

GRENFELL TOWER INQUIRY

SUPPLEMENTARY WITNESS STATEMENT OF JANICE WRAY

I, JANICE WRAY WILL SAY AS FOLLOWS:-

1. I make this supplementary statement to assist the Grenfell Tower Inquiry and in response to the Inquiry's letter of 18 February 2020.
2. This statement is to be read in conjunction with my earlier statements to the Inquiry, dated 7 February 2019, 13 March 2019, 24 April 2019, 1 December 2019, 17 January 2020 and 24 January 2020.

Fire Risk Assessment Queries

3. I have been asked by the Inquiry to provide a copy of the fire risk assessment for Gilray House which was completed in 2009. I attached this as (**JW.1, 'Fire Risk Assessment for the Premises Gillray House'**:).).
4. I have been asked to provide evidence of what information was provided to - and what communications were had with - Salvus Consulting ("Salvus") around the time it was appointed by the Kensington and Chelsea Tenant Management Organisation ("TMO") as its fire risk assessor in 2009.
5. By way of background, and as explained in my earlier statement to the Inquiry dated 7 February 2019, after the introduction of the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order ("RRFSO") in 2005, the TMO introduced a risk-based approach to fire safety in consultation with the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea ("RBKC") and the London Fire Brigade ("LFB"). The process by which a property was categorised as high, medium or low risk by the TMO is explained in my statement dated 24 September 2019.

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Janice Wray

6. In October 2009, I reported to the TMO Board that five consultants had been invited to tender to carry out fire risk assessments in the communal areas of the 110 properties that the TMO had categorised as potentially high risk. Following receipt of tenders, each tenderers was interviewed by a panel consisting of TMO and RBKC Officers. The successful tenderer was Salvus Consulting (**JW.2, '08 October 2009, Report by Health and Safety Advisor':**).
7. On 7 September 2009, Salvus Consulting attended a briefing meeting with the TMO. The minutes of this meeting are attached (**JW.3, '07 September 2009, Briefing Meeting, Fire Risk Assessments in high rise blocks':**). In this meeting, it was agreed that the FRA programme was to start on 24 September 2009 and be completed within six months. In this meeting, Valerie Sharples, a TMO Project Manager, took the attendees through the relevant sections of the Consultant's Brief.
8. Salvus were advised by the TMO that an FRA should focus on compartmentation in the context of the operation and adequacy of fire doors, firefighting equipment, automatic detection systems, extraction systems, sprinklers, dry risers, wet risers, means of escape including final exit doors, the secondary means of escape where present and its appropriateness, emergency lighting, signage, fitness for purpose of the building in relation to fire safety, fire safety management systems and recording procedures and the marking of all this information on floor plans.
9. In respect of fire doors specifically, I confirmed in this meeting that my expectation would be that Salvus inspected and assessed a random sample of doors at each property. I further explained that where many doors were identical, several should be inspected, and where there were a wide range of door types, it would be helpful to inspect as many of the different types as possible.
10. In this meeting it was agreed that each FRA report produced by Salvus had to identify, detail and prioritise remedial action required by law, as well as remedial action recommended by Salvus and any recommendations it had for fire safety improvements with the approximate cost. These actions were required to presented in format ready for use as a works instruction to a contractor.

11. In addition to these reports, the minutes of this meeting record that Salvus were to produce floor plans for every block for the TMO. It was agreed that these plans would need to identify not only information in respect of communal areas but also all designated escape routes including those from individual dwellings. It is my understanding that Salvus produced plans for many TMO properties including Grenfell Tower.
12. In the same meeting I advised Salvus, in respect of asbestos, that the TMO did not generally have labelled asbestos containing materials as the blocks were residential (rather, we had written to residents to advise them of the locations of asbestos containing material use in their homes). I also agreed to forward Salvus the details of asbestos containing materials in the common parts of Trellick Tower, which was the block where asbestos containing materials recurred most frequently. I also agreed to provide Salvus with any Type 2 surveys of communal areas which were held electronically, all recent LFB correspondence in respect of TMO blocks and additional information in relation to the highest priority blocks that Salvus would be assessing at the start of the programme.
13. In respect of Grenfell Tower specifically, I advised Salvus that it was a twenty floor block with a single internal staircase built with automatic fire detection and mechanical extract ventilation on the landing on each floor linked to fire alarm. I further advised that there was an Estate Office on the first floor, a Social Services office, a boiler room in the basement and a nursery at ground floor level.
14. The same minutes record that Steve Wain of Salvus advised the TMO that there were a number of documents that he would require sight of, such as the TMO's Fire Safety Policy. It is then recorded that Steve Wain:

"... will be providing a list of this documentation and he confirmed that he will attend Charles House in the morning of the 24th Sept to have sight of all of these. (Assessments then to start at 9 and 11/12 Colville Sq in the afternoon of the 24th Sept.) Valerie advised that we could provide a list of buildings for which we currently hold a CDM H&S File."

