

GRENFELL TOWER INQUIRY

SUPPLEMENTARY WITNESS STATEMENT OF JANICE WRAY

I, JANICE WRAY, WILL SAY AS FOLLOWS:-

1. I make this supplementary statement to assist the Grenfell Tower Inquiry. This statement is intended to be read in conjunction with my earlier statements to the Inquiry, dated 7 February 2019 and 24 September 2019.
2. At the time of the fire at Grenfell Tower on 14 June 2017, I was employed by the TMO as the Health and Safety and Facilities Manager. This was an occupational health and safety role.
3. Several of the questions asked of me in my supplementary statement request relate to the refurbishment of Grenfell Tower that took place between 2012 and 2016. However, because I had no designated role in this project, and because my involvement was only on an ad hoc or peripheral basis, I am often not the person best placed to answer these questions. I have nevertheless endeavoured to provide as much information as I can in relation to these questions to assist the Inquiry in its role.

Fire door replacement programme

4. I have been asked, in relation to the fire door replacement programme that took place across the borough in 2012, what Rand Associates were asked to consider in their review of the TMO stock doors.
5. Rand Associates had been procured by the TMO to carry out condition surveys across the stock. In 2010, the TMO extended Rand Associates' remit to carry out assessments of the compliancy and condition of front entrance doors across the stock. Following this instruction, Rand Associates

produced a spreadsheet of information from which the TMO put together the fire door replacement programme (**JW/1, ‘Rand Associate Stock Condition Survey’**:).

6. The fire door replacement project was overseen the TMO’s Asset, Investment and Engineering Team. The Project Manager was Abigail Acosta. While the Health and Safety Team did not oversee the project, I was involved to the extent that I acted as a liaison between the project team and Carl Stokes, the TMO’s fire risk assessor. I believe that the person who would be able to provide the Inquiry with the most detailed information in relation to this programme would be the Project Manager.
7. I have been asked what Rand Associates were asked to consider in their review of TMO stock doors. Essentially, Rand Associates was asked to survey the doors and inform the TMO of the detail of compliance of those doors. Rand Associates did not determine the risk category that a property fell in to. Rather, the TMO took the information on non-compliant doors submitted by them and applied the set of criteria agreed upon with the RBKC and the LFB to identify whether properties were potentially high, medium or low risk. Carl Stokes also had input into the final criteria. The criteria applied were outlined in the document titled “Fire Risk Assessments – Criteria for prioritising Council blocks.” (**JW/2, ‘Fire Risk Assessments Risk Criteria’**:).

Fire Door Replacement Programme 2011 – advice/discussion

8. I have been asked to outline any discussions I had with Carl Stokes regarding the selection of a suitable contractor to supply and install fire doors.
9. As outlined in my earlier statement, the TMO procured its fire door contractor, Manse Masterdor Ltd, through the London Housing Consortium (“LHC”). The LHC had a dedicated framework of rigorously vetted specialist fire door contractors, which assured the TMO that it was dealing with a reputable contractor supplying a compliant product and whose

operatives would be competent, trained and supervised to install the suitably fire-rated flat entrance doorsets. I never had any reason to doubt the quality of this procurement process.

10. I recall that Simon Throp, the Assistant Director of Assets, Investment and Engineering, had just overseen a very similar fire door replacement programme at another organisation, in which the LHC had been used to procure the fire door contractor. This history provided us with an additional level of confidence in the quality of the contractor and the compliance of the doorsets. It follows that Carl Stokes was only involved peripherally in the procurement of the fire door contractor as an additional consultant if we needed him.
11. I have been asked what discussions I had with Carl Stokes in relation to the suitability of the fire doors that were supplied. As outlined above, the LHC had already vetted Manse Masterdor Ltd and Carl was only peripherally involved. While I believe I would have had discussions with Carl in relation to the experience of Manse Masterdor once they were identified as the successful contractor from the LHC Framework, I cannot recall when these discussions took place or specifically what was said. I am confident that Carl went and observed the pilot door and part of its installation. I do not recall him raising any concerns with the door's compliance.
12. I recall that Carl produced a document for the TMO entitled "Criteria for prioritising the fitting of new entrance doors to flats" (JW/3, '**Criteria for the fitting of new fire rated entrance doors to flats**':). Then, in 30 April 2011, Carl Stokes wrote to me summarising the relevant items of the draft "*Fire Safety in Purpose-Built Blocks of Flats*" Guide which could affect the door replacement programme (JW/4, '**30.04.10 Letter from Carl Stokes to Janice Wray**':). This statement was erroneously dated as April 2010 however the title quote of the guidance draft is 18 April 2011 and my file was clearly saved in line with this timeline. In this letter, Carl highlighted the requirements of this new guidance document

and the responsibilities that fell on contractors. He further noted that it might have implications for Building Control.

13. I have been asked to detail any discussions I had with Carl Stokes in relation to the need to consider test certification provided by Manse Masterdor Limited. I believe that Carl Stokes asked for the test certificates however I am unable to find any records of this correspondence.
14. I have been asked to set out the advice I gave or discussions I was involved in relating to the selection of Manse Masterdor as the contractor to supply and install fire doors. I was not involved in any such discussions other than that I believe I passed on the comments of Carl Stokes to the Project team.
15. I have been asked to identify, in relation to the May 2011 pilot installation of a fire door under the Fire Door Replacement, any discussions that took place about the fire safety requirements of the fire door, including self-closing devices and the provision of certification.
16. As explained in my earlier statement to the Inquiry, it was always my understanding that the new replacement doorsets installed by Manse Masterdor were required to be self-closing “FD30” doors fitted with intumescent strips and cold smoke seals and were therefore fully compliant. I do not believe there was ever any debate about whether the doors required self-closing devices. While I was not the Project Manager, I am confident that Manse Masterdor and LHC would always have been expected to provide certification to the TMO.
17. I have been asked what discussions took place with the LHC regarding the inspections they were required to carry out under the Fire Door Replacement Programme. However, because I was not Project Manager, I was not involved in providing any instructions to LHC, nor was I consulted on the details of the inspection programme. For this reason, it is my belief that this information is better sought from the Project Manager and the project team.

Fire Door Replacement Programme – LHC and sign off

18. I have been asked to set out further information on the role and responsibilities of LHC in relation to the Fire Door Replacement Programme, including what percentage of installations the LHC were required to inspect and provide site reports for. However, I do not possess this level of detail about the programme as I was not the Project Manager and I was not involved in agreeing to the inspection regime with the LHC.
19. While I had sight of some of the LHC site reports, I had no role in signing off the replacement doors as this was overseen by the Project Manager. I do not recall any issues being brought to my attention in relation the service provided by the LHC.
20. I can say that Carl Stokes assessed the compliance of the new fire doors in his subsequent Fire Risk Assessments. For example, in his November 2012 Fire Risk Assessment for Grenfell Tower, Carl commented:

The tenanted apartments within this building have recently had their flat entrance doors replaced with new self closing 30 minute certified fire rated doors which meet the requirements of the Building Regulations. The letter box on these new doors is fire rated and cold smoke seals are fitted as standard, there is a level threshold for compliance with Part M of the Building Regulations. A key is not needed to open these new flat entrance doors from the internal face of the door again complying with Building Regulation requirements. Information on these new doors which also have acoustic, safety and security properties (PAS 23 and 24) as well as fire along with the fire certification documentation is held at the Hub in the TMO offices. The other flat entrance doors which have not been replaced are flush solid fire rated doors with perco self closing devices fitted on the ones looked at, these are the originally fitted doors. please see the significant findings sheets for more information on the flat entrance which have not been replaced by the TMO and the locations of any non compliant doors.

