

Initial views of Fire Risk Assessor following his inspection of Adair Tower on 3rd November 2015

- The TMO Management procedures worked well
- The LFB were notified of the fire by residents by dialling 999 (believed first call received at 08.54am) - this can be confirmed by asking the LFB for this information. LFB attended swiftly and bridgehead set up on 2nd floor as evidenced by writing on the wall where the person in command noted down information.
- People living on the 3rd floor level, where there was involvement with the fire, left their flats and the building.
- LFB fire room control operators initially instructed other residents to stay in their flat, when persons rang to report the fire, as this building has a "stay put" policy.
- It is understood having talked to residents that the LFB then facilitated a total evacuation of block floor by floor etc when they had the resources to do so in a controlled manner. This was a precautionary measure – it is believed these residents were in no danger.
- The fixed fire systems within this building provided for use of the LFB operational firefighters, the dry rising water main and firefighting lifts, worked correctly and were used by the LFB to help with the fire fighting operations
- The structure of the building performed as it was constructed to do and contain the fire to the flat of origin
- Smoke and fire damage were sustained to the 3rd floor lift lobby area. It is likely this was caused by the flat door being in the open position, there are items on the floor of the lift lobby area and the burning pattern of the door would suggest that the door was in the open position. The heat damage to the ceiling of the lift lobby area also would suggest that the door was held in the open position.
- The fire crews entering the flat to extinguish the fire would have had to open door and it would then have been held in the open position by the fire hose.
- Minimal smoke damage to other flats this 3rd floor level. This could have been caused where doors opened for the residents to leave their flats, but it does appear that one flat door was left open as the smoke damage in this case was greater than that to the other flats. Flat 16, the flat next to the fire flat has minimal heat or smoke damage within it.
- In extinguishing the fire the fire service caused severe water damage to flat 9 directly below flat 15 and also to flat 3, which is directly below flat 9. It is possible that these flats will take longer to bring back into use than the other 5 flats on the floor level where the fire occurred.
- There was minimal damage to any flats above the 3rd floor level. Some smoke did enter the staircases and lift lobby areas.
- Some smoke entered the staircase with the refuge chute located in it via the permanently open vents in the screen onto the lift lobby area, this smoke then travelled up the staircase.
- Talking to residents it appears that some smoke may have entered the fire escape staircase. Having vented the windows of flat 15 this may have entered the staircase via an open window on an upper floor level.
- Externally there is minimal damage evident – restricted to cleaning of windows of flat above (21) and cleaning and reinstatement of render directly above flat 15. (Pigeon netting on adjacent balconies and on balconies above the fire not damaged)
- The fire doors of the service riser cupboards on lift lobby area stopped any fire or smoke spreading up building via the duct, these service risers are fire stopped at each floor level, but

there are cable ducts which travel straight up the service risers. The doors etc performed as expected.

- The fire escape staircase adjacent to flat 15 appears to have maintained it's integrity throughout its height, there is one cracked panel of georgian- wired fire rated glazing in door on 3rd floor level. This is the only evidence of and damage. At the time of the inspection on 3rd November the self closing devices on these staircase fire doors all held the doors in the closed position.
- It was noted that there are two cracked panels of georgian- wired fire rated glazing in door on 3rd floor level of the 2nd staircase - the one with the refuge chute in it. Otherwise there appears to be no damage to the doors etc on this staircase.
- As mentioned before the timber grided screen allowed smoke to disperse off the 3rd floor level lift lobby area (the fire floor) up the building. There is an external scaffolding located outside of this staircase and some of the outer louvered window panes have been removed so that the scaffolding can be secured.

Doors

The original flat entrance doors within this building were fire-rated doors fitted with rising butt hinges which was the standard at the time of construction.

As per the TMO 's policy as any flat entrance doors are replaced they will be replaced with doors to the standard required by the Building Regulations.

The other 5 flat entrance doors on this floor level all held their integrity.

The door of flat 16 withstood the intense heat coming from the fire in flat 15 - this flat door is right next to the flat entrance door of flat 15.

Lighting including Emergency Lighting

From information I have been given the normal and then the emergency lighting worked. The electrical power was isolated to the 2nd and 3rd floor levels by the utility company on request of the LFB – however, power supply to the 2nd floor level was later reinstalled.

Lifts

At the request of the emergency services the lift doors and the lifts were programmed not to open at the 3rd floor level and this remains the case. The lifts are both in working order but the lift doors at the 3rd floor level will be inspected and tested before these lifts are brought back into use at this floor level.

Note

The other 5 flats on the 3rd floor are potentially habitable after relatively minor cleaning, electrical checks etc. Flat entrance doors are also to be replaced.