

## GRENFELL TOWER INQUIRY

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### SUPPLEMENTARY WITNESS STATEMENT OF JANICE WRAY

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#### I, JANICE WRAY WILL SAY AS FOLLOWS:-

1. I make this supplementary statement to assist the Grenfell Tower Inquiry and in response to the Inquiry's letter of 3 March 2020.
2. This statement is to be read in conjunction with my earlier statements to the Inquiry, dated 7 February 2019, 13 March 2019, 24 April 2019, 1 December 2019, 17 January 2020, 24 January 2020 and 19 June 2020.

#### **Fire Risk Assessment and Record of Significant Findings and Action Plan dated 17 October 2014**

3. As explained in my statement dated 19 June 2020, fire risk assessment ("FRA") items derived from Carl Stokes' Significant Findings and Action plan were input by Cyril Morris or myself onto W2. On this workflow I was able to assign FRA items to teams and individuals for completion. When we received information back from that individual as to the actions taken to resolve that item, Cyril or I would update W2 and mark items as complete or partially complete.
4. A report would only be an accurate representation of the status of FRA items on the day it was run. Other individuals in the TMO were able to run reports from W2 of the items assigned to their team.
5. As explained in my statement dated 19 June 2020, I did not actually undertake the actions required to close out a FRA item unless it was assigned to the TMO Health and Safety team. My role was to oversee the process by ensuring that actions were assigned to the correct TMO department, to update the status of these actions when I received information and evidence from the relevant team, to

provide a breakdown of the progress of actions to teams and the Health and Safety Committee, and to assist with the follow up on any outstanding items raised by the Health and Safety Committee.

6. I have been asked to provide evidence from TMO systems to demonstrate the actions taken to resolve the item contained within the table below, which was raised by Carl Stokes in his Record of Significant Findings and Action Plan dated 17 October 2014 [TMO10012526].

No Item	High	The external face of this building is to be over clad	I would recommend that the contractor provides 1. The scope of works covering how this cladding? How will the cladding be fixed to the building? 2. What fixings will be used? 3. The fire rating of the cladding and the fixings? 4. The Building Control Officers acceptance of this fixing system and the cladding used?
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7. This FRA item was assigned to Claire Williams of the Asset and Regeneration department for completion (JW/1, ‘**Grenfell Tower Significant Findings & Action Plan Oct 2014.W2**’: ). The corresponding W2 Report (often referred to by my team as an “action tracker”) to this Action Plan records “*Timber*

*battens purely for mock up. Cladding has horiz cavity barrier to 30/30. Awtg building regs approval. May 2015 for full building regs approval.*" This item is recorded as being fully completed by 10 May 2015 with the "action taken" being:

*"The contractor has provided information on cladding, inc fixings, fire barriers. This is being inspected as work progresses by the Clerk of Works employed by the TMO as well as Building Control officer (John Hoban). Building control payment for services attached. The final cert will not be issued by them until the end of the job"* (JW/2, '**Grenfell Tower Action Plan from 2014 FRA**': ).

8. To further assist the Inquiry, I produce two documents I understand to have been disclosed by the RBKC in respect of this particular FRA item, namely its W2 record (JW/3, '**W2 FRA – Grenfell Tower – Process 172247**': ) and a Project Fire Risk Assessment produced by Rydon which makes reference to the overcladding, which I have no recollection of ever seeing, but which may be relevant to the Inquiry (JW/4, '**February 2015 Project Fire Risk Assessment**': ). However, I produce an email which I received from Dave Hughes of Rydon on 24 May 2016 attaching a Project Fire Risk Assessment of that date (JW/5, '**24.05.2016 Email from David Hughes RE: Project fire risk assessment template REV3 Grenfell Tower may 2016 & Project fire plan REV3 Grenfell Tower May 16**': ) and an email dated 25 May 2016 from myself to Carl Stokes forwarding this email and attachment for his attention (JW/6, '**25.05.2016 Email from Janice Wray FW: Project fire risk assessment template REV3 Grenfell Tower may 2016 & Project fire plan REV3 Grenfell Tower May 16**': ).

