

# Review of the Lakanal Action Plan

Protect – Legal  
4 January 2013

LONDON FIRE BRIGADE



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## **1 Executive Summary**

- 1.1 In September 2012, Operational Assurance were required to review the thirty-four actions which were established, following the fatal fire at Lakanal House in Peckham, on the 3<sup>rd</sup> July 2009.
- 1.2 This briefing paper reports on the findings of the review and highlights the key findings for the Commissioner's Group.

## **2 Recommendation**

- 2.1 This report is provided to the Commissioner's Group for consideration.

### 3 Background

3.1 Following the Lakanal House fire, 3<sup>rd</sup> July 2009, a number of actions were ordered to:

- Gather information regarding the incident,
- Establish factors which contributed to the outcome of the incident,
- Change internal procedures and practices to reduce the likelihood of a similar outcome,
- Influence external standards to reduce future risk to the public and fire fighters, and
- Share any learning with the whole fire sector.

3.2 A review of these actions was requested by the Commissioner's Group in order to confirm their completion and compliance with the intended outcome. This review was completed by GM Lindridge, as a secondee to Operational Assurance, over two months from mid-September 2012.

3.3 This briefing paper highlights the key findings of the review.

### 4 Methodology

4.1 The review was implemented to confirm the delivery of the thirty-four actions established following the Lakanal House fire, which occurred on 3 July 2009. For consistency, a standard approach was applied to reviewing each action. This involved the following key elements:

- Confirming the anticipated outcome for the action;
- Identifying evidence of the activities / outcomes taking place;
- Comparing the reported outcome, with the achieved outcome; and
- Reporting on any gap identified.

4.2 These elements were achieved through:

- Interviews with Departmental Heads and those responsible for delivery of the actions;
- Review of documentary evidence and records;
- Secondary product evidence; and
- Discussions with individuals for whom the actions were completed.

- 4.3 Initially, the reviewer met with each of the heads of service, or their delegated representatives to explain the purpose of the review. Each department was offered regular meetings during the review process and was updated on the findings throughout.

## **5 Key findings**

- 5.1 All departments offered their full support to the review and have cooperated throughout. The review found that the activities reported on the action log were accurate.
- 5.2 Of the 34 actions (see Appendix I) 16 have on-going activities related to achieving the intended outcome(s). These on-going activities include those dependent on a future event (which cannot be simulated) and those which involve influencing external agencies. These sixteen also include those with an on-going review of performance levels, subsequent to the action being closed on the log.
- 5.3 This review was unable to confirm 13 actions as fully achieving their expected outcome. For each of these, the actions are either on-going, or dependent on a future event.
- 5.4 A full list of the actions and a brief explanation of the findings is appended to this report. Listed below are the reviewer's key findings, specific to 10 actions, for the Commissioner's Group's attention:

### **Action 5 – National Control Guidance vs. LFB Control Policy Gap Analysis:**

The gap analysis did not include FSC 54/04 as part of the national guidance for consideration. FSC 54/04 introduced a "three-staged call handling approach", and included additional FSG questions for "assessing the caller".

The gap analysis also identifies areas for improvement for the national guidance. These recommendations have not been addressed or reflected in local policy.

### **Action 6 – Revision of High Rise Firefighting Policy:**

All of the recommendations from the Gap Analysis have been considered in the revision of the High Rise Firefighting policy (HRP). Those which have not been followed were explained by the policy owner, Operational Procedures.

An unrelated activity to be aware of is the recent review of the national Generic Risk Assessment (GRA) by LFB in late 2012, which is expected to be published in the coming weeks. This will result in another review of the local HRP. The review considered recent events and incidents in other FRs.

### **Action 7 – Control Staff involvement in PRC and ORT meetings:**

Since the action has been recorded as complete, only three examples of Control Officers attending a debrief outside of Control have been reported. To overcome the logistical difficulties of including control room operators and managers at these debriefs, a debrief form has been developed to allow



them to submit information to debrief sessions. This approach does not, however, promote two-way dialogue and of the four debrief forms sampled, none of the comments were identifiable on the Incident Management Performance Database (IMPD). This review also identified that the debrief forms are not archived consistently by Control.

Since this review was undertaken the Senior Operations Managers have now been directed to attend all PRCs and ORT meetings to establish a robust and effective protocol for securing a Control representation at the significant debriefs.

#### **Action 9 – Revision of the FSG Control Reference Information Files (RIF):**

The RIF has been reviewed and has been amended to comply with FSC 10/93. The guidance introduced in FSC 54/04 is not included.

It is relevant to explain that the purpose of this RIF is to assist the call taker whilst performing a Fire Survival Guidance call and the format received some criticism from Control Room Operators (CROs). The RIF covers 27 pages, which can be navigated by hyperlinks. A single page flow chart was to be developed for the CROs, but no evidence of this has been produced.

