

Grenfell Tower Background Information

Jobs on File No: 12/020696

<u>Job No.</u>	<u>Type</u>	<u>Date Completed</u>
1028392	Fire Safety Audit	09/07/2010
1057071	Goodwill Advice -General Public	23/11/2010
1112725	Fire Safety Audit	16/03/2011
1300020	Goodwill Advice -General Public	02/01/2013
1412357	Fire Safety Audit	24/03/2014
1414358	Informal Notification of Deficiencies	24/03/2014
1456940	Building Control Consultation	06/01/2015
1607567	Building Control Consultation	10/03/2016
1645168	Fire Safety Audit	17/11/2016
1656769	Informal Notification of Deficiencies	17/11/2016

There 4 audits since 2010, 2 of which have been resulted in 2 NOD's being issued, please find details of the articles and the timelines involved.

Points of interest :-

- Gas Pipe correspondence dated 22/03/2017 (attached)
- Goodwill Advice regarding concerns of Brigade access due to parking 21/12/2012 (attached)

Ms J Wray
Health and Safety Manager
Kensington and Chelsea TMO
292a Kensal Road
London
W10 5BE

London Fire and Emergency Planning
Authority runs the London Fire Brigade

Date 17 November 2016
Our Ref 12/020696/NM

Dear Ms J Wray

**REGULATORY REFORM (FIRE SAFETY) ORDER 2005: NOTIFICATION OF FIRE SAFETY
DEFICIENCIES**

Premises: Grenfell Tower , Lancaster West Estate, London W11 1TG

The Authority's Inspectors have recently carried out an inspection of the above-mentioned premises. During the inspection, it was noted that some fire safety matters require attention to reduce the risk of fire and/or reasonably ensure the safety of people using the premises. These matters need to be addressed in order to comply with Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005 (the Fire Safety Order). The matters that need to be addressed, together with the Authority's recommendations about the actions you should take are explained in the attached schedule. We recommend that action should be taken by **18 May 2017**.

If you are in any doubt about what you need to do to comply with the Fire Safety Order; or if there is anything in the schedule that you do not understand or need further explanation of then please contact the Inspector named at the end of this letter. If you are dissatisfied in any way with the response given please ask to speak to the Team Leader quoting the above reference.

You may also wish to know that fire safety guidance for businesses can be found on the Authority's web-site at www.london-fire.gov.uk under the heading 'Fire safety at work'. Additionally, guidance on general fire precautions and how to comply with the Fire Safety Order can be found at www.Gov.uk under the heading 'Fire safety law and guidance documents for business'.

When undertaking fire safety works at your premises you may need to seek approval for what you are going to do. Examples of this would include:

- any building works for which you are obliged to notify or seek the approval of Building Control;
- if your premises have a listed heritage status, approval from the local authority conservation officer; or
- if your premises are licenced then you may need to consult the relevant licensing or approvals authority.
- It is your responsibility to consult the relevant bodies and obtain any necessary approvals.

I would ask you to note that as well as placing people at risk, operating premises without having adequate general fire precaution in place to remove or reduce fire risk and to ensure people can safely escape if a fire does occurs can result in a criminal offence being committed. This letter and its associated schedule are consequently issued without prejudice to any legal action the Authority may subsequently take regarding failures to comply with the Fire Safety Order.

Yours faithfully,

for Assistant Commissioner (Fire Safety)

Directorate of Operations

FSR-AdminSupport@london-fire.gov.uk

Enc: Form FS03_01b Legislation Extracts
Form FS03_01c Schedule
Form FS03_06 Definitions of standard terms

Reply to Inspecting Officer Michele McHugh

Direct T [REDACTED]

Notes to accompany the Notification of Deficiencies schedule.

Important information to consider before taking remedial steps:

1. Certain terms written in BLOCK CAPITALS in the attached schedule are standard terms defined in "Definitions of standard terms used in means of escape requirements" which form part of this schedule.
2. Officers of the Authority may visit your premises again to check on the action you have taken.
3. **Notwithstanding any consultation undertaken by the fire authority, before you make any alterations to the premises, you must apply for local authority building control department approval (and/or the approval of any other bodies having a statutory interest in the premises) if their permission is required for those alterations to be made.**
4. There may be suitable alternative safety measures to those detailed in this schedule, which would meet the requirements of the Order. If you wish to propose or discuss any alternative measures you should get in touch with the person named as the contact above, before you take any action, to ensure that your proposed measures are deemed satisfactory by the Authority.
5. Remedial steps must be undertaken by a competent person who has sufficient training, experience, knowledge or other qualities to enable him or her to properly undertake them.
6. We recommend that remedial steps are undertaken in accordance with the appropriate British or European Standards, or recognised industry guidance.

THE REGULATORY REFORM (FIRE SAFETY) ORDER 2005

Your rights when Fire Safety Inspecting Officers take action.

The fire authority has a duty to enforce the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005.

If an Inspector:

tells you to do something - you have a right to a verbal and written explanation of what needs to be done and why.

Intends to take immediate action - for example by issuing an enforcement notice this will include a written explanation either forming part of the notice or by separate letter.

Issues a formal notice - you will be told in writing about your right to appeal to a magistrates' court. You will be told:

- ◆ how to appeal;
- ◆ where and within what period an appeal may be brought; and
- ◆ that action required by a prohibition/restriction notice is not suspended while an appeal is pending unless the court so directs.
- ◆ that action required by an enforcement notice is suspended while an appeal is pending.

Issues a Notification of Fire Safety Deficiencies - full discussion should have taken place and agreed improvements to bring the premises up to minimal standards should be formulated. A Notification of Fire Safety Deficiencies carries no statutory force but may result in formal action being considered if the agreed improvements do not take place.

The procedures and rights above provide ways for you to have your views heard. If you are not happy with the inspecting officer's action you should contact the Team Leader on the telephone number shown at the head of the covering letter in the first instance.

ENVIRONMENT AND SAFETY INFORMATION ACT 1988

SECTION 4 - PROTECTION OF TRADE SECRETS

The above Act requires the London Fire and Emergency Planning Authority to maintain public registers of notices issued under Article 30 of the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005, (other than those which impose requirements or prohibitions solely for the protection of persons at work) and Sections 21 and 22 of the Health and Safety at Work etc, Act 1974.

Provisions are made within the Act for persons on whom the above notices are served to appeal against any proposed entry in the register which may disclose "trade secrets" or "secret manufacturing processes".

Entries in the register are required to be made after the period for appeal against the notice expires or after any appeal is disposed of.

If you feel that any such entry would disclose information about a trade secret or secret manufacturing process you may write to the Fire Authority within a period of 14 days following the service of the notice, requesting exclusion of these details (see Section 4 of the 1988 Act).

SCHEDULE OF FIRE SAFETY AUDIT OBSERVATIONS

FILE 12/020696/NM
REFERENCE:

OCCUPIER/AGENT: DEFAULT PROPERTY

ADDRESS: GRENFELL TOWER,
LANCASTER WEST
ESTATE
LONDON
W11 1TG

Article	Issue	Action(s) to be taken
Article 11	At the time of the audit your preventative and protective measures had not been planned, organised, controlled monitored or reviewed where required. It was found that there were multiple items in the common parts, several fire doors did not fit fully into their frames and there was a breach in your services duct.	Arrangements identified as not suitably addressed must be effectively planned, organised, controlled, monitored or reviewed.
Article 17(1)	At the time of the audit you had not ensured that a suitable system of maintenance was in place in your premises. It was found that several of the fire doors protecting your escape staircase did not close fully into their frame.	Arrange initial and on-going maintenance to ensure fire safety measures are kept in an efficient state, working order and good repair. This can be achieved by regularly checking the fire doors and the their self closers on your escape stairs to ensure they close fully into their frame and if they do not taking appropriate action.
Article 17(1)	The corridors, lobbies and stairs used for access to and from flats in the premises (the access route(s)) are intended for use by relevant persons as a PROTECTED ROUTE. This route should provide a safe means of escape in event of fire and must be maintained in an efficient state, in efficient working order and good repair. During audit it was found that the responsible person for management of the access route has not prevented or addressed deficiencies in the fire resistance of the PROTECTED ROUTE and/or required rectification of defects that have arisen in, and/or alterations made to the protection to the access route. The PROTECTED ROUTE has been compromised by the fitting of	Ensure the access corridor is returned to its intended state as a PROTECTED ROUTE to afford protection from fire in a flat to relevant persons who may require use of that corridor for safe escape from the premises in case of fire. Remedial work that may be necessary for this purpose, must be assessed and completed by a competent person who is practised in application of the relevant standards for means of escape. Your attention is drawn to the provisions of subsections (2), (3) and (4) of Article 17 of the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005 in the following extracts of legislation. You are advised that walls in PROTECTED ROUTES should have a minimum of 60 minutes fire resistance. Openings in the walls leading to accommodation off a PROTECTED ROUTE (including doors in

	doors that do not self close. Flats 44 and 153 were checked at audit and did not self close.	entrance ways should be of a minimum 30 minutes FIRE RESISTANCE and should self close. Means the responsible person could use to comply with Article 17 (1) may include enforcing terms of lease and Landlord and Tenant/ Property legislation as lessor/owner.
Article 14	At the time of the audit the emergency routes or exits were inadequate. It was found that various items were stored in the common parts, including a mobility scooter which was being charged through the letter box.	Ensure adequate emergency routes and exits, for use by relevant persons in the premises, are available and can be safely and effectively used at all relevant times. This can be achieved by removing the items from the common parts and providing an alternative means for the mobility scooter to be charged.
Article 14	At the time of the audit the emergency routes or exits were inadequate. It was found that doors to flats 44 & 153 did not self close.	Ensure adequate emergency routes and exits, for use by relevant persons in the premises, are available and can be safely and effectively used at all relevant times. This can be achieved by ensuring that all fire doors on the means of escape route self close.
Article 8	At the time of the audit the general fire precautions required to prevent fire and smoke spread via shafts, risers or ducting were inadequate. It was found that the top corner of one of the panels protecting your services duct on the 8th floor was damaged and broken creating a breach in the service duct void.	Take the general fire precautions required to prevent fire and smoke spread by repairing or replacing the broken panel.
Article 15(1)	At the time of the audit your procedures to be followed in the event of serious and imminent danger were inadequate. It was found that Fire Action Notices were not displayed in your common parts.	Adequate procedures for serious and imminent danger and for danger areas should be established and followed. This can be achieved by displaying Fire Action Notices in the common parts of your building.



The Company Secretary
Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea
Tenant Management Organisation Limited
Unit A
Kensal Road
London
W10 5BE

London Fire and Emergency Planning
Authority runs the London Fire Brigade

Date 24th March 2014
Our Ref 12/20696/jf

Dear Sir/Madam,

**REGULATORY REFORM (FIRE SAFETY) ORDER 2005
NOTIFICATION OF FIRE SAFETY DEFICIENCIES**

Premises: GRENfell TOWER, LANCASTER WEST ESTATE, LONDON, W11 1TQ

A recent inspection of the above premises by a fire authority officer revealed that certain conditions specified in and required by the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005, were being contravened. The Authority considers that the step(s) detailed in the attached schedule need(s) to be taken in order to comply with the above legislation.

The steps should be completed by **5th May 2014** when a further inspection may be carried out.

You should note that failure to comply with any requirement of the legislation is an offence and the person responsible is liable to prosecution. This letter and attached schedule are issued without prejudice to any legal action which may subsequently be taken regarding the failures to comply with the Legislation.

Your attention is drawn to the notes attached.

The contents of this notice are without prejudice to any requirements or recommendations that may be made by the Authority under the Petroleum (Consolidation) Act 1928, or either the local authority or the Health and Safety Executive under any other Act of Parliament or Regulation for which they are the enforcing authority. Approval will normally be required under the Building Regulations for any building works for which you are obliged to notify the local Building Control Officer under the Building Regulations 2010 or an Approved Inspector under the Building (Approved Inspectors etc) Regulations, 2010.

If you are in any doubt as to the obligations placed upon you by the legislation, or if there is any relevant matter upon which you require clarification you may contact the person named below. If you are dissatisfied in any way with the response given please ask to speak to the Team Leader quoting the above reference.

Yours faithfully,

for Assistant Commissioner (Fire Safety Regulation)

Deputy Commissioner's Directorate

FSRSouth@london-fire.gov.uk

Enc: Form FS03_01b Legislation Extracts

c.c Janice Wray, Tenant Management Organisation Ltd, Unit A, 292 Kensal Road, London, W10 5BE

Reply to Matthew Ramsey

Direct T [REDACTED]

SCHEDULE

PREMISES: GRENFELL TOWER, LANCASTER WEST ESTATE, LONDON, W11 1TQ

File Number: 12/20696

Sheet 1 of 1

This schedule should be read in conjunction with the Authority's letter dated **24th March 2014**.

The condition(s) specified in the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005, were being contravened and the following step(s) need(s) to be taken in order to comply with the above legislation:

Article	Area of Concern	Steps Considered necessary to remedy the contravention.
Article 11(1)	Failure in the effective monitoring of preventive and protective measures. For Example. A significant number (approx. 25%) of automatically opening vents within the common parts of the premises were found not to be in working order. No suitable system of monitoring was in evidence to identify deficiencies with the smoke ventilation system.	Implement effective monitoring of preventive and protective measures.
Article 17(1)	Failure to ensure that the premises and any facilities, equipment and devices are maintained in an efficient state, in effective working order and in good repair. Approximately 20% of Emergency Lighting Luminaires did not appear to be in working condition as LED indicators were not lit. Approximately 25% AOV ventilation units within the common residential lobbies were not held in the closed position indicating the system has not been maintained in effective working condition.	Ensure that adequate maintenance systems are in place to ensure that the premises and any facilities, equipment and devices are maintained in an efficient state, in effective working order and in good repair.
Article 21	Failure to ensure employees receive adequate safety training. Staff on site did not appear familiar with actions to be taken in response to the fire safety system Alarm and Indicator panels situated in and around the reception area. At the time of audit a detector in an adjacent block had been sent	Implement/review training programme to ensure employees receive adequate safety training.

	into pre alarm mode as indicated on the AOV activation / Alarm Panel however no action had been taken to investigate.	
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THE REGULATORY REFORM (FIRE SAFETY) ORDER 2005

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LOUGHER, HANNAH

From: CUNNINGHAM, STEVEN
Sent: 21 December 2012 11:12
To: OHARA, COLLETTE
Subject: RE: Brigade Access to Grenfell Tower.

Hi Collette,

I have just sent an email to Janice following a site visit at her request yesterday. I found no issues at the time and clarified what we would expect. Only issue was the Fire Gate at the front was open but no one was parking there, it is open for rubbish removal. Janice seems to be getting a lot of residents complaining about this despite the fact they are getting new windows and boilers out of the new development.

It is quite a small plot of land for an Academy and sports centre.

I will get crews to keep an eye as the construction develops.

Best Regards and Happy Xmas.

