

# Review of the Lakanal Action Plan

Protect – Legal November 2013

# Contents

1	Executive Summary	2
2	Recommendation	2
3	Background	3
4	Methodology	3
6	Conclusion	4
7	Further considerations Error! Boo	kmark not defined
8	Appendix – Action log feedback	5

# 1 Executive Summary

- 1.1 In September 2012, Operational Assurance were required to review the thirty-four actions that were established following the fatal fire at Lakanal House in Peckham on the 3<sup>rd</sup> July 2009.
- 1.2 This report details the approach taken to review those actions and highlights the key findings for the Commissioner's Group consideration.

### 2 Recommendation

2.1 This report is provided to the Commissioner's Group for consideration.

### 3 Background

- 3.1 Following the Lakanal House fire, 3<sup>rd</sup> July 2009, a the Commissioner's Group ordered number of actions to achieve the following:
- To gather information regarding the incident,
- To establish factors which contributed to the outcome of the incident,
- To change internal procedures and practices to reduce the likelihood of a similar outcome,
- To influence external standards to reduce future risk to the public and fire fighters, and
- To share any learning with the whole fire sector.
- 3.2 A review of these actions was requested by the Commissioner's Group in order to confirm their completion and compliance with the intended outcome. This review was completed by GM Lindridge, as a secondee to Operational Assurance, over two months from mid-September 2012.
- 3.3 This briefing paper highlights the key findings of the review.

# 4 Methodology

- 4.1 The review was implemented to confirm the delivery of the thirty-four actions established following the Lakanal House fire, which occurred on 3 July 2009. For consistency, a standard approach was applied to reviewing each action. This involved the following key elements:
- Confirming the anticipated outcome for the action had been delivered;
- Identifying evidence of the activities / outcomes taking place;
- Comparing the reported outcome, with the achieved outcome; and
- Reporting on any gap identified.
- 4.2 These elements were achieved through:
- Interviews with Departmental Heads and those responsible for delivery of the actions;
- Review of documentary evidence and records;
- Secondary product evidence; and
- Discussions with individuals for whom the actions were completed.
- 4.3 Initially, the reviewer met with each of the heads of service, or their delegated representatives to explain the purpose of the review. Each department was offered regular meetings during the review process and was updated on the findings throughout.

## 5 Key findings

- 5.1 All departments offered their full support to the review and have cooperated throughout. The review found that the activities reported on the action log were accurate.
- 5.2 Of the thrity-four actions (see Appendix I) eight have on-going activities related to achieving the intended outcome(s). These on-going activities include those dependent on a future event (which

cannot be simulated) and those which involve influencing external agencies. A full list of the actions and a brief explanation of the findings is appended to this report.

#### 6 Conclusion

- 6.1 Of the 34 actions, 8 have activities on-going related to reaching the expected outcome of the actions.
  - Two of the actions are dependent on the outcome of the inquest before they can be completed (32 and 34);
  - Five of the actions are dependent on external agencies for completion (17, 26, 27, 29 and 30);
  - One action is an on-going activity which is being addressed through the natural cycle of training and internal review processes at fire stations. (21)
- 6.2 Each of the departments has been able to evidence and/or explain how they have performed their role in delivering the 34 actions. The appendix includes a brief explanation of the findings for each action.
- 6.3 Evidence of specific activities in relation to achieving the required outcomes was identified by the responsible department was apparent for each of the actions.

