WITNESS STATEMENT

Criminal Procedure Rules, r27.2; Criminal Justice Act 1967, s.9; Magistrates' Courts Act 1980, s.5b

Statement of: DOLAN, MATTHEW JOHN

Age if under 18: OVER 18 (if over 18 insert 'over 18') Occupation: CONTRACT DIRECTOR

This statement (consisting of 22 page(s) each signed by me) is true to the best of my knowledge and belief and I make it knowing that, if it is tendered in evidence, I shall be liable to prosecution if I have wilfully stated in it anything which I know to be false, or do not believe to be true.

Signature: M J DOLAN Date: 05/02/2018

Tick if witness evidence is visually recorded ☐ (*supply witness details on rear*)

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1. My name is Matthew John DOLAN. I am employed by Skanska Construction UK Limited and work on the Gas Distribution Strategic Partnership (East), named by tRIIO as a Contract Director.
2. I am duly authorised to make this statement on behalf of tRIIO.
3. The purpose of this statement is to respond to the questions put to me in an e-mail from Michelle HART, Detective Constable of the Metropolitan Police Service on 20 October 2017. The topics are identified below:
   (a) tRIIO's structure, contracts and role at Grenfell Tower;
   (b) Construction, Design and Management Regulations 2015;
   (c) Sub-contractors;
   (d) Chronology of key dates;
   (e) Inspection of the work carried out;
   (f) Qualifications of the individuals who carried out the inspections;
   (g) Further information that may assist the investigation;
4. Michelle HART's email included a request for documents, which tRIIO will address separately and comprehensively.
5. In summary, tRIIO was not involved in any works at Grenfell Tower (Tower) other than the replacement of a single gas riser pipe, being one of six riser pipes at the Tower, and the associated pipework to reinstate gas to 13 flats in the Tower following a publicly reported gas leak on 1 October 2016. tRIIO was not involved in the refurbishment works or in any other works at the

Tower prior to October 2016. The work undertaken by tRIIO, which was near to completion at the time of the fire, is set out more fully in the statement below.

A. tRIIO's structure, contracts and role at Grenfell Tower

6. tRIIO is an unincorporated joint venture between Morrison Utility Services Limited (Morrison), which has its registered office at Abel Smith House, Gunnels Wood Road, Stevenage, Hertfordshire, SGI 2ST, and Skanska Construction UK Limited (Skanska), which has its registered office at Maple Cross House, Denham Way, Maple Cross, Rickmansworth, Hertfordshire, WD3 9SW.

7. tRIIO was formed pursuant to a Joint Venture Agreement between Morrison and Skanska dated 11 July 2012. tRIIO's registered office is also Maple Cross House, Denham Way, Maple Cross, Rickmansworth, Hertfordshire, WD3 9AS.

8. In June 2012, National Grid Gas Plc issued an invitation for companies to tender for its National Grid Gas Distribution Delivery Programme. tRIIO was established to (a) prepare and submit the tender for the National Grid Gas Distribution Workload Delivery Programme, (b) agree contracts relating to this programme and (c) execute works in accordance with these contracts.

9. Following a successful tender, Morrison and Skanska entered into two contracts with National Grid Gas Plc: a Gas Distribution Strategic Partnership Contract dated 18 December 2012 for a term of 8 years for certain gas works in London (Contract) and a second contract relating to works in the East of England. In September 2016, National Grid Gas Plc transferred its assets and liabilities of the gas distribution business to a new company, National Grid Gas Distribution Limited and on 1 May 2017, this company began business under its new brand, Cadent (Cadent). On 2 May 2017, National Grid Gas Distribution Limited changed its name to Cadent Gas Limited. For ease of reference, I refer to Cadent throughout my statement.

10. Under the Contract, tRIIO carries out work in London to replace existing metallic gas mains with new polyethylene gas mains, lay new gas mains and install new connections. Work is done on the instruction of Cadent, which owns the gas network. This includes providing a design and construction service for replacement gas networks in Multi-Occupancy Buildings (MOBs) of which around 80% of the MOBs programme works arise from reports from the public and others relating to gas leaks (reactive works) and the remaining 20% relate to planned replacement programmes (proactive works).