Steven Cunningham
Station Manager G27
North Kensington
[REDACTED]

From: OHARA, COLLETTE
Sent: 21 December 2012 11:01
To: CUNNINGHAM, STEVEN
Cc: COMERY, NICOLAS
Subject: Brigade Access to Grenfell Tower.
Importance: High

Hi Steve

Hope you are well.

I have received a call from a resident within the Lancaster West estate who has advised of their concerns regarding Brigade access to Grenfell Tower. He said that particular, in the evening and night times, vehicles delivering various services etc. block the brigade access to the tower.

I think his main concern is that there are major works taking pace in Kensington Academy and Leisure Centre, consequently the car park is closed. This means the cars which would have park in the car park are now forced to park on the main roads. This is then having a knock on effect that service vehicles are parking in the area designated for Brigade access.

I have advised the resident that the stations do carry out familiarisation visits to blocks like these all the time and are quite possibly aware of the changes to the area. I did tell him, however, that I would pass on his concerns. I also advised that if the station are not aware of these changes then I would recommend a visit to the site to make sure the fire fighters are happy with the access to the tower and in fact the whole of Lancaster West Estate.

If the station do carry out a visit and they find there are problems you are welcome to contact Jancie Wray from the TMO directly on tel no: [REDACTED] Likewise you are welcome to call me and let me know and I will see what I can do.

Thank you in advance for your time.

Kind Regards

Collette O'Hara

Fire Safety Inspecting Officer
London Fire Brigade

Kensington and Chelsea Borough Team Office: [REDACTED]

Ext: [REDACTED]

E: Collette.O'Hara@london-fire.gov.uk

LOUGHER, HANNAH

From: DEWIS, BEN
Sent: 22 March 2017 10:01
To: FSR-AdminSupport
Cc: BURTON, REBECCA
Subject: FW: Seriously exposed newly installed gas pipe line throughout the entire staircase of Grenfell Tower poses extremely serious health and safety Risk. (Case file not found - emailed)

Dear Admin,

Please upload this email trail to the portal, file number – **12/020696**

Regards,

Ben Dewis
Fire Safety Inspecting Officer
Fire Safety Regulation

London Fire Brigade
169 Union Street London SE1 0LL

T [REDACTED]
M [REDACTED]
E ben.dewis@london-fire.gov.uk

london-fire.gov.uk



From: DEWIS, BEN
Sent: 22 March 2017 10:00
To: 'Edward Daffarn'
Subject: RE: Seriously exposed newly installed gas pipe line throughout the entire staircase of Grenfell Tower poses extremely serious health and safety Risk.

Dear Mr Daffarn,

Thank you for your email, I am not in a position to comment as the London Fire Brigade are not the Enforcing Authority when it comes to gas installations, I would advise you contact the gas board.

Kind regards,

Ben Dewis
Fire Safety Inspecting Officer
Fire Safety Regulation

London Fire Brigade
169 Union Street London SE1 0LL

T [REDACTED]
E ben.dewis@london-fire.gov.uk

london-fire.gov.uk



From: Edward Daffarn [REDACTED]

Sent: 20 March 2017 11:30

To: DEWIS, BEN

Subject: Fw: Seriously exposed newly installed gas pipe line throughout the entire staircase of Grenfell Tower poses extremely serious health and safety Risk.

Dear Mr Dewis,

I am requesting that the London Fire Brigade come and inspect the new gas pipework that has been installed in Grenfell Tower.

The Vice-Chair of the Grenfell Tower Leaseholders Association has made the following concerns public and these health and safety fears are backed up by a number of tenants.

We have also been informed that the National Grid will not be returning to Grenfell Tower to re-earth the power supply to newly installed meters.

Please can you keep this correspondence private and confidential between ourselves as I fear repercussions from my landlord if they discover the source of this complaint.

Kind regards,

Edward Daffarn

Grenfell Action Group

From: Grenfell Tower Leaseholder's Association <GrenfellLeaseholdersAssociation@hotmail.co.uk>

Sent: 07 March 2017 18:33

To: pmaddison@kctmo.org.uk; cllr.feilding-mellen@rbkc.com

Cc: cllr.paget-brown@rbkc.gov.uk; Robert Black; staffordt@parliament.uk; laura.johnson@rbkc.gov.uk;

Amanda.Johnson@rbkc.gov.uk; abosman@kctmo.org.uk; abosnjakszekeres@kctmo.org.uk;

[shaylorc@parliament.uk](mailto:(shaylorc@parliament.uk)); [REDACTED] clwilliams@kctmo.org.uk; Judith Blakeman; Judith Blakeman;

cllr.atkinson@rbkc.gov.uk; cllr.lasharie@rbkc.gov.uk; [tim.davis@rbkc.gov.uk](mailto:(tim.davis@rbkc.gov.uk)); cllrdentcoad@rbkc.gov.uk;

scrutiny@rbkc.gov.uk; Eddie daffarn; [REDACTED] Daniel Wood; [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] info@platinum-c.co.uk;

[REDACTED] Miguel Manuel Ferreira Alves;

[REDACTED] Ilick Burton; Shanti Patel; [REDACTED]

Samuel Anyanwu; [REDACTED] Grenfell Tower Leaseholder's Association;

nbartholomew@kctmo.org.uk; mwilliams@kctmo.org.uk; jjones@kctmo.org.uk; Peter Bradury; Anthony Parkes;

Derek Myers; [REDACTED]

info@octaviahousing.org.uk; ksingh@kctmo.org.uk

Subject: Seriously exposed newly installed gas pipe line throughout the entire staircase of Grenfell Tower poses extremely serious health and safety Risk.

Dear Mr Peter Madison,

We hope this email find you very well.

We are writing to the KCTMO as our managing agent appointed by our landlord the RBKC as well as to our landlord to explain to the wider audiences and the recipients of this email in relation to the attached picture of the gas pipe line recently installed by the national grid at Grenfell Tower.

The KCTMO manages over 10,000 housing stock for the RBKC that's includes high rise building such as Grenfell Tower.

Could you please kindly provide us the proof or evidences that anywhere at RBKC or in London or in the United Kingdom that gas pipe line exposed such a manner and installed beside the staircase(only fire escape) where there is no air can escape whatsoever. And more importantly the staircase of Grenfell Tower is the main breeding ground and where the vandalism and antisocial are daily occurrences. This newly installed exposed gas pipe line is easy target of vandalism and one incident can have serious catastrophic consequence for the whole building.

Could you please kindly provide us the health and safety certificate authorised that the KCTMO or the National Grid that they obtained permission before installing the gas pipe going through the entire staircases of the Building?

The logic along dictates that, its poses serious health and safely risk for the entire building and it would be very interesting to hear the expert opinion as well.

Finally, the KCTMO has habit of shooting the messenger because they may NOT agree with the message BUT we strongly feels that its a serious health and safety concern needs clarify either from our Landlord or from their managing agent the KCTMO.

On a separate note, we are assured by our local councillors of Notting dale and we quote from the email sent to us on dated 16th February 2017

"The Notting Dale councillors are dealing with this, along with everyone else involved at the TMO".

We wait to hear from urgently.

Best Wishes

Tunde Awoderu

The Vice Chair of Grenfell Tower

Email disclaimer

The information in this email may contain confidential or privileged materials.
Please read the full email disclaimer notice at london-fire.gov.uk/EmailDisclaimer

For fire safety advice please go to london-fire.gov.uk/YourSafety

LOUGHER, HANNAH

From: PARKER, MALCOLM
Sent: 04 March 2016 14:56
To: building.control@rbkc.gov.uk
Cc: FSR-AdminSupport
Subject: D.Job No.1607567 - FS12/020696 - Grenfell Tower Grenfell Road London W11 1TH
Attachments: Grenfell Tower(RBKC)2.pdf

Dear Mr.J.Allen,

Please find attached a copy of our response to your building control consultation letter dated 05 February 2016.

Yours sincerely,

Malcolm Parker FRS

Inspecting officer

Westminster East FS Team

Fire Safety Regulation SW

London Fire Brigade

██████████ / extension ██████████

Email: malcolm.parker@london-fire.gov.uk

visit our website at www.london-fire.gov.uk

Email disclaimer

The information in this email may contain confidential or privileged materials.
Please read the full email disclaimer notice at london-fire.gov.uk/EmailDisclaimer

For fire safety advice please go to london-fire.gov.uk/YourSafety



RBK&C Building Control ,
Town Hall,
Hornton Street,
London. W8 7NX

London Fire and Emergency Planning
Authority runs the London Fire Brigade

Date 04 March 2016
Our Ref FS012/020696
Your Ref FP/14/03563

Dear Sir/Madam

RECORD OF CONSULTATION/ADVICE GIVEN

**REGULATORY REFORM (FIRE SAFETY) ORDER 2005 ARTICLE 45
THE BUILDING (APPROVED INSPECTORS ETC.) REGULATIONS 2010**

SCOPE OF WORKS: New Works to Grenfell Tower

PREMISES: GRENFELL TOWER GRENFELL ROAD LONDON W11 1TH

DRAWINGS : AS SUBMITTED

The Brigade has been consulted with regard to the above-mentioned premises and makes the following observations:

- **The Brigade is satisfied with the proposals as shown .**


Other comments:

- **A comprehensive Risk Assessment must be carried out to cover all the changes that are being carried out.**

This Authority strongly recommends that sprinklers are considered for new developments and major alterations to existing premises, particularly where the proposals relate to schools and care homes. Sprinkler systems installed in buildings can significantly reduce the damage caused by fire and the consequential cost to businesses and housing providers, and can reduce the risk to life. The Brigade opinion is that there are opportunities for developers and building owners to install sprinkler systems in order to save money, save property and protect the lives of occupier. Please note that it is our policy to regularly advise our elected Members about how many cases there have been where we have recommended sprinklers and what the outcomes of those recommendations were. These quarterly reports to our Members are public documents which are available on our website.

Any queries regarding this letter should be addressed to **Malcolm Parker**. If you are dissatisfied in any way with the response given, please ask to speak to the Team Leader quoting our reference.

Yours faithfully,



Assistant Commissioner (Fire Safety Regulation)

Reply to Malcolm Parker

The London Fire Brigade promotes the installation of sprinkler suppression systems, as there is clear evidence that they are effective in suppressing and extinguishing fires; they can help reduce the numbers of deaths and injuries from fire, and the risk to firefighters.

LFEPA-LONDON FIRE BRIGADE- REPORT FORM

Address of Premises: TMO
Charles House
Kensington High Street

Job No.:
File No.: 12/015318

PART A (Section to explain the involvement of the Brigade)

REQUEST FOR ADVICE (**Note:** AFRs to be recorded on FS_G01_01 – Available as Word Letter Wizard template)

From: _____
(Name and designation e.g. manager, secretary etc.)

Tel No: _____

Details taken by: O'Hara

Date: _____

PART B (Only complete this section if inspection carried out. Otherwise, go to Part C).

Date of Inspection: _____ Inspecting Officer: _____

Carried out under: *Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005 /Licensing Act 2003/ Gambling Act 2005
Other (state which): _____

1 Reason for inspection _____

2 Licence type (if application) _____

3 Date 28 days time limit expires (Licensing) _____

4 Licensing: No. of exits: _____ No. of persons on premises at any one time _____

	Yes	Satisfactory	Unsatisfactory	No
Exit Signs	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Secondary Lighting	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Fire appliances	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Is the MOE satisfactory	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

5 Should representation be made? (Licensing only) **Yes** ☐ **No** ☐

6 Previous requirements/ recommendations completed? ☐ ☐

7 Alterations to premises since last inspection? ☐ ☐

8 Plans attached for (tick which): File ☐ Owner ☐ Occupier ☐
LA ☐ Other (state) ☐

9 Consultation required with local authority? Yes ☐ No ☐

10 Time allowed for completion of works _____

11 Extension of time allowed (if follow up visit) Yes ☐ No ☐

12 Length of extension _____

* delete as appropriate

PART C: (To include notes concerning action required, notes of meetings, relevant details, structural features, conclusions, telephone conversations, etc.).

General Notes:

Overview from May 08 to Nov 09

The Tennant Management Organisation (TMO) are the Arms Length Company for Kensington Chelsea Council managing their entire housing stock which comprises of approx 400 properties.

Approx May 2008 IO O'Hara visited a variety of premises managed by the TMO. Each visit highlighted the same problem; whilst a Fire Risk Assessment (FRA) was available it only identified the measures a property had in place. There were no significant findings stating whether these measures were acceptable or not. I clearly explained to Janice Wray the TMO Health & Safety Adviser and person who had carried out the FRA what the expectation was for the assessments. Supplied her with GEN 66's and directed her towards the www.communities.gov.uk website for further detail. Repeatedly she advised me that she understood.

Over a period of approximately 6 months I identified that the FRA's had not improved. I advised my team leader Angus Sangster, who took over the role in Oct 2008, that I had concerns regarding the FRA's. I asked TL Sangster to accompany me to Gilray House, Cremore estate, and then look at the FRA. He agreed to accompany me to a meeting I had with Janice Wray on the 26 January 2009 (please see the Gen 01 on Gilray house on Farynor regarding this).

At this meeting attended by Janice Wray, TL Sangster and I, clearly explained to Ms Wray the requirements for a FRA. Referred Ms Wray again to relevant documents regarding Risk Assessing. She advised her understanding.

A discussion also developed over a period of time and 2 particular meetings regarding the requirements of secondary means of escape from properties and separation between units in a property. Please see the following Gen 01: - Fire resisting separation and secondary means of escape

16 June 2009 IO Ryan audited two premises run by the TMO. Janice Wray provided him with a revised copy of the FRA that her department had been working upon. Please see FRA Whitchurch House. TL Sangster, IO Ryan and IO O'Hara all agreed that whilst it was more detailed it still failed to identify significant findings.

In one last attempt to get the TMO to achieve the minimum standard for the premises they are responsible for, I arranged to meet 2009 with Ms Wray, Adrian Bowman TMO Health & Safety Adviser, TL Sangster and I. Ms Wray suggested we meet on site at a premise she felt was their highest risk, 11-12 Colville Gardens. TL Sangster and IO O'Hara did have a discussion before the meeting as to what the next step will be if the TMO have still not resolved the issue of unsuitable FRA's. We both agreed that if no progress had been made then we would have little choice but to issue an Enforcement Notice

17 June 2009 - The property is a purpose built block, basement, ground +3. There is a question due to the age of the property whether there is the correct level of separation in place. There is a single staircase with no lobbies. At the top of the staircase there is an alternative route which comprises of a Jacobs ladder to the roof but does not lead anywhere. There is no AFA, emergency lighting, and some of the doors to the flats are not fire resisting. Whilst Ms Wray had identified a lot of the correct concerns within the premises she did not have the knowledge to identify any solutions. We questioned her as to the TMO's solution to this problem and TL Sangster and I agree that whilst MS Wray was doing her best she did not have the level of knowledge necessary to accomplish the task necessary. With this in mind TL Sangster advised Ms Wray that we would be issuing an Enforcement Notice asking for a competent person to carry out Risk Assessments.

