

TABLE 3 EVIDENCE OF FFS DEALING WITH FLAT 16, EARLY OBSERVATIONS OF INTERNAL FIRE, HEAT AND SMOKE SPREAD

NAME	ACTIVITY
Charles Batterbee	<p>TIC images show the FF entering the hallway of flat 16 and it continues with your entry into the hallway at 01:08:12:09 we see from the TIC image that the crew carries out a search of the flat up to 01:14:15 before the images of the fire is seen.</p> <p><i>"...I could see what i thought the fridge and the cupboards was alight. There as a line that stayed at the ceiling height above the window. It went from right to left, to the point where I couldn't see where it ended" [MET00012871 0007]</i></p> <p><i>Once inside the room I could see that the fire had vented because the window, up to the right hand side had gone....</i></p> <p><i>I then noticed outside the window, up to right hand side Gust above ceiling level) I saw what looked like or could have been a large extractor fan box which was alight. Essentially it was a large object that was alight, and it was this which first drew my attention to the fire outside the building / window. It was at this point we were both assessing what we were seeing, and I thought the fire had jumped a floor. I then sent priority messages to Alpha Control via my Barie radio.</i></p>
Danny Brown	<p><i>"I realised that where I had seen the curtain of flame was in fact where the window had been. The window and frame were no longer there and it had completely dropped out, leaving a hole in the wall.....leant out of the hole to look at the outside of the building. I could see that the two pointed sections on the outside of the building (I have drawn an arrow on them on DRB/3) were on fire. I immediately shouted " Charlie tell them that its going outside". "</i> MET00010867_0010</p> <p>Compartmentation Failure:</p> <p><i>"I realised that where I had seen the curtain of flame was in fact where the window had been. The window and frame were no longer there and it had completely dropped out, leaving a hole in the wall.....leant out of the hole to look at the outside of the building. I could see that the two pointed sections on the outside of the building (I have drawn an arrow on them on DRB/3) were on fire. I immediately</i></p>

	<p>shouted " Charlie tell them that its going outside". " MET00010867_0010</p> <p>Cladding: Contemporaneous Notes: "The fire was travelling in an upwards direction behind the cladding. As some pieces of cladding had either warped or fallen off, it was easy to see the material behind it was alight and travelling in an upwards direction however the vast majority of the cladding remained in place and any attempts to extinguish simply bounced off" MET00005251_0004</p> <p>"Looking back with hindsight, I believe that the fire quickly began to spread outside, most likely as soon as the fridge exploded (as reported by the resident of flat 16) and even though I initially thought it was contain from my glance at the window when getting off the appliance, I believe it is highly likely the external insulation/cladding was alight before we arrived.....believe the candle-like flame I witnessed was caused by the flammable gas that was contained within the fridge. When the fridge exploded as the owner stated, I think the gas and flame travelled into the vent/extractor located above the fridge catching the external insulation covered by cladding alight."</p>
Dave Badillo	<p>The following is from the LFB Operational Response Vol. 1 LFB00001914_002</p> <p>"01: 15 * -Firefighter Badillo whilst on the third floor meets a group of individuals who show signs of having been in smoke. He states' they have streaming eyes, they are coughing and look panicked. They say they are from the fifth and sixth floors'. (Source: Contemporaneous Notes: GTIRT17-00009 and GTIRT17-00431 and MPS Witness Statement: GTIRT18-01411 and GTIRT18-00917)</p> <p>Mr Badillo's MG11 he describes the stairwell as "very small and cramped and smaller than what I would expect to find in a high rise like Grenfell. Width wise you would struggle to get two people on a stair..... MET00010080 0004</p> <p>He, FF Dorgu & CM Secrett were on the 20th floor to perform a rescue of Jessica, the handheld radios were silent and not transmitting.</p> <p>He states that he attempted to contact WM Dowden regarding the 10-12 residents who passed him on the stairwell from 5th/6th floors but was unable to reach him – he therefore decided that he would have to exit the tower and approach WM Dowden in person to alert him to what he believed was smoke above the 4th floor.</p>

