## <u>LRF February 2020 - Capability Assessment (from touchpoint reports in November 2019) against Planning Assumptions (as outlined in the LRG update, October 2019)</u>

| Capability              | PA referenced  | Met?       | Comment  |   |  |  |
|-------------------------|--|------------|--|---|--|--|
| СОМАН                   | none   |            | "No specific planning assumptions for COMAH. The assessment was instead conducted against the key risks posed by the site. In the context of Flogas". <b>Met</b>   |   |  |  |
| Enfield<br>Reservoir    | none   |            | "There are no planning assumptions for this capability."   |   |  |  |
| ID of the<br>Vulnerable | none   |            | N/A  |   |  |  |
| Fuel                    | L  | Not<br>met | National planning assumption for 10 days of fuel resilience is not achievab  | le for most   | agencies.  |  |
| Mass<br>Evacuations     | None, referred to<br>L21 in risk register  | Not<br>met | It is currently unclear how these figures were come by, and they are unchanged Risk Register version 1 published in 2011. These figures should be reviewed framework.  The framework doesn't mention the planning assumptions beyond acknown paragraphs. We note that mass movements of people in London on this solution police and other partners (football matches, large concerts etc.) but these evacuation on the scale of 150,000 people from London could be well mandon't think it could be well managed with no warning. | d as part of<br>wledging th<br>cale are ma<br>are pre-pla | em in the opening<br>naged regularly by the<br>nnned. We think that an |  |
| Mass Shelter            | Not directly linked<br>to LRPA, used<br>figures already<br>quoted in<br>document | Not<br>met | The planning assumptions used in this framework are:  Evacuees with up to 25,000 people requiring assistance with evacuation People flooded  People without shelter for 12 months or more  Households without suitable shelter for 12 months of more  People stranded away from home for a 36 hour period  People not accounted for, over 48 hours   | 314,000<br>110,000<br>160,893<br>59,696<br>9,515<br>1,730 |  |  |

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|                    |              |            | The framework states that these are based on a reasonable worst case surface water flooding scenario. The framework acknowledges that other hazards could also cause a scenario in which Mass Shelter is required.   |
|--------------------|--------------|------------|--|
|                    |              |            | The capability does not meet the planning assumptions. [ details in original]  |
|                    |              |            | There is an additional concern around the planning assumptions for this Framework regarding the origin of numbers in the assumptions. We have investigated and cannot find a methodology of how these numbers were calculated. There is no methodology behind the national planning assumptions, and there is no methodology in the London planning assumptions that states how the London numbers were reached.   |
| Mass<br>Casualties | А            | Met        | No notice non contaminated mass casualties and fatalities (physical injury): Up to 2,000 casualties. <b>Met</b>  |
|                    | В            | Not<br>met | Potentially contaminated casualties and fatalities resulting from the release of Chemical, Biological, or<br>Radiological material.<br><b>Not Met</b>  |
|                    |              |            | Mass Casualty Framework excludes CBRN incidents due to the difficulties of mass clinical decontamination.  |
|                    | E            | Met        | Rubble, debris and trapped people: Large proportion of the occupancy of affected building(s) missing/trapped. <b>Met</b> - With the assumption that this would not exceed 2000 casualties.   |
| Recovery           | n <b>one</b> |            | No comments made   |
| REPPIR             | BCDHILQR     |            | Diamin - accountions   |
|                    |              |            | Planning assumptions   |
|                    |              |            | B No notice non contaminated mass casualties and fatalities (physical injury):  i. Up to 2000 casualties  ii. Over 1000 fatalities.  |
|                    |              |            | B No notice non contaminated mass casualties and fatalities (physical injury):  i. Up to 2000 casualties  ii. Over 1000 fatalities.  C Potentially contaminated casualties and fatalities resulting from the release of Chemical, Biological or Radiological material.   |
|                    |              |            | <ul> <li>B No notice non contaminated mass casualties and fatalities (physical injury):         <ol> <li>Up to 2000 casualties</li> <li>Over 1000 fatalities.</li> </ol> </li> <li>C Potentially contaminated casualties and fatalities resulting from the release of Chemical, Biological or Radiological material.</li> </ul>  |
|                    |              |            | <ul> <li>B No notice non contaminated mass casualties and fatalities (physical injury): <ol> <li>Up to 2000 casualties</li> <li>Over 1000 fatalities.</li> </ol> </li> <li>C Potentially contaminated casualties and fatalities resulting from the release of Chemical, Biological or Radiological material. <ol> <li>Radiological - up to 100,000 fatalities and 100,000 casualties</li> </ol> </li> <li>D Potentially contaminated environment resulting from the release of Chemical, Biological or Radiological</li> </ul> |

