

Witness statement of: Gary Reason

No. of statement: 1

Exhibits: 23

Date of statement: 12 February 2019

GRENFELL TOWER INQUIRY

WITNESS STATEMENT OF GARY REASON

I, Gary Reason, say as follows:

1. I make this statement to explain and clarify some of the 'list of issues' raised by the Grenfell Tower Inquiry (GTI) in its letter to the Brigade dated 18 May 2018. It also responds to the four specific issues detailed in the letter I received from the Brigade's General Counsel team on 17 October 2018. For ease of reference, I have set out each of these issues separately below.

Career Profile

2. I joined the London Fire Brigade (Brigade) in 1984 where I served for over 30-years covering all operational roles/ranks from firefighter up to and including Brigade Manager (BM). During the first 10-years of my service I worked at a range of inner and outer London fire stations performing the roles of firefighter, Leading firefighter, Sub Officer (now known as Crew Manager) and Station Officer (now known as Watch Manager). In the early 90's I took up my first middle management role as Station Manager (SM) and progressed to Group Manager (GM) in 1996. I remained in the GM role for over 9-years undertaking a range of different managerial positions across various Brigade departments including the role of the Borough Commander for Wandsworth between 2006 and 2007.
3. In January 2007 I was promoted to Deputy Assistant Commissioner (DAC) working in the Brigade's Training and Development (T and D) Department. In November of the same year I was temporarily promoted to the role of Assistant Commissioner (AC) with responsibility for

parts of the Service Delivery Department before moving to become the Head of the Brigade's T and D Department in February 2008.

4. As the Head of the T and D Department I was responsible for the management of the Brigade's Training Centres and staff resources and delivery of the majority of the Brigade's training requirements with the exception of Brigade Control which had its own training team. It should be noted that during my tenure as the Head of the T and D Department a corporate project was initiated to look at different options for the future provision of the Brigade's training function. This initiative was called the 'Future Options for Training' project and in April 2012 culminated in the Brigade's Training delivery function being outsourced to a third-party company (Babcock). To date, Babcock have been responsible for delivering the majority of the Brigade's operational skills and non-operational training requirements with the exception of Brigade Control training and some very specialised national incident command courses such as the Multi-agency 'Gold' and Chemical, Biological, Nuclear and Radiological Strategic command courses.
5. In June 2008, I was appointed permanent AC and remained in my role as Head of T and D. In April 2010 I left the T and D Department and took over as the Head of the Operational Resilience (OR) Department. As the Head of OR I had responsibility for the Brigade's Contingency and Emergency Planning functions, the Brigade's input in to major transport infrastructure projects (such as Crossrail) and the Special Operations team that develops the Brigade's specialist capabilities and associated policies for the current and emerging terrorist threats.
6. In addition to managing the OR Department's core functions I also had the lead responsibility for planning the Brigade's and national fire service preparations and for the 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games. During this period I was also responsible for the Brigade's preparations relating to the Coroner's inquests for the London Bombings (2005) where 52 civilians tragically lost their lives as a result of four separate suicide bomb attacks. I was the most senior Brigade officer to give evidence at the London Bombing inquest.
7. In January 2012 I was promoted to the role of Director of Operational Resilience and Training (DoORT), a position I held until I retired from the Brigade in January 2015. The DoORT role formed an integral part of the Brigade's Corporate Management Team (CMT) that had responsibility for the effective management and continuous improvement of the full range of

prevention, protection and emergency response services provided by the Brigade. At the time of taking up the DoORT role the Brigade's CMT was made up of the Commissioner (Ron Dobson), Deputy Commissioner (Rita Dexter), Director of Contractual Services (Sue Budden) and myself. The CMT was supplemented in 2013 by the appointment of a 'Third Officer' (Assistant Commissioner Dave Brown), who at that time, was responsible for managing all of the Brigade's fire stations.

