

WITNESS STATEMENT

(Criminal Justice Act 1967, Section 9;
Magistrates' Court Act 1980, Section 5B;
Criminal Procedure Rules 2005, Rule 27.2)

STATEMENT OF: Claude Schmidt

Address: 2 Rue Marie Curie, 68500 Merxheim, France

Age of Witness: Over 18

Occupation: Managing Director Arconic Architectural Products SAS ("AAP SAS")

This statement (consisting of 48 pages signed by me) is true to the best of my knowledge and belief and I make it knowing that if it is tendered as evidence I shall be liable to prosecution if I have wilfully stated in it anything which I know to be false or do not believe to be true.

Dated the day of

Signature:

1. I am the above named person and I have been asked to provide information to the Metropolitan Police to assist with their inquiries concerning the fire at Grenfell Tower.
2. The facts set out below are within my own knowledge and belief, save where otherwise stated or where the same is obvious from the context. Where I refer to information supplied to me by others, the source of that information is identified.
3. I am providing this statement in my native French but I understand that it will be translated into English and a certified translation provided to the Metropolitan Police.
4. I will make reference to a number of documents attached to this statement in a paginated bundle which I exhibit as **CS/10** which is made up of 531 pages. In addition, where they exist, electronic versions of those same documents are included on a USB drive which I exhibit as **CS/11**.

AAP SAS INFORMATION, MY BACKGROUND, EMPLOYMENT HISTORY AND ROLE, AND AAP SAS PERSONNEL

5. AAP SAS is a limited liability company incorporated in France with the Trade Registry ("**Registre de commerce et des sociétés**"). It was established on 20 May 1962, originally under the name Société Industrielle de Laquage et Produits Anti-Corrosion. It has had several

name changes since that time. First, on 7 September 1971 to Reynolds Aluminium France SA and then on 1 January 2002 to Alcoa Architectural Products SAS, following the acquisition of Reynolds Metals Company and its foreign subsidiaries by Alcoa Inc. On 22 August 2016, Alcoa Architectural Products SAS changed its name to Arconic Architectural Products SAS ("AAP SAS"). This change in name came about due to the separation of the business lines of the group of companies of which it forms part, with the materials group being spun out as a company called Alcoa Corporation, and the engineered components group changing its name to Arconic Inc.

6. AAP SAS operates from one property comprising the manufacturing plant plus offices, which is located at 2 Rue Marie Curie, Merxheim, 68500, France. AAP SAS's operations were previously carried out at a property located at 1 Rue Du Ballon. Operations were progressively moved from that site to the current site located at 2 Rue Marie Curie as the site was developed and new production facilities installed. From around 2008/2009 AAP SAS had stopped all manufacturing operations at 1 Rue Du Ballon. In August 2015, the address was changed to 2 Rue Marie Curie. This was to avoid confusion with another "Rue Du Ballon" located in the nearby town of Guebwiller which also had the same postcode as Merxheim, as delivery vehicles were arriving at the incorrect location. It has 255 employees and is certified to international standards in respect of a number of its management systems, that is: ISO 9001 (quality management, and which AAP SAS has held since around 1993), ISO 50001 (energy management, held since 2015), ISO 18001 (health and safety, held since 2011) and ISO 14001 (environmental management, which AAP SAS has held since around 1999). Audits against these standards are carried out annually.
7. A document summarising the senior management team is exhibited at page 1 which details the management roles of the company and the persons in such roles from 2011 to date. These show that the senior management team during this period has comprised the Managing Director, Finance Controller, HR Director, Plant Director, Production Director, Technical Director and Sales and Marketing Director; the company is organised in to different functions reporting to such directors. Please note that the English version of the organisational chart prepared refers to directors as "managers". It should also be noted that there was a reorganisation of management functions in 2017, meaning that from 1 August 2017, the role of Plant Director was replaced through the introduction of Production Director and Technical Director roles, with the Plant Director's responsibilities (which included managing production operations) being split between them.

8. I would summarise the roles and responsibilities of the individuals in these positions as follows:

8.1 **Managing Director** - to provide strategic leadership for the company in areas such as employment issues, compliance issues and financial matters;

8.2 **Plant Director** - to manage the plant so as to deliver results, provide operational and technology leadership, and leadership on issues such as customer service, product quality and corporate environmental and health and safety values;

8.3 **Production Director** - to manage the production process of Reynobond and Reynolux products, including areas such as production lines, packing of product and transportation of products;

8.4 **Technical Director** - to oversee the technical support function (that is, two teams: one responsible for product development and one for technical sales support) for Reynobond and Reynolux products, maintenance and new works;

8.5 **Sales and Marketing Director** - to develop and implement sales strategies;

8.6 **Finance Controller** - to manage the financial and accounting activities of the company; and

8.7 **HR Director** - to manage and implement HR matters including for example in relation to workforce planning, employee relations and disciplinary action.

9. I have been asked to explain the roles and responsibilities, and dates of employment / engagement, of a number of personnel, and provide this information below:

9.1 Claude Wehrle - Claude has worked for AAP SAS since November 2003. His main role is to provide technical sales support in relation to the products that are manufactured by AAP SAS. This involves assisting in obtaining relevant certifications to promote the sale of the products and responding to technical queries that are usually raised with him via the AAP SAS sales teams but are sometimes referred to him from AAP SAS's distributors or customers. He also provides technical support for AAP SAS's participation in international building fairs. The technical work relates to various aspects of the products including, for example, wind loading, water resistance, air resistance, reaction to fire etc. He has no role in sales matters other than responding to technical queries as described above. One of the responsibilities of the team he works in is to liaise with bodies that provide certifications in order to obtain such

certifications if asked to do so by the business for sales and marketing purposes. The team he works in was until 2018 part of the 'Sales Department' and so historically Claude reported to the Sales and Marketing Director. From 2018, the team reported to the Technical Director. The Technical Director left the business in early 2019, and since that date, Claude Wehrle and his team has reported directly to me.

- 9.2 Deborah French - Between October 2007 and December 2014, Deborah was UK Sales Manager for the Reynobond product line of what was then called Alcoa Architectural Products SAS. As she was resident in the UK, Deborah was employed by Kawneer UK Limited (an associate company of AAP SAS), although the overwhelming majority of her instructions came from, and she reported to, AAP SAS personnel. She was responsible in the UK for sales of Reynobond products.
- 9.3 Gwenaëlle Derrendinger - Gwenaëlle began working in what is called the Inside Sales Team on an interim basis in November 2005 and became full time in April 2006 (the Inside Sales Team being a sales function based at Merxheim). Since September 2011 she has worked a four-day week and does not work on Wednesdays. In her role she is responsible for supporting the sales activities of AAP SAS by supplying marketing literature and product samples, responding to queries about AAP SAS's products, checking stock levels, processing orders, confirming delivery details and chasing payment of invoices. This support is provided either to AAP SAS's local sales representatives in various countries or to customers and potential customers who approach AAP SAS direct.
- 9.4 Marie-Claude Jordan (whose name was formerly Marie-Claude Jaeggy) - Marie-Claude started work at AAP SAS in 1987, in the Inside Sales Team, where she still works. In her role she is responsible for supporting the sales activities of AAP SAS by supplying marketing literature and product samples, responding to queries about AAP SAS's products, checking stock levels, processing orders, confirming delivery details and chasing payment of invoices. This support is provided either to AAP SAS's local sales agents in various countries or to customers and potential customers who approach AAP SAS direct.
- 9.5 Peter Froehlich - Peter began working for AAP SAS in 1996 as an engineer, and later as a production manager. He began a role in sales in 2001 and in 2010 began to manage all those sales representatives who dealt with Reynobond architecture. In 2013, following a reorganisation of the sales department, he managed all sales representatives in Europe with responsibility for Reynobond architecture sales. In 2016, he managed all such sales representatives outside of Europe and for potential new markets.

- 9.6 Vince Meakins - Vince began working in effect for AAP SAS on 1 May 2015 as the UK Sales Manager for its Reynobond product range. Because he was and remains resident in the UK, he was and remains technically employed by Kawneer UK Limited although he receives all of his instructions from and reports to personnel at AAP SAS. As the UK Sales Manager for Reynobond product, his role required/requires him to have a reasonable understanding of the marketplace in terms of competitors operating within it, opportunities that might arise such as within the construction sector, and developing commercial relationships with those entities which might offer the greatest potential for repeat business.
- 9.7 Celine Emy - Celine began working for AAP SAS in October 2008 in the Business System Continuous Improvement Team and moved to the Environment, Health, Safety and Quality Team in 2011. She is responsible for the quality management system, which primarily involves conducting internal audits to ensure that the requirements of ISO 9001 (an international standard for quality management systems as referred to in paragraph 6 above) are met and maintained.
- 9.8 With regard to personnel who have roles and responsibilities relating to fire performance, including testing certification, input into the creation of product literature, technical specifications and marketing materials relating to the same, this rests with the technical sales support team. Claude Wehrle's role in this is explained in paragraph 9.1 above. Others in that team have included Nicolas Remy (who supports Claude Wehrle with work on product certifications and has also previously carried out the roles described in this paragraph for Philippe Vonthron and Thierry Riegert), Thierry Riegert (who during his time in the team provided technical support for building projects on matters such as wind load, that is, working with customers to assess how this is impacted by the sizes of the panel the customer proposes to use and whether any further reinforcement is required. This support would only be on the occasions where a customer would specifically ask for this if it did not have the relevant in-house experience) and Philippe Vonthron (responsible for the creation of technical drawings and handling technical questions in relation to optimisation, that is, how to ensure that panels are cut in the most efficient way to avoid wastage. He has also previously supported Claude Wehrle in relation to the maintenance and circulation of fire certificates). Whilst the marketing team will be responsible for creation of marketing materials, any technical information included in these, including in relation to fire performance or certifications, is provided by the relevant technical sales support team - Claude Wehrle or Nicolas Remy in relation to certifications or mechanical properties. I understand that the marketing team would not be involved in reviewing any technical reports.