|  |         |                 | <ul> <li>H Immediate evacuation of hundreds of thousands of people with half displaced for over 2 months</li> <li>I Health and Welfare of UK livestock affected by notifiable animal disease or adverse event.</li> <li>L Disruption to national gas supplies for 9-12 months</li> <li>Q Disruption to water supply and sewerage management services</li> <li>R Disruption to food supply         <ul> <li>i. National disruption to supply (shortages) of essential foods for up to 5 days with the potential for certain areas to experience disruption for much longer.</li> </ul> </li> </ul> |
|--|---------|-----------------|---|
|  |         |                 | Met/Not Met – Hard to determine   |
|  |         |                 | REPPIR framework provides details for the production, agreement and dissemination of public information. It does not detail the operational response to manage the wider consequences of a radiation emergency. Due to this it would be argued that the REPPIR Framework is not a relevant response capability for some of the Planning assumptions listed above, for example L, Q and R.   |
| Severe<br>Weather<br>&Natural<br>Hazards | Unknown |                 | The Severe Weather & Natural Hazards Framework is an overarching framework which encompasses a number of weather events and resulting impacts some of which are also covered by their own capability (e.g. flooding, excess deaths, structural collapse, drought). As such, the capability has a number of interdependencies with other Partnership capabilities and therefore it was not thought that the group could provide an effective assessment of the planning assumptions without prior consultation with the relevant capability groups.  |
| STAC                                     | A       | Not<br>relevant | <ul> <li>A: Excess casualties and fatalities: Non-contaminated excess casualties and fatalities from a persistent but time-limited cause: Not Met</li> <li>STAC shouldnt be listed as no drivers relate to STAC</li> </ul>  |
|  | В       | Not<br>relevant | <ul> <li>B: No notice non contaminated mass casualties and fatalities (physical injury): Met</li> <li>If industrial accident was bold we agree STAC should be listed</li> </ul>   |
|  | С       | Met             | <ul> <li>C: Potentially contaminated casualties and fatalities resulting from the release of Chemical, Biological, or<br/>Radiological material: Met</li> </ul>   |
|  | D       | Met             | D: Potentially contaminated environment resulting from the release of chemical, biological or radiological material and/or the presence of potentially hazardous materials: <b>Met</b>  |

area.

|         |                        |      |                  | event): <b>Met</b>   |    |
|---------|------------------------|------|------------------|--|----|
|         |                        | К    | Not<br>relevant  | <ul> <li>K: Disruption to transport services: Not Met</li> <li>A STAC wouldn't be convened in this scenario</li> </ul>   |    |
|         |                        | L    | Not<br>relevant  | <ul> <li>L: Disruption to energy supplies: Not Met</li> <li>A STAC wouldn't be convened in this scenario</li> </ul>  |    |
|         |                        | М    | Not<br>relevant  | M: Disruption to communications services: <b>Not Met</b>   |    |
|         |                        | Q    | Met              | <ul> <li>Q: Disruption to water supply and sewerage management services disrupted: Met</li> <li>STAC should be listed</li> </ul>   |    |
|         | Structural<br>Collapse | Е    | Partially<br>Met | Planning Assumption E (i.e. up to 7000 tonnes residential debris, 30,000 tonnes industrial debris, missing and trapped people, potential contamination)                                      |    |
|         |                        |      |                  | Planning assumption partially met.   |    |
|         |                        |      |                  | <ul> <li>The review group has asked for further determination from MHCLG regarding how planning assumptio<br/>figures were derived.</li> </ul>   | 'n |
|         |                        |      |                  | No existing sites are identified for the storage or processing of cleared debris. The revised framework provides toolkit for identifying a storage site and ensuring appropriate management. |    |
|         | Capability             | Page | <u> 4</u> 0      |  |    |
| LFB0011 |                        |      |                  |  |    |

Not Met

• E: Rubble, debris and trapped people: Met

F: CNI and other property affected by flooding: Not Met

• H: People displaced and requiring assistance within the UK:

the driver in bold – for flooding it would be as 'F'

STAC would not be convened for flooding as there is guidance out there already

o STAC would be a primary capability to be convened for a 'Major fire' but not for 'flooding' which is

I: Harm to the health and welfare of UK livestock (affected by a notifiable animal disease or adverse

E

Н

Met

Not

Not

met

Met

relevant

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