

- 7 Grenfell Tower refurbishment from September 2013 to Practical Completion in July 2016 was part of my portfolio of asset management strategies. The day to day project management of the refurbishment on behalf of TMO was managed and monitored by project manager Claire Williams, who succeeded Paul Dunkerton in that role in October 2013, reporting to the Head of Capital Investment David Gibson until he retired in 2016. I provided strategic overview of the project reporting as necessary to the TMO Executive and Board as well as directly to RBKC. I did not in this role have direct involvement in day to day management of any contractors involved with the refurbishment nor did I have any direct involvement with RBKC's Building Control or Planning departments. I also did not deal directly with Carl Stokes who was engaged by Janice Wray TMO's Health and Safety Manager to whom he reported, nor did I deal directly with LFB.
- 8 My involvement was to oversee the asset management aspects of the project and provide an interface with the TMO Executive, TMO Board, RBKC senior management and Scrutiny Committee.
- 9 Where possible I have in this statement endeavoured to cover all issues identified by the Inquiry as helpfully as I can but where I have not dealt with some issues it is because those issues are not within my sphere of responsibility or knowledge.
- 10 I have not had access to documents since I left TMO apart from some that have been drawn to my attention to assist me with dates etc. This statement is therefore substantially based upon my best recollections. Most of my involvement should be a matter of record.

Employment history and role at the TMO

- 11 I left college in 1986 with a degree in geography and since 1988 have always worked in public sector housing. I have no housing qualifications nor any technical qualifications.
- 12 I worked at Lewisham Council in the housing department for about 10 years, mostly in property maintenance and capital and regeneration work and became their Property Services Manager and subsequently their Development Manager.
- 13 In 1998 I moved to Camden Council to manage their capital programme team and became their Head of Service managing their capital and development work which involved managing a regeneration budget of £30m per year for the whole of the Camden Borough.

- 14 I left Camden in about 2001 and moved to Family Housing Association now called Peabody which was a much smaller organisation involving estate renewal coordination. I became their Head of Asset Management with a portfolio of 20,000 homes.
- 15 I moved to Hyde Housing Association in about 2006 and remained there for 5 years working on new business opportunities, strategic asset management and stock transfer. I then moved to Haringey Council and was there for 3-4 years managing a £40 million capital works folio.
- 16 Subsequently, I responded to an advertisement seeking an appointment to TMO as Director of Assets and Regeneration. Following a rigorous interview process over two days, I was appointed and started work at TMO in January 2013.

1 and 2. Grenfell Tower’s original design, construction and composition and subsequent modification prior to most recent

- 17 I understand that Grenfell Tower was constructed in the 1970’s and TMO came into existence 20 years later.
- 18 I had no knowledge of Grenfell Tower prior to my joining TMO in January 2013.
- 19 I expected the construction to comply with all relevant legislation and regulations and guidance and I had no reason to believe that it did not.
- 20 I am not aware of any later modifications prior to my joining TMO but again my expectation was that any modifications were compliant with relevant legislation, regulations and guidance and I had no reason to believe that they were not.

3 and 4. Modifications to the interior and exterior of the building between 2012 and 2016

- 21 TMO was the “Client” for the project involving all interior and exterior refurbishments to the Tower between 2012 and 2016 with an objective of delivering the asset development requirements of RBKC. I set out here an overview of the TMO and my involvement throughout this project.
- 22 Upon my appointment to TMO and following a handover from my predecessor Mark Anderson, I took up the position of Director of Assets and Regeneration at TMO on 21st

- January 2013 and at that point the refurbishment of Grenfell Tower became part of my Asset Management remit to deliver RBKC’s required improvements they identified.
- 23 Although I had previously had some limited involvement with Asset Management projects that had involved cladding, I had and still have no technical ability or knowledge of either the materials used in cladding nor how they are required to be fitted. There was no requirement for me to have that technical knowledge as these matters were very much the responsibility of the Principal Designer, Studio E, and the contract administrators/project managers, Artelia who had responsibility for developing the design to tender stage. The Principal Contractor then took responsibility post-tender into the construction phase to ensure compliant materials were used in a compliant way.
- 24 I became aware prior to my appointment that Laura Johnson, RBKC’s Director of Housing had presented a report to the Council's Cabinet seeking approval to the use of capital receipts arising from the sale of vacant basement spaces at Elm Park Gardens for investment in new affordable homes and major improvements to existing affordable homes with a recommendation that £6 million be invested in works to deliver major improvements to the fabric of Grenfell Tower with new homes.
- 25 At the time of my appointment the rebuilding of the Kensington Academy and Leisure Centre (“KALC”) was being undertaken directly by RBKC using their contractors Leadbitter (later taken over by Bouygues), Architects Studio E, and other contractors and consultants including Artelia then known as Appleyards. RBKC chose to use the same contractors and consultants for the proposed Grenfell Tower refurbishment which they were able to do under the IESI framework agreement for public sector procurement to engage “call off” contractors without the need to go out to tender.
- 26 Studio E had therefore been engaged prior to my appointment to provide architectural advice and support for the refurbishment and in turn, they engaged Exova to provide Fire Safety Engineering Services. Artelia were also engaged prior to my appointment as contract administrators/project managers as I understand it.
- 27 At a TMO Board meeting on 15th November 2012 **(PM/1:TMO10001939)**, my predecessor, Mark Anderson is reported to have presented a paper **(PM/2:TMO10001766)** seeking approval to progression of the detailed design and

tender package phases of the Grenfell Tower Regeneration Project and he recommended the appointment of Principal Contractors Leadbitter for the preconstruction agreement phase. He reported that the Grenfell Tower Regeneration Project comprised two elements; regeneration of the exterior of the Tower and renewal of the internal building services installations and fabric. He reported that the total project budget for the combined works was £9.4 million, comprising £6 million regeneration works, £2.5 million capital programme works and £0.9 million contingency.

- 28 The initial design work and specification for the refurbishment had been worked up over two years before my involvement by Studio E Architects and it was substantially complete by the time of my appointment.
- 29 By the time of my appointment in January 2013 the project was therefore well established and in an advance stage of design and planning including a full fire risk assessment for the Tower conducted by Carl Stokes on 20 November 2012 and assessments by Exova on behalf of Studio E in addition to regular input visits and inspections by LFB.
- 30 RBKC's decision to refurbish Grenfell was to improve the internal living conditions for the tenants and leaseholders, the communal domestic hot water and central heating systems and other services to be upgraded and renewed including thermal insulation to improve thermal efficiency and fuel economy. The plan included the provision of new social housing flats, relocation of a nursery and provision of a new boxing club.
- 31 The professional consultants involved with initial preparations for the project were Artelia as Contract Administrator, Costs Consultants (QS) and CDM Co-ordinator; Studio E as Architects; Max Fordham as Mechanical and Engineering Consultants; Curtins as Structural Engineers and IBI Taylor Young as Planning Consultants. My understanding is that these were all selected by RBKC prior to my involvement and as a consequence of their work on KALC, and they were re-appointed by TMO for Grenfell Tower refurbishment having satisfied RBKC's procurement processes.
- 32 By the time I joined TMO however, Artelia were expressing concerns about the scheme costs put forward by Leadbitter. Artelia had been instructed to negotiate with Leadbitter to bring the cost closer to their budget estimate, it was reported at the TMO Board that the Grenfell Tower project had been delayed due to a difference between Artelia

Consultants cost plan and Leadbitter's costs. Leadbitter proposals were not considered to represent value for money and Artelia recommended a value engineering exercise to bring the scheme within the £8.5m construction budget.

- 33 I spent time during February and March 2013 shortly after joining TMO working with Artelia and Leadbitter to understand the project and explore the project scope and costs. At that time the budgeted costs for refurbishment were £9m while costs presented by Leadbitter were £12m-£13m which Artelia advised did not represent value for money.
- 34 The scope of the project was under review and whilst there had been no firm specification for the type of cladding to be used, I recall at that time Studio E raising the possibility of using alternatives to zinc panels which had been provisionally proposed and that this might bring about some costs saving. I recall reference being made to various types and versions of cladding material including, Zinc, Aluminium and Trespa. I knew there was a wide range of potential cladding materials but the different types meant absolutely nothing to me. All I knew was that the materials and appearance needed to satisfy RBKC Planners and Building Control and the contract required the works to comply with legislation, Building Regulations, standards and guidance documents so any material offered was considered on the basis that it met Building Regulations and complied with the law. I knew nothing more than that.
- 35 At various meetings we discussed the difference between the Artelia and Leadbitter estimates for work packages. I also had concerns at this time about Leadbitter's suitability as a main contractor for this type of project because of their lack of experience of work of this nature and of working with residents who remained in their homes during the works. I also had concerns about them being taken over by Bouygues who, from my past experience, had lacked the experience of working with residents in occupation. It was very important to us on behalf of the residents that the contractors demonstrated their concerns and ability to work alongside residents in situ and to be sympathetic to their needs and issues.
- 36 By 20th June 2013 (**PM/3:TMO10002849**) I presented a paper to the TMO Programme Board seeking approval to market test the contract through an Office of the Journal of European Union (OJEU) procurement process with the aim of achieving value for money and engaging a Principal Contractor with the right skills and proven experience of this

type of work which focussed specifically on RBKC's refurbishment requirements and ability to work alongside residents.