10. The "technical service team" referred to in the technical data sheets is a reference to the technical sales support team, that is, Claude Wehrle's team and the work that Nicolas Remy, Philippe Vonthron and Thierry Riegert carry out referred to above.
11. I have been asked to describe in detail any contact that those involved in the refurbishment of Grenfell Tower had with AAP SAS's technical service. My understanding is that there was no such contact.
12. With regard to my background, I have a degree in metallurgy from St Louis University, France. My first job, which I started in 1985, was as a production manager for Maillard SA (a bike company). I am based at the Merxheim site, referred to in paragraph 6 above. In 1991 I was appointed as the general manager for Reynolux and between 2006 and 2007, I was a production manager focusing on China and a new plant which was proposed there at the time (during that period I was not based in China, but did travel there). I was appointed as Managing Director of AAP SAS in August 2007, and have held the role of President of AAP SAS since June 2010. I have held the role of Vice President of Arconic Architectural Global since June 2016.
13. My role involves overseeing all aspects of the business of AAP SAS, including operational, logistical, sales and technical issues; by this, I mean that the senior management team reports to me on such matters. I am not involved in the day to day discussions which take place, but relevant points should be elevated to me as necessary, and that I would generally receive updates at the senior management monthly meetings which were held at the Merxheim site and which, from 2018, are now held on a weekly basis.

PRODUCTION OF REYNOBOND

14. I am not directly involved in the day to day management /manufacture of Reynobond or other AAP SAS products, as this is dealt with by the Plant Director and his team. The Sales and Marketing Director (another member of the AAP SAS senior management team which reports to me) also has a role in this regard. Those directors and their teams would (and do) deal with day to day issues, and I would be involved where business critical decisions need to be taken. In my role as President of AAP SAS, I obviously know what products the company makes, understand what those products are used for, and have an awareness of market demands.
15. A number of different products are manufactured at the Merxheim site, which has been in operation since 1962, with a Reynobond production line opening in 2000 and a high speed coil coating line for AAP SAS's products beginning operation in 2007. Those products are:

- 15.1 Reynobond (described in detail in paragraphs 17 to 21 below);
- 15.2 Reynolux, a pre-painted aluminium sheet; and
- 15.3 Reynodual, a coil coated double sheet aluminium panel (that is, two aluminium sheets which are bonded together, without a core).
16. The majority of Reynobond products which AAP SAS makes are aluminium composite panels (that is, two aluminium sheets, bonded to either side of a core). AAP SAS does, however, also sell "Reynobond Zinc", which are zinc composite panels, and "Reynobond Inox", which are stainless steel composite panels. The relevant AAP SAS product which was used on Grenfell Tower consisted of an aluminium composite material ("ACM"), and in the remainder of this report where reference is made to "Reynobond", it is to the aluminium form of the product, unless otherwise stated.
17. The official product names / manufacturer's references for Reynobond products manufactured by AAP SAS are Reynobond PE, Reynobond FR and Reynobond A2. The PE product has a polyethylene core, the FR product a core made of 70% mineral content plus 30% polyethylene, and A2 has a core made of 90% mineral content plus 10% polyethylene, which is of limited combustibility. The "A2" reference comes from the class that product achieves when tested to European standard EN 13501-1 (fire classification of construction products and building elements - classification using test data from reaction to fire test). AAP SAS started to manufacture Reynobond A2 at Merxheim in late 2016 with the launch of A2 product from the Merxheim production line being in January 2017 (which was after the supply of the material which was used on Grenfell Tower). From 2014, AAP SAS had made limited sales of Reynobond A2, with the product at that time being manufactured by a third party in China, and returned to AAP SAS as a finished product for sale (I have been asked whether that product was publicly advertised by AAP SAS at the time of the supply of the material used on Grenfell Tower, and having spoken to colleagues understand that it was not. It would however have been available if requested by a customer). At the time that the Reynobond which was ultimately used as one component of the cladding system on Grenfell Tower was sold, it was therefore available with a PE, FR or in a product manufactured by a third party with an A2 core.
18. In terms of the manufacturing process, the Merxheim site receives aluminium coils from suppliers. These are then unrolled and painted as necessary to the desired colour, and then the sheets are re-coiled. The aluminium used for all products is painted at Merxheim. Zinc used is

purchased as raw material or with a coating already applied. Reynobond products can be painted in a wide variety of colours with different textures and technical coatings. The painted aluminium rolls are transferred to the bonding facility, to which the raw materials for the various cores are delivered. The material for the PE core is supplied in pellet form, with the pellets being melted on site and turned into plastic sheets, i.e. the core. The material for the FR core is provided in pellet form and is also melted on site. The A2 core comes ready made from a supplier. Once melted, the PE and FR cores are cooled into shape. The coils of aluminium are unrolled, glue applied and the aluminium sheets plus the core are compressed together to make the composite product.

19. AAP SAS supplies Reynobond products in five different standard widths (that is, 1000 mm, 1250 mm, 1500 mm 1750 mm and 2000 mm), and the product is cut into sheets for dispatch to customers.
20. They are also supplied in three different thicknesses of aluminium. That is, Reynobond 22, (known as Reynolite), which is made of two 0.2mm thick aluminium sheets bonded to a central core with a total thickness of 2mm, Reynobond 33, which is made of two 0.3mm thick aluminium sheets bonded to a core, and Reynobond 55, which is made of two 0.5mm thick aluminium sheets bonded to a core. The cores can also be of different thicknesses, and so Reynobond 33 can have a total thickness of 2mm, 3mm or 4mm, and Reynobond 55 can have a total thickness of 3mm, 4mm or 6mm. Reynobond 55 is the product used for architectural applications, such as a component in rainscreen cladding systems. It is the type of product used on Grenfell Tower.
21. When referring to Reynobond in documentation, AAP SAS uses the shorthand RB, followed by a three-digit number. That number is comprised of two digits representing the thickness of the aluminium, followed by one digit representing the thickness of the finished product, which is determined by the thickness of the core. By way of example, Reynobond 55 with a total thickness of 4mm would be referred to as RB554.
22. I have been asked to provide the CAD files and 3D objects for Reynobond products as referenced in the technical data sheets in exhibit CS4 to my first witness statement. These are exhibited at page 5. I had no involvement in the production of these technical drawings.

SAMPLES

23. AAP SAS keeps a small control sample from each production lot, so that it can be referred to should a customer raise a quality issue. Samples are taken at different stages of the production

process, for example at the beginning and end of production, and are used for internal quality control and testing purposes. I understand that Celine Erny has been asked to provide an overview of the testing and sampling process. I can say that samples are retained for ten years and are stored in boxes at Merxheim. They are marked with a production date and time, the location of the sample in the panel (ie left, middle or right) and a work order number. This information is contained through the writing of the "time" and then the inclusion of the "OF" and "OT" reference number (an explanation of which is included at paragraph 136). When boxes are full, they are sent for off-site storage with Trans'hit International SA in Rixheim. None of the samples from the supplies relating to Grenfell Tower had been moved off site. AAP SAS therefore has samples of product from before and after any changes (for example to the core colour).

24. With regard to the samples from the production lots which were supplied to a fabricator and then ultimately used on Grenfell Tower, the Metropolitan Police Service visited the Merxheim site on 11 October 2017 and took custody of all the relevant control samples, identified by AAP SAS by the identification information included on the samples (as set out above) for the orders in question. An explanation of how these samples correlate with CEP orders is set out in paragraph 135. The production samples were not provided to CEP as they were (as with all samples for all orders) for AAP SAS's internal quality controls.

USES OF REYNOBOND

25. Reynobond 33 with any of the cores referred to above, can be used for corporate signs and displays, in bathrooms and kitchens (for example as partitions or splash backs), and also for industrial and transport applications (for example, containers, protection for machinery and cladding for transportation such as trucks).
26. Reynobond 55 with an A2 or FR core can be used in building and construction (which is referred to as "architectural use"). In general terms, such products are used on the exterior of buildings to improve their appearance and energy efficiency. They are weather resistant and provide protection to the materials underlying them i.e. they form a "rainscreen", protecting insulation from rain.
27. As from 26 June 2017, AAP SAS made the decision to stop supplying Reynobond 55 with a PE core for architectural use in high-rise applications (a copy of the template letter used to inform its customers of this is exhibited at page 6 and a press release confirming the position is at page 9). This decision was effected by AAP SAS ceasing to manufacture Reynobond 55

PE at Merxheim (this was not a product of which stock was retained as it was always manufactured to order). Such decision was not made because AAP SAS believed Reynobond PE to be inherently dangerous, nor because there was any prohibition on its sale for use on buildings above a certain height. It does, however, have certain characteristics which, if it is used incorrectly, can increase the risk of fire spread. That is, the core is made of polyethylene, which is a plastic. If that is exposed to a heat source, it will burn. Incorrect use (for example in a poorly carried out refurbishment where its use in combination with other materials has not been properly assessed) can therefore mean that in the event of a fire, the risk of that fire spreading is increased. The company's assessment, made very quickly after the Grenfell Tower fire, was that its product had been used incorrectly. As such, the trust and confidence which AAP SAS had previously had that the supply chain was complying with relevant regulatory regimes, so that its product was being used in a way which was safe, was lost. As AAP SAS is a component part product manufacturer that does not exercise control on its ultimate use, including what other materials it may be used in combination with, the most expeditious way for AAP SAS to prevent future misuse was to stop supply.

28. In addition to ceasing to manufacture Reynobond 55 PE at Merxheim, in the wake of the Grenfell Tower fire, AAP SAS started to request additional information from customers as a prerequisite for any order / product delivery of Reynobond. An example of an email attaching the questionnaire are exhibited at pages 11, 13 and 14. All sales representatives are required to ensure that the questionnaire is completed.

OTHER FIRES

29. AAP SAS had been aware of fires in high rise residential blocks in previous years, but that only one of those had involved Reynobond PE, that is, a fire at Taplow Tower in London in 2012. I now understand that the cladding system used at that building involved the insulation product Rockwool, although I do not recall being aware of that fire at the time it occurred, and only became aware of it after the Grenfell Tower fire. I now understand that that fire had been contained and there had been no loss of life. I would also note that Reynobond 55 PE is very similar to other ACM products made by other manufacturers and there would be very little difference in the way that these products would react to fire.
30. I have been asked about my knowledge of other previous fires and can comment that:
- 30.1 I am aware of two fires in tower blocks involving ACM PE where AAP SAS's product had not been present on the building. That is, a fire at Mermoz Tower in

France in 2012, and a fire at Marina Torch Tower in Dubai in 2015. I cannot recall exactly when I became aware of these fires, but believe that I knew about the Torch Tower fire at the time it happened, and may not have been aware of the Mermoz Tower fire until after the fire at Grenfell.