11. At any one point in time, tRIIO has approximately 500 projects ongoing, of which around 20 to 30 can be MOBs projects. I am one of two of tRIIO's Contract Directors responsible for the delivery of the overall programme of works, with part of my area of responsibility relating to the design and construction of the MOBs projects for both the London and East of England Networks.
12. The Tower was one such MOB where Cadent instructed tRIIO on 1 October 2017 to carry out reactive works following a gas leak being identified at flats 22 and 32 in the early hours of 1 October 2016.
13. Cadent is the owner and operator of the gas network, which included the gas network and supply to the Tower. The Tower was served by a 15" main which supplied six vertical and associated horizontal gas pipes. These pipes are known as risers (vertical) and laterals (horizontal) connecting the gas supply from the below ground gas network to above ground, into the basement and up through the Tower into the individual flats for cooking appliances only.
14. As a result of the gas leak, Cadent cut off the gas supply to one of the risers that supplied the gas to 20 flats in the south east of the Tower. Of these, only 13 flats used gas for cooking. These were flats 12, 22, 32, 52, 62, 72, 82, 92, 102, 112, 132, 142 and 182. tRIIO was instructed to carry out works to reinstate the gas supply to that one riser and to the 13 affected flats. tRIIO was not required to provide a detailed quote prior to starting the works due to their urgency. The work was carried out on behalf of Cadent and payment for these works was made under the Contract by Cadent to tRIIO.
15. There was a separate gas supply for the communal heating system, but tRIIO did not work on this. tRIIO did not carry out any work on or to the solenoid valve leading into the boilers in the basement of the Tower.
16. From October 2016 and up until the time of the fire, tRIIO worked on the design and construction of the one new riser and lateral gas network to reinstate gas to the riser cut off by Cadent as a result of the aforementioned gas leak.
17. A survey and pre-construction activities were also carried out for the proposed proactive replacement of the remaining five risers, but construction work had not started on the other five risers at the time of the fire. As one of the six risers had leaked, it was standard practice for Cadent to take the opportunity to replace the other five risers in the building.
18. Prior to October 2016, neither tRIIO, Morrison nor Skanska, had worked in or had any other involvement with the Tower.

B. Construction Design and Management Regulations 2015

19. As the reactive work was design and construction work, it was to be undertaken in accordance with the Construction Design and Management Regulations 2015 (CDM). Cadent was the Client under CDM and appointed tRIIO as Principal Designer, Designer and Principal Contractor for the duration of the project. Notification of the project was submitted by Cadent to the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) as required under CDM.

20. As Principal Designer, tRIIO had responsibility to plan, manage, monitor and coordinate health and safety during the pre-construction phase and to liaise with the Principal Contractor during the delivery of the construction work.

21. As Designer, tRIIO's role was to prepare and modify the design in relation to the in ground works and riser pipework at the Tower. In performing that role, tRIIO's designers took account of pre-construction information provided by Cadent to try to eliminate foreseeable risks to the health and safety of those working on the project, the residents and others affected by the works. In circumstances where the risks could not be eliminated, tRIIO's designers took steps to reduce and control those risks. The design was then shared with the construction team and others working for tRIIO.

22. As Principal Contractor, tRIIO had responsibility to plan, manage, monitor and coordinate the entire construction phase of the reactive and proactive works.

23. I set out below a table of those tRIIO individuals involved in this project.

tRIIO		
tRIIO	Contract Director	Matt DOLAN
Design & pre construction	Design Manager	Stephen JOHNSON
	Design Engineer	Martyn WISKEN
	Design Analyst	Ashley JOHNSON
	Design Analyst	Mark BEHM
	Pre-Construction Programme Manager	Cerianne TALBOT
Construction	Operations Managers	Stuart STEPHENS (left December 2016) Stephen JOHNSON (to Apr 2017) Terry PENNY (to current day)
	Project Manager	Harvey SMITH (until end of February 2017)