# 7 Appendix – Action log feedback

Action Ref.*	Dept.	Brief Action Title	Reported Action Confirmed	Activities on-going
<u>1</u>	OP	HRP gap analysis	Yes	No
2	FSR	BRE report	Yes	No
3	OR	STEP report	Yes	No
4	OR	SoE document	Yes	No
<u>5</u>	OPR	Control gap analysis	Yes	No
<u>6</u>	OP	Review of HRP	Yes	No
7	OPR	Control at ORT / PRC	Yes	No
8	OPR	FSO for training	Yes	No
9	OPR	RIF files	Yes	No
10	OPR	Review PN539	Yes	No
11	OPR	FSG Initial training	Yes	No
12	OPR	FSG Refresher training	Yes	No
13	OPR	CLG letter	Yes	No
14	OPR	FSG fireground comms	Yes	No
<u>15</u>	OP	FBU briefing	Yes	No
16	OPR	Review control training	Yes	No
17	OPR	AOM training	Yes	Yes
<u>18</u>	OPR	Draft Control SoE	Yes	No
<u>19</u>	LDS	Control report	Yes	No
20	FSR	Research historic fires	Yes	No
21	OPR	MDT diagrams	Yes	Yes
22	OP	Bridgehead info recording	Yes	No
23	OP	FSG Fire ground Policy	Yes	No
24	OP	Moving bridgehead	Yes	No
25	OP	Search policy	Yes	No
<u> 26</u>	OP	Fallen cables policy/procedures	Yes	Yes
27	FSR	Fixing cables (national)	Yes	Yes
28	FSR	LACORS agreement	Yes	No
29	FSR	LA engagement	Yes	Yes
30	FSR	Fire Lift Testing	Yes	Yes
31	FSR	FS risk based approach	Yes	No
32	FSR	Post-investigation review	Yes	Yes
33	FSR	IO training review	Yes	No
34	FSR	FRS correspondence	Yes	Yes

Total (Yes) 34 8

**Action Reference: 1** 

Responsible Dept. / Officer	Operational Procedures / DAC Cowup
Entry on Action Log	Analysis of High Rise Policy
Expected Outcome	Identification of differences between the national Generic Risk Assessment (GRA) and the local policy.  Identification of where the local policy (and the GRA) do not support the Lakanal House incident.
Review Process Findings	The gap analysis compared the LFB high rise policy and procedures (as extant in July 2009) with the National GRA. A report, dated 23 <sup>rd</sup> November 2009, was produced which describes the gaps and makes recommendations. These recommendations are addressed in Action 6.

**Action Reference: 2** 

Responsible Dept. / Officer	Fire Safety Regulation / AC Turek and DAC Lee Phillpotts	
Entry on Action Log	Undertake BRE (Building Research Establishment) modelling	
Expected Outcome	An improved understanding of the effects of the environmental factors on the building, to explain the fire development and spread.	
Review Process Findings	The BRE were commissioned to conduct tests to answer a series of questions posed by the LFB and MPS. The results form part of a highly technical report which LFB Subject Matter Experts confirm as meeting the department's expectations.	

# **Action Reference: 3**

Responsible Dept. / Officer	Operational Resilience / DAC Cutbill
Entry on Action Log	Complete operational sequential time event plot (STEP)
Expected Outcome	Single reference point for all significant operational events and actions, recorded in chronological order at this incident.
Review Process Findings	It was agreed at the Lakanal Board meeting (8 <sup>th</sup> Nov 2010) that the supplementary matters would be transferred to a more user friendly document. As a result of this action, the STEP document is no longer required to be maintained as current due to it being superseded by Action 4.

# Action Reference: 4

Responsible Dept. / Officer	Operational Resilience / DAC Cutbill
Entry on Action Log	Complete sequence of events (SoE)
Expected Outcome	Provide an evidenced timeline explaining the sequence in which events happened.
Review Process Findings	Ops Assurance confirmed that not all information from Control was included in the SoE document. This was due to the volume of information reducing the usability of the document. As a result, details were limited to those from MOBIS, Main-scheme radio messages and key events.  The SoE has proved to be a highly effective reference document and met the expectations of those involved.

### **Action Reference: 5**

Action Reference: 5	Operations Decumentian & December / A.C. Drawn	
Responsible Dept. / Officer	Operations, Prevention & Response / AC Brown	
Entry on Action Log	Undertake gap analysis of Control National and London FSG policies.	
Expected Outcome	A report to be produced which identifies where London control Fire Survival Guidance (FSG) policy differs from the national guidance.	
Review Process Findings	The gap analysis compares Fire Service Circular 10/93 and the Control Personnel Training document, "Making People Safe", 1994, published by the Home Office with LFB policy number 539 and FSG training materials.	
	DCLG confirm that both Circulars (10/93 and 54/04) are extant, but FSC54/04 was not included in this gap analysis. FSC 54/04 covers the wider subject of "Emergency Call Management", in which FSG is referred to in relation to pre-arrival safety advice. FSC 54/04 neither provides a full explanation of FSG call management, nor is it presented in the form of a standard and for this reason was decided not to include it in this action.	
	The National Guidance (FSC 10/93) sets out the training requirement for all control staff, which includes mention of FSG. The 1994 training document accompanies the FSC as an example of an appropriate FSC training programme.	
	LFB FSG training was based on the National training document and wa delivered to all control staff, in 1994 and subsequently to new entran courses from that point on. This presentation has been transferred to PowerPoint and has been revised to reflect changes to policy specifically to high rise dwellings, communications between control and the Fireground and the use of the four principles of assess, escape protect and rescue.	

