

## **Second Statement of John Allen**

This second statement is made in response to the questions set out in the letter from the Inquiry dated 21<sup>st</sup> December 2018.

### **Notification**

**1. How were you notified of the incident at Grenfell Tower?**

Amir Fardouee, the first responder from the Royal Borough of Kensington & Chelsea (RBKC) Building Control Team phoned me for assistance.

**2. When were you notified?**

I do not know the time of this, I estimate around 5.00am on 14<sup>th</sup> June 2017.

**3. By whom were you notified?**

Amir Fardouee

**4. Did you have any contact with the London Resilience Group? If so, please describe that contact.**

I was not aware of the London Resilience Group. I may have met some of the members without knowing.

**5. Did you become aware at any stage that the LFB had been calling for a DSE since as early as 02.17 ? How and when did you become so aware?**

The term DSE (I think it is District Surveyor Engineer or might be Dangerous Structures Engineer) is used by The London Fire Brigade. Answer to first part of the question is, No. Amir Fardouee was the on-call Building Control Surveyor for Dangerous Structures from RBKC.

### **Discussion with Amir Fardouee**

**6. We understand from the log at FORT00294570 that you had contact with Amir Fardouee on the night. Please can you elaborate on the following:**

**(a) Do you know what time he arrived at the incident? If yes, what time did he arrive? How are you aware of this information?**

I do not know what time he arrived at the incident.

**(b) Can you confirm what time your conversation with Mr Fardouee took place?**

I'm not sure what time I arrived at the scene, I would estimate between 6.00am and 6.30am. Amir Fardouee was understandably distressed, he was saying that he had heard people screaming and that people were still trapped in the building. My recollection of the conversation was that Amir was asked by The London Fire Brigade to enter the building to assess the condition of the structure, but he was too distressed and reluctant to do so.

I told Amir that it is fine and that I would deal with it and that he should go home. I didn't have much time to manage the feelings and wellbeing of Amir Fardouee very well, as I was being asked to enter the building, I'm not sure by who but it was a member of London Fire Brigade.

**(c) What did you discuss with Mr Fardouee prior to your arrival?**

On the phone. He gave me the address and said that there was a fire and that it was bad.

## **Arrival**

**7. What time did you arrive at Grenfell Tower on the night of 14 June 2017.**

See 6b above

**8. On your arrival, do you remember speaking with any persons from the London Fire Brigade? If so, with whom and when? What was the content of your conversation?**

This is all a bit of a blur. I did speak to a member of London Fire Brigade. I think I was heading for the Command/control unit but very quickly was being led to enter the building. I did ask that I was shielded/screened from any bodies, as I had previously suffered some trauma, when seeing a burnt body at a previous dangerous structure call out.

**9. Where did you go and what actions did you take when you arrived?**

I went inside the building to do an assessment of how the building worked from a structural perspective and to see the condition of it and work out if the building was safe for firefighting/rescue operations to continue. In the course of the morning I sought information regarding the effects of fire on reinforced concrete. In summary I knew that the building would have been designed with a maximum period of fire resistance of four hours but possibly two. Also I was not sure when the building had been constructed and if, in particular, it was designed for disproportionate collapse (i.e. it does not collapse disproportionately to the cause, that failure of the structure would be “local”).

Nor could I recall the exact layout of the building. My belief was that it had a single staircase concrete core. I could see the fire had started on the fourth or fifth floor and I had learnt it had started around 1am, therefore by the time of my arrival the fire had been burning intensively for around five hours and therefore beyond the maximum period of fire resistance. Further it is always important to bear in mind that “as designed” may not be “as built” if the building had been built to a lesser quality than designed. My first inspection was to establish that there was a central core and that it was intact and I gave an opinion to the fire fighters, in the context that I understood they had a duty to enter to save life, that I could see that the fire had started on the outside and the likelihood was that the central core would be reasonably intact and that it would be sensible to work close to that core as there would be a greater risk of collapse the further away from the central core one went. See exhibits

- (JA/3 Grenfell Fire )
- (JA/4 Grenfell Fire )
- (JA/5 Grenfell )
- (JA/6 Grenfell Tower Fire )
- (JA/7 Grenfell Tower Fire )
- (JA/8 Fire Resistance and Fire Protection )
- (JA/9 Grenfell Tower Fire )
- (JA/10 Grenfell Tower Fire )
- (JA/11 Grenfell Tower Fire )
- (JA/12 CP100 Reinforced Concrete )



