

TABLE 6 BRIDGEHEAD ISSUES: EXTRACT FROM FF EVIDENCE

NAME	COMMENTS
CM Chris Secrett oral evidence 04/05/ July 2018	FSG management issues —His experience in BH was that as a BA wearer, he stood staring at the wall looking at the FSG information to determine where he should be deployed; he was under no direction. Information regarding the 12-year-old FSG ultimately came from FF Badillo, not through BH.
WM O'KEEFE	<p>Potential delay in resourcing incident with Extended Duration Breathing Apparatus — First 5 FF's with EDBA tallied out of BH at 01:56 and 01:57.</p> <p>GM Welch arrived to the scene approx. 02:00 – 02:30 hours and took over as IC. When GM Welch attended BH, he informed GM Welch what was going wrong; he needed all available EDBA (gives approx. 47 minutes of air) as Standard Duration Breathing Apparatus (SDBA) were preventing crews reaching higher up in the building. (SDBA only gives approx. 31 minutes air). SDBA sets were only able to reach 7 floors when the fire was vented; he is unsure how high FF's could reach within the building earlier in the incident.</p> <p>EDBA management issues — First 5 FF's with EDBA tallied out of BH at 01:56 and 01:57 and were tasked to go to the roof by IC Dowden: <i>"Their brief was to go with a line... a system of lines to secure people or secure equipment on the roof"</i> He felt that there was better use for EDBA — they could be performing rescues.</p> <p>BH and FSG management issues — He states that he <i>"became overwhelmed by the amount of people giving me information"</i>. Eventually WM De Silvo detailed to assist him and he was happy to see another WM. He tasked her to <i>"get a grip.. on BA procedures and the FSG"</i>. Later during the incident, he became aware WM Glynn Williams was collating FSG information - he did not check if there was any overlap or differences with FSG information.</p> <p>FSG information were written on the wall — He states the amount of writing on the wall was too much to brief crews who were stressed before they went up the tower. Anything he drew was to simplify and provide a visual for FF's of where they were being deployed within the tower.</p> <p>He did not communicate with CM Secrett, FF Dorgu and FF Badillo as to where they were going when they went up to 20th floor to attempt a rescue of Jessica whilst rigged in their BA sets.</p> <p>Lack resources at BH - He states that <i>"We were greatly understaffed in the bridgehead"</i> - He was trying to process significant amount of information and coordinate rescues and fire fighting all at the same time. He states that as more residents required rescue as the fire progressed, <i>"we needed help"</i>.</p>
MET00008019_0007 CM	says this about the briefing he was given by WM O'Keefe: <i>"The bridgehead seemed chaotic with lots of people inside, 3 or 4 BA boards on</i>

Craig Eden	<i>the left and there was lots of things going on - talking and radio messages but everyone seemed to know what they were doing. I saw a Station Manager and a couple of other officers whom had white helmets on and there were a couple of fire-fighters donning up. Watch Manager O'KEEFE, who I think is stationed at Kensington, gave us our brief. He said that a BA team was required to go to the 20th floor and tell the bridgehead what we could see and find. I asked him to repeat the brief, as it was not the standard brief you would normally receive for a high-rise building. Normally I would expect to receive more information, such as where the fire was, what room, how many people are trapped, how many flats there are on the floor etc. It is normally quite specific. I did turn around to Tom and said "what the fuck sort of briefing is that?" but I accepted what was said, instead of challenging it, due to the situation and circumstances, but it felt like we were being sent up to the 20th floor to complete a recy. I think someone had been sent up to the 20th floor before us, but still knew very little about Grenfell Tower itself."</i>
MET000080606_0005 Tom Welch,	<i>"On this walkway was a queue of firefighters in pairs in there BA sets waiting to enter the bridgehead and be briefed on their task. I paired up with Craig Eden and I joined the queue. We then turned right from the walkway in to a lobby area which was the bridgehead and the entry control point. The visibility in this area was completely clear. We was briefed by a watch manager with an Irish accent. I do not know his name. The briefing was to go to the 20th floor and see what we could find. I found this briefing to be unusual and slightly vague. A normal briefing at an incident would contain details of a specific task. My adrenaline was pumping at this point as I knew this was a big fire, I wanted to get in as quickly as possible and assist in bringing the incident to an end. During the briefing I asked if we were using the fire lift or the stairs. I was told to use the stairs."</i>
MET00012539 Raoul Codd	Lack of strategic plan regarding BA deployment – Despite being the first EDDBA crew on the incident ground, after attending CU, they were tasked to gather equipment rather than attend BH to be committed. He stated that his crew could and should have been committed earlier than 03:05 hours.
MET00010084_0001 Katie Foster	Lack of strategic plan regarding BA deployment – Despite being SDBA, she was tasked to attend the 18 th floor. She felt this was a long way to go with SDBA. To tackle this issue, her crew did not initially put their masks on to conserve the air in their sets. Whilst on the 18 th floor inside a flat occupied by 1 adult female and 3 child, they also took their masks off to save air.
MET00010815_0001 NOTES: MET00005326 Greg Lawson	Lack of strategic plan regarding BA deployment – Despite only being an SDBA wearer, and standing next to EDDBA, he was tasked to the 18 th floor. He was initially worried about this. To deal with this issue, he and FF Foster waited until they ascended 2-3 flights of stairs before they put their masks on. Whilst on the 18 th floor, he and FF Foster advised residents to stay put and had to descend. Their supply of air was an influencing factor in their decisions on the 18 th floor and to descend.