

## Appendix A

Proforma that can be used as a guide to capture information immediately after an incident and will assist you to make contemporaneous notes. This is to be completed as soon as possible after the incident.

**INCIDENT AT: Grenfell Tower, Lancaster Gate, W11**

**DATE OF INCIDENT: 14/6/2017**

**RECORD OF ACTIONS OF OPERATIONAL PERSONNEL:**

**Started 15/6/2017- Completed 21/6/2017**

**PLEASE COMPLETE AND RETURN ELECTRONICALLY TO** [REDACTED]

**NAME: AC Andy Roe [REDACTED] 8B- Incident Commander.**

Time	Action
01:36	I was at home at my night-time base location, [REDACTED] Paged mobilised for 25 pump fire Grenfell Tower, Lancaster gate, W11. I immediately rang the officer of the watch in our control room they explained they were taking an incredible volume of calls to a very significant high rise fire, they could not tell me who was in charge of the incident but confirmed when I enquired that I had Andy O'Loughlin en route as a DAC and Richard Welch en route as a GM and GMs Mick Mulholland and Matt Cook attending as the operational review team officers. I confirmed I was mobilising to take over as the incident commander.
01:41	I rang Adrian Fenton the duty DAC and asked him to set up BCC. My rationale was that whilst it had not been declared as such, it felt like a major incident and with it already being a 25 pump fire would have implications for pan London LFB resources. I asked him to set up at Stratford, as it was clear that control who were at fall-back location at Stratford due to engineering works, were under immense pressure due to the volume of calls coming in and would also need additional support.
	I received some photos by e-mail from SM Gareth Cook at the incident, they showed 100% of one side of a significant sized tower block alight, I sent them to AC Richard Mills, DAC Adrian Fenton and GM Keeley Foster the Commissioner's staff officer.
	I then got in my car and started to proceed to the incident on blue light.
01:45	I rang AC Richard Mills who was AC2 and asked him to become AC 1 as I was mobilising to the incident. I gave him what little information I had and said that I felt we had what sounded like a major incident on our hands. In that context I asked him to take the pan London lead for LFB and for him to let me know when support structures such as GT/ SOR, Commissioner's group and BCC had been set up and agree lines of communication into the incident. He reassured me he would take care of all of that.
01:59	I attempted to ring DAC Andy O'Loughlin to confirm his location and situational awareness
02:00	I rang GM Matt Cook who was at scene, he confirmed that there was a very significant fire involving the majority of a 24 storey tower block, I explained that I would be taking over on arrival and asked if they needed to consider making it a major incident.
02:02	I rang Richard Mills and gave him a heads up from that the short conversation I had had with Matt it was almost certainly a major incident and should be treated as such.
02:04	I heard Richard Welch take over on CUs and make pumps 40.
02:05	I rang Keeley Foster to give her a verbal update on what I knew of the incident and she confirmed that

	the Commissioner was mobilising to the scene with her.
02:06	I heard major incident sent from CU 8.
02:07	I rang Matt Cook he gave me a situational update regarding the scale and rapid of spread of the fire, I let him know I was about 20 minutes away and that the Commissioner was also en route.
02:16	I rang Richard Mills to confirm he had received the major incident and 40 pump make up, he let me know he was going to represent LFB at GT/SOR when it got set up, BCC was getting set up at Stratford and AC Dan Daly was coming in to support the Commissioner's group.
02:29	I arrived at scene, parked and rang Adrian Fenton at Stratford to get him to book me in attendance as I could hear how busy control were, he confirmed he would and that control were under incredible pressure from the volume of fire survival guidance calls.
	I rigged in my fire gear and began to make my way towards the block which was some 400m away and clearly 100% alight on two sides at that point. It was difficult to get there due to the very large numbers of people on the street and the traffic congestion due to the volume of emergency service vehicles at the scene.
	As I got closer to the tower it I began to encounter small groups of very agitated friends and families of those in the tower. More than one group told me their relatives or friends were trapped and were on the phone to them, the mood of these groups was fairly heightened and at times aggressive. As I got closer to the base of the tower it was clear small groups police were preventing members of the public entering the tower but were in danger of being overwhelmed by the numbers. As I passed the base of the tower it was clear significant debris was falling from it, some pieces being some metres wide. The volume of noise was incredible, along with the sound of falling debris there were the screams of people at the windows trapped in the tower and their relatives and friends shouting up to them. The block was 100% alight from what appeared to be the third to the top floor, with fire showing inside many windows. I saw hose lines going into the building and firefighters running in avoiding the falling debris wearing BA.
	Near the base of the tower I came to the first command unit CU7. On it I found GM Tom Goodall and a CU crew of 3 WMs whom I didn't know by name but recognised. I told Tom I was here as IC and asked him what his role was. He briefed me that he was responsible for Fire Survival Guidance (FSG); recording the fire survival calls sent to him by control passing the locations of trapped persons on to a SM in the tower who was then briefing BA crews directly. I asked him how many FSG entries he had in total, at that point he could not tell me as they were adding them onto the list continuously, but by his estimation the number of persons who had rung in to say they were trapped was over 100. He had a very clear system running I could see one WM taking the calls, one passing them onto the operational sector and the other documenting with Tom maintaining overall control. I felt they were doing an excellent job under impossible conditions and told them as such, I also asked them to keep taking photos of the board as it changed so we maintained a record. I confirmed the location of the command point which was CU 8 some 100 m away and made my way there.
	Reaching CU 8 I was prevented getting on by a group of 3 men who told me their mother was trapped in a flat, one tried to hand me the phone to speak to her. I explained I couldn't as I had to take responsibility for everyone at the incident and asked a nearby police officer to take the detail of the woman's location including flat and floor number and take it immediately to CU 7. He moved off with the men and this allowed me to get on the unit.
	The first person I saw on the unit was an acting MPS inspector Nick Thatcher. I told him that we were on the verge of civil disorder which he agreed with and that I needed the cordons pushed back. He agreed but explained he had very limited resources locally but had asked for whatever was available to make their way to the incident with other out of area units en route. He said he was doing his best which I recognised. I felt at this point we were on the verge of very serious public disorder as well as the ongoing fire which was in itself the most significant I had ever seen in my career, so reiterated the need for him to get all available units to the scene as quickly as possible and secure the