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2018

		Martin LOVEDAY (end of February 2017 onwards)
	Site Manager	Andrew RADLEY
Others	H&S Advisor	Michelle UMAGHO-UKUEKU
	Project Manager Customer Liaison Officer	Dave CASSIN Ian HOSKINS (junior to David CASSIN)

C. Sub-contractors

24. As is routine in the construction industry and as permitted by the Contract, tRIIO subcontracted parts of the specialist construction work to a number of contractors from its approved contractor register. Cadent was familiar with the sub-contractors engaged on the Tower and had, for example, engaged K&S Pipe Contractors LLP (K&S) on many other MOBs projects. Such contractors to tRIIO are required to hold accreditation to pre-qualify for work, which means they have industry recognised health and safety and environmental accreditation.

25. Set out below is a table of those organisations and individuals to which and to whom work was sub-contracted as part of the project.

Sub-contractors		
Company	Role	Key Contact
K&S (sub-contractor to tRIIO)	Senior Partner	Kenny SNELL
London Operations Gas (sub-contractor to K&S)	Surveyor (sole trader)	Simon BOYGLE
Holland Gas Engineers Ltd (Sub-contractor to K&S)	Director	Nathan LITTLEBURY
Express Building Contractors Ltd (sub-contractor to tRIIO)	Director	Alan MONAHAN
Cape Electrical (sub-contractor to tRIIO)	Managing Director	Phil CASSATERI
LAB UK (Asbestos) (sub-contractor to tRIIO)	Contracts Manager	James DENNIS
Globe Scaffolding Ltd (sub-contractor to tRIIO)	Contracts Manager	Richard DAINES
T&S Environmental Limited (sub-contractor to tRIIO)	Managing Director	Bradley REES

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2018

Price Brothers (sub-contractor to K&S)	Director	Dan PRICE
Angles Inspection (sub-contractor to K&S)	Owner (sole trader)	Malcolm RUSSELL

26. K&S was contracted to install and weld the new replacement riser and laterals running from the incoming below ground gas pipe, up through the height of the building and into the 13 individual flats. K&S has been working with both tRIIO and Cadent for many years and both on the tRIIO and predecessor Coalition and Gas Alliance Contracts. The Coalition Contract (which ran from 1 April 2009 to 31 March 2013) was between Morrison and Cadent and included reactive and proactive MOBS work. The Coalition subcontracted the reactive MOBs workload to K&S. The Gas Alliance Contract (which ran from 1 April 2005 to 31 March 2013) was between Skanska and Cadent and included MOBS work associated with mains replacement work i.e. proactive work only. Part of the MOBS works were subcontracted to K&S. K&S was engaged at the outset of the reactive works in the Tower in early October 2016 and was part of the design discussions that took place in respect of the proposed route for the new riser. By the time of the fire, K&S and its sub-contractors (listed below) had completed the work it was contracted to carry-out at the Tower.

27. With tRIIO's approval, K&S subcontracted parts of its work to specialist contactors so that:

(a) London Operations Gas, a survey company run by Simon BOYGLE, was contracted to survey the Tower to determine a suitable route for the replacement riser and laterals.

(b) Holland Gas Engineers Ltd (Holland Gas) was contracted to move the meters within the 13 residential properties, reconnect and certify the internal "gas safe" supply to the cooking facilities.

(c) Price Brothers Surfacing was engaged to complete the in-ground reinstatement works (i.e. works outside the Tower building).

(d) Angles Inspection was engaged to inspect the quality of the welds undertaken on the riser and laterals.

28. tRIIO also engaged a number of other contractors directly, namely:

(a) Express Building Contractors Limited (Express) assisted Holland Gas fitters with carpentry work in January 2017 by opening the existing boxing around the heating system into the individual

flats. Express was then engaged in April 2017 to box-in the replacement riser in the stairwell and the lateral pipework in the communal landings to the identified flats. At the time of the fire, the boxing-in of the riser in the stairwell was complete up to and including Floor 19. I have referred throughout this statement to the residential floor numbers in the Tower, rather than the floor numbers. Express had completed the boxing-in of the laterals on Floor 2, and had fitted the battens for mounting the boxing for the laterals on floors 3, 5, 6 and 7. As of 14 June 2017, it was anticipated Express would work on site for approximately 5 more weeks in order to complete the boxing-in.