15. I have been asked whether Steve Wain ever requested these documents. I have not been able to locate any such request from Steve Wain, however on 28 September 2009, Andrew Furness of Salvus emailed myself and Abigail Acosta, copying in Steve Wain, attaching a Salvus Consulting Task Based Risk Assessment and requesting information about potential risks to his staff (**JW.4, '28 September 2009 Email from Andrew Furness RE: info from RBKC and our task based risk assessment for the contract':**). The purpose of this request was to ensure that Salvus did not expose its staff unnecessarily to risks from, for example, asbestos or anti-social behaviour. He accepted that it would be sufficient for this information to be provided verbally.
16. I have not been able to locate any response from myself to Andrew with the requested information, however I am confident that I would have given Andrew what he asked for. I believe that what I sent would have been a large document with details on the locations of asbestos containing materials within the communal areas. These documents, such as Communal Asbestos Surveys, are very large files and I may not have been kept in my inbox due to its size, however the TMO had master copies readily available.
17. I have been asked whether it is known if the documents and information provided to Salvus were made available to Carl Stokes before he completed the fire risk assessment dated 30 September 2009. At this time, the TMO's contractual relationship was with Salvus. Carl Stokes was a sub-consultant of Salvus and therefore the TMO would not have been party to communications between the Salvus and Carl Stokes.
18. On 16 September 2009, the TMO hosted a meeting to introduce Salvus to the LFB's fire safety officers (**JW.5, '16 September 2009 Minutes of Introductory meeting between Consultant and Fire Brigade':**). In this meeting, Angus Sangster of the LFB confirmed that the LFB required the TMO's entire property portfolio to be assessed within three years, with remedial works to ensure full compliance with the RRFSSO complete within five years.
19. It was at this meeting that I circulated the spreadsheet of potentially high risk properties and confirmed that all properties had been categorised using a set of

criteria that I had agreed with the RBKC and copied to the LFB. As explained in my earlier statement to the Inquiry, all high rise blocks within the TMO were automatically categorised as potentially high risk, as were all sheltered housing complexes and temporary housing blocks.

20. The minutes of this meeting record that the LFB required one of their officers to accompany Salvus on each of the first five assessments undertaken and then a further six assessments chosen at random later in the programme. The LFB agreed to produce a report following these first five attendances following which a meeting would take place with the TMO and Salvus.

21. In respect of the FRA proforma presented by Salvus, the minutes record as follows:

“AS advised that he was “more than happy “ with the Salvis proforma and he emphasised that he was particularly interested in the quantitative mechanisms. He further advised that he would like one of his team to accompany the Consultant on the first five inspections / assessments and then perhaps randomly on a further six assessments later in the programme. AF welcomed the FB involvement and JW agreed to forward the programme to the FB. AS offered to produce a report following these five assessments and all agreed that this would be helpful. It was also agreed that we should invite the FB to a further meeting following these initial assessments so that they can present their report and comment on our approach.”

22. The minutes further record as follows:

“Collette O’Hara had been unable to attend the meeting but had sent some comments which SR presented. Specifically, she had raised a query on who would be responsible for the Evacuation Plans. AF stated that their role would be to point out requirements and highlight any deficiencies and assist TMO to meet their responsibilities. However, JW agreed that clearly the responsibility for these would be the TMO’s.”