- 37 On 16th July 2013 **(PM/4:TMO00840255)** Laura Johnson presented her paper to the Council providing information relating to the investment plans for Grenfell Tower. Specifically, this report advised the benefits anticipated from the project included the replacement of single-glazed windows, which were beyond economic repair, with double-glazed fenestration. This she reported would improve thermal efficiency and fuel economy. The project would also include the installation of cladding and rain screen curtain walling to significantly improve thermal efficiency and fuel economy, as well as provide for an improved external appearance that reflected and complemented the KALC project.
- 38 As of July 2013 RBKC had allocated an overall budget of £9.7m, inclusive of fees, for the regeneration works to the Tower and by 25th July 2013 **(PM/5:TMO10003173)** the Board agreed that the project was to go to market via the OJEU tender process.
- 39 A scope of works and performance specification was developed by Artelia and following that the scheme was put out to tender through the OJEU tender process. The regeneration works ultimately included:-
- Window renewal
 - Thermal external cladding to the building
 - New entrance lobby
 - Communal decoration
 - New communal heating system (with individual control)
 - Hidden homes – 7 new flats later revised to 9 new flats
 - Relocation of boxing club, nursery and office accommodation
 - Fire safety and ventilation works
 - Environmental enhancements

- 40 I am aware that Artelia sent out invitations to tender on 29th November 2013 (PM/6:TMO10004645) and Rydon were appointed following the OJEU open market tendering exercise.
- 41 Artelia led the procurement exercise with advice from Jenny Jackson an external procurement consultant engaged by TMO to ensure the procurement rules were followed correctly. It was important that TMO staff and residents were involved in scoring the tender and there was a costs and quality matrix to follow. I was not involved in the procurement process nor the tender scoring but I received the report on the tender analysis by Artelia and used this as the basis for reporting and seeking approval. I also attended interviews of the tenderers to gauge whether their written proposals had substance. From memory the interviews were attended by Faye Edwards the Chair of the TMO Board, Cllr Blakemen, David Gibson, and Artelia. A very important part of the tender scoring and assessment was the contractors' ability and commitment to consult and engage with residents to manage their welfare.
- 42 This was a "Design and Build" contract with all responsibilities for design and construction work being the responsibility of the Principal Contractor with warranties supplied to cover liabilities. This meant that the successful tenderer would be contractually responsible for obtaining and receiving Building Regulations approval and to ensure all works were compliant with all relevant legislation Standards and guidance documents.
- 43 As Client, TMO's role was to monitor and manage progress of the refurbishment work against budget to ensure delivery of the programme on behalf of RBKC, residents and leaseholders. Alongside contractors, its role was to liaise with residents to facilitate works within residential areas. TMO's role was also to report progress and budget to the TMO Executive, TMO Board and to RBKC.
- 44 During the tendering process there were initially 17 responses to the OJEU Pre-Qualification Questionnaire expressing initial interest in the tender. Procurement was dealt with independently by Jenny Jackson to oversee compliance with OJEU Regulations with all assessments and recommendations being made by Artelia the Contract Administrators and Costs Consultants. Jenny Jackson led the procurement process. She collated the paperwork and information and assessments provided by

Artelia and I presented them to the TMO Board with recommendations for a decision to be made.

- 45 Ultimately there were five tenderers for the project, namely Durkan, Rydon, Wates, Keepmoat and Mulalley but subsequently Wates and Keepmoat withdrew.
- 46 RBKC were kept formally advised throughout the procurement process and advised of all issues via the monthly Asset Management meetings.
- 47 Artelia reported tenders of £9.2m, £10.4m and £9.9m from Rydon, Mulalley and Durkan respectively with respective quality scores of 76.64, 58.42 and 62.23 with recommendation that Rydon be appointed to carry out the refurbishment work. I presented my paper to the board on 27th March 2014 passing on Artelia's recommendation and following interviews conducted by members of the KCTMO Board. Rydon were approved by the Board noting that if the final price was above £9.7m further approval would be required from RBKC.
- 48 My understanding is that the Board agreed to enter into a pre-contract agreement with Rydon Construction Ltd with a total scheme cost of £9.7million. The Board was advised that there was further work to be done to finalise the detailed design and achieve the necessary planning permissions.
- 49 Residents were advised of the project tender acceptance in a Grenfell Tower Regeneration Newsletter dated April 2014 (**PM/7:TMO00837550**)

- **Project team**

- 50 Rydon was the Principal Contractor responsible for all aspects of the Design and Build contract to ensure compliance with all building and fire regulations and as part of their quality assessment to work and liaise with residents in relation to the refurbishment work.
- 51 Studio E were the architects for the scheme providing design advice and specifications and they liaised with the Borough Planning.
- 52 They drew up the specifications for the Tower refurbishment and were recommended by RBKC following their work on KALC.

- 53 Studio E had been involved with the scheme from early on attending resident consultation sessions as the scheme was put together. They were tasked with providing information for the scheme to achieve planning approval.
- 54 Studio E were re-engaged by Rydon following their appointment to ensure design continuity.
- 55 IBI Taylor Young are planning consultants who were initially appointed by RBKC in relation to KALC. They facilitated discussions with the Borough Planners to understand the requirements of planning permission and to liaise with all concerned, particularly Studio E, to facilitate those requirements to achieve planning consent.
- 56 Artelia were initially engaged by RBKC to manage the KALC project and then the Grenfell Tower refurbishment on behalf of TMO. Their role was that of Project management/Contract Administrator, Costs Consultant (QS) and CDM Co-ordinator and as such they were required to manage the contract on behalf of TMO; advise on the specifications in terms of CDM and understand the costs involved and provide regular reporting on programme and costs.
- 57 As CDM Co-ordinator, they were required to check the tender information to ensure compliance and comment on any concerns before it was sent out to tender and to check compliance with the contract throughout the refurbishment project and to oversee Rydon's co-ordination of contractors during the project. Their contract administration role was to alert the TMO, as project client, of any cost or programme issues that would impact positively or negatively on the project.
- 58 They provided a monthly cost report setting out financial information in respect of anticipated and actual costs as well as a graph showing actual progress against the contractor's programme.
- 59 Curtins were the structural engineering consultants again originally engaged by RBKC on KALC who had input to structural issues to check the suitability of the structure for accommodating cladding and its fixings
- 60 Max Fordham are service engineers who dealt with mechanical and engineering aspects. Like others, they were originally engaged by RBKC to work on the KALC project and

they continued on Grenfell and were subsequently contracted by TMO to write the performance specifications relevant to mechanical engineering and to approve contractors' proposals for completion of those works and check compliance. These works principally related to the heating specifications, boiler, water flow, water temperature and ventilation including the smoke dispersal system, lifts, windows dry riser and electrical and lighting standards.

61 Exova Warrington Fire are fire engineers. Their appointment and role in relation to the project was that of fire strategy advisers to Studio E and latterly Rydon.

62 I had little knowledge of Rydon's sub-contractors and only became involved in companies who ran into financial difficulties as occurred with Harley Facades and Rydon's steel erectors whose name I do not recall. I have very limited knowledge of any other sub-contractors.

63 I am aware that planning submissions were presented prior to my engagement and ultimately planning permission was granted by RBKC on 10 January 2014. This permission was in relatively standard form and referred to numerous drawings all of which had been prepared by Studio E.

64 The permission was conditional upon matters such as detailed drawings or samples of materials being submitted for approval by the local planning authority before the relevant part of the work was begun. It was specified that the material to be used on the external faces of the buildings was to accord with the development plan by ensuring that the character and appearance of the area was preserved and living conditions of those living near the development suitably protected. Similar conditions were specified in relation to the windows and doors to ensure the appearance of the development was satisfactory and to safeguard the amenity of the area.

• **Thermal external cladding to the building**

65 I have no technical qualification, ability or knowledge of either the materials used in cladding insulation nor how they are required to be fitted. The Design and Build contract administered by Artelia on behalf of TMO meant that cladding design and fitting was the

responsibility of the Principal Contractor and their specialist designers and sub-contractors.

- 66 Rydon were selected via their tender submission because of their experience and expertise in this regard having carried out similar projects previously under the terms of the Design and Build contract. They were tasked with ensuring that appropriate materials were being used and fitted. It was the responsibility of Artelia to check compliance and for John Rowan and Partners who were engaged as Clerk of Works, to check and inform TMO of any non-compliances in the installation. The detail would then be interrogated by RBKC Building Control who themselves would liaise with the Principal Contractor, their advisers and LFB to ensure all Building and Fire Safety Regulation requirements were being met.
- 67 In very general terms, my understanding was that the cladding was to be fitted on or within a framework bolted to the exterior of the building. The new windows were fitted into the new framework and initially were installed additional to the existing single glazed windows which were removed following installation of the double glazed replacements.
- 68 As part of the value engineering process, I was involved with discussions regarding zinc or aluminium cladding. Both were priced as part of the tender when options were being kept open. I was also involved with discussion on whether the cladding should be cassette or riveted as part of the value engineering process. The more expensive option was chosen. I had no further role or input to technical decisions concerning cladding, insulation or cavity barriers. I do not have any technical expertise in this regard and TMO relied on the specialist contractors appointed to undertake the project under this Design and Build contract. My understanding and expectation was that all materials were compliant with all appropriate Building Regulations.
- 69 Cladding, insulation and cavity barriers were therefore designed and installed by the specialist contractors under the control of Rydon as part of the Design and Build contract and inspected and checked by John Rowan and Partners as part of their duties as Clerk of Works and inspected and approved by RBKC's Building Control from a construction perspective and with the approval of RBKC Planning Department in terms of aesthetics.

70 My understanding is that the cladding was sourced by Rydon and installed by them or their contractors and based on specifications drawn up by Studio E Architects and approved by RBKC Building and Planning departments with supporting information provided to them by Rydon, Artelia, IBI Taylor Young and checked by RBKC Planners and Building Inspectors carrying out their own researches and inspections. I believe the RBKC building control inspectors attended site on numerous occasions throughout the refurbishment.

71 I do not have specific knowledge of the materials involved and whilst I may have been informed of trade names and perhaps general information, they would not have meant anything to me.

- **Windows**

72 New powder-coated aluminium windows were installed by Rydon to the cladding structure to the exterior of the building prior to removing the existing framed windows within.

73 The original proposal was that the windows would be designed larger than the structural opening. I did not know this until it was pointed out. I did not appreciate the implication of it at the time but I learned later that this was because new windows had wider frames and there was an intention to keep the glazed area the same size to preserve light standard. Had this remained, the contractor would have been required to carry out internal works within the flats to cut larger structural openings to fit the larger windows and this would have caused difficulties and major disruption to all individual residents. Residents raised this concern as part of the resident consultation on the windows. Their concern was that fitting larger windows would cause them considerable disruption and involve purchasing new curtains. A decision was taken following this consultation to review the matter.

