

**Minutes: 47<sup>th</sup> Meeting of London Risk Advisory Group**

<b>MEETING</b>	London Risk Advisory Group
<b>DATE</b>	19 June 2019
<b>TIME</b>	13:30hrs
<b>PLACE</b>	LFB HQ, 169 Union Street, London SE1 0LL

**Attendees**

Organisation	Name	Organisation	Name
Environment Agency	Hayley Deakin	MCHLG RED	Jasmine Taylor
Greenwich RB	Ian Cheshire	MCA	Terry Leach
Haringey LB	Katie Fisher	Military	Ian Kemp
Harrow LB	Sam Murphy	MPS	Steve Feely
Havering LB	Trevor Meers	MPS	Ed Rees
Lewisham LB	Samera Hudroge	NHS	Barry Emerson
London Ambulance Services	Alan Palmer	Richmond & Wandsworth LB	Ali Malvern
London Resilience (Chair)	Manuela Roedler	Southwark LB	Andy Snazell
London Resilience	Esme Cole	Thames Water	Sarah Burchard
London Resilience	Sonja Weigl	TfL	Monica Cooney
LFB	Shaun Coltress	TfL	Patrice Locker
Apologies			
BTP	Maxine Foxwell		
Merton	Sarah Chittock		
Military	Sarah Streete		
PHE	Anna Sexton		
Met Office	Bryony May		

**Actions and decisions**

Actions		
Ref.	Action	Action by
1	All risk leads to examine the Summary of changes document and update the individual risk profile, noting merged risks and the historic risk codes.	All
2	Shaun Coltress (LFB) and Esme Cole (LRG) to verify the planning assumptions on the individual risk assessment of <b>H4</b> (Hazardous	Shaun Coltress

	Liquids Supply Infrastructure).	
3	Esme Cole (LRG) to verify the scoring of <b>H5</b> (Fire or explosion at an onshore fuel pipeline), as the individual risk assessment score differs from the London Risk Register.	Esme Cole
4	Esme Cole (LRG) to verify the scoring of <b>HL30</b> (Localised explosion at a natural gas main), as the individual risk assessment score differs from the London Risk Register.	Esme Cole
5	Hayley Deakin (EA) to cross-check the overall scoring of <b>H11</b> (Radiation Exposure from Stolen Goods), once the NRA is accessible again. If the scores differ to please provide evidence on the individual risk assessment.	Hayley Deakin
6	Sam Murphy (LB Harrow) to add the NHS (Listeria) incident to key historical evidence and to update the social disruption scores of <b>H14</b> (Food Supply contamination), accordingly.	Sam Murphy
7	Terry Leach (MCGA) to request the Thames Resilience Panel risk assessment from PLA and share it with LRG in relation to <b>H15</b> (Maritime pollution).	Terry Leach
8	All Fire, Industrial Accidents & Pollution leads to consider <b>HL4</b> (Major pollution of inland waters) as a secondary risk and add this where appropriate to their own risks, particularly <b>H15</b> (Maritime pollution).	All Fire, Industrial Accidents & Pollution
9	Ian Cheshire (LB Greenwich) to add flooding as an environmental impact to <b>HL23</b> (Bridge Collapse).	Ian Cheshire
10	Esme Cole to add <b>HL26a/HL26b</b> ( (Non-) zoonotic Notifiable animal diseases) to the agenda of the next LRG meeting, to allow time for the risk leads to convene and review the risk.	Esme Cole
11	All partners to share current use of NRA guidance with the NSRA development team.	All

Decisions	
Ref.	Decision
1	Esme Cole (LRG) to remove <b>HL4</b> (Major pollution of inland waters). It is to be excluded from the risk register on the grounds that it is covered under H15 and as a secondary risk of other Fire, Industrial Accidents & Pollution risks.
2	LRG to await NSRA publication and then consider a workshop with an NSRA representative from CCS.

## 1. Summary of Actions

Refer to the LRG Action Tracker.

**2. Minutes of Last Meeting and matters arising**

The minutes of the London Risk Advisory Group meeting on 26 February 2019 were agreed as a complete and accurate record. There was one change to the scoring of Item **H12** (Biological substance release from facility where pathogens are handled deliberately), which will be followed up and edited.

