

GRENFELL DEBRIEFS – UPDATE REPORT

1. Introduction

The Grenfell Tower Fire which occurred in the early hours of 14th June 2017, is considered to be the most impactful peacetime incident in the UK. The incident presented multiple complexities both in response and recovery. The London Resilience Partnership response and recovery ran from 14th June to 8th September 2017. During this time, seven Partnership plans were activated in turn initiating the activation of a number of coordinating groups.

Debriefs covering the response to the Grenfell Tower Fire were held between 10th and 19th July 2018, coordinated by the London Resilience Group and facilitated by Public Health England.

2. Debrief Methodology

Due to the scale and complexity of the multi-agency response to the Grenfell Tower Fire, the debrief took the form of seven discrete debriefs focused on each of the seven plans which were invoked. For each plan, a number of key themes/topics were identified from within the plan to focus discussions. For each topic of discussion participants were requested to identify aspects that went well, aspects for improvement and recommendations.

Each debrief was led by two independent facilitators from Public Health England; one facilitating discussion and one as scribe. Debrief reports were written ‘live’ during the debrief with all participants provided with the opportunity to agree on the exact wording of discussion points.

3. Debrief Scope

Each debrief was limited to matters relating to multi-agency strategic coordination and to the time during which the relevant multi-agency plan was in operation to the period until 8th September 2017, when the recovery operation passed from the Grenfell Fire Response Team to the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea.

The focus of the debriefs was on how actions were taken in accordance with the relevant multi-agency plan, with a view to identifying whether changes to the plan were required.

4. Lessons Identification and Allocation

Following sign off within the debrief meetings, debrief reports were submitted to the Learning and Implementation Review Group (LIRG) for allocation to relevant workstreams. An overview of how these lessons were allocated can be seen in the table below.

Grenfell Tower Fire – Lessons Overview		
Incident Date	14 th June 2017	
Lead Agency	London Fire Brigade	
Lessons		
Total*	139	
By Work Stream	<i>Strategic Coordination Enhancement</i>	22
	<i>Training & Exercising</i>	12
	<i>Humanitarian Assistance</i>	15
	<i>London Resilience Communication Group</i>	16
	<i>Mass Fatalities</i>	13
	<i>Recovery</i>	37
	<i>Scientific and Technical Advice Cell (STAC)</i>	24

*The total number of lessons may not equate to the sum of all lessons by workstream. Some lessons may be attributed to more than one workstream.

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	<i>Arrangements</i>	
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Further breakdown of each individual debrief and the resulting lessons allocation can be found in the tables below.

Full detail of all lessons and recommendations (as well as aspects that went well which do not have a resulting recommendation) is included as appendices at the end of this report. All points have been transferred from the debrief reports to the Lessons Database verbatim following agreement on wording by all attendees within each debrief session however, not all points sit under the same heading within the Database as they did within the debrief reports. The structure of the debriefs was such that Aspects That Went Well, Areas for Improvement and Recommendations were all discussed as separate, stand alone points therefore, not all recommendations necessarily have a corresponding Aspect That Went Well or Area for Improvement. Likewise, some points which were noted as Areas for Improvement were better suited as Recommendations and therefore have been moved in the database to reflect this.

London Resilience Partnership Recovery Management Protocol, Version 1.0: September 2016		
Debrief Date	10 th July 2018, 13:00-17:00	
Attendance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Area Dean – London Anglican • British Red Cross • City of London Corporation • London Councils • London Local Authorities Chief Executive Liaison • London Resilience Group • Maritime & Coastguard Agency • Metropolitan Police Service • NHS England • Public Health England • Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea • West London Clinical Commissioning Group 	
Discussion Points	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Activation • Recovery Coordinating Group (RCG) • Recovery Sub Groups • Transition from Response to Recovery • Liaising with Others • Stand Down 	
Lessons (Appendix 1)	Total*	22
	Recovery	22
	Training & Exercising	2
	Strategic Coordination	1
	Sector Panels	2

London Resilience Partnership Strategic Coordination Protocol, Version 7.3: February 2017		
Debrief Date	11 th July 2018, 09:00-13:00	
Attendance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Environment Agency • London Fire Brigade • London Local Authorities Chief Executive Liaison • London Resilience Group 	

**The total number of lessons may not equate to the sum of all lessons by workstream. Some lessons may be attributed to more than one workstream.*

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	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Maritime & Coastguard Agency • Metropolitan Police Service • NHS England • Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea 	
Discussion Points	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Notification • Assessment • Activation • Strategic Coordinating Group 	
Lessons (Appendix 2)	Total*	12
	Strategic Coordination	12
	Training & Exercising	3

London Resilience Partnership Humanitarian Assistance Framework, Version 5.0: April 2017		
Debrief Date	12 th July 2018, 09:00-12:00	
Attendance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • British Red Cross • City of Westminster • London Resilience Group • Maritime & Coastguard Agency • NHS England • North West London Clinical Commissioning Group • Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea • Victim Support 	
Discussion Points	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Activation • Information Sharing • Impact Assessment 	
Lessons (Appendix 3)	Total*	15
	Humanitarian Assistance	15
	Training & Exercising	1

London Scientific and Technical Advice Cell (STAC) Arrangements, Version 3.0: May 2017		
Debrief Date	17 th July 2018, 13:00-17:00	
Attendance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Bureaux Veritas • Environment Agency • London Resilience Group • Met Office • Public Health England • Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea 	
Discussion Points	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Activation • Notification • STAC Function • STAC Meetings • Stand Down 	
Lessons (Appendix 4)	Total*	16
	STAC	16
	Strategic Coordination	2