(JA/13 Grenfell Tower Fire )  
 (JA/14 Grenfell Tower Fire )  
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 (JA/19 Barbara Lane-Walls )  
 (JA/20 Grenfell Tower Fire )  
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 (JA/22 Photo )  
 (JA/23 Today's Events )  
 (JA/24 Grenfell Tower Location of File )  
 (JA/25 Apologies for LDSA Today )  
 I refer to exhibit JA/25, which refers to the fact that I was able to inspect up to the eighth floor. The purpose of this was to ascertain the condition of the concrete floors and the reinforced concrete columns with respect to the overall stability of the building and to check the condition of the "infill" panels, as I had seen that one panel had fallen from the building and, as set out in the email, the safety of people in and around the building was an issue. Inside the building I was a part of a team of five or six, the others being Urban Search and Rescue from the Fire Brigade and Health and Safety officers from the police and fire brigade. I do not recall anyone's name. I exhibit all of the photographs that I took and which are in my possession as (JA/124 Photos in my possession )  
 (JA/26 Re: Grenfell Tower – Location of File )  
 (JA/27 Barbara Lane – Peak temperatures )  
 (JA/28 Barbara Lane Re: Panels & Walls )  
 (JA/29 Photos - Grenfell in Confidence )  
 (JA/30 Re: Photos )  
 (JA/31 Telephone Call Re: Grenfell Tower Concrete )  
 (JA/32 Barbara Lane – Floors )  
 (JA/33 Request for Structural engineering Support )  
 (JA/34 Re: Flat Fire Disaster )  
 (JA/35 Request for Structural Engineering Support )

(JA/36 Note Re: Grenfell Situation Appraisal 16<sup>th</sup> June 2017 )

On 16<sup>th</sup> June 2017 I prepared a short agenda for discussion with the chief executive, see exhibit (JA/36) when I raised, as a result of the media coverage, the potential conflict of interest. As a result I spoke to the Incident Commander who was happy for me to carry on in my role but felt it ought to be raised at the next high level command meeting. Eventually it was agreed that there should be a handover of role to the London Borough of Harrow.

(JA/37 Contracted Structural Advice to RBKC )

(JA/38 Contracted Structural Advice to RBKC )

(JA/39 Contracted Structural Advice to RBKC )

(JA/40 Contracted Structural Advice to RBKC )

(JA/41 Peak Temperatures )

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(JA/46 Grenfell Structural Drawings )

(JA/47 Grenfell Structural Drawings )

(JA/48 Grenfell Structural Drawings )

(JA/49 Grenfell )

(JA/50 Grenfell )

(JA/51 Grenfell Tower Fire )

(JA/52 Grenfell Tower Fire )

(JA/53 Grenfell Tower Fire )

(JA/54 Grenfell Tower Fire )

(JA/55 Barbara Lane – Floors & Columns )

(JA/56 Photo Key Plan Floor )

(JA/57 Handover )

(JA/58 Photo Key Plan Floor )

(JA/59 Photo Key Plan Floor )

(JA/60 Grenfell Movement Monitoring )

(JA/61 Handover to Harrow Building Control )

(JA/62 Handover to Harrow Building Control )

(JA/63 Handover to Harrow Building Control )

(JA/64 Contracted Structural Advice to RBKC to Harrow Building Control )

(JA/65 Grenfell Movement Monitoring )

(JA/66 Confirmation of Handover )

(JA/67 Photos – Grenfell )

(JA/68 Photos – Grenfell 1 )

(JA/69 Grenfell Notes from Phone )

(JA/70 Photo Key Plan Floor )

(JA/71 Grenfell Tower Fire )

(JA/72 Structural Engineers Re: Grenfell Tower Fire )

(JA/73 Structural Engineers Re: Grenfell Tower )

(JA/74 Information Re: Demolition Company )

(JA/75 Grenfell information for Harrow Borough )

(JA/76 Grenfell Structural Drawings )

(JA/77 Grenfell Structural Drawings )

(JA/78 Handover of Building Control Team Involvement )

(JA/79 Contracted Structural Advice to RBKC )

(JA/80 Grenfell Tower )

(JA/81 Contracted Structural Advice to RBKC )

(JA/82 Request for Structural Engineering Support information to Harrow Building Control )

(JA/83 Peak Temperatures )

(JA/84 Parameters for Accessing Central Cores )

(JA/85 Information for Harrow )

(JA/86 Engineering Information for Harrow )

(JA/87 Information for Harrow )

(JA/88 Photos )

(JA/89 Photos )

(JA/90 Information for Harrow )

(JA/91 Information for Harrow )

(JA/92 Information for Harrow )

(JA/93 Information for Harrow )



(JA/94 Information for Harrow Re: London Underground )  
 (JA/95 Information for Harrow Re: Builders )  
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 (JA/117 Actions from 18.06.17 )  
 (JA/118 Actions from 18.06.17 )  
 (JA/119 Grenfell Tower Progress )

Generally the emails threads above show that I secured advice regarding the concrete structure so that I could liaise with the London Fire Brigade and organise the handover and transmission of information to the London Borough of Harrow.

**10. What contact did you have with Amir Fardouee, if any, on your arrival? If yes, what did you discuss with him?**

See 6b above

## **Plans**

**11. We understand from the documents that you attended Kensington Town Hall to look for existing plans and structural details of the building see FORT00294570 exhibited at (JA/120 )**

**(a) Why did you need these documents?**

Because I became aware that the London Fire Brigade needed them in order to know the layout of the building for their continued rescue and firefighting operations. I may have heard this in or around the command unit.