18 June 2009 - TL Sangster received a telephone call from Alexis Correa Health and Safety Advisor for Kensington and Chelsea Council stating that they will be employing a Risk Assessor and putting money aside to implement all the works necessary. He asked if they do this will TL Sangster not issue Enforcement notice. TL Sangster agreed on the provision that the council/TMO provide us with a schedule of works.

9 July 2009 – Schedule received from Janice Wray. See email Fire Risk Assessment. Risk Criteria. TL Sangster advised Ms Wray that this was not acceptable and suggested a meeting to discuss the future partnership working. Meeting arranged for 6 August 2009.

6 August 09 – See minutes on Farynor

16 September 2009 – Meeting for LFB to meet Fire Risk Assessment consultants - Salvus. See minutes.

25 September 2009 - Meeting with Salvus at 9 and 11-12 Collvill Square. IO Sutcliff and IO O'Hara attended with 2 representatives from Salvus. Spoke with representatives regarding the process of carrying out the FRA. They advised that they will be looking at the property and any areas they have concerns they will highlight in the FRA and if it needs resolving ASAP and interim measures needed they will contact TMO immediately. IO O'Hara clearly advised the representative of the importance of doing an intrusive survey whenever there is a question regarding the separation within a premises particularly when defend in place is suggested. Salvus advised they would be doing this whenever they are unsure whether a premise is separated adequately. IO Sutcliff also clearly advised that when they are proposing a solution for example 'defend in place' situation they need to fully justify their reasoning in the FRA. This is needed particularly when there are properties like 9 and 11-12 Collvill Square where there is a question regarding the level of compartmentation. Salvus agreed this was something they would do.

6 November 2009 - Arranged a further meeting with TL Sangster, IO Sutcliff, IO O'Hara, Ms Wray, Pam Sedgwick Executive Director, Housing, Health and Adult Social Care and Robert Black Chief Executive of TMO.

- See minutes.

REMEMBER TO INFORM LOCAL STATION OF ANY OPERATIONAL ISSUES/RISKS (E.G. DANGEROUS SUBSTANCES, FIREFIGHTERS SWITCHES) USING FORM SFS:A020:a2a

PART D (I.O. to sign in all instances)

Admin to note:

FS_GEN_18 completed/amended?
(State Section(s) as appropriate)

☐ Yes

☐ No

Section(s):

I.O.'s signature O'Hara

Date: 16/11/09

Rank/Grade FRS C/D

TEAM LEADER'S COMMENTS (IF VETTED)

Signed _____

Date: _____

TMO Meeting – Fire Risk Assessments
Kensington and Chelsea Town Hall, Room 140
Thursday 6th August 2009
@ 1500hrs

Attendees: Jean Daintith – Executive Director (LB Kensington & Chelsea)
Laura Johnson – Housing Dept (LB Kensington & Chelsea)
John Walsh – LFB (Kensington & Chelsea Team)
Collette O'Hara – LFB (Kensington & Chelsea Team)
Brian Deans – LFB, Borough Commander (Kensington & Chelsea)
Angus Sangster – LFB, Team Leader (Kensington & Chelsea Team)
Keith Holloway – TMO Properties

Recorder: Jake Lawrence – LFB (Performance Management & Support Team)

1. Opening Statement:

Meeting began with all attendees being introduced and an understanding gained from Jean Daintith as to the ranking system within the brigade.

Jean Daintith expressed her concern the LFB were treating K&C Council differently to other boroughs. She also expressed a want to comply with current legislation.

Angus Sangster reassured her that K&C Council were not being treated any different to other housing providers or other borough councils. If any deficiencies are identified within properties then they are addressed with the managing agents.

Jean Daintith reaffirmed the Councils commitment to adhering to current legislation and making buildings safe. All parties agreed this was the main aim of the meeting.

2. Enforcement Notice(s):

Jean Daintith expressed her concern that the London Fire Brigade had considered serving an Enforcement Notice on the Council.

Angus Sangster (LFB) advised her that the decision to potentially do this had not been a simple one. The LFB have been in discussion with TMO since mid 2008, however the TMO offices in place lacked the competence to carry out adequate risk assessments.

3. Risk Categories:

Keith Holloway (TMO) stated that the TMO have risk categorised their high risk properties and found 50 that need looking at.

Collette O'Hara (LFB) questioned whether there were 50 or 110?

Keith Holloway (TMO) confirmed there are 110 individual properties and these would all be Risk Assessed with 12 months. He gave a copy of the high risk properties to Collette O'Hara.

Angus Sangster (LFB) asked Keith Holloway (TMO) about how TMO were going to base their risk categories of buildings. Keith Holloway (TMO) replied that it would be done via the consultants. Laura Johnson (Housing) asked about the cost implications that could arise out of the risk audits. Angus Sangster (LFB) replied that the RRO(Regulatory Reform Order) states, that buildings which fall within its remit, must come up to a required standard of fire safety. He stated that the LFB uses a sensible approach to work which is to be carried out. However, the LFB ultimately wants a 'safe building'. A point agreed by everyone present.

4. Best Practice

Angus Sangster (LFB) produced a possible example of best practice created by Croydon Council.

Keith Holloway (TMO) stated that TMO have started devising a plan for best practice for all the properties they have in K&C.

He agreed with the content of the letter and advised Angus Sangster that he would be happy to produce something similar. A copy of the letter was requested which Angus Sangster agreed to.

5. Fire Risk Assessment(s):

Angus Sangster (LFB) stated that the TMO risk assessments so far had not been up to a satisfactory standard. He explained that through conversations with the officers currently carrying out the Fire Risk Assessments he felt they did not have the level of understanding required.

Keith Holloway (TMO) explained that the fire risk assessments would be carried out by the consultant and that surveys had gone out to tender.

Angus Sangster (LFB) suggested the TMO show the LFB a copy of the proforma before risk assessments are carried out.

Keith Holloway (TMO) suggested it might be beneficial for LFB to meet with the chosen contractor before any risk assessments were completed.

Angus Sangster (LFB) confirmed he would be happy to do this.

Jean Daintith stated a desire that Kensington & Chelsea Council, TMO and LFB could reach a consensus on adequate risk assessments for TMO premises in the borough.

Laura Johnson (Housing) asked about what happens after the 30 most vulnerable TMO premises are risk assessed.

Keith Holloway (TMO) replied that once they have details of the necessary works they will prioritise this so that they can use their resources to address risk critical situations.

Angus Sangster (LFB) asked whether the Council and TMO felt that 3 years would be acceptable to carry out risk assessments of all the properties they are responsible for. Both Jean Daintith and Keith Holloway (TMO) agreed.

Angus Sangster (LFB) asked whether the Council and TMO felt that 5 years would be acceptable to carry out all the significant findings identified by the risk assessments for all the properties they are responsible for.

Both Jean Daintith and Keith Holloway (TMO) agreed.

Jean Daintith confirmed that she felt the time scales proposed were realistic for the work needed.

6. General Discussion:

Keith Holloway (TMO) asked about where the 'problem areas' may arise in TMO premises.

Angus Sangster (LFB) mentioned about flats and the one hour compartmentation. He stressed that few of the TMO buildings have fire doors or some do not have dry risers. Collette O'Hara (LFB) said this was one of the key problems with the TMO Risk Assessments so far had been the low level of knowledge as to whether a door should/is a fire door up to the correct standard.

7. Risk Critical Issues/ Interim measures.

Angus Sangster (LFB) used an example of Health and Safety at Work act to illustrate the point he was trying to make regarding employing appropriate interim measures to any risk critical issues that may arise from the Fire Risk Assessments.

Jean Daintith (Housing) was in agreement.

8. Review of Buildings by LFB:

Angus Sangster (LFB) said that the LFB would look at the first 5 risk assessments carried out by TMO.

Both Jean Daintith and Keith Holloway (TMO) agreed.

Angus Sangster (LFB) also suggested a meet with TMO every 4 months for the first year to review how things were proceeding.

Both Jean Daintith and Keith Holloway (TMO) agreed.

9. Evacuation Strategies:

Angus Sangster (LFB) stated that TMO tenants need to be given building specific information about their evacuation procedures. He acknowledged the potential impact this could have with residents particularly in relation to the 'defend in place' strategy.

He suggested an open approach with TMO tenants in order to try and make them feel more secure.

Laura Johnson (Housing) said general messages should be sent to tenants.

Collette O'Hara (LFB) agreed she felt this to be a good idea for if people were more aware of the importance of door closures for example they may be less likely to remove them.

Angus Sangster (LFB) stated he is in the process of speaking with all stations so that the crews will be able to relay people's fears in relation to the 'defend in place' strategy.

Angus Sangster (LFB) quoted Gilray House as an example. He said the premises had nine floors and no dry risers, no lobbies and the lifts were not working. He told Keith Holloway(TMO) to get the means of escape sorted out.

9.1 Escape strategies/Assembly Points

Angus Sangster (LFB) mentioned that from conversations he has had with TMO officers he has been advised there may be situations when an escape routes in a TMO premises does not lead to a place of final safety i.e. the pavement/streets. He advised those present that this was not classed as an acceptable evacuation strategy. He requested that if in the interim it used the TMO /Council should advise Brian Deans (LFB) so that he can organise an appropriate operational response.

10. General Discussion: (Timescales for Completion of Risk Assessments/Work(s) Completion)

Laura Johnson (Housing) again questioned the LFB's consistency in approaching social housing providers.

Brian Deans and Angus Sangster (LFB) informed the meeting that this type of major works will take on a national imperative and will not be limited to TMO owned properties only.

Jean Dainith (Housing) said she felt confident that TMO would deliver the work(s).

Laura Johnson (Housing) told the meeting that she had written to all Residential Social Landlords (RSL's) in the borough. She said she was asking them about what they were doing in regards to maintaining fire safety standards on their premises.

Keith Holloway (TMO) reiterated that TMO would complete their procurement programme by September 2009. The risk assessments would be completed over the following 12 months.

Angus Sangster (LFB) replied that he feels TMO need to develop the level of competence amongst their staff.

He also suggested a member of staff from the council / TMO could be seconded into the LFB in order to gain experience of fire safety procedures.

Note: A copy of the Croydon letter was given to all attendees.

11. AOB:

Angus Sangster (LFB) asked was there any other points that need raising?

Collette O'Hara (LFB) asked whether the TMO could categorise all of the properties they are responsible for into High Medium and Low risk soon this way they can be confident they are directing their resources at in the right direction from the beginning?

Keith Holloway (TMO) agreed.

Collette O'Hara (LFB) asked when did the Council / TMO feel the actual works could begin?

Keith Holloway (TMO) said it would have to be thrashed out prioritised accordingly so they are addressing the risk critical problems.

Collette O'Hara (LFB) re-affirmed that the Council / TMO would be submitting a proposal of future intention?

Both Jean Daintith and Keith Holloway (TMO) agreed.

Collette O'Hara (LFB) asked could this be done within six weeks from this meeting? Keith Holloway (TMO) agreed they would definitely be able to provide this within that time frame and hopefully even sooner. He also suggested a further meeting to discuss further detail would be beneficial. Angus Sangster (LFB) agreed this would be sensible.

Meeting Closed.

Housing Health and Adult Social Care
Kensington Town Hall, Hornton Street, LONDON, W8 7NX

Executive Director - Housing, Health and Adult Care Services
Jean Daintith

Chief Housing Officer
Laura Johnson

12/01/5318



THE ROYAL BOROUGH OF
**KENSINGTON
AND CHELSEA**

27 January 2010

Please ask for: Janice Wray
Telephone: [REDACTED]

e-mail: jwray@kctrno.org.uk

Address: 4th Floor, Charles House
375 Kensington High Street
LONDON
W14 8QH

Dear Mr Sangster,

Compliance with the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005

Further to our recent meeting at your offices with Pam Sedgwick, RBKC's Housing Client Side Manager and Janice Wray, the TMO's Health & Safety Advisor, we write to confirm our commitment to complying with this legislation and to set out our approach to achieving compliance.

You indicated in July 09 that we should aim to complete Fire Risk Assessments (FRAs) for the communal areas of all of the Council blocks within three years and to complete all works identified by the assessments as necessary for statutory compliance within five years. Jean Daintith, the Council's Executive Director and I as TMO Chief Executive agreed to this timeframe. However, specifically, jointly with RBKC and in liaison with your Fire Safety Team we have agreed to –

- Adopt a risk-based approach
- Agree a criteria for identifying, initially, the potentially high-risk blocks and subsequently the medium- and the low-risk properties
- Appoint a competent Fire Safety Consultancy partner to undertake the fire risk assessments at each of the 110 potentially high-risk blocks
- Seek a commencement date of September 2009 for the programme of FRAs at high-risk blocks and completion within 6 months

Direct Line: [REDACTED]
Fax: [REDACTED]
Email: laura.johnson@rbkc.gov.uk
Web: www.rbkc.gov.uk



**INVESTORS
IN PEOPLE**

- Evaluate the performance of the Fire Consultant and, resource-permitting, adopt the same approach to completing the FRAs of the medium and also the low-risk properties. Aim to undertake the programme of medium-risk FRAs at the conclusion of the high-risk programme. Aim to commence the low-risk programme immediately on completion of the medium-risk project.
- Formally introduce the Fire Consultant to your team and give you the opportunity to approve the Consultants approach and his proposed Proforma
- Invite your team to accompany the Fire Consultant on the assessments and subsequently to report back on their impressions
- Keep your team appraised of progress with the overall assessment programme and also with progress on completing the works identified as necessary for compliance with the Safety Order
- Invite your team to regular meetings where progress is monitored – believe that you asked for 4-monthly progress meetings.

Additionally, we can confirm that in order to effectively progress the recommendations from the assessment reports in a timely manner TMO officers have established a Working Group which meets every two weeks. This Working Group discusses in detail each report that is received and agrees a responsible person and a timescale to progress each action. As you know there are a significant number of recommendations in these reports, however, it is important for us to concentrate our resources on the higher priority work and to facilitate this we asked the Consultant to colour-code these recommendations: Specifically, work required to comply with statute is red, work required to comply with British Standards, best practice guidance etc. is amber and work recommended by the consultant is green. In the short-term we are, therefore, concentrating largely on the red recommendations in the first instance and then, resource-permitting, those coded amber.

Many recommendations can be progressed quickly and with relative ease. Examples of these are –

- minor repairs - can usually be carried out under our existing Response Repairs contract,
- storage within the communal areas - the Neighbourhood Officer will write to all residents giving them a date when clearance of any remaining stored items will be undertaken
- installation of signage
- provide evidence of existing planned maintenance contract as proof that emergency lighting, dry risers and other fire safety measures are being maintained in accordance with the British Standard
- review inspection regime at block
- inspect inaccessible loft area to ensure party wall is adequately fire-stopped – TMO surveyors can inspect


- Write to residents re-iterating fire procedure and outlining the main findings of the Fire Risk Assessment carried out at that block.

More major recommendations – particularly those which potentially require significant resources and / or policy changes – are referred to the TMO Executive Team by the Working Group. The TMO Executive Team will take a view on whether there is a need to discuss these with RBKC and seek additional funding etc. from them and advise the Working Group on what action to take.

