recognition of the role and value of local political oversight and scrutiny mechanisms provided not only by local authority scrutiny committees but also by Police and Crime Commissioners, introduced over a decade ago, and more recently by Mayors of combined authorities. This is a significant weakness which needs to be addressed.

There is a similar gap in political accountability to the UK Parliament. The Act and its associated Regulations and supporting guidance are silent on the role of the UK Parliament or the provision of support by the UK Government to Parliamentary scrutiny. Our research suggests that Parliamentary scrutiny since 2004 has mainly been confined to reviews of



the response to particular emergencies after the emergencies have occurred and inevitably with a scope confined narrowly to the particular risk event. There have been valuable reviews with a wider scope carried out by Committees of the House of Lords, especially that by the Select Committee on Risk Assessment and Risk Planning. But there appear to be no arrangements which provide for the systematic, forward-looking review by the UK Parliament of the quality of resilience arrangements in the UK overall, across all identified risks and covering all aspects of resilience.

Our strongly-held belief, reinforced by the clear view of those we interviewed, is that **the quality of resilience in the UK would be greatly reinforced by stronger political oversight and scrutiny at all levels, and by enabling people and communities to scrutinise and challenge what public bodies are doing in their name.** That leads us to recommend new legislative provisions on executive accountability, and clearly defined obligations on designated bodies to support democratic accountability arrangements.

### Executive Accountability

The designation of Accountable Officers is a discipline already well embedded for some risks covered by local and national risk assessments. And it is widely used in other fields where the safety and wellbeing of people is a key consideration, such as the health sector.

There is no such clarity on the personal accountability of the heads of most bodies with duties under the Act for the way in which their organisations fulfil their responsibilities across all of the work of the Resilience Partnership. As our interviews showed, Chairs of Resilience Partnerships and others judged that the weight of responsibility and accountability is not felt and respected in all cases and seen in the actions of senior leaders. We therefore recommend that **the Act and its associated Regulations should not only designate local bodies with legal duties but also make clear that the heads of those bodies have personal accountability for the performance of their organisations against those duties and associated standards.**

Equally, we believe that UK Government departments should be subject to the same disciplines of accountability for their performance, to the UK Parliament. **Ministers and Accounting Officers of designated departments should have personal accountability for the performance of their organisations against the duties placed on their departments and associated standards** captured in an amended Act or future legislation.

Given current machinery of government structures and roles, **accountability for cross-government activity should sit with the National Security Adviser or a nominated Deputy who should be appointed as the ‘UK Government Chief Resilience Officer’, a single, identifiable senior official who cares and is seen to care about the quality of resilience in the UK.** The postholder should have responsibility for the quality and effectiveness of resilience-building activity across the UK, including that undertaken in central government departments and (subject to respecting the scope of devolved powers) by designated local bodies and Resilience Partnerships. **He or she would be directly responsible for the new**

**multi-agency validation team** described above. **He or she would act as effective ‘head of profession’** until new independent governance and regulation arrangements were put in place. **The postholder should bring substantial operational experience of working in a front-line role in the resilience field and have credibility across all sectors.** The accountability of the postholder and of a designated Cabinet Office Minister for the quality of resilience in the UK should be set out in an amended Act or future legislation.

---

### The Obligation to Support Local Political Accountability

There is already a range of local political oversight and scrutiny mechanisms, often involving members of the public, including local authority scrutiny committees, Health and Wellbeing Boards, Police and Crime Panels and, to the degree that they are covered by devolution settlements, oversight structures maintained by Mayors and combined authorities.

These mechanisms cover most of the local bodies with duties under the Act, so that there is no obvious immediate need to create new political oversight structures. But we would recommend that Mayors, Elected Members, Police and Crime Commissioners and other elected or co-opted individuals come together to undertake multi-agency scrutiny of the multi-agency work of a Resilience Partnership.

To close the current gap, we recommend that **the valuable role of local democratic engagement, oversight and scrutiny arrangements, and the obligation on bodies designated with duties under the Act to support those arrangements, should be set out clearly in an amended Act or future legislation and supporting guidance.** We also recommend that the reports of multi-agency validation reviews of the work of Resilience Partnerships, together with the Action Plan agreed by the Partnership, should be published locally, for the information of the public and for use in local political scrutiny.

---

### The Obligation to Support Accountability to the UK Parliament

By extension, we recommend that **the important oversight and scrutiny role of the UK Parliament, and the obligation on the UK Government to support Parliament and its Select Committees in their work, should be set out clearly in an amended Act or future legislation and supporting guidance.** This should include details of the documentation that departments should provide to Parliament and its Select Committees.

At departmental level, documentation should include Sector Security and Resilience Plans produced by Lead Government Departments as part of their pursuit of sector-wide resilience in the sectors they sponsor. It should also include the departmental validation reviews, and resulting Action Plans, described earlier.

The House of Lords Select Committee recommended that annual reports on UK resilience be signed off by Ministers and laid before Parliament for debate<sup>26</sup>. We believe that that obligation should be captured in law, and that **the UK Government should provide an annual ‘Resilience Report’ to the UK Parliament, prepared by the UK Government Chief**

**Resilience Officer and submitted by the Cabinet Office Minister to Parliament.** This should provide for Parliamentary review and scrutiny a summary assessment of the findings of validation reviews of Resilience Partnerships and of UK Government departments conducted in the year, together with agreed Action Plans; a report on the findings of any lessons identified reviews carried out during the year and progress in the implementation and embedding of lessons of all past reviews; a description of progress on the main risk reduction and emergency preparedness programmes, including the major programmes within individual sectors; and a summary analysis of the current state of UK resilience.