	cordons so we could operate effectively.
02:44	Also on the unit were DAC Andy O'Loughlin, GM Steve West, SM Jackie McConochie and a CU crew of 3 who I recognised but did not know by name. I told them all I was taking over with immediate effect and asked the radio operator to communicate that with both control and the fireground. I asked Jackie to act as my loggist from that point onwards noting all key decisions and recording the minutes of any TCMs
	Andy let me know he had taken over a short time previously and I asked him to give me a brief. He explained we had the third to the 24 <sup>th</sup> floor of Grenfell house alight, with multiple persons trapped inside. He had given GM's Richard Welch and Pat Goulbourne the fire sector which encompassed the entire building, Steve West Command Support sector, Dave O'Neill the safety sector and asked for BA main control to be set up in front of the leisure centre opposite the block. We had BA crews rigged in the block and were progressing rescue efforts well up into the building
02:47	Based on the fire spread in the building, what I had seen walking in and the numbers of persons trapped, I asked the CU to contact control and ask them to stop giving stay put advice if they still were. As I did this the same request came back the other way from control so I agreed it and asked them to now advise people to make best efforts to escape.
02:52	I asked for the CU to request BA support vans from PEG
02:54	I asked Andy to become my operations commander with responsibility for the fire sector, FSG operation and BA main control. Safety and command support would answer to me but with a responsibility to work closely with him. I confirmed Steve West in command support would be responsible for keeping the fire sector resourced with BA and equipment as needed via BA Main control which was acting as a supply conduit into the operational sectors. There was external firefighting with officers directing activity but no formal sectors, but I explained that I would establish those more formally and they too would become his. We had a short conversation about where he would be located, both of us agreed that in light of the incident he would be better out on the incident ground acting almost in the old sector commander coordinator role, pushing the sectors to maintain the momentum of rescue operations with a continual awareness of the operating environment. I explained that I had two priorities for him, the first and most important was to work with Dave O'Neill to establish safe access/egress due to the significant amount of debris coming off the building, which presented as great a life risk to our crews as the fire itself. The second was to drive the rescue effort as hard as possible accepting the building was un-saveable and the focus had to be on rescue of saveable life. I confirmed I would be asking for another DAC to attend, Lee Drawbridge, to take on the command support role, with Steve staying in that sector to support Lee in that role.
02:55	As the final part of my brief to Andy I told him and the CU I would set up channel 2 as a command channel on the fire ground radio and that my immediate priority was to get the police to secure the cordon. I explained that I was going to hold a quick tactical command meeting JESIP style with the other partner agencies at the earliest opportunity.
02:57	I requested PPV/SERT via the duty DAC reasoning that we might be able to make use of the fan and high pressure lance technology in some way.
	One of the CU crew who had been tasked to set up channel 2 and make sure all officers were on it let me know that despite considerable efforts they could not get it to work, I asked them to let all the officers on the incident ground that we were back on channel 1 or would use mobile phone or runners if necessary.
	I asked the unit to get a better map up, they confirmed the command support system wasn't working. I then briefed Steve West.
.	I briefed Steve that he was sector commander command support, but that because I had Jackie directly supporting me he was to concentrate on end to end resourcing to ensure there was a continuous supply of material to the operational sectors. I explained his priority was that the BA main control was kept supplied with kit and people as that was where all BA crews were being marshalled prior to entry

