

TABLE 4: EXTRACTS OF FF COMMENTS STAY PUT, CLADDING, COMPARTMENTATION AND EVACUATION

NAME	STAY PUT AND EVACUATION	CLADDING	COMPARTMENTATION
<p>MET00012871 0018 Charles Batterbee</p> <p><u>ORAL EVIDENCE</u> 28th June 2018</p>	<p>Failure to adopt an evacuation plan or abandoning stay put policy – He said it is a HR policy not an LFB policy. Generally it is the policy that the owner imposes; This relies on compartmentalisation working – in the event of failing you use the covering jet. Asked whether he was trained on alternatives if compartmentalisation failed he said no.</p> <p>He explained what he meant by a ‘fire compartment’ as a fire in that flat rather than just smoke. He realised compartmentation between floors 4 and 5 had failed. He had no thoughts to evacuate. He did not contact Dowden to relay what he had seen as he was in BA mode.</p>		
<p>Danny Brown 28/29th June 2018</p>		<p>He said he had never received any training on fires that might ignite the exterior of a building, neither on cladding nor lateral fire spread. Although he knew compartmentation had failed when he leaned out of the window to inspect the “candle light flame” he had witnessed outside the compartment - he “did not know it was cladding at that time”.</p>	
<p>SM Egan 3rd July 2018</p>	<p>He was a Station Manager acting as a Fire Safety team leader. This role is comprised of arranging premises to be inspected and to determine high-</p>		

	<p>risk premises. He arrived at the scene at approx. 01:58 hours and stated <i>"it was obvious as I attended.. it was horrendous", "my opinion was you cannot put that out, were not going to have the resources to put that out" and therefore "people needed to get out of the building". He communicated his concerns throughout the incident to higher chains of command including Richard Welch and Pat</i></p> <p>ORAL EVIDENCE</p> <p>Daniel Egan: Failure to adopt an evacuation plan or abandon stay put policy – As a fire safety officer, his role comprises the consideration of routes out of the building/means of escape. Despite his initial views upon arrival at approx. 01:58 hours that people needed to get out of the building, this was not considered at that time as IC Welch advised him to instead deal with FSG.</p> <p>He informed Tom Goodall that the advice was stay put but they needed to get residents out. Tom Goodall agreed with him that there should be an evacuation. Tom Goodall went to speak with the IC to communicate that the stay put advice should change, as they did not have the authority to do this.</p> <p><i>"We needed to evacuate the building, we weren't getting anything back with regards to what information we was putting through they was obviously under the because you know the guys up there you could tell just by looking at the building you know that everybody's lives were in danger you know residents, firefighters, everybody. it was a case of they just needed to get out".</i></p>		
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	<p><u>He stated that at the time, he had considered an evacuation plan:</u></p> <p><i>"It would have taken a lot of command and control. We would have had to use some of warning so loudhailers for the crews. And my thought process was that they would systematically go through a couple of floors at a time. And with crews [of approx. 4 FF] going along banging on doors, giving people a chance you know trying to cajole them out if they was in there and try to escort them down".</i></p> <p><i>As the majority of calls were coming from the 11th floors, he would have committed crews here and worked his way down as higher floors tend to have clearer air: "You would have to start at the highest point that you could probably get to. So like I said so from my – my thought process it would've been the 11th floor upwards".</i></p>		
<p>Secrett 4th-5th July 2018</p>			<p>Lack of training for procedures/strategy when compartmentation fails - Training does cover compartmentation however it does not cover what a FF should do if compartmentation within HR building should fail or training on how to assess whether the stay put policy remains a safe policy to retain in the event compartmentation fails.</p>
<p>O'Hanlon 4th July 2018</p>			<p>Lack of training for procedures/strategy when compartmentation fails – He has not received any training with regards to external cladding/materials catching fire on a HR building. He has also not received training regarding fire</p>