---

### **The Role of the National Audit Office**

The National Audit Office (NAO) has widely drawn powers under the National Audit Act 1983 to examine the economy, efficiency and effectiveness with which government bodies have used their resources and to report the results of this work to the UK Parliament. Against a backdrop of an increasing focus on risk and resilience, we have discussed with the NAO the application of its powers to the scrutiny of the UK Government's work on building resilience in the UK.

The NAO already covers resilience as appropriate in its routine scrutiny of departments, but we invite the Comptroller and Auditor General to take account of departmental Sector Security and Resilience Plans, together with the UK Government's annual Resilience Report to the UK Parliament, to inform decisions about future examinations by the National Audit Office and its scrutiny of resilience-building work in the UK.



---

## SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

The recommendations from our main report are reproduced below. Recommendations that may require new or amended primary legislation are shown in **blue**.

---

### Chapter 3: What is Resilience and a Truly Resilient Nation?

**Recommendation 1:** An amended Act or future legislation, and associated Regulations, should set risk reduction and prevention activities on an equal basis with emergency preparedness, enabling the full range of risk management action at national and local levels.

**Recommendation 2:** An amended Act or future legislation should include a new duty on risk reduction and prevention placed on all Category 1 responders.

**Recommendation 3:** The execution of the new duty on risk reduction and prevention should be addressed in new statutory and non-statutory guidance, aligned to the Sendai Framework, Sustainable Development Goals and the Paris Agreement.

**Recommendation 4:** The UK Government should put in place mechanisms to gather metrics, at UK and locality level, to allow progress in building UK resilience to be tracked, and to provide data into the UN Disaster Risk Reduction programme.

**Recommendation 5:** The role of Resilience Partnerships should be expanded to cover risk reduction and prevention as well as emergency preparedness, response and recovery.

**Recommendation 6:** The UK Government should encourage and support localities in the development of Local Resilience Strategies which seek to build deeper societal resilience, drawing on the work of the London, Greater Manchester and Hampshire and Isle of Wight Resilience Partnerships. Statutory guidance should reflect the role of Resilience Partnerships in leading or providing significant support to the development of Local Resilience Strategies.

---

### Chapter 4: Involving the Whole of Society

**Recommendation 7:** Statutory guidance on the execution of the Emergency Planning duty should be fundamentally revised to put people first, through a move to needs-based planning. It should be re-developed around a main theme of identifying the consequences for people of major emergencies and their potential physical, social, psychological





and economic needs; and then using that analysis as the basis for determining which organisations are best placed to meet those needs, from whichever sector, subject to the necessary safeguards. It should embed existing good practice developed in some Resilience Partnerships on the identification and recording of potential contributions through the use of a Capability Matrix and other similar tools, and then ensuring that contributors are trained and plans are tested in exercises involving the organisations concerned. Relevant Regulations on the execution of the duty should be revised to adopt a human-centred rather than process-based approach.

**Recommendation 8:** The formula in Regulations by which designated local bodies are required to ‘have regard to’ the capabilities of the VCS in carrying out their duty on emergency planning should be abolished. Regulations associated with an amended Act or future legislation should provide for VCS organisations to have partnership status in the resilience-building activities of local bodies, Resilience Partnerships and central government departments. Engagement of the VCS in resilience-building at local level should be captured in a new Resilience Standard.

**Recommendation 9:** Statutory guidance to the Act or successor legislation should promote the development and use by Resilience Partnerships of a Capability Matrix to capture the skills and capabilities potentially available from local VCS organisations, for use in emergency planning and response.

**Recommendation 10:** Statutory guidance to the Act or successor legislation should include much fuller information on the broader range of VCS organisations, and their skills and capabilities, which experience has shown to have an important contribution to make in the response to a major emergency.

**Recommendation 11:** The VCSEP should be invited to work with Resilience Partnerships and VCS partners iteratively to test and develop the concept of a National Capability Matrix of the VCS organisations, and their skills and capabilities, which operate on a national or regional basis, able to be used by Resilience Partnerships and VCS organisations as a shared online resource.

**Recommendation 12:** We welcome the intention of the VCSEP to provide a ‘brokering’ facility by which local bodies and Resilience Partnerships can identify VCS organisations, and which VCS organisations locally can use to more easily signpost and navigate partners to offer support, in the response to a major emergency.

**Recommendation 13:** The UK Government should work with the VCSEP to identify specific functional areas where joint, common and consistent training between local bodies and VCS organisations would have operational and efficiency benefits.

**Recommendation 14 (linked to Recommendation 84):** The core training materials provided to local bodies, Resilience Partnerships and government departments for adaptation and use in their own in-house training should be made equally available to VCS organisations for their own use should they wish.

**Recommendation 15:** Statutory guidance to the Act or successor legislation should continue to encourage local bodies and Resilience Partnerships to involve VCS organisations in relevant in-house training and exercising.

**Recommendation 16:** Statutory guidance to the Act or successor legislation should include a model for the engagement of the VCS (and other) organisations based on the principle of ‘Putting People First’ by focusing on the outcome to be achieved – of providing effective support to those affected by the emergency.

**Recommendation 17:** Statutory guidance to the Act or successor legislation should make clear that it is for VCS organisations themselves to select the Chairs of any sub-groups led by the VCS or their representatives on other committees set up by Resilience Partnerships.

**Recommendation 18:** The UK Government should recognise the potential mutual benefits provided by the VCSEP by co-resourcing its annual operating costs.

**Recommendation 19:** The UK Government should develop with business a formal Business Sector Resilience Partnership focusing on resilience matters. This should supplement existing business engagement arrangements managed by Lead Government Departments within their sectors and focus on wide-scale national risks and common and cross-cutting issues. Participation should go widely, to cover business representative bodies and a wide spread of businesses and business resilience-focused consultancies. Its work should be operationally-focused, and cover the assessment of risks and their consequences, risk reduction, the mitigations which might be put in place to address the impacts of emergencies on businesses, and the contribution which businesses might make in the response to major emergencies.