- 30.2 Exhibited at pages 17 and 18 are emails relating to a fire in Bucharest in 2009 (the emails are dated 17 and 26 July 2009). Reference is made to the panels on the building being PE composite, but not manufactured by AAP SAS. I do not recall these emails, nor do I recall having any discussions with Claude Wehrle in relation to these emails.
- 30.3 Exhibited at pages 20, 24 and 28 are emails relating to a fire at Tamweel Tower in UAE in 2012. It may be possible that these emails were discussed at a meeting, but I cannot recall such a discussion, nor do I remember seeing these emails before. Having now seen the comment about Alucobond using fire core only as standard, however, if this is a reference to all Alucobond sales, I would be sceptical about the content of the email from the 3A sales manager (3A being the manufacturer of Alucobond) as we believed from general industry knowledge and market sales, that Alucobond PE was being sold at that time. In this context, I would refer to an Alucobond brochure dated June 2015 (over two years after the email concerning Tamweel Tower), which appears to refer to panels with a PE core being used for facades, as well as Alucobond year-end presentations from 2012, 2013, 2014 and 2017 which refer to PE core in the context of architecture. To my knowledge, these presentations were not attended by AAP SAS, but I did review them as part of my competitor analysis, with the focus being on the financial trends and performance of AAP SAS competitors.
- 30.4 Exhibited at pages 208, 209 and 210 are emails relating to a fire at the Address Downtown Hotel in Dubai, dated 4 January 2016. I cannot recall having seen these at that time.
- 30.5 I was not aware of a fire at the Lacrosse Building in Melbourne in November 2014.
- 30.6 Since the fire at Grenfell Tower, I have been made aware of fires which occurred in tower blocks in the UK at Lakanal in 2009 and Shepherd's Bush in 2016. I understand that neither of those involved ACM panels. I therefore believe that any issues with cladding systems on high rise buildings may not be confined to ACM materials.

31. Before the Grenfell fire, I do not believe I knew of any case where there had been any fatalities amongst the residents of a building in which ACM panels with a PE core had been part of the cladding system where there had been a fire. I therefore did not believe that end users, including in the UK, were using Reynobond PE improperly or not in conformance with local regulations. The combination of all of this meant that until the Grenfell Tower fire, AAP SAS reasonably believed that its product was being used safely and appropriately, and that no specific steps therefore needed to be taken to inform or educate staff, certifying bodies or customers or potential customers in respect of those fires.

FABRICATION OF REYNOBOND

32. Before being used in building/construction works, Reynobond panels have to be fabricated in to the size and shape that the building designer/architect wants; this is the case whatever the core is made of. AAP SAS does not fabricate panels; it sells the Reynobond product in sheet form to fabricators, who are its customers. The fabricators then shape the panels, including ensuring that they can be attached to the intended building in the way specified by their customers. This may be by perforating panels so that they can be attached by rivets or screws, or by machining and folding panels to make "cassettes" which can then be fixed to the building by suitably competent installation professionals.
33. AAP SAS produces fabrication guidelines, available on its website. These do not recommend the uses for which the product is suitable, nor comment on whether rivet or cassette panels should be used in any particular circumstances. A copy of AAP SAS's fabrication brochure entitled "Step by step to a perfect cladding" is provided at exhibit CS5 to my statement dated 17 August 2017. That document has since been reviewed and amended and its replacement, "Guidelines for handling, storage and fabrication", dated April 2019, is exhibited at page 211. The document has been simplified, and references to the use of Reynobond PE in architecture deleted. Disclaimer wording has also been added, which emphasises the need for customers to take account of local laws and regulations and ensure that the product is used in a system that complies with applicable fire safety regulations. Such wording was not included because of a change in AAP SAS's position on such matters, but because we believed following the Grenfell Tower fire, that as a responsible business we should emphasise the point.
34. At the time of supply by AAP SAS, it would not be usual to know how the product was to be fabricated. The company may find out in due course, for example if it is required to give a warranty for the product, via the warranty questionnaire.

SALES OF REYNOBOND

35. In respect of sales of ACM, AAP SAS has never had a large market share in the UK (estimated at approximately 10%). For example, I understand (having considered sales information) that in 2000 AAP SAS sold 16,472 sqm of Reynobond into the UK for use in architecture. This figure fluctuated in subsequent years, increasing to a maximum of approximately 79,000 sqm in 2008, but always remained as a small proportion of the UK market.
36. The figures referred to above are for sales of Reynobond PE, as in that period, that was what the UK market demanded. I was aware that in some jurisdictions (for example Poland) legislation was in place which prevented the use of PE products in architecture other than in limited circumstances. In cases where AAP SAS's customers wanted to use Reynobond but were not permitted by local legislation to use PE, they increasingly pushed for Reynobond FR to be supplied, but at PE prices. In 2008, Reynobond PE would cost in the region of EUR 25,34 per sqm, with Reynobond FR being more expensive at an average of EUR 27,51 per sqm. The reason for the difference in cost was simply that the material used for the FR core was more expensive than for the PE core.
37. With regard to the prices of ZCM and ACM FR in comparison to ACM (55) PE around the time of the refurbishment of Grenfell Tower, these were as follows:
- 37.1 ZCM - circa EUR 80 per sqm
- 37.2 ACM FR - circa EUR 28 per sqm
- 37.3 ACM PE - circa EUR 26 per sqm
38. So far as profit margins on ZCM, ACM FR and ACM 55 (PE) products at the onset and during the refurbishment of Grenfell Tower are concerned, these were as follows:
- 38.1 ZCM - circa EUR 30-40 per sqm
- 38.2 ACM FR - circa EUR 5-6 per sqm
- 38.3 ACM PE - circa EUR 7-8 per sqm
39. I have been asked how the price of Reynobond ACM 55 PE cassettes compared to face fixing / using Reynobond in a riveted system at the onset and during the refurbishment of Grenfell Tower. I cannot comment on this, as AAP SAS does not sell rivet or cassette systems, it sells

flat sheets of Reynobond which customers can fabricate and use as part of a rivet or cassette system if desired (as is explained in further detail above in the section of the report headed 'Fabrication of Reynobond'). However, I do know that as a general rule, cassette variant is more expensive than rivet after fabrication and installation due to the more detailed processes involved in the making of the cassette product.

40. Over time, market demand in various jurisdictions shifted from PE to FR across a number of jurisdictions. It was important for the AAP SAS business to reflect this change and remain competitive, and so we started "Project FR @ PE cost" in 2008, which had the aim of reducing the cost of producing Reynobond FR to bring it in line with the costs of Reynobond PE. Exhibited at pages 214 and 220 is an email dated 29 June 2009 attaching a presentation about the project. Exhibited at pages 221 is an email dated 30 May 2014 relating to a visit from Prefa (one of AAP SAS's customers), which refers to a competitor (Alucobond) offering its FR product at a PE price. This reflected the company's understanding of the way in which the market was moving.
41. I was aware that the technical department was working with suppliers in relation to different FR formulas, which were trialled in order to establish if price reductions could be achieved (further details are contained in paragraph 61 below, although it should be noted that at the time I was not aware of the detail of the trials, and simply that this was one area being looked in to by the business as part of the FR @ PE cost project).
42. By 2015, the price of Reynobond FR and Reynobond PE was nearly the same, with the average price of the FR product being EUR 26,71 per sqm, and of the PE product EUR 26,06 per sqm.
43. Exhibited at pages 224 and 226 is an email chain from June 2015. By that date, the plant had taken things as far as it was able in terms of the FR @ PE cost project, and to progress further would need further substantial investment. It is to that request that the email chain relates.
44. Although AAP SAS wanted to further reduce the cost of FR, our general push towards FR was successful, as by 2015, the overall sales from Merxheim of Reynobond FR for architecture exceeded the sales of Reynobond PE for architecture (exhibited at pages 227 is a graph demonstrating this). Furthermore, in relation to UK sales, FR moved from accounting for approximately 3% of sales in 2014 to 30% of sales in 2015 and 34% of sales in 2016. Whilst the UK market was therefore lagging behind other countries, as ACM PE was popular

and the market was slow to respond to change, the position was moving, and the percentage of UK sales which were FR did increase between 2013-2016 (inclusive).

45. I was not directly involved in speaking with customers about moving to FR from PE (this would not be something which I would do in my role), but I was part of the decision to try to move AAP SAS's business in that direction. I exhibit at page 230 an email dated 3 May 2016 (i.e. after the date that the Reynobond which had been used on Grenfell Tower had been supplied) sent by Alain Flacon (the Sales and Marketing Director at that date) to the French sales team, as forwarded by Alain to me on 14 June 2017. I confirm that I had not seen this email at the time it had been sent to the sales team (and would not have expected to see it), but I now understand that it was sent to that team given the regulatory regime in France as it related to the use of ACM PE. That email is illustrative of the approach which was being taken to shift the business towards FR.
46. As is mentioned above, Reynobond panels needed to be fabricated into rivet or cassette versions before being used as part of a cladding system. Although AAP SAS does not carry out such fabrication, and so does not have direct knowledge of market place demands for the different variants, I now understand that "cassette panels" require more fabrication than "rivet panels" (by their very nature). In addition, the FR core is more abrasive when machined than the PE core, and so FR panels are harder to fabricate. The combination of these factors means that PE rivet panels were the cheapest available, including the fixings for them being cheaper than for cassette panels. The main demand for cassette panels was where the appearance of the building was of more importance - cassette panels therefore tended to be used on higher specification buildings.

FIRE PERFORMANCE TESTING/CERTIFICATION OF REYNOBOND ACM PRODUCTS

47. Whilst I was aware of the need for testing of AAP SAS products, I would not arrange tests and generally not be provided with test results, or be aware of when fire performance testing was being carried out, or to which standard (although I was aware that there were both European and national standards which may be used in different countries). AAP SAS has a technical sales support team in Merxheim, which deals with such matters.
48. In relation to awareness within AAP SAS of the results of fire performance testing and certification, a number of people within AAP SAS would have been aware including the sales team and the technical sales support team. Members of the sales team would be aware of results as they are made available to them through an online system referred to as the

"toolbox". Claude Wehrle and the technical sales support team would upload to the toolbox a new or updated classification report or certification and would notify the sales team via email of any such changes. Such emails were sent to two mail distribution lists: "RAF Liste Commercial Interne" which includes all members of the Sales and Marketing Department that are based in Merxheim including those working in "internal sales", "outside sales" and "technical support" and "RAF Liste Commercial Externe" which includes all members of the Sales and Marketing Department that are based outside of Merxheim and either employed by AAP SAS or are its agents, including for example, Deborah French and Vince Meakins. For completeness, it should be noted that in my experience the technical (research and development) team may have a general awareness of tests being carried out in the context of any product modifications and to the extent that technical information is required by the technical sales supports team as part of the testing it arranges. I would also note that information may have been presented to management on specific occasions, for example, in relation to investment decisions in respect of FR or A2 investment projects.

