

TOPIC INSPECTION PACK

Natural Gas network supplies in high rise dwellings

Version 1.0

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1. SUMMARY

This topic pack is intended for use by Energy Division (ED) Inspectors and other inspectors who are undertaking inspection of the arrangements for the integrity management of gas network pipelines relating to high rise dwellings (**6 storeys or more**). It provides background information on the statutory provisions and questions to ask key personnel involved with both the management and operation of pipelines associated with such property. These questions are designed to sample key components that provide effective pipeline integrity management providing a basis for assessing compliance with the relevant statutory provisions.

2. INTRODUCTION

This topic pack provides guidance for Inspectors on the inspection of Natural Gas network installations in high rise dwellings. (Typically this will be all pipework upstream of the emergency control valve (ECV) and extending to the mains connection.)

3. SCOPE

This guidance is aimed at the operation of natural gas networks supplying dwellings located within high rise properties. The definition of "high rise" as currently defined for gas network operators is 6 storeys or more (IGEM/G/5) and **does not cover** installation pipework or appliances downstream of the ECV. However, some topics may span the upstream / downstream boundary in which case inspectors should be prepared to deal with matters of evident concern. Where the high rise property has a small proportion of occupiers carrying out commercial activities (e.g. shops on the ground floor with flats above) these properties are still within scope.

In cases of doubt, particularly concerning the designation of the end of the network, or the responsibility to ensure ECV access, specialist advice should be sought. This is unlikely to be the gas network operator (see note within section 4.2.3)

4. LEGAL FRAMEWORK

This topic pack does not set out a detailed consideration of all legal duties imposed upon gas network operators but provides an indication of the more important areas that Inspectors should be aware of when inspecting gas network installations associated with high rise dwellings.

4.1 Background

A large number of domestic dwellings are supplied with natural gas via gas networks which are owned and operated by organisations in possession of an accepted safety case, a requirement of the Gas Safety (Management) Regulations 1996 (GSMR). The vast majority of these properties are supplied by small diameter, typically 1" pipes that feed individual dwellings. Gas supplies to high rise properties differ in this respect as each individual dwelling can be supplied in a number of ways and isolation of individual gas supplies is not always possible or practicable.

The extent of the gas network and the point at which the gas network terminates and the downstream installation begins is subject to regulation. Guidance is available within L56, guidance to the Gas Safety (installation and use) Regulations 1998. L80, guidance to the Gas Safety (Management) Regulations 1996 and L82, guidance to the Pipelines Safety Regulations 1996. A brief summary of all three statutory instruments is included below.

Other relevant legislation in addition to the HSWA which needs to be considered include but are not limited to:

- Management of Health and Safety Regulations 1999
- Provision and Use of Work Equipment Regulations 1998
- Confined Spaces Regulations 1997
- Work at Height Regulations 2005
- Dangerous Substances and Explosive Atmosphere Regulations 2002

4.2 Legal Duties

4.2.1 Gas Safety (Management) Regulations 1996 (GSMR)(L80)

GSMR covers four main areas:

- The safe management of gas flow through a network and minimising the risk of a gas supply emergency
- Arrangements for dealing with gas supply emergencies
- Arrangements for dealing with gas escapes and incidents
- Gas composition

GSMR cover networks conveying gas (any substance in a gaseous state which consists wholly or mainly of methane). The Regulations define what pipes are "on the network"; gas services up to and including the ECV are defined as "on the network".

The Regulations require that "any person" wishing to convey gas in a network prepares a safety case which is accepted by HSE. Gas network operators have a duty to conform to their safety case and it is the document against which inspections are based.

4.2.2 Pipelines Safety Regulations 1996 (PSR) (L82)

PSR define the limits of pipelines, this is the same as the GSMR definition, the upstream pipeline including the ECV. The gas service pipe and supplies to high rise properties fall within this definition. The Regulations cover the life cycle of the pipeline from design to decommissioning and define those pipelines for which additional duties are required, for gas this is restricted to those pipelines operating at pressures above 7 bar (gauge). For gas services supplying domestic property, low pressure up to 75mbar is the norm and therefore the additional duties do not apply.