**Recommendation 20:** The Business Sector Resilience Partnership should be supported by a Business Resilience Team in the Civil Contingencies Secretariat, responsible for leading cross-government work with business on resilience matters. Its work should include ensuring that each Lead Government Department in its resilience-building activity has an established programme of engagement with businesses in the sectors it sponsors, and that cross-cutting issues raised by individual sectors are acted on where necessary. It should also support the Devolved Administrations and Resilience Partnerships in their engagement with businesses in their areas.

**Recommendation 21:** There should be a new chapter in statutory guidance dedicated to business involvement in building the resilience of the UK. Engagement of the business sector in resilience-building should be captured in a new Resilience Standard.

**Recommendation 22:** The Business Sector Resilience Partnership should, as a first early priority, co-develop and disseminate information and advice on risks, their consequences and response plans targeted on meeting the needs of businesses, for their use in organisational resilience and business continuity planning.

**Recommendation 23:** A second early priority for the Business Sector Resilience Partnership should be the development of a National Capability Matrix of the skills, assets and capabilities offered by businesses which operate on a national and regional basis for use in the response to major emergencies.

**Recommendation 24:** The UK Government should explore, including with the National Consortium for Societal Resilience [UK+], how Resilience Partnerships can be provided with the practical hands-on peer support and advice they need to enable them to promote community resilience development in their areas.

**Recommendation 25:** The UK Government should include advice in statutory guidance on community participation in formal training and exercising activities organised at Resilience Partnership level, including advice on the appropriate legal and safeguarding issues.

**Recommendation 26 (linked to Recommendation 69):** The UK Government should encourage the Community Resilience Co-ordinators in each Resilience Partnership to form a network to enable the provision of peer support as well as the effective and timely sharing of information and best practice.

**Recommendation 27:** A new duty should be added to an amended Act or future legislation requiring designated local and national bodies to promote and support community resilience, with delivery of the duty at local level being co-ordinated through Resilience Partnerships, and nationally through the Civil Contingencies Secretariat. Key elements of the successful execution of the duty should be clearly articulated in Regulations associated with the Act and developed further in a dedicated Chapter in statutory guidance. The National Resilience Standard for Community Resilience Development should be updated accordingly, to provide a clear roadmap for Resilience Partnerships to fulfil the requirements of the duty and build their own capabilities to support local activity.

---

## Chapter 5: Who Should Have Duties?

**Recommendation 28:** All existing Category 1 organisations should remain designated in Schedule 1 of the Act or successor legislation, except that the designation of NHS bodies should be reviewed once the Health and Care Bill has received Royal Assent. There are strong arguments for Integrated Care Boards to be designated as Category 1 responders; and for mental health Trusts to be placed on the same footing as acute Trusts.

**Recommendation 29:** The full suite of Category 1 responder duties should be placed on the organisations currently designated under the Act as Co-operating Bodies (Category 2 responders). The UK Government should pursue and capture in statutory guidance ways in which the additional burdens of fulfilling the new duties might be reduced, for example by activity undertaken at multi-LRF / regional level.

**Recommendation 30:** The full suite of Category 1 responder duties should be placed on the UK Government. Associated Regulations and statutory guidance should set out the roles, responsibilities and accountabilities of relevant departments and agencies in the



implementation of those duties, differentiating clearly between the Cabinet Office, Lead Government Departments and other departments and agencies who act in support.

**Recommendation 31:** The UK Government should consider with the organisations concerned whether the Animal and Plant Health Agency, the Food Standards Agency, the Meteorological Office, Inland Drainage Boards, operators of COMAH and REPPiR sites, the UK Oil Pipeline System, the Oil and Pipelines Agency, The Crown Estate, and St John Ambulance and other charitable ambulance services should be considered for addition to the Schedule of designated bodies with legal duties under the Act or successor legislation.

**Recommendation 32:** The status of the British Red Cross as an auxiliary to the UK Government, and its particular and valuable capabilities in planning, needs assessment and humanitarian assistance for emergencies, especially those which occur overseas, should be recognised in statutory guidance.

**Recommendation 33:** There remains no case for the designation of the Armed Forces with duties under the Act or successor legislation. But the UK Government should review the contribution which should be made by the Armed Forces, alongside all other parts of society, to the response to future national, wide-scale catastrophic emergencies and, if appropriate, take the conclusions into future legislation and statutory guidance.

---

## Chapter 6: Duties Under the Current Civil Contingencies Act

**Recommendation 34:** The risk assessment duty in the Act remains fit for purpose and should remain at the core of resilience activity in the UK.

**Recommendation 35:** The current two-year timeline for the National Security Risk Assessment does not provide a sound platform for effective resilience-building activity at national and local levels. It does not sufficiently inform planning and capability-building for emerging societal hazards, especially those with complex cascading and compounding effects across multiple sectors, and including chronic risks which might worsen over an extended period of time. Nor is it an adequate basis for long-term policy-making or investment decisions for risk reduction and prevention projects which will be implemented over several years. Risk assessment should be returned to the previous practice of having separate assessments that look ahead for five years and twenty years respectively, to enable longer-term prevention and preparedness activity.

**Recommendation 36:** Risk assessment at national and local levels should identify and analyse areas where risks are likely to arise concurrently, either because of the cascading and compounding consequences of a major emergency or because likelihood assessment identifies a significant potential for simultaneous emergencies.

**Recommendation 37:** The UK Government should use the new Situation Centre as the hub of a network providing relevant, rapid and dynamic analysis of emerging and changing risks to Resilience Partnerships and the Devolved Administrations as well as central government departments.