(b)Globe Scaffolding Limited (Globe), was contracted to install scaffolding on Floor 20 and it did so on 12 and 13 of June 2017. This was to allow safe access for the installation of the boxing-in around the new vertical riser from the 20th Floor up to the roof vent, a distance of approximately 7 metres. At all other locations within the Tower the boxing-in had been installed without the need for scaffolding. The scaffolding was in situ at the time of the fire.

(c)Cape Electrical & Mechanical Limited (Cape) was contracted to move the lighting in the stairwells and communal areas where additional room was needed for the new riser and lateral pipework and/or boxing-in to the 13 flats. Cape was on site at the Tower between January and March 2017. I understand from Cape that the lighting was tested on site using a mains voltage tester by each electrician. Photographs taken by Martin LOVEDAY on 23 March 2017 show that lights at the Tower were operational. tRIIO did not work on the emergency lighting at the Tower.

(d)Lab UK Limited was contracted by tRIIO to conduct an asbestos survey on the 13 flats and adjoining communal areas at the Tower in December 2016 following the completion of the design. Due to its age, asbestos was identified in various parts of the building but was in good condition. Lab UK's work included further work following the disturbance of asbestos in Flat 12 by a Holland Gas worker in February 2017.

(e)T&S Environmental Limited was contracted to carry out asbestos sampling, removal and disposal work as described at (d) above.

D.Chronology of key dates

29.I understand that on 1 October 2016, Cadent were notified of a reported gas leak at flats 22 and 32 of the Tower. Cadent shut off the gas to the riser affected and provided a notification to tRIIO through a Riser Request Proforma, which is, in effect, the Client Brief for the purposes of CDM. By this Client Brief, tRIIO was instructed to carry out a reactive MOBs project to design and

construct a new riser and lateral gas pipes on the one riser in the south-east elevation of the Tower and to reinstate gas to the customers supplied from the gas pipe, which had been cut off by Cadent. tRIIO received this instruction as it was within the London area covered by the Contract.

30. Cadent provided some information to tRIIO about the Tower such as the height of the Tower, number of floors, number of properties and gas usage within the Tower. tRIIO added to that information during the pre-construction stage of works, during which the surveyor gathered information from site by knocking on doors at the Tower. The Tower was owned by Kensington & Chelsea Borough Council and managed by The Kensington & Chelsea Tenant Management Organisation (KCTMO).

31. The existing network could not be repaired due to the leakage being within the fabric of the building i.e. embedded in the concrete between flats. If we could have visually inspected the gas riser, it may have been possible to refurbish the existing pipe.

32. It was therefore standard practice for tRIIO to ask Cadent whether the gas supplies should be reinstated or whether Cadent would "buy-out" the gas customers within the Tower by providing them with compensation in lieu of the gas supply. In this instance, Cadent confirmed it would not consider the Tower for buy-out as it said only a single riser was affected and so instructed tRIIO to proceed with the reinstatement of gas.

33. In order to reinstate gas to 13 properties, tRIIO was required to design and construct a new replacement riser and laterals to allow gas to be supplied from the gas network in the street up to each of the residential floors of the Tower and into each flat that required their gas to be reinstated. The riser went into the building via the basement. The affected flats already had existing pipework running to the gas meter within the flat and terminating at the emergency control valve (ECV). The ECV is used for controlling the supply of gas in that particular flat and is the end point of the gas

network, which Cadent owns and operates. Beyond the ECV and gas meter is the customers own pipework and gas cooker. tRIIO was required to ensure that when the gas supply was reinstated within each flat, the work was checked in accordance with Gas Safe requirements, including pressure testing, purging and checking that cookers were operating safely.