8. My responsibilities within the DoORT role included providing support and guidance to the strategic operational command function both in terms of preplanning for major events affecting the service and responding to operational emergency incidents. During my 30-years of operational service I attended a large number of major incidents and represented the Brigade as 'Gold' Commander and at the Mayor's Advisory Group meetings, the latter being a meeting that is normally called by City Hall when London is facing a specific threat or a major incident/event is in progress.
9. In my role as Director I had oversight and responsibility for the following functions and departments that made up the structure of the Operational Resilience and Training Directorate:
 - Operational Assurance
 - Operational Procedures
 - Human Resource and Development - this department also provided the main interface with the external training provider (Babcock)
 - Health and Safety
 - Operational Resilience
 - Emergency Planning
10. While in the DoORT role I was a standing member of a number of strategic governance Boards that had specific responsibility for monitoring the progress of the two action plans that the Brigade produced following the Lakanal House residential high rise fire, which occurred in 2009. More detail about these Boards are covered later in this witness statement.

My role since the Grenfell Tower fire

11. In the days following the Grenfell Tower fire (June 2017) I was contacted by the London Fire Commissioner (LFC) Dany Cotton and asked to assist the Brigade with establishing an investigation team that would undertake the Brigade's internal Safety and Learning Review and support the Metropolitan Police Service's (MPS) criminal investigations. The LFC asked for my assistance due to my previous experience in managing the London Bombing inquests, which were held in 2011/12.
12. I returned to the Brigade on Monday 19 June 2017 and began the task of establishing a team to commence the work associated with the Brigade's Safety and Learning Review. This team is now known as the Grenfell Tower Investigation and Review Team (GTIRT).
13. In addition to establishing the team I produced an initial Terms of Reference (ToR) covering the Brigade's Safety and Learning Review. This initial ToR was shared with the MPS as the original approach was to undertake a shared investigation with the Police and Health and Safety Executive (HSE). This ToR was agreed at a Commissioner's Board meeting in August 2017. These ToR have subsequently been updated to reflect changes in the way the Brigade is undertaking its Safety and Learning Review. The primary change to the original ToR relates to the fact that the Brigade is no longer part of the joint investigation with the MPS and HSE.
14. During the first few weeks following my return to the Brigade I worked closely with the MPS's Senior Investigating Officer (SIO) and the Brigade's General Counsel team to establish the protocols for managing the investigation and associated information gathering/sharing processes. I remained working for the Brigade in a full-time capacity for several months until a new Head of the GTIRT was appointed and embedded in the role after which I moved to a part-time position as the Strategic Advisor to the GTIRT. This is the role that I am currently performing for the Brigade.

My involvement in the Lakanal House Board, including specific responsibilities I had in relation to discharging any specific items detailed in the Lakanal House Action Plan

15. In 2009, Ron Dobson (the then London Fire Brigade Commissioner) established the Lakanal House Board. At that time I was not a standing member of this Board. However, in my senior management role I was aware that the Board had been established to oversee the Brigade's

investigation into the Lakanal House fire and ensure that any lessons learnt were acted upon to drive continuous improvement within the Brigade. I was also aware that the Board monitored the work being undertaken to support the MPS investigation and subsequently the Coroner's inquest when this was announced.

16. I was first invited to attend the Lakanal House Board meetings in January 2012 following my promotion to DoORT. The first Lakanal Board meeting that I attended was on 3 February 2012. At this point an action plan had already been developed and consisted of 34 separate items. In February 2012 only six of the items in the action plan were not marked as 'completed'. I did not have any actions allocated to my role or me personally although one action marked as 'still in progress' was allocated to the Head of Operational Procedures (OP), a department that was within my Directorate. A copy of the February 2012 Lakanal House Board meeting minutes and associated action plan is provided as Exhibit GR/1 (GR/1:).
17. As a member of the Board I received copies of all the papers and reports that were presented at the Lakanal House Board meetings. While I do not recall all the reports that I reviewed during my time on the Board in my role as DoORT I would have commented and made contributions to the reports and issues, as appropriate.
18. I remained a member of the Lakanal Board until it was closed down, which I recall was around the end of 2013.

