A Statement made pursuant to Rule 9 of The Inquiry Rules 2006

Statement of	:	Matthew John Dolan
Age of witness	:	Over 18 years of age
Occupation of witness:		Operations Director for tRIIO

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1 My name is Matthew John Dolan. I am employed by Skanska Construction UK Limited and work on the Gas Distribution Strategic Partnership (East), appointed by tRIIO as an Operations Director. I was previously a Contract Director.

2 I am duly authorised to make this statement on behalf of tRIIO.

3 The purpose of this statement is to supplement the signed statement I provided to the Metropolitan Police on 5 February 2018 and which was provided by Addleshaw Goddard (the solicitors acting on behalf of tRIIO) to the Public Inquiry (**Inquiry**) investigating the Grenfell Tower (**Tower**) fire. I understand that the Inquiry has requested that I address, on behalf of tRIIO, a number of additional matters. The statement covers:

(a) Points raised in the letter from the Inquiry to Addleshaw Goddard dated 14 June 2018; and

(b) Additional matters in the letter from the Inquiry to Addleshaw Goddard dated 31 July 2018.

4 I referred throughout my previous statement to the residential floor numbers in the Tower, rather than the actual floor numbers. As this may cause confusion, I have adopted the Inquiry's approach to floor numbering and can confirm that tRIIO carried out works to 13 flats ending in '2' within the Tower, on the following floors: 12 (Floor 4), 22 (Floor 5), 32 (Floor 6), 52 (Floor 8), 62 (Floor 9), 72 (Floor 10), 82 (Floor 11), 92 (Floor 12), 102 (Floor 13), 112 (Floor 14), 132 (Floor 16), 142 (Floor 17) and 182 (Floor 21).

Inquiry Letter dated 14 June 2018

Request 1: Describe the nature of tRIIO's involvement with the reactive and proactive works to replace the gas risers at the Tower ("the gas supply replacement works ")?

5 My previous statement sets out in detail the nature of tRIIO's involvement in the gas supply replacement works.

Request 2: What was the status of the gas supply replacement works on the night of the fire (14 June 2017)?

6 A timeline of events is described in paragraphs 29 to 54 of my previous statement.

7 In summary,

(a) tRIIO started work on site on 9 December 2016;

(b) the installation and commissioning of the single riser and laterals was completed on 25 January 2017;

(c) the gas supply to the flats that tRIIO worked on was complete by 10 March 2017;

(d) with the exception of floor 23, the work to box-in the riser and laterals in the stairwell was complete;

(e) scaffolding was installed on floor 23 on 13 June 2017 to facilitate completing the boxing-in of the riser;

(f) the lateral pipe within the lobby area of floor 5 had been boxed-in;

(g) battens for the boxing-in of the laterals had been installed in the communal lobbies on floors 4, 8, 9, 10 and 11. I observed during a site visit to the Tower in July 2018 that battens had not been installed in the communal lobby on floor 6, as was my understanding at the time of my first witness statement; and

(h) there were around 5 more weeks of work to complete the boxing-in of the remaining laterals in the communal lobbies.

Request 3: Identify the parties with whom tRIIO entered into relationships in order to carry out its role, describing the purpose of those relationships?

8 Please see paragraphs 24 to 28 of my previous statement, where I listed the sub-contractors who carried out work at the Tower on behalf of tRIIO.

Request 4: What steps did tRIIO take to survey and understand the existing conditions of:

a) The gas supply systems, including issues of corrosion in supply pipes and the location of isolation valves?

b) The construction and condition of the Tower?

9 Cadent is the owner and operator of the gas distribution network which includes the supply to the Tower. The condition of the existing gas supply system, including issues of corrosion, is not a matter tRIIO is able to comment on. Cadent may be able to assist the Inquiry on this issue. The same applies to the location of isolation valves for the existing gas supply.

10 tRIIO was not involved in any construction work at the Tower other than the replacement of a single vertical gas riser pipe, being one of six riser pipes, and the associated horizontal pipework. As per my earlier statement, tRIIO was instructed on 1 October 2016 by Cadent to reinstate gas to 13 flats following a reported gas leak attended to by Cadent, who 'cut-off' supply to the leaking pipe. The gas supply to the 13 flats was for cooking load only and not related to the communal heating system.

11 As part of its brief, tRIIO was required to consider the riser which had been cut off by Cadent to determine whether it could be repaired and reconnected. The existing riser could not be repaired due to the location of the leaking pipe being within the fabric of the building.

12 tRIIO instructed K&S to carry out a survey to identify a potential route for the new riser. K&S subcontracted the survey to London Ops Gas. Surveys were undertaken in October and November 2016 and provided to tRIIO and K&S. tRIIO used the survey to inform the design for the new riser.