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London Resilience Partnership Mass Fatalities Framework, Version 5.0: June 2015		
Debrief Date	18 th July 2018, 13:00-17:00	
Attendance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • City of Westminster • Coroner • Home Office – Pathology • London Ambulance Service • London Resilience Group • Maritime & Coastguard Agency • NHS England • Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea • UK Disaster Victim Identification 	
Discussion Points	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Activation • Notification • Mass Fatality Coordination Group (MFCG) • Finance Management Group 	
Lessons (Appendix 5)	Total*	13
	Mass Fatalities	13
	Strategic Coordination	1

London Structural Collapse Response and Recovery Framework, Version 2.0: August 2015		
Debrief Date	19 th July 2018, 09:00-13:00	
Attendance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Metropolitan Police Service • Environment Agency • London Ambulance Service • London Underground • London Resilience Group • Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea • Health and Safety Executive • Wates Ltd. • Public Health England • London Fire Brigade 	
Discussion Points	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Notification • Response • Investigation • Recovery • Site Clearance Cell 	
Lessons (Appendix 6)	Total*	37
	Site Clearance	37
	Training & Exercising	5
	Strategic Coordination	1

The London Resilience Communication Group (LRCG) Emergency Plan, Version 1: September 2016		
Debrief Date	19 th July 2018, 13:00-17:00	
Attendance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • City of Westminster • London Ambulance Service • London Councils • London Fire Brigade 	

**The total number of lessons may not equate to the sum of all lessons by workstream. Some lessons may be attributed to more than one workstream.*

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • London Resilience Group • Maritime & Coastguard Agency • Metropolitan Police Service • NHS England • North West London Clinical Commissioning Group 	
Discussion Points	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Alert System/Activation • London Resilience Communication Group (LRCG) • Media • Public Information • Website Information and Updating “London Prepared” 	
Lessons (Appendix 7)	Total*	24
	Communications	24
	Training & Exercising	2
	Recovery	1
	Mass Fatalities	1

5. Lessons – Themes

All lessons are set out in the appendices by debrief and within the Lessons Database by workstream however, there are some themes that run across a number of different workstreams.

5.1 Experience/relationship building

Feedback within the debriefs highlighted the importance of working relationships between responders. A number of partners identified how experience of working with each other during a number of recent incidents and exercises had improved their response as there was a clearer understanding of each other’s capabilities and priorities. Continuity of staff through the response was also seen as beneficial although it is acknowledged that this cannot always be guaranteed in a prolonged response.

Some organisations utilised the opportunity to allow less experienced staff to shadow those in specific role, acknowledging the value of such a large scale incident in training those who may have a role in a future response.

Aspects that went well	
Recovery	Relationships that were generated over the response period (9 days) and the effective communication and decision making that resulted from these relationships. Some of the staff who were part of the SCG became the same staff for RCG.
Mass Fatalities	Due to having experienced multi-agency personnel, who had worked together previously (trained, exercised and real time incidents), the whole Disaster Victim Identification worked well.
Site Clearance	Good team working and good leadership. Consistency and commitment to same people.
Humanitarian Assistance	Assistance - Recent events (e.g. Westminster Bridge) and the consequent network building that took place meant that organisations were aware of each other's capabilities and worked together prior to the establishment of the HASG.
Aspects for improvement	
Recommendations	
Recovery	Allow staff who have not had experience of this scale of incident the opportunity to shadow an experienced member of staff to create learning opportunity.

**The total number of lessons may not equate to the sum of all lessons by workstream. Some lessons may be attributed to more than one workstream.*

Humanitarian Assistance	Review the provision of awareness raising, training and familiarisation with the [Humanitarian Assistance] Framework.
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5.2 Community Engagement

Community engagement is a key part of almost any response and this was particularly pertinent during the Grenfell Tower Fire response. Consideration for the needs of the affected community is referenced in a number of London Resilience Partnership plans and frameworks however, it was highlighted that there needs to be much further consideration on the wider impacts and how this can influence the direction of the response.

Aspects that went well	
Recovery	London Local Authority Gold (LLAG) led meetings with community groups.
	The community engagement plan developed over time in an attempt to meet the community's needs.
Humanitarian Assistance	The community itself set up shelters, assistance centres and rest centres for survivors.
Aspects for improvement	
Recovery	Consider how to communicate and coordinate with the emergent local voluntary sector.
	Consider the impact that an incident and the subsequent actions of others have on tensions within communities.
Humanitarian Assistance	The community response is not fully accounted for in the [Humanitarian Assistance] Framework.
Site Clearance	Impact of response activities on community needs better consideration.
	Sensitive issue around dealing with personal memorials (short/medium/long-term).
	Community engagement work - better informing on progress of work.
Recommendations	
Recovery	Consider how to exercise the relationships with the established voluntary sector and local authorities.
	Consider including more in the protocol with regard to engagement with the public and in particular the role and management of public meetings.
	Consider including more in the protocol with regard to community engagement.
	Ensure all agencies recognise the importance of community engagement and have appropriate plans in place.
	Recognise the impact that an incident can have on tensions within communities.
Humanitarian Assistance	Recognise in the [Humanitarian Assistance] Framework that the community itself may set up shelters, assistance centres and rest centres for survivors and the authority of the community groups should be respected. Acknowledge and plan for this type of spontaneous voluntary community response.
Site Clearance	Strategy for managing wider impact of response activities on community and integrating with responders.