23. In respect of the standards and requirements of the LFB in respect of FRAs, the minutes record the following:
- “SW advised that he was keen to establish early on what standard of fire safety is to be achieved. Specifically, what are the minimum expectations of the fire authority? AS advised that he was aware of the wide range of Council blocks and he accepted that the FB would need to be flexible and not stick rigidly to an Approved Document B approach - would clearly not be feasible.”*
24. Finally, the minutes record that Salvus agreed to produce an “Outline Cautionary Report” for any urgent matters that were identified. I recall that a few issues were raised in this way however the only one that I recall was when Salvus queried the working practices of a contractor in a basement boiler room at a block other than Grenfell.
25. The report that I produced for the Board dated 8 October 2009 records that, on 24 September 2009, a further meeting was held between the TMO and Salvus to enable Salvus to have sight of various relevant documents, including the TMO’s fire safety policies, procedures and planned maintenance contracts. The aforementioned report confirms that the feedback from Salvus during this meeting was generally that the TMO had good fire safety policies and procedures in place, although these had not been consistently documented. I therefore advised the Board that the TMO needed to review and update its Fire Safety Policy and Procedures to more accurately and comprehensively reflect our good practice (JW.2:). We did this by taking some time to pull everything together into one consolidated policy/procedure and there was a working draft being updated for some time and in 2013 a consolidated Fire Safety Policy was implemented (TMO00830598).
26. On 28 September 2009, Andrew Furness emailed me a copy of the Salvus task based risk assessment (JW.4:).
27. Monthly progress meetings then took place over four months between the TMO, the RBKC and Salvus during the high rise FRA programme. This allowed the LFB to monitor ongoing progress with the FRA’s and with any remedial works

arising. The minutes of these meetings are attached (JW.6, '19 October 2009 Minutes of Fire Risk Assessment in high rise blocks Progress Meeting':), (JW.7, '23 November 2009 Minutes of Fire Risk Assessment in high rise blocks Progress Meeting':), (JW.8, '26 January 2010 Minutes of Fire Risk Assessment in high rise blocks Progress Meeting':), (JW.9, '23 February 2010 Minutes of Fire Risk Assessment in high rise blocks Progress Meeting':), (JW.10, '01 April 2010 Minutes of Fire Risk Assessment in high rise blocks Progress Meeting':),

28. During the Progress Meeting that took place on 23 November 2009 (JW.7:), Angus Sangster confirmed that the LFB were happy with the risk assessments and the progress that the TMO had made to date. He then sought clarification as to how the evacuation strategy for each block was being identified. I advised that this was coming out of the risk assessment itself and was being documented in each respective report. Steve Wain then advised that the TMO had initially confirmed what the existing strategy had been for the majority of blocks and whilst carrying out the assessments, he and his colleagues had endeavoured to establish if this was appropriate.

29. On 10 December 2009, I presented a further update report to the Board in respect of the FRA programme (JW/11, "Fire Risk Assessments Board Report 10 December 2009":). This report recorded that the main request made by the LFB in respect of Salvus' work was that "more detail of the building structure should be documented in the assessment report and the Consultant has been asked to address this in future reports." Salvus confirmed they would be taking on board the LFB request and the January 2010 Progress Meeting the minute records (RBK00052572):

"In response to the concerns raised by the LFB's Angus Sangster about the level of information on the block structure contained in the report, AF advised that Salvus had made some small changes to the introductory pages to supplement the existing information and they were confident this would now meet requirements."

30. The FRA programme for potentially high risk properties was completed in March 2010. In setting out the history between Salvus and the TMO above, I have endeavoured to provide the Inquiry with as much information as I can about communications that took place between the TMO and Salvus at the time of its appointment.
31. In preparing its statement, I have been referred to SAL00000041, which records that a meeting was planned to take place with Russell Thompson, Ann Muchmore and myself, all of the TMO, and the LFB Fire Safety Team on 20 April 2010. This meeting referred to did take place and I attached the minutes (**JW.12, '20 April 2010, Minutes of meeting between LFB, RBKC Council and TMO':**). In this meeting, I confirmed that the TMO would be competitively re-tendering for the medium and low risk programmes and that Salvus had confirmed they would be on the tender list.
32. It had always been agreed with Salvus that at the conclusion of the high risk programme, the TMO would review the initial FRA programme and carry out competitive tendering in line with its procurement requirements to appoint the consultant who would undertake the medium risk programme. The tenderers were required to demonstrate their experience of working in all types of resident blocks, submit a completed FRA, attend and interview with RBKC and TMO officers.
33. The minutes of the TMO Health and Safety Committee Meeting that took place on 13 September 2010 record that CS Stokes & Associates Limited was appointed by the TMO, in consultation with the RBKC, as its fire risk assessor for the properties designated as potentially medium risk (**JW.13, '13 September 2010 Minutes of the TMO Health and Safety Committee Meeting':**).
34. I have been asked to explain whether any information was provided to Carl Stokes, at the commencement of the contract between CS Stokes & Associates Limited and the TMO, which concerned existing fire safety features, Regulation 38 fire safety information, testing and maintenance records, information on relevant persons, information on any dangerous substances, risk assessments from other responsible persons and/or information on the management of preventative measures undertaken by the responsible person.