#### **Fire Risk Assessment and Record of Significant Findings and Action Plan dated 26 April 2016**

9. I have also been asked to provide evidence to demonstrate the actions taken to resolve the items listed in the table below, which were raised by Carl Stokes in his Record of Significant Findings and Action Plan dated 26 April 2016 [CST00003098]:

3a	High	There is no fireman override switch fitted to the ground floor entrance hall to lift lobby area door. The emergency services can access the ground floor level entrance hall area but not the lift lobby area.	I would recommend that a fireman override switch is fitted to the ground floor entrance hall to lift lobby area door so that the emergency services can access the ground floor level lift lobby area.
14a	High	Some fire stopping has been undertaken, but there are still holes and gaps in the wall and ceiling linings of this building. In the basement boiler room and in the staircase.	All holes and gaps in all compartment walls and ceiling should be fully and suitably fire stopped.
17b	High	It appears that the mains gas supply to this building is	I would strongly recommend that the gas supply system in this building is

		interfaced with the automatic opening ventilation system and shuts off if the AOV system operates, the lifts could also be interfaced.	NOT interfaced with the AOV system. Can it be confirmed if any other system are interfaced with the AOV system? If so which systems? I would also say that no systems should be interfaced with the AOV systems.
19b	High	There are no operating instructions or as installed diagrams located next to the Automatic Opening Vents (AOV) control panel, how is this control panel accessed?	Provide operating instructions and as installed diagrams located next to the AOV control panel along with access information.
19c	High	It is not known if training on the operating of the AOV system has	Provide training on the operating of the AOV system to all relevant TMO

		been given to all TMO staff who requires it.	employees.
19d	High	Where are the keys kept to manually operate the individual AOV over ride devices?	The keys to manually operate the individual AOV over ride devices should be freely available for use by the fire service if needed.
19g	High	It is not known if the fire service controls for the lifts been moved back down to the street level?	Can it be confirmed that the fire service controls for the lifts been moved back down to the street level? If not then this must be undertaken immediately.

10. Because many of the items raised by Carl Stokes in his April 2016 Significant Findings and Action Plan related to works undertaken by Rydon, the Plan was sent to Rydon by Claire Williams for comment (**JW/7, '09.05.16 Email from Claire Williams RE: Grenfell Tower Significant Findings and Action Plan 2016':** ) (**JW/8, '10.05.16 Email from David Hughes RE: Grenfell Tower Significant Findings and Action Plan 2016':** ); (**JW/9,**

**‘Grenfell Tower Significant Findings and Action Plan April 2016 + Rydon Comments’:**                    ).

11.       In respect of FRA item 3a, this was assigned to myself. It is recorded in the Significant Findings and Action Plan referred to above: *“Rydons advise Fireman’s switch to front door opens all doors of Grd Floor lobby for 90secs – agreed with fire brigade”* and *“Fireman’s switch to front door opens all doors of GF lobby for 90secs – agreed with fire brigade”* (JW/9:                    ).

12.       Progress in respect of this item was then recorded in the attached FRA spreadsheet (JW/10, **‘Grenfell FRA actions - FRA June 2016’**:                    ), where it is recorded:

*“No actions are required. The fireman's override switch fitted to the buildings ground floor entrance/exit door releases all the ground floor door locks for a 90 second time period. This has been agreed with the Building Control Officer. So the emergency services can access all the ground floor level areas.”*

The item is marked as “fully completed” as at 31 August 2016, with the ‘action taken’ being *“CONFIRMED - agreement provided.”*

13.       In respect of FRA item 14a, on 20 May 2016 I emailed Carl Stokes advising him that the April 2016 Significant Findings and Action Plan had been provided to Rydon who had responded with comments (JW/11, **‘20.05.16 Email from Janice Wray RE: Grenfell Tower – FRA’**:                    ). In this email, I queried in respect of item 14a, *“Can you give me an indication of locations on the action below otherwise this will not get done.”* I am advised that no response to my email has been located, however I believe that I would have received a response and appraised my colleague Claire Williams of its contents.

14.       In respect of 17b, 19b, 19c, 19d and 19g, the actions taken in respect of these items are set out in my answer to the question below on the basis that they correspond to actions in the Carl Stokes’ June 2016 Significant Findings and Action Plan (albeit the numbering is different).

**Fire Risk Assessment and Record of Significant Findings and Action Plan dated 20 June 2016**

15. I have been asked to provide evidence to demonstrate the actions taken to resolve the items listed below which were raised by Carl Stokes in the Record of Significant Findings and Action Plan dated 20 June 2016 [CST00003069].

12g	High	The flat entrance door of flat 24 is damaged with the letter box missing.	This door should be repaired and a new fire rated letter box fitted, alternatively a new self closing certified 30-minute fire rated door fitted with intumescent strips and cold smoke seals could be installed.
12h	High	The flat entrance door of flat 112 is being replaced, this new door is not marked as a fire rated door and it does not have a self closing device fitted to it. Cold smoke seals are fitted.	The occupier of flat 112 should be asked to confirm that the new flat entrance doors is a certified FD30 door, a self closing device should be fitted to this door.



