

WITNESS STATEMENT OF DEAN RICKETTS

(Rule 9, Inquiry Rules 2006)

I, Dean Ricketts, say as follows:

I am a Watch Officer in the London Fire Brigade ('LFB'). I have been employed in the fire service for 24 years. I started my career as a firefighter at Knightsbridge fire station and have had an operational responsibility at Crew Manager and Watch Manager level since 2010. I have served at a number of locations including Knightsbridge, Northolt, Harrow as firefighter and Northolt as a Crew manager, Fulham as Watch Manager specialist – Command Support, Fulham as Watch manager A and North Kensington as a Watch Manager B. I am qualified as a Watch Manager B. My current role is Watch Manager B at G27 North Kensington Green watch.

I make this statement to assist the Public Inquiry in understanding the following matters:

- My role in preparing the aborted 4 pump exercise at Grenfell Tower which was due to take place on 8 June 2017 and, in particular, the preparation of the risk assessment for that exercise.
- My understanding of the requirements of GRA 3.2 and LFB Policy 633 (particularly Appendix A) in relation to the nature, extent and purpose of visits conducted for the purposes of s. 7(2)(d) of the Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004;
- My role (if any) in the visits, conducted for the purposes of s. 7(2)(d) of the Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004, in relation to Grenfell Tower between February 2015 and June 2017.

- My role (if any) in ensuring that information gathered during the course of these visits is fully and accurately recorded (whether in the ORD or otherwise) so that fire-fighters, when deployed to Grenfell Tower, had an appropriate understanding of the building in which a fire was to be fought.

My role in preparing the aborted 4 pump exercise at Grenfell Tower

As an operational Watch Manager I was tasked to plan and organise a four pump exercise within my Borough. The dates of these exercises are entered into the station diaries by the Establishment and Performance Team (EPT) and Watches are expected to plan their exercises according to the dates given to them by EPT. Many of these training exercises are completed on Brigade property, quite often, outside venues are identified locally. If outside venues are identified, permission for their use must be sought from the premise/property owner and a risk assessment completed.

The risk assessment is completed on a 'Notification of off Station Training Event and Risk Assessment Form 5532' (commonly known as a F5532).

During a visit completed by myself at Grenfell Tower on the 27th March 2017, I recognised the complexities of the basement area and identified this would be a suitable venue for a training exercise with an opportunity for Brigade personnel to practice a realistic operational scenario.

Following the visit, I sent an email at 17:01 on the 27th March to Janice Wray of the RBKC Tenant Management Organisation (TMO) detailing my request for use. I received an immediate reply at 17:05 stating that she would try to accommodate the request. I received a further email from Janice Wray on the 18th April stating there were no objections in principle as long as we did not create smoke, touch any plant or equipment. I confirmed in a reply to Janice Wray that I would provide a training proposal and forward to her for her return after the Easter break.

On the 23rd April 2018 I sent an email To Janice Wray requesting a meeting to discuss the proposed exercise. The meeting was agreed for the 28th April 2017, in my absence, Crew Manager Healy of G27 Green Watch attended and met with Janice Wray.

Crew Manager Healy took a series of photographs of the basement area from which we were able to complete the planning process for the exercise and complete the F5532 risk assessment.

On the 1st May 2017 I completed the F5532 risk assessment for the basement area and this was forwarded with an accompanying email on the morning of the 2nd May 2017 (attached as exhibit DR1) to the following:

- Station Manager G27 North Kensington; Nicolas Davis (at the time)
- Borough Commander Kensington and Chelsea; Paul Kavanagh (at the time)
- Station Manager; Claiton Murray (Service Standards Support Officer)
- Health and Safety; Andrew Darlow (LFB HQ)
- Watch Manager Moustapha El-Awdeh; Command Support Officer (CU8 Fulham)

On the afternoon of the 2nd May 2017 I received an email addressed to myself and SM Nick Davis from Group Manager Paul Kavanagh asking for the date of the exercise to be checked as he believed this was a date scheduled for a table top exercise at Wormwood Scrubs prison .

It appears that Group Manager Kavanagh and Station Manager Ben Moore (G36 Hammersmith) had been liaising with prison management and had arranged a table top exercise at the prison for the same day.

As a result, I was notified by telephone of the cancellation of the exercise at Grenfell Tower by Station Manager Nick Davis. I was told the table top exercise would take priority over the Borough planned exercise. This was confirmed via email from SM Davis to Janice Wray and myself on the 3rd May 2017.