	<p>into the tower and that system seemed to be working. I confirmed we had 40 pumps either at or coming to the incident and that Steve needed to get control of those resources via marshalling officers. I made the point that he would never truly achieve that due to the nature of the incident, with early pumps having arrived outside of a more formalised system of control and were scattered throughout the surrounding streets. But that he should make best endeavours to ensure BA resources in particular were sent directly to the holding area located with BAMC. I asked him to tell me if we were reaching the point of needing more resources at the earliest opportunity he was aware of it and to secure what spare officers he could to support him. I asked him to confirm the 2 RVPs with all the CU crews, he had CU 1 at Latimer Rd to run his function out of and when DAC Lee Drawbridge came he would take over the sector. I felt Steve was calm and coping well with the pressure, he confirmed the brief and left the unit.</p>
03:09	I asked the CU to order DAC Lee Drawbridge onto the incident so he could be my SCCS
03:10	The CU confirmed we had a possible FF emergency having lost a crew in the building, I asked them to investigate, confirmed it was to be resolved via the Ops Commander but not to relay via control. My rationale for deviating from normal process was that we had enough resources to resolve it at scene and control were already overloaded. I did not want additional appliances mobilised to what was already a chaotic scene externally until we had established better cordons with the police and got a grip of how we were using and where our existing resources were. Shortly after they confirmed the crew had been found.
	I stuck my head outside the unit and saw the same police officer I had earlier asked to take the details of the trapped person, he confirmed he had delivered it to CU 7.
03:15	I asked the CU to request the urgent attendance of a Dangerous structures engineer.
03:20	I chaired the first TCM. Minutes are as detailed in the accompanying decision log. In summary I explained that my main priority was for the police to use TSG if necessary to secure the cordon in the face of a deteriorating public order situation. That if they did that I could then concentrate on my priorities which was a very high risk fire rescue operation pushing crews up into the tower as high as I could. I explained the risk for falling debris/ building collapse was extreme and reminded partners we had primacy and no one should be moving independently of the fire service within the inner cordon. I confirmed it was a major incident but that we were not going to follow major incident cordon control at that point as there were not effective cordons to do so and it was too complex to implement in light of the external environment. I just wanted simple secure cordons with each partner aware of the others responsibilities. I confirmed where the casualty handling areas were and the temporary mortuary and that we were expecting very high casualty numbers, possibly in the hundreds. I asked for plans from the LA. I established we would hold TCMs at hourly intervals whilst the incident was so dynamic.
03:39	Matt Cook (ORT) and Andy O'Loughlin got onto the unit to give me my update face to face as the radio communications were so intermittent. The y explained Pat Goulbourne had moved the bridgehead downwards due to fire compromising it and EDBA was being pushed up to the 4 <sup>th</sup> floor. There was a heavy turnover of EDBA and Pat wanted an EDBA make up. I asked for an update from the BCC on EDBA resources pan London with a view to establish where they were and then bring the whole lot in, if necessary by minibus. Dave O came on at the end of brief he made it clear that access egress was extremely hazardous due to the enormous amount of debris coming down, some of it alight he went straight back out onto the incident ground to ensure the access egress was kept as safe as possible. Matt and Dave had explained they had started using the TSG shields to partially protect crews as they ran into the building, this of course would not protect them from the much larger and heavier debris, but was some mitigation. I decided I needed to go to the tower get into the Lobby and make a decision as IC as to whether the continuing rescue effort was tenable in the face of such significant internal fire spread and such a significant external risk of partial collapse and the resulting debris.
	The Commissioner arrived on the unit, I gave her a situational brief, told her my structure and that I had decided to continue to put BA crews into the tower but was going out to make a personal assessment due to a deteriorating situation. We agreed she did not need to take over as Dany was

	<p>going to have to handle the wider political and media environment and pan London picture, while I had operational command for the incident. She agreed the structure was appropriate, was comfortable with how I was running the incident and would remain on the unit for continuity whilst I went out onto the incident ground.</p>
	<p>I then went out onto the incident ground accompanied by Matt Cook and Andy O'Loughlin. My immediate impression was that the police had already done a fantastic job in getting some degree of order on the cordon line, there were no longer the numbers of public right up on the tower itself and there were many more police officers on the street. The mood seemed strangely a lot calmer than it had earlier despite a visible worsening of the fire itself, which was now on all sides of the tower and clearly inside many of the flats.</p>
	<p>As we passed CU7 I stepped on to take a short brief from Tom Goodall he told me that he had over 100 people involved in fire survival calls at his best estimate and that whilst the system for relaying information to the operational sectors was working he couldn't give me any firm numbers on rescues completed at that point as it was basically changing by the minute. I felt his system was working, the boards on the unit were orderly, information was going on to the grids in a calm and planned way and he clearly had a system working despite the tempo of the incident.</p>
	<p>I then moved to BA Main Control, SM Dan Kipling and Nick Saunders were running the holding area and main control. Again despite the tempo of the incident the area was calm, well ordered and they clearly had a grip on ensuring enough resources were being pushed into the lobby to service the main operational sectors.</p>
	<p>I then went to the base of the tower to go into the Lobby. There were still people visible at the windows with those trapped inside screaming. The debris falling was becoming more and more significant. I received a brief from Dave O'Neil who explained he had a series of safety officers spotting for debris fall and that to get into the building you got under a riot shield either held by an MPS officer or Firefighter, waited for the spotter to judge a momentary period of all clear and then ran into the building. I considered this to be extremely risky but agreed with Dave that it was the only way we were going to maintain rescue operations as there was no other entry point. As I finished talking to Dave a male member of the public jumped from the tower and hit the firefighter standing about 6 inches in front of me as we waited in a line to get under the shields. The member of the public who appeared to be middle eastern or North African was dead on impact, his leg being ripped off by the force of it. The body narrowly missed Andy O'Loughlin and Matt Cook as it fell. I instructed two firefighters to drag the body away so that crews would not have to keep on passing it, the firefighter did not appear to be seriously hurt having been helped to his feet. I asked another crew member to get him off the incident ground and to be assessed by the LAS. I then got under a riot shield and ran into the building.</p>
	<p>My impression on entering the lobby was that whilst the tempo of operations was very high there was clearly a crew ordering, briefing and entry control system. However the forward information boards had been dispensed with and Fire Survival Guidance information was going up on the wall in chinagraph, simply due to the volume of information coming from CU 7. I undertook 2 mass briefings of BA crews, in each side of the lobby. I reminded them we had already had a crew go missing that were then found and that we were going to continue operations despite the significant danger as we had a moral duty to those trapped in the tower to do so. In that context I reminded them of the important personal responsibility to understand when you had reached a limit and the need to identify and take absolute care of your BA partner, as we were asking them to operate outside of what would be the normal limits of our procedures in relation to exposure, the number of wears they would have to undertake as well as the appalling fire conditions.</p>
	<p>I received a quick brief from Pat Goulbourne and Richard Welch who were running the Fire sector between them, they told me they had cleared as best as possible up to the 8<sup>th</sup> at that point and were having to firefight hard to get beyond that but had had crews earlier in the incident well up beyond that to possibly the 20<sup>th</sup> and 21<sup>st</sup> floors. The both seemed calm and focused with an immediate aim to fight through to the 12<sup>th</sup> floor despite having intermittent issues with water supply due to burst</p>