74 Rydon suggested retaining the structural openings and fitting the windows to them to avoid these issues. Max Fordham checked the lighting levels and Rydon were required to confirm that the proposed revisions for the new windows met the existing Building Regulations for refurbishment standards. This was ultimately achieved.

75 The issue of window sizes was raised at a Progress Meeting and Rydon reported that if the windows were sized to fit an existing opening they could over clad on the existing

operated in conjunction with sensors detecting the presence of smoke in the communal areas and for which Rydon obtained approval under the Building Regulations.

- 82 My understanding is that an automatic opening vent (AOV) system was designed from specifications provided by Max Fordham as approved by RBKC building control. The AOV system incorporated dampers to the ducts in lobbies at each level and in environmental mode, the dampers would open or close at specified temperatures to control air flows to keep temperatures at ambient levels. If smoke was detected the environmental settings were automatically overridden to a smoke control mode which closed all dampers except on the floor where the smoke was detected and then large fans would blow and draw the smoke from the lobby through ducting and out of the top of the building. Upon being activated the system cut off the gas supply to communal boilers and relay an alarm message to Tunstall, the off-site remote monitoring company, to alert the emergency services. I understood the system could be manually overridden on each floor but I am not familiar with the detail of this. All I can say is that it was a system that was designed and checked by Max Fordham to be compliant with current regulations and it was still under warranty with Rydon at the time of the fire.
- 83 The system was required to be checked by Rydon and their contractors while still under warranty and in addition, it was checked regularly, weekly I believe, by TMO staff. Allied Protection were TMO's appointed contractors for the repair and maintenance of fire safety equipment and they were ready to take over the service and maintenance of the ventilation system when the Rydon warranty ended.
- 84 I was aware that Studio E had consulted with Exova in relation to fire safety strategy when drawing up specifications for the refurbishment. I did not see their reports to Studio E at the time but I am now aware they produced reports to Studio E dated 31/10/12 (PM/9:TMO) and subsequently 24/10/13 (PM/10:TMO) and a third signed report bearing two different dates, namely 5/11/13 or 7/11/13 which appear to be the same (PM/11:TMO10017186).
- 85 I have noted that it was reported by Exova that "*it is considered that the proposed changes will have no adverse effect on the building in relation to external fire spread but this will be confirmed by analysis in a future issue of this report*". I do not know what

Exova based this opinion on or whether they produced any further analysis or reports. If they did, I did not see them.

- 86 I am also aware that on 17th October 2014 Carl Stokes conducted a Fire Risk Assessment **(PM/12:TMO10042446)** for Grenfell Tower. Carl Stokes engagement was by Janice Wray, TMO’s Health and Safety Manager.
- 87 I have seen the fire risk assessment and it recorded amongst other things, that the fire strategy for residential areas was a “stay put” strategy which he confirmed meant that residents remain within their own dwelling during a fire incident unless the fire is in that dwelling or it is otherwise affected, in which case they should immediately evacuate the dwelling and call the fire and rescue service. He went on to say that the fire service or TMO employees will arrange for a general evacuation of the building at any time if this is appropriate or the resident can leave at any time if they so wish. He noted that information had been provided to all residents in the form of tenants’ handbook, letters and briefing sheets etc. and articles on fire safety advice and emergency procedures were also included in the residents’ magazine called “Link”.
- 88 He further reported that the provisions for means of escape for the flats are based on the assumption that the fire is generally in a flat; there is no reliance on external rescue (e.g. by a portable ladder) and that there was a high degree of compartmentation and therefore low probability of fire spread beyond the flat of origin so that simultaneous evacuation of the building is unlikely to be necessary; and although fires may occur in the common part of the building, the materials and construction used there should prevent the fire from being involved beyond the immediate vicinity although in some cases communal facilities exist which require additional measures to be taken.
- 89 This Fire Risk Assessment referred to an audit having been conducted by Fire Safety Inspecting Officer Matthew Ramsey of the London Fire Brigade.
- 90 Mr Stokes noted that the building appeared to have appropriate fire separation and compartmentation and, from a visual inspection of the structure of the building, there appeared to be no areas that raised concern about structural damage to the building or fire stopping issues. There were no visible breaches of the compartment walls and ceiling

linings at the time of this risk assessment and the fire loading of the common parts of the building was considered to be good.

- 91 He observed that the building appeared to have been constructed in accordance with the building regulations at the time of construction with the layout of the building, including the travel distances, the escape routes, the width of escape routes and the number of exits appropriate for the present use. The means of escape route/the staircase leads to a final exit at the walkway level at that time. The entrance/exit doors of this building all open in the direction of travel as do the flat/lift lobby area doors onto the staircase.
- 92 He also observed that there was adequate protection for the means of escape route from the building with no visual damage observed during the assessment, there are no openings on the staircase apart from the entrance/exit doors to each flat/lift lobby area. Each flat/lift lobby area has the apartment entrance doors and the refuse chute room door off it. The tenanted apartments within this building had a few years ago their flat entrance doors replaced with new self-closing 30 minute certified fire rated doors which meet the requirements of building regulations. The other flat entrance doors which have not been replaced are flush solid fire rated doors with perko self-closing devices fitted on the ones looked at, these are the originally fitted doors. He commented that if new flat entrance doors are fitted in the future then these will need to conform to the requirements of the building regulations at the time of installation.
- 93 He commented that the door to each of the refuse chute rooms is a 30 minute fire rated door fitted with a self-closing device and cold smoke seals.
- 94 I took from this report that there had been a complete fire risk assessment which, in the event of fire, required residents to remain in their homes unless the fire was in their flat in which case they should evacuate and that anyone wishing to evacuate was safe to do so via the protected staircase.
- 95 I understood this was the strategy advised and endorsed by LFB who regularly attended meetings to discuss and who made regular visits to Grenfell Tower to carry out familiarisation exercises and inspections.

- 96 I did not interface with LFB myself but was informed throughout the refurbishment work, that there were regular attendances by representatives of LFB who attended to discuss fire safety issues with Rydon and for the benefit of familiarisation visits and to make observations and recommendation aimed at managing fire safety. On these occasions, LFB officers met Rydon to understand how the systems worked and to familiarise themselves with them. I fully expected that this would include familiarisation with the lay out, dry riser, lifts and ventilation system and a review of the stay put policy. I am sure that if anything was found to be non-compliant or below standard it would have been brought to my attention but nothing was and I had no reason to believe that LFB were anything other than entirely satisfied with layout and all fire safety systems and facilities and they were fully familiar with them having attended to consider them and to familiarise themselves with them and their operation.
- 97 As far as I was aware, LFB continued to support a stay put policy and no time did they or Carl Stokes suggest that any other policy should be considered.
- 98 Via the Newsletters, Claire Williams passed on to residents the specific instruction received from LFB and stated that it had been emphasised by LFB who wished to reinforce the message to residents that *"If there is a fire which is not inside your own home, you are generally safest to stay put in your home to begin with; the fire brigade will arrive very quickly if a fire is reported. The only reason you should leave your home is if the fire is inside your home. In this case you and your family should leave the flat immediately: close the door behind you, leave the building and call the 999 giving your address and postcode. If there is a fire in the block near your flat and you believe you are at risk and would prefer to evacuate the building then please do so using the stairs and wait outside the building for the fire brigade to arrive"*. I understood this to be the advice specifically identified by LFB.
- 99 Carl Stokes conducted a further assessment and produced a record of his significant findings and action plan dated 26 April 2016. Rydon recorded their responses on the action plan record and I understand this was returned to Janice Wray to assist Carl Stokes with his overall fire assessment for the building required under the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order which he reported on 20 June 2016 near to practical completion of the refurbishment works.

- 100 Carl Stokes noted in his 2016 assessment that he had conducted an inspection and reviewed information gathered from the buildings’ occupants, TMO employees and from analysis of documents provided by TMO and concluded, without conducting an invasive structural investigation that the building’s structure, the construction and any refurbishments of the building had gone through the Building Regulations process.
- 101 He noted that new external cladding had been fitted to the building as part of the project of refurbishment/construction work being undertaken on and within this building. The original external face of the building had been over clad, the new fire rated cladding is fixed to the outer face of the building by metal fixings and the whole process has been overseen by the RBKC Building Control department and officers. They have approved and accepted the fixing systems and the cladding used. He noted that “there are no apparent unusual elements of building construction that were considered to add a significant additional contribution to the fire risk”.
- 102 Mr Stokes referred to the “stay put” evacuation strategy and what that meant and identified that this was the general advice provided by the LFB as noted on their website and as communicated to the residents.
- 103 In relation to the dry riser, again my understanding is that Rydon engaged contractors to make modifications to the existing dry riser by extending it to the new lower floors and this work was in accordance with specification drafted by Max Fordham as approved by RBKC Building Control. I am not aware of any issue with the dry riser at Grenfell Tower. If there had been any I would have expected that to have been picked up by RBKC Building Control and/or raised as an issue in the fire risk assessments conducted by Carl Stokes or by LFB during their inspections and familiarisation visits, one of which I understand was specifically in relation to the dry riser.
- 104 Minor modifications were made to the lifts. Again I believe Rydon engaged contractors to make these modifications pursuant to specifications prepared by Max Fordham as approved by RBKC Building Control. I am not aware of there being any issue with the lifts to the new lower floors. The lifts were considered by Carl Stokes and LFB. The requirement from TMO’s perspective was that the lifts should meet all legislation, regulation, standards and guidance and having been designed and constructed and checked by so many professionals, I had no reason to believe that they did not do so.

Further, the lifts were regularly serviced and underwent a major service shortly before the fire. This was by specialist service engineers PDERS. Further, the lifts were independently inspected by Bureau Veritas for insurance purposes and all inspections and service updates were up to date at the time of the fire.

