

G11 QUESTIONS NOT ASKED OF CROs + FFs

List of schedules

1. CROs: 1. Sarah Russell (p1-3); 2. CRO Christine Howson (p4-5); 3. CRO Heidi Fox (p5-8); 4. CRO Yvonne Adams (p4-9); 5. CRO Sharon Darby (p9-11); 6. CRO Jo Smith (p12-14); 7. CRO Alexandra Norman (p15-20); 8. CRO Duddy (p20-26); 9. CRO Real (p27); 10. Aisha Jabin (p27)
2. Short table including examples of areas where questions were not asked of firefighters (p28-29)

1. CRO SARAH RUSSELL [numbering following that of the joint G4/G11 questions submitted]

5. Individual calls taken

5.1 Flat 201 (Jessica Urbano Ramirez 23rd floor) [6-7]

- a. First call is at 01.29.48 from BT who say that the line has cleared, the person appeared to be a child and sounded in distress (LFB00004790_0023 and LFB00000481)
- b. Do you agree that a child caller presents a number of specific challenges?
- c. Do you agree that these would include:
 - Their ability to provide accurate information?
 - Their ability to estimate time, distances etc?
 - Their level of stress and anxiety is likely to be higher than an adult?
 - They may well need far more reassurance and patience from the operator?
 - They may not understand complex questions so the operator will need to tailor their advice accordingly?
- d. You call her back at 01.30.08 (LFB00004790_0023 and LFB00000507). Call lasts 00.54 minutes, so it finishes at 02.24
 - In your experience and from your training would that be deemed as an excessively long call?
 - What if anything does your training say about the length of time that you should remain on a call?
- h. ORR v.2 (LFB00004828) states that you only confirmed the caller's name was Jessica, that she was 12 years old and was in flat 201 and that there were 10 people in the flat including herself, at 1.47.28, over 17 minutes into the call
 - Why was this information was only gathered 17 minutes into the call?
 - Do you think that the lack of this crucial information from the onset may have adversely affected what information you were able to pass to the incident ground?
 - If so, how?
- i. About a third of the way through the call, you get the flat number: 201 (0028) and by that time you have been told that there are 12 people including a baby
 - Would it not have been important to update the control room and thereafter CU7, the fire ground and bridgehead as to the accurate picture in flat 201 in terms of numbers, their ages and capacity to leave unassisted?

- Would you agree that this is the vital type of information that those on the fire ground would need in order to assess and plan their rescue attempts?
- j. Towards the end of the call, Jessica says “*there’s a fire in here*” (0058). It is very difficult to get an answer from her. She is saying that she cannot breathe. You tell her to keep on the floor.
- Was there a point in time when you trying to get her to leave? [G4 question]
 - If not, why not?
- k. You then suggest that they might move into a different room. She says that they have tried to go outside and there was lots of smoke
- This was not the first time Jessica had explained this. Bearing in mind she is telling you that there is fire inside the flat, her only possibility, however remote, was to leave. Why did you not tell her in clear unequivocal terms that she must prepare herself, wrap a wet towel around her face and leave?
- l. At around the same time, Debbie Lamprell has told Aisha Jabin in NWFC that the windows were cracking and she was then advised that everyone should try to leave
- Had you been aware that an adult, Debbie Lamprell, was on an FSG call at the same time as you were speaking to Jessica, how would that have affected the advice you were giving Jessica?
 - Have you ever been trained on how to talk people through an escape, i.e. remain on the phone with them as they try to escape, encouraging and guiding them as best you can?
 - Is that something that you thought about doing for Jessica?
- m. Operational Response Report v.2 (LFB00004828_0072) - OM Alexandra Norman at Brigade Control rings team leader from CU8 and says she needs crews to go and check some flats. There are no names or flat/floor numbers in relation to call(s) from the top floor
- Do you think that the reason why the call(s) are reported without information regarding the caller or the flat/floor number (at this stage) is because you did not get this information until later in the call?
 - Were you ever aware at any stage that some firefighters (led by FF Badillo) had gone looking for Jessica, but went to the flat where she lived in rather than the one she had moved to during the night of the fire?