	<p>branch/ hydrant lengths as a result of falling debris or hose getting burnt through. Pat confirmed my belief we needed more EDBA and I explained that I had asked for every EDBA asset in the LFB to be sent to scene, I asked either Matt or Mick to get a message back to the CU to make sure that happened. I asked both of them about the internal stability of the building, they confirmed they had had no reports of any issues with the concrete superstructure, either columns or floors and felt they could continue to commit crews despite the horrendous firefighting conditions. I thought they were both doing an excellent job under enormous pressure and told them so, I explained we were having issues with comms but that Mick Mullholland and Matt Cook were acting as a communication link back through to Andy O'Loughlin. I confirmed that I supported the decision for crews to wear SDBA and EDBA outside of policy in relation to number of wears but that meant they had to keep a close scrutiny on the physical condition of those they were committing. I told them I would be back in the lobby personally within the next hour to check progress, but that if there was any doubt as to the structural integrity of the building they must withdraw all crews for an assessment prior to re-committal. I repeated this brief to Dave O' Neill the safety officer and Andy O'Loughlin.</p>
	<p>I then got back under a riot shield and ran back to the external sectors. I noted that we had officers in charge of those sectors controlling limited firefighting operations with covering jets but that at some point when resources allowed we would need to reinforce that structure, it was not really a priority at that point as external firefighting was fairly meaningless in the face of the entire building being alight, other than to protect surrounding buildings which it was. On the way back to CU 8 I stopped in the BA main control area and briefed what I would estimate to be over 100 firefighters. I told them that we were operating in a highly dangerous and uncertain environment often outside of recognised procedures. I asked them to listen carefully to the officers briefing them, take personal responsibility for their own and each other's safety and that I was extremely proud of them as London Firefighters. I told them I thought despite the dangers, in my professional opinion, the concrete superstructure would hold and that therefore I would be continuing to commit crews as we had a moral duty to those people trapped in the tower to try and rescue them and it was what Londoners would expect us to do. I asked them to pay particular care coming in and out of the building and listen to the safety officers as that was particularly hazardous.</p>
04:06	<p>I got back onto CU 8 to find that every EDBA set in London had been ordered by the Commissioner with an RVP given for their arrival and that separately in my absence she had also asked that it was logged that EDBA could be worn on more than one occasion which matched my assessment out on the incident ground. Lee Drawbridge had arrived whilst I had been off the unit and had been tasked by the Commissioner as SCCS with a focus on resourcing, just as I had planned for prior to leaving for my walk round.</p>
	<p>I then gave the Commissioner a full situational update from the incident ground. I asked Jackie McConochie my loggist to record that I had made a decision to continue to commit crews to save life, despite the extremely dangerous environment they were operating in and that I felt justified to do so in the context of our duties laid out in the 2004 FRSA and under the Human Rights act. I explained that my professional judgement was that despite cladding and filler panels burning and falling and some concrete spalling on the outer edges of the building, what I had seen of the columns in the lobby and the reports from those far up inside the building about elements of the concrete structure, led me to believe that the concrete superstructure, particularly the core was holding and therefore despite the risk we could continue to commit crews. I asked her to record that I had briefed the safety officer and sector commanders to withdraw crews if there was any doubt around this or the situation changed. I also asked her to record that I had made a decision to allow SDBA and EDBA to be re-worn outside of the normal limits laid down by policy due to the resourcing demands of the incident.</p>
04:11	<p>I was told Lee Drawbridge was on CU1 at Latimer Road working up a resourcing plan. After trying unsuccessfully to reach him via radio comms I explained to CU 8 that I would make my way to that location to brief him face to face so that he began to draw up a relief plan as priority and so that I could begin to understand the disposition of the resources at the incident as it was a sector at that point I felt needed more attention, before returning in time for the TCM. I asked the Commissioner to once again provide continuity of command on the unit whilst I was away. She told me she was handling all the</p>