#### **Action 10 – Revision of PN539 Emergency Call Handling:**

PN539 has been reviewed and it complies with FSC10/93 including "making people safer" control training guidance (1994). The revision of PN539, Emergency Call Handling, does not include the entire details from FSC 54/04.

One recommendation of the Control gap analysis (Action 5) stated, "the information is found in a number of LFB documents and needs to be consolidated", but the structure of the Brigade policy notes appears to be unchanged from pre-2009.

Specific observations made as a result of this review have been fed back to the AC OPR. These will be considered in a forthcoming review of Control FSG policy.

#### **Action 12 – FSG Refresher training:**

Control training records have no recorded FSG training for two watches (watches 2 and 3) in 2011. Conversations with members of control staff and managers suggest that this is a recording error.

The Computer Based Training (CBT) package was completed earlier this year but has not yet been accessed. It will be completed by all Control Room staff during 2013. Due to the refresher training being conducted with a PowerPoint presentation in 2011, no-one had accessed the CBT before November 2012.

Since the outsourcing of Brigade training to Babcock, there is no official mechanism to maintain the CBT content for control room staff.

**Action 14 – Creation of Policy for Communications from Control to the Fireground:**

Control Staff perceive PN790 as an operational policy for frontline personnel. Specific observations made as a result of this review have been fed back to the AC OPR and will be considered in a forthcoming review of Control FSG policy.

**Action 17 – Enhanced FSG training for Control Managers:**

The enhanced training is run in full for newly promoted Assistant Operations Managers (AOMs) and has not been applied to existing staff. This was first run in Spring 2012, when three new officers started to perform the AOM role. The control room managers are seeking ways to apply the enhancements to existing AOMs according to individual training needs.

The Minerva course (mentioned in the Action Log) is not shown on the training template and there is no evidence of AOMs attending Minerva sessions in their Control Room role.

Control Staff report that training is designed for station based staff and is often not accessible to Control Room staff as it forms part of larger development programmes. This is being addressed by Learning and Development Strategy (to be included in the HRD strategy) and will be addressed as part of the training arrangements with Babcock.

**Action 21 – Inclusion of line drawings on the Operational Risk Database (ORD):**

Of the 260 residential high rise entries discovered on the ORD, 62 had images associated with them, only one of which met the description of this action. Articles in Shout (November 2012) and in the forthcoming Ops News will provide further guidance for gathering Residential High Rise information. Furthermore, a training programme is being developed to give guidance to crews conducting 7(2)d visits to improve quality and consistency.

**Action 22 – Means for recording information at the bridgehead:**

Due to the application of the Forward Information Boards being wider than High Rise firefighting, this procedure is being developed as a standalone policy which will be referenced in the High Rise Fire Fighting policy. The policy is currently being processed through the BJCHSW and the equipment is being produced in-house. Anticipated delivery is by the end of January 2013.

**Action 26 – Protocol for mitigating the hazard to crews from fallen cables:**

Operational Procedures have initiated a national forum to discuss the issue and are contributing to national progress in response to the recently published recommendations (in the Coroner's Rule 43) associated with the Shirley Towers fire, which occurred in the Hampshire Fire and Rescue Service area. Delivery of equipment and protocols is anticipated for summer 2013.

## 6 Conclusion

- 6.1 Each of the departments has been able to evidence and/or explain how they have performed their role in delivering the 34 actions. The appendix includes a brief explanation of the findings for each action. The key findings, above, have been selected for the Board's information.
- 6.2 Of the 34 actions, 16 have activities on-going related to reaching the expected outcome of the actions.
- 6.3 Whilst all of the actions have been researched, this review recognises that 13 actions where the expected outcomes were still being delivered. This was either due to on-going activities, or the delivery scheduled for a time in the future.

## 7 Further considerations

- 7.1 A further internal/independent review of the status and progress of the on-going actions may be beneficial to confirm full and satisfactory completion of all the intended outcomes.