35. I am unable to locate any specific information given to Carl Stokes at this time, however Carl Stokes had been employed by Salvus prior to the appointment of CS Stokes & Associates Limited and had carried out the majority of Salvus' FRAs in the RBKC stock. He was therefore very familiar with the stock and with TMO processes. My understanding was that Carl also communicated regularly with several of the TMO caretakers/ESA's, therefore if he had any questions about a property while on site he would be able to ask them.
36. I have been asked to confirm whether monthly, bi-monthly or quarterly meetings took place between the TMO and Carl Stokes between 2010 and June 2017. I do not recall having many formal contract meetings with Carl Stokes during his contract with the TMO. The reason for this was that Carl was frequently showing up at my office and contacting me through email or letter. In more recent years, he became so familiar with TMO processes that he would often go directly to my colleagues for relevant information. For example, I know Carl would contact Alex Bosman if he needed contract management information. I believe Carl also had access to the Keystone Kiosk, where he was able to find compliance information about gas and electrics.
37. The Inquiry has referred to two letters, namely CST00000991 and CST00003149, which I understand it considers to demonstrate that Carl Stokes gave advice to the TMO on the new flat entrance doors that were installed by Manse Masterdor in May 2011. I have been asked to provide any documents that pre-date the two letters referenced which evidence the instructions provided to Mr Stokes which prompted him to provide the letters of advice, however I have not been able to locate any such communications however I am not surprised that Carl was involved in this as he was proactive and knowledgeable. I have located an earlier letter from Carl Stokes in which he was asked to provides further advice in respect of the flat entrance door requirements (JW/14, "**07 March 2011 letter from Carl Stokes re criteria of entrance doors**":).
38. I have been asked explain what Carl Stokes' role was in the door replacement programme and whether he received any formal or informal instructions in respect of that programme.

39. As explained in my earlier statement on this subject, there was a full framework in place for the fire door replacement programme with the London Housing Consortium and Manse Masterdor. The TMO also had a Planning Supervisor, Bailey Garner. The TMO's Project Manager as the Client was Abigail Acosta.
40. Carl Stokes had no formal role in the project. However, because he was the TMO's Fire Risk Assessor, it was important that he was aware of the door programme so that he could incorporate the changes into his FRAs. Carl was also invited to provide input on the door specification and the pilot installation, on the basis that if he was not satisfied with the doors, he was likely to query this as part of his FRA programme. Therefore on 23 May 2011, Carl provided a letter with comments in respect of the pilot installation for the programme and the LHC site visit report (CST00000991). On 26 May 2011, I forwarded Carl's letter to Abigail Acosta and she forwarded it to Alex Fomin of LHC, who amended the site visit report to reflect Carl's recommendations (**JW.15, '26 May 2011 Email from Alex Fomin RE: Flat door replacement programme':**).
41. On 24 June 2011, Carl provided a further letter of advice to Abigail Acosta (CST00003149).
42. In addition to these two letters, Carl Stokes provided advice in relation to the programme on an ad hoc basis. Below I have set out the communications I have been able to locate with Carl Stokes which relate to the fire door replacement programme:
43. In July 2011, Lorna Cunningham, a TMO Resident Liaison Officer who was working on the fire door replacement project, wrote to Andy Webster of Manse Masterdor, copying in Abigail Acosta and myself, advising him that two elderly residents were struggling to open and close their replaced front doors. Lorna queried whether there was a chance that support could be received from the Community Safety Team, the Fire Service and the Fire Risk Assessor to remove the self-closing device (**JW.16, '12 September 2011 Email trail RE: Door Installation – Elderly':**). On 27 July 2011 I forwarded this correspondence to Carl Stokes welcoming his view. Carl responded on 4 August 2011 advising in that he did not recommend removing any self-closing devices

on the basis that the Building Regulations were specific on the requirement for a self-closing device to be fitted to flat entrance doors (**JW.17, '04 August 2011 Letter from Carl Stokes Subject: Removal of the self-closing device on a flat entrance door'**:).