5.2 Flat 173 (Mary Mendy and Khadija Saye, 20th floor)

- a. At 02.26.48 Khadija Saye called 999. The call was taken by CRO Russell (LFB00000355). Flat 173- Floor 20th - - caller - smoke is coming in quite low now – I’m in living room with my mom [...]
- d. Would you agree that in those circumstances the occupants would have been scared, panic stricken and confused?
- e. Would you also agree that in those circumstances the occupants may well have needed guidance and encouragement as to what to do?
- f. Can you recall when the information was passed to the incident ground?
- g. What information, if any, was passed to the incident ground?

5.3 Flat 194 (Anthony Disson, 22nd Floor)

- a. At 02.30.45 you took a call from Surrey FRS, who in turn were passing details for a call taken from a relative of Mr Disson (LFB00000357). You said to the Surrey FRS “*we’ll pass it on to our command unit, but they’re, they’re fighting their way up for a lot of people*”
- Did you consider what impact the assurance that help was coming might have on someone’s decision to remain or to attempt to leave their flat? **Asked in relation to Jessica’s call.**

5.9 Flat 113 (Zainab Deane, 14th floor) *None of the questions for this deceased were asked*

- a. Call is at 03.06.06 and lasts for 2 minutes and 51 seconds, concluding at 03.08.57 (LFB00004790_0120 and LFB00000405)
- b. At the time of this call, FFs had already rescued 4 individuals from flat 113. Olu, Rosemary and [REDACTED] and Omar Alhaj Ali. They exit the Tower at around 02.45 (MET00016072_0040). Zainab and Jeremiah Deane, Dennis Murphy and Mohammed Alhaj Ali remained in the flat
 - Were you aware at the time of this call, that FFs had already been to this address but for some reason only half of the occupants of the flat had been rescued?
 - There had been earlier calls from Zainab Deane, but also Rosemary Talabi from flat 113. Was there any system in the control room by which you could be made aware that there had been previous calls from this flat?
 - The caller is speaking from flat 113 on the 14th floor and it takes some time to ascertain the flat number
 - The caller is described as female at LFB00004790_0120 so it is probably Zainab Deane
 - She says that they are covered with smoke and that someone is unconscious (0002)
 - Did you question Zainab as to who was unconscious?
 - Did you question her as to how many people were with her, their names, ages and physical conditions?
 - They say they are in the bedroom and there are flames. You ask if they can leave and she says “no, we can’t leave. Nobody is coming for us” (0007). Then the line cuts off
 - Did you have any information from the bridgehead or CU7 that Omar Alhaj Ali had told FFs that his brother and “others” remained in flat 113?

Question pertaining to Raymond Bernard

Awareness of other Control Rooms being on the phone to people in that flat:

At the same time, your colleague Christine Howson is talking to the other child, Biruk Haftom, in the same flat. The call starts at 01.32.10 (LFB00000667) and it lasted 4 minutes and 1 second, to 01.37.11. During that call, CRO Howson speaks to an adult who is believed to be the tenant of the flat, Raymond ‘Moses’ Bernard who says “oh my god the fire is coming through” and then that the smoke is coming through the window (LFB00000667_0004).

Did you know about your colleague’s call?

Also at the same time, one of the adults in the room, Debbie Lamprell, is talking to North West Fire Control on the phone (LFB00000486). That call starts at 01.41.18 and lasts until about 02.22 or so.

Did you know or could you hear that someone else was talking on the phone?

While Aisha Jabin in NWFC was talking to Debbie, her colleague Brian called London. LFB00004790_0050 shows that at 01.47.44 London Control Room passed the information about 10 people, in flat 161, on 23rd floor to the fireground. At 01.52.34 (LFB00003618_0003) it seems the flat number is corrected to flat 201.

Was that information ever given to you?

2. CRO CHRISTINE HOWSON

2 CONTROL ROOM [1-2]

2.1. Layout [LFB00004790_0174-5]:

- a. Where were you seated? [G4 question]
- b. How easily could you see the whiteboard?
- c. Could you read the details of calls recorded on it from where you were seated?

5. INDIVIDUAL CALLS TAKEN

5.3 Flat 194 (Anthony Disson, 22nd Floor)

- a. You take a call from Mr Disson at 02.00.33 (LFB00000337). This is his third 999 call; the first two were handled by CRO Fox and CRO Duddy respectively
- b. He immediately told you he had been *"waiting for 15 minutes"*. What did you understand him to mean?
- d. On what basis did you tell him *"you can't go anywhere anyway"*?
- h. What did you understand to be the relevance of the fact that smoke was coming through his letterbox?
- i. What did you do with the details from this call and specifically the fact that he was a pensioner, the smoke density, the internal smoke spread, the deterioration and his height in the tower?