	wider political and organisational communication back into the Commissioner's group and was in contact with comms officers to work up a media plan.
	I made my way to CU 1. Meeting Lee I briefed him that as my SCCS his immediate priority was to get an understanding of what we had on the incident ground, how we were using it, liaise directly with the Ops Commander Andy O'Loughlin as to the rates of BA usage in particular and then make a determination as to what sort of immediate relief we needed, getting back to me so that I could send the make up. He had Steve West and some other officers working for him at that point, I promised him more officers as soon as I could, with a view to use Keeley Foster to support him to implement any relief. Lee had set up an airwave channel to use for resourcing which I told him, I and Andy would also go onto to ensure a triangulation of our respective parts of the incident.
	I walked back to CU 8 via the tower. I once again got a quick situational update from Andy O'Loughlin, there was little change other than crews continued to work hard to progress inside the building and he was looking to strengthen the structure of the external sectors
04:20	I then waited for an MPS officer with shield and went back into the Lobby. Briefed by Pat and Richard I asked them to start using SDBA as much as possible to follow behind the EDBA crews to make best use of resources. They detailed some continuing issues with water pressure, burst hose lengths and the very hot internal working conditions. They told me they now had BA crews up to the 12 <sup>th</sup> and 13 <sup>th</sup> floors. I let them know they were doing an excellent job and that my assessment was that the structure was holding and therefore we continued to commit crews despite the risks inherent in the fire conditions. As I was leaving a WM who was writing up FSG information on the wall tried to apologise for doing so, saying he had run out of space on the boards, he looked close to tears. I put an arm round him and told him that I could see he was doing an excellent job in impossible circumstances and that I didn't care we had stopped using the boards, the only thing I cared about was getting the information to the crews. I asked one of the officers who was there to ensure we kept on taking photos of the wall so that we kept a record. Once outside I quickly briefed Andy O'Loughlin about my desire to use more SDBA coming in behind the EDBA.
	On the way back to CU 8 I once again stopped and checked on BA main control, it seemed to be working well, where possible FFs were resting, there was plenty of bottled water there and I could see crews from PEG unloading multiple cylinders into an Equipment dump. I once again briefed a group of what I would estimate to be about 100 firefighters. I once again told them that I was very proud of them, that unfortunately I had to continue to still commit them into a very uncertain environment and that they would have to operate outside of the normal limits of our operating procedures due to the moral responsibility we had to those people trapped. I reminded them of their individual responsibility for their own and each others safety and confirmed I thought the concrete superstructure would hold hence my decision to continue search and rescue operations.
04:35	Getting back on CU8 The Commissioner had started to brief the TCM establishing the priority as safety. I then took over the TCM having been briefed that Dany had ordered a 20 pump relief, the DSE was en route and Keeley had gone out to take command of the external sectors for Andy O'Loughlin. I asked that Lee be briefed immediately to that effect along with the RVP location and explained that he was on a dedicated airwave channel. I confirmed that with the arrival of the relief we would have 61 appliances on the incident ground.
	I then chaired the TCM apologising for having been late back off the incident ground. Minutes for the TCM are as per the incident log. I gave a situational update reflecting the briefing I had got from my commanders out on the fire ground. In particular I asked all agencies to maintain discipline on the incident ground due to the extreme danger from falling debris. The police confirmed that they were going to close Ladbroke grove to facilitate the arrival of the 20 new appliances and I asked for a police liaison officer to go into CU 1 with Lee. LA confirmed a number of rest centres had been set up but could not provide much detail. I asked for the DSE to be blue lighted in in partnership with MPS as I had been waiting 2 hours for their arrival. Police confirmed they were evacuating adjoining blocks on Barrington Walk. I asked that Press were corralled in one location by MPS and that LFB would be leading on press lines, with the Commissioner coordinating backwards through our Gold Comms. The

	meeting concluded at 0450 with another scheduled for 0550.
04:51	UKPN presented at the CU having been requested as part of the make up for a major incident. I asked them if there was any particular electricity hazard associated with the building and they told me there was a sub station in the basement that supplied 3 other blocks as well. I took the decision that as it was not involved we would keep it on to ensure lighting in particular for crews in areas where that was still working, as in the lobby. UKPN briefed me that they could isolate remotely in 3- 4 mins if required so we took the direct phone number to enable that. They also told me that if they couldn't get remote isolation to work it would take 30 mins to isolate it at street level. I asked the CU crew to brief the command team on the incident ground via Andy O'Loughlin.
	I was told the DSE had arrived and was making an assessment of the building.
	Mick Mullholland got on the unit and provided an update as to the rate of use of EDDBA and SDBA and that we had EDDBA up onto the 12 <sup>th</sup> and SDBA to the 7 <sup>th</sup> floors.
	I asked that PPV be used to clear the lobby of smoke and that SM Nick Harding should be tasked to that effect by Mick via Andy O'Loughlin. I also asked Mick if we had the space now to get an ALP in or whether the debris fall and pressure on water supply was still too considerable, he told me it might not be achievable but he would pass back to Andy O'Loughlin and get me an answer.
	I asked the CU crew why we still didn't have plans of the building, they confirmed again there were none on ORD but there were meant to be a set in a premises information box in the lobby of the tower according to the ORD entry. I asked for this information to be relayed to the fire sector and made a note to ask for a set from the LA at the meeting again.
05:16	I was informed we had another fire fighter emergency with emergency crew committed, again I asked the CU to confirm it was the Ops Commander Andy O'Loughlin/ Ops sectors' responsibility to address and inform me of outcome without relaying by control as we had enough assets on scene to deal with it. Shortly after word came back the crew had been found.
05:20	I got a face to face situational update from Andy O'Loughlin on the CU, he told me there was a bariatric fatal on the stairs blocking progress and that he still had considerable numbers of casualties coming out, with persons seen at windows. Visibility was ok until the 5 <sup>th</sup> floor from which point on it was smoke logged even in the central core. I asked if the wet riser was up and running he said that it was but that the water supply was not at the pressure they wanted. I suggested they prioritised getting the Bariatric out to enable progress.
	I requested a full senior officer relief for 0800 hours and let Lee know as he was still concentrating on consolidation of existing resources and the integration of the 20 pump relief. The commissioner asked me to pass back via AC1 that no officers were to be on status 7 today.
	The Commissioner and I had another conversation reference the continued use of BA crews I recommended we continued to commit crews as the superstructure was still maintaining it's integrity. She supported my decision in the context of how many members of the public were still trapped. She told me she was ordering DAC Rick Ogden on to help with press as there was now a significant media presence, and that having been out on the incident ground she had reminded FF's to hydrate but was concerned for large numbers of them who were clearly traumatised. Dany told me she was going to coordinate the media and political response and communication from another CU (CU3) with Vicky Hardman one of our comms officers.
05:32	Dave O'Neill came onto the unit to give me his regular update as sector commander safety. They continued to use the long shields from TSG to provide a degree of mitigation to the debris fall on access /egress. He told me a senior DSE had arrived John Allen who confirmed the building had up to 4 hours protection but that obviously the scale and ferocity of the fire may have compromised that. He told me John like us had no concern about overall collapse but agreed that columns could fail and cause isolated partial collapse. Dave told me he had further briefed safety officers to focus on the stability of columns and had passed that brief into the lobby for BA crews.