## 8 Appendix – Action log feedback

Action Ref.*	Dept.	Brief Action Title	Reported Action Confirmed	Activities on-going	Further Review Activity *
<u>1</u>	OP	HRP gap analysis	Yes	No	No
<u>2</u>	FSR	BRE report	Yes	No	No
<u>3</u>	OR	STEP report	Yes	No	No
<u>4</u>	OR	SoE document	Yes	No	No
<u>5</u>	OPR	Control gap analysis	Yes	No	No
<u>6</u>	OP	Review of HRP	Yes	Yes	No
<u>7</u>	OPR	Control at ORT / PRC	Yes	Yes	Yes
<u>8</u>	OPR	FSO for training	Yes	No	Yes
<u>9</u>	OPR	RIF files	Yes	Yes	Yes
<u>10</u>	OPR	Review PN539	Yes	Yes	Yes
<u>11</u>	OPR	FSG Initial training	Yes	No	No
<u>12</u>	OPR	FSG Refresher training	Yes	Yes	Yes
<u>13</u>	OPR	CLG letter	Yes	Yes	Yes
<u>14</u>	OPR	FSG fireground comms	Yes	No	Yes
<u>15</u>	OP	FBU briefing	Yes	No	No
<u>16</u>	OPR	Review control training	Yes	No	Yes
<u>17</u>	OPR	AOM training	Yes	Yes	Yes
<u>18</u>	OPR	Draft Control SoE	Yes	No	No
<u>19</u>	LDS	Control report	Yes	No	No
<u>20</u>	FSR	Research historic fires	Yes	No	No
<u>21</u>	OPR	MDT diagrams	Yes	Yes	Yes
<u>22</u>	OP	Bridgehead info recording	Yes	Yes	Yes
<u>23</u>	OP	FSG Fire ground Policy	Yes	No	No
<u>24</u>	OP	Moving bridgehead	Yes	Yes	Yes
<u>25</u>	OP	Search policy	Yes	No	No
<u>26</u>	OP	Fallen cables policy	Yes	Yes	Yes
<u>27</u>	FSR	Fixing cables (national)	Yes	Yes	No
<u>28</u>	FSR	LACORS agreement	Yes	No	No
<u>29</u>	FSR	LA engagement	Yes	Yes	No
<u>30</u>	FSR	Fire Lift Testing	Yes	Yes	No
<u>31</u>	FSR	FS risk based approach	Yes	No	No
<u>32</u>	FSR	Post-investigation review	Yes	Yes	No
<u>33</u>	FSR	IO training review	Yes	No	No
<u>34</u>	FSR	FRS correspondence	Yes	Yes	No
<b>Total (Yes)</b>			<b>34</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>13</b>

\* This column identifies those on-going actions where further review may be beneficial to confirm full and satisfactory completion of all the intended outcomes.

**Action Reference: 1**

<b>Responsible Dept. / Officer</b>	Operational Procedures / AC Knighton
<b>Entry on Action Log</b>	Analysis of High Rise Policy
<b>Expected Outcome</b>	Identification of differences between the national Generic Risk Assessment (GRA) and the local policy.  Identification of where the local policy (and the GRA) do not support the Lakanal House incident.
<b>Review Process Findings</b>	The gap analysis compared the LFB high rise policy and procedures (as extant in July 2009) with the National GRA. A report, dated 23 <sup>rd</sup> November 2009, was produced which describes the gaps and makes recommendations. These recommendations are addressed in Action 6.

**Action Reference: 2**

<b>Responsible Dept. / Officer</b>	Fire Safety Regulation / AC Turek and DAC Lee Phillpotts
<b>Entry on Action Log</b>	Undertake BRE (Building Research Establishment) modelling
<b>Expected Outcome</b>	An improved understanding of the effects of the environmental factors on the building, to explain the fire development and spread.
<b>Review Process Findings</b>	The BRE were commissioned to conduct tests to answer a series of questions posed by the LFB and MPS. The results form part of a highly technical report which LFB Subject Matter Experts confirm as meeting the department's expectations.

**Action Reference: 3**

<b>Responsible Dept. / Officer</b>	Operational Resilience / DAC Cutbill
<b>Entry on Action Log</b>	Complete operational sequential time event plot (STEP)
<b>Expected Outcome</b>	Single reference point for all significant operational events and actions, recorded in chronological order at this incident.
<b>Review Process Findings</b>	It was agreed at the Lakanal Board meeting (8 <sup>th</sup> Nov 2010) that the supplementary matters would be transferred to a more user friendly document. As a result of this action, the STEP document is no longer required to be maintained as current due to it being superseded by Action 4.



**Action Reference: 4**

<b>Responsible Dept. / Officer</b>	Operational Resilience / DAC Cutbill
<b>Entry on Action Log</b>	Complete sequence of events (SoE)
<b>Expected Outcome</b>	Provide an evidenced timeline explaining the sequence in which events happened.
<b>Review Process Findings</b>	<p>Ops Assurance confirmed that not all information from Control was included in the SoE document. This was due to the volume of information reducing the usability of the document. As a result, details were limited to those from MOBIS, Main-scheme radio messages and key events.</p> <p>The SoE has proved to be a highly effective reference document and met the expectations of those involved.</p>

**Action Reference: 5**

<b>Responsible Dept. / Officer</b>	Operations, Prevention & Response / AC Brown
<b>Entry on Action Log</b>	Undertake gap analysis of Control National and London FSG policies.
<b>Expected Outcome</b>	A report to be produced which identifies where London control FSG policy differs from the national guidance.
<b>Review Process Findings</b>	<p>The gap analysis compares Fire Service Circular 10/93 and the Control Personnel Training document, "Making People Safe", 1994, published by the Home Office with LFB policy number 539 and FSG training materials.</p> <p>DCLG have confirmed that both Circulars (10/93 and 54/04) are extant, but FSC54/04 was not included in this gap analysis.</p>