When this building was constructed it was not a requirement under the Building Regulations standards at the time to have cold smoke seals

fitted to fire doors either the flat entrance doors or other fire doors, changes to the Building Regulation standards are not retrospective. Over time some entrance doors and other fire doors in the building have been replaced, so therefore have smoke seals. The fire doors that do not have smoke seals are close fitting and shut tight. If these fire doors are to be replaced, repaired or any refurbishment work carried out that involves these fire doors, then they will either be upgraded with smoke seals fitted to the door or in the surrounding frame or replaced with doors that already have smoke seals fitted. This stance on cold smoke seals is backed up by the Secretary of State's determination issue in May 2012" (JW/5, 'Carl Stokes FRA Grenfell Tower November 2012':).

Fire Door Replacement Programme – training and information

21. I have been asked to set out the training that was given by Manse Masterdor to the TMO and their employees and/or contractors regarding maintenance of the new doors. I am not aware of any training that took place, however I believe that information about possible training would be best sought from the Project Manager.
22. I have been asked what information was provided to residents regarding their replacement fire door by Manse Masterdor and/or by the TMO. I did not send any correspondence to residents in relation to this programme as this would generally have been done by the Project Manager. Alternatively, it may have been done by a Resident Liaison Officer, if one had been allocated to the project.
23. I am aware that on 2 March 2011, the TMO wrote to the residents of Grenfell Tower advising that their block had been included in the 2011 to 2012 flat entrance door replacement programme (JW/6, '02.03.11 Letter to TMO residents':). My recollection is that this letter was produced by the Project Manager. It advised residents that surveys would be carried out at their building and requested that they select their preferred choices of door

and colour from an attached document (JW/7, 'Fire door options':).

Fire Door Replacement Programme – issues

24. I have been asked to give details of any issues with, or complaints about, the hardware on the doors, including self-closing devices, which arose during the course of the Fire Door Replacement Programme. However, I do not recall ever being made aware of any complaints of this nature.
25. I do recall that some elderly residents found the new doors difficult to open on the basis that they were perceived as being too heavy. As a result, assisted closers were fitted to these particular doors. These assisted closers are the only alternative self-closer that I am aware of being provided to residents. I do not believe any of these residents lived at Grenfell Tower.

Multi Installations Limited

26. I have been asked to give details of how and why a different contractor, Multi Installations Ltd, was selected, at some point between May 2013 and January 2014, to fit the remainder of the doors under the Fire Door Replacement Programme.
27. Manse Masterdor were contracted to carry out the fire door replacement programme as a large programme of work. However, my recollection is that because they were based outside of London, they were not available to carry out smaller programmes of work. For this reason, the TMO contracted with a London-based company, Multi Installations Limited, to carry out any individual door replacement works that were required, such as one-off replacement highlighted by the FRA programme.
28. I am unable to provide any further detail in relation to the contract with Multi Installations Ltd as this contract would have been overseen by the Asset and Regeneration team.

Leaseholder flat doors

29. I have been asked to set out my understanding of the reasons given by Carl Stokes for his conclusion in November 2012 that the leaseholders of Grenfell Tower did not need to change their original flat entrance doors. As with the installation programme, issues to do with leaseholders were primarily dealt with my others in the asset management department in liaison with colleagues in the Home Ownership Team. However, to assist the Inquiry, I have been through the documents referenced in paras 29 to 47 below and set out the chronology apparent from those documents.
30. On 29 February 2012, the RBKC and the TMO met to discuss the issue of leaseholder flat entrance doors and fire safety (**JW/8, '29.02.11 RBKC TMO Meeting to discuss leaseholders flat entrance doors':**). On 22 August 2012, Robert Black wrote to the LFB's Borough Commander explaining the TMO's position and requesting that the LFB confirm their position as a matter of urgency in terms of enforcement (**JW/9, '22.08.12 Letter from Robert Black to Borough Commander':**).
31. In October 2012, the TMO wrote to all of its leaseholders advising them of the requirement for their flat entrance doors to meet the fire safety standards outlined in that letter (**JW/10, 'October 2012 Letter to Residents':**). Following this, a further letter was sent to those leaseholders whose doors had been identified through the Fire Risk Assessment programme as being potentially non-compliant, seeking evidence that their door was compliant. In this second letter, the details of the TMO's Fire Safety Consultant were provided on the basis that he had offered to make himself available for a private consultation. Leaseholders were provided with an advice note from Carl Stokes helping them identify whether their doors were compliant (**JW/11, 'Fire door information for leaseholders October 2012':**).
32. In his November 2012 Fire Risk Assessment for Grenfell Tower, Carl Stokes recorded as follows:

“If any of the apartments in this building are leaseholder apartments rather than tenanted apartments then the entrance door of the flat is

demised to the leaseholder. The TMO does not have any control over or legal powers to intervene if the leaseholder changes the flat entrance door. the lease agreement clearly defines that the entrance door is demised to the leaseholder so if there is an issue over the conformity of the flat's entrance door to either the standards required of the Fire Safety Order or the Building Regulations this is a private matter between the leaseholder and the enforcement authority. There have been meetings on this subject between the TMO and the local LFB fire safety team leaders, minutes of these meetings are held by the TMO Health and Safety team manager along with the relevant policies and procedures."

(JW/5:).

33. On 14 November 2012, Tunde Awoderu wrote to the TMO on behalf of the Grenfell Tower Leaseholders Association, querying why leaseholders had been excluded from the fire door replacement programme (**JW/12, '14.11.12 Email from Tunde Awoderu, Fire Safety and Leasehold Flat entrance door'**:). He also queried why leaseholders had only just been notified of this requirement when Tower residents had been initially informed of the replacement programme in March 2011.
34. On 20 November 2012, Paul Dunkerton sent a letter of reply to Tunde Awoderu, confirming that the TMO's intention was to ensure that all tenanted properties benefitted from the new improved door replacement programme (**JW/13, '20.11.12 Letter from Paul Dunkerton to Tunde Awoderu'**:). He confirmed that it was the TMO's intention to assist leaseholders in ensuring that their doors were compliant and in identifying whether they required replacement. Paul explained the position outlined in Carl Stokes' November 2012 Fire Risk Assessment for Grenfell Tower. Specifically, he advised that the flat entrance doors or leaseholder flats were demised to the lessee in their lease. He then advised that while there was debate about enforcement responsibilities for this, the TMO had nevertheless sent a letter to leaseholders highlighting the fire safety requirements in relation to flat entrance doors.

