

IN A MATTER CONCERNING THE GRENFELL TOWER INQUIRY

WITNESS STATEMENT OF DAVID SMALLEY

1. I make this statement to the Grenfell Tower Inquiry in response to a written Request for Evidence dated 26 July 2019. In this statement, I will do my best to address all the questions and issues raised in the Inquiry's Request.
2. I work for PDERS, which is a sub-division of Express Lifts Alliance Group. Express Lifts Alliance Group is a division of Otis Ltd, a UK lift maintenance company.

Training, experience and qualifications

3. I first started working in the lift maintenance and repair industry in 1965, when I joined a company called Newbury & Thomas as a lift engineer's mate. In around 1970 I joined another lift company, Porn & Dunwoody, and it was while I was with them that I passed the Engineering Industry Training Board's then lift practice and lift servicing and maintenance training modules, known as "J05" and "J26". These are equivalent to the current NVQ Level 3 qualification.
4. Porn & Dunwoody was later bought by Otis Ltd and became part of the PDERS division, and I have been an Otis employee since it acquired Porn & Dunwoody at some point in the 1990s. During my time with Porn & Dunwoody and PDERS I have serviced and maintained a variety of goods and passenger lifts around the country. I have also undergone a variety of different briefing and training sessions, including in safety awareness and in PDERS' systems and procedures.

5. In the last few years my work has been mostly limited to the London area. Three or four years ago I was transferred from PDERS' lift maintenance contract for the London Borough of Lewisham, to its contract for the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea.

Involvement with Grenfell Tower lifts

6. When I transferred to the Kensington and Chelsea contract, the contract was made up of two routes, and I was allocated the North Kensington route. This route included the two passenger lifts at Grenfell Tower, which meant that I was then the lift engineer who would carry out the planned, monthly service visits to the lifts. I believe I was transferred to this contract and began working on the North Kensington route in or around September 2016.
7. Any ad hoc call outs and repairs to the lifts were picked up by any of the PDERS engineers available, depending on proximity, availability and workload, which included me. We would receive details of these call outs via our PDA.
8. I cannot remember receiving any briefing or paperwork regarding the Grenfell Tower lifts before I first carried out my first service visit. But I would have received details such as the site name and address and a checklist of drop down boxes covering generic servicing tasks on my PDA. The PDERS engineer who had previously covered the North Kensington route, or others who had done work on the Grenfell Tower lifts, might also have spoken to me about some of the lifts on the route, but after all this time I cannot remember. There was nothing unique or unusual about the Grenfell Tower lifts that I recall.
9. I cannot remember if there was an Operation and Maintenance Manual available and provided for the Grenfell Tower lifts. There would have been a log book kept in the motor room, with details of previous visits and repairs done. Although I cannot recall for sure, I would think there would also have been wiring diagrams kept in the motor room. These diagrams can be useful as reference when carrying out maintenance and repair work.
10. I have checked PDERS' Repair Visit Reports and Service Visit Reports completed by me and the visits range in date from 3 October 2016 to 22 March 2017. I attach a copy of these as Exhibit DS/1:

11. Service visits were carried out on a monthly basis. From the reports I can see that in 2016 and 2017 I carried out planned service visits to the Grenfell Tower lifts on the following dates:
- (a) 30 November 2016 (although I note the relevant service visit report is dated 20 February 2017 which is probably because the job wasn't closed correctly on my PDA and the report was only generated when it was fully closed);
 - (b) 16 and 19 December 2016;
 - (c) 5 January 2017;
 - (d) 18 January 2017 (to the best of my recollection these visit were carried out within only two weeks of each other because the visit on 16 December was to carry out the annual LG1 tests and did not constitute a full service visit); and
 - (e) 8 March 2017.
12. Unfortunately PDERS have not retained the service visit report on our system for February 2017.
13. On average, I spent about two hours per lift on each planned service visit to Grenfell Tower. During these visits I carried out the activities which are set out in the service visit reports, under the heading "Works completed", as well as other checks that I have been trained to carry out. These checks would be things like checking the condition of the elevator pit, ropes, safety edges and the fire control switch. These items aren't specifically listed on the PDA but would come under the subheadings listed in the section entitled "Works Completed".
14. I also carried out a number of repair visits to the Grenfell Tower lifts in 2016 and 2017. The repair visit reports record that I visited the lifts on 3 October 2016, 4 October 2016, 10 October 2016, 11 October 2016, 18 October 2016, 28 November 2016, 19 December 2016, 22 December 2016, 10 January 2017, 25 January 2017, 31 January 2017, 21 March 2017 and 22 March 2017.

15. The issues that prompted these visits included: faulty landing door/gate locks, hanger rollers and pick up skates; and control panel processors and connections. There were also occasions when I was called out, but when I checked over the lifts I could find no faults.
16. When attending a repair call out, I would check whether there was a fault, whether a repair was required, and I would look to get the lift back into service.
17. During a repair visit, I would not carry out the same checks that would be appropriate during a planned monthly service visit. For example, I would not carry out a check of the fire control switch during a repair visit.