**Recommendation 38:** The UK Government should radically re-imagine and simplify the risk assessment process. Changes to risk assessment methodology should be introduced only after discussion with Resilience Partnerships and the Devolved Administrations and where they make a material difference to the placing of risks in the risk matrix, and hence to the prioritisation of actions taken to address them. When the methodology changes, the Government should provide full support to Resilience Partnerships to ensure that they understand the reasons for the changes, can effectively apply the new methodology and that the assessment of risks is consistent. Relevant national risks which draw on expertise best accessed at national level should be assessed once, at national level, with the results passed to Resilience Partnerships for taking into their local risk assessments, adapted if necessary to reflect local variations in likelihood or impact.

**Recommendation 39:** Except where there are compelling national security reasons for not doing so, the main components of the National Security Risk Assessment should be provided to Resilience Partnerships via a digital platform which allows the ability for local data interrogation and extraction. The UK Government should provide via the digital platform standard tools and templates, including those needed to explore the impact of concurrency, which Resilience Partnerships can adapt and use in taking the national methodology into local risk assessments.

**Recommendation 40:** To enable the better sharing of the National Security Risk Assessment (NSRA), the UK Government should consider the identification in the document of the specific passages which are classified rather than having a single uniform classification for the document as a whole. The NSRA should include clear and unequivocal guidance for document handlers on the level of security clearance (if any) needed for those who wish to access and use the information it contains.

**Recommendation 41:** The emergency planning duty in the Act or successor legislation should remain at the core of resilience-building activity in the UK.

**Recommendation 42:** The business continuity management duty in the Act or successor legislation should be amended to move to the concept of organisational resilience.

**Recommendation 43:** Resilience Standards should be updated to reflect the move to organisational resilience. The effectiveness and coverage of organisational resilience planning should be included in validation and assurance arrangements.

**Recommendation 44:** The duty in the Act on local authorities to provide advice and assistance on business continuity management to business and voluntary sector organisations in their area should be abolished. The UK Government should build on the opportunity and learning from the response to the COVID-19 pandemic to rethink from first principles the Standard to be promoted, the audiences that are best placed to receive and act on advice, the wide range of channels (including government bodies) for reaching those audiences, and the most efficient and consistent way of providing advice which supports the objective of improving the resilience of businesses and voluntary organisations.

**Recommendation 45:** The two public information duties in the Act – to raise the awareness of the public on risks and plans, and to warn and inform the public in the event of an emergency – remain fit for purpose.

**Recommendation 46:** The UK Government should amend Regulations associated with the Act or successor legislation and supporting statutory guidance to ensure that there is a clear separation between the public awareness duty (information shared in advance of an emergency) and the warning and informing duty (information shared when an emergency occurs or is imminent). Statutory guidance should contain a chapter on each duty.

**Recommendation 47:** The UK Government and designated local bodies (co-ordinated through Resilience Partnerships) should publish significantly more detail on risk scenarios, their potential consequences and the broad nature of emergency plans, at both national and local level. Statutory guidance should amplify the main categories of information which should be made available under the Public Awareness Duty.

**Recommendation 48:** There should be a presumption of publication of material on risks and their consequences, including that in the National Security Risk Assessment, and on national and local planning unless there are clear and justifiable national security or commercial reasons not to do so. Where there is a question about the release of information on security or other grounds, sensitivities should be balanced against the public interest in releasing material if doing so would make a material contribution to the safety and wellbeing of those likely to be affected by an emergency.

**Recommendation 49:** The UK Government should abolish Regulations 27 and 30 warning against causing undue alarm when communicating with the public.

**Recommendation 50:** Government and designated local bodies (co-ordinated through Resilience Partnerships) should ensure that the information they publish about risks, consequences and plans is designed, presented and actively promoted in a way which supports the public, businesses and voluntary and community organisations in their own planning. This should include the ability to support sustained local and national media campaigns.

**Recommendation 51:** The UK Government should draw on its experience of communicating with the public in other areas of public policy to identify the most effective ways of presenting information about risks to different audiences and share this with Resilience Partnerships.

**Recommendation 52:** The UK Government should identify with Resilience Partnerships those areas where the development of information once, at national level, would mean that the information provided to the public was consistent and reduce the duplication of effort at local level, allowing Resilience Partnerships to focus on the development of material tailored to local circumstances.

**Recommendation 53:** Information should be provided in a form which is easy to digest, navigate and interrogate, and to extract. The UK Government should discuss with Resilience Partnerships the development of a shared web presence to hold both national and local content, including hosting it on the GOV.UK platform.

**Recommendation 54:** The UK Government should work with Resilience Partnerships to develop, and then consistently use, a single 'brand' for resilience information in the UK.

**Recommendation 55:** The information sharing duty in the Act remains fit for purpose for supporting the sharing of information between designated bodies at local level.

**Recommendation 56:** In refreshing statutory guidance on the information sharing duty, the UK Government should ensure that it aligns with the latest Government Security Classification scheme.

**Recommendation 57:** Resilience Partnerships should use the updated guidance on the information sharing duty to ensure that they have the necessary security-cleared and trained personnel, and information security arrangements, in place to effectively support multi-agency sharing of information.

**Recommendation 58:** The UK Government should review the role, use and user-friendliness of ResilienceDirect with designated local responders and make the necessary improvements.

**Recommendation 59:** The UK Government should consider the need for additional Regulations, with supporting statutory guidance, covering the information sharing mechanisms to be used between designated bodies at national level, and between designated local and national bodies.

**Recommendation 60:** The UK Government should pursue with the Information Commissioner the creation of an exemption in the Data Protection Act 2018 or successor legislation explicitly to allow for the sharing of personal data during emergencies in cases of urgent humanitarian necessity.

**Recommendation 61:** Legal provisions and principles on the sharing of personal data, including guidance provided by or agreed with the Information Commissioner and any new exemption in Data Protection legislation, should be captured in updated guidance and training for staff in those organisations most likely to face decisions on sharing personal data during the response to a major emergency.