**The total number of lessons may not equate to the sum of all lessons by workstream. Some lessons may be attributed to more than one workstream.*

5.3 Complexity of Response and Recovery

The response to the Grenfell Tower Fire was a complex one, with seven plans activated and a number of resulting coordinating groups and meetings. A key issue raised within the debriefs was that it was sometimes not clear what groups were activated, where they were located and who was the point of contact. It was recommended that an organogram which could be shared across all responders as required would be beneficial, something that could be devised as an outline during planning and amended during response.

Aspects that went well	
Aspects for improvement	
Strategic Coordination	The coordination structure used was different from that envisaged in the [Strategic Coordination] Protocol and not all of the agencies and sub groups were aware of the wider coordination structure.
	Various sub groups worked in different locations to the SCG on a scale which was not envisaged in the [Strategic Coordination] Protocol.
Humanitarian Assistance	The coordination organogram was not shared widely with all organisations.
	It was difficult to respond operationally to the requests from different channels because the coordination structure and who was in charge of various elements of the response was not clear to some organisations.
	Community Engagement, Donations and Housing were treated as distinct groups which caused problems with information sharing and connectivity between groups.
Recommendations	
Strategic Coordination	Produce and share an organogram to create greater visibility of the coordination structure and points of contact for all agencies. This could be published on LSAT.
	Consider plotting the resourcing requirements for all strategic sub groups and where they can be physically located.
Humanitarian Assistance	Share the coordination organogram.
	There needs to be formal communication lines between groups so that HASG has a clear overview.
Mass Fatalities	Map communication lines between Mass Fatality Coordination Group and other groups including associated routes of accountability.

**The total number of lessons may not equate to the sum of all lessons by workstream. Some lessons may be attributed to more than one workstream.*

Appendix 1 – Grenfell Debrief Lessons: Recovery

Grenfell Debrief Lessons: Recovery		
10 th July 2018, 13:00-17:00		
Aspects That Went Well		
Relationships that were generated over the response period (9 days) and the effective communication and decision making that resulted from these relationships. Some of the staff who were part of the SCG became the same staff for RCG.		
Email distribution lists published over the 9 days facilitated effective communication.		
PHE virtual peer review meetings with other organisations to explore rationales for decision making and support decision makers (as per page 10 3.12 of the Protocol).		
Battle rhythm for meetings was dictated by the need to make a decision as a result of changes in the incident/situation or when information was required for e.g. the CRIP.		
Continuous conversations were able to take place as a result of co-location of agencies/organisations in the 'Recovery Coordination Centre' in the Westminster Council suite.		
Interaction with DCLG RED in their role as Government Liaison Officers.		
There were protocols in place to facilitate the handover from the RCG to RBKC and due process was followed.		
The handover process from RCG to RBKC was well managed and not rushed.		
Partners agreed that the process was well structured and all informed.		
Lesson Identified	Recommendation	Suggested workstream
Consider how to communicate and coordinate with the emergent local voluntary sector.	Consider how to exercise the relationships with the established voluntary sector and their local authorities.	Recovery Voluntary Sector Panel
	Consider how to manage offers of help.	
Each agency needs to be represented by someone who can make decisions for their organisation. (as per page 23 of the Recovery Protocol).		Recovery
Add to page 10 in the Recovery Protocol "read 3.12 taking into account 3.15 - 3.18" to illustrate the flexibility of the guidance in the Protocol.	Add to page 10 in the Recovery Protocol "read 3.12 taking into account 3.15 - 3.18" to illustrate the flexibility of the guidance in the Protocol.	Recovery
	Consider if an explanation of time periods can be inserted under the critical information section.	Recovery
Include on page 15 a paragraph with regard to listening to and speaking directly with communities affected by an incident.	Include on page 15 a paragraph with regard to listening to and speaking directly with communities affected by an incident.	Recovery

Appendix 1 – Grenfell Debrief Lessons: Recovery

Sector panels need to consider how to achieve representation for their sector from someone who can make decisions for their organisations in the response phase.		Recovery Strategic Coordination Sector Panels
Westminster Council suite used as an impartial, non-hierarchical multi agency recovery centre for face to face meetings enabling key staff to come together. This also worked very well for virtual participants.	Create a template for a suite that can be used by all as the Westminster Council suite was for this incident.	Recovery
Westminster City Council provided administrative staff to collate and analyse data to support decision making.	Consider establishing a template for a multi-agency intelligence/analytical support cell.	Recovery
Create an environment where strategic conversations can take place in a timely fashion.		Recovery
Have a single point of contact for each agency/sector to avoid relying on individual email addresses to ensure that information is passed to the right place.	Have a single point of contact email/phone number for each organisation/sector.	Recovery Strategic Coordination
Use of critical friends/wise counsel of equal level and similar experience (e.g. fellow Chief Executive) worked very well for some strategic commanders.	Consider the use of a 'critical friend' to support strategic commanders.	Recovery Training & Exercising
	Allow staff who have not had experience of this scale of incident the opportunity to shadow an experienced member of staff to create a learning opportunity.	
A dynamic action tracker was developed by the secretariat for the RCG.	Use of a standard action tracker for the RCG as developed for this incident.	Recovery
Be aware that recovery can be just as resource intensive as the response.	Consider exercising recovery processes in the same way as for response incorporating data collection and resource management.	Recovery
Be aware of the need for summer planning with regard to the availability of staff in July and August to ensure the right staff are available for organisational resilience.		
Sharing of personally identifiable information between agencies was challenging.	Consider effective pre planned signposting to partner agencies on how to share personally identifiable information.	Recovery
London Local Authority Gold (LLAG) led meetings with community groups.	Consider including more in the protocol with regard to engagement with the public and in particular the role and management of public meetings.	Recovery
The community engagement plan developed over time in an attempt to meet the community's needs.	Consider including more in the protocol with regard to community engagement.	Recovery
	Ensure all agencies recognise the importance of community engagement and have appropriate plans in place.	Recovery
Consider the impact that an incident and the subsequent actions of others have on tensions within communities.	Recognise the impact that an incident can have on tensions within communities.	Recovery