35. On 13 February 2013, Paul Dunkerton wrote to Tunde Awoderu on behalf of the Grenfell Tower Leaseholder's Association again advising him that Carl Stokes had reviewed his Fire Risk Assessment dated November 2012 (**JW/14, 13.02.13 'Email from Paul Dunkerton to Tunde Awoderu':**). He explained that a letter had been sent to leaseholders throughout the Borough who had been identified as having potentially non-compliant front entrance doors, however because none of the leasehold properties at Grenfell Tower had been highlighted as having a potentially non-compliant entrance door, none of the leaseholders at the Grenfell Tower had received a second letter. He explained that it seemed on this basis the doors currently installed provided sufficient fire resistance, however any door which is replaced would need to meet the current fire safety standards as laid out in an attached leaflet.
36. I have been asked (1) to explain how the TMO's policy in relation to potentially non-compliant leaseholder doors in the TMO stock evolved throughout the period from 2011 – 2017, (2) how compliance was dealt with during the period in which there was a dispute over which body was responsible for enforcement and (3) to provide any further information I can in relation to the steps taken by the TMO to reduce the number of potentially non-compliant doors and the records kept with regards to this.
37. The TMO took the issue of potentially non-compliant leaseholder doors very seriously and we were doing everything we could to ascertain whether we had the legal responsibility to enforce compliance. The issue of enforcement was summarised in the minutes of an Operations Committee meeting on 2 May 2013 (**JW/15 '02.05.13 Operations Committee Meeting':**). Specifically, the RBKC were of the view that enforcement should be carried out by under the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order by the LFB, however Senior Policy Advisors at the LFB had instructed their staff to encourage local authorities to use the Housing Health and Safety Rating System to enforce non-compliance in this area. These minutes also record that while a protocol existed between the RBKC and the LFB clarifying the

division of responsibilities for enforcement, the interpretation of this protocol was in dispute.

38. The gap in time between when we informed residents of the programme and when we informed leaseholders of the programme was because of the difficulty we had in confirming responsibility for enforcement. We were initially confident that it was the LFB's responsibility under the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order however once this was challenged, the TMO became unclear what to inform residents.
39. By early February 2013, the TMO still had not resolved the issue of enforcement. This is recorded in the minutes of an Assets and Regeneration and Repairs Health and Safety Group meeting on 7 February 2013 (**JW/16 '7.2.13 Asset and Regeneration and Repairs Health and Safety Group Meeting:'**), which note than an application was being made to the Secretary of State for a determination in terms of responsibility for enforcement. It is also recorded that we were doing everything we could to reduce the number of non-compliant leaseholder doors in the stock.
40. It is recorded in the minutes of a TMO Health and Safety Committee meeting on 16 April 2013 that I advised that there was still a difference of opinion between the LFB and the TMO and RBKC as to which was responsible for enforcement (**JW/17 16.4.13 'Minutes of TMO Health and Safety Committee Meeting:'**). These minutes record that the matter had been raised with the Department for Communities and Local Government and until it was clarified, the TMO would continue to identify potentially non-compliant doors and inform the lessee of the requisite standards.
41. Around this time the TMO agreed to fund a free personalised assessment of leaseholder doors by Carl Stokes to assist leaseholders who were unable to confirm if their door was compliant to identify whether or not their door was non-compliant.

42. On 26 April 2013, the Department for Communities and Local Government responded saying that they did not view it as appropriate for the Secretary of State to intervene (**JW/18 26.04.13 ‘Letter from the Department for Communities and Local Government:’**).
43. The minutes of a TMO Health and Safety Committee meeting on 20 June 2013 record that this response received from the Department for Communities and Local Government was unhelpful and inadequate, and as a result Laura Johnson had asked for a further letter to be sent challenging the response and pressing the Department for further clarity (**JW/19 20.6.13 ‘Minutes of TMO Health & Safety Committee Meeting:’**).
44. In the same meeting, the TMO agreed to identify the lessee doors that were considered to present the highest level of potential risk so they could be considered for any future enforcement pilot activity. Confirmation that this was done was recorded in a Housing and Property Scrutiny Report dated 16 July 2013 and produced by Laura Johnson (**JW/20 16.07.13 ‘Housing and Property Scrutiny Report’, TMO00840255**). This report also records that the Council considered that the TMO’s approach of writing to all leaseholders amounted to ‘due diligence’.
45. The minutes of a Health and Safety Committee Meeting on 28 August 2013, record as follows:

“Dan advised that a determination had been sought from the Secretary of State on this issue and the response had been that Environmental Health should enforce non-compliant doors using powers under the Housing Act. Janice circulated the list of lessee doors highlighted by the FRAs as being potentially non-compliant (in each case the assessor had been unable to obtain access to assess the door fully, and highlighted that confirmation of compliance should be sought from the leaseholder). This list has been passed to RBKC and their legal team have confirmed that they are drafting a letter to go to all on the list.”

Janice advised that the view of the assessor was that a significant number of these doors are likely to be compliant, however, he had been unable to confirm this at the time of the inspection. Until now responsibility for confirming the door's compliance had been the lessee's. Some lessees had commissioned the Fire Consultant to assess their door and produce a report (copied to me). There was some discussion about the possibility of the TMO appointing the assessor on a daily rate to assess as many of the doors on this list as possible. It was agreed that we should proceed in this way as it would have the advantage of only referring doors to RBKC that were definitely non-compliant or where no access was provided for this assessment. This should substantially reduce the list and therefore the potential scale and cost of enforcement activity and would demonstrate the TMO's level of commitment to resolving the issue. The Committee agreed that we should proceed in this way and Janice and Dan would liaise to maximise access etc." (JW/21 28.08.13 'Minutes of Health and Safety Committee Meeting:').

46. I recall that the TMO approached Environmental Health and had a number of meetings with them and RBKC Legal Services to discuss their potential use of the Housing Health and Safety Rating System to enforce the non-compliant doors. However, following protracted consultation it was concluded that they would not enforce against self-contained dwellings as they were generally concerned with Houses in Multiple Occupation. Additionally, it would not be sufficient to confine the assessment to only the individual flat entrance door which were potentially non-compliant but it would be necessary to also assess many of the neighbouring flat doors and possibly also other areas of the flats and the common parts of the block.
47. Furthermore, even if Environmental Health did proceed, they advised that, in all likelihood, the hazard identified would not have been classified as a "Category One" hazard and as the Council's policy was only to enforce against this category this would not have resulted in enforcement action. Rather, if the assessment identified a "Category Two" hazard, the result

would only be a letter to the leaseholder. As we had already written to the leaseholders, the conclusion was that this would be of limited value and would not facilitate enforcement.

48. A TMO Chief Executive's update report dated 21 November 2013 recorded as follows:

“An update was given to the Scrutiny Committee for Housing and Property on work undertaken in relation to leaseholder flat entrance doors which are not compliant with fire safety standards. Work has been undertaken by RBKC and TMO to ensure that those doors are compliant with legislation.

Whilst we are confident that we are on target in meeting our obligations within the stock, there was a need to clarify how we would deal with any potential risks from leaseholders' front entrance doors that are the responsibility of the lessee under their lease. Regarding this matter, there has been a difference of view held by RBKC and the London Fire Brigade about which statutory authority is responsible for the enforcement of non-compliant flat entrance doors to leasehold properties. The current position is that the Department of Communities and Local Government (DCLG) have advised RBKC to seek a judicial review on this matter.

Until a decision is made on whether to apply for judicial review, steps are being taken to ensure fire safety within the blocks where there are non-compliant doors. A list has been compiled of leasehold flats where the entrance door has been identified through the Fire Risk Assessment as potentially non-compliant, which is being kept up to date as leaseholders confirm that their doors are now compliant. A letter was sent out on 1 October by RBKC Legal to the non complying leaseholders asking for confirmation and evidence that their door met the required fire safety standard, or to make an appointment for an inspection by the TMO's appointed Fire Consultant.

By mid-October, over 50% of leaseholders had responded, and the number of potentially non-compliant doors has been reduced as they have now been assessed as compliant. Deadlines have been given for the remainder of leaseholders to contact either the consultant or Janice Wray, and further steps are being taken to make contact with these leaseholders.