**Action Reference: 6**

<b>Responsible Dept. / Officer</b>	Operational Procedures / AC Knighton
<b>Entry on Action Log</b>	Review High Rise Policy
<b>Expected Outcome</b>	To improve guidance for frontline staff to prepare them for the demands of a similar incident, by recognising the activities that were necessary.
<b>Review Process Findings</b>	<p>This activity considered all of the findings from the Gap analysis produced in Action 1 and have been adopted in the most part.</p> <p>LFB (Ops Procedures) are undertaking a review of the High Rise Firefighting Generic Risk Assessment (GRA). This is currently being considered by CFRAU and when published will prompt another review of internal policy. The GRA review also considered recent incidents in FRSs beyond London. The LFB involvement in the revision of the GRA, will minimise the time for adoption within local policy.</p>



**Action Reference: 7**

<b>Responsible Dept. / Officer</b>	Operations, Prevention & Response / AC Brown
<b>Entry on Action Log</b>	Review control involvement in PRC and ORT meetings
<b>Expected Outcome</b>	Control to be represented at the PRC / ORT meetings when significant control input has been made with the fire-ground, such as when multiple FSG calls have been made.
<b>Review Process Findings</b>	<p>Only three examples of attendance at PRCs and ORT meetings has been provided since 2009. Representation is highly time consuming, and difficult in relation to matching shift patterns. A debrief form is now completed post-incident for incidents of 8PF or above; incidents involving mobilising issues; Fire Survival Guidance; or Fire Ground and Control issues.</p> <p>The debrief form is forwarded to the "ORT" and "GVP Senior Managers" email addresses. Feedback is received via the IMP database.</p> <p>In November 2012, it has been decided that a Senior Operations Manager (SOM) will attend all PRCs and ORT meetings to propose a protocol for attending meetings with most benefit.</p>

**Action Reference: 8**

<b>Responsible Dept. / Officer</b>	Operations, Prevention & Response / AC Brown
<b>Entry on Action Log</b>	FSG – training to include input from Fire Safety Officers (FSO)
<b>Expected Outcome</b>	Training for Control Officers should comply with the National Guidance, which details the involvement of an FSO for elements of the input.
<b>Review Process Findings</b>	<p>FSC 10/93 recommends FSG refresher training is conducted annually.</p> <p>In LFB, the full FSG training package is now conducted every other year. This was first conducted in 2010 with an FSO. Due to the timing of the Olympics, the full course was postponed until November and December 2012. It has since been confirmed that another FSO is being inducted to perform the Control training role, thus improving resilience arrangements. The FSG subject headings described in FSC10/93 are covered in the FSO training packages. The FSO, however, is not involved with the role play session as suggested by FSC10/93.</p> <p>For the alternate years, a Computer Based Training (CBT) package has been developed. This does not include the input of an FSO, but it is worth noting that the national guidance is not definitive as to what is expected for refresher training.</p> <p>It is also worth noting that the CBT was not available in 2011 and a locally produced PowerPoint presentation was used to deliver refresher training. The CBT will be used from 2013.</p>

**Action Reference: 9**

<b>Responsible Dept. / Officer</b>	Operations, Prevention & Response / AC Brown
<b>Entry on Action Log</b>	FSG – Revise RIF (Reference Information File) file
<b>Expected Outcome</b>	The RIF files for FSG should comply with National Guidance.
<b>Review Process Findings</b>	<p>The RIF provides the Control Room Operators (CROs) with an aide memoire for handling FSG calls, based on national guidance (FSCs 10/93). Two versions exist: One for the CRO and one for the Control Supervisor (Assistant Operations Manager). FSC54/04 has not been adopted (which introduces three-stage approach to Emergency Call Handling and the assessment of the caller).</p> <p>The format of operator's RIF is not favoured by the CROs and a single page flow chart was requested from the Ops Support Team in March 2012. No evidence of this flow chart existence or development has been provided.</p>

**Action Reference: 10**

<b>Responsible Dept. / Officer</b>	Operations, Prevention & Response / AC Brown
<b>Entry on Action Log</b>	Revision of Policy 539 ( <i>Emergency Call Handling</i> )
<b>Expected Outcome</b>	Ensure Policy 539 complies with national guidance.
<b>Review Process Findings</b>	<p>PN539 has been reviewed as a result of this action and does not contradict FSC10/93.</p> <p>PN539 does not contain the complete detail on the LFB's FSG arrangements and needs to be read in conjunction with the training documents and the Control Reference Information Files (RIFs). Whilst it could be argued that PN539 does not contain all of the information in the National Guidance, it should be noted that the format of the national guidance (the detail is in the form of a training package) does not lend itself to a methodical approach.</p>

**Action Reference: 11**

<b>Responsible Dept. / Officer</b>	Operations, Prevention & Response / AC Brown
<b>Entry on Action Log</b>	FSG – Initial training
<b>Expected Outcome</b>	To deliver Control Room Operative (CRO) FSG Training which complies with the national guidance and which is suitable and sufficient to develop the performance of the CROs.
<b>Review Process Findings</b>	The course has been extended to a duration of 10 weeks, with FSG training taking place in the last week. This complies with FSG10/93 which recommends that FSG training for "recruits" should take place at between 8 – 12 weeks.