Appendix 1 – Grenfell Debrief Lessons: Recovery

Earlier engagement with legal advice and the Inquiry into the possibilities of holding hot debriefs would have expedited the debrief process.	Consider early engagement with legal advice to expedite the debrief process.	Recovery
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Appendix 2 – Grenfell Debrief Lessons: Strategic Coordination

Grenfell Debrief Lessons: Strategic Coordination 11 th July 2018, 09:00-13:00		
Aspects That Went Well		
Notification for the declaration of the SCG took place in a timely manner.		
Although notification as per the protocol didn't happen that is not unusual as the protocol is written to cover a wide range of incidents and therefore there is flexibility. The protocol is for guidance and written as 'should' not 'must'.		
LFB Gold Commander and MPS Gold Commander worked very well together to carry out the initial joint assessment which was passed to the LRG.		
In advance of the first SCG LRG invited partners as per the protocol.		
First meetings were virtual, by teleconference, which worked well.		
Contact list is circulated to partner agencies for update every quarter.		
1st SCG invitation was made to all by telephone and email rather than just relying on emails.		
The first SCG meeting was held by teleconference and subsequent meetings were held at Lambeth and by teleconference as per the protocol and this worked well.		
The joint strategy was agreed at the second SCG meeting and reviewed at subsequent meetings.		
The template agenda at page 38 of the [strategic coordination] protocol was referred to as a guide in SCGs		
The agenda template aligns to the JDM.		
Lesson Identified	Recommendation	Suggested workstream
LRG first became aware that something was happening through a request for assistance rather than a formal notification with a METHANE report.	Continue to embed the use of METHANE reports for notification and information sharing from the scene through to tactical and strategic levels of command.	Strategic Coordination Training & Exercising
Although notification as per the protocol didn't happen that is not unusual as the protocol is written to cover a range of incidents and therefore there is flexibility. The protocol is for guidance and written as 'should' not 'must'.	Raise awareness of the protocol with regard to notification through training and exercising and relationship building.	Strategic Coordination Training & Exercising
Re: 2.5.6 and 2.5.7 [of the Strategic Coordination Protocol] LSAT was not used to its full potential. Written situational awareness was recorded in SCG	Embed the use of LSAT as an information sharing medium by training and regular use.	Strategic Coordination

Appendix 2 – Grenfell Debrief Lessons: Strategic Coordination

meetings. There is a need to embed LSAT to increase familiarity with it.		Training & Exercising
	Clarify that this notification process is for declaration of the need for strategic coordination. Initial incident notifications between agencies should take place at operational and tactical levels. For example add the content of 2.1.1 [of the Strategic Coordination Protocol] into the front prompt sheet on page 3.	Strategic Coordination
Assessments were carried out as per page 4 [of the Strategic Coordination Protocol] to determine the level of coordination required.	Clarify that the prompt sheet on page 4 [of the Strategic Coordination Protocol] refers to the initial assessment and not the ongoing assessment as per 2.5.9 on page 19.	Strategic Coordination
	Clarify that in the immediate hours of a fast paced incident it may be more appropriate for shared situational awareness to come from discussion at SCG meetings and recorded in those minutes.	Strategic Coordination
	Review how situational awareness can be enhanced in advance of the initial SCG.	Strategic Coordination
	Review how situational awareness can be enhanced ahead of all SCG meetings e.g. the timely dissemination of actions and minutes from previous meetings.	Strategic Coordination
The use of individual contact information for activation and notification is time consuming and potentially ineffective if the contact information is incorrect.	Consider non person specific central contact for every organisation.	Strategic Coordination
Some organisations felt disadvantaged by not being invited to the initial SCG meetings.	A core list of Cat 1 responders and appropriate others is maintained to invite to the first SCG meeting to ensure the right people are on the call from the outset and achieve inclusivity.	Strategic Coordination
The coordination structure used was different from that envisaged in the Protocol and not all of the agencies and sub groups were aware of the wider coordination structure.	Produce and share an organogram to create greater visibility of the coordination structure and points of contact for all agencies. This could be published on LSAT.	Strategic Coordination
Various sub groups worked in different locations to the SCG on a scale which was not envisaged in the [Strategic Coordination] Protocol.	Consider plotting the resourcing requirements for all strategic sub groups and where they can be physically located.	Strategic Coordination