We hope that this clarifies our position and our commitment to ensuring that the Council's residential blocks continue to be safe. We have set out the outcomes of many meetings and discussions you have had with ourselves and our Officers over recent months and we hope you find this helpful. We would add that we were pleased to be advised that you now consider the TMO to be an example of good practice in this area.

If you require anything further please do not hesitate to contact us.

Yours sincerely,



Robert Black
TMO Chief Executive



Laura Johnson
Chief Housing Officer

OHARA, COLLETTE

From: LANAWAY, MARK
Sent: 06 May 2010 18:50
To: OHARA, COLLETTE
Cc: SAUNDERS, PATRICK; THORNES, TONY; APPLETON, STEPHEN; DEANS, BRIAN; SUTCLIFF, SPENCER
Subject: RE: Fire on Friday 30 April at Grenfell Tower, Grenfell Road

Hi Collette, obviously the smoke was very heavy on the 6th the fire floor, and was travelling up the stairs through the door on to the staircase due to the dry riser employed on the 4th floor. Once I confirmed the fire was extinguished to Wm Thornes, I was then re-deployed as you stated to check on and reassure the residents of flat 156 on the 15th and then on to flat 205 on the 20th floor. I can confirm that both floors were smoked logged, and although some smoke travelled up the staircase through the open door on the 6th this was not the cause of the smoke logging on these floors as the smoke on the staircase was diluted as I ascended. I was met by many residents descending, concerned by the smoke within the building, as I travelled up towards the 15th and 20th floors, so I feel that other floors were probably also affected.
Regards

Mark Lanaway
Crew Manager
White Watch
G27 North Kensington
London Fire Brigade
T: [REDACTED]
E: mark.lanaway@london-fire.gov.uk

From: SAUNDERS, PATRICK
Sent: 05 May 2010 15:37
To: APPLETON, STEPHEN; LANAWAY, MARK
Subject: FW: Fire on Friday 30 April at Grenfell Tower, Grenfell Road
Importance: High

Steve/Mark

Seeing that Tony is on leave can you respond to Collette O'Hara email.

Regards,

Patrick Saunders

Station Manager
G27 North Kensington
Tel: [REDACTED]

From: SUTCLIFF, SPENCER
Sent: 04 May 2010 13:16
To: DEANS, BRIAN; SAUNDERS, PATRICK
Subject: FW: Fire on Friday 30 April at Grenfell Tower, Grenfell Road
Importance: High

Brian/Pat

FYI

Spencer

From: OHARA, COLLETTE

Sent: 04 May 2010 13:07

To: THORNES, TONY

Cc: SUTCLIFF, SPENCER

Subject: Fire on Friday 30 April at Grenfell Tower, Grenfell Road

Importance: High

Hi Tony

Hope you are well. I have been advised of the fire on Friday 30 April at Grenfell Tower, Grenfell Road. I have read Fire Investigations report and they have stated that the smoke extraction system in the lobby did not function correctly. This resulted in smoke spreading to numerous floors above the 6th floor.

I am trying to find out to what level the dampeners in the smoke vents failed. With this in mind, in your opinion, to what level did the smoke spread to the following floors: 7,12,13,15,17,18,19 and 20? Was it quite dense or not that bad?

I can see from the Mobis report that a couple of occupants in flats needed to be assured as they were quite concerned about the smoke in the lobby outside their flat.

If it's ok, I would be grateful if you could please come back to me as soon as you can as it will aid me in this investigation.

I look forward to hearing from you.

Regards

Collette O'Hara
Fire Safety Inspecting Officer
London Fire Brigade

Kensington and Chelsea Borough Team Office: [REDACTED]

Ext: [REDACTED]

E: Collette.O'Hara@london-fire.gov.uk

OHARA, COLLETTE

From: Janice Wray <jwray@kctmo.org.uk>
Sent: 12 May 2010 13:53
To: SUTCLIFF, SPENCER
Cc: Tony Ohara; Robert Black; Lornette Pemberton; Alasdair Manson; Sacha Jevans; OHARA, COLLETTE; Simon Throp; Dave Steppel; Keith Fifield
Subject: FW: Fire at Grenfell Tower - Friday 30th April

Spencer

Thank you for your e-mail. I referred most of your queries to my Senior Electrical Engineer and he has responded as follows -

"The remedial works that were agreed for this system prior to this incident include a complete overhaul and clean of all the intake and extract vents and when works are completed the system will be fully operational. The works were not based on the individual leaks identified during the fire. I cannot comment on the level of smoke seepage at the time of the incident but having visited site yesterday there was little or no evidence of smoke damage on the lobbies other than the sixth floor.

Apart from the fact that there was not a complete seal on all of the vents the system operated as intended and I do not consider that there was a "catastrophic failure". On activation of the fire alarm the extract and intake vents opened on the sixth floor providing natural ventilation for this floor. The mechanical extract was functioning correctly but was not activated at the manual controls in this instance. There is labelling above the fire panel indicating the location of smoke vent controls and instructions on their use inside the cupboard adjacent to the switch. Upon completion of the overhaul we have arranged for two smoke tests to be carried out, one on natural ventilation mode and one on fan assisted mode."

I can confirm that the works to the vents were completed on schedule last Friday and that a successful smoke test has also been undertaken. However, my colleague has asked for this to be repeated whilst he is in attendance and this is currently being arranged.

I believe that this addresses all of the issues you have raised and would therefore be keen to proceed with the on-site meeting with your operational colleagues soon so that if there are any further concerns these can also be addressed promptly.


Please let me know if you require anything further

Janice

Janice Wray
TMO Health & Safety Advisor
t: [REDACTED]



w: www.kctmo.org.uk
a: : The Network Hub, 300 Kensal Road, W10 5BE

 Before printing, please think about the environment

From: spencer.sutcliff@london-fire.gov.uk [mailto:spencer.sutcliff@london-fire.gov.uk]

Sent: 06 May 2010 11:49

To: COLLETTE.O'HARA@london-fire.gov.uk; Janice Wray

Cc: Tony Ohara; Robert Black; Lornette Pemberton; Alasdair Manson; Sacha Jevans

Subject: RE: Fire at Grenfell Tower - Friday 30th April

Dear Janice,

Thank you for your response regarding the Fire Safety failings at Grenfell Tower.

I would like to add the additional comments:

- I appreciate your comments regarding the admission of interim measures and endorse your future recommended actions. I recommend that there is an assessment made for each individual Fire Safety maintenance issue to ensure that higher priority areas are dealt with to a strict time-scale.
- Please be aware that if the seals are replaced in the reported areas then the failing may not be completely rectified.
 - o Did the reported smoke logging match the reported failings for each floor level?
 - o After liaising with our Fire Engineering department, it is surprising that if all systems are in place, defective seals would cause this level of smoke seepage.
 - o Consideration should be given to the entire system. E.g.: Did any other floor vents open, did the top vent open correctly, is there sufficient draw in the first place to enable smoke to travel vertically.
 - o Due to the catastrophic failure of the system, I would suggest that it would be very difficult to demonstrate compliance without a full Engineers smoke test.

Please feel free to contact me to discuss further.

I appreciate your offer to meet on site with your Engineer and the local station and Collette will help with the co-ordination of that. The key areas for this visit would include the operation of the fans and Fire Lift.

Regards,

Spencer Sutcliff

Team Leader

Kensington and Chelsea Fire Safety

Tel: [REDACTED]

From: OHARA, COLLETTE

Sent: 06 May 2010 09:58

To: SUTCLIFF, SPENCER

Subject: FW: Fire at Grenfell Tower - Friday 30th April

Importance: High

Collette O'Hara
Fire Safety Inspecting Officer
London Fire Brigade

Kensington and Chelsea Borough Team Office: [REDACTED]

Ext: [REDACTED]

E: Collette.O'Hara@london-fire.gov.uk

From: Janice Wray [mailto:jwray@kctmo.org.uk]
Sent: 05 May 2010 16:48
To: OHARA, COLLETTE
Cc: Tony Ohara; Robert Black; Lornette Pemberton; Alasdair Manson; Sacha Jevans
Subject: Fire at Grenfell Tower - Friday 30th April
Importance: High

Collette

Further to our telephone conversations yesterday about this fire I would advise as follows –

1. It is suspected that the fire on the sixth floor of Grenfell Tower was started deliberately by acquaintances of the resident of flat 64. They allegedly propped bags with recycling (due for collection on Saturday at 8am) against the front door of his flat and set them alight. The communal detection system was triggered and the fire alarm sounded. On hearing the alarm a neighbour came out of her property and used a garden hose to extinguish the fire. The flat entrance door withstood the fire but will be replaced asap.
2. The communal fire detection system is linked to an extraction system and this did operate removing the smoke from the lift lobby. Unfortunately, it appears that there was spillage / leakage of smoke from the extraction system into the lobbies of floors 7, 12, 13, 15, 17, 18, 19 and 20 and this led a number of residents to believe that their lift lobby was smoke logged and they were trapped in their home and as such they telephoned the FB raising their concern .
3. The smoke extraction system is maintained under our fire safety planned preventative maintenance contract with RGE Services. This requires maintenance as per the requirements of the British Standards and as such these vents are subject to quarterly inspection and maintenance. I am advised that the incomplete sealing of a number of the vents had been identified on the most recent inspection visit. The contractors had been asked to submit a quotation for the necessary remedial works to address this problem and this was received on 20th April. I can confirm that a works order was raised the same day for the works to be progressed. Unfortunately, the contractors had some difficulty which they had not foreseen sourcing the required parts and the works were scheduled to start on site yesterday (Tuesday 4th May). As discussed, in retrospect the delay should have caused us to consider what, if any, interim measures were required until repairs were completed and the system was fully operational again. I have spoken to the TMO Senior Engineer and advised that I believe, as a minimum, we should have advised the local Area Housing Team and the local Fire Station Manager of the defect and kept them appraised of progress and completion target for remedial works etc.
4. I can confirm that our engineers and the planned maintenance contractors inspected the system yesterday to identify any damage caused by the fire and none was found. Additionally, the planned remedial works commenced on site yesterday and will take three days to complete. It is therefore, anticipated that the ventilation system will be fully operational again by Friday 7th May.
5. In discussion with the engineers yesterday the issue of the operation of the mechanical fan on the ventilation system came up. I am advised that it is not operated automatically but can be turned on manually by FB personnel or TMO staff once the fire is safely extinguished. I believe that there is signage to advise FB personnel of the existence and operation of this fan, however, our Senior Electrical Engineer will be visiting the block this pm and will investigate what additional signage etc. could be installed to alert operational firefighters to this.

6. The Police arrested an individual yesterday on suspicion of starting the fire maliciously and they were interrogating CCTV footage of the area, however, they have not yet confirmed if this individual is to be charged.
7. You mentioned that there may have been a problem with the lifts at the time of the fire and that specifically they may not have returned to ground level when called by the FB. ILS our lift maintenance contractors tested the fire fighters override switches etc. on both lifts yesterday and confirmed that both were operating perfectly and lifts had both returned to ground when called as required. Therefore, there does not appear to have been a problem but if further information comes to light then I would be grateful if you could please advise.
8. RBKC have confirmed that they collect recycling from outside flat entrance doors at 8am on Saturday mornings. It is our intention to engage with the residents and RBKC to see if an alternative arrangement for recycling can be introduced.
9. Once permission given by Police that cleaning works could be progressed in the lift lobbies this works were initiated. (yesterday afternoon)
10. I believe there would be some value in our Senior Electrical Engineer meeting with some FB officers at Grenfell Tower to better explore how this system operates – perhaps within the next few weeks. Presumably it would be most appropriate for my colleagues to meet with some of the operational staff from the local Fire Station. However, we would be grateful for your view on this and your advice on who we should contact.

I hope this is helpful. Please advise if you require anything further.

Janice

Janice Wray
TMO Health & Safety Advisor

t: [REDACTED]



w: www.kctmo.org.uk

a: : 4th Floor, Charles House, Kensington High Street, W14 8QH



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We Are Moving!

From Monday 10th May, Kensington & Chelsea TMO's new address will be 292a Kensal Road, London, W10 5BE.

If you wish to contact a member of the team after this date please call our Customer Service Centre on [REDACTED] or write to the above address.

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LONDON FIRE BRIGADE

For fire safety advice please go to <http://www.london-fire.gov.uk/YourSafety.asp>

To book a LFB workplace fire safety training course go to <http://www.london-fire.gov.uk/workplacefiresafetytraining.asp>

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OHARA, COLLETTE

From: Janice Wray <jwray@kctmo.org.uk>
Sent: 07 June 2010 14:20
To: OHARA, COLLETTE
Cc: SUTCLIFF, SPENCER; Keith Fifield
Subject: Grenfell Tower - Smoke Test

Collette

Just to let you know that the smoke test at this block was successfully undertaken last Friday and that Keith Fifield, the TMO's Senior Electrical Engineer, was in attendance. We will be receiving an Engineers Worksheet to confirm this - please let me know if you require a copy

Please advise

Thanks

Janice

Janice Wray
TMO Health & Safety Advisor
t: [REDACTED]



w: www.kctmo.org.uk
a: : The Network Hub, 300 Kensal Road, W10 5BE

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We Have Moved!

Kensington & Chelsea TMO has moved! Our new address is 292a Kensal Road, London, W10 5BE.

If you wish to contact a member of the team please call our Customer Service Centre on [REDACTED], or write to the above address.

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Conference w/ S. Walsh
22 Aug.

Grenfell Tower Inquiry

Dany Cotton, Commissioner
London Fire Brigade
169 Union Street
London, SE1 0LL

23 August 2017

FIRST CLASS

GRENFELL TOWER INQUIRY

LONDON FIRE BRIGADE REQUEST FOR DOCUMENTS No. 1

Dear Madam,

As you will be aware, the Prime Minister has appointed Sir Martin Moore-Bick to chair an Inquiry into the fire at Grenfell Tower on 14 June 2017.

The Inquiry's Terms of Reference

The Inquiry's Terms of Reference are attached as Annex A to this Request.

Request for Documents

Generally

This is a Request for Documents in the control of the London Fire Brigade ("the LFB") that are relevant to the issues covered by the Inquiry's Terms of Reference.

Royal Courts of Justice, London, WC2A 2LL
General enquiries: contact@grenfelltowerinquiry.org.uk
Legal enquiries: solicitor@grenfelltowerinquiry.org.uk

Grenfell Tower Inquiry

You are requested to produce such documents to the Inquiry by 4 p.m. on 22 September 2017 ("the Request").

For the purposes of the Request, a document is in the control of the LFB if it is in its physical possession, or the LFB has a right to possession of it, or the LFB has a right to inspect or take copies of it, or customarily has access to it.

In order to allow its investigation to be conducted swiftly and efficiently, the Inquiry expects that the LFB will itself examine its documents and provide only those that are relevant to the issues covered by the Terms of Reference.