**Action Reference: 12**

<b>Responsible Dept. / Officer</b>	Operations, Prevention & Response / AC Brown
<b>Entry on Action Log</b>	FSG – Refresher training
<b>Expected Outcome</b>	A recurring programme of FSG training to be covered by all Control personnel, in accordance with national guidance.
<b>Review Process Findings</b>	<p>All Control personnel complete FSG training on an annual basis. The full FSG package, with FSO input is completed on the even years since 2010, with a CBT package completed on the odd years, starting from 2013. (The CBT was not available in 2011, and a locally produced PowerPoint was delivered). The CBT can also be used to support ad hoc training needs.</p> <p>The FSO is not involved in the delivery of the CBT, which could be argued does not meet the requirements of FSC10/93. Whilst the FSO role is detailed for the FSG training, the content of refresher training is not specified.</p>

**Action Reference: 13**

<b>Responsible Dept. / Officer</b>	Operations, Prevention & Response / AC Brown
<b>Entry on Action Log</b>	Draft letter to CLG, re FSG
<b>Expected Outcome</b>	Clarification of national guidance, with a consistent approach followed by all FRSs.
<b>Review Process Findings</b>	This action will not be complete until the Control report is accepted, to ensure all issues are included.

**Action Reference: 14**

<b>Responsible Dept. / Officer</b>	Operations, Prevention & Response / AC Brown
<b>Entry on Action Log</b>	FSG – Policy for communications with the fire ground
<b>Expected Outcome</b>	Standardise the protocols for sharing FSG information between Control and the Fireground, and also for maintaining updates from the fireground at Control.
<b>Review Process Findings</b>	<p>PN790 was authored by representatives from Incident Management Policy and Control. The procedures describes two way exchange of FSG information. This was tested in an exercise at Stratford (16<sup>th</sup> June 2011), with feedback shared with the authors. Overall it was a success, but did identify that FSG is resource intensive at Control.</p> <p>The Control Room Trainers explained that the exchange of information with the incident ground works well, using the template.</p>



**Action Reference: 15**

<b>Responsible Dept. / Officer</b>	Operational Procedures / AC Knighton
<b>Entry on Action Log</b>	FBU Briefing
<b>Expected Outcome</b>	Secure the efficient and effective delivery of required changes with all personnel.
<b>Review Process Findings</b>	The Lakanal Presentation was delivered to the FBU (12 <sup>th</sup> Aug 2010 at 1330hrs) and that no further request for information has been received from the FBU.

**Action Reference: 16**

<b>Responsible Dept. / Officer</b>	Operations, Prevention & Response / AC Brown
<b>Entry on Action Log</b>	Control – General review of training
<b>Expected Outcome</b>	Confirm the FSG training for Control Room Operators is suitable and sufficient.
<b>Review Process Findings</b>	<p>The report from the training audit was not available during this review and as a result it was not considered. This review assessed compliance with the comments made in the log relating to these actions.</p> <p><u>Enhanced role play</u> The role play sessions have been implemented, and now include pre-recorded messages, and more detailed scenarios.</p> <p><u>Proactive Training plan including use of STEP</u> STEP has not been used to create a proactive training plan due to technological limitations. A two year rolling training plan is being created on an Excel spreadsheet and should be fully available by January 2013. (Note: information received in Jan 2013 indicates that STEP will be adapted to include Control in the near future)</p> <p><u>Training Records</u> Currently all training at Control is recorded on a spreadsheet at Control and transferred to STEP by the Information Management department.</p>

**Action Reference: 17**

<b>Responsible Dept. / Officer</b>	Operations, Prevention & Response / AC Brown
<b>Entry on Action Log</b>	Enhanced training for Control Supervisors
<b>Expected Outcome</b>	Control Supervisors should be trained to support a Control Room Operator when they are handling a FSG call, to a standard commensurate with the National guidance.
<b>Review Process Findings</b>	This action required a two week package to be developed for AOMs. The courses are delivered in 6 modules with a suggested duration of 9.5 days, plus a "5 day Foundational Leadership Course". Whilst this course description meets the requirements of the action, it has only been

	applied to newly or temporarily promoted AOMs. The Senior Operations Managers have been tasked with applying this training to existing AOMs based on individual training needs analyses.
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**Action Reference: 18**

<b>Responsible Dept. / Officer</b>	Operations, Prevention & Response / AC Brown
<b>Entry on Action Log</b>	Draft Control Sequence of Events - (Control SoE)
<b>Expected Outcome</b>	Single index for all messages that were made to or from Control, relating to the incident, from the original call until 2100hrs on the same day. These should be listed in chronological order, for cross referencing back to the source WAV file.
<b>Review Process Findings</b>	A Control Room Operator was seconded for three months and reviewed all recorded Control messages between the original emergency call, (made at 1618:31) through until 2100hrs. 340 WAV files were identified and referenced in an Excel spreadsheet. The content of the messages are not reflected in the spreadsheet. The spreadsheet has been reviewed, but not referenced against the WAV files. Deemed complete by Ops Resilience.