Appendix 3 – Grenfell Debrief Lessons: Humanitarian Assistance

Grenfell Debrief Lessons: Humanitarian Assistance		
12 th July 2018, 09:00-12:00		
Aspects That Went Well		
Groups such as Housing, Donations and Community Engagement were set up		
The HASG sent out the humanitarian impact assessment template for completion and the information was returned to Public Health for collation		
Lesson Identified	Recommendation	Suggested work stream
The Framework was in draft at the time and had been widely shared so that it became the reference point for the HASG and SCG. Organisations responded as per their own individual organisational plans before the HASG was set up.	Review the provision of awareness raising, training and familiarisation with the [Humanitarian Assistance] Framework	Humanitarian Assistance Training & Exercising
Recent events (e.g. Westminster Bridge) and the consequent network building that took place meant that organisations were aware of each other's capabilities and worked together prior to the establishment of the HASG.		
The community itself set up shelters, assistance centres and rest centres for survivors.	Recognise in the [Humanitarian Assistance] Framework that the community itself may set up shelters, assistance centres and rest centres for survivors and the authority of the community groups should be respected. Acknowledge and plan for this type of spontaneous voluntary community response.	Humanitarian Assistance
The community response is not fully accounted for in the [Humanitarian Assistance] Framework.		
Local Authority Directors of Public Health were involved in the response.	Include Local Authority Directors of Public Health in the suggested invitation list for the HASG and include their role and responsibilities in the [Humanitarian Assistance] Framework.	Humanitarian Assistance
	The [Humanitarian Assistance] Framework needs to reflect the clarity with regard to the use of Helplines, online resources and related communications.	Humanitarian Assistance
The functions of a SRC were not all replicated in the centres that were set up.	Review the provision, model, capabilities and resources available to set up emergency centres.	Humanitarian Assistance
The functions of a FFRC were not all replicated in the centres that were set up.		
The coordination organogram was not shared widely with all organisations.	Share the coordination organogram.	Humanitarian Assistance

Appendix 3 – Grenfell Debrief Lessons: Humanitarian Assistance

It was difficult to respond operationally to the requests from different channels because the coordination structure and who was in charge of various elements of the response was not clear to some organisations.	There needs to be formal communication lines between groups so that HASG has a clear overview.	Humanitarian Assistance
Community Engagement, Donations and Housing were treated as distinct groups which caused problems with information sharing and connectivity between groups.		
No formal data sharing agreements are in place, however the NHS and CCG's do have examples of good practice which could be more widely shared.	Adopt and modify work done on information sharing in response to the incidents in 2017.	Humanitarian Assistance
Information management was not effectively coordinated.		
Not all organisations understood how the humanitarian impact assessment template should be completed or its purpose.	Review the purpose, process, resourcing and ownership of the humanitarian impact assessment to ensure it helps to meet the needs of the people affected by the incident.	Humanitarian Assistance
Completion, collation and analysis of the humanitarian impact assessment template is resource intensive and collation is not always timely.		

Appendix 4 – Grenfell Debrief Lessons: Scientific and Technical Advice Cell (STAC)

Grenfell Debrief Lessons: Scientific and Technical Advice Cell (STAC)		
17 th July 2018, 13:00-17:00		
Aspects That Went Well		
Deputy Regional Director called the STAC - first time a formal STAC in London since creation had been called (not within an exercise).		
EPRR colleagues (London Resilience Partnership) in London had the contact details for those who would attend the STAC.		
Environment Agency (air quality and technical advice) were using pre-existing contact within PHE and having those talks early on.		
All the activation steps were simple and effective.		
LRG keep contact details of STAC representatives for all Local Authorities and the process of notification worked.		
Within the first meeting, the correct personnel were present and considerations were given for additional members.		
All the functions and roles were carried out within the plan.		
A PHE Comms representative sat on the STAC who could feed back into the London Resilience Comms Group (part of the SCG) to provide the public facing comms message from STAC and the direct comms message from PHE.		
The flexibility of the delivery method (virtual and face to face) was good.		
The plan annexes were clear and easy to use (i.e. for agenda template and role cars). The STAC support roles were very useful and supportive.		
Meetings were focused and content was relevant due to agenda template and chairing skills.		
The recommended timings of the STAC meeting (in Annex C) are a good reference to keep to.		
Input into the Recovery Management Group was appreciated.		
The STAC was flexible (was stood down and back up) in line with the demand of the incident.		
Lesson Identified	Recommendation	Suggested work stream
In a major incident, PHE as a Cat 1 responder should be invited to the SCG when an SCG is called independently to the activation of the STAC {for the SCP}.		STAC Strategic Coordination
There might need to be more flexibility of who can activate STAC,	Enable the Subject Matter Experts who would be present on a STAC to be	STAC

Appendix 4 – Grenfell Debrief Lessons: Scientific and Technical Advice Cell (STAC)