12i	High	Some of the staircase doors are not being closed fully by the self closing devices fitted to the doors. These doors should be picked up during the caretakers inspections of the doors.	Any staircase doors which are not being closed fully by the self closing devices should have the self closer adjusted or a new one fitted so that the doors close fully onto their stops.
12j	High	The staircase door at the 16th floor level is damaged.	This door should be repaired or alternatively a new self closing certified 30 minute fire rated door fitted with intumescent strips and cold smoke seals could be installed.
17d	High	It appears that the mains gas supply to this building is interfaced with the automatic opening ventilation system and shuts off if the AOV system	I would strongly recommend that the gas supply system in this building is NOT interfaced with the AOV system. Can it be confirmed if any other system are interfaced with the AOV system? If

		operates, the lifts could also be interfaced.	so which systems? I would also say that no systems should be interfaced with the AOV systems.
19a	High	There are no operating instructions or as installed diagrams located next to the Automatic Opening Vents (AOV) control panel, how is this control panel accessed?	Provide operating instructions and as installed diagrams located next to the AOV control panel along with access information.
19b	High	High It is not known if training on the operating of the AOV system has been given to all TMO staff who requires it.	Provide training on the operating of the AOV system to all relevant TMO employees.
19c	High	The keys to operate the manually operated individual AOV override devices should be on site, they will be in the AOV control	The keys to manually operate the individual AOV override devices should be freely available for use by the fire service if needed.

		box, but there are no keys there at present and the system is in use.	
19f	High	It is not known if the fire service controls for the lifts been moved back down to the street level?	Can it be confirmed that the fire service controls for the lifts been moved back down to the street level? If not then this must be undertaken immediately.
23g	High	Are the weekly occupier's tests of the buildings automatic smoke ventilation system being undertaken.	Weekly occupier inspections of the buildings smoke ventilation system should be undertaken, with the results recorded as proof of the inspections having been undertaken.
23h	High	Caretaker testing and inspections of the buildings structure etc.	Can it be confirmed that the caretaker is undertaking the tasks as per the caretakers check list in this building,

			with the completed sheets kept as a record and as proof of testing etc. LFB Notification of Fire Safety Deficiencies dated 17 November 2016
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16. In respect of item 12g, this was assigned to myself. As recorded in the June 2016 report (**JW.10:** ), a responsive repair was raised with Repairs Direct, with the ESA confirming completion. This action was fully completed.
17. While I was not involved in the resolution of this action by Repairs Direct, I have been shown a spreadsheet containing data extracted from Open Contractor, which was a workflow system used by Repairs Direct (**FORT04780053**). It appears that the repair raised in respect of FRA item 12g corresponds with repair order number 201623006 of this spreadsheet, which records that this job was allocated to an external contractor called Goni Property Services and fully completed on 22 September 2016. To further assist the Inquiry, I attach a document which I understand to have been produced by RBKC which contains the W2 record for this particular FRA item (**JW/12, ‘W2 FRA – Grenfell Tower – Process 269366’:** ).
18. In respect of FRA item 12h, this was assigned to Claire Williams (**JW.10:** ). While I was not involved in the communications between Claire and the leaseholder, Mr Azab, I have reviewed the following relevant emails in preparing this statement and attach them to assist the Inquiry:
- a. On 14 July 2016, Claire Williams emailed Mr Azab (the leaseholder of Flat 112) requesting urgent confirmation that his front door had a fire resistance of one hour. Mr Azab responded assuring Claire that he bought his door and ensured that *“it was fireproof regulations and for*

*extra protection my carpenter put a fireproof seal.*” He then stated “*I don't know much about the regulations but I got him to pick one that was. I will look for the receipt and forward it on to you.*” Claire responded saying the information would put the TMO’s fire risk assessor at ease (JW/13, ‘14.07.16 Email from Mohamed Azab RE: URGENT 112 Grenfell \_ new front door’: ).