At this early stage of its investigation, it is not possible for the Inquiry to provide a final and complete list of the relevant documents and classes of documents that it will require. However, to assist the LFB, set out below is an illustrative (but not exhaustive) list of the type of documents and classes of documents the Inquiry expects that the LFB will provide in response to the Request.

The Inquiry requests that the documents be provided electronically. The Inquiry is using an online document management review system in order to be able to quickly and efficiently review your documentation. Please can you provide your documents electronically in either their native format, for example Microsoft Word, Microsoft Excel, MSG email files / PST email containers, or please convert any proprietary file formats to Adobe PDF. If you have any hard copy documentation that you will be digitising before providing to us, please ensure you scan your documents to multipage PDF format. If the document is mainly text based, please scan your documents in black and white - only scan in colour where it is critical to the legibility of the document. If you are able to, please ensure that your scanning settings are set to 300dpi (number of dots per inch as scanned) for both black and white and colour documents.

Documents should be sent to solicitor@grenfelltowerinquiry.org.uk When emailing documents, please insert the name of your organisation into the subject header along with the words 'response to request for documents'. We are in the process of finalising a cloud based system for the uploading of large volumes of documents. If you wish to use such a system, please contact us for further information.

The documents should also be accompanied by an inventory listing them and signed by or under the authority of the person providing them.

The Inquiry, being a public inquiry, seeks to be as transparent as possible. This means that it expects to disclose material to core participants and may (regardless of

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Inquiry

disclosure to any person) seek to use such material as part of its body of documentary evidence to which reference may be made by its experts or in its reports and as such may form part of the Inquiry record. Moreover, to ensure that the Inquiry has maximum access to relevant material, it is anticipated that all material in the hands of the Inquiry will be available for the Police to view, should they wish (and vice versa).

The Inquiry will work on the assumption that any material in its possession may be disclosed or used in the manner set out above. Should you seek to object to disclosure or use by the Inquiry, then you should identify your objection in full by reference to specific documents or categories of documents, and support it by legal submission explaining why this course should not be followed in the specific circumstances, in any covering letter accompanying the material.

Basis of the Request

The Request is not made in exercise of statutory powers to compel the production of evidence or documents. The Chairman expects all parties to whom a request of this kind is addressed will co-operate with the Inquiry and provide all relevant material voluntarily without the need for him to exercise those powers. However, the Chairman will consider exercising those powers if the response to this or any later Request is, for example, refused, or incomplete, or not provided by the set deadline.

Further Requests

This request is not and is not intended to be the only Request for Documents. It is anticipated that, as the Inquiry's investigations develop, further Requests will be made.

Illustrative list of documents

1) The recent modifications/renovations of Grenfell Tower (2012-2016)

Design

- 1.1 All relevant communications between Royal Kensington and Chelsea Council ("**the Council**") and/or the Royal Borough of Kensington & Chelsea Tenant Management Organisation Limited ("**the TMO**") and the London Fire Brigade ("**the LFB**") relating to the design of the

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Grenfell Tower

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recent modifications/renovations and, in particular, to the prevention and mitigation of fire and the provision of means of escape;

1.2 All relevant communications between the Council and/or the TMO and the LFB relating to compliance with relevant contemporaneous building regulations, fire regulations, other legislation, guidance (including British Standards) and industry practice;

1.3 All relevant communications between the Council and/or the TMO and the LFB relating to consideration and selection of cladding, insulation, windows and fixings at the design stage including, in particular, all relevant documents relating to the properties, composition, fire resistant qualities, method of fixing and cost of the cladding, insulation, windows and fixings considered by the designers;

*unsey /
carem
what is inc.
in consultation*

1.4 All relevant communications between the LFB and the Health & Safety Executive and any other regulator/inspectorate regarding the design of the recent modifications/renovations.

Implementation

1.5 All relevant communications between the Council and/or the TMO and the LFB relating to the implementation of the recent modifications/renovations and, in particular, the prevention and mitigation of fire and the provision of means of escape;

*ask assessment
done
following
works*

1.6 All relevant communications between the Council and/or the TMO and the LFB relating to consideration, selection and installation of cladding, insulation, windows and fixings at the implementation stage including, in particular, all relevant documents relating to the properties, composition, fire resistant qualities, method of fixing and cost of the cladding, insulation, windows and fixings considered;

1.3

1.7 All relevant communications between the Council and/or the TMO and the LFB relating to the implementation of the recent modifications/renovations including, in particular, all relevant documents evidencing compliance with relevant contemporaneous building regulations (such as building control inspectors' reports), fire regulations, other legislation, guidance (including British Standards)

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and industry practice (particularly in relation to the cladding, insulation and windows);

- 7.1
- 1.8 All relevant communications between the LFB and the Health & Safety Executive and any other regulator/inspectorate regarding the implementation of the recent modifications/renovations.

2) Safety of Grenfell Tower

2.1 The LFB's fire safety policies and procedures

- 2.1.1 All relevant LFB policies and procedures (between 2012 and June 2017) relating to the prevention and mitigation of fire and provision of means of escape in high-rise buildings in London. For the purposes of the Request, a high-rise building is one that is 18 metres high or higher;
- 2.1.2 All relevant documents relating to any review (between 2012 and June 2017) of the LFB's policies and procedures relating to the prevention and mitigation of fire and provision of means of escape in high-rise buildings in London.

2.2 Fire safety measures within Grenfell Tower

- 2.2.1 All relevant documents relating to the measures in place as at 14 June 2017 for the prevention and mitigation of fire and means of escape;
- 2.2.2 All relevant documents evidencing compliance of such measures with relevant contemporaneous fire legislation, other legislation, guidance and industry practice between the completion of the most recent renovations and 14 June 2017;
- 2.2.3 Any fire risk assessments of Grenfell Tower conducted by or provided to the LFB between 2012 and 14 June 2017;
- 2.2.4 All relevant documents (between 2012 and June 2017) relating to consideration of, and decisions in relation to, the fire risk assessments that were conducted in respect of Grenfell Tower

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(whether such assessments were carried out by or on behalf of the Council, the TMO, the LFB and/or any other person);

2.2.5 All relevant communications (between 2012 and June 2017) between the Council and/or the TMO and the LFB concerning the prevention and mitigation of fire and provision of means of escape at Grenfell Tower;

2.2.6 All relevant communications between the LFB and the Health & Safety Executive and any other regulator/inspectorate regarding the prevention and mitigation of fire and provision of means of escape at Grenfell Tower.

2.3 The exterior of the building – including cladding, insulation, windows and fixings

2.3.1 Post-construction, all relevant documents evidencing compliance of the cladding, insulation, windows and fixings with relevant contemporaneous fire legislation, other legislation, guidance (including British Standards) and industry practice.

2.4 Fire Inspections

2.4.1 All relevant LFB policies and procedures (between 2012 and June 2017) relating to the carrying out of fire inspections of high-rise buildings;

2.4.2 Post-construction, all relevant documents relating to fire inspections including, in particular, all relevant documents relating to consideration of, and decisions in relation to, the contents of any fire inspection reports;

2.4.3 Post-construction, all relevant communications between the Council and/or the TMO with the LFB concerning any fire inspection.

2.5 Fire advice to residents

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Grenfell Tower Inquiry

Know how plan

Emergency
response
procedures

AFSD
DATA

ANY
EMERGENCY
ADVICE



2.5.1 Any relevant LFB policies and procedures regarding the communication of fire-related advice to residents of high-rise buildings from 2012 to 14 June 2017;

2.5.2 Any relevant LFB fire safety advice actually provided to residents of high-rise buildings between 2012 and 14 June 2017.

2.6 Response to the Lakanal House Inquest and other previous relevant incidents

2.6.1 All relevant documents relating to consideration by the LFB of, and implementation of, the recommendations of the Coroner in the Lakanal House Inquest (including any communications with the Council, the TMO, the Department for Communities & Local Government ("DCLG") and the Health & Safety Executive);

Min

2.6.2 All relevant documents relating to consideration by the LFB of previous fires in high-rise buildings in the United Kingdom and abroad (in particular, those involving external cladding) and any possible consequences for/lessons to be learned in relation to the high-rise buildings in London;

2.6.3 All relevant documents relating to any previous fires at Grenfell Tower.

3) The fire

All relevant documents (including reports) relating to the response to the fire as well as its cause, speed and propagation.

4) The response of the emergency services


4.1 All relevant LFB policies and procedures (between 2012 and June 2017) relating to the emergency response to a major fire in a high-rise building.

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Grenfell Tower Inquiry

Kindly acknowledge receipt of this letter within 7 days.

Yours faithfully,


Solicitor to the Inquiry

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Legal enquiries: solicitor@grenfelltowerinquiry.org.uk

**Grenfell Tower Inquiry
Terms of Reference
15 August 2017**

The Inquiry's Terms of Reference are:

1. To examine the circumstances surrounding the fire at Grenfell Tower on 14 June 2017, including:
 - (a) the immediate cause or causes of the fire and the means by which it spread to the whole of the building;
 - (b) the design and construction of the building and the decisions relating to its modification, refurbishment and management;
 - (c) the scope and adequacy of building regulations, fire regulations and other legislation, guidance and industry practice relating to the design, construction, equipping and management of high-rise residential buildings;
 - (d) whether such regulations, legislation, guidance and industry practice were complied with in the case of Grenfell Tower and the fire safety measures adopted in relation to it;
 - (e) the arrangements made by the local authority or other responsible bodies for receiving and acting upon information either obtained from local residents or available from other sources (including information derived from fires in other buildings) relating to the risk of fire at Grenfell Tower, and the action taken in response to such information;
 - (f) the fire prevention and fire safety measures in place at Grenfell Tower on 14 June 2017;
 - (g) the response of the London Fire Brigade to the fire; and
 - (h) the response of central and local government in the days immediately following the fire;

and

2. To report its findings to the Prime Minister as soon as possible and to make recommendations.

DALY, DAN

From: COOMBE, NICHOLAS
Sent: 24 August 2017 15:35
To: DALY, DAN
Subject: FW: FIRE SAFETY LETTERS TO BOROUGH/HOUSING PROTOCOL/LIST OF POST LAKANAL ACTIONS
Attachments: March 2005 - AC letter to Boros-Provision of smoke alarms in council housing.doc; 6 July 2007 AC letter to Boros -Recycling schemes.doc; January 2009-AC letter to Boros-HAs Fire safety in social housing.doc; 23 March 2009-AC letter to Boros-HAs Fire safety in social housing.doc; 3 July 2009 -List of Lakanal post fire actions-internal.doc; 9 July 2009 -Chief Off letter to boroughs-HAs re RAs and MoE.doc; 28 April 2010 -AC letter to boros-ALMOS -maintenance of DRMs survey.doc; 1 October 2011 - Housing protocol signed LFEPA-RB of Ken and Chelsea.pdf; 24 January 2014 - AC letter to social hsg providers-Multi layer paint.docx; 17 February 2014 -AC letter to Boros -vents and lifts maintenance.docx; 5 April 2017 - AC Daly letter to London Boroughs re external fire spread..docx
Importance: High

For meeting with Steven Walsh

The attached documents are listed below in chronological order and in the sequence of attachment:

1. March 2005 – AC Turek letter all London Boroughs re: provision of smoke alarms in council accommodation-survey of provision of alarms;
2. 6 July 2007 - AC Turek letter to all London Boroughs re: recycling schemes –issues relating to storage on means of escape corridors;
3. January 2009 – AC Turek letter to London Boroughs/social housing providers on a number of fire safety issues in social housing;
4. 23 March 2009 – AC Turek letter to London Boroughs/social housing providers on a number of fire safety issues in social housing (similar to letter in 3. above);
5. 3 July 2009 – List of Lakanal House post fire actions;
6. 9 July 2009 – Commissioner Dobson's letter to London Boroughs/social housing providers re: fire risk assessments and maintenance of means of escape provisions;
7. 28 April 2010 – AC Turek letter to London Boroughs/ALMOs re: maintenance of dry rising main installations;
8. 1 October 2011 – signed Housing Protocol LFB/RB of Kensington & Chelsea;
9. 24 January 2014 – AC Turek letter to London Boroughs and social housing providers re: multi-layer paint;
10. 17 February 2014 – AC Turek letter to London Boroughs and social housing providers re: advice on smoke ventilation systems and maintenance of fire lifts.
11. 5 April 2017 – AC Daly letter to London Boroughs re: external fire spread (cladding panels) this same letter was sent to ALMOs and Housing Associations on 5 May 2017.

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For fire safety advice please go to london-fire.gov.uk/YourSafety

FIRE AND COMMUNITY SAFETY DIRECTORATE
Malcolm Kelly Assistant Commissioner (Community Safety)

Date
March 2005

Our Ref. Your Ref.

Addressee

Please reply to (quoting reference above)

Letter to Directors of Housing, all London Boroughs

Malcolm Kelly

Direct Telephone Direct Fax

Direct E-mail
malcolm.kelly@london-fire.gov.uk

Dear

PROVISION OF SMOKE ALARMS IN COUNCIL ACCOMMODATION

This Authority has long campaigned on the benefits of installing smoke alarms in domestic dwellings as this is seen as having a major influence on achieving our aim to reduce death and injury from fire in the capital. As well as undertaking community safety initiatives to increase levels of smoke alarm ownership we have taken every opportunity, through partnership working, to encourage the London Boroughs to install smoke alarms in all residential premises under their control. In continuing to promote our objectives I am writing to highlight an incident in accommodation where no smoke alarm was installed and to seek responses to a number of questions on the progress being made by your authority in fitting alarms.

The incident referred to above, that gave some cause for concern, was a fire in a premises that was managed by a Housing Association but had been allocated for use to the local borough. As a result of the fire the occupant of the flat involved was taken to hospital in a critical condition and the flat itself was severely damaged, additionally, seven people were rescued from the upper floors of the block, three of them being taken to hospital suffering from smoke inhalation.

A post fire investigation by officers of this Authority revealed that none of the flats in the block were fitted with any form of smoke detection. In view of these findings, and the seriousness of the fire, I would be grateful for your advice on your authority's policy with regard to the provision of smoke detection in any social housing used to house tenants, whether such housing is council owned or allocated by other organisations for council use. I am sure that most London Boroughs will have in place policies that stipulate certain standards, including fire safety standards, in respect of the premises they use to accommodate their tenants. However, there would appear to be inconsistencies in this respect. By providing the information requested above it is hoped that, through partnership working, we can achieve a consistent approach in the application of standards for council accommodation and at the same time reduce the life safety risk for certain vulnerable groups.

In addition to the above it would be helpful if you could answer the following questions in relation to the action you are taking on installing smoke alarms:

How many smoke alarms have you installed?

Do you have a programme for smoke alarm installation? If so, what are the programme details.

Do you have a budget for this activity and, if so, how much?

Do you have any liaison arrangements in place with this Authority's local Community Safety Teams?

In closing may I thank you for your assistance in providing the information requested above. If you have any queries on the content of this letter then please do not hesitate to contact me.