depending on the incident (Subject Matter Experts).	able to activate a STAC in London.	
Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea and PHE staff were trained in the STAC process; however it would have been difficult to have only 1 representative from each organisation on the STAC. Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea had 2 reps which worked well to allow resilience within the team.	To ensure that there are at least 2 representatives trained on STAC processes to allow resilience in organisations present on a STAC.	STAC
The notification route of some agencies about a STAC needs to be clarified.	Relevant organisations to confirm generic contact details for notification of a STAC forming and added as a restricted annex that should be updated on a regular basis.	STAC
The STAC should formulate the public health advice not only to the SCG but the public health messaging to be used for members of the public once authorised by the SCG chair.	The STAC should formulate the public health advice not only to the SCG but the public health messaging to be used for members of the public once authorised by the SCG chair. {edit to the role of the STAC "...scientific, technical, environmental and public health advice to the SCG and the Public during the response".	STAC
The PHE representative (PHE Local Gold) attended the SCG instead of the STAC Chair; however this is not currently in the plan.	For the PHE representative to attend the SCG instead of the STAC Chair; and to be added into the plan.	STAC
The Subject Matter Experts and the Chair are separate in roles.	For the [STAC] plan to specify that the Subject Matter Experts and chair should be separate roles.	STAC
	Prolonged response mode may be required in some incidents and resilience needs to be established. {in the [STAC] plan it states days, weeks; needs to add months}.	STAC
The STAC should consider whether validation testing in an affected area would reassure members of the public.	The STAC should consider the implementation of validation testing in an affected area to reassure members of the public.	STAC
In virtual meetings, it is hard to hear when a spider phone is used.	If virtual meetings are required, to ensure that robust telecommunications are in place, with training and exercising in place.	STAC
Those who attend STAC should have the authority to make the decisions required.	The attendees present of the STAC should be those that can make the decisions to input to conversation and the output of the STAC, in support of the response.	STAC
For a live log to be written during the meeting would have been beneficial to be disseminated straight after the meeting.	For an action log to be written during the meeting to be disseminated straight after the meeting.	STAC Strategic Coordination
	To review the STAC support role and whether they are required for each incident.	STAC
	For the STAC members contact details to be disseminated straight after every meeting, to be conducted by STAC support roles.	STAC

Appendix 4 – Grenfell Debrief Lessons: Scientific and Technical Advice Cell (STAC)

	During a recovery phase, STAC needs to be aware of which activities require STAC to consider and which could be managed as business as usual.	STAC
	For the multi-agency debrief to be conducted as soon as possible.	STAC

Appendix 5 – Grenfell Debrief Lessons: Mass Fatalities

Grenfell Debrief Lessons: Mass Fatalities 18 th July 2018, 13:00-17:00	
Aspects That Went Well	
Mass Fatalities Coordination Group followed the plan as soon as the group convened. This has been trained and exercised previously.	
The local disaster plan helped to inform decision making (Westminster Plan).	
The mortuary was extended as part of the plan (Local Mortuary Plan - Westminster).	
Mass Fatalities Coordination Group followed the plan with regard to notification.	
Good communication occurred between coroner and London Resilience Group.	
The correct organisations were at the meetings (face to face or virtually).	
Meetings were recorded and the minutes were decision reason action logs recorded by London Resilience Group. The minutes were the correct length for ease of sign off.	
Frequency of the meetings was appropriate to the response.	
The attendees of the meetings evolved throughout the response and was inline according to need.	
Compliments from London Resilience Group on the meeting content and process.	
Standard agenda aided to cover all points within the meeting; therefore nothing was missed (as appendix).	
Once appointed, the personnel working on the finance issues worked well.	
Good relationship and good will from suppliers and stakeholders helped in the response.	
Due to the correct people being present at the Mass Fatality Coordination Group, science, law and ethics could be discussed.	
Due to having experience multi-agency personnel, who had worked together previously (trained, exercised and real time incidents), the whole Disaster Victim Identification response worked well.	

Appendix 5 – Grenfell Debrief Lessons: Mass Fatalities

Lesson Identified	Recommendation	Suggested work stream
Do organisations know the arrangements for if a Mass Fatalities incident occurs on the River Thames?	Add wording to remind users that the protocol is valid whether the incident is on land or water.	Mass Fatalities
What triggers the Disaster Victim Identification response from the Police and other organisations in regard to mortuary numbers? {There isn't a trigger number but rather the complexity of the response - needs to clarify in the plan}.	To clarify the trigger of the [mass fatalities] plan is not based on numbers alone but complexity of the response.	Mass Fatalities
Clarity needs to be made in [mass fatalities] plan that finance (from multiple organisations) needs to be involved in the response and coordination from the outset (especially on page 15-16).	The lead local authority needs to have the appropriate finance personnel to make the financial decisions. The plans need to reinforce that appropriate finance personnel (from multiple organisations) needs to be involved in the response and coordination from the outset (especially on page 15-16).	Mass Fatalities
	There is currently a cross over system with the coroners across London and is being formalised. Once this has been formalised, this needs to be added into the plan for clarity.	Mass Fatalities
	Include NHS England on the attendees list, as they were helpful on this response (Appendix E) [Mass Fatalities Plan].	Mass Fatalities
	Local Authority needs to cascade and activate their personnel through their internal processes (Westminster).	Mass Fatalities
There were issues with communication equipment (i.e. bad lines).	For robust communications equipment to be made available for members of the group.	Mass Fatalities
	Pre-determined options need to be considered where the Mass Fatality Coordination Group will convene and provide protected space and facilities available.	Mass Fatalities
This group [Mass Fatalities Finance Management Group] was not convened, despite repeated request for finance representative by the London Resilience Group from the outset.	The Finance Management Group must be convened and cannot be detached from the decision making.	Mass Fatalities
	Understanding and raising awareness of section 24 Coroners Act (regarding finance issues).	Mass Fatalities
The task of organising logistics (i.e. accommodation) was performed well under pressure.	With regard to logistics, it would have helped to have MOUs/contracts in place (e.g. hotels).	Mass Fatalities
	Map communication lines between Mass Fatality Coordination Group and other groups including associated routes of accountability.	Mass Fatalities
	Staff welfare needs to be discussed on the first SCG and tasked to a sub	Mass Fatalities