4.2.3 Gas Safety (Installation and Use) Regulations 1998 (GSIUR)(L56)

GSIUR apply to installations downstream of the ECV and deal with the safe installation, maintenance and use of gas systems, including gas fittings, appliances and flues, mainly in domestic and commercial premises, e.g. offices, shops, public buildings and similar places. The Regulations generally apply to any 'gas' as defined by the Gas Act 1986 (amended by the Gas Act 1995), apart from any gas comprising wholly or mainly of hydrogen when used in non-domestic premises. The requirements therefore include both natural gas and liquefied petroleum gas (LPG).

GSIUR Network related requirements

Although GSIUR relates to downstream gas installations a number of provisions relate to ECV's and upstream requirements which may impact upon gas network operators.

NOTE – Caution needs to be exercised when considering the demarcation between upstream networks and downstream installations. The boundary between the two regimes is the outlet of the emergency control valve (ECV) and provisions within GSIUR place duties upon persons in relation to the installation of an ECV including, access to the ECV and meter by the consumer, operation and customer information and other requirements identified within the Regulations. A number of duties are placed upon persons providing a gas supply for the first time, meaning the first time that gas is installed at and supplied to premises. There are no on-going duties placed upon these persons within Regulations 9(1) or 9(4).

Appendix 2 provides guidance on the key points relating to gas network operators. Comprehensive guidance is contained within L56, Guidance to the Regulations.

5. STANDARDS

A number of standards relating to gas networks supplying high rise properties are available including but not limited to:

- BS EN 12007-5: 2014 Gas Infrastructure – pipelines for maximum operating pressure up to and including 16 bar
- BS EN 1775: 2007 Gas Supply – Gas pipework for buildings – Maximum operating pressure less than or equal to 5 bar – Functional requirements
- IGEN/G/5 Gas in flats and other multi-dwelling buildings
- IGEN/TD/4 PE and steel gas services and service pipework
- IGEN/G/1 Defining the end of the network
- IGEN/TD/101 Edition 1 (2002) – Adoption of pipe systems by a GT – management of UIP activities.

6. INTERVENTION STRATEGY

The following section describes the overall approach to be taken with operators of gas networks and provides a framework in order to ensure that regulatory resource is directed on a risk prioritised basis.

Initial intervention is required with high rise gas network operators at their headquarters in order to ascertain the following:

- That policies and procedures are in place in order to demonstrate that the organisation, planning, monitoring, audit and review in relation to the planning, installation, inspection and maintenance of gas network supplies within high rise dwellings are suitable and sufficient
- Operators process for identifying high rise properties on their network
- Operators risk ranking process relating to their inspection and maintenance activity
- Network inspection records
- Documentation relating to the scope of remedial works
- Evidence that site visits to verify work have been completed (or to verify the inspection record if no remedial work has been identified)
- Review of overdue remedial work – and onsite verification of risk scoring (i.e. to check that a programmed remediation should not have been an urgent or immediate repair)
- Competency management system

Following HQ intervention on site intervention is to be conducted based upon the information gained. Other factors influencing the selection and number of high rise dwellings to inspect should take into account the following:

- Size of network (high rise population)
- Verification of management systems
- Inspection history and findings
- Missing or incomplete data
- Previous remedial work having taken place
- Overdue inspection or maintenance
- Vulnerable population identified i.e. elderly / disabled
- Unresolved post inspection issues with property owner

7. ENFORCEMENT MANAGEMENT MODEL & ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE

7.1 ACTUAL RISK

The **consequence** from a leak of natural gas from network pipes is of possible multiple serious personal injuries (or deaths) as an explosive / flammable concentration can escalate within a building or area and be ignited, either directly injuring persons from the blast or from secondary effects e.g. building collapse.

The **likelihood** of such an event occurring is dependent upon various factors including pipe design, construction type, pipe location, environment, inspection history, maintenance and defects etc. and is therefore likely to be **probable or possible**.

7.2 BENCHMARK

The benchmark standard for pipelines is defined within the Pipelines Safety Regulations 1996. Regulation 13, maintenance dictates that, *"The operator shall ensure that a pipeline is maintained in an efficient state, in efficient working order and in good repair"*. So that in all cases there is a nil / negligible chance of a significant injury occurring.

The **consequence** remains identical as an escape of gas would result in the risk of **serious** personal injury or death should control measures be put in place.

The **likelihood** of such an event taking place is **nil / negligible** should the operator ensure that control measures in line with industry standards are met.