**Recommendation 62:** Additional Regulations, with supporting statutory guidance, should specify the co-operation mechanisms to be used between designated bodies at national level, and between designated local and national bodies.

## Chapter 7: Structures

**Recommendation 63:** The current geographical basis for Local Resilience Forums in England and Wales should be sustained. There would be value in the Scottish Government reviewing roles and responsibilities of Partnerships in Scotland at local, regional and national levels, drawing on learning across the four UK Nations.

**Recommendation 64:** LRFs in England and Wales, and RRP in Scotland, should continue as a partnership of organisations, including those with duties in law.

**Recommendation 65:** The UK Government should establish stronger arrangements for administrative escalation to, and timely intervention and enforcement action by, the sponsoring central government department in the case of sustained under-performance by a designated local body. This function, and the processes to be followed, should be clearly set out in Regulations and statutory guidance.

**Recommendation 66:** The UK Government should as an early priority discuss and agree with Devolved Administrations and English LRFs a formal document which sets out the future role of local bodies and of Resilience Partnerships, and expectations on the way in which they will discharge that role. It should subsequently reflect the revised framework in changes to the Act or successor legislation, associated Regulations and supporting statutory and non-statutory guidance.

**Recommendation 67:** The Chairs of Resilience Partnerships should continue to be appointed from the senior leadership of local bodies designated under the Act or successor legislation.

**Recommendation 68:** Decisions on who should chair Resilience Partnerships are properly a decision for the partners involved. But the Co-Chair model appears to have significant advantages which the UK Government should discuss further with the Devolved Administrations and English LRFs. Depending on the outcome, the Co-Chair model could be included in a subsequent revision of statutory guidance.

**Recommendation 69:** A sustainable long-term funding package for LRFs in England would cover as a minimum the costs of a core team of five posts and one major multi-agency exercise each year in each LRF. This should be provided by the UK Government as either ring-fenced funding or specific grant, so that the sums available are visible to all partners. The UK Government should also fund the consequential increases to settlements for the Devolved Administrations.

**Recommendation 70:** The UK Government should, working with English LRFs, develop and publish a standard funding formula for the top-up contributions made by those bodies designated as Category 1 responders under the Act or successor legislation. It should be based on the partnership principle that all Category 1 responders contribute their fair share calculated under the funding formula.



**Recommendation 71:** The valuable role of Metro Mayors should be recognised in an amended Act or future legislation, associated Regulations and supporting statutory guidance.

**Recommendation 72:** The value of regional collaboration between LRFs in England should be recognised, reinforced and put onto a consistent, secure footing. LRFs should decide their chosen forms of regional collaboration. The need for regional collaboration forums, and the potential scope of their activity, should be captured in Regulations associated with the Act, and in supporting statutory guidance. Support should be provided by the government department with lead responsibility for the stewardship of local resilience activity, and by the core team in each LRF.

**Recommendation 73:** Multi-SCG Response Co-ordinating Groups enabling cross-boundary collaboration between Strategic Co-ordinating Groups at local level continue to have a vital role in the emergency response framework for national emergencies. Their value in such emergencies should be recognised, and the government department with lead responsibility for the stewardship of local resilience activity should support local areas in their activation and use.

**Recommendation 74 (linked to Recommendation 76):** UK Government stewardship of the involvement of the VCS in building UK resilience should rest with the Civil Contingencies Secretariat or any successor organisation.

**Recommendation 75 (linked to Recommendation 76):** UK Government stewardship of local resilience activity should rest with the Civil Contingencies Secretariat or any successor organisation.

**Recommendation 76:** UK Government stewardship of all UK resilience-building activity should be led by a single government body which provides:

- A single, visible point of focus for resilience in the UK
- Clear, credible leadership, visible to those working on resilience in all sectors and to the public, both in normal circumstances and in the leadership of a national emergency
- A clear mandate, with the authority, drive and resources to build UK resilience across all areas of risk and emergency management.

The new body should have:

- a. Staff drawn not only from the Civil Service but also – and vitally – from all sectors who are knowledgeable, experienced and credible with their stakeholders.
- b. The authority, credibility and convening power to join up work across government departments.

- c. Corporate Governance mechanisms which allow for the full and effective engagement of the Devolved Administrations and of representatives of all sectors; and for the provision of support and challenge via independent Non-Executives with substantial experience in risk and emergency management.
- d. A culture which captures and reflects the operational imperatives of risk and, especially, emergency management: agile, flexible, data driven, and delivery- and outcome-focused.
- e. A demonstrable passion for the pursuit of learning, improvement and excellence: in the development of knowledge, skills and capabilities; in products and publications; and in arrangements for validation and assurance.

The new body should build two important cultural underpinnings to its work:

- A demonstrable desire to reach out to gather and share wisdom and experience. It should ensure that the voice and contribution of front-line responders, VCS organisations, businesses and those affected by past emergencies is embedded in the development of policy and operational practice, so that they are grounded in reality and people's needs
- It should seek to rebuild and sustain with stakeholders the spirit of partnership in a shared enterprise

**Recommendation 77:** Single- and multi-agency doctrine and guidance which act as the spine of coherent resilience-building activity across the resilience community need urgent – and then regular future – updating to ensure that they reflect developments in policy and operational practice and learning over the last decade. Cross-referencing of, and links to, other documents should also be checked to ensure they are – and continue to be – up-to-date.

**Recommendation 78:** The Lexicon of Civil Protection Terminology should be refreshed and made a more accessible, user-friendly, reference document. It should then be used consistently to inform the writing of all single- and multi-agency doctrine and guidance.

**Recommendation 79:** The UK Government should develop and publish digitally for use by local bodies, Resilience Partnerships and government departments a simple map of current doctrine and guidance.