	The LFB gap analysis suggested improvements to national guidance. The subject of Fire Survival Guidance is part of the national operational guidance project and this gap analysis has been made available to that team.
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### **Action Reference: 6**

Responsible Dept. / Officer	Operational Procedures / DAC Cowup
Entry on Action Log	Review High Rise Policy
Expected Outcome	To improve guidance for frontline staff to prepare them for the demands of a similar incident, by recognising the activities that were necessary.
Review Process Findings	This action considered all of the findings from the Gap analysis produced in Action 1 and these have been adopted in the most part.  LFB (Ops Procedures) have undertaken a review of the national High Rise Firefighting Generic Risk Assessment (GRA). This has now been published and has led to a further review of local policy. The GRA also considered recent incidents in FRSs beyond London. The LFB involvement in the revision of the GRA, will minimise the time for adoption within local policy.

# **Action Reference:** 7

Responsible Dept. / Officer	Operations, Prevention & Response / AC Brown	
Entry on Action Log	Review control involvement in PRC and ORT meetings	
Expected Outcome	Control to be represented at the PRC / ORT meetings when significant control input has been made with the fire-ground, such as when multiple FSG calls have been made.	
Review Process Findings  At Control, a debrief form is now completed post-incident of 8PF or above; incidents involving mobilising issues; I Guidance; or Fire Ground and Control issues.  The debrief form is forwarded to the "ORT" and "OMAN Managers" email addresses. Feedback is received vidatabase.		
	In November 2012 it was decided that Senior Operations Manager (SOM) would establish a protocol for managing Control representation at PRCs and ORT meetings and this has been managed with the assistance of the Incident Management department.	
	Control are now invitees on the weekly ORT meeting and PRC Organisers are prompted to consider inviting a representative from Control through the associated documentation. Since this change, Control have been represented at relevant ORT meetings and PRC events.	

### **Action Reference: 8**

Action Reference.		
Responsible Dept. / Officer	Operations, Prevention & Response / AC Brown	
Entry on Action Log	FSG – training to include input from Fire Safety Officers (FSO)	
Expected Outcome	Training for Control Room Officers (CRO) should comply with the National Guidance, which details the involvement of an FSO for elements of the input.	
Review Process Findings	To sufficiently explain the suitability of London's FSG training arrangements, it is necessary to explain the requirements of the national guidance. FSC 10/93 describes the development of a CRO, listed in the following order:  • Initial / Recruit Training  • Continuation Training  • Probationer Training  • Post-Probation Training  • Qualifying Test  • Watch Refresher Training  • Familiarisation Training  • Progression Courses and  • Fire Service College Courses  The detailed FSG course, which requires a FSO is referred to	

that refresher training be both "scheduled and monitored", It also states that "emphasis should be given to little-used procedures". In the context of the national guidance, the details given for the FSG course describe "initial/recruit training" and "continuation training" to improve "skills and knowledge gradually". This statement would not be appropriate for qualified, or experienced CROs.

It has, however, been determined locally that FSG refresher training is conducted annually.

In LFB, the full FSG training package is now conducted for all new entrants and thereafter on a bi-annual basis for all Control Room Officers. Post July 2009, this was first conducted in the summer of 2010 with a FSO. This was repeated in 2012, although due to the timing of the Olympics, it was postponed until November and December.

For the alternate years (ie, from 2011), a Computer Based Training (CBT) package has been developed. This does not include the input of an FSO. The national guidance is not explicit as to what is required for refresher training as FSC 10/93 links the detailed description of FSG training to "Continuation Training", which would be suitable for CROs between their initial training and Probationer Training. It stands to reason that refresher training for experienced Control Room Operators would not need to be as detailed. The full FSG course being revisited on a bi-annual basis is a significant demonstration of LFB's commitment to supporting the development and performance of the CROs.

A second FSO has been inducted to perform the Control training role for the full, bi-annual FSG course, thus improving resilience arrangements. The FSG subject headings described in FSC10/93 are all covered in the FSO training packages.