7.3 RISK GAP

Using the risk gap tables in the EMM for multiple casualties, the risk gap should normally be considered as extreme, but maybe lower depending upon the likelihood of actual risk.

7.4 INITIAL ENFORCEMENT EXPECTATION

Given an extreme risk gap and an established standard (PSR Reg 13) the initial enforcement expectation is an Improvement Notice where there is evidence of metallic gas pipes in poor or unknown condition or where there are no records of the pipe by the operator or strategy for inspection, examination and maintenance.

If there is clear evidence that the pipes are leaking, significantly corroded or damaged and liable to leak, thus resulting in a risk of personal injury, then a Prohibition Notice will be appropriate.

See table 1 for a list of situations providing an indicative initial enforcement expectation.

7.5 DUTYHOLDER FACTORS

Where the dutyholder can provide evidence that pipes identified as being on the network have been identified as requiring replacement in line with risk ranking and suitable timescales an IN may not be appropriate, although Inspectors should still confirm that adequate remedial action has been taken and that risks are controlled up to the point of decommissioning. The enforcement decision will depend upon the information provided by the operator regarding how risk ranking has been undertaken or the site conditions, or additional factors identified by the Inspector.

7.6 STRATEGIC FACTORS

It is expected that the action taken will protect vulnerable groups, including members of the public, who may be exposed to risks from gas network installations that have not been correctly identified and / or adequately maintained. It is in the public interest that gas network installations incorporating both buried and above ground pipes of poor or unknown condition are subjected to inspection, maintenance and replacement as required.

There may be circumstances where an alternative course of action is considered appropriate depending upon the nature of the installation e.g.:

- The effect on vulnerable people such as the elderly or those with small children where the cutting off of heating / cooking facilities, without adequate alternative arrangements being made, may cause significant risk. Replacement action is still necessary but should be planned to ensure that additional risks are not created.

The action should support the inspection, maintenance and replacement strategy in order to promote compliance whilst focusing industry resource on sites in a (risk based) priority order.

7.7 EMM EXAMPLE

A 1" internal steel riser supplies a single block of flats 7 storeys high containing 14 dwellings and has been identified as having 80% through wall corrosion at one location where the riser appears at floor level on the 5th floor stairwell. The riser is located within the fabric of the building and the majority of it is visible. The survey identifying the corrosion took place 15 months previously and no remedial work has been undertaken, the site has not been revisited.

The policies and procedures of the pipeline operator state that where defects greater than 70% of wall thickness exist the supply will be replaced within 12 months following a temporary repair (clean and paint).

7.8 ACTUAL RISK

The **consequence** is **serious** as an escape of gas could lead to serious injury or even death to the residents.

The **likelihood** is **possible** as no remedial work has been carried out and another survey has not taken place.

7.9 BENCHMARK

The **consequence** of a failure even if all control measures were in place remains as **serious**.

The **likelihood** is reduced to nil / **negligible** as the operator has policies, procedures and working practices sufficient to control the risk if applied correctly.

RISK GAP is **extreme**

STANDARD is **defined**.

INITIAL ENFORCEMENT EXPECTATION - **Improvement Notice**

8. ENFORCEMENT

8.1 INITIAL ENFORCEMENT EXPECTATION

- Subject to the discretion of the individual Inspector applying the Enforcement Policy Statement (EPS) to decide whether other enforcement action in a particular case may be appropriate and
- Prior to consideration of any dutyholder and strategic factors that may modify the enforcement decision

The following table does not describe all of the areas that may be examined or issues that may be encountered. It provides Inspectors with examples of some situations and the **initial enforcement** expectation associated with it. A reference to a suitable legal provision is also provided.