My role in responding to the Coroner's 'Rule 43' Recommendations arising out of the Lakanal House fire

19. Following receipt of the Coroner's Rule 43 letter, dated 28 March 2013, I was tasked by the Commissioner (Ron Dobson) to establish a detailed action plan to address and respond to all of the Coroner's recommendations. My first action was to call a meeting with all of the Brigade's Heads of Service (HoS) who had corporate responsibility for the areas of work detailed in the recommendations. Below is the list of the HoS who were directly involved in the work to develop the Brigade's Rule 43 action plan:

- Assistant Commissioner Dave Brown – Head of Operations, Prevention and Response (OPR) and 'Third Officer'
- Assistant Commissioner Steve Turek - Head of Fire Safety Regulation (FSR)

20. Over a series of meetings with the above officers I produced an action plan that addressed all of the Coroner's Rule 43 recommendations. The action plan was broken down into a number of sub-tasks aimed at delivering the underlying improvements intended by the Coroner's Rule 43 recommendations. In developing these sub-tasks officers were directed to ensure that all of the outcomes be measurable and where applicable, sustainable. A copy of the Coroner's Rule 43 action plan detailing the activities undertaken by the Brigade to address the Coroner's recommendations is provided as Exhibit GR/2 pages 19-26 refer (GR/2: LFB00000203).
21. Once completed the action plan was reviewed by the members of the Brigade's CMT and it was agreed that the Head of OA (AC Dany Cotton) be given responsibility for overseeing and updating the action plan. I am aware that the detailed commitments outlined in this action plan were used by the Commissioner in his response to the Coroner Rule 43 recommendations; letter dated 23 May 2013 from the Commissioner Ron Dobson to France Kirkham (Assistant Deputy Coroner).
22. Once finalised and agreed the Rule 43 action plan was regularly reviewed through a number of governance processes; namely the Operational Directorates Coordination Board (ODCB) and Lakanal House Members Working Group (LHWG). These two Boards were the means by which the progress of the Rule 43 action plan was regularly monitored.
23. The ODCB was a quarterly Board meeting Chaired by the then Deputy Commissioner (Rita Dexter) and the Rule 43 action plan became a standing agenda item for this Board. All HoS, with actions within the plan, were required to provide the Head of OA (Dany Cotton) with written updates ahead of each ODCB meeting. The Head of OA was responsible for collating all the HoS responses and updating the Lakanal House Rule 43 action plan. All HoS with specific responsibilities within this action plan were standing members of the ODCB. More detailed information about the OCDB is provided in paragraphs 36 to 47 of this statement.
24. The review of the Rule 43 action plan at the ODCB enabled the Deputy Commissioner and myself to track the progress of each of the activities within the action plan before it was

presented to the LHWG. It also enabled the Deputy Commissioner and myself to understand some of the background issues and impacts involved in delivering the actions.

25. The LHWG was the second forum that had formal oversight of the Lakanal House Rule 43 action plan. This working group was set up by the London Fire and Emergency Planning Authority (the Authority) to provide cross party (political) scrutiny to review and oversee some of the key issues that emerged from the Lakanal House fire and subsequent inquest. The London Fire and Emergency Planning Authority was a functional body of the Greater London Authority (GLA) established to run the London Fire Brigade.

26. At the June 2013 Authority meeting the following terms of reference (ToR) for the LHWG was agreed:

‘to undertake a review of the Brigade’s response to the fire at Lakanal House and to feed recommendations back to the Authority’s Strategy Committee’.

27. The Commissioner, Deputy Commissioner and myself were standing members of the LHWG along with the three Authority Members selected from the main political parties (Labour, Conservative and Liberal Democrats). Other Brigade officers were invited to attend specific meetings when required.

28. The inaugural meeting of the LHWG was held on 24 July 2013. At this meeting the initial work programme, as outlined below, was agreed. The names in the brackets indicate the officer who had responsibility for leading on the item.