44. In early 2012, I asked Carl Stokes to investigate a fire door at Flat 7, 63 Finborough Road that had been brought to my attention. Carl produced a report which I then forwarded to Mike Hallimond and Abigail Acosta on 8 February 2012, requesting that they add this particular flat entrance door to the replacement programme (**JW.18, '15 June 2012 Email trail FW: Flat 7 63 Finborough Road entrance door'**:).

45. On 6 March 2014, I emailed Carol McGarry, a TMO Project Manager, advising her that at the conclusion of the fire door replacement programme, a number of door replacements had been left outstanding. I further advised Carol that in order to minimise the need for legal action (against those residents who refused to allow the TMO to replace their doors), I instructed Carl Stokes to revisit and inspect the doors to confirm whether they were compliant and if further action was necessary.

46. In addition to these ad hoc requests, Carl Stokes would bring to the TMO's attention any matters relating to the fire doors that he considered relevant. For example, on 21 July 2011 Carl Stokes emailed Abigail Acosta informing her that on a recent visit to the Lancaster West Estate he had observed that the self-closing devices on three of the new flat entrance doors had come away from the door. Abigail then forwarded this query onto Andrew Webster requesting that he look into it as a matter of urgency (**JW.19, '26 July 2011 Email trail FW: New Doors at Grenfell Tower'**:).

47. By way of further example, I have located an email that shows that Carl Stokes emailed Abigail Acosta on 9 September 2011 explaining that he had visited a property called Milman House and been informed that there was plasterwork finishing issues where new doors had been fitted. He further advised that there were some new doors which were still to be fitted in the cleaner's room. Abigail forwarded this correspondence to Andrew Webster for rectification (**JW.20, '09**

September 2011 Email from Abigail Acosta FW: New flat doors Milman House':).

48. At paragraph 29 of my first witness statement [TMO00000890], I state that we met with Carl Stokes, RBKC Officers and the LFB to discuss who was responsible for enforcement of the non-compliant leaseholder flat entrance doors.” I have been asked to confirm if the meeting minutes at [TMO00847294] are the minutes which relate to the meeting described. I believe these are the correct minutes. The reason that Carl Stokes was invited to this meeting was so that he was clear on the outcome and could factor any outcomes reached into his future FRAs.
49. The Inquiry’s letter records that on 30 September 2013, 8 November 2013, 23 January 2014, meetings were held between the TMO and Carl Stokes [as recorded in TMO10003733 at lines F30 and F31 and CST00002802]. I have been asked to explain who attended these meetings, the purpose of the meetings, the matters which were discussed and to provide any documentation arising. However unfortunately due to the passage of time I have no recollection of what this reference is about.
50. I have been referred to a document titled “Year-End Performance Review” for myself (TMO10041292) and asked to provide a background as to why I arranged several meetings with Fire Consultant and the TMO’s Assets and Regeneration department. The reason that I facilitated communications between the TMO’s Asset and Regeneration and Carl Stokes was so that Carl was aware of the nature of the works being carried out in the stock and could therefore adjust his FRAs accordingly.
51. In preparing this statement, I have been referred to TMO10001286 and asked to explain who instructed Leon Taylor to complete this fire risk assessment, why the fire risk assessment completed on this date and whether any other fire risk assessments of the common parts of Grenfell Tower were carried out by anyone other than Carl Stokes between 2010 and 14 June 2017. I have never heard of Leon Taylor and I do not recall ever seeing this document. I am not aware of any

other fire risk assessments being carried out in the common parts of Grenfell Tower between those dates by anyone other than Carl Stokes.