8.2 Table 1 – HQ Intervention

Situation	Initial enforcement expectation	Comments	Ref
HQ Inspection			
Gas network supply is identified within high rise property. Gas network operator does not have an accepted GSMR Safety Case.	Prohibition Notice / Improvement Notice	Where a network is identified and the operator is unaware of their duties. Level of risk to residents needs to be ascertained in order to inform enforcement decision. Specialist support required.	1 4
Gas network operator found not to have suitable or sufficient systems in place to identify gas network supplies within high rise dwellings.	Improvement Notice	Can network operator provide a demonstration that all gas network supplies within high rise dwellings have been identified so far as is reasonably practicable.	1 2
Operator found not to have clear policy and procedure in place to ensure that the effective planning, organisation, control, monitoring and review of the preventative and protective measures are in place	Improvement Notice	Is operator able to demonstrate that arrangements are in place and implemented, having regard to the nature of his activities and the size of his undertaking, for the effective planning, organisation, control, monitoring and review of the preventive and protective measures.	1 3 5
Is a clear risk based prioritisation system in place in relation to inspection, maintenance and condition replacement	Improvement Notice / Letter	The operator should demonstrate that a risk based approach has been taken to the inspection of supplies within high rise property. e.g. How old is the system, population, construction methods, location, maintenance, leakage history etc.	1
The operator has not conducted inspections of all of its network within high rise property in line their programme	Improvement Notice	Have all network installations been inspected and recorded and suitable remedial work carried out if required.	1

Situation	Initial enforcement expectation	Comments	Ref
HQ Inspection			
Have competency requirements for inspectors / surveyors been formalised	Improvement Notice	What training and competency requirements are in place for those engaged in inspection work	6
Are inspections up to date or does a backlog exist	Improvement Notice	What plans are in place to deal with any backlog, are those arrangement suitable or sufficient	1
Are procedures in place for dealing with leaks / escapes	Improvement Notice	Does the network operator comply with the arrangement described within their safety case	1
Does the inspection regime provide sufficient evidence that the elements contained within the following site based section are identified and verified	Improvement Notice / letter	The operator should demonstrate that the site based inspection, maintenance and condition assessment regime is suitable and sufficient	1
What measures are taken to ensure that the property complies with other statutory provisions prior to and post gas network installation or adoption	Letter	What arrangements are in place to determine the suitability of a property to receive or continue to receive a gas supply including liaison with other bodies.	1
Do the outputs of inspection and resulting remedial actions form part of the organisations safety performance indicators	Verbal Warning	Does the system provide leading and lagging performance indicators to enable the operator to identify integrity management performance.	
Does the network operator have systems in place to enable access e.g. know who the property owner, landlord, housing association, building owner, freehold, leaseholder etc. is	Verbal Warning	Does the operator have systems in place to ensure that access can gained to high rise dwellings in order to inspect, maintain and carry out work.	
If wall / floor / ceiling piercings are discovered without adequate sealant present what mitigation regarding fire compartmentalisation is put into place prior to permanent resolution	Verbal Warning	If no or non-fire resistant material has been identified at piercings the operator should take steps to ensure that fire compartments are not breached and take steps to ensure that this is the case until a permanent solution is installed	

8.3 Table 2 – On site intervention

Situation	Initial enforcement expectation	Comments	Ref
On site Inspection			
Gas leak present	*Prohibition notice	* Specialist support required. Immediate report to the emergency call centre 0800 111999 depending upon circumstances and immediate risk.	1
A gas network supply is identified within a high rise property. Dutyholder is not in possession of an accepted GSMR Safety Case	*Prohibition Notice / Improvement notice	* Specialist support required. Where a network is identified and the operator is unaware of their duties. Level of risk to residents needs to be ascertained in order to inform enforcement decision.	4
An unknown gas network supply is discovered within high rise property operated by a dutyholder with an accepted GSMR Safety Case.	*Prohibition Notice / Improvement Notice	* Specialist support required. Level of risk to residents needs to be ascertained in order to inform enforcement decision.	1
Riser or laterals show signs of severe damage or corrosion	* Prohibition Notice / Improvement Notice	* Specialist support required. Operator needs to demonstrate that risk has been assessed and appropriate steps taken in mitigation.	1 3
Do network plans indicate position of pipeline isolation valve (PIV)	Letter	It is reasonably practicable to expect the location of PIV's to be input on system records including maps	1
Pipeline isolation valve (PIV) not evident	Improvement notice	Main external service isolation valve. Normally buried and accessed via a valve cover marked "GAS". Should be present and identifiable on site	1 7
Pipeline isolation valve not identified on site	Letter	Valve is present but not identifiable. Location of valve should be marked with a visible marker plate or wall mounted plate and identify property that it relates to.	1
Diagram of network indicating position of PIV and other isolation valves not available on site	Letter	It is reasonably practicable to have produced and to display a general layout diagram for use by employees, residents and the emergency services	1
Does the operator have contingency plans in place to isolate the property should the PIV not be accessible	Verbal Warning	Does mains replacement when applicable consider the fitting of isolation valves in order to remotely isolate high rise properties. Are isolation points on the wider network identified for use in an emergency.	1
How does the duty holder identify areas for inspection. Are areas where corrosion can be foreseen prioritised.	Letter	Are suitable arrangements in place to ensure that pipe at risk of degradation are inspected and that previously inspected sections are available / accessible.	1
Are previously inspected sections of the riser / laterals revisited and inspected	Letter	Is the operator able to ascertain the condition of the pipe over a period of time in order to assess pipe degradation.	1
Are wall / ceiling / floor piercings sealed with an appropriate material	Improvement Notice	The gap between the pipe and sleeve and the gap between the sleeve and the surrounding structure must be sealed with fire resistant material	1