- b. The same day, Mr Azab replied to Claire stating “*can I just add that the original door wasn't fire proof either and the lease holders still have them in place, yet now now it seems to be a problem.*” In response, Claire explained that “*The original doors and frames were half an hour fire resistant, and leaseholders who still have these are not bothered by our Fire Risk Assessment because of this. The TMO recently upgraded tenants doors, but they are still half hour fire resistant.*” (JW/14, ‘14.07.16 Email from Claire Williams RE: URGENT 112 Grenfell \_ new front door’: ).
- c. Claire sent Mr Azab a further email that same day adding “*I forgot to mention that the current building regulations require a ‘self closer’ on a flat front door onto a communal lobby. This is so that as well as being fire resistant, the door closes behind you so that it is not left open – which would theoretically allow smoke/flames to go into the communal lobby and prevent escape from fire. I suspect your door does all this anyway. Maybe a photo of it open would show this?*” Mr Azab responded stating “*Sorry I didn't know that I need the self closer, I'm going to have it fitted then. Will be doing this in a few weeks, will keep you updated.*” (JW/15, ‘14.07.16 Email from Mohamed Azab RE: URGENT 112 Grenfell \_ new front door’: ).
- d. Claire then emailed Mr Azab follow up reminders on 15 July 2016 (JW/16, ‘15.07.16 Email from Claire Williams RE: URGENT 112 Grenfell \_ new front door’: ), 16 August 2016 (JW/17, ‘16.08.16 Email from Claire Williams RE 112 Grenfell and flat front door: ), 30 August 2016 (JW/18, ‘30.08.16 Email

from Claire Williams RE 112 Grenfell Tower: ) and 12 December 2016 (JW/19, '12.12.16 Email from Claire Williams FW 112 Grenfell Tower – new front door: ). I am advised that no responses from Mr Azab have been located to these reminders.

19. By way of further assistance, I attach a document produced by RBKC which contains the W2 record for this particular item (JW/20, 'W2 FRA – Grenfell Tower – Process 269367': ).
20. Further background information about the difficulties that the TMO had with leaseholder fire door compliance is set out in my statement dated 1 November 2019.
21. In respect of FRA item 12i, this was assigned to Nicola Bartholomew of the Neighbourhood Management team (JW.10: ). It is recorded in the June 2016 Report that repairs were raised and completed by 13 March 2017. A note had been added to the 'action' column that *states "Could Paul Steadman please monitor and raise response repairs as necessary."* The 'actions taken' column records "*monitoring ongoing, records provided.*" This action is marked as being fully completed.
22. I was not involved in the resolution of this action within Repairs Direct. However, I have reviewed the aforementioned Open Contractor spreadsheet (FORT04780053) and it is possible that the actions referred to in my spreadsheet for 12i correspond with the repairs logged with order numbers 201632813, 201632818, 201632820, 201632815 and 201632816. This spreadsheet records that these order numbers were fully completed by 13 March 2017 by Repairs Direct operatives. To further assist the Inquiry, I attach a document that I understand to have been produced by RBKC which contains the W2 record for this particular item (JW/21, 'W2 FRA – Grenfell Tower – Process 269368': ).
23. In respect of FRA item 12j, this was also assigned to Nicola Bartholomew (JW.10: ). A note had been added to the 'action' column querying "*Could Paul please confirm if this has now been repaired & if not could he raise*

*/ chase the repair.*” It records that a repair was raised and completed by 13 March 2017. This action was therefore fully completed.

24. I have reviewed the aforementioned Open Contractor spreadsheet (**FORT04780053**) and it would appear that the action taken in respect of FRA item 12j corresponds with the repair order number 201622995. This spreadsheet records that these order numbers were fully completed in September 2016 by a subcontractor, Goni Property Services. To further assist the Inquiry, I attach a document that I understand to have been produced by RBKC which contains the W2 record for this particular item (**JW/22, ‘W2 FRA – Grenfell Tower – Process 269374’**:                    ).
25. In respect of item 17d of the June 2016 Significant Findings and Action Plan (which corresponds to item 17b in the April 2016 Plan), this item was assigned to Claire Williams (**JW.10**:                    ). This was a complex issue and Claire Williams agreed to query the requirements with fire safety specialist Exova. I understand that Claire contacted Cate Cooney from Exova, whose advice was that there was no regulation requiring a detection system in a basement. I understand that Claire then requested Dave Hughes to progress the separation of these areas. (**JW/23, ‘07.12.2016 Email from Claire Williams FW Grenfell Tower – basement fire strategy etc’**:                    ) (**JW/24, ‘28.02.2017 Email from Claire Williams FW Grenfell Tower – basement fire alarm separation**:                    ) (**JW/25, ‘08.03.2017 Email from Claire Williams FW Grenfell Tower – basement fire alarm separation’**:                    ).
26. This is recorded in the ‘actions’ column of the aforementioned Significant Findings and Action Plan here it records “*Claire - can you confirm that the gas supply if not interfaced with AOVs?*” In the ‘action taken’ column it is recorded “*specification to separate main smoke system from basement with gas boilers is in production, with works due to take place this financial year.*” In a subsequent version of this Report, it is further recorded “*further discussions with Fire Assessor & investigations into requirement of fire strategy & Building Services engineers - no final decision reached so gas supply to boilers remains interfaced.*” (**JW/26: ‘Grenfell Tower – FRA Action Tracker Status. 3<sup>rd</sup> July 2017’**:                    ).