Because enforcement under the Housing Act is costly, consideration has been given to making an offer to leaseholders to replace these doors for them, which could also be done in a very short time period compared to the potential 18 months it could take if enforcement action is taken. Therefore a decision has been made to offer to replace the doors of the leaseholders on the list, on the understanding that they will be recharged the cost of this work. Members congratulated the officers on the work being done, and a further update will be given to the Scrutiny Committee.” (JW/22 21.11.13 ‘Agenda Item 6 Chief Executive's Update Report:’).

49. Where it refers to complaint in the above paragraph, my understanding is that it was intended to say compliant.
50. It is my belief that the TMO put a huge amount of effort into progressing this matter and we made a lot of progress. My recollection is that we managed to reduce the number of non-compliant leaseholder doors down to two, with those two prohibited due to access issues. It is my belief that we took a very proactive approach to this identified issue encouraging and assisting leaseholders to clarify whether their doors were compliant and providing advice on required action where necessary. I am unsure what else we could have done given that we had no powers of enforcement.

Maintenance of flat entrance and communal doors

51. I have been asked to give further details as to who was responsible for the maintenance of flat entrance and communal fire doors, the instructions given

to anyone delegated this task and the process by which any issues with fire doors were recorded and maintenance was carried out.

52. In respect of the communal fire doors at Grenfell Tower, these were inspected by both Carl Stokes as part of his Fire Risk Assessment programme and by the Estate Staff as part of their regular inspections. For example, in his 20 June 2016 Fire Risk Assessment, under the heading ‘Measures to limit fire spread and development, it is recorded that the staircase is fire separated from the flat/lift lobby area of each floor level by a self-closing fire rated door (**JW/23 20.06.16 ‘Carl Stokes Fire Risk Assessment:’**). Furthermore, as part of their estate inspections, Estate Service Assistants were required to assess whether communal fire doors were functioning correctly. I attach to this statement the weekly inspection checklist for Grenfell Tower, completed by Paul Steadman (**JW/24 ESA Weekly Health and Safety Checks:’**).

53. In respect of flat entrance doors of tenanted flats, a portion of these were inspected by Carl Stokes as part of his Fire Risk Assessment programme. For example, in Carl Stokes’ June 2016 Fire Risk Assessment of Grenfell Tower, it is asked under the heading ‘Fire Protection Measures’ whether ‘the dwelling entrance doors appear to be fire rated’. Carl Stokes has ticked ‘yes’ in response to this. He also commented:

“The tenanted apartments within this building had a few years ago their flat entrance doors replaced with new door sets. These door sets are self closing 30 minute certified fire rated doors which meet the requirements of the Building Regulations, if there is glazing in the new doors is fire rated. The letter box on these new doors is fire rated and cold smoke seals are fitted as standard, there is a level threshold for compliance with Part M of the Building Regulations. A key is not needed to open these new flat entrance doors from the internal face of the door again complying with Building Regulation requirements. Information on these new doors which also have acoustic, safety and security properties (PAS 23 and 24) as well as fire along with the fire certification documentation

is held at the Hub in the TMO offices. The other flat entrance doors which have not been replaced are 44mm thick, flush timber fire rated doors fitted with perko, concealed self closing devices on the ones looked at, these are the originally fitted doors. These are close fitting doors. Please see the significant findings sheets for more information on the locations of any non compliant doors in this building and the new door being fitted to flat 112.

If new flat entrance doors are fitted in the future to the original flat doors then these will conform to the requirements of the Building Regulations at the time of installation. On the flat entrance doors that have not been replaced the standard letter box and flap is in the lower half of the door and in some cases these doors are fitted with multiple locks. It is assumed that the occupants of these flats can exit the flat in an emergency without any undue delay.

The original flat entrance doors in this building are flat numbers 56, 61, 86, 92, 105,142,154,156,165,166,174.185,195, and 206. It is TMO's policy that if flats are refurbished or when new tenants move into a flat then the self closing device fitted to the flat entrance door is assessed. If the self closing device does not close the door fully or one is not fitted to the door then a new appropriate self closing device is fitted. Some of the original flat entrance doors have more than one lock fitted to them, it is assumed that the occupants of these flats can exit the flat in an emergency without any undue delay.”

54. In addition to this, the ESAs would also report any damage to front entrance doors that they observed during their estate inspections or any issues reported to them by residents and respond to any reports of damage by residents.
55. As discussed below, the TMO entered into discussions with the RBKC about introducing an inspection programme for the flat entrance doors, and in particular the self-closing devices, however the RBKC ultimately decided that for the reasons outlined below it could not commit resources to an

ongoing programme of inspection unless the benefits could be clearly demonstrated and unless it became a requirement that the LFB applied consistently to all Housing Providers.

56. In respect of the front doors of leaseholders, as discussed above, these were demised to the leaseholder and as such maintenance would fall to the leaseholder. However, if an ESA observed damage to a lessee door as part of their estate inspections, it would be my expectation that they would report this in the same way that they would for a tenanted flat.

Self-closing devices

57. I have been asked to provide further details of any discussions I had regarding the importance of the self-closing devices on doors installed under the Fire Door Replacement Programme.
58. The importance of self-closing devices was well known to the TMO and, as discussed earlier in this statement, the specification for doors to be installed in the Fire Door Replacement Programme required that they be self-closing “FD30” doors fitted with intumescent strips and cold smoke seals
59. The presence of self-closing devices was also assessed as part of the Fire Risk Assessment programme. For example, in his 20 June 2016 Fire Risk Assessment of Grenfell Tower, Carl Stokes affirmed that where appropriate, fire doors were fitted with self closing devices which functioned correctly.
60. The importance that the TMO placed on self-closing devices on doors was demonstrated by the fact that in 2017 the TMO updated its Fire Safety Policy to record its intention to undertake a programme of retrofitting self-closing devices across the stock. This programme was initiated even though the legislation did not require retrofitting of devices.
61. The minutes of a Health and Safety Committee meeting dated 16 March 2017 record that following discussions with the RBKC, the TMO had received confirmation that a five year programme of retrofitting self-closing

devices across the entire housing stock was to be undertaken (JW/25 16.03.17 'Health and Safety Committee Meeting Minutes:').

62. In this meeting, the TMO advised that they had proposed to the RBKC that a dedicated inspection and maintenance programme for self-closing devices also be implemented. However, the RBKC informed us that this was not feasible due to concerns that the real value of the programme was impossible to quantify and therefore it was difficult committing resources. The RBKC said that if the LFB wanted to make the regular inspection and maintenance of self-closing devices a priority they could introduce a London wide standard that was enforceable. We were therefore unable to initiate a maintenance programme of this nature.
63. I have also been asked to give further details of any discussions I had regarding problems with self-closing devices, however I am not aware of any problems with self-closing devices. There was always the potential for residents to remove self-closing devices from their front doors however this was never reported to me as being an issue.
64. I have been asked what information was given to residents regarding the purpose and importance of the self-closers on their flat entrance doors. I believe this would have been addressed in some of the periodic fire safety articles in the Link and also by the LFB as part of any Home Fire Safety Visits that they conducted. Residents were advised of the opportunity to receive a Home Fire Safety Visit in the leaflet given to new tenants.
65. I have been asked to provide more information in relation to paragraphs 79-85 of my initial statement to the Inquiry, in which I discuss an issue that arose in 2017 whereby some residents complained that the entrance doors of newly constructed flats were difficult to open. Specifically, I have been asked what was done to resolve the issue referred to by Carl Stokes of the doors not shutting because of the loosened self-closers.
66. While I was aware of this issue, I was not responsible for addressing it as it was part of the refurbishment works and therefore Claire Williams was

overseeing its resolution. However, I do recall that on 2 March 2017 I was involved in email correspondence with Carl Stokes and Claire in which Carl recommended shaving the newly constructed doors to make them less difficult to open (JW/26 2.03.17 'Email from Carl Stokes:'). I can recall that this did not resolve the issue and that Claire became increasingly frustrated that the issue was not getting resolved. I recall liaising with the Occupational Therapists about the issue, including meeting one on site at the flat in question, as well as liaising with Repairs Direct, however I do not believe I was made aware of the details of the final solution reached.