**Recommendation 80:** As part of updating doctrine and guidance, the UK Government should examine whether legal and other developments, including the recommendations of public Inquiries, mean that some areas of current non-statutory guidance, especially on safeguarding, humanitarian assistance and emergency co-ordination structures, should now be made statutory.

## Chapter 8: The Pursuit of Excellence

**Recommendation 81:** The UK Government, working with stakeholders from all sectors, should develop a Competence Strategy covering everyone with a substantial role in building UK resilience.

**Recommendation 82:** The UK Government should develop with stakeholders from all sectors, professional bodies, employers and the higher and further education sectors, an integrated Resilience Competence Framework. The Framework should cover both individual and team competences. It should identify the core knowledge, skills, attitudes and experience that are common across organisations as well as those for particular functional and technical specialisms. The resulting Framework should be aligned with those already in place in other sectors and regulatory regimes. Once developed, the Framework should be subject to regular review.

**Recommendation 83:** In the short term, the UK Government should provide leadership of the development and promotion of the Resilience Competence Framework. But it should pursue with existing professional bodies whether they would, collectively, wish over time and with Government support to create a governance and regulatory body for UK resilience.

**Recommendation 84:** The UK Government should lead a fundamental ‘reboot’ of the current resilience training ecosystem, set against the goal of providing the necessary training and development opportunities to allow everyone with a significant resilience role to develop the competences and confidence they need. This should include:

- Developing, in conjunction with training providers as appropriate, a wide range of training options, including modular courses, digital delivery and on-site training provision to make it easier for individuals and teams to undertake training and development
- Producing and maintaining accredited core training materials on subjects agreed with Resilience Partnerships which they can adapt and use locally. These materials should be kept up-to-date with the latest legislation and guidance, good practice (from operational experience and research in the UK and overseas), and lessons identified from emergencies and exercises
- Providing ‘train the trainer’ training to those in Resilience Partnerships responsible for developing capacity and capability to provide them with the skills and confidence needed to train others locally
- Developing and making available to Resilience Partnerships a national register of recognised trainers and subject matter experts. Registration requirements should include ensuring compliance with legislation and doctrine, demonstrating that training materials are up-to-date, that trainers and subject matter experts have relevant recent experience and that training is perceived as high quality. Registration should be refreshed every three years. Technical specialisms should be delivered by those formally assessed and registered as competent expert providers

**Recommendation 85:** Team competences set out in the Resilience Competence Framework should be used as the reference standard when designing multi-agency training and exercising.

**Recommendation 86:** The suite of accredited core training materials developed by central government should include those for multi-agency command team training and exercises.

**Recommendation 87:** The national register of recognised trainers and subject matter experts should include the accredited providers of multi-agency strategic emergency management training.

**Recommendation 88:** All Category 1 responders must have the capability and capacity to deploy trained and approved strategic leaders for civil emergencies. Senior leaders from Category 1 responder bodies who are expected to be core members of Strategic Co-ordinating Groups in the response to a major emergency should be mandated in an amended Act or future legislation and supporting statutory guidance to attend a strategic emergency management training course every three years, and subsequently undertake annual CPD, in order to be assessed as 'approved' to fulfil that role. A record of those who have received the necessary training and CPD should be maintained by Category 1 responder bodies and Resilience Partnerships and used as the basis for drawing up rotas. This requirement should be phased in over a three-year period, drawing on the increase in accredited training capacity being put in place by the College of Policing and, we hope, by other accredited providers, with new SCG members being prioritised for training. In recognition of the mutuality of benefits gained, the UK Government should provide specific, time-limited co-funding of the cost of meeting this requirement.

**Recommendation 89:** An amended Act or future legislation and supporting statutory guidance should mandate that core members of Strategic Co-ordinating Groups should undertake at least one command team exercise per year, externally observed and assessed by independent external assessors against the requirements set out in the Resilience Competence Framework. If collective performance is assessed as being seriously weak in any areas, Resilience Partnerships should be required to put in place an improvement plan and to evidence improvement in the areas that fell short of the expected standard within a given timeframe.

**Recommendation 90:** The Resilience Competence Framework should set out the competences required of civil servants with resilience roles, with training to allow individuals to achieve those competences incorporated into the training provision of the Government Skills and Curriculum Unit and the new Leadership College for Government. The Framework and Curriculum should also include the competences needed by civil servants who are expected to act as a Government Liaison Officer within Strategic Co-ordinating Groups.



**Recommendation 91:** All Lead Government Departments must have the capability and capacity to deploy trained and approved civil servants for emergencies requiring a single department or cross-government response. This includes the provision of sufficient trained and approved Government Liaison Officers to be deployed to work with Resilience Partnerships where required. Senior leaders of Lead Government Departments who are expected to be core members of their emergency management groups in the response to a major emergency should be mandated in an amended Act or future legislation and supporting statutory guidance to attend a strategic emergency management training course every three years, and subsequently undertake annual CPD, in order to be assessed as ‘approved’ to fulfil that role. A record of those who have received the necessary training and CPD should be maintained by each department and used as the basis for drawing up rotas.

**Recommendation 92:** An amended Act or future legislation and supporting statutory guidance should mandate that core members of departmental emergency management groups should undertake at least one command team exercise per year, externally observed and assessed by independent external assessors against the requirements set out in the Resilience Competence Framework. If collective performance is assessed as being seriously weak in any areas, an improvement plan should be put in place with improvement evidenced in the areas that fell short of the expected standard within a given timeframe.

**Recommendation 93:** An amended Act or future legislation and supporting statutory guidance should mandate that core members of cross-government emergency management groups should undertake at least one command team exercise per year, externally observed and assessed by independent external assessors against the requirements set out in the Resilience Competence Framework. If collective performance is assessed as being seriously weak in any areas, an improvement plan should be put in place with improvement evidenced in the areas that fell short of the expected standard within a given timeframe.