52. I have also been referred to CST00003187, which is a letter sent to me on 17 September 2014 from Carl Stokes with requests for information for “the contractor.” I have been asked to confirm if the requests were answered by myself and if so to provide the documents provided as a response.
53. On 23 September 2014, I wrote to Matt Rawlings and Keith Noble from the TMO, requesting that they provide compliance information for inclusion in the FRA for Grenfell Tower. In doing so, I advised them that we wanted to make the FRA as comprehensive as possible so that we were better able to challenge “Mr Daffarn’s criticisms”. I believe this related to general criticisms made by Edward Daffarn to Ben Dewis of the LFB which we had been made aware of (JW/21, “01 September 2014 Email from Janice Wray FW Grenfell Tower”:), (JW/22, “04 September 2014 Email from Janice Wray FW Grenfell Tower”:), (JW/23, “25 September 2014 Email from Janice Wray FW Grenfell Tower - ppm documentation”:)).
54. On 25 and 26 September 2014, Matt Rawlings, John Parsons and Maria Ares provided this information (JW.24, ‘26 September 2014 Email from Maria Ares RE: Grenfell Tower – ppm documentation’:) and (JW.25, ‘26 September 2014 Email from John Parsons RE: Grenfell Tower – ppm documentation’:). I have not been able to find a record of myself providing this information to Carl Stokes however it is my belief that I would have.
55. The Inquiry’s letter has also referred me to TMO10012526, which is the Significant Findings and Action Plan accompanying the FRA completed by Carl Stokes on 17 October 2014. I have been asked to explain who amended this document by inserting comments in green in the columns “by whom” and “date to be completed by” and when this was done. I am unable to tell who wrote the comments in green, although it is clear that the comments are intended to be status updates in respect each action. It is possible that I wrote those comments, however this would only have been based on information from the assigned responsible

person. By way of example, I would never have known that boiler work was starting on 8 December or that Rydon pricing for new doors. This information would likely have come from somebody involved in the project, most likely Claire Williams.

56. I have also been referred to ART00003068, which is the minutes from “Progress Meeting No.4” dated 21 October 2014. In this document it is recorded at [5.3] that “Carl Stokes has been to site to look at the fire system” with Claire Williams’ initials recorded against the note. I have been asked to explain what Carl was instructed to do on this site visit and to produce any documents evidencing the same. I have also been asked to provide details of any information or advice produced as a result of the site visit. However, I did not instruct him in this task and therefore I am unable to assist with these questions.
57. The Inquiry’s letter has referred me to ART00003597, which minutes a housing management liaison meeting that took place between Rydon and the TMO on 16 February 2015. At item 14 of those minutes it is recorded that “Rydon’s fire strategy consultant had been on site and met Carl Stokes (TMO’s fire risk assessor) and agreed that these panels did not need to be fire resisting on the basis that the services were fire-stopped at floor and ceiling slab level and so there would be no fire spread within the ducts.” I have been asked to explain what Carl was instructed to do on this site visit and to produce any documents evidencing the same. I have also been asked to provide details of any other information or advice produced as a result of the site visit. However, I had no involvement in this meeting and therefore I am unable to assist with these questions.
58. I have also been referred to TMO00843558, which is an email dated 13 November 2015 from myself to Robert Black, Barbara Matthews and Sacha Jevans, in which I discuss a meeting I attended with Rebecca Burton, the LFB Fire Safety Team Leader. I have been asked to confirm whether this email sets out all matters that were discussed in that meeting. I do not believe there were any separate meeting minutes and my recollection is that I wrote this note as if it were a minute.
59. I have been asked to provide the date when Carl Stokes attended Grenfell Tower for a site visit in order to complete the FRA dated 26 April 2016. My recollection

is that Carl Stokes usually put the date of his visit in the FRA and therefore I suspect the date that FRA took place was on 26 April 2016.

60. I have been referred to CST00003047, which records that on 16 June 2016 Carl Stokes emailed me asking for “any answers to any of the FRA significant findings” from the Grenfell Tower Significant Findings and Action Plan dated 26 April 2016. I have been asked to explain whether a response was provided to Carl Stokes.
61. I have been referred to CST00000336 which records that I was seeking to arrange a site visit on or around 3 April 2017 between Carl Stokes and the National Grid. I recall that we were keen for this site visit to be arranged (**JW/26, “27 March 2017 Email from Janice Wray RE National Grid”**:)) however I do not believe that it took place. I believe we had a lot of difficulty getting National Grid to confirm or attend.
62. I have also been asked what Carl Stokes’ intended role at the site visit was to be. Carl Stokes’ role was to assist in seeking confirmation from National Grid that it would ensure that it made good any fire safety breaches to the required standard with the necessary degree of priority.
63. I have been referred to TMO10016058, which refers to quarterly meetings that were to take place, with the next on 20 April 2017, between Carl Stokes and myself. I have been asked to confirm whether this meeting did take place and if so, to provide further details. My recollection is that following the fire at Adair Tower we had a series of meetings. I am unsure whether this meeting took place however I attach a screenshot of my Outlook calendar which shows that I had a meeting diarised with Carl Stokes on 20 April 2017 (**JW/27, “20 April 2017 Scheduled meeting with Carl Stokes”**:).