"Fire fighting lifts"

18. I do not know exactly what the Inquiry thinks is a "fire fighting lift", but from my experience I can say that the Grenfell Tower lifts were not fire fighting lifts. They were normal lifts with a fire control switch.
19. I would not have expected them to be fire fighting lifts. I do not remember any of the lifts on the North Kensington route being fire fighting lifts. None of the lifts on the Lewisham route are fire fighting lifts either.
20. I did not raise any concerns with PDERS or KCTMO regarding the fact that the Grenfell Tower lifts were not fire fighting lifts. None of the other lifts were fire fighting lifts and in my experience this is the norm. As far as I understand it, it is down to the customer to specify what type of lift they wish to be installed.

Fire control subsystem and switch

21. I can't be sure but from memory I think the fire control switch for the Grenfell Tower lifts was between them on the ground floor.
22. The fire control switch would have been wired from the motor room down the lift shaft on a two wire system.
23. I don't recall there being any instructions for use for the fire control switch. They all have direction arrows on the face plate which shows firefighters which way to turn the drop key to turn fire control on and off but that is probably it.

24. I do not recall the fire control switch at Grenfell Tower ever being disconnected from the lifts.
25. One of the jobs to do during the monthly service visits was to carry out a check of the fire control switch. I would have done this when I carried out my service visits in November and December 2016 and in January and March 2017. The procedure was to use a drop key to activate fire control. There is a small hole in the face plate which has a coloured indicator behind it. In normal mode the indicator is green, but when you operate fire control by using the drop key the indicator should change to red. I would then check that both lifts had come to the ground floor and that their doors had opened. This would show that they were in fire control mode.
26. I would then enter each lift and press and hold the door close button to check that the doors started to close. Once I had done that I would come back out of the lift and use the drop key to return the lifts to normal mode. The indicator on the face plate would then show green again.
27. From memory, the drop key I used to operate the fire control switch was a universal drop key. This could also be used to open the lift doors. A picture of the correct drop key is exhibited at DS/2:
28. I do not recall ever encountering any problems inserting or turning the drop key when checking the operation of the fire control switch at Grenfell Tower. I do not recall any occasions when the fire control switch did not operate properly and as expected, or any faults with it.

Other matters

29. The Inquiry's Request refers to a planned service visit to the Grenfell Tower lifts on 9 May 2017 and a repair visit on 7 June 2017. I did not undertake either of these visits, so I cannot comment on them. I think that Mark Wallis undertook these visits although I am aware that the relevant repair visit reports indicate that Tony Smart actually undertook them. I believe this is because Mark Wallis did not have a PDA during this period and Tony was closing the reports on his PDA on Mark's behalf.

30. After I stopped working on the RBKC contract I transferred to work in Lewisham and then Hackney. I am now back in Lewisham.
31. In terms of the prevailing nature of the issues I dealt with when I worked on the Grenfell Tower lifts, I recall some of the rollers on the doors were in bad condition when I first started servicing the lifts which was in October 2016. I think this was probably caused by the dust and debris generated by the builders who were working in Grenfell Tower at the time, but once the rollers were replaced I do not remember them being a recurring problem. I can see from the "Observations" section on my Service Visit Reports that we were recommending a full shaft cleandown and a deep clean of the motor room and the lift car tops once the builders had finished the work they were doing. Where I refer to "LG1" in the service visit reports, I am simply referring to the annual tests that are undertaken to ensure the locks, safety devices, buffers, brakes and car overload detection devices are working correctly.
32. Other than the fire control switch, the Grenfell Tower Lifts also had autodiallers as another fire safety feature. These dialled through to KCTMO directly and, when carrying out monthly maintenance visits, were checked by pressing the alarm to ensure it dialled through to TMO & giving the operator the lift number.
33. I had no concerns about the operation or safety of the Grenfell Tower lifts.
34. I am not sure how my work specifically at Grenfell Tower was supervised or checked. Generally, I would see my manager Phil Edwards in the office rather than on site, but every three months or so he or one of the other managers would visit me on site and carry out an audit. During the audit they would check that I followed the proper procedure to access the lift and to take control of the lift, following the lock out tag out process in the motor room to make sure the lift was properly isolated before any work was done. They would also check that I had the right safety equipment, such as a harness, and my tools were all in order and in good condition. They would also observe me carrying out servicing tasks.
35. In addition, Pat Barret of KCTMO tended to contact me on a regular basis and I would see him on site probably once a week. He often talked with me about repairs that had

been done or needed to be done to this or that lift and he discussed and checked the work I was doing when he visited.

The contents of this statement are true to the best of my knowledge and belief. I am content for this statement to form part of the evidence before the Inquiry and published on the Inquiry's website.

Signed: Smalley

Dated: 1-10-2019