	I asked Jackie to record that I continued to believe, based on my own professional judgement and the brief that Dave had given me, that it was proportional and necessary to continue to commit BA crews into the building to save life. I had a conversation with Dave to the effect that I wanted the DSE into the lobby if possible to make an assessment internally as well.
	I asked for Tom Goodall to attend the next TCM to give an update on where we were with FSG.
	I heard fireground radio traffic relating to an issue with water supply and committing without water supply to recover a trapped person.
05:40	Mick Mullholland came back onto the unit, he gave me a full situational update. I asked him to ascertain if we had many crews progressing without adequate water supply to known locations for rescue and to emphasise to Pat and Richard as well as Andy O'Loughlin that wherever possible crews had to have a water supply ahead of them.
05:40	Tom Goodall got onto the unit, he had received reports of someone Facebook streaming live trapped on the roof of the building. I asked him to verify. I considered the possibility of requesting MCA SAR helo support as London does not have a winch rescue capability. My reservations with this option were the 45 min minimum arrival time, and the possible effect of downdraft on the fire whilst we had so many people trapped and firefighters inside.
05:45	I asked Dan Daly (AC 1) to place MCA SAR helo on warning for possible tasking through GT. I did not want it deployed until Tom had verified.
05:45	GM Charlie Pugsley the head of Fire Investigation got on the unit. Knowing he had led previously on major investigations and had drafted a major investigation policy, I asked him to instigate that policy and take an immediate lead for investigation putting in place whatever measures he required to capture and record evidence.
05:50	Tom Goodall came back on the unit, he confirmed there was no verifiable report of anyone on the roof so asked for the warning order for helo to be cancelled. He had been out onto the incident ground and into the lobby. He told me that the wet riser whilst working was giving a poor supply and an LPP had been set up to supply from the 6 <sup>th</sup> floor but crews were committing with limited weight of attack even above the fire.
	I asked the CU to request another BMA to assist with improving water supply as a result of Tom's update.
05:50	I chaired the TCM (minutes as per attached decision log). I explained that due to some issues with water we might not get above the 14 <sup>th</sup> based on the updates I had from the sectors. I explained I would be going out after the TCM onto the fireground to make a personal assessment in that regard. Tom gave a detailed set of numbers of persons trapped from an FSG perspective. I made the point this was based on information from control and members of the public going into CU 7 but could not be seen as definitive with many more likely to be trapped as well as many more likely to have been already rescued. The local authority again gave some detail about rest centres but it was clear they did not have either control of them or accurate information coming from them. I asked them to make more of an effort in giving me details of numbers in them. I confirmed GT/SOR was open with the MPS and we were sending an AC in there. I also asked the police to coordinate the press pen in Avondale Road and send their press officer to Vicky Hardman our press officer on CU 3 where she would be working with the Commissioner to coordinate the press and regional and central government communication. The police told me Casualty bureau had been opened.
06:10	I had a series of updates from the incident ground by radio as the TCM was ongoing, all described an issue with water supply. Based on the limits of exploitation they were describing I logged a decision to limit crews to the 12 <sup>th</sup> floor pending reassessment and an improvement in water supply, I asked for this to go back to the fire sector supporting their assessment and validating their recommended decision.
06:13	I got an update from the DSE on the CU, he explained he could not get safely into the building, but had assessed it was unlikely that the floor plates would fail leading to a pancake collapse. I asked him

	for plans and he said he would personally find someone on the LA to supply them.
	On the basis of the DSE's update I asked for Jackie to log that I would continue to commit crews into the building but based on the reports from the sector would still not push beyond the 12 <sup>th</sup> floor at that moment. I asked for an urgent message to go back to Andy O'Loughlin that empowered him to continuously review that decision and if possible push beyond the 12 <sup>th</sup> at the earliest possibility if water supplies were improved, letting me know when that happened.
06:15	The Commissioner got onto the CU, she asked for me to make sure the duty counsellor had been paged as she was encountering groups of severely traumatised firefighters on her walk around. I assured her that had already happened and that I would ring Dan Daly as AC 1 to ensure that they started drawing together an attendance list for contact. It was clear from crews comments as they passed or came to the unit that the Commissioner's presence on the incident ground had been very important in boosting morale and motivation, I reflected this back to her and asked her to continue to engage and talk to crews.
06:16	Dany let me know she had devised a press strategy with LFB Gold Comms and was shortly going to give a talking head to press but with no casualty numbers.
	Charlie Pugsley came back on the unit and gave me a detailed brief on how he was going to begin collation of evidence. He asked if I wanted to sign off the e-mail he was going to send out to all crews and officers attending, I authorised him to send it without me seeing at that point as I was confident from what he had done on other incidents and major investigations. Charlie asked me to remind other agencies that at the next TCM of the need for all individuals attending to make contemporaneous notes. He said he would make contact with the police to establish primacy of investigation. I asked him to attend the next TCM in his capacity as investigative lead.
06:28	I asked for a reminder to be sent out to the operational sectors that I wanted them to be pushing beyond the 12 <sup>th</sup> floor as soon as it was possible, so to let me know if they felt able to do that so I could log the decision as made.
06:31	Matt Cook gave me a situational update direct from the ops sectors, they confirmed initial clearance had taken place up to the 12 <sup>th</sup> Floor and that they had an additional BMA in attendance (Chris Payton) and had improved water supply so were going to push beyond the 12 <sup>th</sup> with EDDBA.
06:35	I was happy external sectors 1-4 were now under the control of Andy O'Loughlin with sufficient officers, with an ALP now working in 4. As a consequence I think it was about this time I asked Keeley Foster to work for Lee Drawbridge to implement the relief, as she had successfully put in place those sectors for Andy.
	Dany had got back on the unit she let me know she had been in regular contact with the Mayor's office and had arranged wider GLA family support for C&W through the SCG.
	I think I rang Dan Daly at this point to give him a situational update for the SCG and to make the request for attendance lists to go to C&W.
	Adrian Fenton rang me to confirm he was speaking directly to Lee Drawbridge from the BCC to support resourcing.
06:42	BCC offered me a 42m aerial appliance from Surrey FRS, I accepted the offer and asked it to mobilise, envisaging it could replace our ALP which only has a 30m reach.
	Dany was concerned that there were large numbers of displaced persons wandering the local area and asked me to raise it at the next TCM. I asked Jackie to make a note.
	I left the unit for a face to face update with Andy O'Loughlin and the sector commanders on the fire ground, this time the Commissioner accompanied me. I met Andy first he assured me that the water supply had improved despite major issues with burst lengths. Chris Payton the additional BMA was there and confirmed this, as well as the fact that Thames Water could not give us any additional pressure as it risked bursting water mains further back in their supply chain.