The CBT was not available in 2011 and a locally produced PowerPoint presentation was used to deliver refresher training. The CBT is being reviewed for accuracy and will be completed by all CROs from December 2013. As this is managed through the computer-based "Knowledge Centre", the involvement of all CROs will be auditable.

#### **Action Reference: 9**

Responsible Dept. / Officer	Operations, Prevention & Response / AC Brown
Entry on Action Log	FSG – Revise RIF (Reference Information File) file
Expected Outcome	The RIF files for FSG should comply with National Guidance.
Review Process Findings	The RIF provides the Control Room Operators (CROs) with an aide memoire for handling FSG calls, which has been developed from the national Control training packages (1994). Two versions exist: One for the CRO and one for the Control Supervisor (Assistant Operations Manager).

The previous format of operator's RIF was 27 pages long and not favoured by the CROs. A single page flow chart was suggested by the Ops Support Team in March 2012. Since this suggestion was made, a revised RIF has been adopted which is user-friendly and has negated the need for a flow-diagram.
This new RIF complies with FSC10/93, but the FSG elements of FSC54/04 have not been adopted. This was because FSG is only mentioned in the latter circular as an example of how the three-stage approach to Emergency Call Handling may be applied and FSG is not detailed fully.

## **Action Reference: 10**

Responsible Dept. / Officer	Operations, Prevention & Response / AC Brown
Entry on Action Log	Revision of Policy 539 (Emergency Call Handling)
Expected Outcome	Ensure Policy 539 complies with national guidance.
Review Process Findings	PN539 has been reviewed and found to comply with FSC10/93.  PN539 does not contain the complete detail on the LFB's FSG arrangements and needs to be read in conjunction with the training documents and the Control Reference Information Files (RIFs). It should be noted that PN539 does not contain all of the information in the FSC10/93, as to include all details from the National Control Training Package would not be suitable for a policy document.  One recommendation of the Control gap analysis (Action 5) stated, "the information is found in a number of LFB documents and needs to be consolidated". The structure of the Brigade policy notes for FSG, however, appears to be unchanged from pre-2009. This action is currently being conducted as part of a policy review and a draft PN539 is being consulted on.

# Action Reference: 11

Responsible Dept. / Officer	Operations, Prevention & Response / AC Brown
Entry on Action Log	FSG – Initial training
Expected Outcome	To deliver Control Room Operative (CRO) FSG Training which complies with the national guidance and which is suitable and sufficient to develop the performance of the CROs.
Review Process Findings	The course has been extended to a duration of 10 weeks, with FSG training taking place in the last week. This complies with FSG10/93 which recommends that FSG training for "recruits" should take place at between 8 – 12 weeks.

**Action Reference: 12** 

Action Reference, 12	•
Responsible Dept. / Officer	Operations, Prevention & Response / AC Brown
Entry on Action Log	FSG – Refresher training
Expected Outcome	A recurring programme of FSG training to be covered by all Control personnel, in accordance with national guidance.
Review Process Findings	All Control personnel complete FSG training on an annual basis. The full FSG package, with FSO input is completed on the even years since 2010, with a CBT package completed on the odd years, starting from 2013. (The CBT was not available in 2011, and a locally produced PowerPoint was delivered). The CBT can also be used to support ad hoc training needs.  To breakdown the numbers of Control staff trained each year since 2009 (data supplied by OPR):  • 2010 – 108 of 116 staff have been refreshed  • 2011 – 106 of 116 staff have been refreshed  • 2012 – 94 of 104 staff have been refreshed  Up to 2013, all staff have completed at least one full FSG training session.  Update May 2014: The CBT package was not updated to make the content current. FSG Training has been delivered using alternative means and recorded manually. Additional training now involves two command units and Control Room Operators and includes familiarisation and role play exercises. (Information provided by SOM Bagnelle and not audited).

Action Reference: 13

Responsible Dept. / Officer	Operations, Prevention & Response / AC Brown
Entry on Action Log	Draft letter to CLG, re FSG
Expected Outcome	Clarification of national guidance, with a consistent approach followed by all FRSs.
Review Process Findings	The author was informed of the completion of this action earlier in 2013. No review necessary.