- Ongoing updates on the progress of the Lakanal House Rule 43 Action Plan (Gary Reason)
- Victim Support - looking at the support available in London to victims of major fires and incidents (Gary Reason)
- Fire Safety Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order - to provide an explanation of legislation covering fire safety (for which the Brigade is the prosecuting Authority) and the fire safety inspection regime used by the Brigade for high rise premises (Steve Turek)
- Incident Command Developments - to review all the developments relating to incident command that the Brigade had implemented following the Lakanal House fire (Gary Reason)

- Capture and use of premise based information - information explaining how the Brigade captures, stores, accesses and uses premise based information (Dave Brown)
- Fire safety information for residents in high rise residential premises - a review of the information that is provided to residents of high rise residential tower blocks and those who have responsibility for fire safety of these buildings (Steve Turek).

29. The above topics were the key issues that the members of the LHWG wished to explore and understand more fully. Further topics were added to the initial work programme during the life of the Working Group. This resulted in additional reports, briefing notes and presentations being requested, one of which was a very detailed presentation by the Building Research Establishment (BRE) on the history of the building (Lakanal House) and its performance during the fire. The full list of the presentations, reports and briefing notes considered by the LHWG is detailed as Exhibit GR/3 (GR/3:).

30. In addition to being a standing member of the LHWG I had responsibility for presenting the Lakanal House Rule 43 Action Plan Monitoring Report that was a standing agenda item for this meeting. This involved me going through each of the actions and explaining the updated position(s) that had been provided by each of the HoS who had corporate responsibility for each action item. The Commissioner, Deputy Commissioner and myself also answered any questions the Members had relating to the Lakanal House Rule 43 action plan updates.

31. To maintain an overview of progress against all the actions detailed in the Rule 43 action plan I used the information that was routinely provided to the ODCB meetings. This was supplemented by tracking the actions that were generated through the LHWG and any related issues that were being progressed by the Authority's Strategy Committee. This resulted in one composite action plan being presented to the LHWG. Exhibit GR/2 pages 19-31 refer (GR/2:LFB00000203) is an example of the composite action plan presented to the LHWG meetings.

32. In addition to presenting the updates for the Rule 43 action plan I also produced a number of the briefing notes and reports that were requested by the Working Group. These covered the following topics:

- Victim Support (briefing note) - this provided background information relating to the organisations that could provide support to people who have been affected by

improvements within the Brigade. I believe some of the work progressed by this Board may be of interest to the GTI as they cover issues that are relevant to high rise incidents.

36. As previously stated the ODCB meetings were, in the main, chaired by the Deputy Commissioner (Rita Dexter), although I did Chair a number of the meetings when the Deputy Commissioner was unavailable. One of the main purposes of the ODCB meeting was to consider information from a number of the Brigade's performance management data sources covering operational and training activities. This information enabled the Board to identify issues and areas of underperformance that may need addressing. The Board remits are summarised below:

- review the Brigade's operational and training performance in order to make informed decisions on where to target new/additional/revised training and/or raise the profile of emerging trends/issues.
- oversee the progress of the LHWG and Senior Accident Investigation (SAI) action plans. The SAI action plan was a list of actions arising from formal accident and/or 'near miss' investigations undertaken by the Brigade.
- consider 'Strategic Direction' issues which included policy issues affecting both the Deputy Commissioners' and my own Directorate. This included changes to strategies and policies related to health and safety, operational staff training and development, senior officer training and development and the prioritisation of non-core operational training needs.
- review the operational elements of the Brigade's selection/promotion processes.
- review Babcock's annual training delivery plan.

37. The full Terms of Reference (ToR) for ODCB is provided as Exhibit GR/8 (GR/8:).

38. The ODCB meetings were scheduled quarterly of which every second meeting (six-monthly) looked specifically at the range of the Brigade's operational and training performance data to identify trends and themes that may need to be addressed. The meetings were attended by the following HoS from the three Directorates:

Deputy Commissioner's Directorate

- Deputy Commissioner (Chair)
- Third Officer - Head of Operations, Prevention and Response
- Assistant Commissioner Fire Safety Regulation
- Assistant Commissioner Mobilising and Resource Management Centre
- Head of Strategy and Planning
- Head of Information Management and Performance
- Head of Operational Directorates Support Group (Clerk)