34. At the outset, tRIIO commissioned K&S to undertake a survey of the Tower to identify a potential route for the new pipework. In accordance with edition 2 IGEM/G/5 (the industry standard for gas installations within MOBs), tRIIO's designer must consider the most appropriate design option

based on consideration of factors, namely safety, security, future access and maintenance. IGEM/G/5 sets out a hierarchy of options to consider, the first of which is to run the riser external to the building. This is tRIIO's standard approach as it is less disruptive to the tenants, easier to install and would be naturally ventilated. Verbal discussions with KCTMO concluded that running the riser external to the building was not an option here given the cladding on the exterior of the Tower. Drilling and fixing gas pipes to the exterior would have rendered any cladding guarantee null and void as we would have penetrated any seals or system integrity. Accordingly, it was necessary for the riser to be run internally within the Tower.

35. K&S subcontracted the survey to Simon BOYGLE of London Ops Gas, with support from Harvey SMITH and Martyn WISKEN of tRIIO to determine the route for the new riser. Achieving a buildable route is often a joint effort and was on this occasion with a number of options being considered by Simon BOYGLE, tRIIO and Cadent and shared with KCTMO, for example running the replacement riser in the same place as the old riser and running the lateral pipework through the false ceilings in the landings, but these were discounted in discussions between tRIIO and KCTMO. There were also problems with ventilation in the location of the original riser in the utility shaft. KCTMO consulted the contractor responsible for the previous refurbishment project at the Tower, who advised that they would not recommend running the lateral pipework through the false ceilings in the landings as these were pipe boxings, which were fitted as tight as possible to the new heating distribution pipework. Given these constraints, tRIIO and the surveyor had no further option but to propose a route to KCTMO for the riser to run inside the building through the stairwell in the Tower to achieve compliance with IGEM/G/5 and Building Regulations.

36. tRIIO used the survey along with pressure modelling software, Gasworks 9, to develop and produce the design for the new riser and laterals connecting each individual flat in accordance with IGEM/G/5 and Building Regulations. Gasworks 9 models pressure drop, velocity, gas demand and sizes the gas pipework. The design made allowances for further works to replace the existing 5 risers, with construction work to start after the reactive works were completed.

37. The pipework for the riser and laterals was ASTM A106 steel, which has a melting point of 1425 to 1540 degrees Celsius. It is a standard material used in the construction of MOBs gas networks.

38. The design required the laterals to be 'boxed-in' to provide a route for any gas leaks to escape to the stairwell, which was directly ventilated to outside, direct ventilation being a requirement of IGEM/G/5. The design did not require the riser pipe in the stairwell to be boxed-in as the stairwell

had natural ventilation. However, given the fire compartment having being penetrated between the stairwell and hallways to facilitate the route of the lateral pipework, the boxing-in also served as fire protection within the hallways thus maintaining the integrity of the stairwell fire compartment. tRIIO considered the use of fire rated materials from the outset and discussions took place with KCTMO about the fire rating of the materials for the boxing-in.

39. The design was prepared by tRIIO designers and was approved by a tRIIO design engineer. The installation of the riser and laterals was undertaken by K&S.

40. The design was accepted by KCTMO, as managing agents for the owner of the building, on 30 November and tRIIO commenced work on 9 December 2016.

41. On 25 January 2017, K&S completed the work to install the new riser and laterals to the 13 flats requiring their gas supply to be reinstated and these were pressure tested. Gas was introduced into the riser and laterals on the same date and into the individual flats up to the new ECV and new meter position. Gas was later introduced into the pipework running to the cooker in each of the 13 individual flats once "Purge and Relight" tests were completed between 16 February and 8 March 2017. Please see paragraph 53 below for further details.

42. KCTMO instructed an independent fire risk assessor, Carl STOKES, of C S Stokes and Associates Limited to visit the Tower and inspect the newly installed gas riser and laterals. He visited the site on 26 January 2017 and published a report, which was provided to tRIIO for comment. tRIIO provided assurance to KCTMO that the newly installed lateral pipework would be boxed-in for ventilation purposes and holes sealed where they were not needed for such ventilation.