105 There had previously been emergency lights on every other floor in the stair well but following a report from a resident Mr Collins that they were faulty, we arranged for all the lights in the stair well and lobbies to be replaced and we took this opportunity to fit new emergency lights to every floor in the stairwell instead of every other floor. The new lights were installed – by Allied Protection I believe - at the time of the refurbishment works. This was in 2016 and all lights were therefore relatively new at the time of the fire.

106 My understanding is that there was a fire door replacement program in about 2012 when all non-compliant fire doors were replaced and that all doors were therefore compliant. I had no reason to consider that they were not. My understanding is that as part of the refurbishment new fire doors were installed in the newly constructed areas at lower level and that those doors complied with current fire standards as required.

107 I was aware there had been a Borough wide survey to review the doors of leaseholders and this gave rise to some difficulties replacing doors that were not considered to be compliant. However none of these were at Grenfell Tower and my understanding was that all doors in Grenfell Tower were considered to be compliant although I believe some steps may have been taken to replace one leaseholder's door. I had no reason to believe that the fire doors were not and I would expect the fire risk assessments to have identified any deficiencies or non-compliances but I am not aware of any being identified. My understanding is that one leaseholder had replaced his flat door and there was difficulty obtaining a certificate to confirm that it was a 30-minute fire door.

Inspections

108 Rydon had the responsibility under the Design and Build Contract to comply with all legislation, standards and Building Regulations and to obtain Building Control approval. All matters relative to Building Control were therefore dealt with directly between Rydon

- 114 The Inquiry has asked what system there was, if any, for residents to express their concerns and views in relation to fire safety and the channels of communication provided etc. together with details of issues raised.
- 115 In terms of general interaction and concerns there is a recognised local authority process whereby representative groups may voice opinions. Here the recognised residents associations had been the Lancaster West Residents Association and Lancaster West Management Board but these were in existence before I joined TMO and I had no interaction with them. My perception is that historically there had been issues with both organisations.
- 116 We held public meetings and drop-in sessions for residents. We then consulted residents on their preferred method of consultation. Only one resident favoured public meetings. The majority asked for Newsletters plus informal drop-ins.
- 117 A formal focus group recognised by local authorities and known as a “Compact” was set up specifically in response to issues raised by and on behalf of residents regarding the location of the HIUs within some flats. This was set up and various individuals were involved.
- 118 There were a range of informal opportunities for residents to raise issues and concerns however, there was also a formal, three stage complaints system. All issues raised through this process were responded to and appropriate actions taken. Only a small number of issues raised related to fire safety.
- 119 As regards issues raised during the refurbishment works, the Project Manager and Head of Service were responsible for the day to day management of the contract. I became involved in some detail when residents raised issues through the formal complaints system, Compact or through the local councillor or when key issues needed attention- eg delays in the programme eg resulting from the liquidation of two sub contractors
- 120 There was a big issue raised about the Heat Interface Unit (HIU). The design had placed the HIU in or above shelving/cupboard in the hallway of the flats. It seemed sensible to locate it there alongside services and its presence did not in any way restrict access because the units were contained within the already occupied by shelving/cupboards. The

location of the HIU was a change from the original proposed location. Residents were informed of the proposed change via newsletter and drop-in session however some residents were not happy with the change and a number of residents wanted the HIU installed in the kitchen. This was undesirable for many reasons including concerns about the integrity of the old pipe work to which it was to be installed and it would also be more difficult to install and would cause disruption to the kitchen area and work surfaces.

- 121 This had become such an issue that we organised a series of meetings at the Tower at which Robert Black, Sacha Jevans, Claire Williams and myself and Board members from TMO; together with Nicholas Paget-Brown, Rock Feilding-Mellen and Laura Johnson and her team from RBKC; and Councillor Blakeman all attended. The consensus was that there was nothing wrong with installing the HIU's in the hallway and that was clearly the best place to do so but it was decided at extra cost to move the HIU's into the kitchen area for those who wanted them there. We subsequently offered to locate the HIU in the kitchen as originally proposed as long as residents were prepared to endure the extended disruption this would cause.
- 122 The refurbishment of Grenfell Tower was a very big project for everyone involved and we were particularly conscious of the fact that work was being carried out while the residents remained in situ and as a result we held numerous public meetings and drop-in sessions coffee mornings, door-knocking exercises etc. in addition to dealing with matters with residents on an individual basis.
- 123 Initial public meetings were poorly attended by residents and were often dominated by a small number of vocal residents who persisted with raising issues outside of the scope of the meetings causing distraction from their purpose and objective. There were discussions about power surges which I deal with elsewhere but I do not recall other fire safety concerns being raised at these meetings. As I recall, the only issues to come out of those meetings relevant to the refurbishment itself were ones expressing disappointment that the refurbishment was not proceeding as quickly as the residents would have liked and residents were generally unhappy with some of the timescales involved. This was principally because the work had been planned for some time and there was perhaps some impatience and understandable disappointment at what needed to be involved.

- 124 We considered alternatives to public meetings and Claire Williams, Project Manager consulted separately with residents to enquire as to their preferred means of consultation. The consensus was that the public meetings were of limited value and most residents preferred drop-in sessions and newsletters to be informed of developments and that is the approach we agreed to take.
- 125 Communication with residents with regards to the refurbishment works was managed on behalf of TMO by Claire Williams and the contractual arrangements were specifically set up so that all residents' issues relevant to the refurbishment would be directed to Rydon who were required to respond and manage them. This was a very important aspect of the tendering process and Rydon scored highly in this regard and as far as I am aware they dealt with all residents issues satisfactorily
- 126 I understand that Rydon conducted a complete resident profiling exercise and in conjunction with TMO carried out "door-knocking exercises" the purpose of which was to conduct a resident profiling exercise to establish face to face contact with each household to gather information about their preferred approach to contact them in the run up to and over the duration of the works and to establish whether there were any specific needs or requirements that would have to be taken into consideration. As part of that exercise it was established that no household needed to have any assistance with any language difficulties because there was at least one person within each household who had good command of the English language.
- 127 Any issues raised in connection with the refurbishment were therefore channelled to Rydon. The contract was set up in this way and it was an important part of the tender process that the successful tenderer should deal with such matters. The Newsletters and posters all identified that issues should be directed to Rydon and by and large they were. Any reports made elsewhere were all channelled to Rydon. Claire Williams managed that process to check that all reports were suitably responded to by Rydon. My understanding is that they were.
- 128 In general terms all reports of defects and repairs were required to be communicated to the Customer Services Centre via Freephone, email or letter or on line. Out of hours emergency reports were handled by Pinnacle a specialist emergency housing maintenance contractor service. In relation to all repairs, an order would be raised and

any other enquiries would be entered in the Customer Relationship Management database known as CRM, previously known as W2.

- 129 Residents could also call into the on-site neighbourhood office at Grenfell Tower to report their concerns. This office was managed by the Neighbourhood Management Team which is not within my department. For the duration of the refurbishment works, Rydon had a site office based in the building. There was a permanent Resident Liaison Officer located there to deal with any issues relating to the refurbishment works.
- 130 Ultimately all reports by whatever means that were in any way relevant to the refurbishment were directed to Rydon.
- 131 TMO did not however simply rely on issues being raised by residents, it had a regular inspection regime whereby Estate Services Assistants carried out regular routine inspections to report deficiencies as noted and John Rowan and Partners made regular inspections and Claire Williams regularly communicated with residents.
- 132 In terms of the refurbishment works, by way of example, any issue raised that may have been made about an ill-fitting window or similar would be raised directly with Rydon or referred to them to respond to it and as far as I am aware they did so. The TMO would often not be advised of every issue. I had no personal involvement with this defect reporting which was managed by Rydon in conjunction with Claire Williams and the Resident Liaison Officer but my understanding was that it worked effectively.
- 133 I was committed to understanding any concerns and dealing with them positively where possible and I would often find that various issues were directed to me outside of these formal processes and I would deal with them to the best of my ability. I also met with residents as described earlier through the Compact group. These meetings were often held in the evening or on a Saturday morning and I was happy to give my time to try and make things work as well as possible.
- 134 An issue was raised with me regarding gas pipes. Some of the residents raised legitimate issues concerning the siting of gas pipes in the stair well and the failure to fire stop the newly installed pipes.

- 135 National Grid were the statutory undertaker responsible for the gas supply to Grenfell Tower up to the meter in each flat. They were responsible for ensuring, by inspection and maintenance, the safe operation and condition of the gas supply pipework within the building. They are not contractors of TMO and there is no contractual relationship between the two organisations.
- 136 I am not sure exactly when it was but I understand that in about September 2016 National Grid conducted a survey of the pipes and discovered a gas leak in one of the four gas mains supplies at Grenfell Tower. The other three pipes remained fit for purpose.
- 137 The supply that was affected involved the gas main to some of the residents' cookers. In the immediate short-term it was arranged for the residents affected to be given temporary electric cooking equipment while National Grid reviewed the position. As explained further below National Grid were very slow to respond at all stages.
- 138 I became involved probably as a result of my involvement with the Grenfell Compact group previously. I was concerned to ensure that the residents had more permanent cooking facilities over the approaching Christmas period and staff in the Contracts Management Team put forward a proposal to National Grid to install electric cooking facilities and remove the domestic gas supply to the building. National Grid were against that and insisted on a new gas supply.
- 139 National Grid advised the TMO that it wished to run gas pipes up the stairway. They considered this to be the only place to run the pipes as there was no feasible route to run the pipework externally. The TMO was powerless to prevent that as National Grid were the statutory undertakers. Legally National Grid had the powers to specify how it wished to install its infrastructure. TMO were concerned by the proposals and needed reassurance and commitment from National Grid that what they were proposing was safe.
- 140 As a result of our own concerns, as well as those presented by and on behalf of residents, we sought the involvement of RBKC Building Control. However, they advised that the location of the pipe work was not a building control matter and was a matter for National Grid who were insistent on siting them in the stair well.