49. Given my comments above, I cannot provide a detailed history of the fire performance testing/certification of Reynobond ACM from 2005 to present, including in relation to British Standard tests and European classification for reaction to fire (EN 13501), cannot comment on results achieved and cannot comment on fire tests performance ratings or certifications of Reynobond 55 PE between 2005 and June 2017, save to the limited extent referred to in paragraph 54 below regarding the French classification system and paragraphs 57, 64 and 66-67 regarding EN 13501 testing. Neither can I comment on any subsequent changes in the classifications of the products or on actions taken following testing.
50. I have been asked if ACM has a harmonised product standard, and if any work had been conducted by AAP SAS to achieve one. Given my role in the company this is not an issue with which I have been involved. I understand, however, that this issue is addressed in the statement given by Claude Wehrle.
51. I have also been asked whether AAP SAS trained its staff and contractors on the technical performance of its products, in particular, fire performance. To my knowledge, AAP SAS does not use contractors on any relevant matters. Insofar as AAP SAS staff are concerned, there are one or two sales meetings a year where Claude Wehrle and his team would include a session on technical (i.e. product certification/testing) matters. While this would sometimes include fire performance, generally it would be a rolling training programme covering different topics. The format of this training would typically include three main areas:

provision of statistics about recent testing (e.g. how many/types of tests carried out), general market news and then the particular training topic.

52. Training would also be provided for new sales team members. This would be carried out by Claude Wehrle / his team, and they would spend time explaining the fire certifications held and what would need to be provided to sell product in a particular country.
53. I have been asked to explain my understanding of the UK Building Regulations and Associated Guidance in relation to the required fire performance of products used in external walls of buildings over 18 metres in height. AAP SAS supplies products which are used in many different jurisdictions and I personally do not have detailed knowledge of local laws on building construction and how to comply with them. Prior to 14 June 2017, I was not aware of the detail of the UK requirements in respect of the use of building products, other than that they were controlled at the point of use. This remains my understanding since 14 June 2017.
54. As I am based in France, I did have more of an awareness of the legal requirements for selling Reynobond panels here. Although I did not deal with the detail of this, I knew that construction products had (and have) to be classified in to categories relating to reaction to fire and resistance to fire. Each category has sub-categories depending on complex criteria, with specific reaction to fire requirements. A system is in place in France (and has been since 1983) which defines five classes of product, from M0 (incombustible) to M4 (highly flammable). It also specified the test methods and procedure for determining the classification based on such tests. Although the ruling which set out the test methods etc is no longer in force in France, the classification methods and procedures established under it continue to have effect under French national standards. Manufacturers of construction products in France must provide information as to which classification under the M system its product meets. It is then for the designers of buildings to ensure that their construction meets legal requirements. This system informed AAP SAS's general approach to product sales.
55. There were (and are) also requirements in France relating to the use of construction products for particular purposes. As far as fire safety is concerned, buildings are classified as follows:
 - 55.1 Establishments open to the public;
 - 55.2 High rise buildings (more than 50 metres for residential buildings and more than 28 metres for every other building);
 - 55.3 Employee sites; and

55.4 Residential buildings.

Generally speaking, panels used on the façades of high rise buildings in France must have an M0 classification.

56. Reynobond PE has held the "M1" classification continuously since 2011. The testing was carried out by a French accredited certifying body called the Centre Scientifique et Technique du Batiment ("CSTB"). Where a product of this type is covered by such testing, it can be seen as a passport to place the product on the market in the European Union as a product which has obtained that classification, though this is subject to compliance with the applicable local building and construction regulations. The testing may relate to all colours in the range, if the certificate states "Coloris Divers", or it may only relate to specific colours tested, if that is specified on the certificate. It would be expected that any customers which had any concerns would contact the company and raise questions, which could then be discussed.
57. Insofar as testing to achieve an M1 classification is concerned, I am aware that this is carried out on unfabricated product. I now understand that the same is true for the tests carried out in respect of achieving National Class 0 (or "NC0") in the UK. I also now understand that the various tests which can be carried out in order to achieve different classifications under European Standard EN 13501 (i.e. reaction to fire tests and fire resistance test), are undertaken on fabricated products (so on rivet or cassette versions). The tests are not comparable, and so an EN 13501 classification of E would not mean that the product could not achieve an M1 classification under French testing, nor NC0 under UK testing.
58. On 19 June 2017, Claude Wehrle sent an email to me, enclosing a PowerPoint presentation dated 26 April 2016 (see exhibited at pages 232 and 233). This presentation is headed "Requirements for reaction to fire products in France". It referred to Reynobond PE rivet having an EN 13501 C classification and cassette having an E classification. This was not something which I had seen until it was sent to me after the Grenfell Tower fire and I did not attend this meeting.

COMPOSITION OF REYNOBOND ACM PRODUCTS

59. There have been no substantive changes to the composition of Reynobond PE since 2005, save for a change to the colour of the core from translucent to black as from 4 May 2015. I was aware that this change was being made, and that when in rivet, the edges of the core were exposed, and they could be degraded by UV; the black core was more UV resistant than the translucent core. In addition, the change was made for aesthetic reasons; that is, customers did

not want to be able to see any differences in the colour of the core at the edges of panels. I was not involved in the details of the change at the time (as this was dealt with by the technical (research and development) team at AAP SAS), but I have since seen various emails and documents relating to it. These are described further below.

60. I was not directly involved in communications with customers concerning the PE core colour change, but would have expected that at the time, the Sales and Marketing Director would have required all customers to be notified of the change. In an email dated 16 April 2015 sent from the Marketing Manager to RAF Liste Commercial Externe and RAF Liste Commercial Interne (exhibited at page 239), it was requested that customers were notified of the change by 4 May 2015. Examples of the change being communicated to customers (on 28, 29 and 30 April 2015) are at pages 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245 and 247.
61. With regard to Reynobond FR (which was not used on Grenfell Tower), there have been a number of changes to the core since it was first produced in January 2001 (it has been sold continuously since that date). It should be noted that AAP SAS does not manufacture the FR core material, nor own the recipes for it; these are owned by its suppliers, Crosspolimeri S.P.A. ("**Crosspolimeri**") and VICOM 2002 S.L. ("**VICOM**"). I was not involved in these changes, but having discussed with Laure Quiquerez and the technical (research and development) team for the purposes of this interview, I can now provide information regarding various changes to recipes, dates sold and test results, as set out below.
- 61.1 Reynobond FR containing the first FR recipe (FR-F base ATH) was sold between January 2001 and September 2011. The FR product was tested and received a B classification under EN 13501 and was also confirmed to be class 0 in accordance with British Standard 476.
- 61.2 A new recipe was produced by Crosspolimeri (COA3 base MDH) and used in Reynobond FR sold by AAP SAS between July 2006 and March 2007. This was tested under EN 13501 receiving a B classification and under BS 476 resulting in class 0. It also received a B1 under DIN 4102 (Germany), NRO under PN-90 (Poland) and a Class A under ASTM E84 (USA). This recipe stopped being used as it was too abrasive and wore down too quickly during production and fabrication.
- 61.3 Reynobond FR with recipe COA4 base MDH (produced by Crosspolimeri) was sold between May 2007 and July 2008. There were no tests carried out on this, but Crosspolimeri confirmed that there were no changes from recipe COA3 in relation to fire behaviour (a copy of the email from Crosspolimeri sent to Laure Quiquerez on 2

August 2007 is exhibited at page 248). Use ceased as the product was too abrasive.

- 61.4 Recipe COA8 MDH (produced by Crosspolimeri) was used in Reynobond FR sold between July 2009 and January 2011. This was tested under EN 13501 receiving a B classification and under BS 476 resulting in class 0. It also received a B1 under DIN 4102 (Germany), NRO under PN-90 (Poland), and a rating of 1-h for fire resistance in accordance with ASTM E119-00a (USA). Use ceased as the product was too abrasive.
- 61.5 Recipe FR-1 base ATH (produced by Crosspolimeri) was used in Reynobond FR sold from March 2011 and is still sold to date. This was tested under EN 13501 receiving a B classification. It also received a B1 under DIN 4102 (Germany).
- 61.6 Recipe FR-V1 base MDH (produced by VICOM) was used in Reynobond FR sold between July 2012 and February 2013. This was tested under BS 476 resulting in class 0, and under EN 13501 receiving a B classification. It also received a B1 under DIN 4102 (Germany) and a Class A under ASTM E84 (USA). Use ceased due to stability issues on long production runs.
- 61.7 Recipe FR-V2 base MDH (produced by VICOM) was used in Reynobond FR sold between February and July 2013. I understand that Claude Wehrle will explain that although the change between FR-V1 and FR V-2 was very small; an orientation test was carried out the result of which showed, as expected, that as far as reaction to fire was concerned there was no significant difference between it and the FR-V1 core. It was therefore decided that a full EN 13501-1 classification was not required. It received a B1 under DIN 4102 (Germany) and NRO under PN-90 (Poland). Use ceased due to issues with delamination.
- 61.8 Recipe Frabond base ATH (produced by Crosspolimeri) was used in Reynobond FR sold between October and December 2014. This was not tested as the supplier guaranteed a fire performance as good as or better than recipe FR-1 and the indicative tests carried out to standards EN 13501 and DIN 4102 confirmed the B1, d0 level. Use ceased due to issues with costs and extrusion behaviour.
- 61.9 Recipe FR-V5 base MDH (produced by VICOM) was used in Reynobond FR sold from July 2017. This was tested under EN 13501 receiving a B classification. It also received a B1 under DIN 4102 (Germany), an NRO under PN-90 (Poland), and a pass under NFPA-285 (USA) for a particular system configuration.
- 61.10 Recipe FR-3 Noir base ATH (produced by Crosspolimeri) was used in Reynobond

FR sold between July 2017 and November 2018. This was tested under EN 13501 receiving a B classification. AAP SAS's technical team has explained that the DIN 4102 test (Germany) failed as the smoke temperature was outside the requirements. This product was not sold in Germany. Use ceased due to stability issues on long production runs.