43. There was some delay to completing the boxing-in works to the laterals as a result of a disturbance of asbestos in the Tower. On 16 February 2017, a worker engaged by Holland Gas to relocate the gas meter within Flat 12 mistakenly drilled through a panel, above a door, containing asbestos within the flat. This was picked up when a carpenter despatched to carry out boxing-in work in Flat 12 discovered debris on 27 February 2017. tRIIO was made aware of the incident on 27 February and immediately engaged LAB UK to carry out an asbestos background air test. T&S Environmental was also instructed to attend site the same day to carry out an emergency clean up and to arrange the disposal of the asbestos containing materials. A RIDDOR report was submitted to the HSE following the incident.

44. Martin LOVEDAY inspected the site the next day (28 February) together with K&S and Holland Gas. Work was stopped, the MOBs Construction Pack and Site Emergency Plan (containing the

design, site specific health and safety information and documents) were removed from site to prevent access and the site was closed until around 6 March.

45. Between 7 March and 24 March, KCTMO communicated to tRIIO that concerns had been raised by some residents about the newly installed exposed gas pipes. One email raised concerns regarding the riser being in the fire escape and mentioned that vandalism and antisocial behaviour were daily occurrences on the staircase and the exposed gas pipes might be an easy target for vandalism. These emails were escalated to me as a Contract Director.

46. I understood the concerns raised by some of the residents and considered them as legitimate. However, the pipework was constructed of seamless carbon steel and would be difficult to vandalise and in any event, for the reasons I have identified, the riser had to be installed internally in the Tower. The riser itself was not boxed-in as this was not required by IGEM/G/5. Nonetheless, a meeting was arranged with Cadent and KCTMO to address the residents concerns. That meeting was to take place on 27 March 2017, but events overtook this plan. As I explain in paragraph 47, tRIIO's design team was made aware that flanged joints had been installed on the pipework and this required the design to be revised on 24 March 2017, with the new design requiring the boxing-in of the riser to comply with Building Regulations and IGEM/G/5.

47. On 21 March 2017, Steve JOHNSON, a Design Manager for tRIIO, was made aware that flanged compression joints had been installed onto the pipework rather than welded joints, as per the design. These were installed by K&S in discussion with tRIIO's Project Manager and Site Manager. tRIIO's instructions from Cadent were that gas reinstatement was a priority. The flanged joints would allow the residents to have their gas supply reinstated more quickly. As a result, on 24 March 2017, the tRIIO design team completed a design review and modified the ventilation and boxing-in requirements to include boxing-in of the riser in the stairwell. Building Regulations and IGEM/G/5 require that any pipework in a stairwell not screwed or welded to be boxed-in with fire rated materials. The modified design, therefore, provided that all pipework (riser and laterals up to the flat entry point) be boxed-in with 2 hour fire rated materials, including the use of fire rated sealant. It also stated that the entry between the protected shaft (stairwell) and the common landing needed to be unsealed within the boxing for ventilation purposes. Express Builders used Everflex fire mate sealant on the screw heads on the boxing, on all boxing butt joints, and to seal

the boxing where it met the wall, floor and ceiling. The entry between each floor needed to be unsealed within the boxing for ventilation purposes.

48. On 27 March 2017, a meeting was held between Mary RYAN and Patrick KELLY (Cadent), Steve JOHNSON (tRIIO) and Anthony CHENEY (KCTMO) to inspect the installation and discuss the revised design. They also discussed the asbestos incident, the further works required to complete the reactive project and the scope of the proactive works, including a proposed construction programme, and the residents' concerns relating to the boxing-in of the pipework.

49. On 19 April 2017, tRIIO carried out a letter drop to all residents at the Tower on behalf of Cadent to notify them that a survey of the building would be required in order to inspect the existing gas supply in individual properties, to establish the scope of the further proactive work required. The letter advised that a surveyor was required to attend each flat to carry out a brief survey. Other complaints to Cadent were received from certain residents, channelled through KCTMO, which related to the proposed route of the pipework as part of the proactive works and the further disturbance this would cause.

50. As a result of the modified riser design in the stairwell, tRIIO (on behalf of Cadent) sent a letter to the residents to advise them that in order to protect the newly installed gas pipe, Cadent was required to install fire proof boxing and would be arranging for operatives to attend site to carry out this work, which would be limited to the communal areas.