This action was marked as partially complete. In the corresponding Significant Findings and Action Plan, a note has been added which states “**LIFTS NOT INTERFACED – Cwiliams.**” I am aware that Carl Stokes’ advice was that the lifts should not be interfaced (**JW/27, ‘23.05.2016 Email from Carl Stokes RE Grenfell standalone basement fire alarm spec’:** ). To assist the Inquiry, I attach a document that I understand to have been produced by RBKC which contains the W2 record for this particular FRA item (**JW/28, ‘W2 FRA – Grenfell Tower – Process 269391’:** ). I

27. In respect of FRA item 19a (which corresponds to item 19b in the April 2016 Plan), this item was assigned to myself (**JW.10:** ). The ‘action taken’ column of the referenced tracking spreadsheet records “*Written instructions provided - diagram within Hub Room on site. (Hub room accessed via key stored in keysafe installed in bin room - accessed via FB14 key).*” This action was fully completed. To further assist the Inquiry, I attach a document that I understand to have been produced by RBKC which contains the W2 record for this particular FRA item (**JW/29, ‘W2 FRA – Grenfell Tower – Process 269425’:** ).
28. In respect of FRA item 19b (which corresponds to item 19c in the April 2016 Plan), this item was assigned to myself. The ‘action taken’ column records “*2 sessions in familiarisation completed by Rydons. LFB also attended for familiarisation. Info provided.*” This action was fully completed. To further assist the Inquiry, I attach a document that I understand to have been produced by RBKC which contains the W2 record for this particular item (**JW/30, ‘W2 FRA – Grenfell Tower – Process 269427’:** ).
29. In respect of FRA item 19c (which corresponds to item 19d in the April 2016 Plan), this was assigned to myself (**JW.10:** ). The ‘action taken’ column records “*Keys stored in Keysafe located in bin room - accessed via FB key.*” This action was fully completed. To further assist the Inquiry, I attach a document that I understand to have been produced by RBKC which contains the W2 record for this particular item (**JW/31, ‘W2 FRA – Grenfell Tower – Process 269432’:** ).



30. In respect of item 19f (which corresponds to item 19g in the April 2016 Plan), this was assigned to myself (JW.10: ). The ‘action taken’ column records “COMPLETE” by 9 December 2016.. In a subsequent FRA tracker, a further comment has been added “COMPLETED - ppm contractors confirm these controls are as they should be with fire control switch at ground level causing lift to return there” (JW/26: ). To further assist the Inquiry, I attach a document produced by RBKC which contains the W2 record for this particular item (JW/32, ‘W2 FRA – Grenfell Tower – Process 269444’: ).
31. In respect of item 23g, this item was assigned to Nicola Bartholomew (JW.10: ). A note had been added to the ‘action’ column which stated “Can you confirm that Paul is undertaking these please?” In the ‘action taken’ column, it is recorded “tested weekly on Fridays.” This action was fully completed by 13 March 2017. In a subsequent FRA tracker, a further comment has been added “tested weekly on Fridays - inspectio record supplied” (JW.26: ). To further assist the Inquiry, I attach a document produced by RBKC which contains the W2 record for this particular item (JW/33, ‘W2 FRA – Grenfell Tower – Process 269522’: ).
32. In respect of FRA item 23h, this item was assigned to Nicola Bartholomew (JW.10: ); (JW.26: ). In the ‘action taken’ column, it is recorded “Confirmed inspection records supplied.” This action is marked as being fully completed by 9 December 2016. To further assist the Inquiry, I attach a document that I understand to have been produced by RBKC which contains the W2 record for this particular FRA item (JW/34, ‘W2 FRA – Grenfell Tower – Process 269524’: ).

### **LFB Notification of Fire Safety Deficiencies**

33. I have been asked, with regard to the LFB Notification of Fire Safety Deficiencies (“NoD”) dated 17 November 2016 [CST00000425], to explain whether the actions raised were added to W2 and/or CRM. I have also been asked to provide evidence from the TMO systems to demonstrate the actions taken.