62. In addition to the above, there were a number of recipes proposed by AAP SAS's suppliers which were never used in Reynobond FR. There were various reasons for this, for example that the material was too abrasive, or it was not possible to produce it on an industrial scale.
63. I have been asked how and where any changes/ modifications to Reynobond 55 (ACM) PE and FR products were recorded. This is not a matter with which I have direct dealings; such issues are dealt with by the AAP SAS technical team (i.e. the product design and development team). I can say, however, that there is a formal procedure in place at AAP SAS to ensure that all new products or changes to existing products are fully discussed and assessed and that this includes a review of all processes and quality control measures. Having spoken with the technical team, I can explain this further: when any modification is proposed to an existing product or a new product is proposed, then following approval to progress matters by AAP SAS's management committee, a project team is created. This team comprises members of the different functions of AAP SAS, including, for example, the technical team and the technical sales support team. This project team is responsible for assessing the modification / potential new product and will hold various meetings throughout the process. A "final project review document" is created once the process has reached an end which records the outcome of testing and position reached. That document is reviewed by AAP SAS management, which makes the decision as to whether the proposed modification / new product should be given the go ahead. The technical team also maintains an internal electronic document which records and contains any technical changes to a product as well as details of the suppliers of the component materials (and is therefore commercially sensitive).
64. Having spoken to Claude Wehrle about testing of Reynobond PE following the change to the core colour, I am now aware of the following: Testing against the European standard, EN 13501, was carried out by the CSTB in June 2015 after the change to the core colour referred to in paragraph 59 above. It was not something with which I was involved at the time, as described above, although I understand that our technical sales support team was confident that the change to the core colour would have no impact on the fire performance of the product. Such testing of the product is something which I would have expected to occur, as AAP SAS would always ensure that it had EN 13501 classification reports prepared by the

CSTB, in place for the company's products. Although it is the M1 classification under the French system that is important for AAP SAS in terms of its ability to sell Reynobond, the reason that testing against the European standard is relevant is that AAP SAS knows that there are a number of jurisdictions which use such test reports and classifications as part of their assessment of compliance with local building codes relating to the use of construction products. The CSTB puts its classification reports online, and so they are freely available to any end users or other persons who may have an involvement with AAP SAS products.

MARKETING OF REYNOBOND ACM

65. In respect of marketing materials and technical data sheets for Reynobond ACM, although I am of course aware of the existence of such documents, and the fact that they will be updated as necessary, these are not areas with which I have day to day involvement, and I would not personally "sign off" on the creation or amendment of such documents. In this regard, exhibited at page 250 is an email dated 29 May 2012 from Claude Wehrle to Peter Froehlich and I, noting that he wanted to speak about the fire class of the product when tested to EN 13501. On 15 June 2012, Claude Wehrle then followed this up by sending a request for a meeting to be held on 19 June 2012 between 11:00 am and 11:30 am. On 15 June 2012, I responded, rejecting the meeting request and asking for Claude Wehrle to clarify what the purpose of the proposed meeting was (page 251). Claude Wehrle responded on 15 June explaining that the meeting was for two reasons, one of which was to discuss the classification of Reynobond PE (page 252). I do not recall having received such an email until it was shown to me when preparing this statement. I could not recall, and am aware that neither could Claude Wehrle, if we met or had a quick call on this. I therefore checked my diary from the time (an extract from the relevant pages of my diary is exhibited at page 253) and cannot find any record of a meeting having taken place about it, and so we could only have had a quick conversation. If such a meeting with Claude Wehrle were to have taken place, and I had been told that Reynobond PE no longer had a "B" classification, then I would have said that the reference to "B" should be removed if it was no longer correct to refer to it as such.
66. I can clarify why the European classification (EN 13501) for Reynobond FR was stated on the technical data sheet at exhibit CS1 to my first witness statement (that statement being dated 17 August 2017), but the European classification for PE was not. I understand that the reason for this is that EN 13501 testing of the PE product in cassette form, carried out in October 2011, had resulted in an E classification. Although the riveted form tested in February 2011

FT22EN	August 2014
EN FT43EN	December 2013
EN FT20EN	August 2014
EN FT19EN	June 2014

71. I had no direct involvement in their creation. The AAP SAS marketing team takes responsibility for producing the technical data sheets for Reynobond PE and FR, based on the information received from AAP SAS's technical team and technical sales support team. I understand the production process involves the marketing team providing a "blank table" to be populated by the relevant teams with the information required. The marketing team is provided with content and information from the following people:
- 71.1 in relation to product paint from Yves Biehlmann in the technical team;
 - 71.2 about Reynobond's product specifications from Laure Quiquerez and/or Eric Rominger in the technical team;
 - 71.3 about the technical performance by Claude Wehrle, or Nicolas Remy (until August 2018), or Thierry Riegert from August 2018; and
 - 71.4 about certifications by Claude Wehrle and/or Nicolas Remy.
72. Having spoken with the marketing team, I understand that once the draft data sheet is created, or the text is substantially modified or new technical information is included, it is sent to the Sales Director for final review and approval. At the time the documents referred to in paragraph 70 above were created, the Sales Director would have been Alain Flacon and at the times the documents were modified, the respective Sales Directors would have been Alain Flacon in 2016 and Lionel Marconnet in 2017.
73. The dates included on the right hand margins of the technical sheets are the dates when the document was last modified. The documents referred to in paragraph 70 have subsequently been amended in light of the decision to stop supply of Reynobond 55 with a PE core for architectural use, by deleting relevant references, and adding a disclaimer emphasising the need for customers to take account of local laws and regulations and ensure that the product is used in a system that complies with applicable fire safety regulations. This amendment was

made not because of a change in AAP SAS's view on such matters, but rather because it believed that following the Grenfell Tower fire, as a responsible business it should emphasise the point.

74. In addition, whilst I did not have any involvement in these, I can confirm that the following types of changes have also been made to the technical data sheets between December 2013 and present:

74.1 Updates to reflect the change in name and branding from Alcoa Architectural Products to AAP SAS;

74.2 Formatting and stylistic changes, including to font and layout;

74.3 Updates to include references to updated product range and colours available; and

74.4 From August 2017, FT22EN referred to FR and A2 core and as such, from this point information from Technical data sheet FT43EN was included in the FT22EN data sheet - it did not make sense to keep both datasheets as they included the same information.

75. The amended data sheets are exhibited at page 264.

76. All marketing materials and technical data sheets were available to customers and potential customers on AAP SAS's website, and customers / potential customers could also contact the company to request specific information.

77. I have been asked if I ever advised or marketed the Reynobond 55 PE panel as suitable for use in rainscreen cladding systems in buildings over 18 metres in height, and I confirm that I did not. I am not aware that AAP SAS ever marketed it as such; as I have explained elsewhere in this statement, it is not the role of the company to advise on how to use products in specific projects.

78. I have been asked about the steps, if any, AAP SAS took to tell customers and potential customers about fire performance test results and / or certification of Reynobond 55 PE, whether I ever explained to potential customers that there was a difference between the fire performance of the FR and PE ACM Reynobond panels (including in terms of their national and European classifications), if so, in what circumstances that advice was provided and whether that advice was ever communicated in AAP SAS product literature or other technical information about the product. I understand that these questions have also been asked of

Claude Wehrle, and that they have been answered at length in his statement. To my knowledge, AAP SAS did not specifically market cassette or riveted variants of ACM panels as being suitable for any particular use, as we were (and are) concerned with the manufacture and sale of unfabricated product.

79. I have been asked whether AAP SAS sought or attempted to seek any advice or guidance at any stage from any external body or organisation (other than the British Board of Agrément) as to any aspect of the suitability of Reynobond 55 PE panels for use on buildings over 18 metres. Within the question, examples were given of the National House Building Council, the Building Research Establishment, Local Authority Building Control, the Building Control Alliance and the Department for Communities and Local Government (or any of its predecessors). My understanding is that this is not something which happened and that it is not something which is required of a component part manufacturer. As is explained from paragraphs 95 onwards below, AAP SAS had a relationship with the BBA, and placed reliance on it in respect of regulatory requirements in the UK. In addition, my understanding is that in the UK, construction products are controlled at the point of use, and so consideration of whether any particular product could be used at any given height, would be undertaken by professionals such as architects and building designers in light of the detailed knowledge which they would have about the project in question.

PRODUCTS SUPPLIED FOR GRENFELL TOWER

80. I was not personally involved in the contract to supply the product which was ultimately put onto Grenfell Tower as part of the cladding system, and would not expect to have been. I did not therefore attend any meeting with any relevant professionals involved in the refurbishment of the tower, nor was I aware that the tower had a height in excess of 18 metres, or that it was proposed to re-clad the entire building as part of the refurbishment works. I have now seen various emails and contract documentation relating to it and also spoken with various employees on this. My comments below are based on such documents and discussions.
81. The materials supplied to CEP Architectural Facades Limited ("CEP") were as follows:
- 81.1 Reynobond 55 PE 4mm smoke silver metallic E9107S DG 5000 Washcoat. The AAP SAS order acknowledgements and CEP purchase orders confirmed that the total area of this product purchased by CEP in connection with Grenfell Tower was 6,586 sqm.

- 81.2 Reynobond 55 PE 4mm pure white A9110S DG 5000 Washcoat. The AAP SAS order acknowledgement and associated CEP purchase orders confirmed that the total area of this product purchased by CEP in connection with Grenfell Tower was 180 sqm.
82. I was not aware of the order of product for the Grenfell tower project at the time it was placed, and so was not aware at the relevant time what the fire classification was. Whilst I cannot comment as to what tests were carried out on which colours when, and so cannot confirm whether Reynobond ACM PE in smoke silver metallic has ever been subject to any fire performance tests, I have discussed with Claude Wehrle, and I am able to confirm that an M1 classification was held, under the French system, as there was a certificate in force which applied to all colours in the range. Insofar as the EN 13501 European standard is concerned, in 2005, ACM PE (which I understand was the grey/green rivet product) had a B classification. In 2011, a different colour of the product was tested, and was given a B classification for the product in rivet form (which was still valid at the time of the supply for Grenfell Tower) and an E in cassette form.
83. In 2014, different colours were again tested, with the result being a C classification for rivet and an E for cassette. The tests of a different colour in 2015 gave a C classification for rivet and E for cassette.
84. Not every colour of product is tested, and I understand that the classifications related to the specific colour of product tested only, and to the other particular details (such as the form of fabrication or the size of the air gap) contained in the test report. AAP SAS would expect users/specifiers of its products to look at the test and clarification reports (which were and are available on the CSTB website), so that they had the technical information needed to support their technical deliberations.
85. Other than the paint colour of the products noted above, the only differences between the products supplied to CEP were in respect of the core colour. The first purchase order date (which was for the smoke silver metallic) was 18 March 2015. The product supplied under that would have had a translucent core as it pre-dated the change from translucent PE to black PE as referred to in paragraph 59 above. The product supplied under the subsequent purchase orders (dated 17 July 2015, 6 October 2015 and 11 November 2015) would all have had a carbon black PE core. The orders for July and October 2015 were for smoke silver metallic finish, with the November 2015 order being for the pure white finish. In total, this would

mean that 3,150.5 sqm was supplied with translucent core and 4,122.65 sqm product with a carbon black core.