**Action Reference: 19**

<b>Responsible Dept. / Officer</b>	Legal and Democratic Services (LDS)
<b>Entry on Action Log</b>	Review of draft control analysis
<b>Expected Outcome</b>	Production of a report analysing the actions at Control.
<b>Review Process Findings</b>	<p>The report is being produced to meet an internal standard.</p> <p>The report details the Fire Survival Guidance (FSG) performance. It includes a review of the policies (local and national); training; summary of key events; lessons learnt; recommendations.</p> <p>This report has been reviewed and accepted by Legal and Democratic Services, and the Commissioner.</p>

**Action Reference: 20**

<b>Responsible Dept. / Officer</b>	Fire Safety Regulation / AC Turek and DAC Lee Phillpotts
<b>Entry on Action Log</b>	Review of high rise fires where fire spreads beyond the compartment
<b>Expected Outcome</b>	Identify recorded fires which could have produced a learning opportunity, prior to 3 <sup>rd</sup> July 2009.
<b>Review Process Findings</b>	A senior officer with a Health and Safety specialism conducted a document search of fires within LFB, and other UK FRSs. An experienced Fire Investigator sent a request to an international Fire Safety organisation with a similar intention. Both searches identified no such incidents. This outcome has been included in the FI report.



**Action Reference: 21**

<b>Responsible Dept. / Officer</b>	Operations, Prevention & Response / AC Brown
<b>Entry on Action Log</b>	Fire crews to increase the level of pre-planning at residential high rise fires to include single line diagrams showing number and location of individual flats.
<b>Expected Outcome</b>	Fire crews should have access to risk information relating to residential high rise buildings to assist with the implementation of High-Rise procedures and to assist with development of an operational plan.
<b>Review Process Findings</b>	<p>Activities to record risk information about Residential High Rise premises on the Operational Risk Database commenced prior to the Lakanal House fire, and were reinforced by an email from the AC OPR. This is an on-going activity, necessary to maintain the currency of the data available to frontline fire-fighters.</p> <p>Publication of PN800 "Information Gathering / Contingency Planning" gives a risk based approach to recording risk information. This is necessary to ensure suitable information is recorded on the ORD, and will only capture those premises which meet a predetermined threshold.</p> <p>Suitability of ORD information is considered at post-incident debriefs, including the "Performance Review of Command" (PRC) and the "Operational Review Team" (ORT) meetings.</p> <p>The images attached to high rise premises on the ORD vary in quality and consistency. OPR are publishing details of how to apply PN800 to HR premises in Shout (November 2012) and the forthcoming Ops News (14<sup>th</sup> January 2013). This will be supplemented with a Computer Based Training package.</p>

**Action Reference: 22**

<b>Responsible Dept. / Officer</b>	Operational Procedures / AC Knighton
<b>Entry on Action Log</b>	Policy / procedure on recording command information at the bridgehead
<b>Expected Outcome</b>	<p>A standardised protocol, supporting commanders at forward command points, allowing the recording of Command decisions and operational progress.</p> <p>The solution should be easily located at a scene of operations where a Command Unit would not be able to access, such as a bridgehead.</p>
<b>Review Process Findings</b>	A procedure for recording command information at a position remote from the Command Unit has been developed. This will involve the introduction of Forward Information Boards, to be carried on all Pump Ladders and CUs. These will have a use beyond just High Rise Firefighting and therefore be detailed in its own policy note and referenced elsewhere.



	The draft policy is being processed through BJCHSW and the equipment is being produced internally. This includes the laminated sheets and Plastic backboards. Anticipated delivery is end of January 2013. Their availability will be referenced in PN633 – High Rise Firefighting.
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**Action Reference: 23**

<b>Responsible Dept. / Officer</b>	Operational Procedures / AC Knighton
<b>Entry on Action Log</b>	Policy / procedure for operational staff dealing with fire survival calls at incident
<b>Expected Outcome</b>	Standardise the protocols for managing FSG information on the Fireground.
<b>Review Process Findings</b>	The policy for fire ground management of FSG is delivered in PN790. The introduction of the Forward Information Boards will support this function.