			traveling on the external façade of the building for fire spread travelling laterally or downwards.
Thomas Abell 7 th July 2018	<p>Failure to adopt an evacuation plan or abandoning stay put policy – He said it is a HR policy not an LFB policy. Generally it is the policy that the owner imposes; This relies on compartmentalisation working – in the event of failing you use the covering jet. Asked whether he was trained on alternatives if compartmentalisation failed he said no.</p> <p>He explained what he meant by a ‘fire compartment’ as a fire in that flat rather than just smoke. He realised compartmentation between floors 4 and 5 had failed. He had no thoughts to evacuate. He did not contact Dowden to relay what he had seen as he was in BA mode.</p>		
WM O’Keefe 5 th -7 th July 2018	<p>Lack of training on when to abandon stay put policy or implement evacuation - He has not received any training with regards to evacuation tactics or how/when to make a judgement to abandon stay put policy. There is evacuation guidance within LFB policy under 633 but there is no training provided.</p> <p>When he became aware that FF Hippel and FF Stern informed him that there was fire on 5th and 6th floor, he thought compartmentation had failed internally “just between a couple of flats”. As circumstances were “exceptional” and he had never “experienced it [fire spread] at the rate it was happening”, he did not discuss evacuation with IC Dowden. He believed the correct procedure to follow in the circumstances was to bring in</p>	<p>Lack of training on how to operationally/strategically deal with fires involving combustible materials – He has not received any training on how to consider the impact of materials such as plastic or aluminium frames, PVC or UPVC. Material he can recall that was discussed within the fire service were sandwich panels which are full of combustible materials as well as risks of glass and wood on buildings particularly if under construction. Cladding systems were not discussed/considered.</p>	<p>Lack of training where compartmentation fails- He has not received training regarding fire spread on the exterior of a building or what to do where compartmentation fails: his only knowledge of procedure response to breach of compartmentation is employing a covering jet to address fire breaking out of windows/roofs however this was relevant to domestic low rise premises. They were made aware of external fire during a training course following Lakanal House fire in 2009 but “it wasn’t a specific training package”.</p>

	<p>additional resources and extinguish the fire.</p> <p>Evacuation was not considered even though he held the opinion that <i>"we were never going to get that fire under control ever"</i> – he was determined to perform his role and carry out fire fighting and rescues.</p>		
<p>Jo Smith 11th-12th July 2018</p>	<p>Delay in changing stay put advice - The decision to change the stay put advice was not one for CRO, <i>"she was responsible for making a decision to change the stay put policy"</i>. It would be down to the control room and not officers on the fire ground as <i>"the control room operators would be able to engage with those callers"</i></p> <p>Approx. 15 minutes after her arrival at the control room at approx. 02:30-2:35 hours she felt that the advice should change. DAC Fenton believed this was an <i>"educated decision"</i> that control had made and together they agreed that it was the appropriate action to take.</p> <p>A primary reason for changing the advice was a result of information obtained by DAC Fenton that he had received via mobile from senior officers on the incident ground that BA wearers were struggling to go beyond the 15th floor: <i>"I asked her [Alex Norman] to tell the CRO's that we were going to change the advice and what advice to give out to callers"</i>.</p> <p><i>"I was uncomfortable that people were remaining in their flats and we were trying to protect them in their flats when it was clear that the protection advice was failing"</i> – She believed that</p>		

	<p>compartmentation had failed or was close to failing. This meant the advice would need to change for callers to leave their premises. The IC was not contacted: <i>"There wasn't anyone [available] to contact the incident ground"</i>. It wouldn't be common practice for control to speak directly with the IC.</p> <p>She did not discuss with her colleagues why this decision to change the advice: <i>"I wouldn't imagine that anyone could have an oversight and step back because they were all very task orientated which was rightly so to supply the incident with the resources they need so I didn't query why that decision was made earlier"</i>.</p> <p>She did not know information of conditions within the building however she knew the alternative to not changing the advice.</p>		
<p>DAC Adrian Fenton</p> <p>17th July 2018</p>	<p>Delay in changing stay put advice – He states that after viewing a <i>"pictorial view"</i> of the tower on a television in the BCC, some time after 02:00am, this was a major factor and made all the difference prompting him to speak with Jo Smith with regards to the stay put advice.</p> <p>The televisions within the control room was switched off as Jo didn't want to cause stress/distract staff <i>[had this television been switched on – potentially the decision to change stay put may have been made earlier]</i></p> <p>Lack of consideration of an evacuation plan – In his understanding, an IC would not expect to undertake a full or partial evacuation. <i>"First of all"</i></p>		