86. I have been asked how, when and with whom it was agreed that AAP SAS would supply cladding with a PE core, that is, Reynobond 55 PE for the Grenfell Tower Project. As explained above, this is not something with which I was involved at the time, and understand that this issue is touched upon in statements given by Deborah French, Gwenaelle Derrendinger and Marie-Claude Jordan. I would reiterate that the Reynobond 55 which AAP SAS supplied could be used as part of a cladding system, but that the material itself was simply supplied as flat sheets, and AAP SAS's customer may then fabricate it, and others could then incorporate it in to a cladding system.
87. I have been asked about any knowledge which AAP SAS had before the fire that the Reynobond 55 PE for Grenfell Tower would be fixed as cassettes and how, when and with whom that was agreed. I now understand that in an email into which Debbie French was copied on 31 July 2014 sent by Harley, reference was made to the Grenfell Tower project proceeding with a cassette system as this was what the planners wanted. I also understand that Debbie has stated that this was not something on which she would have focused at the time, and this fits with the way in which AAP SAS's business operates, i.e. we sell flat sheets of Reynobond and are not involved in how the panels are ultimately used, including the way in which they may be fabricated and affixed as part of a cladding system.
88. I have been asked a number of detailed questions regarding quotations provided by AAP SAS for the Grenfell Tower refurbishment, in respect of samples and materials for mock ups which were provided, matters such as references and order, invoice and purchase order numbers and IT systems relating to the same. I had no involvement in such specific matters, and understand that such points are addressed in the statements given by Deborah French, Gwenaelle Derrendinger and Marie-Claude Jordan.
89. I have been asked when AAP SAS became aware that its product had been selected for use in the refurbishment at Grenfell Tower. Having spoken to my colleague Gwenaelle Derrendinger and seen her email at page 310 sent to Peter Froehlich, Alain Flacon and Virginie Leicht (Head of Inside Sales at the relevant date), I understand that AAP SAS were informed of this by CEP on 13 March 2015. I was not aware of this at the time, but would not expect to be informed each time AAP SAS won a contract.

90. I do not know exactly what information AAP SAS had about the proposed refurbishment of Grenfell Tower prior to or after the order was placed, but I am now aware that various samples of the Reynobond product with different finishes were provided to CEP, that the project was in respect of a building referred to as Grenfell Tower in emails, and that AAP SAS employees and the UK sales manager for Reynobond, Debbie French, were aware that it was a residential building in the public sector which was being refurbished. I would not expect that AAP SAS would have any further information about the project nor about other materials to be used in the façade. As described above, AAP SAS manufactures and sells unfabricated ACM panels and does not sell other components of cladding systems. Its customers are the fabricators, and the company has no involvement in the fabrication of or installation of its products. Decisions on whether or not products are suitable for use in a construction or refurbishment project are for professionals such as architects, engineers and building designers to make. Such decisions will be made based on a number of factors, including other materials, design of cladding system and the project details generally, to be used in the project, and AAP SAS would generally not recommend the use of a product for a particular project. In line with this, so far as I am aware, AAP SAS did not recommend the use of Reynobond 55 (ACM PE), nor any alternative products, for Grenfell Tower.
91. I am not aware that anyone at AAP SAS provided any information about the suitability of its products for use to those involved in the refurbishment of Grenfell Tower or relating to their fire classification or performance. CEP was an existing customer of AAP SAS and had been so for a number of years and had previously purchased Reynobond PE. It was very familiar with the product and I do not believe that it (or anyone else involved with the refurbishment of Grenfell Tower) requested or that AAP SAS sent any information about fabrication or installation of the product in relation to Grenfell Tower. Having looked in to the matter in connection with this statement, I am not aware that any product literature, technical specifications or marketing materials (including the BBA Agrément Certificate) were provided by AAP SAS to those involved in the refurbishment of Grenfell Tower for the reasons noted above, that is, its customer was CEP, and it was very familiar with the product.
92. Given AAP SAS's role (that is, a manufacturer and supplier of unfabricated ACM panels) it would not have considered whether the use of Reynobond 55 PE cassette panels as part of the façade of Grenfell Tower would comply with relevant building regulations or associated guidance including in respect of fire safety. It would not be possible for the company to consider such matters, as it would not know exactly how its product was to be used including what other materials its product would be used in combination with. For the same reasons,

neither could AAP SAS form a view as to whether the design of the façade of the tower complied with relevant building regulations and associated guidance, so far as fire safety, or indeed any other aspects, were concerned. AAP SAS did not therefore rely on any advice from third parties about such issues, as they were not (and would never be) within its remit to consider; AAP SAS is simply a supplier of one component product which may be used in the façade of a building.

OTHER COMPANIES INVOLVED IN THE REFURBISHMENT OF GRENFELL TOWER

93. I have been asked to provide details of other projects for which AAP SAS has previously supplied products to CEP. I had heard of CEP before the Grenfell Tower fire, in that I knew that it was a customer of AAP SAS, but I did not have dealings with anyone who worked there and am not aware of any specific projects. I understand, however, that statements given by Debbie French and Vince Meakins refer to non-Grenfell Tower projects on which AAP SAS had supplied products to CEP. I now understand that CEP visited the Merxheim site in 2006, although I did not meet anyone from the company.
94. I have also been asked whether AAP SAS has previously supplied products for other projects involving Harley, Rydon or Studio E, and if so to provide details of the projects and the AAP SAS products supplied. Prior to the Grenfell Tower fire, I had not heard of these companies. I understand, however, that the statement given by Debbie French refers to projects with Harley, and that of Vince Meakins to Rydon.

BBA CERTIFICATE/CORRESPONDENCE

95. I refer to my first witness statement (dated 17 August 2017) and specifically to the BBA Agrément Certificate No 08/4510, originally issued on 14 January 2008. This BBA certificate was relevant to the product supplied to CEP for use at Grenfell. It deals with a number of different quality and safety issues including fire safety. In respect of matters relating to for example durability and cleaning, the certificate is of general application to all product manufactured by AAP SAS. The certificate also gives advice on the safe fixing of fabricated product to reduce the risk of fixed panels coming loose and falling off the building. With respect to fire safety, the certificate gives an indication that a particular colour of product has been tested to NC 0 and has achieved that standard or that a particular colour and fabrication of product has been tested to EN 13501 and has achieved a certain classification. The certificate makes it clear that other colours of the product may react differently to fire. Accordingly, I understand that it would be the responsibility of the person carrying out the

building work to satisfy himself that product of a particular colour would be suitable in respect of fire safety.

96. Further information which I am able to provide regarding discussions and sharing of information with the BBA prior to the grant of that certificate are set out in paragraphs 100 to 105 below. I had very minor involvement only with the BBA regarding Reynobond until after the Grenfell Tower fire, and I was not included on the majority of the emails or other correspondence between the BBA and AAP SAS prior to 14 June 2017, and so cannot comment on or explain them in detail. Nevertheless, I have considered the position and spoken with colleagues (that is, Claude Wehrle and Nicolas Remy) in order to answer the questions which have been put to me in relation to this statement. In my previous role as Production Manager for Reynolux, I had some involvement with the BBA, having been involved to a limited extent with audits which were carried out in that regard, and so have an awareness of its role and how it operates.
97. The full name of the BBA is the British Board of Agrément. It describes itself (on its website) as an independent non-profit distributing organisation. Whilst the BBA may be non-profit distributing, it charges for its services, and in order to obtain an Agrément Certificate, organisations must enter into a contract with the BBA, and a fee is payable for the service which the BBA provides. I very rarely, if ever, dealt with the BBA directly (this was done by the Quality and technical sales support teams, but was aware the Agrément Certificates were important for sales of AAP SAS's products into the UK market even though there was no legal requirement to obtain them.
98. The BBA's website states that *"The BBA Agrément Certificate was first issued by us in 1966 and since then it has become the most reliable way for a manufacturer's new product or system to gain quick acceptance in the market place. Only products and systems that have passed a series of comprehensive assessments – including laboratory tests, on-site evaluations, quality management checks and inspections of production are awarded a BBA Agrément Certificate."*

"As well as BBA Agrément, we offer various other initiatives and schemes that make up our extensive range of Certification services. These Certificates have been created to help manufacturers demonstrate to architects, designers and specifiers that the products being used for construction projects, match the required specification."

"Products that receive BBA Agrément Certificates are recognised by building control and government departments as meeting the BBA standards of quality, safety and reliability; providing them with reassurance of the product's fitness for purpose. For new construction products it is vital to achieve this certification if they are to gain a quick route to the marketplace."

99. So far as I am aware, this has always been the BBA's approach, and for those reasons, AAP SAS felt confident in using its services. Exhibited at page 311 is a BBA leaflet from 2001, and which sets out the background to the organisation. It refers to assessment by the BBA being "painstaking and thorough".
100. AAP SAS has a longstanding working relationship with the BBA and I recall that in my previous role as Production Manager for Reynolux in the 1990s, BBA production audits were carried out. A decision was made to seek an Agrément Certificate for the Reynobond product as a result of market demand. For example, I understand that it is quite common for design and build contracts in the UK to require that the contractor does not authorise or use any products or materials which don't conform with either British or European standards, or which no such standards exist, do not conform with a British Board of Agrément Certificate.
101. I understand that discussions with the BBA regarding Reynobond 55 (that is, the product which was at the time for use in architectural applications) started in early 2004. I understand from emails which I have seen, that AAP SAS's main BBA contacts at that time were Hamo Gregorian (project manager - Engineering Systems), Bob Keyse (Area Business Manager) and John Albon (Section Head). As explained above, I would reiterate that I was not personally involved in any discussions with the BBA in relation to this, and that I do not recall the names from the emails. The main contacts from AAP SAS were Claude Wehrle and Colin Southgate (UK Sales Manager for Reynobond and Reynolux at that time).
102. In my position as President of AAP SAS, I do not review or provide BBA certificates, and cannot describe how such certificates are used within the construction industry.
103. As I have explained, I was not involved in obtaining a BBA certificate for Reynobond 55 PE and FR, and do not deal with such certificates myself. As such, I cannot provide a detailed explanation of that certificate. Furthermore, I cannot describe how the certificate was produced, what documents were provided to the BBA before or after the certificate was issued, nor provide details of any contract or agreement, formal or otherwise, between the

BBA and AAP SAS including what AAP SAS's duties were regarding the provision of information about its products under the contract including updating information over time.