34. By way of background, on 17 November 2016 the TMO received a NoD from the LFEPA in respect of Grenfell Tower. This NoD listed seven “fire safety matters” that the LFEPA considered needed to be addressed in order to comply with the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005 (“RRFSO”). The LFEPA recommended that action be taken by 18 May 2017.
35. Of relevance to this question is the TMO Procedure for dealing with LFB Deficiency Notices, dated January 2016 (TMO00840480), which set out the following:
- “Depending upon the nature of the breaches the H&S Team will send a copy of this notice to the relevant team(s) and discuss with them the necessary remedial action and timescale for this.*
- H&S Team monitor completion of the necessary works.*
- Deficiency Notices (and Broadly Compliant letters) and progress with completing the actions they raise are reported to the Health & Safety Committee. Further, a summary of these are provided in the Company's Annual Health & Safety Report.”*
36. This Procedure therefore required the TMO to monitor completion of the necessary works and progress actions through the Health and Safety Committee, but it did not specify that these actions be closed out using the same recording process or systems as the FRA programme. It is for this reason that progress made by the TMO in closing out the actions raised in the above NoD was monitored in Health and Safety Committee and LFB and TMO bi-monthly meetings following its receipt (TMO10016022; TMO10046970; CST00002062), rather than being closed out through W2 or CRM.
37. I understand that solicitors for the RBKC have carried out searches of W2, CRM, Open Contractor and Capita for an action plan, as requested by the Inquiry, for the actions arising out of the NoD, however these searches did not produce anything. This does not surprise me for the reasons I have provided above.

38. Below I will go through the actions that the TMO took in relation to each of the seven issues raised by the LFEPA below. In doing so I make reference to a copy of the NoD annotated by myself as at February 2017 (**JW/35, '17.11.16 LFB Letter to Janice Wray'**:                    ).
39. The first issue raised was in relation to Article 11 of the RRFSo. Specifically, the LFEPA noted that at the time of its audit, *"it was found that there were multiple items in the common parts, several fire doors did not fit fully into their frames and there was a breach in your services duct."* The action required was *"arrangements identified as not suitably addressed must be effectively planned, organised, controlled, monitored or reviewed."* The annotation I have made in respect of this issue is *"Neighbourhood Team instructed to treat as "zero tolerance." Items removed + regular inspections ongoing."*
40. The Estate Service Assistants undertook weekly inspections which were recorded, and in doing so they were required to highlight any storage in the communal areas. I also recall that December 2016 Carl Stokes and I undertook training with the Estate Service Assistants which would have covered the TMO's zero tolerance policy to storage in the communal areas. In respect of this training, I attach the training agenda, case study and presentation used in this training (**JW/36, 'ESA Fire Safety Training – Agenda'**:                    ); (**JW/37, 'ESA Fire Safety Training – Case Study One – Communal Storage'**:                    ); (**JW/38, 'Fire Safety Training for ESAs Dec 2016'**:                    ).
41. The second issue raised was in relation to Article 17(1). Specifically, the LFEPA noted that *"it was found that several of the fire doors protecting your escape staircase did not close fully into their frame."* The action required was:
- "Arrange initial and on-going maintenance to ensure fire safety measures are kept in an efficient state, working order and good repair. This can be achieved by regularly checking the fire doors and the their self closers on your escape doors to ensure they close fully into their frame and if they do not taking appropriate action."*

42. The annotation I have made in respect of this issue is “*Responsive order has been raised on 7/11/16 to attend communal doors on floors 18, 10, 7 + 5 – completed 23/11/16. Doors regularly inspection by ESA + repairs reported.*”
43. While I was not involved in the progression of this repair from the Repairs Direct side of things, I have reviewed the aforementioned Open Contractor spreadsheet (**FORT04780053**) and it would appear that this repair is job number 201633971. The data held for this job number records “*Special Instructions: FIRE DOOR RETURN ARMS NOT CLOSING ON 18<sup>TH</sup>/10<sup>TH</sup>/7<sup>th</sup> AND 5<sup>TH</sup> FLOORS. AS REPORTED BY THE FIRE BRIGADE.*” This job was raised on 7 November 2016 and marked as being “fully completed” on 23 November 2016.
44. The third issue raised was also in relation to Article 17(1). Specifically, the LFEPa noted that “*the protected route has been compromised by the fitting of doors that do not self close. Flats 44 and 153 were checked at audit and did not self close.*” The action required was;
- “Openings in the walls leading to accommodation off a protected route (including doors in entrance ways should be of a minimum 30 minute fire resistance and should self close. Means the responsible person could use to comply with Article 17(1) may include enforcing terms of lease and Landlord and Tenant/Property legislation as lessor/owner.”*
45. The annotation I have made on this document is “*responsive repairs requested.*” The Open Contractor spreadsheet refers to job number 201631934 in respect of Flat 153, raised on 26 October 2016, with the instructions “*FRONT DOOR NOT LOCKING PROPERLY. IT IS A MULITI LOCK DOOR. P LEASE ATTEND TO OVERHAUL LOCK.*” This job is marked as being “fully completed” on 3 November 2016. The Capita record confirms that this was reported by a resident via the telephone, which would indicate why the repair was raised before the NoD was received. I attach for information a screenshot from Capita which shows that there is no record of a repair order being raised in relation to the door or self-closing device at Flat 44 (JW/39, ‘**Screenshot of Repair Spreadsheet for Flat 44**’:  
( ).