- 141 Following internal discussions, it was also agreed that Carl Stokes, the TMO's retained fire expert, should visit the Tower to give us his view on the location of the pipe work. Carl Stokes produced a report concluding that the location of gas pipes was not a problem per se provided they were fully fire-stopped.
- 142 This became the subject of much correspondence with residents and Councillor Blakeman on their behalf who understandably were not happy with the situation. The TMO had sympathy with their view but was advised that there was no basis presented that would support a challenge to National Grid and we were left having to manage that position with residents even though it was not our decision.
- 143 The work of boxing in and fire stopping progressed slowly and was the subject of many complaints by TMO to National Grid. I was aware that Anthony Cheney, who was Acting Head of Contract Management, Assets and Regeneration and who reported to me at the time, was chasing National Grid on a very regular basis but often his emails received no reply at all, or promises were made which were not kept. My understanding now is that some of the boxing in work may not have been completed by the time of the fire.
- 144 In addition to the issues in relation to gas pipes I have referred to, residents raised concerns regarding power surges in May 2013 which resulted in damage to some electrical equipment. This matter was fully investigated and it was found that there was a fault on a cable on the rising electrical main. The matter was referred to RBKC's insurers who established that there was no liability as TMO had undertaken all necessary checks of the supply. The matter was also the subject of detailed reports to TMO Board and RBKC's Housing and Property Scrutiny Committee.
- 145 Mr Collins reported in January 2016 that the emergency lights in the stairwell were faulty, The non-emergency lights in the stairwell were all working but there was a fault on the emergency circuit. Following this report, we arranged for all the lights in the stairwell and lobbies to be replaced and we took the opportunity to fit new lights to every floor in the stairwell instead of having lights on every other floor. New lights were fitted at the time of the refurbishment works. This was in 2016 and all lights were therefore relatively new at the time of the fire.

- 146 I am also aware that some residents had raised concerns about the location of the HIU within their flats and its potential to obstruct access. The reason for the proposed location was explained to residents through newsletters and drop-in sessions in the show flat as part of the consultation on the works. The location of the HIU was considered as part of Rydon's responsibility as main contractor under the design and build contract, and appropriate checks were carried out by Artelia, the Clerk of Works and Building Control. Concerns about any fire risk were also referred to Carl Stokes who produced reports that explained that he did not consider that the matter presented a fire risk. This matter was considered through the TMO Complaints procedure and was not upheld.
- 147 I learned that before my time there had been a small fire in a lobby area in 2010 with ongoing complaints that the smoke dispersal system did not work. The matter was investigated and the failure of a vent was rectified. The ventilation system was nearing the end of its expected life and was indeed replaced in the 2015-16 refurbishment.
- 148 There was also a concern raised about an empty flat door being left open over a weekend and concern that there was no door closer working to close the door. The concern expressed was in relation to security rather than any issue of fire safety. This was investigated and it was established that a Rydon contractor had worked in the flat following flooding from the re positioning on the HIU in the flat above and had left the front door open. The door closer was repaired and an apology was given. Rydon were instructed to ensure it did not happen again.
- 149 A resident raised a concern about parking at the base of Grenfell Tower and access arrangements for LFB in the event of a fire. I had no involvement with this but understand the Health and Safety Manager liaised with LFB to confirm that they were satisfied with arrangements in the area. I also understand that the local housing management team took action to deal with vehicles parking inappropriately in the area.
- 150 An issue was raised concerning the link between activation of the smoke ventilation system and notification being given to the Fire Brigade. I explained in correspondence that the AOV system when activated did not automatically contact the Fire Brigade as the Fire Brigade did not provide a response in such circumstances. I went on to explain that once the refurbishment work was complete, there would be a phone line direct to a call centre who would contact the Fire Brigade in the event of the system being triggered.

The Fire Brigade was aware of these arrangements which had been reviewed by the fire risk consultant.

- 151 A resident raised concerns about bulk refuse that was left by a resident in the communal area including some internal doors. This matter was referred to the housing management team and they arranged for the refuse to be removed.
- 152 Another issue concerned the original floor numbering in Grenfell Tower which was “hotel style”, e.g, flat 101 was on the first residential floor, flat 201 the second, etc. The first few floors were called “Ground”, “Walkway”, “Walkway plus 1”. When the lower floors were brought into residential use and the lift stops were added to these floors, a decision was made to renumber the floors, based, I understand on advice from Planners. Residents were informed of this change through the regular newsletters and the change was implemented.
- 153 Subsequently, the resident Compact asked that the numbering be changed back to the original format as they thought it was easier to know which flat was on which floor. This was not agreed, as the change had already been implemented and a further change would be confusing. New signage was introduced to detail which flats were located on each floor.
- 154 I am not aware of any other issues having been raised in relation to fire safety.

Fire advice to residents 2012 to 14 June 2017

- 155 I do not think I can assist the Inquiry in this regard and will defer to others who can. I am aware however that via handbooks, Resident magazine, posters and Newsletters, residents at Grenfell Tower received stay put advice. In her Newsletter Claire Williams passed on to residents the specific instruction received from LFB and stated that it had been emphasised by LFB who wished re-inforce the message to residents that “If there is a fire which is not inside your own home, you are generally safest to stay put in your home to begin with; the fire brigade will arrive very quickly if a fire is reported. The only reason you should leave your home is if the fire is inside your home. In this case you and your family should leave the flat immediately: close the door behind you, leave the building and call the 999 giving your address and postcode. If there is a fire in the block

near your flat and you believe you are at risk and would prefer to evacuate the building then please do so using the stairs and wait outside the building for the fire brigade to arrive”.

156 I understood this to be the advice specifically identified by LFB and I understood that it was the firm advice of the LFB to be reinforced that residents should observe the “stay put” policy unless the fire service advised differently.

157 There may have been other fire advices to residents but I am not the person to identify these.

Chronology

158 In the weeks and months since my starting at TMO, I became familiar with the requirements of the Grenfell Tower refurbishment project and had attended meetings with Artelia and Leadbitter with more detail for their proposals given that the project budget was forecast to overspend by £2.2million. This was reported at the Executive Team meeting on 6 February 2013 (**PM/13:TMO10005816**) where it was also reported that I would be arranging to meet Laura Johnson of RBKC to discuss the options with her.

159 I attended at the Programme Board meeting on 21 February 2013 (**PM/14:TMO10038426**) for the issue relevant to Grenfell Tower and to report that negotiations were ongoing with Leadbitter and Appleyards and the architects, and that discussions were expected to continue over the next month. It was reported that if there was a redesign of the project it could take months to receive planning permission and noted that “a major cost variation” was on cladding, one of the differences between Appleyards and Leadbitter being the amount of cladding required rather than quality/price. At present we were £2.8M adrift.

160 It was also reported that because attendance was poor at public meetings, we were consulting through newsletters and displays so residents were aware of what the project would look like.

161 I did not attend the Executive Team meeting on 4 March 2013 (**PM/15:TMO10003105**) but it was reported that I had prepared two versions of the capital programme for 2013/14,

one of which included Grenfell Tower and the other excluded the project. This was because of the uncertainty regarding the project at this stage. This was subsequently reported to the Board in the Chief Executive's report dated 21 March 2013 **(PM/16:TMO10002337)** reporting that the Grenfell Tower project had been delayed due to a difference between the Appleyards' consultant's costs plan and Leadbitter's costs. It was reported that "work is now being undertaken through further value engineering to try and bring the costs back within budget. The planning application has been withheld until it is understood whether the proposed design can be delivered within the budget. A deadline for the end of March has been given to the consultant and contractor".

162 I attended Programme Board on 25 March 2013 **(PM/17:TMO10038870)** to report the ongoing work to agree costs for the project. It was reported that the budgeted cost was £9million whilst the costs being presented by Leadbitter was approximately £12-£13million. It was also reported that the design was also being revisited as there might be costs savings with revising it.

163 The recommendation I gave the Board was to re-procure. I proposed that we wait until next week's deadline for Leadbitter to come back with a breakdown and reasons for gaps in costs. If the information was not forthcoming or we could still not reach an agreement then we should proceed by using the OJEU process.

164 It was recorded that my team would look at the redesign opportunities to get a sense check and go back to RBKC with a proposal for how to proceed.

165 By email dated 17 April 2013 **(PM/18:TMO10002602)** Bruce Sounes of Studio E emailed me and others to report upon the discussions that we had been having regarding value engineering proposal and included in that note was reference to Studio E's belief that something more than bare minimum to insulate the building would be necessary to satisfy the planners as to the appearance of the building and "going beyond the meeting I think it is worthwhile circulating the samples we have been collecting of alternative cladding options to zinc" and he sent some pictures of some alternative materials.

166 Paul Dunkerton attended the Programme Board meeting on 24 April 2013 **(PM/19:TMO10028438)** to report that no agreement had been reached on costs for the Grenfell project with Appleyards and that a re-procurement exercise would take 4 – 5

months or more and assurance was requested that RBKC were in agreement with this approach. On issues relevant to the gap in costs, Paul Dunkerton reported that “we had already toned down the colour scheme following the original planning application”.