Directorate of Operational Resilience and Training

- Director of Operational Resilience and Training
- Assistant Commissioner Operational Procedures
- Assistant Commissioner Operational Resilience
- Assistant Commissioner Operational Assurance
- Head of Human Resources and Development
- Deputy Assistant Commissioner (Operational Assurance) for the Operational News agenda item and other operational performance related business
- Babcock (for the 6-monthly meetings)

Directorate of Contractual Services

- Assistant Commissioner Technical and Service Support
- Head of Finance and Contractual Services

39. At the six-monthly meetings the Board was presented with a report that highlighted issues arising from the performance of the Brigade at operational incidents and training courses/exercises. This report, usually presented by the Deputy Assistant Commissioner from the Operational Assurance (OA) Department, identified the operational related trends that had emerged in the Brigade during the previous six months. Longer term trends were also highlighted in the report, where appropriate.

40. The report was primarily based upon the information captured in the Brigade's 'Incident Management' database. This database was the repository for all development and positive points, both individual and organisational, captured through the Performance Review of Operations (PRO) and Performance Review of Command (PRC) formal debrief processes. The data also captured the observations reported by individual operational senior officers following their attendance at operational incidents and training events or exercises.
41. The report detailed the key issues highlighted by the performance data and the Board would select a number, usually between four and six, of the items to become articles for the Brigade's Operational News publication. The Operational News publication is the Brigade's newsletter for operational staff that typically includes a number of mandatory training support packages that need to be completed by all operational staff.
42. Decisions relating to the selection of Operational News items were informed through detailed professional discussion relating to how frequently the development issue appeared in the performance data and the risk exposure/impact the issues presented to the Brigade. Therefore, items were sometimes chosen even though they only represented a small percentage of the issues reported. Issues that appeared in the report that were not chosen for the next Operational News publication were maintained in a 'running log' and brought to the next meeting of ODCB for consideration. This approach ensured no performance issue that had been captured in the 'Incident Management' database and reported to ODCB was lost.
43. In addition to selecting the Operational News articles the Board also reviewed the existing training and policy provision associated with each of the articles chosen to determine whether any new, additional or revised training or policy inputs were needed.
44. When new training solutions were requested these would be developed by the Brigade's training provider (Babcock) as either a fire station and/or senior officer training support package. Once developed and agreed by the Brigade's 'Commissioning Department' these training support packages would be launched to coincide with the publication of the Operational News bulletin. The Brigade's 'Commissioning Department' is the department designated to take responsibility for working with Babcock to develop and 'sign off' the training support package. This is usually the department that owns the relevant Brigade policy.

45. The training support packages (commonly referred to as Computer Based Training packages) could be accessed by all operational staff, fire station based personnel and senior operational officers through the Brigade's computer system. There was typically a time period in which this training was to be undertaken and all staff were required to record when they had completed the training support packages. The data relating to the completion of the training support packages was provided by the Third Officer so it could be reviewed by ODCB.

January 2012July 2012

November 2012

- **Compartment Firefighting** - This was a special edition of Operational News focusing on compartment firefighting tactics and the provision of new equipment, specifically the introduction of two new firefighting branches. A training support package was produced for this article, which was based on a fire the Brigade had attended in 2011 at East Hill, Wandsworth where a number of firefighters were seriously injured. This Operational News is provided as Exhibit GR/11 (GR/11:).

March 2013

- **Fire Survival Guidance (FSG) calls** - this article explained the definition of an FSG call and detailed the supporting fire engine and officer resources that should be mobilised when FSG calls are being received by the Brigade. It also detailed the information that should be captured by the Control Room Officers and stressed the importance of officers keeping Brigade Control informed of the actions being taken to resolve the FSG call at the incident. This Operational News is provided as Exhibit GR/12 (GR/12:).
- **7(2)d visits** - This article explained the fire authority's statutory powers under Section 7(2)(d) of the Fire and Rescue Service Act (2004), that allow the Brigade to obtain the information necessary to inform the Brigade's planning process and operational response. A training support package was produced to supplement this article. This Operational News is provided as Exhibit GR/12 (GR/12: LFB00003557).
- **Aerial Appliances (high reach)** - this article detailed the capabilities of the different Aerial Appliances in the Brigade's fleet and the considerations that Incident Commanders should make when deciding on their deployment/use. A training support package was produced to supplement this article. This Operational News is provided as Exhibit GR/12 (GR/12: LFB00003557).