	Dave O'Neill gave me a safety update, he did not feel there had been any substantive change to the structure of the building although debris fall was still considerable. He was liaising constantly with the DSE to monitor this.
	I then saw Dany again who had been talking to some of the crews. Together we ran under shields into the Lobby, I have to say I had some nervousness about the Commissioner getting hit by a large piece of debris, but tried to put that out of my mind. Inside the Lobby Pat Goulbourne and Richard Welch gave me a very clear brief, they were now satisfied with water supply were pushing crews up beyond the 12 <sup>th</sup> with a view to get to the 18 <sup>th</sup> where they had the last recorded live FSG call. They described a situation where they had significant numbers of dead in situ on the stairs. I confirmed I was happy with the decision to push onto the 18 <sup>th</sup> and would log that on my return to the unit. I could see no physical changes that would alter my perception of the buildings stability. I discussed briefly with Dany and she supported my assessment based on her own view of the situation.
07:03	I got back on CUs with Dany, she took a phone call and let me know that Roy Wilshire NFCC chair was going to brief the Home Office. Dany then left the unit to make further phone calls into central and regional government and the Commissioners Group.
07:08	I asked Jackie to log that having received a full situational update I had not changed my position on the stability of the building and with an improved water supply was happy that crews should try and push up beyond the 12 <sup>th</sup> floor again.
07:13	I chaired the TCM. I gave a full situational update, including the push beyond the 12 <sup>th</sup> floor. The police confirmed that any civil unrest had dissipated. The LAS at that point only had a couple of P3s on scene but I asked them to maintain their resourcing level as I thought we might still get survivors and I still had many crews in the building. I made the point that my crews were encountering many fatalities in situ and that we should anticipate very large numbers of deceased. Charlie gave an update on his priorities for investigation with a particular emphasis on LAS to provide details of where casualties were being removed to. LA gave a better update on numbers in rest centres but I now asked specifically for them to produce lists of addresses of those survivors in those rest centres so that we could start to cross reference information. I think it was at this TCM although it is not on the log, that Charlie explained that all LFB appliances would be going back via Paddington Fire Station to be met by C&W and for crews to make a contemporaneous log. Once again I formally requested plans from the LA who had not yet produced any. The TCM ended at 07:35 and the next was scheduled for 08:40.
	I was beginning to get reports of FF injuries I asked the CU to send any details by phone to control and to ensure we had enough SAIs mobilised to investigate within the constraints of officers left available.
07:35	I asked Matt Cook and Mick Mulholland to give Andy O'Loughlin some clear instruction to set up a strategy for systematic search of previously cleared areas as I felt we were now beginning to transition into a phase where the chances of survivability were less and less, although casualties were still coming out. I wanted them to also help Andy ascertain his likely EDBA use up to 1300 hrs and then having agreed a level of EDBA relief with me pass that information to Lee Drawbridge. We also discussed how we would effect an officer relief. All of us agreed that we needed to gradually withdraw officers when the 0800 officer relief came on to both maintain continuity and to allow initial officers to see the job through to a natural break for their own closure as long as they were still making decisions effectively.
	Matt and Mick confirmed no SDBA was being used at that time.
07:44	I asked for an update from Lee Drawbridge, who told me he was having a very difficult job getting crews away from scene but was slowly trying to reduce the incident down to 20 pumps as per the relief. We discussed and agreed we would move to a pattern of 3 hour rolling 10 pump relief s once the 20 was implemented, maintaining 20 on the incident ground for the foreseeable future.
07:55	GM John Graham was my first relief officer on, I asked him to go and slowly take over from either Pat Goulbourne or Richard Welch, dependent on who needed it the most. Andy O'Loughlin had come onto the CU and was part of that discussion as was Dave O'Neill the safety sector commander who