Yours sincerely

M. KELLY

Assistant Commissioner
Community Safety

Hampton House
20 Albert Embankment
London
SE1 7SD

Switchboard [REDACTED]
Text phone [REDACTED]
Web www.london-fire.gov.uk



FIRE AND COMMUNITY SAFETY DIRECTORATE

Steve Turek M.Pub.Pol & Admin, GFireE. Assistant Commissioner (Community Safety)

Date

6th July 2007

Our Ref.

Your Ref.

Please reply to (quoting reference above)

AC Steve Turek

TO: CHIEF EXECUTIVES, ALL LONDON BOROUGHS

Direct Telephone

Direct Fax

Direct E-mail

Steve.turek@london-fire.gov.uk

Dear Sir/Madam,

This letter is to draw your attention to fire safety considerations in connection with recycling schemes that the Council or others may be operating in your Borough.

Recently we became aware of a London Borough operating recycling scheme using doorstep collection from flats on estates. Our inspecting officers have visited a number of blocks of flats where the scheme operated and found that in some cases the scheme resulted in significant risk to residents should a fire involving the recyclable materials occur. We advised the Council concerned accordingly and subsequently, the Council concerned sought an independent fire risk assessment of this element of their recycling scheme. The conclusion of the independent review (which mirrors our conclusion and the advice given, by our Inspecting Officer) was that:

"the scheme [doorstep collection] in its present form is unacceptable in properties that rely on single internal staircases, internal corridors or escape in one direction only as part of the means of escape."

The reason for this conclusion is that, in these types of properties, a fire involving the recyclable materials placed in the escape route for collection would render the escape route unusable and place the residents at risk. Such a fire also poses the possibility of fire spreading to the flats themselves. As a result of the conclusions drawn, the Council concerned are now revising their recycling scheme to provide alternative arrangements for collection from properties where this risk can arise.

You will appreciate that, under the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005, the Council is responsible for undertaking a fire risk assessment of its premises. This includes the common parts of Council premises containing more than one set of domestic premises (i.e. blocks of flats). I should be grateful if you would ensure that the need to consider the presence of flammable materials on escape routes as a result of doorstep collection schemes is brought to the attention of appropriate persons within the Council; is taken into account in the Council's fire risk assessments; and, where necessary, alternative collection arrangements are considered as part of any recycling schemes the Council or others may be running or participating in.

In closing I would like to stress that we do understand the importance of these initiatives and I am sure that we can help find realistic and pragmatic solutions that will allow both the Mayor's waste strategy and legislative requirements for fire safety to be met. I am also sure that the result of our close working will ensure solutions are found and agreements reached. Your local fire safety team will be available to provide advice and help in the development of fire safe recycling schemes.

making London a safer city

LFB is part of the London Fire & Emergency Planning Authority

Sir Ken Knight, CBE, QFSM DL Commissioner for Fire & Emergency Planning



Should you wish to discuss anything arising from this letter please contact Andy Jack [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] in our Fire Safety Policy Group].

Yours faithfully

Steve Turek
Assistant Commissioner
Community Safety

FIRE AND COMMUNITY SAFETY DIRECTORATE
Steve Turek, Assistant Commissioner (Fire Safety Regulation)

Date

January 2009

Our Ref.

Your Ref.

Addressee

Mr Neil Litherland
Director of Housing And Community Care
London Borough of Camden
Crowndale Centre
218 Eversholt Street
London

Please reply to (quoting reference above)

Steve Turek

Direct Telephone

Direct Fax

Direct E-mail

steven.turek@london-fire.gov.uk

NW1 1BD

Dear Mr Litherland

FIRE SAFETY IN SOCIAL HOUSING

Following a number of fires over recent months I thought it would be helpful to draw your attention, as a social housing provider, to a number of significant issues relating to your responsibilities under the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005.

Each of the following issues has resulted in significant levels of risk to occupiers and also contributed to levels of fire damage.

Multi-layer paint

Some years ago, it was recognised that where decorative paint in common areas is allowed to build up into multiple layers, this can allow very rapid fire spread as the paint delaminates and burns. The risk pre-dominantly arises where there is poor paint adhesion / flaking paint. Recent fires and audits of premises have shown that this problem still exists in some blocks of flats.

Replacement windows

We have noted cases where replacement windows, particularly uPVC window units, are of a shorter depth to the original units/window sets. This has resulted in the gaps being covered with non-fire resisting materials which, in the event of fire distort and allow fire into the wall cavity. Although the latest amendments to the Building Regulations require fire stopping around the window, the problem may exist in many properties with windows that were replaced before April 2007.

We have also noted that panels on the exterior of flats have been replaced with non-fire resting uPVC panels as part of replacement of window units. This may have contributed to total failure of the windows during a fire and consequently contributed to fire being able to pass upwards across the exterior wall to the windows of flats above, causing them to fail and fire to spread to those flats.

Lack of fire stopping barriers in wall cavities

Lack of fire stopping in wall cavities has been noted in a number of fires, particular those involving older timber frame construction. Although such structures are safe in correctly constructed, the lack of fire stopping in some 1960s and 1970s structures is a cause for concern as it has allowed unrestricted rapid fire spread through the building. In more than one case this has resulted in total loss of the building. Although required by Building Regulations the same problem has been found in some more modern properties.

Lack of fire stopping in service risers

Lack of fire stopping in service riser ducts and from these ducts into corridors (and sometimes from the corridors to the residential flats) has been found on a number of occasions, notably in comparatively new build properties. This lack of fire stopping has resulted in rapid fire spread through blocks of flats, trapping some residents who were unable to evacuate due to smoke logging and high temperatures in the means of escape. Lack of fire stopping between the means of escape and individual flats has also meant residents have been trapped in flats where they should be safe but which in fact filled with smoke and residents had to be rescued by the brigade using ladders and hydraulic platforms.

Fire doors being wedged open resulting in both smoke spread and damage to self closing devices

Poor adjustment of self closing devices (or inappropriate choice of closer type) has been found to have caused fire doors to close very quickly and so loudly 'bang' into their frame disturbing nearby residents. Because of this residents wedged the fire doors or placed materials at the foot of the frame to stop the door fully closing (and so avoiding the loud 'bang'). Repeated wedging of doors in this way was found to have weakened some types of door closers (mainly those contained within the door structure) to the extent that they failed to fully close even when not wedged. These circumstances have allowed smoke to easily spread through blocks of flats and ultimately to enter flats which would otherwise have been reasonably protected from the effects of fire and smoke.

Empty properties (including those undergoing refurbishment)

Empty or vacant properties can be readily targeted by vandals and others who may deliberately or accidentally cause a fire. Often the properties contain a significant fire loading from possessions of a former tenant or from materials that are being used or stored in the premises for refurbishment purposes. Fires in such properties can grow undetected for some time and may even overcome inbuilt fire precautions such as fire resisting doors (especially if fire resisting doors have been replaced with doors of a lesser standard by tenants).

Storage and security

Recent fires have involved combustible materials left in common parts (e.g. stairwell and corridors) of blocks of flats and houses converted to flats. These materials can be prone to deliberate fire setting and as they occur in the means of escape can quickly block the means of escape. In addition they can provide sufficient heat to ignite multi layer paint systems.

We have also encountered electrical and gas riser cupboards (and others) that are not secured. These have become used as storage and/or a place to dump rubbish which can be ignited deliberately or accidentally and again prevent the means of escape from being used.

Frost protection and thermal insulation in roof voids

Cases have come to light where electrical heaters have been installed in roof voids as a frost protection measure and, with an ever increasing emphasis on reducing heat emissions, these voids have also been insulated. Problems have arisen where the insulation has been placed over the heater. This has caused the heat to be contained and reflected into roofing timbers to which the heaters are fixed. Over time the beams have charred, significantly weakening them and ultimately resulting in the beams igniting, causing significant damage and risk to persons in the flats.

Conclusion


These issues identified above are all of direct relevance to emergency arrangements and general fire precautions for blocks of flats and houses converted to flats.

As enforcing authority for the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005 we consider that:-

- the structure of the building and changes that have been made to it;
- levels of fire resistance (e.g. fire stopping and working fire doors);
- the availability of locations and sources of fuel for deliberate fire setting; and
- ignition sources that are introduced to the premises

are matters that should be considered as part of a suitable and sufficient fire risk assessment. I am sure that you, as a responsible provider of social housing would agree and I would urge you to ensure that these matters are considered as part of your ongoing programme of fire risk assessment and reviews of those assessments.

Yours sincerely



STEVE TUREK
Assistant Commissioner
Fire Safety Regulation

4

London Fire Brigade is run by the London
Fire and Emergency Planning Authority

Date 23 March 2009

«Job_Title»
«Organisation»
«Add1»
«Add2»
«Add3»
«Add4»
«Postcode»

Dear Sir/Madam

FIRE SAFETY IN SOCIAL HOUSING

In the light of a number of recent fires in social housing blocks I am seeking your help in bringing fire safety issues to the attention of your tenants and staff and as an enforcing authority we thought it would be helpful to draw your attention, as a social housing provider, to a number of significant issues relating to your responsibilities under the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005.

Storage and security

Recent fires have involved combustible materials left in common parts (e.g. stairwells and corridors) of blocks of flats and houses converted to flats. These materials can be prone to deliberate fire setting and as they occur in the means of escape can quickly block the means of escape. In addition they can provide sufficient heat to ignite multi-layer paint systems.

We have also encountered electrical and gas riser cupboards (and others) that are not secured. These have become used as storage and/or a place to dump rubbish which can be ignited deliberately or accidentally and again prevent the means of escape from being used.

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Poor adjustment of self closing devices (or inappropriate choice of closer type) has been found to have caused fire doors to close very quickly and so loudly 'bang' into their frame disturbing nearby residents. Because of this, residents wedged the fire doors or placed materials at the foot of the frame to stop the door fully closing (and so avoiding the loud 'bang'). Repeated wedging of doors in this way was found to have weakened some types of door closers (mainly those contained within the door structure) to the extent that they failed to fully close even when not wedged. These circumstances have allowed smoke to easily spread through blocks of flats and ultimately to enter flats which would otherwise have been reasonably protected from the effects of fire and smoke.

Empty properties (including those undergoing refurbishment)

Empty or vacant properties can be readily targeted by vandals and others who may deliberately or accidentally cause a fire. Often the properties contain a significant fire loading from possessions of a former tenant or from materials that are being used or stored in the premises for refurbishment purposes. Fires in such properties can grow undetected for some time and may even overcome inbuilt fire precautions such as fire resisting doors (especially if fire resisting doors have been replaced with doors of a lesser standard by tenants).

In addition to the issues mentioned above each of the following issues have resulted in significant levels of risk to occupiers and also contributed to levels of fire damage.

Multi-layer paint

Some years ago, it was recognised that where decorative paint in common areas is allowed to build up into multiple layers, this can allow very rapid fire spread as the paint delaminates and burns. The risk predominantly arises where there is poor paint adhesion / flaking paint. Recent fires and audits of premises have shown that this problem still exists in some blocks of flats.

Replacement windows

We have noted cases where replacement windows, particularly uPVC window units, are of a shorter depth to the original units/window sets. This has resulted in the gaps being covered with non-fire resisting materials which, in the event of fire, distort and allow fire into the wall cavity. Although the latest amendments to the Building Regulations require fire stopping around the window, the problem may exist in many properties with windows that were replaced before April 2007.

We have also noted that panels on the exterior of flats have been replaced with non-fire resisting uPVC panels as part of replacement of window units. This may have contributed to total failure of the windows during a fire and consequently contributed to fire being able to pass upwards across the exterior wall to the windows of flats above, causing them to fail and fire to spread to those flats.

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Cases have come to light where electrical heaters have been installed in roof voids as a frost protection measure and, with an ever increasing emphasis on reducing heat emissions, these voids have also been insulated. Problems have arisen where the insulation has been placed over the heater. This has caused the heat to be contained and reflected into roofing timbers to which the heaters are fixed. Over time the beams have charred, significantly weakening them and ultimately resulting in the beams igniting, causing significant damage and risk to persons in the flats.

Conclusion

The issues identified above are all of direct relevance to emergency arrangements and general fire precautions for blocks of flats and houses converted to flats.

As enforcing authority for the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005 we consider that:-

- the structure of the building and changes that have been made to it;
- levels of fire resistance (e.g. fire stopping and working fire doors);
- the availability of locations and sources of fuel for deliberate fire setting; and
- ignition sources that are introduced to the premises

are matters that should be considered as part of a suitable and sufficient fire risk assessment. I am sure that you, as a responsible provider of social housing would agree and I would urge you to ensure that these matters are considered as part of your ongoing programme of fire risk assessment and reviews of those assessments.

Yours faithfully

Steve Turek
Assistant Commissioner
Fire Safety Regulation

Reply to Steve Turek
Assistant Commissioner (Fire Safety Regulation)
Direct T [REDACTED]
Direct F [REDACTED]
E steve.turek@london-fire.gov.uk

LAKANAL HOUSE FIRE (3 JULY 2009) – POST FIRE ACTIONS

DATE	FORMAT/GROUP LEADING	DETAIL
9 July 2009	Letter from Commissioner to all social housing providers.	Reminding them of their responsibilities under RRO, the need to undertake risk assessments and to provide advice to tenants on means of escape arrangements.
10 July 2009	Letter from CLG (Sir Ken Knight) to all housing authorities (HAs).	Asking HAs to provide details of all premises of scissor type construction for which they were responsible. LFB followed this up with HAs in London and asked for the same information; all such premises were then audited under RRO.
6 October 2009	Letter from Area GMs FSR to HAs and ALMOs.	Requesting a local meeting to discuss status of risk assessment programme for housing stock and what review arrangements were in place. Sample auditing also proposed.
16 February 2010	Letter from AC FSR to all social housing providers.	Requesting advice on premises with more than 6 floors that do not have a dry rising main (built before main was a requirement under Building Regs). Information needed for Operational planning.
12 March 2010	Fire safety seminar	London Fire Commissioner briefed an invited audience of London borough representatives (Councillors and officers) on fire law.
28 April 2010	Letter from AC FSR to HAs and ALMOs.	Requesting that they inspect all dry rising mains and report any defects to central mailbox. Defects notified to local station. Emphasise their

		responsibility to maintain the mains in working order.
April 2010	New Housing policy issued	Updated the way we deal with Residential properties and updated protocol with LHA.
Ongoing	CFOA Housing Working Group.	Producing advice on 'stay put' policy. Guidance on high rise in conjunction with LACORS
Ongoing	FSR Policy Group.	Liaison initiated with Tenant Services Authority (TSA) the government regulator for social housing.
Ongoing	Local FSR teams/FSR Policy Group.	Presentations to social housing landlords/forums on responsibilities under RRO.
Ongoing	Local FSR teams.	Liaison with HAs under LACORS Housing protocol/ getting HAs to sign up to protocol.
Ongoing	FSR Policy Group.	Monitoring of all enforcement action against HAs to ensure consistency and application of Enforcement Policy Statement.
Ongoing	Local FSR teams.	Audits of high rise buildings (over 1300 in 2009/10).
Ongoing	Principal Managers, FSR Policy, FSR Teams	Meetings with representative bodies for Housing in London (Chartered Institute, London Councils) at Chief Executive and health and safety/fire safety management levels (6+ meetings so far)
Ongoing	Area GMs FSR	Meetings with local authority housing and ALMOs to discuss and review fire risk assessment (and general fire precautions implementation) arrangements



LONDON FIRE BRIGADE

Ron Dobson QFSM, MFireE
LONDON FIRE COMMISSIONER

6

London Fire Brigade Headquarters
3rd Floor, 169 Union Street London SE1 0LL
T [REDACTED] F [REDACTED]
E ron.dobson@london-fire.gov.uk
www.london-fire.gov.uk

TO:
London Borough Housing Departments;
Housing Associations and
other social housing providers in London.