**(b) Do you remember if anyone had asked you to obtain them? If so, do you remember who that was and what time they made that request?**

(See 11a) In relation to what time it would be. Sometime after I came out of the Tower for the first time. Estimate 6.30am to 7.00am.

**(c) What efforts, if any, did you make when you arrived at the scene to obtain plans and structural details of the building? Please describe in detail any discussions you had or requests that you made and of whom.**

As the Fire Brigade had no plans at the scene, I said I would return to RBKC Town Hall to see if there were any in the Building Control records

**(d) What time did you leave Grenfell Tower to attend Kensington Town Hall?**

I'm not sure what time, I estimate 7.00am. There should be a record of my entry to RBKC Town Hall, either in signing in book in Civic Reception as well as my swiping entry doors or via CCTV. I do not have access to such records.

**(e) How long did you spend at Kensington Town Hall looking for plans?**

I'm not sure, I estimate 30 minutes

**(f) Are you able to provide a copy of the plans that you printed off?**



I printed off a copy of some floor plans. I believe I found these within the electronic records of the means of escape files. I don't have any plans. The Means of Escape File is a very large electronic set of records which RBKC can provide.

**(g) If not, do you know if the plans at p.49 and p.51 of LFB00001968 are the plans you located and printed?**

I took the plans back to the Command Unit, time estimate after 7.30am (see JA/2 Email to Stallwood ) informing him I was leaving the Town Hall at 7.31am. When I got into the Command Unit they had the same plans that I was about to give them, already on the screen in the unit. (See FORT 00294570 ). the plans at p49 and p51 look like the plans I saw.

**12 In the log at FORT00294570 it is stated "Printed off plans and returned to site. By this time the TMO had provided some plans to the Fire Command Unit as well".**

**(a) Do you remember what time it was when you got back to the incident? How soon after that did you provide the plans that you had obtained to the Command Unit?**

Estimate after 7.30am see JA/2 above. I did not provide the plans as they had plans already.

**(b) How did you become aware that the TMO had provided plans to the Command Unit?**

The Command Unit had them. I believe they were on the screen in the command unit

**(c) Do you know how the TMO plans were provided to the Command Unit?**

I don't know as I was not on site at that time. There is a record of an email from Robert Black (JA/1 Email from Robert Black ), sent at 06.16 also [RBK00001468], I have no memory of actually seeing this email or receiving it. Also exhibited as (JA/125 Grenfell Tower Outline Fire Safety Strategy ) prepared by Exova Warrington Fire dated 7<sup>th</sup> November 2013.

**(d) Do you know what time the TMO plans were provided?**

Don't know as I was not on site at that time.

**(e) Do you know who provided the TMO plans?**

I do not know for sure but I believe the TMO supplied the plans.

**13. Can you explain what use was made of the plans, either by you or by LFB personnel, once they had been obtained?**

I believe that the LFB needed to confirm/understand the layout of the building and the flats to supplement their knowledge for their rescue operation.

**14. Do you recall being sent an email by Robert Black titled "Fire access plans from the refurb" on the night [please see RBK00001468]?**

**(a) If yes, please can you elaborate on any actions you took on receiving this email.**

As I have said above (see 12(c)) I cannot recall the e-mail.

**(b) Did you send this email to the London Fire Brigade? If yes, to whom? When? Please disclose a copy of all correspondence.**

I cannot recall receiving this e-mail or forwarding it on to the LFB

## **Return to Grenfell Tower**

**15. What time did you return to Grenfell Tower?**

Estimate 7.45am to 8.00am

**16. What actions did you take on your return to Grenfell Tower after you had attended Kensington Town Hall?**

Went to Command centre as 11(g) above. I believe I stayed at the scene until the late evening. Although I cannot remember exactly I went back into the tower at least one further time on 14<sup>th</sup> June. Photographs taken inside Tower from 1.42 pm on 14<sup>th</sup> June to assist in considering the safety of the structure, exhibited as (JA/21 ) and (JA/22 ).

**17. Did you have any other contact with Amir Fardouee during the night? If yes, what did you discuss with him?**

No

**18. Did you have any contact with David Kerridge, of the BECC, at any point up to 9am? When was that contact and what was it about?**

I don't know who David Kerridge is and I am not sure what the "BECC" is. I do know David Kerry who worked for RBKC in Emergency Planning. I believe Nick Layton from RBKC was on site acting as the Local Authority Liaison Officer.

### **Log**

**19. In addition to the Log at FORT00294570 which is three pages long and goes up to 23 June 2017, the Inquiry has also been provided with a Log at FORT00294571 which is much shorter. Could you explain the difference between these two Logs?**

Difference between 2 logs, FORT00294570 is an updated and fuller version of FORT00294571, an earlier version. They are exhibited as (JA/123 ) and (JA/122 ).


### **Other Matters**

**20.** On the 14<sup>th</sup> June 2017 I received an email from Beverley Kuchar asking for information about the cladding (JA/120 ) and was copied into a reply by Paul Hanson (JA/121 ).

I believe the content of this statement is true.

I am willing for this statement to form part of the evidence before the Inquiry and published on the Inquiry's website.

**Signed:**



**Dated:**

21/02/2019.



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