**Action Reference: 14** 

Responsible Dept. / Officer	Operations, Prevention & Response / AC Brown
Entry on Action Log	FSG – Policy for communications with the fire ground
Expected Outcome	Standardise the protocols for sharing FSG information between Control and the Fireground, and also for maintaining updates from the fireground at Control.

Review Process Findings	PN790 was authored by representatives from Incident Management Policy and Control. The procedures describes two way exchange of FSG information. These protocols were tested in an exercise at Stratford (16 <sup>th</sup> June 2011), with feedback shared with the policy authors. Overall it was a success, but did identify that FSG is resource intensive at Control.
	An exercise package has also been developed and tested (20 <sup>th</sup> December 2012) to involve Control Room Operators, Command Unit staff, fire crews and senior officers. This proved to be successful and utilised all the communications methods.
	The Control Room Trainers explained that the exchange of information with the incident ground works well, using the template provided.

**Action Reference: 15** 

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Responsible Dept. / Officer	Operational Procedures / DAC Cowup
Entry on Action Log	FBU Briefing
Expected Outcome	Secure the efficient and effective delivery of required changes with all personnel.
Review Process Findings	The Lakanal Presentation was delivered to the FBU (12 <sup>th</sup> Aug 2010 at 1330hrs) and that no further request for information was received from the FBU.

Action Reference: 16

Responsible Dept. / Officer	Operations, Prevention & Response / AC Brown
Entry on Action Log	Control – General review of training
Expected Outcome	Confirm the FSG training for Control Room Operators is suitable and sufficient.
Review Process Findings	The report from the training audit was not available during this review and as a result it was not considered. This review assessed compliance with the comments made in the log relating to these actions.
	Enhanced role play The role play sessions have been implemented, and now include pre- recorded messages, and more detailed scenarios.
	Proactive Training plan including use of STEP STEP has not been used to create a proactive training plan due to technological limitations. A two year rolling training plan is being created on an Excel spreadsheet and should be fully available by January 2013.
	Training Records Currently all training at Control is recorded on a spreadsheet locally and

	transferred to STEP by the Information Management department. This system was sampled by this review and all of those sampled were found to be compliant.
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#### **Action Reference: 17**

Responsible Dept. / Officer	Operations, Prevention & Response / AC Brown
Entry on Action Log	Enhanced training for Control Supervisors
Expected Outcome	Control Supervisors should be trained to support a Control Room Operator when they are handling a FSG call, to a standard commensurate with the National guidance.
Review Process Findings	This action required a two week package to be developed for AOMs. The courses are delivered in 6 modules with a suggested duration of 9.5 days, plus a "5 day Foundational Leadership Course". Whilst this course description meets the requirements of the action, it had previously only been applied to newly or temporarily promoted AOMs.  The Senior Operations Managers have been tasked with applying this training to existing AOMs based on individual training needs analyses. All AOMs have now received training, but not all courses have been available through Babcock.  The Minerva course (mentioned in the Action Log) is not shown on the training template and AOMs do not attend ICE (the current version of Minerva sessions) in their Control Room capacity.

### **Action Reference: 18**

Responsible Dept. / Officer	Operations, Prevention & Response / AC Brown
Entry on Action Log	Draft Control Sequence of Events - (Control SoE)
Expected Outcome	Single index for all messages that were made to or from Control, relating to the incident, from the original call until 2100hrs on the same day. These should be listed in chronological order, for cross referencing back to the source WAV file.
Review Process Findings	A Control Room Operator was seconded for three months and reviewed all recorded Control messages between the original emergency call, (made at 1618:31) through until 2100hrs. 340 WAV files were identified and referenced in an Excel spreadsheet. The content of the messages are not reflected in the spreadsheet. The spreadsheet has been reviewed, but not referenced against the WAV files. Deemed complete by Ops Resilience.

# **Action Reference: 19**

Responsible Dept. / Officer	Legal and Democratic Services (LDS)
Entry on Action Log	Review of draft control analysis
Expected Outcome	Production of a report analysing the actions at Control.
Review Process Findings	The report is being produced to meet an internal standard.  The report details the Fire Survival Guidance (FSG) performance. It includes a review of the policies (local and national); training; summary of key events; lessons learnt; recommendations.  This report has been reviewed and accepted by Legal and Democratic
	Services, and the Commissioner.