13 The following key features of the Tower were identified by London Ops Gas in the survey:

(a) Newly installed exterior cladding and double glazing prevented an external route for the pipework;

(b) The Tower used a communal heating system;

(c) All of the properties below the 4th floor used electric cookers;

(d) The layout of the sectional floor plans, including the location of the flats, stairwell, the lift, recently installed mechanical air vents and bin room;

(e) Dimensions of false ceilings within the communal areas which enclosed heating pipes;

(f) The layout of the flats, the existing gas meter locations and a suitable position backing onto the communal lobbies where the gas meters could be re-located;

(g) The location of the riser that was 'cut-off' and capped on the ground floor;

(h) The layout of the basement and the height of the boiler room;

(i) Potential asbestos within the flats; and

(j) The location of the existing risers.

14 Other than as set out above, and in the survey, it was not necessary for tRIIO to consider other elements of the existing construction/condition of the Tower.

Request 5: Was any (and if so what) consideration given to fire safety of the existing construction/condition at this time and/or how the gas supply replacement works may affect fire safety of the Tower?

15 tRIIO considered how the gas supply replacement works may affect the fire safety of the Tower at an early stage and discussions took place in October and November 2016 between tRIIO, KCTMO and Cadent regarding whether the proposed route for the gas riser pipe was acceptable and compliant with the fire management precautions in place at the Tower. The design was approved by KCTMO on 30 November 2016.

Request 6: Describe the original design(s) of the gas supply replacement works, any relevant changes made to the design during the course of the refurbishment, by whom those changes were made and the reasons for those changes.

16 The original design is described in paragraphs 34 to 40 of my previous statement. Paragraph 47 explained the changes made to the design during the reactive works in March 2017, who made those changes and the reasons for those changes.

Request 7: How and why were choices as to design and materials made for the gas supply replacement works?

Request 8: What factors influenced the choices as to the design and materials.

17 Dealing with requests 7 and 8 together, as set out above, the original design is described in paragraphs 34 to 40 of my previous statement. Paragraph 47 explained the changes made to the design.

18 Some of the materials used are described in paragraphs 37, 47 and 51 of my previous statement.

19 The choice of materials is largely determined by the requirements of IGEM/G/5 and Cadent's specifications.

Request 9: To what extent, if at all, was tRIIO involved in or aware of:

a) The refurbishment works conducted principally by Rydon completing in July 2016?

b) The design work for the gas supply replacement works carried out by others, such as subcontractors and sub-subcontractors?

c) The construction of the gas supply replacement works carried out by others, such as subcontractors and sub-subcontractors?

20 In relation to (a), I refer to paragraph 5 of my previous statement. tRIIO was not involved in the refurbishment works or in any other works at the Tower prior to the gas leak reported in October 2016.

21 As to (b), this is answered in paragraphs 34 to 36 of my previous statement.

22 As to (c), I explained at paragraphs 24 to 28 of my previous statement that tRIIO sub-contracted parts of the gas supply replacement works.

Request 10: At the outset and throughout the gas supply replacement works:

a) What consideration was given to compliance of the design with the relevant legislation, Building Regulations and associated guidance?

b) Did anyone at tRIIO form a view as to whether the design of the refurbishment of the Tower complied with the relevant legislation, Building Regulations and associated guidance, in particular as relevant to fire safety?

c) If not, why not?

d) If so, what was that view?

e) Did tRIIO rely on any advice from third parties about the compliance of the gas supply replacement works with the all relevant legislation, Building Regulations and associated guidance, particularly as relevant to fire safety? If so, what was the nature of that advice?

23 In response to (a), tRIIO applied IGEM/G/5 in designing and constructing the gas supply replacement works. This summarises best practice and guidance from legislation and existing gas industry standards and procedures for gas installations in multi-occupancy buildings.

24 The purpose of the survey and design process was to achieve a design that was compliant with IGEM/G/5 and Building Regulations. tRIIO formed the view that the design was compliant in this case and would not have proceeded with construction works otherwise. Achieving a compliant route was a collaborative effort between tRIIO, K&S, London Ops Gas, Cadent and KCTMO.

25 As to (b), (c) and (d) tRIIO did not form such a view as the design of the refurbishment works at the Tower were not within the scope of Cadent's work instruction to tRIIO.

26 In relation to (e), I have set out above that achieving compliance was a collaborative approach. I have also set out in this statement and previously the extent to which tRIIO relied on others in the design and construction of the replacement riser

Request 11: Did tRIIO carry out or instruct any inspections of the Tower?

Request 12: If so, what was the outcome of those inspections?

27 Requests 11 and 12 are covered in paragraphs 55 to 61 of my previous statement, where I explained that inspections were carried out to the in-ground work, riser, laterals and internal gas works in the flats. I also outlined in those paragraphs the outcome of those inspections.