**Action Reference: 24**

<b>Responsible Dept. / Officer</b>	Operational Procedures / AC Knighton
<b>Entry on Action Log</b>	Policy / procedure for controlled movement of bridgehead at high rise incident
<b>Expected Outcome</b>	Frontline crews to be able to relocate a Bridgehead, when necessary.
<b>Review Process Findings</b>	<p>Paragraph 7.23 specifically describes "vertical downward fire spread", and lists five considerations that need to be acted upon if it is necessary to move the Bridgehead.</p> <p>This will be expanded when the revised Generic Risk Assessment (GRA) is published. The LFB involvement in the revision of the GRA, will minimise the delay with the review of internal policy.</p>

**Action Reference: 25**

<b>Responsible Dept. / Officer</b>	Operational Procedures / AC Knighton
<b>Entry on Action Log</b>	Policy / procedure for conducting search operations – to include guidance for those conducting search operations and those having to manage those operations.
<b>Expected Outcome</b>	A standard policy to provide consistent guidance for crews conducting complex searches, and for the officers who have responsibility for giving briefings and managing them.
<b>Review Process Findings</b>	Policy Note 803 was written for the guidance of operational commanders and fire-fighting / search and rescue teams and covers tactics, procedures and briefings for search. It also suggests search methods, including the national standard detailed in the appendix.

**Action Reference: 26**

<b>Responsible Dept. / Officer</b>	Operational Procedures / AC Knighton
<b>Entry on Action Log</b>	Policy / procedure for the means of mitigating the hazard to crews from fallen cables
<b>Explanation of action</b>	A consistent procedure should be adopted by operational personnel, to mitigate the risk presented by cables that fall when affected by fire.
<b>Review Process Findings</b>	<p>Fire-Fighter Development (FFD) training package M4.69 (slide 21) highlights the hazard presented by fallen cables. Actions in the event of entanglement include notifying BA Entry Control Officer (BAECO) and deployment of an emergency team.</p> <p>November 2010 – Ops News Issue 17 highlighted the hazards associated with fallen cables. This publication included a one-off training package which required watch-based staff to read the article. Further guidance was offered through the Training Support Pack (Electricity) available through the training support icon – 2.1 presentations.</p> <p>In August 2011, Ops Procedures (OP) led an operational practitioners' forum at the Fire Service College for all FRSSs, to discuss this issue. Following on from this, in October 2012, LFB officers met with Hampshire to review their proposed solution. As a result, an LFB solution for including wire cutters on individual BA sets has been identified. OP are writing the risk assessment and are preparing training arrangements with Babcock. OP is collating information for presentation to ODCB and a delivery plan will follow, expected to complete in Summer 2013.</p>

**Action Reference: 27**

<b>Responsible Dept. / Officer</b>	Fire Safety Regulation / AC Turek and DAC Lee Phillpotts
<b>Entry on Action Log</b>	Consideration of changing national requirements for the fixings of cables
<b>Expected Outcome</b>	Influence a change in the national standards related to the routing and/or fixing of cables to impart a degree of fire resistance, in order to reduce the risk of entanglement to fire-fighters and the public.
<b>Review Process Findings</b>	<p>CFOA have been leading on this, in an attempt to influence the Electrical Safety Council. A secondee from LFB who has now returned to FSR was responsible for the publication of a recent DCLG Bulletin which highlights the issue.</p> <p>This has not yet resulted in a change in the British Standards, but the subject has been raised at a national level and LFB are keeping abreast of the national progress.</p>

**Action Reference: 28 (Linked with Action 29)**

<b>Responsible Dept. / Officer</b>	Fire Safety Regulation / AC Turek and DAC Lee Phillpotts
<b>Entry on Action Log</b>	The FSR Housing Policy – review policy and LACORS ( <i>Local Authorities Coordinators of Regulatory Services</i> ) agreement
<b>Expected Outcome</b>	Revise the agreement between LFB and the London Boroughs, in relation to Fire Safety responsibilities for Residential Premises, (as described in the Housing Act (2004), and the Fire Safety Order (2005)) to support compliance with the national LACORS protocols.
<b>Review Process Findings</b>	LFB have rewritten the agreement with the Local Authorities regarding the management of housing stocks, to comply fully with LACORS.



**Action Reference: 29 (Linked with Action 28)**

<b>Responsible Dept. / Officer</b>	Fire Safety Regulation / AC Turek and DAC Lee Phillpotts
<b>Entry on Action Log</b>	Review engagement with Local Authorities
<b>Expected Outcome</b>	LFB should support a LACORS agreement as described in the national guidance, and seek formal agreement with all 33 London Boroughs. This will clearly describe responsibilities of LFB and Local Authorities, in relation to the premises mentioned in the LACORS protocols.
<b>Review Process Findings</b>	<p>FSR have made contacted all Boroughs, seeking agreement with the new standard. Progress as reported mid Oct 2012:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 13 London Boroughs have signed the agreement</li> <li>• 8 are engaging with the LFB and progress is being made (inc. Southwark)</li> <li>• Further efforts are being made to encourage the remaining 12 Boroughs to sign up to these protocols.</li> </ul> <p>Efforts on-going in attempt to secure full sign-up to new protocols.</p> <p>Significantly, Southwark are engaged, although not yet fully signed up.</p>