51. As at the time of the fire, with the exception of the basement and Floor 20, tRIIO had completed the work to box-in the riser in the stairwell, the laterals in the stairwell and the laterals on Floor 2. The remaining 12 laterals were scheduled to be completed within approximately 5 weeks. The boxing-in of the pipes consisted of 12 mm uniboard, manufactured by Enviroboards. These were fire boards, which were fire resistant. The boards were screwed to battens, which were fitted to the walls and ceilings. Express Builders used Fire Mate Sealant (an emulsion acrylic based sealant used for sealing joints in fire walls) to seal the joints and the screws. K&S used Hilti sealant around the laterals going into the flats. Below is a table showing some of the materials used for the reactive works:

Materials	Purpose	Fire Rating (hours)	Melting Point
Gas Pipework – riser and laterals			
ASTM A106 Grade B carbon	Internal pipework. 1" to 3" thick/width	Not applicable	1425-1540 °C

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2018

steel	of steel pipe		

HILTI CP 606 Flexible Firestop Sealant	Fire stopping and sealing product for linear joint and gap seals	4 hours	Not applicable
Flanged compression joints			
ASTM A1O5N steel	1" and 3" slip-on flange fittings	Not applicable	1425-1540 °C Equivalent to ASTM A106 steel (Schedule 40 - L245/B PSL1 Grade B)
TESNIT® BA-202.	Gasket (seal between two flange surfaces)	Not applicable.	1000 °C The gasket is between the flanges. This is the heat level applied to the flange where the gasket becomes vulnerable.
Gas connection and security valves			
Emergency Control Valves (ECV)	Consumers control valve fitted adjacent to the gas meter to provide individual gas service isolation provision in each property	Not applicable.	850 °C
Lateral Isolation Valve	Security valve fitted on the lateral pipes on the network pipe system on each landing and within the protected stairway. Designed for sectional isolation of network pipes for maintenance purposes	Not applicable	850 °C
Boxing in of pipework			
Enviroboard Fire Board - Uni-Board 12mm	Fire boxing material	88 minutes Manufacturer's specification is up to 2 hours	Not applicable

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2018

Everflex Fire Mate Sealant	Sealing the boxing in joints and screws.	5 hours	Not applicable
Battens	Strip of timber for fire boxing attachment.	Limited	Not applicable

52. As of 14 June 2017, tRIIO had undertaken internal works to the following flats within the building: 12, 22, 32, 52, 62, 72, 82, 92, 102, 112, 132, 142 and 182.

53. Of the 13 affected flats with a lateral pipe, flats 12 (Floor 1), 22 (Floor 2), 32 (Floor 3), 52 (Floor 5), 62 (Floor 6), 92 (Floor 9), 102 (Floor 10), 142 (Floor 14) and 182 (Floor 18) had their gas supply reinstated on the following dates:

Flat 12 - 16 February 2017

Flat 22 - 9 March 2017

Flat 32 - 22 February 2017

Flat 52 - 26 January 2017

Flat 62 - 10 March 2017

Flat 92 - 22 February 2017

Flat 102 - 2 February 2017

Flat 142 - 9 March 2017

Flat 182 - 8 March 2017

54. Flats 72 (Floor 7), 82 (Floor 8), 112 (Floor 11) and Flat 132 (Floor 13) had gas supplied to the ECV, which was capped, but no further because:

(a) Flat 72 had a leak identified on the existing outlet pipework (tRIIO made this safe and notified the resident so they could arrange for it to be addressed as this pipework was owned by the resident, rather than Cadent, so did not fall within tRIIO's scope);

(b)Flat 82 decided to have an electric oven fitted;

(c)Flat 112 did not have a gas meter;

(d)Our internal works engineer had not been able to gain further access to Flat 132.

E.Inspection of the work carried out

55.Inspections were carried out to the in-ground work, riser, laterals and internal gas works in the flats as follows:

In-ground, riser and laterals

56.The riser, laterals and in-ground pipework were pressure tested by K&S between 25 January and 20 February in accordance with industry standards IGEM/G/5 and pressure test certificates were produced. All test results were given a 'pass' rating.