104. Given that it is the AAP SAS quality and technical sales support teams which deal with the BBA, I cannot describe what AAP SAS was required to do as a company to maintain BBA certification for Reynobond 55 PE and FR. I cannot therefore describe any audits or product surveillance processes which the BBA carried out. I am aware that it is the quality and technical sales support teams that would have dealt with this for AAP SAS, but do not know when any audits were conducted, nor by whom, as I was not personally involved with them. This means that I cannot describe what the BBA checked during its audits, nor what paperwork was made available to it. This includes any communications with the BBA regarding the products and testing or certification thereof. I understand that statements given by Celine Erny and Claude Wehrle address audits etc. carried out post issue of the agrément certificate.
105. I am aware from discussion with colleagues that there were numerous discussions with the BBA prior to issue of the agrément certificate in 2008, that the BBA and the CSTB were in direct contact, and that the BBA referred to the fact that it obtained input from regulatory authorities. It should also be noted that AAP SAS placed reliance on the BBA in respect of UK standards and requirements. Such matters are dealt with in the statement of Claude Wehrle.
106. I have considered the certificate in detail since the Grenfell Tower fire, and note that the section which relates to behaviour in relation to fire (section 6), refers to the specific samples of the product for which the BBA was provided with test reports. Insofar as Reynobond PE is concerned, the test report related to a product with a grey/green Duragloss 5000 coating, in rivet form.
107. In any event, since the Grenfell Tower fire, AAP SAS has reviewed a number of its competitor's BBA Agrément Certificates, and notes for example, that in the Alucobond certificate reference 05/4214 dated 4 August 2017 (exhibited at page 311), it is stated that Alucobond PE panels have a class 0 classification under national building regulations, whilst at the same time that product's EN 13501 classification is D.
108. I have no knowledge of any issues with the BBA or the certificate for Reynobond 55 PE and FR, including whether there were any discrepancies between the certificate and AAP SAS's knowledge of the products.

CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN AAP SAS, ITS LEGAL REPRESENTATIVES AND THE BBA SINCE 14 JUNE 2017

109. The first contact from the BBA received after the Grenfell Tower fire was on 16 June 2017, when Simon Wroe (Head of Approvals - Engineering) emailed Nicolas Remy (AAP SAS technical sales support team), asking for confirmation that AAP SAS supplied Reynobond cladding panels to either Harley Curtain Wall Façades or Rydon Construction for use at Grenfell Tower. Claude Wehrle forwarded this email to me and a colleague from the communications team (Jasper van Zon) the same day, and a copy of that email chain is exhibited at pages 325 and 327.
110. On 30 June 2017, the BBA sent an e-mail to Nicolas copied to Claude Wehrle indicating that it had been trying to get hold of Nicolas and noting that it understood from the media that Arconic is discontinuing global sales of PE in high-rise applications (exhibited at page 329). It indicated that it wanted to understand how this would affect the BBA certificate and also requested information as part of the on-going re-issue process on the current recommendations for the use of PE in the UK and details of the composition of the core of the FR material.
111. On 4 July 2017, Hannah Willis of the BBA, on behalf of the BBA operations director Brian Moore, emailed Nicolas a letter relating to the Grenfell Tower fire. A copy of the covering email and letter are exhibited at pages 331 and 332. The letter attached a document which had been sent to local authorities and housing associations on 30 June 2017, to assist their understanding of how to use and navigate BBA certificates. The letter stated that the note had explained that ultimately it was the responsibility of relevant construction professionals (for example designers, contractors, installers etc.) to comply with national building regulations. This confirmed AAP SAS's understanding of the position. A copy of the note is exhibited at page 333 and it can be seen that the BBA's position is that certificates describe a product's technical performance in a way so as to give a potential specifier, such as an architect or contractor, the information needed to decide whether or not a product is suitable for a particular installation. It goes on to note that "*obviously, not all products are suitable for every situation, and not all products work well in combination*"... "*it is not a guarantee and it does not and cannot relate to individual buildings*". It explains that in certificates for aluminium composite panels, results from various tests are listed and the composition of the products is described, and that from a combination of such information, a judgment can be made about whether the requirements of the building regulations are met for a specific building. This accorded with AAP SAS's understanding of the position and the way in which

BBA certificates were used in the construction industry, i.e. the BBA certificates apply specifically to the product that the relevant test reports relate to and specifiers, architects or contractors can review the BBA certificates and should consider the background information to inform them in making such judgments.

112. On 5 July 2017, Simon Wroe of the BBA wrote to Claude Wehrle, requesting a response to a 16 June 2017 email referred to above. A copy of the letter is exhibited at page 338. That letter was sent to Claude Wehrle and other colleagues by email on 5 July, and Claude Wehrle then circulated it to a number of AAP SAS personnel, including me. A response was subject to internal discussion. It can be seen that the BBA refers to media reports that Reynobond PE cladding had been used in the refurbishment of Grenfell Tower, and notes that if a response to the 16 June 2017 email had not been received by 5pm on 12 July 2017, certificate 08/4510 would be suspended, and then withdrawn on 26 July 2017.
113. A response was sent to the BBA on 11 July 2017, requesting a short extension of time to reply, to 17 July (copy email exhibited at page 339). The BBA confirmed that this was acceptable, in an email of 12 July 2017 (copy exhibited at page 341).
114. On 17 July 2017, a formal response was sent to the BBA (exhibited at page 353). This explained that the company intended to continue with production and sale of Reynobond PE for non-high-rise applications, and that AAP SAS wished to continue with the BBA certification for Reynobond PE and FR. Simon Wroe responded by email on the same day (copy exhibited at page 348), noting that as part of an initiative to clarify behaviour in relation to fire and permissible areas of use of aluminium cladding materials, the BBA intended to reissue certificate 08/4510 to indicate a building height limit of 18 metres for the installation of such products. A response to this was chased on 20 July (copy email exhibited at page 346), and an email was sent on behalf of me (exhibited at page 345).
115. In that email, I made the point that the BBA's proposal did not align with the UK building codes. As explained earlier in this statement, prior to the Grenfell Tower fire, these codes were not something with which I was familiar, and AAP SAS had placed reliance on the expertise of the BBA in that regard. The relevant personnel in AAP SAS had, however, considered the UK regime in great detail after the fire, and so were able to comment on the BBA's suggestion. It was clear to the company that Reynobond PE and FR could be used over 18 metres where the cladding system of which they formed part achieved the criteria set out in BR 135, or compliance was demonstrated via a desk top study. If the BBA amended its certificates as proposed, this could indicate that such use was not permitted. Given that AAP

SAS had already taken the decision to cease supply of Reynobond PE for use in high-rise applications, however, the BBA certification for that would only be needed for use under 18 metres, and so such an amendment would not cause AAP SAS concern. In respect of Reynobond FR, I made clear that AAP SAS wished to retain certification for its use, without limitation by height or otherwise.

116. The 20 July 2017 response received from the BBA (exhibited at page 344), stated that both PE and FR panels were restricted to use on buildings up to 18 metres in height. Reference was made to the UK building regulations requiring core material to achieve a limited combustibility rating. On 21 July 2017, the BBA sent Nicolas Remy a draft amended certificate 08/4510 (email and draft exhibited at page 355). With regard to behaviour in relation to fire, the draft certificate noted that use of the panels was restricted to buildings up to 18 metres in height, unless a full scale fire test to BS 8414 had been conducted for the specific wall under consideration, and the other requirements under BR 135 had been met.
117. There then followed an exchange of emails relating to changes to the BBA's conditions of certification, where AAP SAS asked for clarification as to what this meant (exhibited at page 367). The BBA explained by email dated 26 July 2017 (exhibited at page 366) that it would need to visit the company's factory regularly, and that it reserved the right to ask AAP SAS to retest its products should any anomalies arise within the audit or as part of the review. This did not cause the business any concern, and fitted with our experience of how the BBA had been operating in any event.
118. Certificate 08/4510 for Reynobond was reissued by the BBA on 4 August 2017 (exhibited at page 370). AAP SAS had, by then, already terminated the sale and supply of Reynobond PE ACM for architectural applications. The relevant changes to the BBA Certificate (i) removed reference to the "standard" (i.e. PE) panels having a UK Standard or national Building Regulation classification, but continued reference to the PE panel having a EN fire classification of B-s2, d0; (ii) removed such UK classification for the FR panel with gold Duragloss 5000 coating, whilst maintaining the reference to the EN fire classification of B-s1, d0; but (iii) included a "Class 0" or "low risk" classification under the UK Building Regulations/national standard for the FR panel with metallic grey PVDF coating, without any reference to this panel's EN fire classification.
119. Following a site visit by Mr O'Neill of the BBA on 13 September 2017, an observation was made in his report (which is exhibited at page 390), to the fact that references to the PE version of Reynobond were to be removed from the quality plan as AAP SAS had made the

decision that Reynobond PE should no longer be covered by the Agrément Certificate (I am aware that the quality plan is a document which sets out the manufacturing process and also covers issues such as quality checks and traceability, and understand that a statement to be given by Celine Erny will address this in further detail). Given that AAP SAS had ceased to manufacture Reynobond 55 PE at Merxheim, the certificate was subsequently reissued without a reference to PE.

120. On 6 February 2018, Brian Moore emailed Claude Wehrle, regarding contact from the BBC about a programme it intended to broadcast in respect of the Grenfell Tower fire. The BBC had apparently informed the BBA that in 2015, some changes may have been made to the PE material in the core of the Reynobond PE product and that that information had not been communicated to the BBA. Claude Wehrle circulated this email to others at AAP SAS (including me) and to AAP SAS's legal advisers on the same date. A copy of the email from Brian Moore is exhibited at page 391. Internal discussions were taking place and advice was being sought on the company's response, and a reply was not therefore sent immediately. After a week, Mr Moore forwarded the email to me (on 14 February 2018) to ask for a response. On the same date Mr Moore had written to Claude Wehrle and me on the same point, and these letters are exhibited at pages 393 and 395. These letters were sent to Austria, however, and so were not received by Claude Wehrle or I. I had a brief call with Brian Moore on 23 February 2018, following which he emailed me to confirm that a written response to the 6 February email was required, and that the BBA understood that the CSTB had provided a number of reports regarding the fire performance of PE, which the BBA believed it had not seen.
121. A reply was sent to Mr Moore by email on 28 February 2018 (exhibited at page 396). This email explained that not only were the classification reports for Reynobond PE publicly available on the CSTB website, but that when the September 2017 site visit was carried out by the BBA (as referred to in paragraph 119 above), binders containing those classification reports and underlying test data were made available to the auditor. He had, however, indicated that for the purposes of this audit he did not wish to review them. It was also made clear to Mr Moore that such documents would have been available to the BBA during previous audits. I explained that given the ongoing Public Inquiry and investigations in the UK, I was concerned that any discussions I had with the BBA could lead to breaches of my confidentiality obligations. I therefore requested that Mr Moore speak direct with AAP SAS's legal advisers about any further queries. Contact details were provided. A number of emails then followed between the company's legal adviser and the BBA wherein they were making

arrangements to discuss. These are exhibited at pages 397, 399, 402 and 411. Mr Moore asked that I send him the folders which I had explained had been available to BBA auditors, and requested further information as to which AAP SAS members of staff had shown the file to the BBA's auditor, and what had been said about their significance. This email is exhibited at page 426.