46. The fourth issue raised was in relation to Article 14. Specifically, the LFEPA noted that *“it was found that various items were stored in the common parts, including a mobility scooter which was being charged through the letter box.”* The action required was *“removing the items from the common parts and providing an alternative means for the mobility scooter to be charged.”*
47. The annotation I have made on this issue is *“mobility scooter – OT asked to assess. Tenant visited by ESA + instructed not to charge in communal areas. Suggested storage in clubroom being investigated it.”* There is also a cross reference to the action taken in respect of the first listed issue, where I had annotated *““Neighbourhood Team instructed to treat as “zero tolerance.” Items removed + regular inspections ongoing.”*
48. Additionally, I raised the issue of mobility scooters with the LFB in a TMO and LFB liaison meeting that took place on 29 March 2017 (TMO10046970), the minutes of which record:
- “Janice advised that she had received a copy of the draft Mobility Scooter Guidance recently produced by the Chief Fire Officers Association. She expressed concern about the impact of this. Currently, TMO Policy had been to consider each scooter on a case by case basis and, where possible, to allow storage but never charging within the block. This policy has been discussed with the LFB at these meetings and it was our understanding that this met with LFB approval. However, the new guidance document does not permit storage of scooters within any lobby or means of escape. There was some discussion and it was recognised that even where an approved external charging area is available the resident may not be physically able to get from there to their flat. Additionally, many scooters are too large to be taken into the flat. Janice advised that she would be submitting comments on this draft.”*
49. The fifth issue raised was also in relation to Article 14. Specifically, the LFEPA noted that *“it was found that doors to flats 44 and 153 did not self close.”* The action required is to ensure *“that all fire doors on the means of escape route self close.”* The annotation I have made on this issue is a cross reference to the action

taken in respect of the third listed issue, where I had annotated “*responsive repairs requested.*”

50. The sixth issue raised was in relation to Article 8. Specifically, the LFEPA noted “*it was found that the top corner of one of the panels protecting your services duct on the 8<sup>th</sup> floor was damaged and broken creating a breach in the service duct void.*” The action required was “*repairing or replacing the broken panel.*” The annotation I have made on this issue is “*responsive repair requested. ESA to monitor + report any issues.*” Unfortunately no record has been found for this repair request.
51. The seventh issue raised was in relation to Article 15(1). Specifically, the LFEPA noted that “*it was found that Fire Action Notices were not displayed in your common parts.*” The action required was “*displaying Fire Action Notices in the common parts of your building.*” The annotation I have made on this issue is “*Fire Action Notices installed on every landing (LFB advised) in Dec 16.*”
52. I am confident that Fire Action Notices were installed at Grenfell Tower by December 2016, with other properties to follow. This is recorded in a TMO and LFB liaison meeting that took place on 29 March 2017 (**TMO10046970**), the minutes of which record:

*“Fire Action Notices — Installation Programme*

*Janice advised that the TMO were embarking on an installation programme for Fire Action Notices. The programme would eventually cover all blocks but would be risk—based to ensure that all potentially high risk blocks were completed as first priority. This programme was due to start in April and Janice agreed to report back on progress. (A copy of the notice will be sent out with these minutes for information.)”*

**Repairs Direct FRA Action Implementation**

53. I have been referred to the spreadsheets [TMO00000732] and [RBK00053525] which contain data about repairs jobs arising as a result of FRAs undertaken at Grenfell Tower. I am advised by the Inquiry that the job numbers for those repair

jobs are: 201401263 (**RBK00053525**); 201412609 (**TMO00000732**); 201456398 (**TMO00000732**); 201527673 (**TMO00000732**); 201554098 (**TMO00000732**); 201554104 (**TMO00000732**) 201554112 (**TMO00000732**); 201554118 (**TMO00000732**); 201554124 (**TMO00000732**); 201554129 (**TMO00000732**); 201608929 (**TMO00000732**); 201608946 (**TMO00000732**); 201622988 (**TMO00000732**); 201622995 (**TMO00000732**) and 201623006 (**TMO00000732**).