Role during the refurbishment

67. I had no defined or designated role in the refurbishment of Grenfell Tower. I am not a design or construction expert and my involvement in the refurbishment was limited to occasions where I was asked questions on an ad hoc basis about discrete issues.
68. The refurbishment was overseen by a designated Refurbishment Project team within the Asset Management Team of the Operations department who employed professional consultants to advise them on all aspects pre and post contract. I was not part of the TMO Refurbishment Project Team and I never attended any Building Control, Project Progress or Resident Compact meetings.
69. I have been asked whether I attended LFB familiarisation visits at Grenfell Tower alongside Claire Williams during the refurbishment project. The LFB did not require us to accompany them on familiarisation visits, nor did they ever request our attendance. My understanding is that this was because the LFB wanted to visit premises without notice or warning so they could be confident they would witness an everyday situation.
70. In addition to this, the LFB were often unable to prearrange visits in case they could not attend due to unforeseen operational matters. Furthermore, it would not have been practicable for me to attend every familiarisation visit

as the TMO had approximately 10,000 properties and fire safety was only one aspect of my role as Health and Safety and Facilities Manager.

71. Nevertheless, the LFB would always let us know following a visit if there was an issue, either immediately after a familiarisation visit or during our bi-monthly liaison meetings. During the refurbishment, Grenfell Tower was a regular standing agenda item in these meetings. Claire Williams was in attendance at these meetings such that if any matters were raised that Rydon needed to resolve, she could instruct them to do so. A

Premises information packs

72. I have been asked to provide any correspondence or notes I have in relation to Carl Stokes' recommendation that premises information packs should not be provided on the basis that the Fire Services Act required the LFB to undertake 7(2)(d) visits.
73. On 18 March 2014, Carl Stokes wrote to Claire Williams and myself in relation to several issues raised by the LFB during their visit to several RBKC properties, including Grenfell Tower (**JW/27 18.03.14 'Letter from Carl Stokes to Claire Williams:'**). On the subject of premises information packs and other information, Carl advised:

“The fire officers asked about the providing of premises information packs, I would strongly recommend that these are not provided. There were other questions asked about the fire fighting strategy for a fire in the lower ground floor level areas underneath the walks of Testerton, Barandon and Hurstaway and how systems would be used etc. It is for the LFB to undertake what is called Fire Service Act 7.2D information gathering, the responsible person of a premises can only maintain any systems and fixed equipment installed within their premises. It is up to the fire service to gather information on the premises located on their station grounds and then collate this information and adopt procedures etc to use this installed equipment. The fire risk assessment excludes operational fire fighting because the assessor cannot know what a fire

crew will do in an operational incident. As a matter of interest operational crews of the local Fire and Rescue service should have been undertaken regular familiarisation visits to premises on their station grounds since 1947 under section 11 d of the Fire Services Act 1947.”

74. I have been asked whether I queried with Carl Stokes whether the TMO should comply with the LFB’s request for a premises information pack in addition to the 7(2)(d) visits being carried out.
75. I state at paragraph 58-59 that in May 2016 the LFB specifically requested that I install a Premises information Box at Grenfell Tower. At paragraph 60 I state that I was not involved in the decision not to do so. I have been asked to clarify to the best of my understanding who was involved in this decision and whose responsibility it was to make this decision.
76. The LFB were fully aware prior to the fire that the only high rise building within the RBKC’s stock that had a premises information box was Trellick Tower. This is recorded in the minutes of a quarterly meeting between the LFB and the TMO on 15 May 2013. In this meeting I referred to the pilot scheme in several boroughs where the use of ‘plates’ as an alternative to these boxes was being investigated. Then, in a TMO Health and Safety Committee meeting on 20 June 2013, the matter of premises information boxes is addressed as follows:

“Janice advised that we had installed a Premises Information Box at Trellick Tower but that to date discussions with the LFB had highlighted the need for these in any other block. However, there is a pilot in several other London Boroughs and we await the findings from that.” (JW/19 20.06.13 ‘Minutes of TMO Health & Safety Committee Meeting:’

)

77. This paragraph is meant to read “... but that to date discussions with the LFB had *not* highlighted the need for these in any other block.” That is my recollection of what was said in the meeting.

78. It is my belief that the decision as to whether the installation of a premises information box or pack was necessary at a property was made by the TMO acting on the LFB's guidance. This is demonstrated by the minutes of the LFB and TMO bi-monthly meeting on 20 October 2015 record as follows:

“Information Plates on high-rise buildings – Further to the discussion at the previous meeting Dan [Hallissey – LFB Station Manager – Kensington and North Kensington] reiterated that he believes this is for operational crews to discuss with landlords and either agree a wording for landlord to display or put the wording onto the LFB system. However, currently this is optional for landlords. Dan advised that his personal preference is to put the wording onto the LFB system so that it is available to all crews. Janice confirmed that our only complex building is Trellick Tower and this has a Premises Information Box with 2 sets of building plans. available (Additionally, the sheltered scheme have “Fire Document” Boxes with details of the residents physical ability to self-excavate and the location of any specific risks such as oxygen cylinders.”)

79. It was my belief that during their familiarisation visits at Grenfell Tower, the LFB were recording relevant information onto their system for the availability for all crews, as discussed in our meetings.
80. Trellick Tower had specifically been identified as requiring a premises information box on the basis that it was the TMO's only complex high-rise building. Grenfell Tower contained no maisonettes and was identical on every floor.
81. Ultimately I was always eager to provide the LFB with any information or documentation that they required to carry out their job.

Floor numbering

82. I have been asked to provide further information as to why permanent floor numbering had not been implemented in place of spray painted numbers in

the stairwell at Grenfell Tower on completion of the refurbishment and whether I or anyone at the TMO pursued this issue with those responsible.

83. The signage in the stairwell formed part of the refurbishment works and would not therefore have been overseen by myself. I do not recall being informed that the signage needed redoing following the refurbishment. The only way that I would have become aware of this need is if I was specifically told about it for example by Estate or Neighbourhood staff or if Carl Stokes noted it in his Fire Risk Assessment at Grenfell Tower on 20 June 2016. I have reviewed this Fire Risk Assessment in preparing this statement and I note that under the heading “Fire Safety Signs And Notices” Carl advises:

“Signs displaying the floor level number are permanently fixed to the wall of the staircase landing and on each flat/lift lobby area in a large font in this building to aid the emergency services. In the ground floor level lift lobby area of this building there is a sign on the wall informing the emergency services which flats are located on which floor levels. This sign aids the fire service or other emergency service to where an incident in this building maybe located.”

84. The Fire Risk Assessments produced by Carl Stokes in relation to a property were the main way in which issues relating to fire safety measures were brought to my attention. It is clear from this particular Fire Risk Assessment that there were no issues raised with the signage at Grenfell Tower. I do not recall any issues with the signage being brought to my attention by any other avenue.

