

## **GRENFELL TOWER INQUIRY**

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### **SUPPLEMENTARY WITNESS STATEMENT OF RICKI SAMS**

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#### **I, RICKI SAMS, WILL SAY AS FOLLOWS:-**

1. I make this supplementary statement to assist the Grenfell Tower Inquiry. I understand that I may be called to give evidence at the Inquiry in relation the matters raised in the Inquiry's letter of 5 September 2019. This statement is to be read in conjunction with my earlier statements to the Inquiry.

#### **Role and responsibilities**

2. I joined the TMO in August 2011 as a temporary Projects Manager, working on minor water hygiene and electrical projects. I later took up the role of Head of Building Services and held this role until my departure from the TMO in May 2013. I cannot remember the specific date I took on this role however I believe it would have been at the end of 2011 or at the start of 2012. In this role, I reported to Mark Anderson, the Director of Asset Investment and Engineering, and then to Peter Maddison following Mark's departure in January 2013.
3. At paragraph four of my initial statement to the Inquiry, I state that my responsibility as Head of Building Services was the maintenance and repair of the mechanical and electrical assets within the entire housing stock managed by TMO. I have been asked to provide further detail as to how I carried out this role, including further detail about the nature of my day-to-day responsibilities and the systems under which I operated. I have endeavoured to answer these questions below.
4. On a day-to-day basis, I oversaw a team of contracts managers who were responsible for overseeing mechanical and electrical contracts. The team oversaw contracts by monitoring the contractors and the service delivery, chairing contract meetings and carrying out audits of the services provided. It was my role to ensure that the

team were managing these contracts properly and that the service was being delivered appropriately.

5. I oversaw the contract managers by carrying out formal one-to-one meetings with them. I also carried out ad hoc meetings with them whenever they required my support or if an issue arose. In addition to this, I reviewed the performance information collated by my team on Keystone about contractors and produced a monthly KPI report. This report was then presented to the TMO Directors and the Board by Mark Anderson and, following his departure, Peter Maddison.
6. In terms of health and safety responsibilities, my team had to ensure that the assets and contracts were compliant with health and safety regulations. Compliance information was recorded on the TMO's asset management database 'Keystone.' Keystone would alert me via a prompt if compliance certificates were required for a particular asset. I would then assign that task to the relevant contract manager within my team to ensure that requisite work was done to ensure the asset was compliant.
7. My recollection is that there were two TMO staff members who managed the input and output of information into Keystone. Because of the time that has passed since I worked for the TMO, and the short duration of my tenure, I can no longer recall their names. I do recall that they were very good at their jobs.
8. If the TMO acquired a new property, the TMO would register the block and give it a unique property reference. Asset surveys would then be carried out and the assets identified would be incorporated into the TMO's asset maintenance programme on Keystone.
9. I have been asked, in relation to paragraph five of my witness statement, to set out in detail the system under which I reported to Mark Anderson and Peter Maddison, and to provide any relevant records of meetings, correspondence or written reports I made during the period in which I held my position as Head of Building Services.
10. I recall that I frequently attended one to one meetings with Mark Anderson, and following his departure with Peter Maddison, to go over the performance reports

that I describe above, in addition to budget information. Together, we would look for any shortcomings of service delivery that would need to be highlighted to the Board. I would then be required to ensure that any identified improvements to the assets and services were made. I do not believe that these meetings were recorded as we worked so closely. By this I mean that I sat with my team and Mark's, then Peter's, office was right in front of me.

11. In reality, if I needed Mark or Peter's authority or advice I would often speak to them in the office or email them. We also had team meetings, which I believe may have been called Building Service Team meetings, that I believe were minuted.
12. I have been asked, in relation to paragraph five of my witness statement, to identify the Electrical Manager and the Mechanical Manager who reported to me. However, unfortunately, for the same reasons given above, I cannot recall their specific names, though I do recall that one of them took on the role of Head of Building Services after I left.
13. I have been asked to explain in detail the system under which these two individuals reported to me. I have also been asked to provide any relevant records of meetings, correspondence or written reports recording the reports that were made to me by them which are relevant to the under investigation by the Inquiry in relation to Grenfell Tower.
14. These two staff members reported to me through one-to-one meetings, which were not formally recorded for the same reasons my one-to-one meetings with Mark Anderson and Peter Maddison were not recorded. I also monitored the work of these individuals by reviewing asset performance data. I do not recall ever being made aware of any matters of significance or issues in relation to Grenfell Tower. My belief is that we managed the assets diligently.
15. I have been asked, in relation paragraph seven of my statement, to explain the system under fire risk assessment actions were assigned to my team. The TMO's Health and Safety team progressed the fire risk assessment programme. If an action arose from that programme which was relevant to my team, typically building services assets, then the Health and Safety team would inform us of the action that was