Situation	Initial enforcement expectation	Comments	Ref
On site Inspection			
How much of the overall system is available for inspection. How has an adequate representative view of riser condition been formed.	Improvement Notice / Letter	If access for inspection is limited how condition is assessed by the duty holder and what evidence can be provided that a risk based approach has been taken to inspection and decision making.	1
Is the survey methodology fit for purpose	Improvement Notice / Letter	Does the survey methodology provide a robust risk based assessment of condition on which to base decisions relating to inspection frequency, repair or condition replacement.	1
How is external riser condition assessed	Letter	Is the methodology suitable and sufficient to provide the operator information in relation to the condition of the system	1

Table 1 references

1. HSWA 3(1)
2. MHSWA 3(1)(b)
3. PSR 13
4. GSMR 3
5. MHSWA 5(1)
6. HSWA 2(2)(c)
7. PSR 6

8.4 Prohibition notices

It may be necessary to serve a deferred Prohibition Notice where action by the gas network operator is required in order to control the identified risk. **Specialist advice required**

8.5 Improvement notices

When setting timescales for remedial action or decommissioning of network gas supplies within high rise properties Inspectors should bear in mind the complexity of the network and engage the dutyholder. Remedial work may require the dutyholder to engage with various stakeholders, e.g. local planning authority.

8.6 Prosecution

Where widespread and significant deficiencies are identified and the attitude of the dutyholder is, or has been inadequate and the EPS tests are met then prosecution as well as the most suitable Notice(s) should be considered.