**Action Reference: 30**

<b>Responsible Dept. / Officer</b>	Fire Safety Regulation / AC Turek and DAC Lee Phillpotts
<b>Entry on Action Log</b>	Raise standards on installation and testing of fire lifts as a national issue
<b>Expected Outcome</b>	To amend the national industry standards to include inspection of the lift's fire-fighting functions as part of the routine testing. This would improve the likelihood of a lift's fire-fighting features being operational when required.
<b>Review Process Findings</b>	<p>The British Standard (BS EN 81-72:2003) does not refer to this capability, and so it is not a requirement. FSR found inconsistencies amongst lift Engineers on whether lifts' fire fighting functions are tested as part of routine inspections.</p> <p>Contact with the Lifts and Escalators Industry Association (LEIA) prompted a positive response raising the issue to a national level. In Feb 2011 the LEIA confirms a change to the Code of Practice for the testing of lifts (as reflected in BS 9991:2011). Further work is on-going to improve standard.</p> <p>FSR have a comprehensive audit trail demonstrating their efforts.</p>

**Action Reference: 31**

<b>Responsible Dept. / Officer</b>	Fire Safety Regulation / AC Turek and DAC Lee Phillpotts
<b>Entry on Action Log</b>	FSR team planning to continue targeting of social housing using a risk based approach
<b>Expected Outcome</b>	The Authority can demonstrate the methodical use of Fire Safety resource, to inspect premises according to their assessed risk levels
<b>Review Process Findings</b>	<p>LFB is responsible for audit and enforcement of the Fire Safety Regulation and will sample the blocks checked by the LA. LFB meet with the LA or responsible association, to identify those premises.</p> <p><i>"Fire Safety Information and Guidance Note 115"</i> includes a matrix identifying the frequency of visits, or the proportion of sampling that is undertaken for each of the group of premises types, based on their relative risk rating scores.</p> <p>The activities of Inspecting Officers are managed as part of the team plans, established by the Team Leaders. The programme of visits, to be carried out over the year, is determined at the start of the (financial) year, with progress being monitored quarterly by Fire Safety Group Managers with their Team Leaders.</p>

**Action Reference: 32**

<b>Responsible Dept. / Officer</b>	Fire Safety Regulation / AC Turek and DAC Lee Phillpotts
<b>Entry on Action Log</b>	Conduct post investigation/prosecution review, in particular in relation to liaison with MPS / CPS / HSE
<b>Expected Outcome</b>	Confirm compliance with the Inquest recommendations.
<b>Review Process Findings</b>	This activity has not been started as it will act on the outcomes arising from the forthcoming Inquest. Existing internal processes will be followed through to manage these outcomes. Responsibility for outstanding actions will be passed to the appropriate department and monitored by Operational Resilience.



**Action Reference: 33**

<b>Responsible Dept. / Officer</b>	Fire Safety Regulation / AC Turek and DAC Lee Phillpotts
<b>Entry on Action Log</b>	Review learning and training for inspecting officers (IOs) in terms of social housing
<b>Expected Outcome</b>	The ability to demonstrate that organisationally, LFB has a robust process to develop the competency of fire safety inspecting officers in relation to these types of premises.
<b>Review Process Findings</b>	<p>Two IOs from each Borough team attended courses covering "Training in Purpose Built Blocks of Flats" in October and November 2011, delivered by "Colin Todd Associates". This training was to be cascaded to the rest of their teams. This was a one-off training intervention to update IOs on the risks associated with this type of premises.</p> <p>Between 2008 and 2010 a suite of nationally recognised qualifications was agreed with Skills for Justice, which covered the LACORS protocols. Edexcel are the awarding body for this qualification.</p> <p>Since April 2012, all new entrants complete level 3 certificates, with experienced IOs expected to be working toward level 4 certificates. Team leaders and senior fire safety officers will complete the Level 4 diploma, which is the highest qualification currently available through this awarding body.</p> <p>The Level 3 course may take up to 18 months, and completion will be towards the end of 2013. It is expected that the Level 4 qualifications will take between 12 to 15 months to complete, leading to the first awards being made in mid-2013.</p> <p>The FSR department maintains comprehensive records of all personnel's development and progress.</p>

**Action Reference: 34**

<b>Responsible Dept. / Officer</b>	Fire Safety Regulation / AC Turek and DAC Lee Phillpotts
<b>Entry on Action Log</b>	Consider any external and national FRS issues
<b>Expected Outcome</b>	Consistent understanding and application of national guidance.
<b>Review Process Findings</b>	Draft letter, detailing the Fire Safety issues identified during the internal investigation, has been presented to the Board for consideration before sending to CLG. It will consider the Inquest findings before being sent.