Appendix 5 – Grenfell Debrief Lessons: Mass Fatalities

	group and appoint a lead.	Strategic Coordination
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Appendix 6 – Grenfell Debrief Lessons: Structural Collapse

Grenfell Debrief Lessons: Structural Collapse		
19 th July 2018, 09:00-13:00		
Aspects That Went Well		
Strategic Coordination of multi-agency response – organisational protocols for response in place and activated. London Resilience response follows on from organisational response. However, this is not recognised in the Strategic Protocol. Notification has already taken place.		
4pm Friday was earliest opportunity to survey building for movement; monitoring continued. External survey conducted. Internal survey also conducted with appointment from structural engineers and consultation with HSE.		
Wider initial consultation with partners (e.g. Military) enabled learning and awareness.		
Regular meetings. Early recognition of expertise and specific requirements. Good interaction and communication between stakeholders working on site (site clearance activities). Identification of priorities.		
Third Sector support to response - provision of welfare to responders.		
Good collaboration and integration with other Grenfell activities supported by good identification of priorities.		
Good willingness to engage and to be flexible; good team working.		
Early establishment of project plan which was communicated and updated supported activities.		
Good team working and good leadership. Consistency and commitment to same people.		
All teams involved achieved their key activities to date.		
Lesson Identified	Recommendation	Suggested work stream
Plan needs to identify risk of collapse/not collapsing. Assessment of the building and structural monitoring to be considered. Strategy for a building that is at significant risk of collapse to be developed.	This document needs to reflect potential for collapse and its wider implications.	Site Clearance
Consideration of potential legal implications.	Consideration of legal proceedings should be mentioned in strategic protocol.	Site Clearance
	Checklist of key people to be involved would be helpful in the strategic document.	Site Clearance
Regular site stability meetings co chaired by HSE and Building Control.	Consider Site Stability Meeting to be set up to consider specific site issues. This could be an Appendix to the Framework.	Site Clearance

Appendix 6 – Grenfell Debrief Lessons: Structural Collapse

	Responsibility for decontamination of site and debris external to the site needs to be clarified in the [site clearance] framework. Resources to support this also need to be identified. Decontamination here refers to site, not people. But need to consider people involved in site clearance and potential need for human decontamination as well as environment.	Site Clearance
	Decontamination requirement for people, environment, on-site and off-site needs clarification in the Framework.	Site Clearance
	[site clearance] Plan needs to better identify phrases of (Page 10, para 3.1) response, investigation and recovery to facilitate separate and overlapping activities.	Site Clearance
	Coronial system and impact on activities; plan does not sufficiently reference and clarify coroner's role and responsibility (Reference to Mass Fatalities Plan required).	Site Clearance
	Plan needs to better clarify the roles and responsibilities of DVI.	Site Clearance
Handover of primacy for recovery and implications for resources, stakeholders, etc.	Handover of responsibility for the site needs to be clarified in the [site clearance] Plan.	Site Clearance
	Complex site with complex issues need to be considered. Guidance on issues around structural collapse and site demolition and clearance need to be developed. HSE legislation needs to be a prime consideration.	Site Clearance
Recognition of statutory rights and responsibilities of stakeholders involved.		Site Clearance
Impact on environment (e.g. leisure centre) if recovery activities increase extent of cordon in the midst of a functioning community. Access to site for transport and impact on community.	Recovery section needs to be re-written to encompass diverse aspects of recovery activities.	Site Clearance
	General Recovery guidance needs to be expanded for specific activities.	Site Clearance Recovery
	Wider consequence of risk of collapse to be considered by strategic leaders (transport, utilities, residential, environmental, commercial issues). Consider impact on wider stakeholders and warning/informing for risk assessment purposes.	Site Clearance
	Need to ensure an interim survey to determine stability of the (non-collapsed) building as early as possible.	Site Clearance
Unclear how communication of potential for collapse was implemented (communication strategy).	Need a communication process that is not just inclusive to multi-agency but also includes the public.	Site Clearance
	Attendance for this group [site clearance] to be agreed at SCG. Awareness of this framework [site clearance] and function to be included	Site Clearance Training &

Appendix 6 – Grenfell Debrief Lessons: Structural Collapse

	and reinforced in strategic level training.	Exercising
	Greater awareness among multiagency partners of London Resilience to be strengthened.	Site Clearance Training & Exercising
	Better publicity on London Resilience; membership and email contact addresses to be clarified/shared. Some confusion exists around use of London Fire Brigade email addresses.	Site Clearance Training & Exercising Strategic Coordination
Greater awareness of roles and responsibilities of responding organisations to be strengthened and communicated including remit/mandate for their activities to avoid confusion.	More opportunities for awareness training for interested parties on USAR, including wider community of integrated response involved in Recovery.	Site Clearance Training & Exercising Recovery
	HSE need to be involved as early as possible - safety of workers, structural issues. Office of Road & Rail needs to be involved (or Highways) if potential for impact on infrastructure. Consider wider impact on other organisations/areas.	Site Clearance
	Access to site - need to consider impact of cordons and impact on wider community over the time required for site clearance.	Site Clearance
Cordon and access control to be established and maintained as early as possible.	Consideration to be made early on whether site is a potential crime scene and whether police cordon needs to be established and access controlled (including escorted visits).	Site Clearance
Impact of response activities on community needs better consideration.	Strategy for managing wider impact of response activities on community and integrating with responders.	Site Clearance
Sensitive issue around dealing with personal memorials (short/medium/long-term).		Site Clearance
Community engagement work - better informing on progress of work.		Site Clearance
	More strategic level commitment for attendance at tabletop exercises required to support awareness training for those involved in response (all levels, not just EPs). This would give better understanding of roles and requirements. More tabletop exercises that focus on recovery.	Site Clearance Training & Exercising
	Lack of robustness in hierarchy and oversight of partners (reporting lines).	Site Clearance
	Importance of robust record keeping, financial and accounting, governance, etc.	Site Clearance

