

**In the matter of the Grenfell Tower Inquiry**

**Witness statement of Shkelzen Canaj**

1. My Name is Shkelzen Canaj.
2. This is my first witness statement prepared to assist the Chairman of the Grenfell Tower Inquiry.
3. I have not previously made any witness statement to the Metropolitan Police Service.
4. I am currently employed by J S Wright & Co. Limited, Atlas Building, 16 Portland Street, Birmingham B6 5RX ("JSW" or the "Company") as a Lead Aftercare Engineer. At the material time I was employed as a Lead Aftercare Engineer.
5. In this witness statement I will provide some background information and details of my involvement in the Grenfell Tower refurbishment in my capacity as an employee of JSW. I am authorised by JSW to make this statement.

Qualifications and Experience

6. [REDACTED] After finishing school I obtained a number of City and Guild qualifications in plumbing and heating and I have worked in the plumbing industry ever since.
7. Prior to joining JSW I worked as a self-employed plumber, installing and adapting bathrooms for disabled people. I have 16 years' experience working as a plumber.
8. I joined JSW as an Aftercare Engineer in 2012. Since joining JSW I have continued to study for City and Guilds qualifications in new disciplines and I now hold City and Guilds qualifications in a variety of mechanical disciplines as well as plumbing and heating. I am in the process of obtaining further qualifications in electrical installation with the support of JSW.

Responsibilities during the Grenfell Tower Refurbishment project

9. As Lead Aftercare Engineer, I am responsible for responding to problems that occur with JSW installations during the defects period which follows practical completion of a particular project or phase of a project.
10. I work as one of a team of Aftercare Engineers. We have different expertise and will respond to different types of defects. I will deal with all types of mechanical defects, with the exception of gas which requires a qualified gas engineer. Once I complete my electrical qualifications then I will also deal with electrical defects but I don't deal with those now.
11. As Lead Aftercare Engineer I am also asked to respond to defects which are particularly complex, or else where repeat appointments by less senior engineers haven't resolved the problem.
12. I report to the Aftercare Supervisor who reports to Toby Guise, Associate Director for Health, Safety and Quality.
13. I generally work on my own when I'm out in the field. I'm not supervised while I'm on site dealing with a defect. However, when I arrive at each appointment I log on the JSW system the time I arrived. During the appointment I will receive an automated engineer's report to my iPad. Once I've finished the appointment I will complete and submit my engineer's report which creates a log on the system of my attendance, findings and action taken.
14. My first involvement with the Grenfell Tower refurbishment project (the "**Project**") was a short time before the defect period for the boilers began on 21 September 2015. I visited Grenfell Tower to walk the Project with the Contract Engineer to familiarise myself with the site and the specific plant and equipment that I would be working with.

Building Management System ("**BMS**") safety circuit

15. I attended Grenfell Tower due to false alarms on the AOV system on a couple of occasions during the defect period. I know from talking to Kensington and Chelsea Tenancy Management Organisation ("**TMO**") and their caretakers that residents smoking in the communal lobbies triggered the smoke detectors which then caused all the plant to shut down. I recall that this was causing the TMO a nuisance as their

maintenance engineers had to keep coming and resetting the existing boilers, which served the Finger Blocks.

16. The way the system worked was that all the new equipment that was installed in the basement as part of the refurbishment, including the new boilers, pumps and the pressurisation units were on a safety circuit. The 3 new boilers were all linked, so if there was a problem with one of the boilers then it would automatically shut off and the heating and hot water would run off another one of the new boilers.
17. If there was a safety issue – like a power surge, or water leak, or one of the temperature or gas detectors in the basement activated - then the entire system would shut down. This would immediately shut down all the boilers and basement plant and cut the supply of hot water and heating to all the flats. This would also shut off the mains gas supply to the basement via a solenoid valve on the existing gas main.
18. The new BMS system would also send a signal to the old BMS panel which would shut down all of the existing plant and equipment, including the old boilers. The old and new BMS panels were adjacent to each other in the basement, literally side by side.
19. The AOV system was also linked up to the new BMS panel. If the AOV system detected smoke then it would send a 'fire' signal to the BMS panel which would shut down all of the basement plant and equipment. The AOV system would have to be reset before the BMS could be reset. Once the BMS panel was reset then the new boilers should restart automatically.
20. I remember that the TMO had to keep attending because of false alarms but then something happened and they seemed to stop attending. I don't know what happened but I did wonder why the false alarms didn't seem to be happening anymore.

#### The AOV system human interface panel

21. The status of the AOV system could be viewed on a human interface panel which was located inside a red dry riser cabinet in the Ground Floor Lobby area. The caretaker had a key to the riser cabinet and would open it for me if I needed to access the AOV panel. I would also expect the Fire Service to have a key to open it if necessary as it was a

standard fire fighter key. It also had a break glass front so even if the Fire Service didn't have a key they could still access the panel in an emergency.

22. Inside the riser cabinet was the digital panel which showed the status of the panel. There was also a key switch which allowed the AOV system to be switched between automatic mode (auto) and manual override (on). The keys to manually override the system were stored on hooks to the left of the panel.
23. Below the display was a list of damper locations in the building so if one of the smoke detectors activated you could see where that activation had occurred. There were also some instructions explaining how the system could be manually operated.
24. If you wanted to manually override the system then you had to insert the key into that panel and turn it to manual (on). Then you would need to take another key to the floor you wanted to override and insert it into the yellow manual override switch on that floor to open those vents.
25. English is not my first language but I think those instructions were easy to understand. It really could not be any simpler. The whole point of these systems is that they can be operated by anyone and you should not need to be familiar with that specific system to use it.