London Fire Brigade is run by the London
Fire and Emergency Planning Authority

Date 9 July 2009

Dear Sir/Madam,

SOCIAL HOUSING - FIRE SAFETY RISK ASSESSMENT AND MAINTENANCE OF MEANS OF ESCAPE PROVISIONS

You may recall the letter dated 23 March 2009 from Assistant Commissioner Steve Turek in which he highlighted a number of significant fire safety issues relating to social housing.

Following the tragic fire in Camberwell on 3 July 2009 I consider it appropriate to personally write to you to remind you of certain matters for which you are either responsible under the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005 (the Order), or which you have a role in enforcing.

Firstly, a requirement of the Order is that a suitable and sufficient fire safety risk assessment is undertaken for all premises to which the Order applies. In this regard I would emphasise that any risk assessment should include, amongst other things, consideration of the compartmentation within the premises, particularly where it protects means of escape routes, and that there are systems in place to ensure that these elements of compartmentation are maintained. It is also a requirement of the Order that the risk assessment should be reviewed if any material change takes place within the premises. This will include changes to the compartmentation arrangements, as well as potentially any refurbishment work.

The findings of the fire risk assessment must be implemented to remove or reduce fire risks and to ensure adequate general fire precautions are provided. In particular this includes an evacuation strategy that is appropriate to the circumstances of the individual premises.

In terms of guidance for your tenants I would emphasise that it should be safe for them to remain in their flats, in the event of fire elsewhere in the building, providing the premises comply with both the Building Regulations and the Order and suitable management and maintenance procedures are in place. If the tenants are unsure what the appropriate action to take will be in the event of a fire, then your organisation should be able to provide them with appropriate advice about the evacuation strategy.

I am sure that our organisations can continue to work together in partnership to reduce any risks for residents. I also hope that you find the content of this letter to be useful and that you will be able to act upon the advice it contains where appropriate. If you need any further clarification of the above, or your responsibilities under the Order, please contact Assistant Commissioner Steve Turek, Head of Fire Safety Regulation at the above address or by email at steve.turek@london-fire.gov.uk.

Yours faithfully,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be 'R. Dobson', written in a cursive style.

Ron Dobson
London Fire Commissioner

London Fire Brigade is run by the London
Fire and Emergency Planning Authority

To: Heads of Housing all London Boroughs

Date 28 April 2010

and Chief Executives, ALMOs

Direct T [REDACTED]
Direct F [REDACTED]
E steve.turek@london-fire.gov.uk

Dear Sir/Madam,

MAINTENANCE OF DRY RISING MAIN INSTALLATIONS

You will recall that I wrote to you last year outlining a number of fire safety concerns that our staff had identified during their visits to premises which could have had implications for you from a regulatory perspective and for your residents from a safety point of view. In line with this I would like to bring to your attention a further issue that we have found while attending fires in a number of residential premises.

There have been several incidents recently where dry rising mains (DRM) in high rise buildings have been found to be defective during firefighting operations due to the outlets being removed on all or several floors throughout the building. Obviously, when encountered, this situation will present fire fighters with significant challenges when fighting fires in any high rise buildings as this equipment is essential for our crews to deliver water quickly to the floor that is on fire and thereby provide for the safety of residents as soon as possible.

On the issue of resident's safety you will appreciate that it is important for our fire crews that all DRM within your buildings are secure and maintained to the high standard required for operational use. In view of this I am writing to all housing providers in the capital who have responsibility for residential high rise buildings, which are 6 floors and higher with a DRM installed, to request that each main is inspected to determine its condition. On the completion of these inspections I would ask that a return be sent to the 'servicedeliveryreturns@london-fire.gov.uk' mailbox regarding any defective DRM with details and location of the defects. I would request that all returns are sent within 21 days of the date of this letter.

I would also remind you that as the 'responsible person' for these premises under the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005 you are required to maintain all firefighting facilities within the building in working order and to ensure this is recorded on the fire risk assessment. May I thank you in anticipation of your assistance to this request. Any information you can provide will contribute to pre-planning in respect of fire fighting tactics and will greatly assist us in assuring the safety of your tenants.

Yours faithfully

Steve Turek
Assistant Commissioner
Fire Safety Regulation

Protocol between

**LONDON FIRE AND EMERGENCY PLANNING
AUTHORITY**

and

**THE ROYAL BOROUGH OF KENSINGTON AND
CHELSEA**



THE ROYAL BOROUGH OF
KENSINGTON
AND CHELSEA



LONDON FIRE
AND EMERGENCY
PLANNING AUTHORITY

PROTOCOL BETWEEN LFEPA AND THE ROYAL BOROUGH OF KENSINGTON AND CHELSEA

Dated: 1st October 2011

Review Date: 1st October 2012

Statement

Inter-agency working is important to the success of licensing and the effective introduction of the Housing Health and Safety Rating System. The Housing Act 2004 and the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005 (the Fire Safety Order) highlight the need for authorities to work together and agree how their respective strategies can complement one another. These must reflect the joint dependencies necessary to tackle the community safety agenda. Within both the Housing Act and the Fire Safety Order, there is a duty on authorities to consult one another on certain prescribed matters relating to HMOs. Authorities must therefore establish joint protocols. There will also be opportunities for authorities to use licensing and the introduction of Housing Health and Safety Rating System and the Fire Safety Order as components in local area agreements.

1. Introduction

This protocol establishes the principles and describes the joint working arrangements between The Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea (RBKC) and the London Fire & Emergency Planning Authority (LFEPA) to deliver the objective of improved fire safety within housing occupied by more than one household. It is a framework which provides the basis for detailed local arrangements whilst encouraging collaboration at a regional level.

The introduction of the Housing Act 2004 and the Fire Safety Order has imposed a dual responsibility on two statutory authorities to enforce reasonable fire safety provisions within such housing.

To promote the efficient use of resources, this protocol will identify discrete areas of inspection and enforcement, appropriate review and monitoring arrangements and provide for urgent or unusual requests for assistance from either party. It seeks to provide all parties with confidence that they are discharging their respective duties under the relevant legislation.

The Housing Act 2004 is the primary piece of legislation for residential premises and this is enforced by The Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea in its own borough.

LFEPA has a legal duty to enforce the Fire Safety Order in the common areas of all residential accommodation not forming a single private dwelling.¹ LFEPA acknowledges that the fire safety standards required by The Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea under the Housing Act 2004 will, in most cases, achieve a satisfactory level of fire safety for relevant persons as required under the Fire Safety Order.

Conversely, RBKC has a duty to identify and, if necessary act upon, significant hazards found within all housing. It acknowledges that LFEPA will monitor and enforce fire safety standards, to a satisfactory standard, in premises identified in Section 3 of this protocol. LFEPA will inform RBKC of serious non-fire matters it encounters.

¹ The Fire Safety Order applies to all parts of domestic premises when prohibition action under Article 31 of the Fire Safety Order is taken.

Both Authorities utilise a risk based enforcement approach and it is recognised that some providers may not have sufficient competencies to undertake such risk assessments. In general, RBKC undertakes a risk assessment utilising the Housing Health and Safety Rating System (HHSRS), whilst LFEPA expects the responsible person for the premises to undertake a risk assessment.

These collaborative working arrangements, which support the Government's broader agenda, will enable both authorities to promote fire safety and other safety provisions within a broader range of premises than would have been possible if they had acted independently or undertaken joint inspections.

Nothing in this agreement shall be considered as creating a partnership, a contractual relationship, a contract of employment or a relationship of principal and agent between the parties and shall not add in any way to the existing statutory duties of the parties. No party to this agreement shall hold itself as being authorised to enter any contract on behalf of any other party or in any way bind any other party to the performance, variation, release or discharge of any obligation otherwise than in circumstances expressly or implicitly permitted by this agreement.

Nothing in this agreement will prevent either authority carrying out their enforcement activities in line with statutory powers.

2. The underlying principles of this protocol are as follows:

- To ensure appropriate standards of fire safety and other safety provisions are provided and maintained in multi-occupied residential premises.
- To develop data sharing arrangements, through established paths and in accordance with Section 9 of this document.
- To assist landlords and other providers to understand the legal framework under which they operate.
- To encourage opportunities for offering joint training and awareness sessions for both authorities.
- To recognise the needs and limitations of LFEPA and RBKC and to acknowledge that both authorities will always seek to act in good faith.

3. Which Authority should take the lead enforcing role for fire safety?

Authorities will normally undertake enforcement action in premises as detailed in table 1 below.

Nevertheless, LFEPA is under an obligation to reduce fire deaths in line with its risk based enforcement policies and will undertake planned, proactive inspections in any identified type of premises or in a particular locality. Prior to any such series of inspections consultation should take place to ensure that duplication of enforcement does not occur. Any such programme of inspection may, subject to local agreement take place individually, collaboratively or jointly and must complement the inspection programme of The Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea.

Table 1: Lead Authorities for enforcement in differing types of premises.

Single dwellings (Fire risk assessment not required)	RBKC
HMOs whether subject to mandatory, selective and additional licensing or not. Hostels ²	RBKC
Self contained flats, whether purpose built or converted ³	LFEPa & RBKC
Premises with mixed residential and/or commercial use ¹	LFEPa
Bed and Breakfast/Hotels/Lodgings	LFEPa
Sheltered Accommodation	LFEPa
All multi-occupied accommodation owned or managed by RBKC	LFEPa

¹Where there is clear fire resisting separation and separate entrances RBKC will take responsibility for the residential premises (unless owned by RBKC) and LFEPa will take responsibility for the commercial premises.

²Hostels generally have a requirement for the residents to have a particular need or dependency and do not provide permanent accommodation.

³Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea retain the lead enforcement role for fire safety within all self-contained flats, whether purpose-built or converted as stated in the protocol; and Fire and Rescue Authority(FRA) take the lead enforcement role for fire safety arrangements in the common parts of all Purpose Built Blocks or converted flats.

What does it mean to be designated as the lead enforcement authority?

It is recognised that when Local Housing Authorities (LHA) or FRAs are locally designated as the lead enforcement authority for a certain type of premises, this does not affect the statutory responsibilities of either authority. Nor does it necessarily imply that all such properties will be proactively inspected by the lead authority. This will depend on the resources available.

Where concerns about fire safety in any individual flats or the common parts of the building come to light for whatever reason, including as a result of a reactive or proactive inspection, it should be the responsibility of the lead enforcement authority to investigate in the first instance.

Where necessary emergency action will be taken by either authority to reduce any immediate risk but further remedial enforcement will only be undertaken following consultation with the designated lead authority. Nothing in this protocol will prevent either authority undertaking specific individual monitoring or enforcement action if appropriate.

The legislative position and the provision and management of supported housing is complex and outside the scope of this protocol.

4. What will The Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea do?

- RBKC will undertake, in line with their statutory requirements, the monitoring and inspection of premises identified in Section 3 of this protocol.
- RBKC will undertake the monitoring and inspection of their own premises to ensure adequate fire safety standards.
- RBKC will enforce fire safety standards in accordance with the provisions of the Housing Act 2004 and the HHSRS, having regard to relevant documents published by the Government including, 'Fire Safety Risk Assessment: Sleeping

Accommodation' (ISBN 9781851128174), statutory operating guidance on the HHSRS and in accordance with any guidance jointly agreed with LFEPA.

- RBKC will, when taking enforcement action under the Housing Act 2004, have regard to the Fire Safety Order.

As RBKC cannot enforce in its own premises it will ensure that when deficiencies are identified it takes appropriate action in a timely manner to ensure acceptable fire safety standards are maintained and achieved in these premises.

- Although RBKC may offer a suitable means of complying with fire safety requirements, it will also:
 - Ensure guidance accompanies all statutory notices informing owners/landlords of the need to undertake their own fire risk assessment.
 - Ensure that in any relevant notice, the schedule of work is drafted in such a way as to offer the owner/landlord the opportunity to bring forward alternative means of complying in accordance with their own fire risk assessment.
 - Where such alternatives are brought forward by the owner/landlord, RBKC will consult with LFEPA.
- RBKC will undertake consultation with LFEPA in line with the criteria detailed in Section 6 of this protocol.
- RBKC will provide LFEPA with relevant, timely and comprehensive data to enable that authority to maintain adequate property and risk based data sets.
- RBKC will consider the use of the full range of powers under the Housing Act 2004, including Emergency Prohibition Orders, where appropriate.
- RBKC will provide LFEPA with suitable out of hours contact details so that where appropriate, consideration is given to ensure vulnerable persons are not left homeless as a result of emergency enforcement action.

5. What will LFEPA do?

- LFEPA will undertake, in line with their risk-based policies, the monitoring and inspection of premises identified in Section 3 of this protocol which fall under the scope of the Fire Safety Order.
- LFEPA will carry out post fire audits on all premises where the Fire Safety Order applies, taking appropriate action where necessary.
- LFEPA will enforce fire safety standards in accordance with the Fire Safety Order, having regard to relevant documents published by the Government including, 'Fire Safety Risk Assessment: Sleeping Accommodation' (ISBN 9781851128174) and in accordance with any guidance jointly agreed with RBKC.
- LFEPA will undertake consultation with RBKC in line with the criteria detailed in Section 6 of this protocol.
- LFEPA will provide RBKC with relevant, timely and comprehensive data to enable those Authorities to maintain adequate property and risk-based data sets.
- LFEPA will provide RBKC with information, within their scope of competency, of serious matters that may need to be addressed by those authorities. (This may include such information as apparent overcrowding, poor management or unsafe practises by tenants).

- LFEPA is an emergency organisation which provides 24-hour cover. Information about dangerous fire safety conditions may come via complaints or post incident and may occur outside of normal working hours. LFEPA are under an obligation to take action in such circumstances. Where possible and especially outside of normal office hours, the dangerous conditions will be mitigated and RBKC will be informed as soon as practicably possible.
- LFEPA would, in principle, be willing to support RBKC at Residential Property Tribunals offering professional opinion on fire risks.

6. Consultation

Formal consultation between authorities should take place in accordance with the requirements of the Housing Act 2004 Section 10 and the Fire Safety Order Article 46. Where necessary, in complex premises, joint inspections and consultation may be undertaken to agree a suitable standard prior to the taking of enforcement action by the most appropriate authority.