- 167 At the Project Review meeting with Appleyards on 26 April 2013 **(PM/20:TMO00830537)** there was further discussion on costs and in addition to this, I raised my concerns with Leadbitter’s suitability for working on this type of project. My suggestion was minuted that “if we continue with Leadbitter they need to provide a robust programme showing their management in working with residents, management of surveys and to ensure they comply with specification”. All of these issues were of paramount importance to the contract and I was not confident that Leadbitter would be able to comply.
- 168 I did not attend a Project Review meeting on 8 May 2013 **(PM/21:TMO)** when various value engineering initiatives were considered but it was included within the discussion that Mark Watterson of IBI Group would arrange to meet the Planning Department to discuss amongst other things the proposal to alter external cladding to render and the proposal to alter aluminium windows to UPVC.
- 169 I attended a TMO Board Meeting on 16 May 2013 **(PM/22:TMO10010078)** when I gave an update on the Grenfell Tower project. I reported that progress was being made in closing the gap on costs by refining the scope of the works to achieve value for money. I reported that I would be consulting with residents in June on the revised programme and Board members would be kept updated.
- 170 I attended a residents’ meeting on 17 June 2013 **(PM/23:TMO00837688)** to provide residents with an update on the refurbishment scheme and the recent design considerations. I indicated that TMO were still working with planners to provide a scheme that offered maximum benefits and gave some further detail about the project and answered residents’ questions that were raised. The notes of this meeting were endeavoured to be specific to the purpose for the meeting i.e. the refurbishment project but much more was said in relation to historic power surges.
- 171 I attended for part of the Programme Board on 20 June 2013 **(PM/24:TMO)** to report that we were considering an alternative contractor to Leadbitter and I

recommended that we test the market to obtain value for money by putting the matter out to tender through the OJEU procurement process.

- 172 I submitted a paper in support of the presentation setting out details of the project and the challenges in relation to costs **(PM/25:TMO10002849)**.
- 173 I attended a TMO Board meeting on 25 July 2013 **(PM/26:TMO10003173)** when a decision to procure the works through an OJEU tender process was noted.
- 174 I attended a Residents' Meeting on 15 August 2013 **(PM/27:TMO)** when details of the refurbishment and procurement etc. were explained to residents and identifying some of the challenges. It was in particular identified that the Costs Consultants had stated that the funding available from RBKC is sufficient to carry out all of the proposed works. However, to ensure we are able to evidence value for money it has been decided to tender the works to the market and that this was being done by the OJEU procurement process. The meeting was attended by Bruce Sounes from Studio E Architects who explained some of the design features which were of interest to the residents. It was in particular identified that two types of window were being introduced and Studio E identified that overall the windows would be slightly larger than at present but because the frames are bulkier, the overall area of glass and light to the room should be the same. It was noted that Studio E had also checked and modelled the ventilation requirements to all rooms from the various options on windows and all were acceptable.
- 175 There were no particular issues raised by residents but there were questions aimed at raising issues about the length of time that it would take for the work to be completed. The meeting was again dominated by power surge issues as separately noted **(PM/28:TMO)**.
- 176 I attended a Board Meeting on 5 September 2013 **(PM/29:TMO10010079)** and identified that it was hoped that approval would be given to the revised planning application for Grenfell Tower Refurbishment in September and the works were planned to start in March 2014 and complete by March 2015. I produced a timeline for the project as shown in paragraph 3.3 of Agenda item 6 **(PM/30:TMO10003403)**.

the tenderers had pulled out and there was concern about the costs because it would be a difficult project.

- 181 I did not attend the Progress Meeting No. 8 on 20 January 2014 **(PM/35:TMO00829831)** but I received the Minutes which included reference to Claire Williams instructing lift maintenance team to carry out work to improve lift efficiency prior to work starting on the lift and to a joint condition survey of lifts would be carried out. There were also references to the dry riser and that detailed design of the AOV had been submitted to building control. Claire was actioned at this meeting to update the Fire Brigade that the works were due to start.
- 182 On 27 March 2014 I prepared a paper for the TMO Board **(PM/36:TMO10005571)** recommending the appointment of the preferred contractor, based on the assessment and information provided by Artelia and based on their evaluation I recommended that the Board agreed to select Rydon Construction Limited as the preferred contractor for the refurbishment of Grenfell Tower. I identified that further work was required to firm up the scope of the works and design and arrive at a fixed costs for the contract and I recommended that the Board agree to enter into a pre-contract agreement with Rydon up to the value of £350k to progress early planning activities prior to entering into a contract with Rydon with a total project cost of £9.7m (inclusive of fees).
- 183 I attended a meeting on 1 April 2014 **(PM/37:TMO10023253)** entitled 'A Contractor Introduction Meeting' at which representatives of Rydon Artelia TMO attended when it was identified that Philip Booth of Artelia would perform the role of Employer's Agent on the project and that Keith Bushell of Artelia would be the CDM Coordinator.
- 184 Philip Booth of Artelia presented that there was a potential saving of up to £376,175 that could be realised through changes to the proposed cladding, by changing the material and method of fixing. He was promoting the change of material from zinc to aluminium and using a face fixing rather than a cassette to save most money.
- 185 He noted that all changes would have to be approved by the planners and Simon Lawrence of Rydon indicated that the only noticeable difference in appearance is that some of the fixings to the cladding would be visible. It was noted that Philip Booth of Artelia would organise an introduction between Marc Watterson of IBI Taylor and Simon

Lawrence of Rydon for them to consider the potential changes. Other potential smaller savings were also identified. Simon Lawrence was actioned to circulate a list of the potential savings that Rydon proposed.

186 The minutes inaccurately record that Studio E and Curtins had been novated to Rydon. It was the arrangement that all responsibility for design was left with the main contractor going forward under the design and build contract. Bruce Sounes and Stefano Strazzullo were the main contacts from Studio E and Curtins respectively. It was planned that Simon Lawrence of Rydon would meet Bruce Sounes of Studio E to confirm the schedule of services that Studio E would provide to them.

187 It was recorded that Exova had completed the fire strategy at the tender stage. They had not been novated but Simon Lawrence will contact them with a view to using them going forward.

188 By email exchanges in early April between Marc Watterson of IBI Taylor Young and Philip Booth of Artelia (**PM/38:TMO10041034**) there was discussion as to how to deal with the planning application and particularly with the proposal by Rydon to face fix aluminium cladding in colours to mirror those submitted for planning. It was noted in those emails that there had been numerous meetings with the local planners when a range of materials had been presented and it was noted that the planners were likely to have queries and issues regarding this and potentially asking for alternatives to be explored and much of the debate at that time between Artelia and IBI Group was revolving around what the local planners would accept principally by way of appearance.

189 It was at the same time being made known publically that the contract for the Grenfell Tower refurbishment had been agreed and there was a news release to that effect.

190 At a TMO/RBKC finance meeting on 14 April (**PM/39:TMO10005829**) which I did not attend, it was recorded that I was currently completing a value engineering exercise to bring the total costs within the budget provision and once completed a report would go to Councillor Feilding-Mellen which would then be followed with a cabinet report by mid-May. The value engineering exercise referred to there was not one that I was actually conducting myself but it was an exercise being conducted by Artelia in conjunction with Rydon and they were reporting to me so that I could report up the line.

been aligned, resulting in a random and un-uniform appearance. In addition, many of the panels had not weathered well, with water damage and accumulation of dirt around ledges, pipes etc. I am interested to understand if the more textured or brushed finish would alleviate some of these issues. Do you have any examples of where a more textured panel has been used on a building that we could go and visit?" These comments followed Sarah Scannell's visit to review cladding that had been fitted at the Chalcott Estate in Camden.

- 196 In further email exchanges on 16 May 2014 **(PM/42:TMO10005924)** Bruce Sounes of Studio E reported to Artelia his conversations with Sarah Scannell and her requirements for the cladding and her interest in the detail and junctions: window head, window cill and the pilasters. She expressed concern about exposed fixings and the overall quality of appearance.
- 197 At about this time and as reported in an Executive team presentation on 21 May 2014 **(PM/43:TMO)**, Rydon were working with energy funders to see whether grants could be obtained. It was recorded that the cladding had been switched from zinc to aluminium to provide high quality cladding and the planning were happy with this but there were ongoing discussions on other external fixtures.
- 198 By email dated 23 May 2014 **(PM/44:TMO)** Bruce Sounes of Studio E reported to Claire Williams and others that he thought brushed aluminium cassette would be acceptable to the Planners.
- 199 It was reported in email exchanges on 4 June 2014 **(PM/45:TMO10041379)** that Sarah Scannell had visited Kilburn that week and that whilst she considered brushed panels to be better, the planners were not convinced of the overall appearance and robustness of the material and again made references to the need for high quality appearance necessary for such a visible building but given the cost and time implications in relation to the project she suggested the provision of different colours with perhaps different fixings for them to consider.
- 200 At a pre-start meeting on 13 June 2014 **(PM/46:TMO00832490)** which I did not attend, it was recorded that Claire Williams would be the representative of the TMO client and the contract administrator would be Philip Booth of Artelia. It was recorded that there

would be a Clerk of Works and it was identified that the CDMC was Keith Bushell of Artelia. Simon Lawrence from Rydon was the main point of contact and Simon O'Connor was the Rydon site manager. It was recorded that it was assumed that the material for the cladding would not be signed off prior to entering into the contract therefore cassette fixed aluminium will be assumed which had a saving of £293,368 from the original design. A decision was still awaited from the RBKC planners in this regard. Other potential savings were identified as this meeting and the adjusted contract sum was therefore currently £8,683,172.78. It was recorded that the works had started on 2 June 2014.

- 201 On 19 June 2014 Laura Johnson, director of housing at RBKC presented a paper to the cabinet meeting of RBKC **(PM/47:TMO10005911)** in which she referred to the project and the appointment of Rydon. She noted that planning conditions were still to be discharged in relation to the detailed design and materials of a number of items including the new windows and the cladding material and fixing method. She noted that subject to agreement with planning these could result in increased costs and it would be prudent to plan for this possibility. Laura referred to the arrangements in place for liaising with the residents and ultimately recommended to cabinet to increase the capital budget for the scheme to £10.3m.
- 202 I attended the Programme Board on 1 July 2014 **(PM/48:TMO10007280)** to present an updated report on the progress of the refurbishment project which was principally to identify the different groups that had been set up to monitor progress and it was suggested that Roger Keane of RBKC could be involved to follow the progress of the project. It was noted by this time at a Capital Programme Team meeting of 24 June 2014 **(PM/49:TMO10006859)** that Roger Keane was now the Liaison Officer for RBKC. It was also noted at this meeting that Rydon were looking at savings focussing on cladding materials. External funding opportunities were limited and getting tighter and a report had been submitted for £600k. Also by this time, the resident engagement role was starting to increase with Rydon's RLO in place and working.
- 203 I was aware at this time that the LFB were attending site having been informed of the commencement of the works.