Lifts

85. The Inquiry advises in my supplementary witness request that section 18.2 of the TMO Fire Safety Policy of November 2013 [TMO00830598] provides a TMO definition of ‘firefighting lifts’ which differs materially from that found within building/design standards (which require protection against water ingress, escape hatches and a secondary power supply). The

lifts register (at Appendix 8) within that document lists Grenfell Tower lifts (H090 and H091) as ‘firefighting lifts’.

86. In this respect, I have been asked to clarify (1) the basis for the difference between the TMO’s definition of ‘firefighting lift’ and the definition in national standards (2) the basis for classification of the Grenfell Tower lifts within the lifts register as ‘firefighting lifts’ with reference to the TMO definition rather than the definition found in national standards (3) whether the TMO considered the risk of confusion when creating/using a definition of a ‘firefighting lift’ which was significantly different from the nationally recognised definition (4) whether, in describing the status of the lifts to other organisations (such as the LFB, Exova, Carl Stokes, RBKC Building Control), the TMO made clear that the TMO’s definition of ‘firefighting lifts’ was being applied when describing them as such and (5) whether, where external organisations described the lifts at Grenfell Tower as ‘firefighting lifts’ (e.g. Carl Stokes, Exova), I took any steps to check which definition was being applied.
87. I wish to do my best to assist the Inquiry but wish to make it clear that am not a lift engineer I also had no role in the replacement of the lifts at Grenfell Tower in 2005. This was a capital project managed by the TMO’s Asset and Regeneration Department, not the Health and Safety team. I have recently learnt that the specialist engineering consultancy who were involved in the installation was Butler and Young Lift Consultants Ltd and that the TMO’s Project Manager for this project was Valerie Sharples. I had no role in specifying the type of lifts to be installed as part of this project, nor did I have any role in ensuring that the lifts installed complied with the Building Regulations.
88. Following their installation, the lifts at Grenfell Tower fell under a maintenance and service contract overseen by a specific contract manager within the Building Services team, not the Health and Safety team. I am aware that this contract included monthly inspections. I have recently learnt that the lift maintenance and service contractor was Apex Lifts Ltd. I had no

role in overseeing this contract, it was overseen by the TMO's dedicated Senior Lift Engineer, Robin Cahalarn, I recall attending a meeting with Robin in 2010 in which he advised me that the TMO's insurers, [REDACTED] also carried out six monthly inspections on all lifts which included a full safety check.

89. Furthermore, as part of their weekly inspections, Estate Service Assistants were required to confirm whether a property had lifts, whether the lift was operating correctly and whether the lift car lights were working properly.

90. Following this meeting with Robin Cahalarn, I wrote an email to Andrew Furness of Salvus Consulting on 3 March 2010 in which I informed him of the information we had compiled in relation to TMO lifts servicing blocks 18m in height (CST00003102_001). By way of background, Salvus Consulting were the TMO's Fire Risk Assessor at the time. Andrew responded saying that Salvus would include a statement in its fire risk assessment that:

“TMO had confirmed that lifts servicing the block (over 18m in height) meet the requirements for fire fighting lifts as per specification provided by TMO senior lift engineer.”

91. However, I never said to Andrew that the TMO were confirming that the lifts in TMO's buildings over 18m met all of the requirements of the regulations. My intention was to point out the features of the legislation that the lifts did display / comply with. I was aware that the TMO lifts did not meet all of the requirements. I brought this to the attention of Carl Stokes however my recollection is that he remained resolute in his belief that they were fire fighting lifts. For example, on 28 February 2011 Robert Calaharn emailed me saying:

“As recently discussed, standards on fire fighting/evacuation lifts, which are not retrospect have become a lot clearer over the last year, none of the TMO lifts are fire fighting or evacuation lifts. The tmo stock

do have some of the requirements, but the cost to meet the recommended standards would prevent us upgrading our lifts.”

92. I forwarded this email to Carl Stokes, who responded saying:

“As far as I know the requirements for a fire fighting lift/evacuation lift did not change in the March 2010 edition of Building Regs, next time I am in the Hub could we sit down with Robin as he might have different information than me. Does he have copies of the information he is taking about the could forward to me?” (CST00003080_0001)

93. On 12 March 2014, Claire Williams emailed me, copying in Carl Stokes, querying amongst other things whether Carl could confirm whether the lifts were either fireman’s or fire fighting as she did not know there was a difference (**JW/28 12.03.14 ‘Email from Claire Williams to Janice Wray:’**). This email came following a meeting Claire held on site at Grenfell Tower with Studio E and Daniel Hallissey from the LFB.

94. The same day, Carl Stokes replied by email to Claire Williams and myself stating that both lifts in Grenfell Tower were fire fighting lifts. In this email, he cited the definitions of a fireman’s lift and a firefighting lift. He then went on to say:

“I think he is getting confused with fireman controls and the fireman’s switches etc which are fitted to a fire fighting lift. There are slight differences between a fire fighting lift and an evacuation lift though.”

95. Then, on 17 September 2014, Carl Stokes wrote a letter in which he stated:

“The lifts in this building are fire fighter/evacuation lifts, have they been reprogrammed so that the fire service can control them from the walkaway level? If so can the service documents and certificates from the lift contractors please be forwarded so that there is evidence if required that the lifts are in full working order as fire fighter/evacuation lifts.”

96. It is my belief that we informed the LFB that the lifts were not fire fighting lifts as this is what the TMO's lift engineer advised me. I passed this information on to Carl Stokes. Ultimately however, the TMO had no intention of ever using the lifts as part of an evacuation strategy. In other words, the fire strategy for the Tower was in no way reliant on the use of the lifts to evacuate people but only for use as Fire Control lifts by the LFB.
97. I have been asked whether the TMO carried out testing of the lift fire control switches and/or the lifts in firefighter-operated mode. As stated above, the lifts were maintained under a maintenance and service contract with Apex Lifts Ltd. I did not oversee this contract as I was not a contracts manager. However, I would expect that as a specialist lift contractor, Apex Lifts Ltd were aware of what they needed to check as part of this regime. I would also have expected all the Insurance inspections to test these features.
98. I have been asked in relation to item 19f on Carl Stokes' Grenfell Tower Significant Findings and Action Plan June 2016 (CST00000101), which was a request to confirm that the lift fire controls have been moved back down to street level, what action was taken by TMO in response to this request. As recorded in the FRA action tracker that I maintained, this item was "Fully Completed" with the action taken column recording "COMPLETED - ppm contractors confirm these controls are as they should be with fire control switch at ground level causing lift to return there" (**JW/29 'FRA Action Tracker:'**).
99. I have been asked, in relation to paragraph 115 of my earlier statement, whether I would have expected the maintenance contractor for the lifts to notify the TMO if the lifts were non-compliant with the relevant Building Regulations, British Standards or other industry standards. However, I was not the Project Manager for this project and I had no role in overseeing the maintenance contract. It follows that I have no knowledge of the contract particulars and requirements and I am therefore not the best person to provide this information.

100. In July 2013, TMO Health and Safety published a document called “Grenfell Tower – Instructions for operation of Lifts Fire Control” which provides instructions on how to switch the lifts into “Fire Service” mode (CST00002037). Essentially, a drop release key is inserted into the fire control unit which switches both lifts onto fire service mode and disables the landing call push circuit. The lifts then immediately travel to the lobby floor and on arrival the lift doors open and remain open until a car call is activated. This document also advises on how to switch the lifts back to normal service.
101. In relation to this document, and my email exchange with Carl Stokes (CST00002037) on 19 July 2013, I have been asked (1) whether I was the author of the Instructions document (2) Who provided information to assist me with drafting the Instructions document (3) Who the intended users or recipients of this document were (4) If it was intended to be displayed inside Grenfell Tower, how/where was it displayed (5) Was the location changed following Apex’s works in or about 2014-2015 and (6) What, if any, information did you have (including photographs) of the ‘Express type drop key’ which was compatible with (and intended for use in) the fire recall switch.
102. While I cannot be completely certain, it is possible that I authored this document, however if I did it was purely recording what Robin Cahalarn advised. For this reason, it is my belief that these questions are best directed to him.

