

## AFTERMATH

to an emergency during normal working hours in the event residents required repairs to their homes as a result. Whilst I have never been involved in implementing TMO's emergency plan, I understood my role and I understood where I sat in the plan.

5. I was aware of the existence of Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea's (RBKC) Contingency Management Plan but I had no experience of it. I had no direct knowledge of their specific policies, procedures and plans or of those on the part of central government for dealing with a major emergency such as the Grenfell Tower fire.
6. I had a defined role within TMO's emergency plan which was the carrying out of any repairs that were required to be done by Repairs Direct. I do not believe I am able to assist the Inquiry with the plans TMO had in place for the provision of humanitarian relief in the event of an emergency nor of the risk assessments done and how these informed emergency planning. I am unable to comment on the arrangements that existed to warn/inform/advise the public in the event of an emergency or of arrangements to share information with other responders and of arrangements in place to utilise and coordinate activities from the voluntary sector. Others may be better placed to assist the Inquiry in these areas.
7. I am unable to say how emergency plans were activated and operationalised in response to the fire on the night. From the scale of the incident, it was clear that it was a much larger incident than would normally be covered by the TMO emergency plan and my expectation was that RBKC's emergency plan would have been invoked far earlier, which is what happened, with TMO providing support and assistance. It was evident upon my arrival at the scene that a structure was already in place and was being followed by the various emergency services and RBKC. For example, RBKC had a Local Authority Liaison Officer (LALO) in place at the scene coordinating requests from the emergency services and directing matters to TMO and others as necessary.
8. I am aware that humanitarian assistance was provided to those directly impacted by the Grenfell Tower for example by the setting up of rest centres to provide shelter and accommodation to residents forced to evacuate their homes. I do not know who was responsible for setting up the rest centres but I am aware many staff from TMO attended at the rest centres to provide support and assistance including speaking with residents.

identifying those who were missing and identifying and locating those who were not. I am unable to say how many staff were involved in the response.

9. I was not involved at the rest centres in the provision of emergency relief and humanitarian assistance to those directly impacted by the fire. In the aftermath of the fire, my team and I from Repairs Direct were involved in providing practical support to the emergency services as and when required as well as providing emergency response to requests for repair or activity requiring skilled tradesperson response, providing 24/7 on call response and providing business as usual across the borough.
10. I have described in my first statement and in my evidence to the Inquiry, my initial attendance on site on 14 June 2017. I did not attend site on 15 June 2017 as I was on a phased return to work following surgery but I remained in telephone contact throughout the day, co-ordinating between my own members of staff and with other teams. I made sure that Repairs Direct teams attended site and supported the Housing Team led by Teresa Brown. More practical support for the Police and Fire Brigade operations was being provided such as arranging quantities of hoarding to be delivered and erected, initially to screen off walking routes and the temporary morgue.
11. I was aware from walkabouts undertaken by the Housing Team, that the police had forced entry to a number of homes across Testerton Walk, Hurstway Walk, Barandon Walk and Treadgold House during immediate evacuation of the area. The Repairs Direct team began to prepare to ensure these doors were made safe, secure or temporarily replaced and to try to gauge how many doors were affected. As the police cordon was reduced and residents allowed to return to their homes in these areas, operatives from Repairs Direct were made available and were willing to work late to ensure doors were secured. This involved minor repairs to some locks, fitting temporary padlocks and hasps to others (with hand bolts on inside), and whole door blanks to other sites if the damage was extensive. All doors that were forced by the Police were secured as cordons were lowered and residents returned to properties.
12. Repairs Direct staff worked tirelessly in the days after the fire to carry out all necessary repairs so that residents allowed to return to their homes could do so safely and securely. Out of concern for the safety and wellbeing of my staff, I made the decision for them to come out of uniform and instead wear plain t-shirts. Plain, un-



across the borough. There was a good level of communication between Repairs Direct and TMO, and with other responders to carry out all work that was required.

The contents of this statement are true to the best of my knowledge and belief. I am content for this statement to form part of the evidence before the Inquiry and published on the Inquiry's website.

Signed: 

Dated: 15 April 2019