After notification that the exercise was cancelled, together with Crew manager Andrew Healy, I concentrated our efforts, as directed by SM Davis, for the preparation of the table top exercise at Wormwood Scrubs prison.

The exercise at Wormwood Scrubs was carried out on the 8th June 2017 with Station Manager Nick Davis, Crew Manager Andrew Healy and myself attending. As this was a table top exercise a F5532 was not required.

The requirements of GRA 3.2 and LFB Policy 633

I was unaware of and had not heard until the commencement of the Grenfell Enquiry of document GRA 3.2

LFB Policy 633 'High Rise Firefighting' is the guidance note issued by the Brigade and is the document from which we draw our knowledge and base our operational tactics from with regards to incidents at premises that are classified as 'high rise'. i.e. Over 18metres in height or 6 floors.

Appendix 1(1) of Policy 633 acts as a guide when conducting visits.

Part (2) of appendix 1 gives guidance on concerns.

7.2.d visits are appointments entered in the station diary and are part of the work carried out locally by crews at each station.

These appointments, as with others, are dropped into the electronic work queue and it is the responsibility of the managers on each watch to ensure the appointments such as 7(2)(d) visits are completed.

My role (if any) in the visits, conducted for the purposes of s. 7(2)(d) of the Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004, in relation to Grenfell Tower between February 2015 and June 2017

My posting to G27 North Kensington was on the 3rd November 2016, all personnel on my Watch were familiar with Grenfell Tower and had visited on numerous occasions before and during the refurbishment works.

As an example of my crews knowledge of Grenfell Tower it should be noted that an exercise was carried out by North Kensington Green Watch on the 21/06/2013.

To the best of my recollection.

The completion date of the 7(2)(d) visit is recorded as the 15th February 2017. I believe this to be incorrect as my visit was conducted on the 27th March 2017. It was at this visit that I met with Nicky Bartholomew of the TMO and on which date I sent an email to Janice Wray also of the TMO. I believe the date issue may have been a result of the visit sitting in my work queue and the appointment was not moved forward in the Station Diary.

My visit to Grenfell Tower was carried out with a crew from North Kensington Fire station. This was a visit for crews and in particular, officers, so that basic information could be gathered and recorded on the Operational Risk Data base (ORD) and a tactical plan be drawn up and accessed via the Mobile Data Terminal (MDT) which is carried on all front line operational appliances.

The ORD information can be either viewed on the MDT or printed off using the appliance on board printer. (new appliances do not have printers-these have been replaced with mobile MDT tablets).

Information regarding Grenfell Tower was already held on the ORD which had been gathered by crews on previous visits. The purpose of my visit was to check that information held on the ORD was accurate and record further findings.

Access to Grenfell Tower was from Grenfell Road. This led to a covered service area that serves the whole of the Lancaster West estate.

It was immediately obvious that due to the volume of parked cars and contractor's vans that fire brigade access could be restricted although I believe there was a hatched area for emergency vehicle parking and I noted removable bollards that linked a driveable pathway from the service area to the leisure centre and onwards to Bonmore Road.

I noted the location of the dry rising main inlet and clarified the location of the hydrants as recorded on the ORD.

I also noted that the tower had a dry riser and not a wet riser. This surprised me considering the vast renovation works that had been carried out on the tower and I later raised this point with Station Manager Nick Davis.

On entering Grenfell Tower I was accompanied, amongst others by Firefighters John Styliano and Warren Bennett from G27 North Kensington. Having been briefed by crews that Grenfell Tower had very recently undergone a major

refurbishment, as I entered the building for the first time, my first thought was to locate the 'Premises Information Box' (PIB).

The PIB would normally hold documents such as plans to the floors, evacuation strategies and procedures, instructions on the use of mechanical ventilation systems and details of anything that was deemed as useful information to the LFB in the event of an emergency.

Despite searching the immediate area inside the building and then retreating outside to try to identify its location, I was unable to locate the PIB.

I recall that due to the time of day (around lunchtime) there was a high number of residents and visitors entering and exiting the building. Whilst I was looking for the PIB, one of my crew informed me that the lifts had 'fireman's lifts' controls but due to the volume of people using the lifts, they were unable to test these controls.

I believe it was at this point I enquired as to whether there was a responsible person for the building on site. This could be in the form of a caretaker or building manager. I was directed to offices detached from Grenfell Tower and located at the eastern end of the finger blocks of the Lancaster West estate.

These offices were occupied by the Tenant Management Organisation(TMO). I entered the public entrance to the office with Firefighter Styliano and introduced myself to whom I believe to be Nicky Bartholomew, neighbourhood team leader of the TMO.