October 2013

- **Search and Rescue Procedure** - this article detailed the search techniques used in compartment search procedures. A training support package was produced to supplement this article. This Operational News is provided as Exhibit GR/13

(GR/13:).

January 2014

- **Weight of Attack - Compartment Firefighting** - This article detailed the main benefits of employing the appropriate weight of attack to ensure a fire is extinguished safely and effectively through the correct application of the appropriate quantity of water. This Operational News is provided as Exhibit GR/14 (GR/14:).
- **Command Roles and Tabards** - This article covered the importance of an appropriate command structure being implemented during the early stages of an incident. It also highlighted the importance of the Incident Commander and Command team being identifiable by donning the appropriate tabard. This Operational News is provided as Exhibit GR/14 (GR/14:).

June 2014

- **Control Structures** - This article emphasised the importance of implementing a robust command and control structure for ensuring effective incident management. This Operational News is provided as Exhibit GR/15 (GR/15:).
- **Fire Survival Guidance Calls** - this was a follow up article to the one that appeared in the March 2013 Operational News publication, detailed above. It provided clarification on the resources that are to be mobilised when an FSG call is in progress. This Operational News is provided as Exhibit GR/15 (GR/15:).

December 2014

- **Ventilation Induced Fire Spread** - this article described the various ways in which fire can be spread by induced ventilation. It also highlighted that uncontrolled ventilation can occur when elements of a building or compartment, such as windows and doors fail, or when damage occurs to the structure of a compartment enabling the products of combustion to escape to open air or enter an adjacent compartment. This Operational News is provided as Exhibit GR/16 (GR/16:).

47. In addition to the Operational News articles and during my time in the DoORT role the ODCB was presented with a number of reports aimed at increasing firefighter safety and improving the Brigade's operational performance. These include:

- **October 2013 - the introduction of cable cutters for each Breathing Apparatus Set** - the introduction of cable cutters within the Brigade was in response to the Coroner's 'Rule 43' recommendations relating to both the Lakanal House (July 2009) and Shirley Tower fire in Southampton (April 2010) where two firefighters (Ffs) tragically lost their life while attending a residential high rise fire. The Coroner's Rule 43 recommendations for the Shirley Tower incident determined that cable entanglement was a contributory factor in the two firefighter's deaths. The Brigade started the procurement of cable cutters in 2013 to provide a means for Ffs to cut themselves free should they become entangled in fallen cables. The ODCB briefing note provided an update relating to the introduction of cable cutters into operational service. This briefing note is provided as Exhibit GR/17 (GR/17:).
- **October 2013 - Operational Risk Assessment Policy (ORA)** - this report provided an update covering the status of the Brigade's draft ORA policy. It provided recommendations on how this change in policy should be communicated to staff, noting that the contents of the policy explicitly authorise greater flexibility in the application of operational procedures at operational incidents. ODCB agreed the report and it was then placed on the agenda for the December 2013 Corporate Management Board (CMB) for consideration. This report is provided as Exhibit GR/18 (GR/18:).
- **May 2014 - Premise Information Plates** - The briefing note provided an update on the Brigade's work with Local Authority partners to set up a pilot to trial the premise information plates on high rise residential social housing. This briefing note is provided as Exhibit GR/19 (GR/19:).
- **September and December 2014 - High Rise Pre-Determined Attendance** - The first report was presented to ODCB in September 2014 and provided an update relating to the Brigade's high rise operational policy note and sought a decision to amend the Pre-Determined Attendance (PDA) (from 3 to 4 fire engines) for all calls to fire on or above the 5th floor of a high rise building. The report is provided as Exhibit GR/20

(GR/20:). Following discussion at the meeting an updated version of the high rise PDA report was re-presented to the December 2014 ODCB meeting where it was agreed. The report was then scheduled to be presented at a CMB meeting in early 2015 for consideration. This report is provided as Exhibit GR/21 (GR/21:)

Other issues that may be relevant to the GTI's terms of reference

48. I have reviewed and considered a number of documents in preparing this statement and believe the following issues may be relevant to the GTI's terms of reference.