FRA Tracker Queries

64. I have been asked what prompted the generation of an FRA action spreadsheet. The TMO had approximately 650 blocks with communal areas that required an FRA following the introduction of the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order in

2005. It was my view that a spreadsheet was the most effective way of tracking the progress of actions arising from Carl Stokes' FRA Significant Findings and Actions plan, in that it allowed me to clearly see what was complete, partially complete and incomplete against the specified timeframe. The spreadsheet also allowed me to, in more recent years, run reports and present high level information at the Health and Safety Committee meetings about the numbers of outstanding actions and which teams were responsible for progressing them.

65. Additionally, the FRA action spreadsheet allowed me to send an extracted report to the each team that had been allocated actions on an at least bi-monthly basis by email. Additionally, teams could run their own reports producing their own spreadsheet from the workflow on W2 or CRM. Whilst everyone could update their own spreadsheet, only Cyril Morris and I could close down actions and only when sufficient evidence had been provided to confirm completion. Adrian Bowman did not close down actions.
66. I have been asked whether any spreadsheets for the period April 2016 to 14 June 2017 are missing from the list provided by the Inquiry. The tracker was a live document and every time I needed to use the information, usually in advance of the bi-monthly Health and Safety Committee meeting, I would run a new report. Any report that was more than a few days old would likely not be an accurate reflection of the position. It is possible that not all copies of the reports run were saved. That being said, each newly generated report would clearly show any historic action which had not yet been completed and closed out.
67. I have been asked by the Inquiry to confirm who generated the FRA action trackers. Initially it was me who populated the information from Carl Stokes' FRA Significant Findings and Actions document, however after the introduction of CRM, Cyril Morris often input the information. I would nevertheless still determine which team to assign an action to.
68. I been asked by the Inquiry why various actions were generated on the dates recorded in the FRA tracker. Each action was entered into the workflow and allocated to the appropriate team as soon as possible following receipt of the completed FRA report. In some cases updates were provided, recorded and dated

and these may have enabled the status of the action to be changed to “partially complete.” For some complex actions there may have been several updates provided before completion was achieved.

69. I have been asked to review the following FRA action documents: TMO document "*FRA - Action Plan items from High Risk Programme - Neighbourhood Management Items* " [TMO10002246] and TMO spreadsheet “ *FRA – Action Plan items – Response Repairs* ” [TMO10002330] and to explain how and by whom these documents were generated. I produced these documents by running a report from the workflow on W2 or CRM.
70. I have been asked to confirm whether the spreadsheets used to track FRA Actions were generated using W2 or CRM. As stated above, I used a workflow on W2 to allocate and track progress with the actions up until a week or so before the fire. CRM was being introduced around this time and the intention was to close out old actions on W2 and log new actions on CRM. The two systems may have had slight differences however in my view they were both effective at tracking progress and identifying outstanding actions. While reports produced from these two systems may have looked slightly different, in substance they were no different.
71. I have been asked, when actions were assigned to teams to be completed, how were those teams notified of the new action. When the TMO still used W2, each team effectively had a W2 inbox in which new actions appeared. This inbox was not just for FRA actions but for any actions allocated to that team. When CRM was introduced, I am aware that FRA actions were allocated to queues for each team on CRM. However, because my current role does not require me to use CRM for this purpose, I am unable to recall the exact way in which teams were notified of new FRA actions.
72. At para 151 of that statement, I write “ *I often queried why actions had not been completed with the responsible team and was given a variety of explanations as to why they could not be completed more quickly.* ” I have been asked how I would go about querying why actions had not been completed. I would do this by email, telephone and in person to the assigned person. I would also escalate outstanding

actions to team managers and raise outstanding items at Health and Safety Committee meetings, particularly if an action was high risk. Barbara Matthews was always clear in meetings that these actions needed to be closed immediately.

73. At paragraph 153 of that statement, I explained that “ *In July 2015 I produced a Health and Safety High Level Exception Report for the Operations Health and Safety meeting.* ” I have been asked to confirm that TMO10009664 is the ‘Health and Safety High Level Exception Report’ that was produced. I can confirm this is the report I produced for both the Operational Health and Safety Committee and the TMO Health and Safety Committee – both met on the same day the 31 July 2015.