122. Mr Moore and DLA Piper (AAP SAS's legal advisers) met on 5 March 2018, and one of the issues discussed related to a change in colour of the PE core (from translucent to black). Emails on this issue which were exchanged following the meeting are exhibited at pages 428, 430, 432 and 437.
123. The email from DLA Piper to Mr Moore dated 11 March 2018 at page 437 is of particular relevance to this point. It explains that the core changed from translucent to "carbon black" for Reynobond PE in mid-2015 (as is referred to in paragraph 59 of this statement). This was effected by a small amount of carbon black material known as Plasblak (the data sheet for that is exhibited at page 442 being added to the core to provide greater UV protection for the core at exposed panel edges, and for aesthetic reasons (which customers were demanding). The change was not related to fire performance.
124. With regard to specifically contacting the BBA to inform it of the change in core colour, my understanding is that this was not done, as the relevant Agrément Certificate did not mention core colour, and AAP SAS believed that it would not impact fire performance of the product. As the CSTB certificate did refer to core colour, it was informed of the change and discussions were ongoing from January 2015 between Claude Wehrle and the CSTB in relation to this (at pages 444 and 446). In March 2015, Claude Wehrle replied to the CSTB's questions about the change. The CSTB responded explaining that additional testing was required as the carbon used to colour the core black may impact certain properties of the core (reference should be made to paragraph 64 above for details of the testing). As noted above, sales agents were also asked to inform customers of the change. The 11 March 2018 email also contained a chart setting out a summary of various tests that had been commissioned for Reynobond FR over the years.
125. Various emails between DLA Piper and Mr Moore followed (between 13 and 22 March, which are exhibited at pages 447, 451 and 456). On 22 March, the email to Mr Moore explained that a step had been added to the AAP SAS product development procedure, which would ensure that the BBA was notified of any product changes relevant to the Agrément

Certificate. It was also noted that the certificate relating to ACM PE clearly contained caveats which were limited to the fire performance characteristics of the product.

126. Further emails were exchanged on 12 April 2018 (exhibited at page 462) relating to the provision of fire test reports to the BBA.
127. On 23 April 2018, Mr Moore emailed DLA Piper and noted that the issue of the fire reports which were to be provided was outstanding. The email is exhibited at page 468.
128. A response to the email referred to above was sent to Mr Moore on 27 April 2018 (exhibited at page 469). That email related primarily to the BBA certificate as at that date, which related solely to the FR product, and attached a number of test reports relating to that product. In respect of the PE product, it was explained to Mr Moore that given the Grenfell Tower Inquiry with which AAP SAS was by this date involved as a core participant, it would not be possible to provide the BBA with documents relating to a product which wasn't part of the current BBA certificate.
129. On 20 July 2018, Mr Moore wrote to me regarding a request made to the BBA by the Metropolitan Police, asking that all communications between the BBA and AAP SAS be provided to it. A copy of that letter was also sent to AAP SAS's legal advisers (these letters are exhibited at pages 471 and 472). A response was sent to Mr Moore by the legal advisers on the same date noting that there was no concern in principle to correspondence being provided, but that in order to confirm, a list of the proposed documents would need to be provided along with sufficient information to enable its advisers and/or AAP SAS to identify them. A copy of that letter is exhibited at page 473 and the covering email at page 474. Mr Moore replied to DLA Piper by way of a letter dated 23 July 2018 (the letter and its covering email being exhibited at page 476 and page 477, noting that the material to be provided would be emails and letters to/from Arconic and to/from DLA Piper since 14 June 2017). My understanding, however, is that despite this indication from the BBA, tab 4 of the file in fact consisted of internal BBA communications, which I have not seen.
130. On 16 November 2018, lawyers acting for the BBA (Taylor Walton solicitors) sent a letter by post to Claude Wehrle (but again to an address in Austria) and to me by email noting that since the August 2017 second revision of certificate 08/4510, it had become aware of matters that it did not know about when the certificate had previously been issued and re-issued, and was suspending the certificate with effect from 17 November 2018. A copy of that letter is exhibited at page 478. In summary, the basis for the suspension was the alleged failure by

AAP SAS to provide the BBA with a number of specified EN 13501 test results, and to differentiate between the fire performance data known to AAP SAS of the cassette variant of the product compared to the riveted variant.

131. On 1 March 2019, correspondence was sent by the BBA to Claude Wehrle (exhibited at page 483) noting that certificate 08/4510 had been withdrawn from the date of that letter "*as we still had not received the key technical data that we requested*". Before this, there had been numerous emails between the BBA and AAP SAS from 23 April 2018 to 16 January 2019, where various pieces of information were requested and provided. Copies of the relevant emails are exhibited at page 484.

FURTHER QUESTIONS

132. I cannot comment on how AAP SAS data was collated/retrieved for provision to the police in October 2017, as this was dealt with by AAP SAS's legal advisers.

CLARIFICATION QUESTIONS

133. I have been asked a number of questions under the heading 'clarification questions', which are not dealt with elsewhere in this statement, and on which I have provided my responses below.
134. I have been asked to provide an explanation/description of exhibits 1/ARC68 to 8/ARC68 provided to the Gendarmerie and then MPS on 11 October 2017 at AAP SAS's premises in Merxheim, France and explain how they relate to Grenfell Tower. My understanding is as follows:
- 134.1 1/ARC68 is a 16GB USB containing 141 emails and 2/ARC68 is a hard copy of the documents on that USB stick. These are the emails which formed exhibits to my first statement, and to the first statement of Deborah French, and are therefore their relevant to Grenfell Tower is explained in those statements.
- 134.2 3/ARC68 to 8/ARC68 inclusive are the red sales files kept by the sales teams, and are referred to in detail in the statement of Gwenaelle Derrendinger.
135. The handwritten notes on the exhibits referred to in paragraph 134 above will be referred to in the statement of Gwenaelle Derrendinger.
136. Exhibits 9/ARC68 to 17/ARC68 inclusive are cladding samples provided to the Gendarmerie on 11 October 2017. They contain references which are used by AAP SAS to trace product

through the order and production process. Each sample contains an "OT" reference and an "OF" reference. "OT" is an abbreviation of "ordre de travail" and is a reference generated by the AAP SAS sales system once an order has been confirmed. Each individual product specification required as part of an order is given a separate "OT" reference. For example, an order that is made up of requests for product with differing lengths, widths or colour, for example, would each have a separate OT reference. "OF" is an abbreviation of "ordre de fabrication". Once an order has been registered on the system, it is issued with an "OF" reference which is then used by the production team. I have been asked to provide an explanation regarding these exhibits and their correlation with AAP SAS products/orders supplied to CEP for the refurbishment of Grenfell Tower. The samples correlate to the CEP orders as follows:

MPS Reference	CEP order reference
9/ARC68	ARC5213/A/023
10/ARC68	ARC5213/A/023
11/ARC68	ARC5213/A/023 <i>[D.N police reference refers to this as 80921 - but it is actually an "8" on the sample.]</i>
12/ARC68	ARC5213/A/023
13/ARC68	ARC5213/A/070
14/ARC68	ARC5213/A/070
15/ARC68	ARC5213/A/070
16/ARC68	ARC5213/A/005

137. In relation to the sample with reference "17/ARC68", this sample was technically taken from an order for another customer (bonded on 25 November 2015 at 00:53) and produced just before the order for CEP (bonded on 25 November 2015 at 01:53). The orders for AAP SAS's other customer and CEP were issued for the same product and were issued from the same

coated coil and bonded in the same conditions. I understand that the requirement to take a sample from the CEP production time was overlooked on that occasion.

138. I have been asked to explain in detail the documents titled “STOCK” within exhibit 3/ARC68 (order file samples 138). This is dealt with in the statement of Gwenaelle Derrendinger.
139. I have been asked to provide an explanation regarding the documents titled “Commande enregistrée le” within exhibit 4/ARC68 and relevant reference numbers within this document. This is dealt with in the statement of Gwenaelle Derrendinger.
140. I have been asked to explain the BCS pricing tool document within exhibit 5/ARC68, and whose handwriting it is on this. This is dealt with in the statement of Gwenaelle Derrendinger.
141. I have been asked what a “waybill” reference is. This is dealt with in the statement of Gwenaelle Derrendinger.
142. I have been asked to explain in detail what “FICHE DE NON.CONFORMITE GENERALE No.” forms are, as provided within exhibit 6/ARC68 (Order file for Second Order 141) and exhibit 3/ARC68 (Order File Samples 138) and any relevance of this in relation to the orders relating to CEP/Grenfell Tower. This is dealt with in the statement of Gwenaelle Derrendinger.
143. I have been asked to explain what “INTERROGATION DES COMMANDES CLIENT” and “AFFICHAGE DES COMMENTAIRES “STOCK” forms are, as provided within exhibit 7/ARC68 (dossier commandes pour la troisième commande) and exhibit 8/ARC68 (dossier commandes pour la quatrième commande). This is dealt with in the statement of Gwenaelle Derrendinger.
144. I have been asked what “Sika Bonding” as referenced in email within exhibit CS4 from Geof Blades to Deborah French in on 05 March 2013 is. It is the glue used to bond panels to the frame on a building. This is not I understand relevant to the rivet or cassette system, but where the panels in an unfabricated form are flat fixed to a building.
145. I have been asked to provide an explanation regarding the various paperwork documentation relating to each order – order confirmation; invoice, ‘bullet de livraison’, ‘bordereau d’expédition’. This is dealt with in the statement of Gwenaelle Derrendinger.

146. I have been asked to provide an explanation regarding the ‘lettre de voiture’ on page 109 of exhibit CS4 and details of companies used to transport goods to UK. This is dealt with in the statement of Gwenaelle Derrenderinger.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

147. I am not aware of any other information that may assist the investigation into the reasons for the Grenfell Tower disaster.

Signed:

Dated:2019