Appendix 6 – Grenfell Debrief Lessons: Structural Collapse

Strategic management of all organisations liaising with DVI to facilitate activities.		Site Clearance
	Considerations of investigative status of stakeholders.	Site Clearance
	Better briefings/handovers to new teams/stakeholders to avoid delays.	Site Clearance
	Consider management of and preparation for access to site (including VIPs, families, etc.).	Site Clearance
Removal and security of personal items from within the cordon needs further consideration, including storage and communicating with owners. Non-evidential property recovery. Local Authority to have pre-agreed arrangements in place.	Consideration of multi-borough property management procurement solution(s) for non-evidential items.	Site Clearance
	Acknowledge time required to implement activities (including legislation); and resources brought to site (logistics).	Site Clearance
	Consideration for additional stakeholders to be identified to support the recovery phase and activities as early as possible.	Site Clearance

Appendix 7 – Grenfell Debrief Lessons: Communications

Grenfell Debrief Lessons: Communications 19 th July 2018, 13:00-17:00	
Aspects That Went Well	
	The right parties were in contact early on during the incident; almost immediately (although this not as per the plan).
	Conference calls took place and worked well.
	There was a good understanding of who to contact during the incident.
	The fundamental core responsibilities of messaging were solid, despite initial misunderstanding and prior to any statements being released.
	The secretariat support from third conference was very helpful. The principal leads worked well together.
	The united front in regards to messaging was evident from the live interviews.
	Good links with the Strategic Coordinating Group (SCG).
	Resilience during the period was aided by help from public services was good 24/7.
	The monitoring showed that the correct messages were being put out to the public in a timely manner, including digital media.
	Deputy Gold for the London response (Southwark Council) was a credible spokesperson.
	London fire brigade commissioner provided an early voice and reassurance.
	Good sharing of official lines between agencies.
	Regular issuing of official lines from different agencies.
	An early explanation of Disaster Victim Identification (DVI) to the media.
	Good multi-channel response to meet the needs of the community in multiple languages.
	The key public safety message was heard and used where appropriate.
	Coherent messaging to members of the public living in high rise buildings across London/nationally.
	The availability of pre prepared digital content in relation to safety.

Appendix 7 – Grenfell Debrief Lessons: Communications

The control of messaging via social media/digital means **your** message is heard (in collaboration with partners).

Secretariat support for offers of assistance to Local Authority (LA).

Lesson Identified	Recommendation	Suggested work stream
First alert system was not used immediately.		Communications
Secretariat support.		Communications
	WhatsApp included in [comms] plan.	Communications
	Clarity on who can activate the system.	Communications
	Action card to be added to the front of the plan in relation to the activation of the system.	Communications
	An agenda template (core questions including capacity, recovery and community engagement).	Communications
	Agenda should include consideration of community engagement and who is responsible.	Communications
	Page 9 of the plan to be reviewed - regarding establishing a media centre.	Communications
	Explore the use of social media - Taking a digital first approach to be considered for inclusion in the plan.	Communications
	Reconsider rewording the description of the website on page 13 and review whether the website is necessary.	Communications
	Review the London Resilience Communication Group (LRCG) plan and whether it should cover the recovery stages and if not where this will be covered.	Communications
	Discussion about Maritime & Coastguard Agency (MCA) membership being included in the first alert/cascade system and any other agencies that may currently be missing from it. Which stakeholders to be included in the first teleconference.	Communications
	Test the activation number routinely on a monthly basis - telephone number and WhatsApp group.	Communications
	Test and rehearse the plan in a multi-agency exercise.	Communications Training & Exercising
	The lead organisation to take responsibility on providing the teleconference facilities (as per page 4).	Communications

Appendix 7 – Grenfell Debrief Lessons: Communications

Initial support for the recovery phase was offered in the early teleconferences. It is at that point that planning should start to be considered by all Local Authority (LA) and other agencies to activate that support.	Explore how and when the London Resilience Communication Group (LRCG) moves from the response stage to the recovery stage.	Communications
Resilience over a long period of time would have been difficult to sustain without the response from the public services.		Communications
	Explore the role of the coroner in communications around fatalities.	Communications Mass Fatalities
There was a breakdown in trust between LA and media.		Communications
A lack of proactivity by some agencies led to a misunderstanding of the public agencies response. (Initial emergency response was good; recovery response was slow in explaining what was going on).		Communications
	Explore ways forward for a collective response to the media to demonstrate the unified and multi-agency response to an incident.	Communications
Misinformation and lack of information to front line staff.		Communications
	A need to develop a comprehensive communications and engagement strategy and exercise it. Develop partnerships with community leaders and faith group leaders.	Communications Training & Exercising
	Review of joint working between Local Authority (LA)/National Health Service (NHS) communications and exercises working on recovery.	Communications Recovery