### **Action Reference: 20**

Action Reference, 20	
Responsible Dept. / Officer	Fire Safety Regulation / AC Turek and DAC Lee Phillpotts
Entry on Action Log	Review of high rise fires where fire spreads beyond the compartment
Expected Outcome	Identify recorded fires which could have produced a learning opportunity, prior to 3 <sup>rd</sup> July 2009.
Review Process Findings	A senior officer with a Health and Safety specialism conducted a document search of fires within LFB, and other UK FRSs. An experienced Fire Investigator sent a request to an international Fire Safety organisation with a similar intention. Both searches identified no such incidents. This outcome has been included in the FI report.

## **Action Reference: 21**

Responsible Dept. / Officer	Operations, Prevention & Response / AC Brown
Entry on Action Log	Fire crews to increase the level of pre-planning at residential high rise fires to include single line diagrams showing number and location of individual flats.
Expected Outcome	Fire crews should have access to risk information relating to residential high rise buildings to assist with the implementation of High-Rise procedures and to assist with development of an operational plan.
Review Process Findings	Activities to record risk information about Residential High Rise premises on the Operational Risk Database commenced prior to the Lakanal House fire. Of the 260 residential high rise entries discovered on the ORD in January 2013, 62 had images associated with them, only one of which met the description of this action.
	Since this was identified, the requirement for recording risk information has been reinforced by an email from the AC OPR and additional publications, training, targets and monitoring.
	PN800 "Information Gathering / Contingency Planning" gives a risk based approach to recording risk information has been reviewed to increase the level of pre-planning at residential high rise premises.

The images attached to high rise premises on the ORD vary in quality and consistency. OPR are publishing details of how to apply PN800 to HR premises in Shout (November 2012) and the forthcoming Ops News publication. This will be supplemented with a Computer Based Training package.
Progress toward improving the quality of recorded risk information will be monitored by Borough Commanders as well as being considered at post-incident debriefs, including the "Performance Review of Command" (PRC) and the "Operational Review Team" (ORT) meetings.

**Action Reference: 22** 

Action Reference, 22	
Responsible Dept. / Officer	Operational Procedures / DAC Cowup
Entry on Action Log	Policy / procedure on recording command information at the bridgehead
Expected Outcome	A standardised protocol, supporting commanders at forward command points, allowing the recording of Command decisions and operational progress.  The solution should be easily located at a scene of operations where a Command Unit would not be able to access, such as a bridgehead.
Review Process Findings	A procedure for recording command information at a position remote from the Command Unit has been introduced. This involves the use of Forward Information Boards which are carried on all Pump Ladders and CUs. These have an application beyond High Rise Firefighting and therefore is detailed in its own policy note.  The procedure includes the use of large laminated templates and Plastic backboards which were operationally available from January 2013. Their availability is referenced in PN633 – High Rise Firefighting.

**Action Reference: 23** 

Responsible Dept. / Officer	Operational Procedures / DAC Cowup
Entry on Action Log	Policy / procedure for operational staff dealing with fire survival calls at incident
Expected Outcome	Standardise the protocols for managing FSG information on the Fireground.
Review Process Findings	The policy for fire ground management of FSG is delivered in PN790. The introduction of the Forward Information Boards will support this function.

**Action Reference: 24** 

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Responsible Dept. / Officer	Operational Procedures / DAC Cowup

Entry on Action Log	Policy / procedure for controlled movement of bridgehead at high rise incident
Expected Outcome	Frontline crews to be able to relocate a Bridgehead, when necessary.
Review Process Findings	Paragraph 7.23 specifically describes "vertical downward fire spread", and lists five considerations that need to be acted upon if it is necessary to move the Bridgehead.
	This is compliant with the recently published Generic Risk Assessment (GRA). The LFB involvement in the revision of the GRA, will minimise the delay with the review of internal policy.

**Action Reference: 25** 

Responsible Dept. / Officer	Operational Procedures / DAC Cowup
Entry on Action Log	Policy / procedure for conducting search operations – to include guidance for those conducting search operations and those having to manage those operations.
Expected Outcome	A standard policy to provide consistent guidance for crews conducting complex searches, and for the officers who have responsibility for giving briefings and managing them.
Review Process Findings	Policy Note 803 was written for the guidance of operational commanders and fire-fighting / search and rescue teams and covers tactics, procedures and briefings for search. It also suggests search methods, including the national standard detailed in the appendix.