	<p><i>how would the incident commander communicate that information to every person or occupant within the building to actually inform them that we were doing a full or phased evacuation? Secondly is the building suitably built to facilitate that? And if the building is build to facilitate that, I would suggest that it would have an intercom or it would have a fire alarm and it would have the facilities there to actually be able to facilitate a full or phased evacuation".</i> In particular, although he conceded a partial evacuation may be viable, with regards to a full evacuation, he does not see how this is feasible: <i>"I don't know how you would communicate a full evacuation to 24 floors of a tower block"</i></p> <p>Lack of evacuation plan information specific to the GT – He states that evacuation plans should be available via the premises information box or from contacting local building management, neither of which was available on the night of the incident: <i>"The information should be available to an incident commander in that situation should they need to consider an evacuation"</i>.</p>		
<p>Raymond Keane 18th July 2018</p>		<p>Lack of training – He criticised the FF training he has received as not realistic: <i>"obviously as a fire-fighter you want to have a realistic fire to be training on"</i></p> <p>He was aware from his previous experience, most recently Shepherds Court, that cladding may exceed fire spread on the outside façade of the building, On the night of the incident, he believed the cladding may be involved in causing rapid</p>	

		fire spread but he did not communicate this as <i>" I'm not in control of the incident... he can see what I can see, so he's further training better trained than I am to make those right decisions"</i> .	
Martin Gilliam 23 rd July 2018:		When he arrived at the scene and witnessed the building alight, he believed the cladding was alight: – <i>"something was burning above it and obviously looking at the rest of the building I could identify that was cladding that was alight"</i> . This opinion was not relayed and did not influence his response in how to deal with the fire.	
Paul Watson 24 th July 2018		He stated that although he did not know the building was covered in cladding he thought the fire was <i>"something to do with what's supplied to the outside of the building as high rise buildings are made of concrete and do not ignite"</i> - He states that <i>"I did not know or think it was covered in cladding"</i> .	
Louisa De Silvo 25 th -26 th July 2018	<p>Lack of consideration of an evacuation plan – She stated that as she was tasked with collating FSG information, she did not consider evacuation as regarding FSG's, <i>"those people were trapped": "an evacuation plan wasn't a consideration, they were trapped"</i> – <i>"the information those people are telling us is that they cant get down there escape route or their stairwell"</i> and that <i>"they are in need of rescue"</i>.</p> <p>She stated that in light of the necessity to conduct search and rescues of these FSGs, <i>"Having that one stairwell for firefighting and for evacuation"</i></p>	Lack of knowledge/training as to combustible cladding – She stated that she has not received any training regarding the risk of fire spread on HR buildings involving cladding.	

	<i>was probably going to be more dangerous and a higher risk at that stage of the incident</i> than to stay put. In addition, regarding feasibility of conducting a full scale evacuation: <i>"We had no way of alarming residents"</i>		
Stuart Beale 2 nd August 2018		<p>He stated that whilst on the incident ground looking up at the building <i>"We could see the exterior cladding was involved, it was alight and burning, almost like molten line diagonally across the building"</i> – <i>"we didn't know how water would react on the exterior of the building"</i>.</p> <p>He elaborates <i>"It was visually obvious that the external flats were alight on those sections and it was visually obvious that the exterior surface, whatever that may have been at that stage, was alight"</i>. He did not however know what materials were involved: <i>"I didn't know what it was, but the exterior was alight and the by-product of that was molten aluminium and plastic."</i></p>	
Marc Aston O'Donovan 31 st July 2018	<p><u>EVACUATION:</u> Lack of training on when to abandon stay put policy or implement evacuation – He states that he has received no training as to partial or total evacuation of a HR building. He also stated that <i>"We are all aware of the stay-put policy, but there's no training as the decision when to change that policy from stay put to evacuation"</i>.</p> <p>He has carried out drills, simulating fires such as at Acton, but these drills do not involve occupants.</p>	<p>Lack of knowledge/training as to combustible cladding – He stated, <i>"I've got no experience"</i> with fires involving cladding. As he arrived at the scene he thought <i>"the external skin is alight"</i> but he has received no training with regards to fires involving cladding on HR building.</p>	<p>Lack of training for procedures/strategy when compartmentation fails – He stated that the training with regards to breach of compartmentation was limited: <i>"There is no particular package or particular training given the breach of compartmentation"</i>. The resources to conduct training is also limited, <i>"There is no towers really above 8 floors"</i> and although he has received training with regards to the coanda effect, <i>"the training is very limited"</i>.</p>