I explained the reason for my presence and further explained that I had been trying to locate the PIB. Nicky Bartholomew was unable to help with my query and said she would give me the contact details of Janice Wray, Health and Safety Manager for Kensington and Chelsea TMO. Nicky Bartholomew also gave me the telephone details of Adrian Bowman who I believe I spoke to later that day. I can not recall the details of that conversation but it may have been about the PIB. Ms Bartholomew then kindly offered to show me around some of Grenfell Tower with the assistance of a member of the TMO maintenance staff.

The TMO maintenance contractor asked if there were any particular areas that I would be interested in seeing. I replied by stating that I would very much like to see the service intakes for gas and electricity. These would be useful as it could be a requirement to isolate these services in the event of a fire.

We began by entering Grenfell Tower at the main entrance where it was explained to me by the TMO maintenance contractor that there were some electrical intake cupboards containing fuse circuit boards within the ground floor lobby area. I was shown these which were opposite the lifts and I was also shown the lift lobby area and a doorway to the staircase.

I was also made aware of the atrium area and a new open staircase leading to the second floor.

I was further shown the smoke extraction controls, the fire alarm panel and it was explained to me how the entry system works with a 'drop key' which releases the main entrance door for 90 seconds.

From there it was suggested that I view the southern elevation of the tower and the access for the basement area. I believe on this elevation there was also a 415v mains electrical intake room and adjacent to this a doorway leading to a complex basement area which was accessed via a long concrete staircase.

In the basement area I was shown various areas divided by tall concrete walls. These areas contained gas boilers, plant machinery, cooling fans, lift motors, gas shut off valves and other service related machinery. I believe there was fire alarm detection and manual fire alarm call points within the basement area.

Throughout the visit, I was in constant fire ground radio contact with my appliance driver and I experienced no communication problems.

On exiting the basement area and identifying its complexities I decided that I would bring the visit to an end (this visit led to the planning of the four pump exercise scheduled for the 8th June 2017).

The two issues that stood out for me were the fact that the dry rising main had not been upgraded although I was unsure as to whether this was a building control requirement on refurbishment projects and I also noted the fact that there was no Premises Information Box within the foyer/lobby. This was recorded on the ORD.

As stated above, I raised the question regarding the dry/wet riser to Station Manager Nick Davis who stated he too was unsure of the requirement.

My role (if any) in ensuring that information gathered during the course of these visits is fully and accurately recorded for use by fire-fighters, when deployed to Grenfell Tower

After the completion of a 7(2)(d) visit it is the responsibility of the conducting Officer to ensure that any information gathered is recorded on the ORD and the Premises Risk Assessment is completed. This is completed through the electronic Station Diary. Some of the information from previous visits that is relevant will automatically be saved and new information must be added.

Some of the information I believe I confirmed and/or added included the following:

- Comments regarding the front entry door system and the entrance lobby and lift lobby.
- I added comments noting the position of the gas boilers in the basement area, the access to these via a concrete staircase and the location of gas shut off valves.
- I noted that communications were good on hand held radio channel 1.
- I confirmed that there was not a Premises Information Box.

- I added comments regarding the restricted access and limitations for the turntable ladder (Aerial appliance).


I completed the risk assessment matrix. I completed this by agreeing to the contents of the previous risk assessment which highlighted the following:

- High voltage electrical equipment
- Non ambulant, visually or hearing impaired and non English speaking occupants.
- Large sleeping risk – over 100
- High rise premises
- Hidden voids which may aid fire spread
- Fixed installations (Dry rising main)
- Appliance access difficulties

Statement of truth

I believe that the facts stated in this witness statement are true.

Dean Ricketts



Dated:

23rd July 2018


EXHIBIT DR1

TO THE WITNESS STATEMENT OF DEAN RICKETTS

(Rule 9, Inquiry Rules 2006)

I believe that the attached documents are a true copy of the original.

Dean Ricketts



Dated:

23rd July 2018

From: RICKETTS, DEAN
Sent: 02 May 2017 10:14
To: DAVIS, NICHOLAS; KAVANAGH, PAUL
Cc: MURRAY, CLAITON; DARLOW, ANDREW; ELAWDEH, MOUSTAPHA
Subject: Four pump exercise 8th June 2017.

Dear All,

Please find the attached 5532 Risk assessment and proposal for the four pump exercise on the 8th June 2017 at Grenfell Tower, W11.

Please forgive me for not giving the requisite eight weeks notice; I have been awaiting approval of use of the venue from Janice Wray, Health and Safety Manager for Kensington and Chelsea.
This has now been approved following a site meeting and the receipt of detailed plans of the basement.