**Recommendation 94:** The UK Government should consider how best to support Ministers in the development of the competences they need to lead a single department or participate in a cross-government response to a major emergency. Ideally, Ministers should undertake at least one cross-government command team exercise per year.

**Recommendation 95:** Government should consider the establishment of a structured programme that can be used both during the planning phase and also during the response and recovery phases of emergencies to facilitate secondments (with public, private and VCS organisations) into and out of departments.

**Recommendation 96:** The Resilience Competence Framework, once produced, should be made available to HEIs to inform their course design and teaching.

**Recommendation 97:** The Civil Contingencies Secretariat or any successor body should establish and promote a formal engagement mechanism for those HEIs seeking advice on current resilience policy and operational practice, or who wish to pursue or promote research of benefit to UK resilience.

**Recommendation 98:** Resilience Partnerships should be encouraged to engage with their local HEIs, including in areas where they can offer analytical expertise in the development of risk assessments and emergency plans to more fully reflect local demographic, socio-economic and other data and information.

**Recommendation 99:** The Civil Contingencies Secretariat or any successor body should collate from across government departments and Resilience Partnerships a list of those UK resilience issues which would benefit from further research, and pursue this with HEIs and research funding bodies.

**Recommendation 100:** The UK Government should pursue the creation of a Centre of Resilience Excellence. This should represent and meet the needs of all sectors engaged in building UK resilience, including by drawing in the expertise it needs from across the sectors. The Centre could lead on the development of the Resilience Competence Framework and the fundamental transformation of the resilience training ecosystem, act as the point of engagement for higher and further education institutions on teaching and research, collate a schedule of Areas of Research Interest, and lead on learning and improvement, including disseminating and embedding lessons identified and the findings of relevant UK and international research. It should embrace the benefits of co-working with other Government Colleges, and with HEIs active in the resilience field. There would be considerable benefits from the Centre being part of the proposed College for National Security.

**Recommendation 101:** The Cabinet Office should signal the need for, and encouragement of, a learning and continuous improvement culture; and demonstrate that commitment by putting in place systematic arrangements for its promotion and pursuit, led by the Centre of Resilience Excellence.

---

## Chapter 9: Validation and Assurance

**Recommendation 102:** Current Resilience Standards provide a sound basis for assessing the performance of local bodies with duties under the Act and of Resilience Partnerships collectively. But they should be revised to include either a crisper definition of requirements or an associated summary checklist. The legal force of each of the three sub-sets of expectations (“must/should/could”) within each Standard should be set out more distinctly. HMICFRS and CQC should be involved in the development of the revised Standards. And it should be made clear that they will be used in single- and multi-agency validation and assurance regimes.

**Recommendation 103:** The UK Government should develop and publish additional Resilience Standards for the performance of designated Lead Government Departments. These should cover the quality of the departments' own work across all aspects of risk and emergency management as well as the quality of their engagement with designated local bodies, including supporting them in their engagement with local democratic accountability arrangements. And they should cover the quality of departments' activities within the essential services sectors they sponsor to build and sustain the resilience of the sector.

**Recommendation 104:** The Resilience Standards should be adopted consistently by HMICFRS and CQC for their assessment of the performance of relevant bodies who have duties under the Act or successor legislation.

**Recommendation 105:** The Resilience Standards should ideally be adopted by relevant regulators in their assessment of the performance of those regulated utilities who have duties under the Act or successor legislation.

**Recommendation 106:** The UK Government should establish arrangements for the assessment against defined Resilience Standards of the performance of English LRFs and of Lead Government Departments. Validation reviews should be undertaken by a small new team of experienced, knowledgeable practitioners, hosted in the Civil Contingencies Secretariat or successor body.

**Recommendation 107:** Validation reviews should be conducted at the request of the Chair of each Resilience Partnership or the Accounting Officer of each Lead Government Department, subject to each Partnership or Department being the subject of validation at least every three years. The focus of the reviews should be on learning and improvement, with reports provided in narrative form. The review team should be able to provide continuing support to Resilience Partnerships or Departments in their improvement programmes, especially in advising on sources of best practice or expertise in particular functional areas.

**Recommendation 108:** An amended Act or future legislation should, in its provisions for monitoring and enforcement, provide legislative backing to Resilience Standards and the associated validation and assurance regime.

---

## Chapter 10: Accountability

**Recommendation 109:** An amended Act or future legislation, and associated Regulations, should not only designate those bodies with legal duties but also make clear that the heads of those bodies have personal accountability for the performance of their organisations against those duties and associated standards.

**Recommendation 110:** An amended Act or future legislation and associated Regulations should make it clear that Ministers and Accounting Officers of designated Lead Government Departments have personal accountability for the performance of their departments against the duties placed on their departments and associated Standards.



**Recommendation 111:** The National Security Adviser or a nominated Deputy should be appointed UK Government Chief Resilience Officer. The postholder should have responsibility for the quality and effectiveness of the resilience-building activity across the UK, including that undertaken in central government departments and (subject to respecting the scope of devolved powers) by designated local bodies and Resilience Partnerships. He or she would be directly responsible for the new multi-agency validation team. The postholder should bring substantial operational experience of working in a front-line role in the resilience field and have credibility across all sectors. The accountability of the postholder and of a designated Cabinet Office Minister for the quality of resilience in the UK should be set out in an amended Act or future legislation.

**Recommendation 112:** The valuable role of local democratic engagement, oversight and scrutiny arrangements, and the obligation on bodies designated with duties under the Act or successor legislation to support those arrangements, should be set out clearly in an amended Act or future legislation, Regulations and supporting guidance.

**Recommendation 113:** The reports of multi-agency validation reviews of the work of Resilience Partnerships, together with the Action Plan agreed by the Partnership, should be published locally, for the information of the public and for use in local political oversight and scrutiny mechanisms. The obligation on Resilience Partnerships to publish the reports should be captured in an amended Act or future legislation.