54. I have been asked to confirm whether these fifteen jobs are all of the repair jobs relating to FRAs of Grenfell Tower which Repairs Direct were instructed to undertake between 1 January 2014 and 14 June 2017. I have also been asked to provide a comprehensive list of repair jobs relating to FRAs of Grenfell Tower which Repairs Direct were instructed to undertake between 1 January 2014 and 14 June 2017.
55. I am not able to confirm or provide this information personally as I no longer have access to the relevant systems. However, I understand that in order to assist the Inquiry in respect of this specific query, solicitors for the RBKC carried out a search of the Open Contractor and Capita databases for repair jobs which were responsive to “FRA” in the text line. I understand that reports were produced by the RBKC in respect of what was found (**JW/40, ‘Open Contractor and Capita Repairs spreadsheet results’**: ). I also understand that a statement is to be provided to the Inquiry by the individual who carried out these searches.
56. While I did not carry out these searches myself, it is my understanding that 15 of the 1432 items on the Open Contractors report responded to “FRA” in the “text line.” Of these, two related to FRA actions as identified in the Public Inquiry's request of 3 March 2020 (job numbers 201622995 and 201623006), both of which I have discussed earlier in this statement in relation to FRA actions 12j and 12g respectively. It is also my understanding that 19 of the 8,394 items on the Capita report responded to “FRA” in the “repairs descriptions” column. However, I understand that none of these 19 items related to the FRA actions in the Public Inquiry's request of 3 March 2020.

57. I also understand that searches of Open Contractor and Capita databases in respect of the NoD of November 2016 did not produce any relevant corresponding data.
58. I am not able to provide any further information in relation to these searches than what is set out above.
59. I have been referred to TMO10001286, TMO00856986 and TMO00856987 and advised by the Inquiry, in respect of job number 201412609, that it understands this job number to relate to Leon Taylor's FRA of Grenfell Tower carried out on 14 June 2014. I have been asked to confirm whether that is the case however I have no knowledge of anyone called Leon Taylor and I have no knowledge of these risk assessments or who commissioned them.
60. I have been referred to TMO10008948, TMO10008949, TMO10008950 and RBK00055933 and, in respect of job numbers 201456398 and 201527673, been advised that the Inquiry understands these relate to a survey and to subsequent work to communal fire doors and post-work inspections at Grenfell Tower carried out by a subcontractor, Summit Property Maintenance, on instruction from John Tatham (Repairs Direct Operations Manager) in or around March 2015. I have been asked to confirm whether that was the case.
61. I recall FRA actions in relation to communal doors were allocated to Repairs Direct and John Tatham then instructed Summit Property Maintenance to progress the relevant works. It is my understanding that Claire Williams was contacted by Rydon advising that the works being carried out by Summit Property Maintenance were poor. Consequently, we instructed it to stop working immediately and I asked Carl Stokes to investigate the issue. Carl then produced a report which we provided to Rydon and John Tatham, to pass on to Summit Property Maintenance (JW/41, '19.03.2015 Email chain from Janice Wray to John Tatham RE: FW: Urgent!': ) (JW/42, '19.03.2015 Email from John Tatham to Janice Wray RE: Communal fire doors': ) (JW/43, '20.03.2015 Email from Janice Wray to John Tatham and Claire Williams RE: Grenfell fire doors': ) (JW/44, '25.03.2015 Email from Janice Wray to Claire Williams RE: Grenfell fire doors': ) (JW/45, '13.04.2015 Email from Janice Wray to Claire Williams RE: Carl's



**report on fire doors at Grenfell’:** ). It is my understanding that remedial works were then undertaken.

62. In respect of job numbers 201622988 and 201623006, I have been advised that Inquiry understands that the metadata of these documents records that they were created by me on 22 June 2017, with the screenshots were generated using TMO’s Capita Housing Management System and/or Capita Open Contractor System. I have been asked to provide screenshots displaying the ‘stages’ of the repair jobs from the date they were logged through to completion for the following job numbers from the table in question 201554112 (TMO00000732); 201622995 (TMO00000732) and 201623006 (TMO00000732). I attach these screenshots, which am advised by solicitors have been produced by the RBKC, as (JW.46, ‘Screenshot for Job No 201622995’:  
(JW.47, ‘Screenshot for Job No 201554112 Part 1’:  
(JW.48, ‘Screenshot for Job No 201554112 Part 2’:  
) ). While I attach these screenshots, I am not able to explain or comment on them as I am not familiar with the different repairs stages or the terminology used.

**I confirm this statement to be true to the best of my knowledge and belief.**

**I confirm that I am willing for this statement to form part of the evidence before the Inquiry and published on the Inquiry’s website.**

Signed: Jan Wray

Dated: 21st August 2020