As this is a new venue and potentially a very good training venue with opportunities for future use. I would like to request a tight oversee of the exercise with an appointed Station Manager from operations and possibly a SSSO or an ORT representative.

Please review and advise accordingly.

Many thanks
Dean Ricketts.

Watch Manager
Green Watch
North Kensington Fire Station
242 Ladbroke Grove
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W10 5LP

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London Fire Brigade

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From (Organising Officer) Dean Ricketts		Date: 01/05/2017
Station: G27 North Kensington		Watch: Green
To: Borough Commander via Station Manager GM Kavanagh / SM Davis		

1. Proposed activity: Four pump station lead exercise		
2. Venue: Grenfell Tower, Grenfell Road, W11 1TG		
3. Date: 08/06/2017	Time: 12.30	Watch: Green

<p>4. Training Aims & Objectives: (e.g. What skills/knowledge you expect crews/officers to learn or demonstrate)</p> <p>To test crews ability to deal effectively with a complex basement incident, using correct procedures, safe systems of work, correct incident command, SDBA, entry control and effective communications. Initial appliance attendance information gathering will be examined as will access to the operational risk database through the mobile data terminal.</p> <p>Documents from the premise information box should be sought and utilised if appropriate.</p> <p>Basement procedure should be implemented although the buildings manager has requested no water to be used therefore the exercise will be dry.</p>
<p>5. Scenario: (eg. Fire in Youth Hostel of 3 floors-Crews to locate & extinguish fire on 1st floor, search smokelogged building for casualties etc)</p> <p>Automatic fire alarm actuating and smoke reported coming from basement entrance doorway.</p> <p>Contractors believed to have been working on plant machinery in the morning. Contractor's van still on site, contractors manager has arrived but no contact can be made with contractors via mobile telephone.</p> <p>Manager reports there are three contractors</p>
<p>Sketch plan attached :- <input checked="" type="checkbox"/></p>

6. Sequence of events: (eg. List appliances in order of attendance and the tasks that you expect crews and officers to perform.)

Attending; G271, G272, G382, A401 to be held at (later) designated RVP until called on.

Appliance commander of G272 to arrive first. Expectations are for initial information gathering using the Decision Making Model and making use of local knowledge. Assessment of immediate resource requirements to be undertaken.

Appliance commander of G272 to brief on coming WM of G271. Priority message and informative to be formulated and initial incident command established together with RVP, designation of ICP and augmented supply to base pump.

A401 and G382 to arrive as make up appliances and are to be briefed by incident commander as to their rolls.

Stage two entry control to be considered and implemented if resources allow.

Aim will be search and rescue of unaccounted contractors.

BA wearers will have to descend two flights of a concrete staircase with dry hose. Good BA practice and safe manoeuvring will be put into practice and overseen by safety officers.

Hose management will be required and again overseen by safety officers.

7. Attendance Details		
(a) Appliances: G271, G272, A401, G382		
Stand By Appliance Details:		
(b) Incident Commander of Exercise: Watch Manager Ricketts		
(c) Other Officers: To be confirmed		
(d) Safety Officers: To be confirmed		
(e) Lead Observers: To be confirmed	(to collate observers sheets and complete 5533)	
(f) Observers: To be confirmed		
(g) Other agencies involved: Point of contact Janice Wray, Health and Safety Manager, Kensington and Chelsea.		
(h) Assembly point and time: 12.30 at adjacent leisure centre)		
(i) Method of call/mobilising: Hand held radio		
8 Debrief – Venue & Chair: On site PRO		
	Date: 08/06/2017	Time: 14.30hrs
9 PRC – Venue & Chair: N/A		
	Date:	Time:
10. Training Event Approved/Comment by Station Manager:		
		Date:

11. Comment by Borough Commander :			Date:
12. Circulation List:			
1. Organising Officer	Dean Ricketts	7. SSSO's	Claiton Murray
2. Station Manager	Nicholas Davis		
3. Relevant Borough Commander	Paul Kavanagh		
4. ORT	Yes		
5. Health & Safety	Yes		
6. Local FBU Secretary	Yes		



LONDON FIRE BRIGADE

Department Name	Operations
Risk Assessment for	Grenfell Tower, Grenfell Road, London, W11 1TG
User Department:	Fire Stations
Created by:	Watch Manager Dean Ricketts (to be reviewed as necessary)
Approved by:	

Document History

Version	Date of Issue	Author(s)	Reason for Issue
1	02/05/2017	Dean Ricketts	Four pump local exercise, new venue - first issue.