**Recommendation 114:** The important oversight and scrutiny role of the UK Parliament, and the obligation on the UK Government to support Parliament and its Select Committees in their work, should be set out clearly in an amended Act or future legislation, Regulations and supporting guidance.

**Recommendation 115:** Lead Government Departments should provide to the relevant Parliamentary Select Committee the Sector Security and Resilience Plans for the sectors which they sponsor, and the reports of validation reviews, together with the Action Plans agreed by the department.

**Recommendation 116:** The UK Government should provide an annual Resilience Report to the UK Parliament bringing together the findings of validation and assurance activity carried out during the year at local and national levels, and of any lessons identified reviews carried out in the year; a description of progress on the main risk reduction and emergency preparedness programmes; and a summary analysis of the current state of UK resilience. The obligation to provide the Resilience Report should be captured in an amended Act or future legislation, and associated Regulations.

**Recommendation 117:** We invite the Comptroller and Auditor General to take account of departmental Sector Security and Resilience Plans, together with the UK Government's annual Resilience Report to the UK Parliament, to inform decisions about future examinations by the National Audit Office and its scrutiny of resilience-building work in the UK.





---

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

**Bruce Mann**

Leader of the Independent Review

**Kathy Settle**

Deputy Leader of the Independent Review

**Andy Towler**

Deputy Leader of the Independent Review

**Rob Doran**

Independent Review Team Member

**Eleanor Parker**

Independent Review Team Member

**Andy Holdsworth**

Independent Review Team Member

**Stephanie Buller**

Independent Review Team Member

**Mike Price**

Independent Review Team Member





---

## REFERENCES AND RESOURCES

---

<sup>1</sup> See Annex A of the main report for the full Terms of Reference for the Review

---

<sup>2</sup> Cabinet Office (2021b). The National Resilience Strategy: A Call for Evidence. Page 7

---

<sup>3</sup> We use the term ‘Resilience Partnerships’ to cover the Local Resilience Forums (LRFs) in England and Wales, Regional Resilience Partnerships (RRPs) and Local Resilience Partnerships (LRPs) in Scotland, and Emergency Preparedness Groups (EPGs) in Northern Ireland

---

<sup>4</sup> National Audit Office (2021b). Initial Learning from the government’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic: Cross-government. Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General. Paragraph 46

---

<sup>5</sup> The full set of recommendations is shown in the [Summary of Recommendations](#)

---

<sup>6</sup> Of which the major elements would be: sustainable funding for Resilience Partnerships (£12m); improved training and exercising (£7m); Centre of Resilience Excellence (£3m); Cabinet Office, including validation and assurance team (£2m). See the main report for full details

---

<sup>7</sup> UNISDR (2005). Hyogo Framework for Action 2005–2015: Building the Resilience of Nations and Communities to Disasters and United Nations (2015a). Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030. The Sendai Framework sets four ‘Priorities for Action’: understanding disaster risk; strengthening disaster risk governance to manage disaster risk; investing in disaster risk reduction for resilience; and enhancing disaster preparedness for effective response and to “Build Back Better” in recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction

---

<sup>8</sup> Including taking in the recommendations set out in House of Lords (2021). Risk Assessment and Risk Planning Committee: Report: Preparing for Extreme Risks: Building a Resilient Society

---

<sup>9</sup> House of Lords and House of Commons (2003). Draft Civil Contingencies Bill. Joint Committee on the Draft Civil Contingencies Bill

---

<sup>10</sup> These are listed in the Resourcing of Local Bodies and Resilience Partnerships section in the main report

---

<sup>11</sup> There would be consequential increases to the funding provided for resilience-building work to the Devolved Administrations

---

<sup>12</sup> Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities (2022). Levelling Up the United Kingdom

---





---

<sup>13</sup> The Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities (DLUHC)

---

<sup>14</sup> The Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS)

---

<sup>15</sup> See <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/meeting-notes-for-uk-resilience-forum/uk-resilience-forum-inaugural-meeting-14-july>

---

<sup>16</sup> Cabinet Office (2011-12). Revision to Emergency Preparedness [different chapters have different publication dates – see Annex E of the main report for full details]

---

<sup>17</sup> HM Government (2013b). Emergency Response and Recovery

---

<sup>18</sup> Cabinet Office (2013c). Responding to Emergencies: The UK Central Government Response. Concept of Operations

---

<sup>19</sup> Including HM Government (2013b). Emergency Response and Recovery and JESIP (2021). Joint Doctrine: The Interoperability Framework. Edition 3

---

<sup>20</sup> Cabinet Office (2013b). Emergency Responder Interoperability: Lexicon of UK civil protection terminology. Version 2.1.1

---

<sup>21</sup> In using the word ‘competences’, we are referring to knowledge, skills, attitudes and experience

---

<sup>22</sup> Continuous Professional Development

---

<sup>23</sup> Cabinet Office (2022a). New National Security College founded to boost UK and Australian National Security (press release)

---

<sup>24</sup> Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire and Rescue Services

---

<sup>25</sup> Care Quality Commission

---

<sup>26</sup> House of Lords (2021). Risk Assessment and Risk Planning Committee: Report: Preparing for Extreme Risks: Building a Resilient Society. Paragraph 267

---



[CLICK HERE TO DOWNLOAD THE FULL REPORT](#)

For further information on the evidence and analysis underpinning our Review, contact:

**Bruce Mann** / [REDACTED]

**Kathy Settle** / [REDACTED]

**Andy Towler** / [andy.towler@theresiliencegroup.co.uk](mailto:andy.towler@theresiliencegroup.co.uk)



[www.nationalpreparednesscommission.uk](http://www.nationalpreparednesscommission.uk)