**3. Risks for Review**

3.1. Esme Cole (LRG) thanked everyone for the risk reviews. Shaun Coltress was introduced as the new LFB risk lead.

**3.2. Spring Year 1: Fire, Industrial Accidents & Pollution**

Risk ID	Risk Type	Lead	Update by lead	Comments by LRG
H58	Wildfires	LFB	Key historical evidence and social disruption scores were added. This did not affect the overall score. A wildfire advisor will soon supplement the LFB response. Moreover, LFB have purchase a drone, a good tool for tactical decision making during a response.	Was merged with historic risk: H37
HL7	Industrial Explosion and major fires	LFB	Social disruption scores were added. The overall score remains unchanged.	Was merged with historic risk: HL25
H4	Hazardous liquids supply infrastructure	LFB	Social disruption scores were added. The overall score remains unchanged.	Was merged with historic risk: HL28.  Please verify planning assumptions.
H5	Fire or explosion at a fuel supply infrastructure (pipelines)	LFB	Social disruption scores were added.	The overall score is 5, while the London Risk Register is 3. Please investigate.
H7	Gas supply infrastructure	LFB	Social disruption scores were added. The overall score remains	

	(high pressure pipelines)		unchanged.	
HL30	Localised explosion at a natural gas main	LFB	Social disruption scores were added. The overall score remains unchanged.	The score differs from the London Risk Register. Please investigate.
H9	Toxic chemical release	LFB	Social disruption scores were added. The overall score remains unchanged.	
HL3	Localised Industrial accident involving small toxic release	LFB	Social disruption scores were added. This reduced the overall score.	
H11	Radiation exposure from stolen goods	EA	The vulnerability and planning assumptions were updated. The likelihood has increased, which did not affect overall score. It was attempted to cross check the NRA score, however, the document is currently inaccessible online.	Please verify NRA scoring. The group agreed that where possible, the risks should reflect NRA scoring unless there are valid reasons for deviation.
H14	Food supply contamination	LA	The impact and likelihood were updated, the impact increased from 2 to 4. This did not affect the overall scoring. Background information was added to the key historical evidence.	The group requested that the NHS incident of mislabelling allergens should be added to historical evidence. Please also update the social disruption scores.
H15	Maritime pollution	MCGA	1. This should sit with PLA, as they have overarching authority of the Thames.  2. The Thames Resilience Panel is collating a separate risk assessment. Parts of this will not affect London, but it may be useful to see.	On point 1: PLA are invited to LLAG but unfortunately did not attend.  On point 2: Please do chase PLA for a copy of this risk assessment.
HL4	Major pollution of inland waters	EA	The Thames is exempt from this risk, at it is already covered in	LRAG agreed that the risk should be removed, provided

			<p>H15. There are frequent but small-scale incidents in Thames tributaries. However, EA recommend that this does not warrant a partnership response. The risk should be removed, but should be noted as a secondary risk to other incidents.</p>	<p>that risks relating to the Thames are expanded on further under H15 and that risk relating to tributaries are covered as secondary impacts in other risk assessments.</p>
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3.3. It was requested that any merging of risks would be recorded in the key historical evidence.

**ACTION 1:** All risk leads to examine the Summary of changes document and update the individual risk profile, noting merged risks and the historic risk codes.

**ACTION 2:** Shaun Coltress (LFB) & Esme Cole (LRG) to verify the planning assumptions on the individual risk assessment of **H4** (Hazardous Liquids Supply Infrastructure).

**ACTION 3:** Esme Cole (LRG) to verify the scoring of **H5** (Fire or explosion at an onshore fuel pipeline), as the individual risk assessment score differs from the London Risk Register.

**ACTION 4:** Esme Cole (LRG) to verify the scoring of **HL30** (Localised explosion at a natural gas main), as the individual risk assessment score differs from the London Risk Register.

**ACTION 5:** Hayley Deakin (EA) to cross-check the overall scoring of **H11** (Radiation Exposure from Stolen Goods) once the NRA is accessible again. If the scores differ to provide evidence on the individual risk assessment.

**ACTION 6:** Sam Murphy (LB Harrow) to add the Pret a Manger incident to key historical evidence and to update the social disruption scores of **H14** (Food Supply contamination) accordingly.

**ACTION 7:** Terry Leach (MCGA) to request the Thames board risk assessment from PLA and share it with LLAG in relation to **H15** (Maritime pollution).

**ACTION 8:** All Fire, Industrial Accidents & Pollution leads to consider **HL4** (Major pollution of inland waters) as a secondary risk and add this where appropriate to their own risks, particularly **H15** (Maritime pollution).

**DECISION 1:** Esme Cole (LRG) to remove **HL4** (Major pollution of inland waters). It is to be excluded from the risk register on the grounds that it is covered under H15 (Maritime pollution) and as a secondary risk of other Fire, Industrial Accidents & Pollution risks.