74. I have also been asked to identify the information used to form the basis of my opinion that in July 2015 “ *a more meaningful breakdown of outstanding FRA actions was required so that we were better able to see the detail of what work programme would be required to clear those actions.* ”

75. The minutes of an Operational Health and Safety Committee meeting that took place on 31 July 2015 record as follows (TMO10009039)

“RD have reviewed all of the FRAs and Health and Safety actions. Currently waiting for RD to programme that work and will then raise the orders for the blocks. BM asked to see the key things and the timing for it. PM asked for a breakdown by priority and age to make it clear where the risks are. There needs to be an ongoing breakdown of the list. PM suggested a meeting to discuss interface between RD and AB's team. CM to organise meeting with PM. AB. Chris Davis and JW.”

76. My recollection of this discussions is that Peter Maddison wanted to understand more clearly what was outstanding and for how long each action had been outstanding so that he could take it back to the responsible person within his team and address the issue. In other words, high level numerical information alone would not have helped his team identify contributory factors whereas, a more detailed breakdown could have highlighted trends and assisted in getting individual action completed.

77. In respect of paragraphs 154 of the same statement, I have been asked to identify the information used to form the basis of my opinion that in April 2016 “ *there had been a significant drop in the number of outstanding FRA Actions.*”

78. My understanding that there had been a drop in the number of outstanding FRA actions would have been based on an analysis of the numbers of remaining outstanding FRA Actions. This is recorded in the following passage from the minutes of a Health and Safety Meeting that took place on 12 April 2016 (TMO10012811):

“JW welcomed the significant drop in the number of outstanding actions for both FRAs and H&S Actions. BM acknowledged the progress made and advised that the Chief Executive remained anxious that all actions older than six months should be completed as a matter of urgency. ABos added that his team currently has a further 50+ actions which have been confirmed as complete and will be fully completed on W2 asap.”

79. I have been asked in respect of [5.6] of the TMO’s ‘Annual Health & Safety Report 14/15’ to explain what further work I am referring to when I wrote: “*Progress with the FRA Action Plan recommendations is monitored by the Operations H&S Group and the H&S Committee. Further work to improve completions is proposed.*”


80. Due to the passage of time, I am unable to specifically recall what further work was proposed to improve completion. I believe it would have been about increasing the rigor with which we interrogated the completion of outstanding actions, ensuring people treated actions assigned to them with priority and removing blockages.

81. The Inquiry has referred me to paragraph 33 of Barbara Matthew’s witness statement dated 22 August 2018 [TMO10049987] in which she refers to receiving “*a spreadsheet on a monthly basis showing the FRA actions completed and outstanding.*” I have been asked to confirm whether the monthly spreadsheets sent to Barbara Matthews were similar to the one exhibited as JW/27 [TMO00842277] and I can confirm this.

82. I have been asked to consider the TMO document “*Fire Risk Assessments & Health & Safety – Current Progress with Completion of Actions*” [TMO00840656]. As it pertains to FRA actions, I can confirm that I produced this document. It was sent to the members of the Health and Safety Committee for the meeting on 13 September 2016. It was created to enable the Committee to see the status of FRA actions allocated to each team and to prompt managers to advise on effort being made within their team to complete the outstanding actions. The source of the data included would have been W2 and a similar report was presented to the Health and Safety Committee which met on a bi-monthly basis.
83. I have been asked to provide further information in relation the iteration of the 17 October 2014 “*Record of Significant Findings and Action Plan*” [TMO10012526]. This document was always sent from Carl Stokes to myself. It would have been annotated primarily by me. I recall passing on Carl’s comments and queries to Claire Williams’ to be addressed with Rydon and chasing when I did not receive a response (JW/28, “17 September 2014 Email from Janice Wray FW Grenfell Tower”:), (JW/29: “22 September 2014 Email from Janice Wray RE Grenfell Tower fire safety issues – response from Rydon?”:), (JW/30, “26 September 2014 Email from Janice Wray RE Grenfell Tower – ppm documentation please”:), (JW/31, “26 September 2014 Email from Janice Wray RE Grenfell Tower – ppm documentation please”:), (JW/32, “26 September 2014 Email from Janice Wray RE Grenfell Tower – ppm documentation please”:).).

I confirm this statement to be true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

I confirm that I am willing for this statement to form part of the evidence before the Inquiry and published on the Inquiry’s website.

Signed: 

Dated: 19th June 2020