AOV System

103. I have been asked to provide further information in respect of the refurbished/upgraded AOV system and the Rydon briefing I attended, and in particular, what my understanding was of the design and intended operation of the new system.
104. The AOV system was installed by Rydon and its subcontractors as part of the refurbishment project overseen by a designated Refurbishment Project

team within the Asset Management Team of the Operations department. At the time of the fire, it remained under the defects period. The briefing I attended with Rydon was no more than a general “for your information” at the conclusion of the works. It follows that I am not best placed to provide detailed information in relation to the AOV system.

105. I have been asked in relation to Carl Stokes’ Grenfell Tower Significant Findings and Action Plan June 2016 (CST00000101) what action was taken by the TMO in relation to several High Priority items in relation to the refurbished AOV system at Item 19 (a)-(e).
106. As outlined in my earlier statement, the process by which I oversaw the Fire Risk Assessment programme was that I would receive the Fire Risk Assessment and the Significant and Action Plan from Carl Stokes. I would then assign out the actions to the relevant individuals within the TMO who would be responsible for completing them. The person responsible was identified in the “BY WHOM” column.
107. The items identified at 19(a) to (e) of Stokes’ Grenfell Tower Significant Findings and Action Plan June 2016 are those which were listed at 19(b) to (g) of his April 2016 Significant and Action Plan. As can be seen from the document, these were all assigned to Claire Williams, as the TMO refurbishment Project Manager.
108. While it was not my role to resolve the actions identified through the Fire Risk Assessment programme, unless they were specifically assigned to me, it was my role to have a system for monitoring the progress of those actions. I did this through a tracking document that is referenced earlier in this statement. As can be seen from this document, actions 19(b) to 19(g) of the June 2016 Significant and Action Plan have were all marked off as “fully completed.” The actions taken by Claire Williams in relation to those items are outlined in the “Action taken” panel.
109. While I believe that Claire Williams is the best person to provide any further information required about the actions described, I am able to confirm that

in completing those actions, she consulted Rydon. Specifically, I have been shown an email sent on 9 May 2016 from Claire Williams to David Hughes of Rydon, in which she has forwarded him the April 2016 Fire Risk Assessment and requested that he read it and provide comments. On 10 May 2016, David Hughes of Rydon sent back the document with comments (**JW/30 10.05.16 'Email from David Hughes attaching FRA with Rydon comments:'**).

Consideration of vulnerable and disabled residents

110. I have been asked to clarify whether it was my understanding that the lifts were intended to be used for evacuation of disabled residents in the event that this became necessary as well as firefighting. As stated above, the lifts at Grenfell Tower were never intended to be used to evacuate any residents, including disabled residents. The fire strategy for the Tower, as outlined in the FRA was “Stay Put”, which did not anticipate full evacuation but initial evacuation of only the flat where the fire started.
111. “Stay Put” is the recommended strategy in the LGA Guidance “Fire safety in purpose-built blocks of flats” (**JW/31 'LGA Guidance 'Fire Safety in purpose built blocks of flats:'**). To assist the Inquiry, I have set out the advice given in this Guidance in relation to the Stay Put strategy below:

“12. Is stay put safe?”

This is the basis for the ‘stay put’ principle (discussed later in this guide): when a fire occurs within one dwelling (or, less likely, in the common parts), it is normally safe for other residents to remain within their own flat. This principle is undoubtedly successful in an overwhelming number of fires in blocks of flats. In 2009-2010, of over 8,000 fires in these blocks, only 22 fires necessitated evacuation of more than five people with the assistance of the fire and rescue service.”

“Most blocks of flats are designed on the ‘stay put’ principle. Although this relies on there being effective compartmentation, it is a principle that should be adopted wherever possible.”

“18. Evacuation strategy

18.1 The compartmentation between flats is analogous to the party wall separation between adjoining houses, which prevents fire-spread from one house to another. It also enshrines the principle that a person’s actions, while they may affect their own safety, should not endanger their neighbours.

18.2 Compartmentation requires a higher standard of fire resistance than that normally considered necessary simply to protect the escape routes. This is to ensure that a fire should be contained within the flat of fire origin. Accordingly, those in flats remote from the fire are safe to stay where they are. Indeed, in the majority of fires in blocks of flats, residents of other flats never need to leave their flats.

18.3 This is the essence of the ‘stay put’ principle. It has underpinned fire safety design standards from even before the 1960s, when national standards were first drafted. It still the basis upon which blocks of flats are designed today. In the majority of existing blocks, it remains entirely valid.

18.4 Inevitably, fires do occur in which, for operational reasons, the fire and rescue service decides to evacuate others in the building. Fires have been known to spread beyond the flat of origin to involve other flats or to spread across the top of blocks through the roof voids. In these cases, total evacuation of the block has sometimes been necessary.

Fortunately, these fires are rare. They are usually the fault of failings in the construction.

19. ‘Stay put’ policy

19.1 A 'stay put' policy involves the following approach.

- When a fire occurs within a flat, the occupants alert others in the flat, make their way out of the building and summon the fire and rescue service.*
- If a fire starts in the common parts, anyone in these areas makes their way out of the building and summons the fire and rescue service.*
- All other residents not directly affected by the fire would be expected to 'stay put' and remain in their flat unless directed to leave by the fire and rescue service.*
- openings in walls and floors for communal heating systems, including ducted warm air systems, as well as hot water supplies*
- doorways or hatches in walls for access to read electricity and gas meters and for deliveries and collections.*

19.2 It is not implied that those not directly involved who wish to leave the building should be prevented from doing so. Nor does this preclude those evacuating a flat that is on fire from alerting their neighbours so that they can also escape if they feel threatened.

19.3 The alternative to a 'stay put' policy is one involving simultaneous evacuation.

19.4 Simultaneous evacuation involves evacuating the residents of a number of flats together. It requires a means to alert all of these residents to the need to evacuate, ie a fire detection and alarm system. Purpose-built blocks of flats are not normally provided with such systems.

19.5 Simultaneous evacuation is sometimes applied to buildings converted into blocks of flats, but usually only where it has not been possible to achieve the level of compartmentation required for a 'stay

put' policy. In purpose-built blocks of flats, experience has shown that most residents do not need to leave their flats when there is a fire elsewhere. Indeed, in some circumstances, they might place themselves at greater risk when they do so.

19.6 Some enforcing authorities and fire risk assessors have been adopting a precautionary approach whereby, unless it can be proven that the standard of construction is adequate for 'stay put', the assumption should be that it is not. As a consequence, simultaneous evacuation has sometimes been adopted, and fire alarm systems fitted retrospectively, in blocks of flats designed to support a 'stay put' strategy.

19.7 This is considered unduly pessimistic. Indeed, such an approach is not justified by experience or statistical evidence from fires in blocks of flats (see Part A of this guide). It also differs from the principles of fire risk assessment (see Part D of this guide).