INITIAL	COMMENTS
Site induction required	
Network plans available	
Service route & pipeline isolation valve (PIV) annotated	
Supply pressure LP / MP	
Date of installation	
Size of service, risers and laterals	
Property type	
Number of floors	
Number of dwellings on each floor	
Network diagram available to residents / emergency services	
PIV observed. Location, access,	
PIV marked on site	
EXTERNAL RISER	COMMENTS
Buried service material. PE / Steel	
If buried steel is CP installed	
Riser material. Steel / PE	
Riser joint type. Screwed / welded / combination	
How is riser secured to building, condition of support	
Pipe diameter. 1" / 2" etc	
Lateral connection	
Are wall piercings sleeved	
Is annulus between pipe and sleeve sealed with fire resistant material	
Is annulus between sleeve and surrounding wall sealed with fire resistant material	
Condition of pipe coating system	
INTERNAL RISER	COMMENTS
Service entry. Above or below ground	
Buried service material. PE / Steel	
If buried steel is CP installed	
Is a insulation joint fitted	
Is a inlet isolation valve (IIV) fitted and labelled appropriately	
If more than one riser are network riser isolation valves (NRIV) fitted	
Is riser supported at its base	
How is riser secured to walls	
Are expansion joints fitted, condition	
Riser joint type. Screwed / welded / combination	
Are thermal cut off or excess flow valves fitted	
Is the riser located within a shaft or duct	
Is the riser "boxed in"	
Is the shaft or duct ventilated directly to outside air	
Is the shaft or duct ventilated indirectly to outside air (fully welded systems only)	
Is the shaft or duct compartmentalised	
Is each compartment ventilated directly to outside air	
Is riser located within common areas	
Is third party damage / interference considered	
Are floor / ceiling piercings sleeved	
Is annulus between pipe and sleeve sealed with fire resistant material	
Is annulus between sleeve and surrounding wall sealed with fire resistant material	
What is the condition of riser that is available for inspection	
How much pipe within the building is available for inspection (as a percentage)	
LATERALS	COMMENTS
Are laterals fitted with network lateral isolation valves (NLIV)	
How are laterals secured to walls	
Joint type. Screwed / welded / combination	
Are expansion joints fitted, condition	
Is the lateral located within a shaft or duct	
Is the shaft or duct ventilated directly to outside air	
Is the shaft or duct ventilated indirectly to outside air (fully welded systems only)	
Is the shaft or duct compartmentalised	
Is each compartment ventilated directly to outside air	
Are laterals present within common areas	
Is third party damage / interference considered	
Are network branch isolation valves (NBIV) fitted	
Are laterals "boxed in"	
Are lateral wall piercings sleeved	
Is annulus between pipe and sleeve sealed with fire resistant material	
Is annulus between sleeve and surrounding wall sealed with fire resistant material	
METER BANKS	COMMENTS
Do residents have access to their individual meter and ECV	
Are residents provided with any information relating to actions to take if gas detected	
Are meters & ECV's labelled appropriately	
Can residents operate their ECV. Identify, handles fitted, height, etc	
Are additional ECV's (AECV) fitted within properties	
Are AECV's located and labelled appropriately	
If bank located within a room or housing is it ventilated	
Where do the vents discharge to	
Are vents fitted at low and high level	
Is "material" stored within the meter room	
If lighting fitted is it of appropriate standard	
METER WITHIN INDIVIDUAL DWELLING	COMMENTS
Is ECV accessible to consumer	
Is EVV / meter labelled appropriately	
Is ECV /meter housing appropriate	
MEANS OF ESCAPE	COMMENTS
Is the meter fitted in a position whereby it is accessed via a means of escape? specialist support should be sought	

Appendix 2 – GSIUR extract from L56

Regulation 2(1)

“emergency control” means a valve for shutting off the supply of gas in an emergency, being a valve intended for use by a consumer of gas;

Guidance 2(1) Emergency control

The emergency control is a valve intended, and readily accessible, for use by the consumer (i.e. end-user) of gas. For example, a valve located in a meter-room which is locked (for security), and accessible only to a landlord, gas supplier, gas transporter and/or emergency services, cannot be regarded as an ‘emergency control’. Where a meter is fitted, the meter control valve may be used as the emergency control, subject to certain conditions – see regulation 9(1).

Although there may be more than one emergency control serving a particular premises, it is the outlet of the first emergency control downstream of the distribution main which marks the interface between a ‘service pipe’ and ‘installation pipework’.

Regulation 9(1)

No person shall for the first time enable gas to be supplied for use in any premises unless there is provided an appropriately sited emergency control to which there is adequate access.

Legal advice - “first time” means the first time that gas is installed at and supplied to premises, Regulation 9(1) does not give rise to an obligation on gas transporters to ensure that the duties in Regulation 9 continue to be met.

Guidance 9(1)

Whenever a **new gas supply** is made available for use in premises, an emergency control should also be provided. Where there is a gas meter, the meter control may serve as the emergency control as long as the following conditions are met:

- (a) Each individual premise (e.g. each house, flat, maisonette, or caravan) using a supply of gas should be provided with an emergency control, whether or not that premises contains a gas meter.
- (b) The emergency control should be situated as near as is reasonably practicable to the point where the gas supply pipe enters the premises.
- (c) It should be readily accessible to all consumers, i.e. gas users, in the premises concerned (e.g. not located in a basement or cellar).
- (d) A valve located in a meter-room which is normally locked, and accessible only to a landlord, gas supplier, gas transporter and/or emergency services for example, cannot act as an ‘emergency control’.
- (e) An emergency control should be protected against unauthorised operation (i.e. tamper-proof) but if situated in a locked compartment, the occupier(s) of the premises should be provided with keys (see also regulation 13(3)–(4)). In such cases, the emergency service

provider should also hold keys where access cannot be ensured for them at all times, e.g. through keys held by the responsible person for the premises.