#### Further gas works after the Project ended

26. At some point not long before the events of 14 June 2017 I noticed that additional pipes had been installed in the hallways of some of the residential floors. I didn't know that any further works were planned after the Project had ended so I rang our Head Office to ask whether there was anyone else working on site.
27. It later emerged that Cadent had been working on the gas supply through the core of the building and into the residential flats but no-one had told me or anyone else at JSW that this work was going on. That would have potentially affected our defect cover, if there was another contractor working on mechanical or electrical systems on site but we didn't know anything about it.

#### Attendance at Grenfell Tower on 16 May 2017

28. On 16 May 2017 JSW were alerted to a fire alarm at Grenfell Tower and asked to send a plumber to site.
29. The defect had been reported as a fire and I was informed that the fire service would be attending. When I arrived there was no sign of anything wrong. I found someone from TMO on site and asked what had happened but they didn't know either. I checked the AOV panel and there were no alarms activating.
30. The AOV panel would display which damper had activated. You didn't have to scroll through the menus or anything like that – it was clearly displayed. There was a list of damper IDs and their locations in the building below the panel so the damper code could be matched against that list to determine where the fire was. The AOV panel would also beep and the light on it would flash red to draw your attention to it if it was activated. The BMS panel didn't show an alarm and everything was operating normally. I recorded all of this in my engineer report (ZC/1:                      ).
31. It seemed strange to me that the safety circuit hadn't kicked in the way it had done in the past. If an alarm had activated I would have expected the AOV system to show smoke had been detected and where it had been detected. I would expect the BMS panel to show a fire alarm and that the main gas shut off valve had been closed. I rang our head office to try to find out who had made the call and what they had said but our system only showed that Rydon had reported it to us and we couldn't trace it any further back.
32. Sometimes faults do get reported as emergencies when they aren't to try and get engineers there quicker, so I just put it down to a false call like that from someone.

#### Attendance at Grenfell Tower on 1 June 2017

33. On 1 June 2017 JSW received two defect reports for Grenfell Tower. The first came from Dave Hughes at Rydon to report a leak in the basement and the second was a follow up email from Rydon Maintenance for 'bms panel as there is a red light on but no alarms logged'. These were logged with JSW as defects 11665 and 11666 (exhibits ZC/2:                      and ZC/3:                      respectively).

34. When I attended the site I checked the BMS panel and found a red light indicating 'water flow failing' and the system had automatically transferred from operating on pump 1 to pump 2 as it was supposed to. The BMS panel made it really straightforward to see what was going on and if there was a problem. The digital display on the BMS panel confirmed that there were no alarms to display.
35. I went and checked the two pumps to make sure that they were operating normally and noted that the pump was running at 2.0 MHz which was normal. I also checked the AOV panel and there were no alarms displaying on there either.
36. I took a number of photographs while I was attending this defect report and I exhibit them as follows:-

Exhibit ZC/4	The boiler pumps showing no leaks or other issues
Exhibit ZC/5	One of the boiler pumps showing it operating at normal speed
Exhibit ZC/6	The BMS panel showing a water flow fault and that the system had switched to pump 2
Exhibit ZC/7	The BMS display panel showing no alarms to display
Exhibit ZC/8	The AOV panel showing no alarms

#### Attendance at Grenfell Tower on 13 June 2017

37. On 13 June 2017 we received a report that there had been a complete loss of hot water in flat 65 and I was asked to attend. I arrived at approximately 2:30pm and checked the heat interface unit ("HIU") in that property and straight away realised that the valves on top of the HIU were turned off. The young woman had just moved into the flat and the valves just needed opening to allow the system to work. I turned the valves on, tested the hot water and confirmed that it was hot. I checked the pressure on the system and noted that it was a bit low so I topped it up to 1 bar and vented the radiators for her. It was not strictly a JSW defect as the valves had just been closed by someone, either the previous tenant or her landlord but I left everything in good working order for her. A defect log entry was generated for this repair at JSW (ZC/9: ).

38. As I was leaving I saw 4 people standing outside the main entrance looking up at the top of the Tower, including the caretaker who I instantly recognised as he would often be on site when I came to deal with defects. I stopped and asked him if he'd had any more problems with leaks in the basement since my last visit. Someone with a TMO logo on his shirt said that he'd seen a couple of leaks and had reported it to his head office. He then gestured to the fourth man, who was from a fire protection company and said something like 'they had other issues at the moment as the fire alarms weren't registering properly'. They said it was nothing for me to worry about.
39. The following morning, 14 June 2017 I met with my manager, Toby Guise who was aware that I had been to Grenfell Tower the previous day and who wanted to make sure that I was okay. Toby was in London that day to meet with his quality engineer, Ben Wright so I sat down with both of them and explained to them what had happened. Toby took a note of this meeting (ZC/10: ).

I believe that the facts stated in this witness statement are true.

I am willing for this witness statement to form part of the evidence before the Inquiry and published on the Inquiry's website.

Signed:



Dated: 25-10-2018