Accordingly, proposals of fire risk assessors, and requirements of enforcing authorities, based on a precautionary approach (eg abandonment of a 'stay put' policy simply because of difficulties in verifying compartmentation), should be questioned. Before committing resources, it might be appropriate to seek a second opinion."

112. I have been asked to clarify what the fire safety policy was for the evacuation of disabled residents in the event that the need to evacuate occurred due to a fire in that person's flat and/or the failure of compartmentation. The fire safety advice given to disabled residents in the Tower was the same as that given to non-disabled residents. I never envisaged that there would be a failure of compartmentation, as I had no reason to.
113. I have been asked in relation to paragraph 126 of my earlier statement to the Inquiry, whether I can recall any complaints or concerns being raised by residents about the evacuation of vulnerable and disabled residents and the

actions taken in response. I do not recall any such complaints or concerns being raised with me.

114. I have been asked to provide more information on the TMO's intention to produce Personal Emergency Evacuation Plans ('PEEPS') for vulnerable and disabled residents. I have also been asked to set out the extent of my knowledge and involvement in this plan.
115. PEEPs were generally targeted at workplace and occupational settings and not residential dwellings. Additionally, the Health and Safety team were not routinely advised of the location of vulnerable residents or those with disabilities. If vulnerable or disabled residents raised concerns with my Estate or Neighbourhood colleagues, we would have visited that resident and/or asked the fire risk assessor to visit and/or sought an LFB Home Fire Safety Visit.

Fire advice and consideration of language needs

116. I have been asked to provide further details on consideration or discussion of the best approach to ensuring that all residents received and understood the fire safety advice provided by the TMO. I have also been asked to provide further details regarding consideration or discussion of the need for any special language provisions for the communication of fire safety advice.
117. My recollection is that some publications were sent out with information as to how to apply for that publication to be provided in other languages. I believe this may have been included in the Link. I do recall several occasions we received a specific request for information or the fire procedure to be translated and we actioned this.
118. The LFB were kept informed of the fire safety information we gave to residents. For example, the minutes of a Health and Safety Committee Meeting dated 28 August 2013 record under the heading "Feedback from Bi-Monthly meeting with the LFB"

“The LFB familiarisation exercise at Grenfell Tower had gone well and the LFB Station Manager confirmed that this had provided effective training for his crews. The possibility of a further exercise – possibly at the Silchester high-rise block as – was discussed with timescales to be agreed.

LFB confirmed that they were happy with the fire safety information we are now providing to tenants.”

Grenfell Tower Fire in 2010

119. I have been asked, in relation to paragraph 202 of my earlier statement to the Inquiry, to provide the original information collated by the TMO following the fire at Grenfell Tower in 2010 to the LFB. This information is contained in an email that I sent to Collette O’Hara on 5 May 2010 (**JW/32 5.05.10 ‘Email from Janice Wray to Collette O’Hara:’**).
120. In summary, in 2010 there was a fire on the sixth floor at Grenfell Tower. It was suspected that the fire had been started deliberately by acquaintances of a resident of Flat 64, who had set fire to recycling bags due for collection. The communal detection system was triggered and the fire alarm sounded. On hearing the alarm a neighbour came out of her property and used a garden hose to extinguish the fire. The Police arrested the individual suspected of starting the fire.

Fire Safety Training

121. I have been asked to provide further information in relation to the fire safety training provided by the TMO to its staff.
122. The TMO’s policy in relation to fire safety training for staff was as follows:

“To increase knowledge, awareness and promote competence amongst staff the TMO requires all staff to complete a comprehensive on-line fire safety training course. Additionally, practical training sessions on the use of fire extinguishers are run annually for fire marshals, estate staff,

sheltered housing officers and other relevant staff. Further, staff who are required to undertake regular communal inspections are also given additional more specialised training to cover fire safety systems and features in residential blocks, stay put strategy, communal storage issues, other issues highlighted by the FRAs etc. to ensure they are clear on what to escalate. This training is also provided annually – with ongoing refresher training at team meetings and on-site briefings with the H&S Team and the Fire Consultant.” (JW/33 ‘TMO Fire Safety Strategy:’).

123. Phoenix Fire Safety Training Ltd provided annual practical fire safety training to TMO staff, such as that which took place at the Kensal Resource Centre in January 2017 (JW/34 ‘Phoenix Safety Training Ltd Certificates:’). This training was also attended by Neighbourhood Officers and Community Officers.
124. Annual training was often discussed in health and safety meetings. For example, in the H&S Committee Meeting on 13 September 2010 it is recorded “*The estate staff along with neighbourhood officers and community officers had also completed the annual fire safety refresher training*” (JW/35 13.09.10 ‘Health and Safety Committee Meeting Minutes:’). The agenda for this training had been amended to take account of the issues that were coming out of the FRAs. In particular, a practical element of inspecting a high-rise block with special emphasis on the fire safety issues had been included so that all participants will more readily recognise, for example, intumescent strips and self-closers.
125. In addition to annual training, Adrian Bowman and I periodically attended Estate Services Team meetings to deliver health and safety training on matters that included fire safety issues. This included highlighting actions identified by Carl Stokes, as well as points of learning from minor fires, changes in best practice, issues raised by the LFB and other areas that it was felt Estate Service Assistants should be particularly attentive to. I do not believe that these meetings were minuted, however they were occasionally

discussed in Health and Safety Committee meetings. For example, in a Health and Safety Committee Meeting on 19 January 2017, it is recorded:

“Janice advised that a half-day Fire Safety training session was held for Estate Staff in December. This was jointly run by JW and Carl Stokes and Feedback was good. JW also confirmed that the annual practical fire safety training on the use of extinguishers for estate staff and fire marshals had run in January. Safety Reps had been invited to attend.”

(JW/36 19.01.17 ‘Health and Safety Committee Meeting Minutes:’

).

126. I also recall that in December 2016, a half-day training session was delivered to Estate Services Assistants presented by me with input from Carl Stokes. To supplement the course information already provided, I attach to this statement the case study on communal storage used in this course and a fire safety quiz used at the conclusion of this course (**JW/37 ‘ESA Fire Safety Training - Case Study:’**).

127. When new employees joined the TMO, they were taken through a health and safety induction checklist by myself, which included matters of fire safety such as fire alarms, fire procedures, evacuations, assembly areas, fire marshals and fire risk assessment. I attach to this statement a checklist of the matters included in this training (**JW/38 ‘TMO Induction HS checklist June 2015:’**). In addition to this, during the TMO’s formal induction course there was a health and safety segment during which I took new TMO staff through a briefing and a quiz. I do not believe there will be a comprehensive record of this leading back as far as 2010.

Handover from refurbishment

128. I have been asked what my understanding was of the requirements of regulation 38 of the Building Regulations 2010 as they applied to the 2012-2016 refurbishment. I had no involvement in this report other than when Carl Stokes requested through his Fire Risk Assessment that specific information be included.

129. I was not provided with the O&M manual for the refurbishment, though I could have found the documents with the assistance of a colleague if I needed to.

Text communication with residents

130. I have been asked to explain how TMO used the “Textburst” system. I believe that the system was set up by Claire Williams and our ICT team for use during the refurbishment. I may have received a quick briefing on it by IT but I never used it. I do not believe that it was ever intended to be used as a general safety feature.

131. I was not in attendance at the fire on 14 June 2017 and I cannot therefore answer whether any consideration was given to using the Textburst system on the night to communicate with residents.

I confirm this statement to be true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

I confirm that I am willing for this statement to form part of the evidence before the Inquiry and published on the Inquiry’s website.

Signed: 

Dated: 20th July 2020.