The person allowing the flow of gas to the premises should ensure that every gas consumer in the premises is aware of the location of their emergency control, and of the action to be taken in case of a gas emergency. (Where there is more than one emergency control, e.g. in multi-occupancy premises, it is important for the particular control serving that consumer to be identified.) This includes following any alterations to buildings or ground works affecting the accessibility of the emergency control and pipework. In the case of rented property, the responsible person for the building, such as a landlord or managing agent, should ensure that all tenants are made aware of this information, including any new tenants.

Some premises contain separate buildings, e.g. a domestic property with stables or an office complex with a number of buildings on one site. As long as the premises are clearly under the control of one person or organisation, only one emergency control is required. However, arrangements should be made to ensure that the person in control is immediately notified of any gas emergency in the premises, so that suitable action can be taken, e.g. to isolate the gas supply (see regulation 37).

Regulation 9(2)

(2) Any person installing an emergency control shall ensure that –

(a) any key, lever or hand-wheel of the control is securely attached to the operating spindle of the control;

(b) any such key or lever is attached so that – (i) the key or lever is parallel to the axis of the pipe in which the control is installed when the control is in the open position; and (ii) where the key or lever is not attached so as to move only horizontally, gas cannot pass beyond the control when the key or lever has been moved as far as possible downwards;

(c) either the means of operating the key or lever is clearly and permanently marked or a notice in permanent form is prominently displayed near such means so as to indicate when the control is open and when the control is shut; and

(d) any hand-wheel indicates the direction of opening or closing of the control.

Guidance 9(2)

The emergency control can operate by a key, lever or hand-wheel which should be securely attached to the operating spindle. Where a key or lever is used, the 'open' position should be when the key or lever is parallel to the axis of the pipe. The 'off' position should be approximately one quarter turn of the key or lever to the right or left and, where the key or lever moves in the vertical plane, the move to the 'off' position should be in a downwards direction. Either the key or lever itself, or a nearby permanent notice, should indicate how the control operates and when the gas is 'off' and 'on'.

Regulation 9(3)

Where a person installs an emergency control which is not adjacent to a primary meter, he shall immediately thereafter prominently display on or near the means of operating the control a suitably worded notice in permanent form indicating the procedure to be followed in the event of an escape of gas.

Guidance 9(3)

Where an emergency control is installed which is **not** adjacent to a primary meter, or where no meter is installed, a prominently displayed notice on or near the control bearing the words 'Gas emergency control' should be provided. The notice needs to tell the consumer:

- (a) to shut off the supply of gas if there is a gas escape in the premises;
- (b) if gas continues to escape, immediately notify the Gas Emergency Freephone Number [REDACTED] (if natural gas).
- (c) not to reinstate the supply until remedial action has been taken by a competent person to prevent gas escaping again;
- (d) details of the emergency gas service contact, including the emergency telephone number. In the case of natural gas, the Gas Emergency Freephone Number should be specified (as above).
- (e) the date the notice was first displayed.

Regulation 9(4)

*Where any person **first supplies** gas to premises where an emergency control is installed, he shall ensure that the notice required by paragraph (3) above remains suitably worded or shall, where necessary, forthwith amend or replace that notice so as to give effect to the provisions of that paragraph.*

Regulation 13(1)

Where a meter is housed in a meter box or meter compound attached to or built into the external face of the outside wall of any premises, the meter box or meter compound shall be so constructed and installed that any gas escaping within the box or compound cannot enter the premises or any cavity in the wall but must disperse to the external air.

Guidance 13(1)

To prevent gas leakage entering the building, any cable or installation pipe should be adequately sleeved and sealed where it passes from the meter box and enters building (see also regulations 14(1) and 19).

Regulation 13(2)

No person shall knowingly store readily combustible materials in any meter box or meter compound.

Guidance 13(2)

Regulation 13(2) applies to everyone, not just gas engineers. Meter boxes or compounds should not, for example, be used for storing combustible household waste such as paper and cardboard.

Regulation 13(3)

No person shall install a meter in a meter box provided with a lock, unless the consumer has been provided with a suitably labelled key to that lock.

Regulation 13(4)

No person shall install a meter within a meter compound which is capable of being secured unless the consumer has been provided with a suitably labelled key for that compound.

Regulation 15 ACOP

Any supplier of gas through a primary meter should ensure that the required emergency notice is in place. Where there is a change in gas supplier which involves a change in the emergency service provider, the notice should be updated/replaced to reflect such a change.