Inquiry Letter dated 31 July 2018

Request 1: What interaction did tRIIO have with Cadent and/or the Kensington and Chelsea Tenant Management Organisation and/or Carl Stokes regarding fire safety

(a) During the initial design phase in October – November 2016?

(b) Thereafter?

28 Fire safety was considered by tRIIO at an early stage and discussions took place in October and November 2016 between tRIIO, KCTMO and Cadent regarding whether the proposed route for the gas riser pipe was acceptable and compliant with the fire management precautions in place at the Tower.

29 KCTMO retained Carl Stokes of C S Stokes and Associates Limited, an independent fire risk assessor. Mr. Stokes was in contact with tRIIO on 25 November 2016 seeking clarification regarding compartmentation. tRIIO responded to confirm that its pipework would be fire-stopped to maintain fire compartmentation, and that its pipework would be installed by reference to IGEM/G/5.

30 The design was approved by KCTMO on 30 November 2016.

31 Mr. Stokes also visited the Tower to inspect the newly installed gas riser and laterals in January 2017, following which he produced a report, which KCTMO provided to tRIIO for comment. tRIIO provided assurances to KCTMO that the newly installed lateral pipework would be boxed-in and holes sealed where they were not needed for ventilation.

32 I explained in paragraphs 45 and 46 of my earlier statement that between 7 March and 24 March 2017, KCTMO informed tRIIO and Cadent that concerns had been raised by some residents about the newly installed exposed gas pipes in the communal areas and stairwells. tRIIO and Cadent worked together to seek to address these concerns with KCTMO.

33 As per my earlier statement, a design review was carried out on 24 March requiring the riser to be boxed-in as a result of flange joints being installed during the construction phase, which would have in any event addressed the residents' concerns regarding the riser being exposed in the stairwell. The design intention was always to box-in the laterals in the communal areas. Cadent was kept up-to-date of these developments. The residents were also updated in April 2017 as tRIIO and Cadent worked together to produce a letter and carry out a letter drop informing residents of the ongoing works to complete the installation, including the fire-proof boxing-in of the pipework.

Request 2: As to the reinstatement of the block paving following the installation of the residential gas supply in January 2017:

(a) Who instructed Price Brothers Surfacing to complete the reinstatement?

(b) Did Price, K&S, tRIIO or any other party ensure a valve chamber and surface box was placed permanently in position over the pipeline isolation valve on that supply?

34 K&S was contracted to install the in-ground pipework, including the new Pipeline Isolation Valve (**PIV**), on the supply for the new riser outside the Tower. K&S subcontracted Price Brothers Surfacing to reinstate the excavation and block-paving, which included installing the valve chamber and surface box.

35 The valve chamber and surface box were placed permanently in position over the PIV by Price Brothers.

36 The location of the PIV (which related only to the newly installed riser) was data captured by tRIIO when attending site to produce an "as-laid" plan on 6 February 2017. This was sent to Cadent on 2 March 2017 to update their asset mapping system.

Request 3: Regarding the replacement of the meter installations in the flats ending with "2":

(a) Did tRIIO issue any design or specification to Holland Gas, directly or through K&S, or was this for Holland Gas to manage?

(b) What assessment of competency to comply with section 5 of IGEM/G/5 was carried out on Holland Gas, if any?

37 London Ops Gas issued the survey to tRIIO and K&S. The survey identified the area in each flat where the meters and ECV should be located. tRIIO's project and site managers met with K&S and walked the site. tRIIO then completed the design for the reactive works and sent this to K&S.

38 K&S sub-contracted the gas safe works to Holland Gas Engineers Limited. They were contracted to install the meters within the flats, reconnect and certify the internal gas supply to the cookers. tRIIO's site manager made appointments with the residents for Holland Gas to install the meters and run the outlet pipework.

39 As above, the location of the meter installations was determined by the surveyor and designer who were both trained on IGEM/G/5 by DNV/GL. As such, Holland Gas had

no involvement in determining the location of the meter installations as per section 5 of IGEM/G/5.

Request 4: How does Mr Dolan come to the conclusion that TESNIT® BA-202 gaskets have a melting point of 1000°C, as asserted in his witness statement?

40 The TESNIT® BA-202 gasket has a maximum operating temperature of 180°C. However, as I explained in my previous statement the gasket was between the flanges and so would not be fully exposed to direct heat. The flanges used at the Tower were made of ASTM A105N steel, which had a melting point of over 1000 °C.

Conclusion

41 tRIIO remains committed to assisting the Inquiry with its investigations into the events that took place at the Tower and is happy to provide further information if and when required.

42 tRIIO is willing for this statement to form part of the evidence before the Inquiry and to be published on the Inquiry's web site.

This statement is true to the best of my knowledge and belief and I make it knowing that, if it tendered in evidence, I shall be liable to prosecution if I have wilfully stated in it anything which I know to be false or do not believe to be true.

Signature:  Dated: 05-10-18