- 204 By email dated 15 July 2014 (PM/50:TMO) Chweechen Lim of Artelia wrote advising TMO to enter into a JCT design and build contract with Rydon based on a 66 week construction programme.
- 205 I attended Progress Meeting Number 1 on 15 July 2014 and the minutes drafted by Artelia (PM/51:TMO00835445) confirmed that TMO had appointed a Clerk of Works and that the works were due to start on 8 September. It was reported that Rydon had completed the mock-up for the cladding and it was confirmed that the planners were viewing the colours and fixing detail on 17 July. In a post-meeting note it was recorded that the planners preference was for champagne to brushed aluminium and they were not keen on the face fix. Simon Lawrence of Rydon confirmed that the discharge of the planning conditions was sent on 3 July.
- 206 By email dated 23 July 2014 (PM/52:TMO10007050) Sarah Scannell of RBKC planners wrote to IBI Taylor Young reporting on her discussions regarding the cladding with comments on the visual amenity and the fixings. It was recorded that officers were not convinced that the natural aluminium brushed colour of the panels would represent a high quality finish when placed across the whole building and the preference was for concealed fixings or cassettes. She requested a full image of the building clad in the champagne metallic so they could decide.
- 207 I attended a TMO board meeting on 24 July 2014 (PM/53:TMO10007374) to present a report which was an update on the paper considered by the board on 27 March in relation to the refurbishment. I reported that the final contract price had been confirmed at £9.7m which left no room for contingency for unforeseen costs in the project. As a result, I proposed to include a 6% contingency provision thereby increasing the total costs of the refurbishment to £10.3m. I reported that the approval of the RBKC Cabinet had been sought and agreed at its meeting on 19 June 2014.
- 208 I attended a Grenfell programme meeting on 27 August 2014 (PM/54:TMO10007302) where the extent of work was reported. Again reference was made to the attendance by LFB for familiarisation visits and it was recorded that the target date for the planners to confirm the cladding materials and colour choices was 29 August 2014.

- 209 I attended a Programme Board meeting on 28 August 2014 (PM/55:TMO10028481) to give an update on developments to date.
- 210 It was reported to residents in Claire Williams' newsletter in October 2014 that the Council had selected a smoke silver metallic (grey) colour for the cladding and that samples could be viewed in the main entrance.
- 211 At a Programme Board meeting on 9 October 2014 (PM/56:TMO), which I attended for part of, it was reported that work on the Grenfell Tower regeneration project was going well so far and it was reported that details of the pallet of materials was circulated and the colour had changed to grey following the intervention of Jonathan Bore, Executive Director of RBKC's Planning and Borough Development.
- 212 At this early stage of the project, I am aware that Carl Stokes attended to carry out a fire risk assessment which he did on 17 October 2014 (PM/12:TMO10042446) and his report made reference to discussions and comments received from LFB and to the active and passive fire safety devices present. He also drew attention to the stay put policy in place as recommended by the LFB.
- 213 By email dated 10 November 2014 (PM/57:TMO00837709) Bruce Sounes of Studio E wrote to Simon Lawrence of Rydon reporting on the windows to be installed which he said were initially proposed by Max Fordham to be central pivoting windows but he was raising issues in relation to these particularly with the concerns as to how they may be cleaned safely from inside and improve the existing barrier condition both for safety and to discourage people throwing things out. I note the paper dated 11 November, which I believe was drafted by Claire Williams, recorded that TMO's requirement was that the window design should prevent falls as well as deterring residents from throwing things out of the window and referred to three alternative designs to achieve this objective. This note also recorded that the original proposals for windows was that they were designed larger than the structure opening as the original client team wanted to improve on the current ventilation and daylight levels so the new windows were over and above the refurbishment building regulation obligations. It was being reported at that time that Rydon was about to carry out internal works within the flats and that cutting larger structural openings may cause difficulties and additional disruption and time within flats together with potential impact on curtains and furniture etc.

- 214 It is recorded that Rydon proposed to fit windows within the structural openings to remove these problems and they would confirm that the new proposals would meet existing building regulations for refurbishment standards. It is clear that TMO's concerns in this regard were to achieve a design of window that was safe and would minimise disruption to residents during installation and in all respects windows were required to meet building regulations which Rydon would need to clear with Building Control.
- 215 This was reflected in Artelia's email from Philip Booth on 26 November 2014 **(PM/58:TMO10007968)** in which Philip confirmed that the concerns regarding disruption to residents that would be caused by fitting larger windows was raised at a design meeting on 22 October and it was resolved following advice from IBI Taylor Young that windows would be installed to the existing openings if appropriate approval could be obtained. It was indicated that Amy Peck, from IBI Taylor Young, advised that the planners would be happy to consider the alteration in the window size as a non-material amendment and the risk of planning approval being refused was stated to be low. It was agreed that larger windows would not be ordered but an application for planning change would be made. Rydon indicated that the windows would need to be ordered by 7 November to maintain the current programme. Various options were considered.
- 216 Planning permission for smaller windows was ultimately given on 2 January 2015 as a non-material change. Correspondence ensued to avoid paying Rydon additional sums for this change of specification which actually resulted in them having to do considerably less work but TMO was advised by Artelia that this was not appropriate.
- 217 On 2 December 2014 Artelia reported that the assessment of the window material costs from Rydon's tender was roughly £1,280,000 **(PM/59:TMO10042475)**.
- 218 By email dated 2 January 2015, Tunde Awoderu on behalf of the Grenfell Tower Leaseholders Association wrote to Councillor Dent Coad and numerous others **(PM/60:TMO10008384)** drawing attention to his concerns for the fire alarm and smoke extract system to be upgraded and stating that although Rydon had been on site since June 2014 there was no tangible evidence of them carrying out such an upgrade and referring to the Carl Stokes fire risk assessment dated 20 November 2012 **(PM/61:TMO10028254)**. I drafted a response on 5 January 2015 for Councillor

Blakeman (PM/62:TMO10008428), to consider including: that the scope of work to Grenfell includes the upgrade/renewal of smoke and fire safety and ventilation system; that the system is currently beyond economic repair and we are working with Building Control to agree a design for the system that will meet current standards; that we have been in close contact with the Fire Brigade to make them aware of the current situation, so they can take this into account in their approach to any fire safety issues; and that our contractors (Rydon) have also been in liaison with the Fire Brigade to agree safe working methods in the interim while the system is being worked on. The response included also that we have posted notices throughout the building and explained in newsletters that a “stay put” policy is in place in the event of a fire.

- 219 I attended a Health and Safety Committee meeting on 19 January 2015 attended by TMO Managers and staff. During this meeting (PM/63:TMO10011987) as recorded at paragraph 3.2, I asked to see a copy of the detail behind a report on the backlog of outstanding actions in relation to fire related deficiencies and indicating my view that the system should be more robust to ensure actions are escalated if they are out of time. There was confirmation that the process would be reviewed. It was also recorded that Janice Wray reported there to be a new Station Commander for Kensington and North Kensington LFB, Nick Davis who visited Grenfell Tower at her request prior to the major works contractors’ Christmas shutdown. She reported that Mr Davis was keen to continue the regular familiarisation visit to Grenfell Tower and the regular liaison with Rydon that his predecessor had initiated.

- 220 It is my understanding that the LFB Station Manager and staff attended those regular familiarisation visits and the regular liaison meetings with Rydon and TMO.

- 221 It was reported that there had been a liaison meeting with LFB on 5 January 2015 whereby TMO had sought clarification of the LFB requirements in relation to Adair Tower and LFB had taken the opportunity to outline their requirement for all flat entrance doors to be fitted with self-closing devices. This was a consequence of the fire that had occurred at Adair Tower which was reported to have identified a number of doors without self-closing devices. It was reported that LFB required the landlords to regularly undertake checks to ensure that self-closers had not been removed or disengaged and that this was to be discussed in greater detail at the next FRA meeting.

- 222 A LFB enforcement notice was served following the fire at Adair Tower and various issues were identified in relation to Adair Tower but this prompted further consideration in relation to the need to check that door closers are fitted to all flat entrance doors with a suggestion that they be made “tamper proof”. This led to a proposal by TMO that checks of door closers be conducted as part of the regular planned maintenance programme.
- 223 At the Progress Meeting No. 7 on 20 January 2015 (**PM/64:TMO10008718**) which I did not attend, it was reported that Simon Lawrence of Rydon had submitted a detailed design of the AOVs to Building Control and Max Fordham has approved the equipment. It was recorded that there were changes to the drawings and with the AOV extending to additional floor for the new flats an increased flow rate was required by Building Control increasing the size of the fans. It was recorded that Rydon had proceeded to procure items necessary for the AOV to reduce risk on delivery time and that Claire Williams would update the LFB when works were about to start and the mechanical system was due to be operational by the end of June.
- 224 The meeting also recorded that windows were due to be delivered on 23 February and that the non-material amendment application had been approved.
- 225 David Gibson attended the Programme Board on 26 February 2015 (**PM/65:TMO10008836**) in my place and he reported upon the windows planning permission having been obtained and that the contract would be extended for 7 weeks at a cost of £78k. He reported upon a Residents’ Association meeting at which a sample window had been viewed and he recorded that the residents were happy with the new windows.
- 226 At the Progress Meeting Number 9 on 17 March 2015 (**PM/66:TMO00829504**) which I did not attend, it was reported that Simon Lawrence of Rydon was meeting with Building Control on 17 March for the sign off of the AOV system. It was also reported that TMO and Rydon were to keep the Fire Brigade informed about works on site identifying that the passive system should be operational by May and the mechanical system operational by the end of June.