Arrangements should be put in place to facilitate the following:

Strategic level consultation

Formal meetings at Area Management (GM) level to review procedural and policy issues. This group should also monitor the outcomes of the protocol and should meet at least every 6 months.

Tactical level consultation

Urgent – Consultation between Local Housing Officer and Local Fire Officer. (Where possible this should be between an identified and named link officer from each authority).

Non-urgent – Discussions between named link officers, if appropriate referred to strategic meetings.

Individual consultation

If a scheme is in compliance with this protocol and jointly agreed guidance, consultation can be deemed to have taken place. Depending on circumstances and the complexity of the requirements, written consultation may not always be necessary. Where alternatives to schemes are offered or problematic/non-standard premises are involved, full consultation should take place.

7. Communication

Local communication channels will be established between LFEPA and RBKC.

Each authority undertakes to provide information about their respective legislation to promote understanding and efficient working.

8. Monitoring and evaluation

Any changes to this protocol, other than minor administrative changes, will be subject to approval at strategic level and the signatories to the protocol.

An annual report will be produced jointly by parties to the protocol.

9. Data Exchange

RBKC and LFEPA will establish local communication channels to exchange data.

RBKC will provide data in an agreed format to LFEPA about residential premises. This will enable LFEPA to populate their premises databases.

RBKC and LFEPA will provide six monthly updates of this data in a format agreed locally.

Both authorities will ensure that the information is marked as confidential and will not disclose it to other organisations without the appropriate consent. Authorities will not use or disclose information supplied pursuant to this protocol without consulting the originating authority. All information whether held on manual files or computer/digital media will be disposed of as confidential waste.

10. Approval


The protocol will be approved and endorsed at a suitable strategic management level by both RBKC and LFEPA.

Consultation should take place on an area basis with appropriate Private Sector Housing Groups.

Signatories to Protocol

Protocol between
LONDON FIRE AND EMERGENCY PLANNING AUTHORITY
and
THE ROYAL BOROUGH OF KENSINGTON AND CHELSEA

Signed:



Date:

20 / 2 / 12

Steve Turek

Assistant Commissioner

For London Fire and Emergency Planning Authority

Signed:



Date:

17. 11. 11

Paul Morse

Director of Environmental Health

For The Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea

Eddie Stevens
Housing & Technical Services Director
City of London
Guildhall
London
EC2P 2EJ

London Fire Brigade is run by
London Fire and Emergency Planning Authority

Date 24 January 2014

Dear Sir

MULTI-LAYER PAINT - FIRE SAFETY ISSUES

In early 2009 I wrote to the then Directors of Housing at all the London Boroughs and other social housing landlords outlining, amongst other things, the hazards associated with multi-layer paint in the common areas of purpose built flats and other social housing premises. In the letter I advised that it was recognised where decorative paint in common areas is allowed to build up into multiple layers, this can allow very rapid fire spread as the paint delaminates and burns. The risk predominantly arises where there is poor paint adhesion / flaking paint. Recent fires in London, and audits of premises by the Brigade's Fire Safety Inspecting Officers, have shown that this problem still exists in some blocks of flats.

As it is some time since my earlier correspondence I am writing again on this matter to ensure you are informed about our concerns and so that this can be taken into account when any maintenance and refurbishment work is being programmed.

I have included for your information a link to our website which contains some literature commissioned by the London Fire Brigade (LFB) and provided by Bureau Veritas on this issue which I hope you will find both informative and useful. This can be accessed by following the link:

<http://www.london-fire.gov.uk/multilayerpaints.asp>

If you or your staff have any queries on this issue please do not hesitate to contact either myself or your local LFB fire safety team.

Yours faithfully

Steve Turek
Assistant Commissioner
Fire Safety Regulation

Reply to Assistant Commissioner Steve Turek
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Eddie Stevens
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London Fire Brigade is run by
London Fire and Emergency Planning Authority

Date 17 February 2014

Dear Mr Stevens

ADVICE ON SMOKE VENTILATION SYSTEMS AND MAINTENANCE OF LIFTS FOR FIRE SERVICE USE IN RESIDENTIAL BLOCKS OF FLATS

This letter provides information about issues the Brigade has identified relating to (a) smoke ventilation and (b) the maintenance of fire lifts in residential buildings, which are both relevant to the fire risk assessments for your residential property portfolios where they are installed.

(A) SMOKE VENTILATION SYSTEMS IN RESIDENTIAL BLOCKS OF FLATS

Recent fire incidents and Brigade audits of premises have demonstrated that in some cases smoke ventilation systems installed in residential buildings are not operating correctly. As part of this, we are also identifying that in some cases, natural smoke ventilation of common corridors, lobbies and staircases by more simple means such as windows or permanent vents is also being removed, obstructed or otherwise compromised. This raises serious concern as in the event of a fire there is the potential that smoke can be contained and spread within a building rather than being vented to the atmosphere via these dedicated smoke ventilation provisions.

Smoke ventilation of escape routes, combined with limitations on travel distance in corridors and lobbies, is designed to assist means of escape for both the occupants who have escaped from the flat that is on fire and for others who may choose to escape subsequently. It may also be there to assist fire-fighters to gain access to the floor of the fire incident. As a result it is extremely important to design, install, and maintain these smoke ventilation provisions so that they operate correctly and safely.

Depending on the number of stairs and the age of the property, smoke ventilation is normally installed in either the stair lobbies or corridors that form the common access area to the residential flats, as well as in the staircase enclosure itself. Simple smoke ventilation measures could comprise of manually or automatically opening windows, or in older buildings, permanently open vents.

However, complex natural or mechanical smoke extract systems can also be employed using smoke ventilation shafts or 'chimneys', particularly in more modern buildings. In some cases, where the building may have only one stair, or where extended common corridor travel distances are present, these can be mechanical single or two-speed smoke extract systems, with pressure sensors and manual override controls for fire fighters.

The expectation in purpose built blocks of flats is that if the smoke ventilation system is automatic and heat and/or smoke enters the common parts on the floor where a fire has started, the smoke ventilation system for the premises will vent that heat and smoke to allow the means of escape to continue to be safely used, at least for a reasonable period of time, as well as to help facilitate fire fighting activities within the building.

In the case of an automatically opening smoke ventilation system into a smoke shaft, if smoke is detected, the door/ damper to the smoke shaft on that floor should open, together with a vent at the top of the shaft and also in the stair at the roof level. This creates a chimney effect, allowing the smoke to vent to open air. All other vents opening into the smoke shaft should remain closed in order to maintain the required level of fire separation in the building, prevent smoke spread to otherwise unaffected parts of the building, and to avoid reducing the smoke ventilation rate from the floor of fire origin.

The Brigade recommends that as part of your on-going maintenance and fire risk assessment programmes you arrange to have the smoke ventilation arrangements within your buildings checked and maintained by a competent person. Where relevant, any automatic systems should be checked to ensure that only the vent on the floor where the fire is first detected opens and that, with the exception of those at the head of any smoke vent shaft and the stair, that the vents on all other floors remain closed (even if smoke were to be detected or manual fire fighter overrides activated subsequently on those other floors).

Additionally, it has come to our attention that some smoke ventilation shaft installations utilise electromagnetic holding devices (to secure/ release vents), which are devices that can have an unpredictable performance leading to failure under fire conditions. Such failure can occur due to a loss of power to the devices, or through the magnetic fields of the devices being weakened as temperatures in and around the smoke ventilation shaft rise. As a result, multiple vents on multiple floors are susceptible to opening to the smoke shaft during a fire incident. This increases the likelihood of fire and smoke spread in a building, with no means to remotely re-set (i.e. close) the vents that have opened. It is therefore recommended that the use of electromagnetic holding devices as part of any smoke ventilation shaft installation should be specifically reviewed as part of your premises fire risk assessment, with consideration being given to replacing these devices with a more robust form of vent actuator.

Due to the potential for misuse and tampering, the need and type of any manual override controls for fire fighters (or maintenance purposes) as part of any smoke ventilation system should also be carefully considered/ reviewed. For example, we have recently identified that in some cases residents of blocks of flats have inappropriately used manual override controls for fire fighters to open vents to improve environmental conditions within corridors, and have mistakenly used such controls during a fire incident. In both examples, this has led to the fire compartmentation and means of escape routes within the buildings in question to be compromised.

Therefore the need to provide manual override controls for smoke ventilation systems should be reviewed as part of your premises fire risk assessment. Where any such controls are installed, these should be provided with clear signage (for example, '*Smoke vent – fire fighter use only*'), and anti-tamper measures where required. Residents should also be informed that these override controls are for fire fighter use only.

If there is any doubt as to whether a smoke ventilation system has been designed and installed correctly in the first instance (and for the purpose of instructing those who are to test and maintain these systems), or you require further guidance in relation to the above mentioned issues, we recommend that reference is made to the current industry best practice document:

'Guidance on Smoke Control to Common Escape Routes in Apartment Buildings (Flats and Maisonettes) - First published Nov 2010; Revision 1 published 14 June 2012'

This document can be downloaded for free at -

Once a smoke ventilation system has been checked and verified it should be recorded in the fire risk assessment for the building.

Separately, on the basis of experience in some fire situations, I also recommend that residents and other occupiers should be made aware of the importance of not tampering with or disabling measures used for smoke ventilation in case of a fire. Ultimately residents and other users safety in the event of a fire in a building could depend upon the smoke ventilation working effectively when needed.

(B) MAINTENANCE OF LIFTS FOR FIRE SERVICE USE

For housing stock above 18m in height a lift for fire service use should have been installed as part of the access and facilities provided for fire-fighters. The type of lift for fire service use will largely be dependent on the age of the building and can be broadly categorised as a "fireman's" lift, or a fire-fighting lift. Each can have very different features/ functions, and offer varying levels of protection for attending fire-fighters.

A fire-fighting lift is the modern standard lift, and will have been installed in accordance with BS5588 part 5/ BS9999: 2008 and BS EN 81-72. These lift installations typically form part of a fire fighting shaft, and include water protection measures, robust power supplies and control logic, and a dedicated fire and rescue service communication system.

A "fireman's" lift will generally have been fitted prior to the mid 1980s and offers a recall facility at ground floor level via a fire-fighters key switch, and may or may not have any additional safety features. A "fireman's" lift typically does not include a secondary power supply or a means of protecting the lift and its components from water ingress. The result is that a "fireman's" lift may have a limited use during a fire incident due to the risks relating to loss of power.

Where it has been identified that a "fireman's" lift (as opposed to a fire fighting lift) is installed within a building then we would request that the responsible person liaises with the relevant London Fire Brigade local Fire Safety Regulation Team to advise them of the premises address and style of lift present (in accordance with sharing of information detailed in Article 13(3)(c) of the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005). This allows any necessary pre-planning to be undertaken and consideration of a familiarisation visit to the premises by our crews.

The type and functionality of lift for fire service use should also be included in the fire risk assessment for the building, and consideration given to the potential impact that a "fireman's" lift may have on any fire incident that may occur on the upper floors of a high rise building. If crews are not able to use the lift beyond the initial stages of an incident then the potential effect of this on the safety of residents must be considered and recorded within the fire risk assessment.

Regardless of the type of lift for fire service use installed within your building(s), the requirement to maintain it in good working order (in accordance with Article 38 of the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005) is paramount to assisting operational crews in the course of their duties. Again, this should be accounted for as part of the premises fire risk assessment.

The maintenance schedule should include specific checks of all special functions and facilities provided for the lift to be used by the fire service, with this being clearly detailed on the relevant inspection/ testing certification. It has, however, come to our attention that such checks may not historically have been included in standard maintenance agreements and so may not have been carried out, I would therefore recommend that you review the service arrangements you have with your maintenance provider(s).

It is also recommended that where buildings have been provided with "fireman's" lifts that consideration is given to upgrading these to fire-fighting lifts designed and installed to BS EN 81-72, particularly where

a significant finding has been made within the fire risk assessment about the suitability of the lift present.

If you have any queries relating to the content of this letter please contact us using the following e-mail address – rro@london-fire.gov.uk

Yours faithfully

Steve Turek
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Fire Safety Regulation

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«Job_title»
«Organisation»
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«Add2»
«Add_3»
«Add4»
«Add5»

London Fire Brigade is run by the London
Fire and Emergency Planning Authority

Date 5 April 2017

Dear Sir/Madam,

TALL BUILDINGS – EXTERNAL FIRE SPREAD

The fire at Shepherd's Court in Hammersmith on 19 August 2016 received widespread coverage in the media, in the main because the cause of the fire was due to a faulty appliance that was subject to a product recall, an issue which the London Fire Brigade has been campaigning on. However, I am also drawing this fire to your attention to highlight the external spread of the fire that occurred.

My predecessor, Assistant Commissioner Steve Turek, wrote to housing providers in March 2009 about a variety of matters relating to fire safety in residential housing blocks. One of those matters was replacement double glazing and the associated replacement of spandrel and filler panels on the external faces of blocks of flats with floors above 18 meters in height. In the case of this fire, we believe such panels were a contributory factor to the external fire spread.

The London Fire Brigade have seen a number of cases where it appears, on the basis of the information available to us, that the level of fire protection to the external face of the building did not comply with the requirements of Part B of the Building Regulations insofar as they seek to limit the speed with which a fire can travel and spread over the external face of a building or may contribute to a fire.

Testing of panels has found that the combustibility of the composition of the panels at Shepherd's Court did not meet the levels expected for conformity with the building regulations. On testing it was found that panels may deform or delaminate exposing any combustible core or constituent material resulting in the panel becoming involved in the fire and allowing the fire to spread and enter flats other than the flat of origin of the fire.


In many instances, how these panels came to be used is not clear due to the length of time since installation. However, we have noted that the glazing used in such replacements has usually been subject to certification under a Competent Persons Scheme for building regulations compliance. It may have been assumed that the spandrel and in-fill panes were also covered by the certification. Our understanding is that these Competent Person Schemes in fact only cover glazing, roof lights and doors containing more than 50 per cent glazing. It is of note that guidance to support some Competent Person Schemes does not mention the need to ensure compliance with section B4 (External Fire Spread) of the Building Regulations and instead focused solely on use of windows as means of escape in case of fire.

In the light of fires that have occurred, I would urge you to consider carefully your arrangements for specifying, monitoring and approving all aspects of future replacement and improvement to building facades and construction of new buildings for which you are responsible. Contracts for the provision and installation of replacement elements of building facades, including insulation, replacement double

glazing and associated spandrel and in-fill panels must ensure compliance with all parts of Part B if they are to secure public safety and minimise fire losses.

I would therefore strongly urge that you consider this issue as part of the risk assessment process for premises under your control. I suggest that you make sure all relevant information about any replacement window and facade schemes is fully available to fire risk assessors. Where no reliable information is available for a given property, it is our general expectation that a strategy to assess the risk and where necessary implement short, medium and long term actions to address the risk. This assessment will need to take account of other fire safety measures already in place in the building as well as potential mitigation measures to ensure that any potential fire spread does not pose a risk to health and safety.

Yours faithfully,



Dan Daly
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Fire Safety Regulation

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