Action Reference: 26

Responsible Dept. / Officer	Operational Procedures / DAC Cowup
Entry on Action Log	Policy / procedure for the means of mitigating the hazard to crews from fallen cables
Explanation of action	A consistent procedure should be adopted by operational personnel, to mitigate the risk presented by cables that fall when affected by fire.
Review Process Findings	November 2010 – Ops News Issue 17 highlighted the hazards associated with fallen cables. This publication included a one-off training package which required watch-based staff to read the article. Further guidance was offered through the Training Support Pack (Electricity) available through the training support icon – 2.1 presentations.  In August 2011, Ops Procedures (OP) led an operational practitioners' forum at the Fire Service College for all FRSs, to discuss this issue.

Following on from this, in October 2012, LFB officers met with Hampshire to review their proposed solution.
As a result, an LFB solution for including wire cutters on individual BA sets has been made operationally available from November 2013. This was supported with a revision to PN466 to include details of the hazards associated with cable entanglement and the procedures to manage it.
This work will be supplemented by the introduction of modified cylinder covers which will reduce the likelihood of entanglement.

**Action Reference: 27** 

Responsible Dept. / Officer	Fire Safety Regulation / AC Turek and DAC Lee Phillpotts
Entry on Action Log	Consideration of changing national requirements for the fixings of cables
Expected Outcome	Influence a change in the national standards related to the routing and/or fixing of cables to impart a degree of fire resistance, in order to reduce the risk of entanglement to fire-fighters and the public.
Review Process Findings	CFOA have been leading on this in an attempt to influence the Electrical Safety Council. A secondee from LFB who has now returned to FSR was responsible for the publication of a recent DCLG Bulletin which highlights the issue.  This has not yet resulted in a change in the British Standards, but the subject has been raised at a national level and LFB are keeping abreast of the national progress.

Action Reference: 28 (Linked with Action 29)

Responsible Dept. / Officer	Fire Safety Regulation / AC Turek and DAC Lee Phillpotts
Entry on Action Log	The FSR Housing Policy – review policy and LACORS (Local Authorities Coordinators of Regulatory Services) agreement
Expected Outcome	Revise the agreement between LFB and the London Boroughs, in relation to Fire Safety responsibilities for Residential Premises, (as described in the Housing Act (2004), and the Fire Safety Order (2005)) to support compliance with the national LACORS protocols.
Review Process Findings	LFB have rewritten the agreement with the Local Authorities regarding the management of housing stocks, to comply fully with LACORS.

Action Reference: 29 (Linked with Action 28)

Responsible Dept. / Officer	Fire Safety Regulation / AC Turek and DAC Lee Phillpotts
Entry on Action Log	Review engagement with Local Authorities
Expected Outcome	LFB should support a LACORS agreement as described in the national guidance, and seek formal agreement with all 33 London Boroughs. This will clearly describe responsibilities of LFB and Local Authorities, in relation to the premises mentioned in the LACORS protocols.
Review Process Findings	<ul> <li>FSR have made contacted all Boroughs, seeking agreement with the new standard. Progress as reported mid Oct 2012:</li> <li>13 London Boroughs have signed the agreement</li> <li>8 are engaging with the LFB and progress is being made (inc. Southwark)</li> <li>Further efforts are being made to encourage the remaining 12 Boroughs to sign up to these protocols.</li> <li>Efforts on-going in attempt to secure full sign-up to new protocols.</li> <li>Significantly, Southwark are engaged, although not yet fully signed up.</li> </ul>

Action Reference: 30

Responsible Dept. / Officer	Fire Safety Regulation / AC Turek and DAC Lee Phillpotts
Entry on Action Log	Raise standards on installation and testing of fire lifts as a national issue
Expected Outcome	To amend the national industry standards to include inspection of the lift's fire-fighting functions as part of the routine testing. This would improve the likelihood of a lift's fire-fighting features being operational when required.
Review Process Findings	The British Standard (BS EN 81-72:2003) does not refer to this capability, and so it is not a requirement. FSR found inconsistencie amongst lift Engineers on whether lifts' fire fighting functions are tested as part of routine inspections.
	Contact with the Lifts and Escalators Industry Association (LEIA prompted a positive response raising the issue to a national level. In February 2011 the LEIA confirmed a change to the Code of Practice for the testing of lifts (as reflected in BS 9991:2011), which dealt with our request that the maintenance and testing requirements for fire-fighting lifts be included in the relevant code of practice. Further work is also on going with LEIA to improve the guidance they provide to industry.
	In addition to this successful outcome the AC FSR has written to a Heads of Housing in all London Boroughs, Chief Executives, ALMO's and Chief Executives of housing Associations relating to the maintenance of fire lifts within their properties and offering them advice and guidance on the matter. (Evidence not inspected as part of this review.)