57.The welded riser and lateral welds were visually inspected by Angles Inspection (100%). A surface crack test (10%) was completed in accordance with T/SP/P/1 (Cadent's specification for welding of steel pipe operating at pressures not greater than 7 bar) and certified.

Internal Gas Works

58.Holland Gas and the Internal Works Engineers completed internal inspections in accordance with Gas Safe requirements on the dates set out in paragraph 53 above.

59.The internal soldered pipework was inspected by site managers from tRIIO and Holland Gas in March 2017. Minor findings were noted and rectified relating to the internal works including one instance of a lack of sleeving on pipework and two instances of minor earth bonding issues. There were also two occurrences of existing cookers missing chains and the customers were advised so they could remedy this. tRIIO does not address existing problems found within properties due to Gas Safe requirements, rather such issues must be flagged to the customer so that they may instruct a third party to deal with these.

Other inspections

60.A MOBS Site Emergency Plan was produced and approved by tRIIO on 5 December 2016 and was reviewed during the project including a Fire Inspection and Risk Assessment, which was carried out by Andrew RADLEY of tRIIO on 7 March 2017. This plan confirmed fire safety arrangements.

61. Throughout the project, regular health and safety site inspections were carried out by tRIIO dealing with site management, competence, management of risk, plant, equipment and materials, and emergency planning. Cadent also made regular site visits.

F. Qualifications of individuals who carried out inspections

62. I set out below a table showing relevant qualifications held by individuals who carried out the various inspection work on this project I have mentioned above together with their roles.

Name/Company	Role/inspection carried out	Qualification
Graham LAWRENCE (K&S)	Riser Team Leader – pressure test of riser and majority of laterals	City & Guilds 'Conduct Specified Testing of Engineering Products or Assets (Service laying)'
Russell SMITH (K&S)	Riser Team Leader - pressure test of 2 laterals	City & Guilds 'Conduct Specified Testing of Engineering Products or Assets (Service laying)' & Utilise 'Riser Team Leading'
Malcolm RUSSELL (Angles Inspection)	Welding Inspector	BGAS and CSWIP Approved for Welding Inspection, Radiography and Magnetic Welding Inspection (BGAS Welding Inspector, BGAS Magnetic Particle Inspector and BGAS Radiographer qualifications) with over 30 years' experience as a welding inspector
Deep BANGHARD (Holland Gas)	Internal Works Engineer	CCN1 and MET1 plus Gas Safe Registration
Eddie KILMARTIN (Holland Gas)		
Paul BAKER (1) (Holland Gas)		
Paul BAKER (2) (Holland Gas)		
Christopher CAMPBELL (tRIIO)		

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Adam MODOO (Holland Gas)		
Devon SHIRLEY (tRIIO)		
Scott DODDS (K&S)	In Ground Team Leader - pressure test of in-ground	NCO (G) Service Layer and Main Layer up to 355mm
Martin LOVEDAY (tRIIO)	Project Manager - site inspections	SMSTS
Andy RADLEY (tRIIO)	Site Manager - internal works and site inspections	CCN1 and MET1 plus Gas Safe Registration SMSTS
Joe EDEN (Holland Gas)	Internal Works Manager - internal works inspections	CCN1 and MET1 plus Gas Safe Registration
Peter O'KANE (tRIIO)	Site Manager (CP) - performed site inspection	SMSTS
Stephen JOHNSON	Design Manager	Gas Appreciation Gasworks 9 G5 MOBS / High Rise Design to Multiple Occupancy Buildings IOSH SMSTS / Utility SHEA Gas CDM PD Training CDM 2015 Ventilation & Fire Safety Design Considerations for MOBS

G. Further information that may assist the investigation

63. Dylan ROBERTS, Director of Health and Safety for Skanska passed a copy of a letter containing the known details of residents to DC Victoria YUSUF of the Police on 5 July 2017.

64. tRIIO was not aware of any other companies working at the Tower between October and June 2017.

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65. tRIIO is committed to co-operating with the ongoing investigation into this deeply tragic event.

tRIIO agrees that this statement provided to the Police may be shared with the Public Inquiry investigating the Grenfell Tower fire.

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