Lakanal House 'Case Study' training package

49. During 2013 the Brigade and Babcock started work on producing a Lakanal House Case Study training package. This training package was designed to capture the key issues arising from the Lakanal House fire and lessons learnt from the Brigade's Lakanal House investigation. This Case Study training package was tailored for two audiences; i) station based operational staff and ii) senior operational officers (Station Managers and above). I recall that this package was the first of its type within the Brigade with television footage, talking head video clips and high quality graphics being used. This type of training content marked a new era for the Brigade in being able to use high quality and interactive training material that could be accessed through the Brigade's IT computer system. Developments in the Brigade's IT systems allowed, for the first time, video, voice and high quality graphics to be embedded within the training support packages.
50. This Case Study training package was launched for a test group of officers (mostly those involved in the incident and commissioning department) in April 2014. Feedback from this test group was incorporated in to the final training package.
51. Starting in July 2014 the Brigade commenced a number of presentation sessions for senior operational officers where the training package was delivered. These sessions were facilitated by staff who had been directly involved in the Lakanal House investigation and production of the incident command training material. The training package was launched for station based operational staff in August 2014. The Lakanal House Case Study training package was mandatory for all operational staff.

52. I understand a copy of this Case Study training package and its associated supporting material is being disclosed to the GTI.

Lakanal House Action Plan - Review Report

53. In September 2012 the Commissioner (Ron Dobson) requested a review to be undertaken of the 34-point Lakanal House action plan. This was progressed through the OA department as independent review and assurance was one of the core responsibilities/functions of this department.

54. I recall that the Head of OA (Dany Cotton) identified a Group Manager (David Lindridge) to be seconded into the OA Department for a couple of months to undertake the review and prepare a report.

55. I remember reviewing the first draft of Group Manager Lindridge's report, entitled the 'Review of the Lakanal Action Plan' around the end of 2012 and forwarded the completed report to the Commissioner, Deputy Commissioner and Director of Contractual Services on the 4 January 2013. It was originally scheduled to be presented and discussed at a meeting of the Commissioner's Group in early 2013, but I recall this meeting was cancelled. The Commissioner's Group was an informal and un-minuted meeting of the Brigade's CMT that was held on a regular basis. A copy of the 'Review of the Lakanal Action Plan' report dated 4 January 2013 is provided as Exhibit GR/22 (GR/22:).

56. It was also intended that this review report would be considered by the Lakanal House Board in early 2013. However, due to the commencement of the Lakanal House Coroner's inquest on the 14 January 2013 there were no meetings of the Lakanal House Board until September 2013. At the September 2013 Lakanal House Board it was confirmed that the 'Review of the Lakanal Action Plan' report had not been signed off.

57. At the beginning of October 2013 I was asked by the Commissioner (Ron Dobson) to arrange for the 'Review of the Lakanal Action Plan' report to be updated. This again was done through the Head of OA who asked Group Manager David Lindridge to revisit and update his original report (dated 4 January 2013) by getting the most up to date position on each action item from the respective HoS. This resulted in Group Manager Lindridge producing a further report dated

November 2014. A copy of the 'Review of the Lakanal Action Plan' report dated November 2013 is provided as Exhibit GR/23 (GR/23:).

58. I recall that the November 2013 'Review of the Lakanal Action Plan' report was reviewed by the members of the Brigade's CMT at a Commissioner's Group meeting held at the end of 2013. However, as this is an un-minuted meeting I am unable to provide any documentary evidence to support this.

59. I confirm that I am willing to attend the GTI to give evidence if required.

60. A detailed 'Schedule of Exhibits' that have been referenced in this witness statement are included as Appendix 1.

Statement of truth

I believe that the facts stated in this witness statement are true. I am willing for this statement to form part of the evidence before the GTI and be published on the Inquiry's website.

Gary Reason :

Date: 12 February 2019