<p>Oliver De Forges</p> <p>31st July 2018</p>	<p>Lack of training on when to abandon stay put policy or implement evacuation – He stated “<i>I don’t remember any specific training for that [evacuation]. The only time I remember evacuating buildings and being instructed to do so was at large gas leaks</i>”. Regarding the stay-put policy, he feels this is the safest system that people should remain in their flats until their flats are directly affected: “<i>My only training that I remember for stay-put policy... we are taught, and the policy states, that unless there’s a specific reason to go against what the buildings policy states, then we should follow that until there’s reason not to follow that</i>”. He could not provide insight as to what reasons would be sufficient to deviate from stay put but stressed this was a decision for the IC or Control.</p>	<p>Lack of knowledge/training as to combustible cladding - He has received no specific training as to combustible materials.</p>	<p>Lack of training for procedures/strategy when compartmentation fails – He states that “<i>we are trained to deal with when compartmentation fails and we are aware of its spread</i>” but there is no specific training provided for dealing with external fire spread. He states that although a usual safe system of work is implemented to contain the fire, “<i>When the fire is, say, 18 floors apart, that system simply cannot work and we are not trained to deal with that</i>”.</p> <p>When he arrived at the scene, he believed that the scaffolding was alight. He quickly realised this wasn’t the case as he approached the building and “<i>I could see that lots of flats were involved</i>”</p>
<p>SM Mulholland</p> <p>1st August 2018</p>	<p>Lack of training as to full or partial evacuation and Failure to adopt an evacuation plan or abandon stay put policy – He stated that he received no training on how to effect a full or partial evacuation.</p> <p>After DAC Andy O’Loughlin took over as IC, they began developing a tactical plan but did not consider deviating from stay put or conducting an evacuation. This was also not a consideration after he conducted a partial 360 assessment of the exterior of the building.</p>	<p>Lack of training as to fires involving combustible materials – He stated that when he arrived at the scene at 01:51:56, he felt the fire “<i>looked abnormal</i>”. He stated “<i>never in my career seen the outside of the building alight like this building was alight</i>” – “<i>it was spitting flame or burning embers off the front face of the building</i>”. He was confused by the nature of the fire as 99% of tower blocks he attends in London are concrete and concrete doesn’t catch fire. As the scene escalated, “<i>I realised there was something fixed to the outside of the building, but I didn’t know what it was that could be burning that quickly</i>”.</p> <p>He recalls a prior incident of a fire of external fire spread approx.. 4-5 years ago</p>	

		<p>where he witnessed a fire involving a UPC section on the exterior of the building (bottom part of a window). The fire however remained in the compartment and was not severe.</p> <p>He is aware of Shepherds Court fire but stated he received no training as to the lessons learnt from the fire.</p> <p>After conducting a partial 360 of the tower: <i>"I was still perplexed at how a building could be burning like that on the exterior, and I think one of my thoughts at that pint was, there must be a flammable blanket wrapped around this building"</i></p>	
SM Wolfenden 11th September 2018	Delay in implementing a full scale evacuation – During the incident, it became clear crews were unable to go beyond the 10 th floor. When BH was informed that there was no crews above the 11 th floor, he was filled with total dread and discussions regarding evacuation begun. Despite this, an evacuation was not implemented due to the conditions, the narrow stairwell and all the debris/water on the stairwell. He stated that even at 8:30am, he thought people would still be alive in their flats. It was only until he went outside and saw the flats above the 10 th floor 100% burnt out that he realised the impossible situation.	Lack of knowledge/training as to external fire spread – He stated that in the event of external fire spread, he assumed it would just burn off. Even on the night of the incident when he witnessed the full west side of the tower ablaze upon his arrival (After 2am), he believed the fire would just spread around and burn off.	
GM Gouldborn 12th September 2018	Lack of training as to implementing a full scale evacuation – He stated that he received no training of a pull evacuation of a high rise, but had received significant planning for evacuation and rescue. He stated the issue with evacuation is that it relies on a building having the ability to		

	<p>facilitate said evacuation.</p> <p><i>I wanted answers – I wanted them to commit crews". He felt that trying to put the fire out was "just wasting resources" and focus should have been flooding the tower with FF's - perform a full-scale evacuation.</i></p>		
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