### 3.4. Summer Year 1: Structural Hazards and Animal Health

Risk ID	Risk Type	Lead	Update by lead	Comments by LLAG
HL22/ HL22a	Building Collapse	LA	This was separated out into two risks to cover large and small building collapse. The overall score remains unchanged.	
HL23	Bridge Collapse	LA	The outcome was updated to include more detail on impacts when collapses occur over rivers or railways. Key historical evidence was updated by removing very old examples and adding recent incidents (Italy, Brazil). Social disruption scores were updated given the fatality and casualty figures of these recent incidents to account for psychological impact and public outrage. Plans were updated.  HL23 risk combines all structural collapse from bridges, merging HL11 and HL24.	Please add flooding as one of the environmental impacts.
HL105	Complex Built Environment	LA	Key historical evidence was added. The social disruption scores increased. Context in the health, economic and environmental sections was added.  The overall score remains unchanged.	LLAG discussed the weighting of impact scores.  The group reconfirmed the weighting of the impact scores for social disruption.
HL21	Land Movement	LFB	Social disruption scores were added. The capability was updated to include correct numbers of USAR teams.  The score has decreased as a result.	
H44	Reservoir/Dam failure	EA	The likelihood is low but the impact would be catastrophic. This means that the overall score is higher than in the NRA guidance. The King	

			George V reservoir (LB Enfield) warrants this high score. It falls into the top 100 reservoirs in the UK where separate planning is required. Key historical evidence was updated with additional examples.	
HL26a	Zoonotic	LA/ PHE	Nationally, HL26a and b are combined into one (H25).The leads have not had an opportunity to meet.	LRAG agreed that these risks would be discussed at the next meeting.
HL26b	Non-zoonotic	LA/ PHE		

**ACTION 9:** Ian Cheshire (LB Greenwich) to add flooding as an environmental impact to **HL23** (Bridge Collapse).

**ACTION 10:** Esme Cole to add **HL26a/HL26b** ((Non-) Zoonotic Notifiable animal diseases) to the agenda of the next LRAG meeting, to allow time for the risk leads to convene and review the risk.

#### **4. NRA 2019 – Update**

4.1. A brief of the summary of expected changes on the 2019 NSRA (National Security Risk Assessment) has been circulated by email in advance of this meeting and was uploaded to Resilience Direct.

4.2. Points to note were as follows:

- NRA and NSRA will be merged to form a single NSRA document
- historically, LRAG used the NRA, as the NSRA was classified
- only very few elements of the new document will be classified secret
- T-references (threat) and H-references (hazard) will be replaced by a general R-reference (risk)
- new references will quote national risk leads i.e. R68-DEFRA
- this new methodology is not mandated, and LRFs are free to adopt it, however there are risks that are new risks, that LRFs are required to review

4.3. The group discussed these key points. An issue raised was the continuity of risk referencing, as well as the added complexity of either re-labelling risks or cross-referencing the NSRA and London Risk Register terminology. A workshop session may be necessary, but until further guidance is seen, the group agreed to make not further plans. Moreover, the group agreed that inviting a representative from the NSRA team from the CCS to explain key changes would be beneficial.

4.4. The group asked to see the latest London planning assumptions. The 2018 version has been published but a review is essential in 2019. This will be conducted together with LRAG once the new NSRA is published.

4.5. All partners are encouraged to feedback how they currently use the NRA guidance locally to the current NSRA development team from CCS

**ACTION 11:** All partners to share current use of NRA guidance with the NSRA development team.

**DECISION 3:** LLAG to await NSRA publication and then consider a workshop with an NSRA representative from CCS.

## **6. Resilience Standards**

6.1. The LRF requested LRG complete a self-assessment against good practice risk communication and local risk assessments supplied by the CCS, but noted that it was a very subjective process.

6.2. The group noted that it was difficult to create a single self-assessment for such a wide variety of partner organisations across London. Moreover, it was noted that Boroughs already have a statutory duty to complete borough risk registers. It was remarked that the online Prezzie (slideshow) was a useful tool for communicating risk to the public as it was accessible and engaging.

6.3. Manuela Roedler (LRG) informed LLAG that a conversation around risk communication has started internally, with a consideration of raising this as a 100 Resilience Cities programme. The group was supportive of this idea and interested to hear more once this is developed further.

## **7. Member Updates and Any Other Business**

7.1. Alan Palmer (London Ambulance Services) updated LLAG on the alignment of LAS with NHS command-control standards. This entailed reviewing each risk and expected numbers of casualties and fatalities for each.

## **9. Forthcoming LLAG meetings and scheduled risks for review:**

NSRA Review meeting	TBC
LRAG	10:00am 3 <sup>rd</sup> September 2019
LRAG	10:00am 3 <sup>rd</sup> December 2019

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