	told me the 11 <sup>th</sup> floor was like a 'furnace' and that Andy Cane the new ORT officer wanted a safety officer in the lobby. I said that I felt having seen the lobby on a number of occasions there was good control, that I didn't want John to do that role but rather take over from tired officers when possible. I sent Andy O'Loughlin and John Graham off the unit to decide which of the fire sector commanders to swap out first and to validate that decision.
08:10	MPS came on the CU and confirmed the Mass fatalities group had been established and all fatalities were to be left in situ. I asked for that message to be passed to the incident ground as a priority.
	National Grid (Gas) presented at the CU having been requested as part of the major incident, I asked them to isolate the gas supply to the block, they explained they would have to dig up 3 locations to do so, one inside the inner cordon, I gave them permission to do so and asked them to get started. They told me it would also isolate gas to one other building. I decided this was acceptable as I was sure burning gas supplies in the flats were adding to the difficulties for firefighters.
08:25	I was given an urgent message from the incident ground that they had undertaken a live rescue of a man from the 11 <sup>th</sup> floor.
08:30	I briefed John Simpson and Andy Cane the new ORT officers. I asked John to advise Lee and work with him to get crews reunited with their own appliances and off the incident ground to prevent further disruption to the wider LFB service. I asked Andy to advise the operational sectors but to be sensitive in how he provided that advice, as officers were tired and had worked beyond normal limits of risk exposure to their utter credit. I agreed he could put an additional safety officer into the tower as we now had some additional relief officers.
	Dany was on the unit for the brief and then let me know she had let North Ken's crews walk back to their station as they were exhausted and their machine was pumping so couldn't be released with them. C&W were briefed to meet them.
08:35	Andy Cane wanted to try and get back into a policy framework. I explained that whilst that was absolutely an aspiration we had only just pulled out a live casualty so my emphasis was still on saving life even if we had to deviate from policy at times in a measured and considered way. I made the point quite forcibly that we would not be able to reach the upper floors if we did not maintain that stance and we had a moral duty to do so. Whilst I appreciated his role to act as my operational conscience having undertaken the ORT role myself, I asked Jackie to record my decision in this regard.
08:45	I chaired a TCM- minutes as per the attached decision log. DVI had now joined the TCM and we discussed the possible transition to body recovery. My main emphasis was that my operational sector commanders had carried out a live rescue only 20 mins earlier so we had to assume there could still be survivors who had mobility issues trapped in areas of relative refuge so therefore we would continue to push aggressively in a controlled way up beyond the 12 <sup>th</sup> floor as we had been for some time. However I accepted that we were beginning to transition from pure life saving into a phase where there would begin to be a greater emphasis on recording the numbers of fatalities in preparation for the moment when we decided survival was no longer realistic. I asked Tom Goodall my FSG commander to start focusing on pulling that information together. I wanted Tom to work with the fire sector to ensure a systematic search of each flat was undertaken and recorded from the ground up even if we had been there before. Charlie Pugsley wanted the occupants of flat 16 (Flat of origin) traced and interviewed as a priority. Charlie also confirmed that the Paddington Fire station reception centre was now established for our crews coming off the incident with C&W in situ.
	Following the TCM I had a longer discussion with Tom about how I wanted him to take responsibility on CU7 not only for the FSG information but to transition it into a location where for now we would begin to collect information on the fatalities to aid any passage of information to next of kin and to inform any investigation.
	I briefed about 15 relief officers outside the CU giving a detailed situational update that was supported by Richard Welch who had just been relieved in the fire sector as commander by John Graham. I delegated a role to each and asked them to receive a more detailed individual brief from the officer they

	were taking over from.
09:10	Dave O'Neill the safety sector commander came onto the unit to give me his regular update, crews were back down to the 12 <sup>th</sup> floor due to a burst branch length on the 11 <sup>th</sup> that was soaking them meaning they were boiling themselves going past it. He told me it was getting resolved and then they would push past it again. We discussed the use of USAR in the coming days (Dave is LFB's USAR lead) and how when the building cooled they would have to work in conjunction with DVI to secure safe access for body removal.
09:30	I replaced some of the officers in the resourcing sector with officers who had arrived as part of the officer relief. I got a good update from Lee Drawbridge who told me he had managed to get 4 FRUs and 11 pumps away and was slowly persuading crews they had to leave despite their desire to continue.
09:35	I received a brief from John Allen the DSE, he wanted to push the cordons back as he was concerned about the length of time the fire had been burning. He could not give me a clear reason for why the superstructure would now collapse and agreed that the core was most likely stable. I asked Jackie to record that as I still considered there to be an outside chance of saveable life I would not push the cordons back as it would be impossible to operate. I asked John to come to the next TCM to update all agencies. I asked him if possible to get in the ALP to make a better assessment of the outer columns which were the area of highest risk. I also asked him to think ahead as to how the LA might support the structure over the next few days as he needed to be prepared in my experience for considerable pressure to enable access to the building to search for fatalities to provide some closure to families. I asked Matt Cook to go out with John onto the fireground and get a consolidated view on the stability of the building prior to the next TCM.
09:45	Pat Goulbourne and Richard Welch were preparing to leave the incident they gave me a final Sitrep. I told them both I thought they had been outstanding both in the context of their personal courage and as officers commanding the fire sector.
10:15	I chaired my final TCM at the incident- with detailed minutes as per the decision log attached. There were long discussions about the building's stability, but I continued to hold the line that whilst it was still alight and there was any chance of survivors we continued aggressive internal firefighting operations. This is recorded in detail in those minutes. As the dynamic of the incident was slowing I agreed the next TCM would be at 1300 hrs with AC Dom Ellis whom I was going to handover to.
10:55	With reports of asbestos I asked the CU staff to contact the DSE and request the asbestos register as well as to ask him to confirm the asbestos location and type.
11:14	I replaced Andy O'Loughlin with Rick Ogden as Ops Commander. Rick having been on scene for some time to handle media and therefore having good situational awareness.
11:35	I handed over to Dom Ellis with a full walk of the incident ground, covering all areas recorded in the handover agenda on the incident decision log. The log was handed over to Dom's loggist SM Peter Cox.
12:35	At approximately this time I left the incident ground having handed over.