- 227 David Gibson attended the Programme Board on 16 April 2015 (**PM/67:TMO10009164**) in my place to report on work progress at Grenfell and that there were issues with the heat exchange units and the windows.
- 228 In relation to the HIUs, David Gibson reported that the best option was to install these near the entrance door for most tenants and installation in the kitchen would be more disruptive and require additional pipework. It was recorded that Eddie Daffarn was expected to continue to oppose the works but TMO would concentrate on reducing the number of “no access” cases in order to ensure that residents had hot water and heating ahead of the winter heating season. A meeting was planned for 20 April.
- 229 It was reported that work on the lifts had started and that the fire brigade had been advised of this work.
- 230 At a Progress Meeting Number 11 on 19 May 2015 (**PM/68:TMO00830456**), it was recorded that TMO and Rydon would keep the fire brigade informed about the works on site and as reported before, the passive system would be operational by May. The mechanical system will be operational by the end of June and bimonthly meetings were organised. It was reported that Building Control visited site on 15 May to inspect the top three floors for insulation, fire breaks and window installation on three elevations and had no adverse comments. I am not clear who attended from Building Control but it was clear to all that they had approved the insulation fire breaks and window installation as seen by them on the visit on 15 May 2015.
- 231 I attended the Programme Board on 8 June 2015 (**PM/69:TMO10028488**) to report RBKC’s concerns about costs and the delivery date for the project and an update on cash flow and timeline had been provided. I was then due to meet Councillor Feilding-Mellen later that day and would brief him on the progress. I reported that there had been a problem with the end of year position as the accruals had not come through but we were now within budget. I reported that the project was due to finish on 23 October and had only been delayed by the need to go back to Planning about the windows and change of use for the offices which were being converted to flats. I reported that I would take Councillor Feilding-Mellen to the show flat which was due to be completed on 11 June 2015 and show him the HIU site.

- 232 Shortly after 29 May 2015 (**PM/70:TMO**) I wrote to Councillor Blakeman regarding a message that she had left in relation to issues raised at her councillor's surgery relating to refurbishment of Grenfell Tower. A number of Grenfell residents had attended her surgery and raised concerns about the proposed location of the HIU in their homes. I met with Cllr Blakeman and residents in the show flat in Grenfell Tower on a Saturday morning in June 2015 to discuss this matter and there were subsequent meetings with the group and Victoria Borwick MP. Having considered the matter it was agreed that the HIU could be located in the alternative location in the kitchen on condition that residents were prepared to endure the additional disruption that this would cause in their homes.
- 233 I wrote to Mr A Mohammed at 51 Grenfell Tower on 20 July 2015 (**PM/71:TMO**) in connection with his reluctance to grant access to his flat to carry out installation of the new central heating. I reported to him that he and a number of residents had raised concerns about the location of the HIU in the hallway and whilst giving details of the reasons for this location, I was pleased to inform him that having listened to resident feedback, we had agreed to make changes to the proposed enclosure of the HIU which I was hoping would address the concerns that had been raised and inviting him to look at the system in the show flat. I indicated that the final choice of position for the HIU will be his but each home would have different obstacles to overcome. I invited him to contact Rydon's Resident Liaison Officers to arrange an appointment to agree the scope and timing of work to his home.
- 234 I attended for part of the Programme Board held on 29 July 2015 (**PM/72:TMO10028489**) to report upon costs and contingencies and budget.
- 235 On 17 August 2015 I wrote to David Collins (**PM/73:TMO00837261**) in response to a number of issues that he had raised and which I had invited a discussion.
- 236 At the Progress Meeting Number 14 on 21 August 2015 (**PM/74:TMO10009801**), which I did not attend, concerns were reported in relation to progress on installation of the external façade. Simon Lawrence of Rydon explained that recalibrating the mast climbers had taken longer than anticipated due to a shortage in labour. He said that whilst tight, it was achievable to complete the external façade works.

- 249 There was a Grenfell Tower Compact Meeting on 12 November (**PM/81:TMO**) which I attended with Kiran Singh and Sam De Haan when a number of items including the HIU location was discussed and the option of relocating some HIUs was reported to be considered once it was known how many residents wanted this work and we had a better understanding of the costs.
- 250 I attended Progress Meeting Number 17 on 17 November 2015 (**PM/82:TMO10011410**) when it was noted under CDM Regulations 2015 recently in force identified that if the Principal Designer's appointment finished before the end of the works, then the Principal Contractor takes on the Principal Designer role and as a consequence puts together the health and safety file for the client. It was agreed however at this meeting that Rydon were not the Principal Designer under the 2015 Regulations and that TMO as the client would undertake this role and it was further agreed that Rydon would be responsible for collating and presenting the health and safety file information in accordance with the Employer's requirements.
- 251 At this time John Rowan and Partners continued to be expressing their concerns about the timings for installing the external cladding, identifying that there was still a lot to do and the programmed date for all cladding to be finished had moved to early January 2016 as reported in the site inspection report of 12 November 2015 (**PM/83:TMO00835928**).
- 252 I attended a joint RBKC TMO management meeting on 2 December 2015 (**PM/84:TMO10011591**) which in relation to Grenfell Tower recorded concern about the possibility of a new estate management board being formed and arrangements were made for a further meeting involving RBKC's Head of Housing Commissioning and others. By email dated 3 December 2015 (**PM/85:TMO10026298**) David Collins wrote to me and to others again in relation to the locating of HIU units and expressing concern that the units were so close to electrics and a fuse box both being located next to the exit from their home. An inspection by Building Control was not a satisfactory solution and he was suggesting that an investigation be conducted by an independent organisation specialising in fire and safety which he suggested Building Control was not. I replied saying that Building Control was an organisation that was independent of TMO and checks conformity to necessary regulations. They had checked the installation of the HIU and were satisfied with the approach. I also reported that our Fire Safety Consultant was asked to review the installation and his report was sent to Mr Collins confirming that

no fire risk had been identified in relation to the location of the HIU in the hallway. I challenged the accuracy of some of the other things that he recorded. On 10 December 2015 John Rowan and Partners reported progress upon the cladding installation and reported in particular that RBKC Building Control was on site two weeks earlier to look at the cladding and apart from some damaged panels and some making good, the inspector was generally happy **(PM/86:TMO00835939)**.

253 In December 2015, Councillor Blakeman raised issues in relation to the signage **(PM/87:TMO10027587)** and this was raised with Janice Wray who reported back to me **(PM/88:TMO10011652)** to confirm that she had spoken to the LFB Station Manager for North Kensington to confirm when his crews had carried out the last of their regular familiarisation visits to Grenfell and this was in October 2015. Janice reported that she had herself inspected the current signage and fed back her comments to Claire Williams who had instructed Rydon to address them and these included signs clarifying which flat numbers are located on each floor, the stencilling of floor numbers within the staircase and temporary laminated signs in each lift car with regard to the flat numbering sign for the whole building, this was fixed in place beside the lifts. Janice confirmed that she had arranged to meet Carl Stokes that day to inspect the block and had arranged to meet the new LFB Station Manager from North Kensington that Friday.

254 I attended the RBKC TMO Joint Management meeting on 2 March 2016 **(PM/89:TMO10014782)** and in respect of Grenfell Tower, I reported the mixed reactions from residents in response to the compact meeting and Robert Black noted that the TMO board agreed to review the complaints under the leadership of Sacha Jevans and Yvonne Birch. As the result of feedback from residents, it was agreed to have a full review of all complaints and the contract with a Board sub group, and we reported to the Scrutiny Committee in this regard.

255 I did not attend the interim meeting on 9 March 2016 **(PM/90:TMO10012507)** but it was noted that the AOV system protected from the fourth floor above was to be commissioned on 17 March 2016 and there was also an item to check the scope of the emergency lights works to ensure compliance with regulations.


256 On 10 March 2016 a revised F10 form **(PM/91:TMO)** was provided to the HSE recording TMO to be the Principal Designer. My understanding was this was a

technicality due to change of regulations midway through the contract and that all design work was complete.

- 257 As I was aware by the end of March 2016 that John Rowan and Partners were reporting that the cladding was nearly complete and there were various reports of Building Control Inspectors attending to inspect the work and of LFB staff attending for familiarisation visits to be better informed about the refurbishment works.
- 258 I attended a Health & Safety Committee meeting on 12 April 2016 (**PM/92:TMO10012811**) where further reference was made to LFB having continued their regular familiarisation visits to Grenfell Tower and Janice Wray indicated an intention to review TMO's fire strategy to ensure that it continued to be compliant with legislation and best practice.
- 259 Carl Stokes completed his fire risk assessment for Grenfell Tower of 20 June 2016 and produced a detailed action plan directed to TMO and to Rydon in particular and all those actions so far as I am aware were attended to and completed. On 24 June, John White of John Rowan and Partners delivered to David Hughes of Rydon a list of outstanding items which he had identified as being required. This included a reference to finishing off the cladding, cleaning and make good ground beam outside external area of flat 6 and he provided a snagging inspection sheet for Rydon's attention. As matters progressed, I attended an Executive team meeting on 7 July 2016 in part to report that the Grenfell refurbishment work would all be completed and handed over the following Monday just 4 days later (**PM/93:TMO10015934**).
- 260 I attended a Programme Board meeting on 20 July 2016 (**PM/94:TMO**) in part to present the Programme operations paper and in relation to Grenfell Tower it was noted that there was no one on site now and that TMO would be conducting a resident satisfaction survey at the end of October when the heating would be on.
- 261 I attended the RBKC and TMO Joint Management meeting on 7 September 2016 (**PM/95:TMO10016130**) to report that Councillor Atkinson was very happy with things at Grenfell but Councillor Blakeman was still sniping. Her main concern at this time was the stairwell decoration and the charges proposed for this.

262 I have by this statement endeavoured to answer all points raised and identified by the Inquiry and to do so as helpfully as I can to assist the Inquiry identify all safety lessons. I would by way of further statement be happy to clarify any points made here as necessary and to respond to any other issues Inquiry wishes to raise.

The contents of this statement are true to the best of my knowledge and belief. I am content for this statement to form part of the evidence before the Inquiry and published on the Inquiry's web site.

Signed.....

Dated.....8/2/19.....