FSR have a comprehensive audit trail demonstrating their efforts.

## **Action Reference: 31**

Action Reference, 31	
Responsible Dept. / Officer	Fire Safety Regulation / AC Turek and DAC Lee Phillpotts
Entry on Action Log	FSR team planning to continue targeting of social housing using a risk based approach
Expected Outcome	The Authority can demonstrate the methodical use of Fire Safety resource, to inspect premises according to their assessed risk levels
Review Process Findings	LFB is responsible for audit and enforcement of the Fire Safety Regulation and will sample the blocks checked by the LA. LFB meet with the LA or responsible association, to identify those premises.
	<u>"Fire Safety Information and Guidance Note_115"</u> includes a matrix identifying the frequency of visits, or the proportion of sampling that is undertaken for each of the group of premises types, based on their relative risk rating scores.
	The activities of Inspecting Officers are managed as part of the team plans, established by the Team Leaders. The programme of visits, to be carried out over the year, is determined at the start of the (financial) year, with progress being monitored quarterly by Fire Safety Group Managers with their Team Leaders.
	Since 3 <sup>rd</sup> July 2009, 6,073 buildings, over 4 floors in height, have been inspected. This represents 12.5% of inspections. In the year 2013-14 a further 60 of these premises are programmed for inspection (not including post incident audits). (Data provided by FSR, but not audited as part of this review).

#### **Action Reference: 32**

Action Reference, 52	
Responsible Dept. / Officer	Fire Safety Regulation / AC Turek and DAC Lee Phillpotts
Entry on Action Log	Conduct post investigation/prosecution review, in particular in relation to liaison with MPS / CPS / HSE
Expected Outcome	Confirm compliance with the Inquest recommendations.
Review Process Findings	This activity has not been started as it will act on the outcomes arising from the forthcoming Inquest. Existing internal processes will be followed through to manage these outcomes. Responsibility for outstanding actions will be passed to the appropriate department and monitored by Operational Resilience.

### **Action Reference: 33**

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Responsible Dept. / Officer	Fire Safety Regulation / AC Turek and DAC Lee Phillpotts
Entry on Action Log	Review learning and training for inspecting officers (IOs) in terms of social housing
Expected Outcome	The ability to demonstrate that organisationally, LFB has a robust process to develop the competency of fire safety inspecting officers in relation to these types of premises.
Review Process Findings	Two IOs from each Borough team attended courses covering "Training in Purpose Built Blocks of Flats" in October and November 2011, delivered by "Colin Todd Associates". In total over forty IO's and team leaders attended the two one day courses and this has been cascaded and completed by 12 of the 17 teams of their teams. The remaining five teams are being completed incrementally. This was a one-off training intervention to update IOs on the risks associated with this type of premises.
	Between 2008 and 2010 a suite of nationally recognised qualifications was agreed with Skills for Justice, which covered the LACORS protocols. Edexcel are the awarding body for this qualification.
	Since April 2012, all new entrants complete level 3 certificates, with experienced IOs expected to be working toward level 4 certificates. Team leaders and senior fire safety officers will complete the Level 4 diploma, which is the highest qualification currently available through this awarding body.
	The Level 3 course may take up to 18 months, and completion will be towards the end of 2013. It is expected that the Level 4 qualifications will take between 12 to 15 months to complete, leading to the first awards being made in mid-2013.
	The FSR department maintains comprehensive records of all personnel's development and progress.

# Action Reference: 34

Responsible Dept. / Officer	Fire Safety Regulation / AC Turek and DAC Lee Phillpotts
Entry on Action Log	Consider any external and national FRS issues
Expected Outcome	Consistent understanding and application of national guidance.
Review Process Findings	Draft letter detailing the Fire Safety issues identified during the internal investigation has been presented to the Board for consideration before sending to CLG. It will consider the Inquest findings before being sent.