Generic Assumptions

The following generic assumptions have been made for

RISK ASSESSMENT			
Description of activity, process or equipment assessed and associated documentation:	Basement	Date prepared:	02/05/2017
Associated documentation:	Plans to follow (now attached)	Review Date:	

Ref. No.	Hazard	Risk	Person at Risk	Initial Rating – No Controls				Existing Control Measures	Amended Rating - Controlled				Tolerable	Further measures required if risk not tolerable
				Sev	L	R	Rating H,M,L		Sev	L	R	Rating H,M,L		
1	Working in semi dark area	injury	all	3	3	9	M	Safety Officers placed throughout	3	3	9	M	Y	
2	Slips, trips and falls	injury	all	3	3	9	M	PPE, BA procedures, safe movement, stair procedures	2	2	4	L	Y	
3	Live plant room	injury	all	3	2	6	L	Excluded area - marked by barrier tape	2	2	4	L	Y	
4	Out of bounds areas	injury	all	2	2	4	L	Metal staircase, safety officer in place	2	2	4	L	Y	
5	Hose management	injury	all	3	3	9	M	Briefings by committing officer. Safe movement.	2	3	6	L	Y	
6	Casualty handling	injury	all	3	3	9	M	Manual handling techniques applied.	2	3	6	L	Y	
7	Communications	Loss of comms	all	2	2	4	L	Comms checked prior to entry, spare radios and batteries available. Safety officers to monitor.	2	2	4	L	Y	
8	Fire alarm actuating	evacuation	all	1	2	2	L	Safety officers to observe break glass call points.	1	2	2	L	Y	
9	Welfare	Hygiene / dehydration	all	2	3	6	M	Fresh water to be made available.	2	2	4	L	Y	
10	Vehicle movement	injury	all	2	3	6	L	Marshalling officer to be appointed prior to commencement of exercise.	2	2	4	L	Y	

				Initial Rating –No Controls				Amended Rating - Controlled				Tolerable	
Ref. No.	Hazard	Risk	Person at Risk	Sev	L	R	Rating H,M,L	Existing Control Measures	Sev	L	R	Rating H,M,L	Further measures required if risk not tolerable

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Ranking risks is necessary in order to identify their relative importance. The degree of risk associated with a particular hazard depends on the likelihood of it causing an accident and the probable severity of the consequence of such an accident. The focus in applying this methodology is the risk faced by a single typical member of the Occupation responsible for carrying out the task giving rise to the hazard.

This ranking system involves classifying likelihood (in terms of frequency) and severity each on a five point scale and then multiplying them both together to give the risk ranking as follows:

This matrix gives possible ranking values as follows:

RISK = SEVERITY x LIKELIHOOD

The ranking values can then be grouped into three broad classes of risk:

		RATING
Critical Risks	16 – 25	HIGH
Significant Risks	8 – 15	MEDIUM
Minor Risks	1 – 7	LOW

		SEVERITY				
		5 Single or multiple fatalities	4 Major disabling injury	3 Injury resulting in 3 or more days off	2 Minor Injury	1 Accident or near miss with no harm arising
LIKELIHOOD	5 Very likely to occur	25	20	15	10	5
	4 Probable	20	16	12	8	4
	3 Possible	15	12	9	6	3
	2 Remote	10	8	6	4	2
	1 Improbable	5	4	3	2	1

RISK TERMINOLOGY

Term	Definition
Accident	An unplanned and uncontrolled event which gives rise to harm.
Consequence or impact	The outcome of an accident.
Controls	Measures that may be introduced with the intention of reducing risk.
Harm	Any kind of safety loss, including fatalities and injuries

Term	Definition
Likelihood (L)	The number of occasions on which a given event is expected to occur over a given time.
Mitigation	Reduction in risk due to the introduction of risk controls.
Rating	The rate given to the control measures associated with the hazard and risk; either High, Medium or Low
Result (Res)	The result based on the existing control measures or prior to implementing further control measures, in order to reclassify the rating to achieve the desired result. Being either: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ 'H' High Risk ▪ 'M' Medium Risk ▪ 'L' Low Risk

Hazard	Anything with the potential to cause harm (or loss).
Incident/ Near miss	An unplanned and uncontrolled event that does not give rise to harm, but which under different circumstances could have resulted in an accident.

Risk (R)	A combination of the likelihood of the harm occurring and the severity of the consequences.
Severity (Sev)	A measure of the significance of consequences.

-01 - Proposed Basement 1-50
1:50