required of us via email. They would also give us a target date for completion. I would then communicate back to that team via email when the works had been carried out and the action was complete.

16. The Health and Safety team would chase us if we had not completed an action, though more often than not it was more a case of one of the team members forgetting to inform me that they had completed an action. My view is that the system worked very well. It would always have been my expectation that any issues with assets would have been picked up in the maintenance contracts we had in place.
17. I have been asked to give an indication of the typical period within which actions arising from the fire risk assessment programme were completed. However, this would have been entirely dependent on the nature of the action. As stated above, the Health and Safety team always typically provided a timescale for delivery that was dependant on the level of severity that they ascribed to it.
18. I have been asked to provide any relevant records of actions assigned to my team in relation to the fire risk assessment programme at Grenfell Tower during the period when I was Head of Building Services. I do not have access to any records of this nature though I am confident the Health and Safety team kept a record of the actions emerging from the fire risk assessment programme and their status.
19. I have been asked to set out any details I have or any notes or correspondence pertaining to any issues with regard to actions arising from Fire Risk Assessments assigned to my team during the period I occupied the role of Head of Building Services. However, I do not recall there being any issues as there was a robust system in place to deal with actions.

#### **Lifts**

20. I have been asked, in relation paragraph four of your statement, whether I was privy to any communication, correspondence or discussion about whether the two new lifts installed in Grenfell Tower in or about 2004-2007 were 'firefighting lifts' within the meaning of Building Regulations/British Standards. I do not recall any communications, correspondence or discussion about this. I also do not recall the

contract manager in my team who was responsible for the lifts ever flagging this as an issue.

21. I have been asked whether I have any knowledge of, or involvement in, the replacement of the lifts at Grenfell Tower by Apex in or about 2004-2007. However, I was not employed by the TMO at the time the lifts were installed and I had no involvement in their installation. Furthermore, this would be a capital project and would not therefore fall within my maintenance responsibilities.
22. I have been asked, in relation to paragraph seven of my statement, what, if any, consideration was given to the accuracy of Carl Stokes' comments in his Fire Risk Assessment, and in particular that "*both [lifts] are evacuation/fire-fighting lifts so can be used for disabled evacuation if needed.*" However, I only ever reviewed the actions sent to me from the Health and Safety team, I did not review the specific risk assessments themselves.
23. I have been asked what, if any, steps I took to test the operability of the lift fire control system (also known as a 'fireman control switch') at Grenfell Tower. I am aware that this switch would permit the LFB to take control of the lift. This switch would have been maintained by the lift maintenance company under a contract managed by my lift contract manager. It would always have been my expectation that the qualified lift company knew what they needed to be checking and what the requirements were.
24. I have been asked, in relation to "Item 19f on Carl Stokes' Grenfell Tower Significant Findings and Action Plan June 2016 (CST00000101)" what action was taken by TMO in response to this request for confirmation that the lift fire controls at Grenfell Tower have been moved back down to street level. I have no knowledge of this specific action however I would expect that it fell under the latent defects period for those capital works as it is not a repair job.


#### **AOV System**

25. I have been asked what my experience was of the performance of, and any concerns with, the AOV system in place at Grenfell Tower which was in place during my

tenure. The only involvement I had with the AOV system at Grenfell Tower was that I installed the autodialler system after the new AOV system was in place. This is because the client usually manages telephone lines as the client will need to arrange their installation and accounts.

**I confirm this statement to be true to the best of my knowledge and belief.**

**I confirm that I am willing for this statement to form part of the evidence before the Inquiry and published on the Inquiry's website.**

Signed: 

Dated: 25<sup>th</sup> October 2019