	<p>He was not made aware whilst attempting to perform the rescue of Jessica that she was in fact within flat 205 on 23rd floor. He was not aware Jessica was on the phone to a 999 operator. This information was not relayed to him during the incident.</p>
Justin O'Beirne	<p><u>Justin O'Beirne's floor by floor</u></p> <p><i>At around this time Firefighter O'Beirne returns to the fifth floor. He enters the fifth floor lobby and sees no smoke. When he looks through the letterbox of flat 26 the hallway of the flat is full of thick black smoke and he can no longer see the light on in the hall way. (Source: Contemporaneous Notes: GTIRT17-00016 and MPS Witness Statement: GTIRT18-00072)</i></p> <p><i>Firefighter O'Beirne radios WM Dowden and says that flat 26 directly above flat 16 is now on fire. Firefighter O'Beirne states he doesn't get a reply from WM Dowden or anyone else. (Source: Contemporaneous Notes: GTIRT17-00016 and MPS Witness Statement: GTIRT18-00072)"</i></p> <p>(a) Went above fire floor without BA set: After seeing the smoke come out from Flat 16 he went off on his own to look around. "I went up not in accordance with policy, don't know why I did that". Asked if it would be rare to go against policy, he said he "would push the boundaries and use [his] own initiative" He justified this by saying he must not have been the first one up there; someone else must have popped their head round first.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 4th floor - He could not recall if he went to the bridgehead first. He set the hose into the dry riser on the 4th floor and went to turn on the valve. He said it took around 30 seconds to connect, the water did not flow straight away but he did not think the crews were ready anyway. • 5th floor - He said he proceeded to the 5th floor immediately after they put the door in. He said no one asked him to go upstairs and check the other floors, he "took it on his own back given the density of the smoke". He said it was instinct and as we had so many people there, there wasn't

	<p>anything for me to do so I thought I would go and take a look upstairs.</p> <p>6th floor - He progressed to the sixth floor and again described it as smoky in the lobby. He met a Spanish family of three who said their flat was alight. He was sure he looked inside their flat. He was aware that three flats were now alight – whether he paid any attention to three flats</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • breaching – was now a great concern. 'I thought we can go and put three flats out' • 7th floor - He continued up to the 7th floor and again saw that flat alight. He radioed that down. He did not try to pass down any other message that BA wearers with water were needed. In his experience he had never seen a fire spread from flat to flat to flat. • 8th floor - He then went up to the 8th floor. He discovered smoke but did not radio down, did not establish where it was coming from or alert the occupants. He did not do this as he did not want to introduce smoke into their atmosphere. He thought the smoke was coming through the lift shafts and at that point he had a sinking feeling he thought they would not be able to get enough crews down to rescue everyone. He did not think it would be mass evacuation; he thought individual crews would be needed to escort people out but it also became apparent that 'people were going to be dying in there'. • 9th floor – Again at the 9th floor he did not radio down to say he saw smoke. Floor was clear. • 10th floor - On the 10th floor he did not knock on any doors as he would not have been able to breathe if he went through that [lobby] door. He did not radio those conditions down. • 11th floor - Even when the fire had reached the 11th floor, compartmentation failure did not cross his mind. He was more concerned with getting the BA crews up the smoky lift lobbies to rescue people not involved in the fire.
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	<p>(b) WM Dowden was not made aware of internal fire spread nor was he made aware of potential FSGs - He progressed upstairs and a family came out of the flat 26 and said their kitchen was alight. He believed that there was smoke in the flat.</p> <p>He radioed down to Dowden – he said BA crew were needed. He got no response to that message – had no confirmation his message was heard but assumed it had been. He did not try to send the message to the BH on Channel 6. He said he had no doubt everyone had received that message. He did not think to knock on any other doors – due to stay put policy he presumed it would stay in that compartment.</p>
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