5.5 Flat 201 (Jessica Urbano Ramirez 23rd floor)

- a. You took various calls from callers on the same floor as Jessica Urbano Ramirez – floor 23
- c. LFB00000340 - call from a caller in flat 203, you say that the fire was only on the 4th floor. This is around 02.05:
 - a. Are you able to recall when you were aware that the fire was spreading to other parts of the building?
 - b. Did you consider calling back the people who had called you to check if they were ok and/or give them different advice?
 - c. During the call, why do you seem to say that it is not possible to evacuate?
- d. LFB00000670 - ORR v.2 (LFB00004828_0181) - 999 call from flat 205 to CRO Howson. At 02.27.48 the caller shouts that there is fire in the flat and reports it is in the bedroom. You tell them to shut the bedroom door and try to explain about blocking up doors. The caller then explains that they have tried to get out before and the corridor is full of smoke. You respond by telling them that they need to decide but if the fire is in the flat then they need to get out
- e. ORR v.2 (LFB00004828_0215) - female caller from flat 203, flat next door is on fire and the smoke is getting quite strong. You ask if caller has taken steps to keep smoke out of flat and caller says she has. Caller says there are 5 adults and 2 children in the flat. You say you will pass on message to crew and tell caller to call back if situation worsens. Caller says the next call might not be possible. You say safest place is in the flat if there are no flames.
 - a. Why do you not explore evacuation options, especially as moments before you took a call from flat 205 where flames had spread into the flat?

5.8 Flat 92 (Karen Aboud and her two sons, 12th floor) *None of the questions for this survivor were asked*

- a. 02.50.48 to AA (LFB00000673) - spoke to a 12 year old child who when asked who he was with, answered that he was with a couple and a child
- b. Did you assume you were talking to an adult?
- c. Aware of previous calls?
- d. Was the outcome of this call recorded and if so, where?

3. CRO HEIDI FOX

1. TRAINING/EXPERIENCE [1-2]

1.3 Post-Lakanal House fire training

- b. Familiar with the LFB report following Lakanal House: Fire at Lakanal, Havil Street, SE5 on 3 July 2009 – main report (HOM00001124)?
- c. Para 316 “Expectations that callers would be rescued and 'stay put' advice: COs had a clear expectation that fire crews would reach the callers quickly. Their experience was that fire appliances arrive quickly and that people are rescued by the Brigade. This is borne out by the fact that only rarely, where FSG is given, do people die in fires (see section E3). As rescues by crews were not immediate there is a question whether the CO and/or callers, could have assessed the risk of attempting to escape from the flat and whether the risk of moving closer to the fire (but escaping) was less than staying put and awaiting rescue. COs relied on advising callers to 'stay put' expecting that this would keep callers safe from the fire.”
- d. Were you aware of this concern following Lakanal House?
- e. Were you given any training in how to assess the risk between attempting to escape as against staying put?

2. CONTROL ROOM [2]

2.2 Practice

- b. Can you help on when calls might be diverted to other call centres due to the sheer volume of calls?
- c. Is local knowledge important to a Control Room operator? e.g. knowledge of London in general, what fire stations might be close and which might be further away?

3. KNOWLEDGE OF GRENFELL TOWER

3.1 Knowledge prior to the fire

- c. No knowledge how tall the block was or how many flats or residents?

4. THE NIGHT

4.1 Your role

- b. Too many calls for you to spend time with people on the end of the phone?

5. INDIVIDUAL CALLS TAKEN

5.2 Flat 95 (Smith/Dabrowska, 12th floor)

- a. Call at 01.26.58 (LFB00004790_0017 and LFB00000309)
- b. Second call you take after you're called back from your break (first call at 01.25.12 [LFB00004790_0015])
- e. What did you do with the information that the fire had spread to the 12th floor?

5.3 Flat 194 (Anthony Disson, 22nd Floor)

- a. You took a call from Mr Disson at 01.30.08 (LFB00000459). As far as we are aware, this was his first 999 call. You did not ask him anything except for confirmation that he was calling from Grenfell Tower:

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- Why did you not ask him to elaborate on what he meant by "terrible"?
- What did you understand about the fire and/or smoke spread that description of the conditions in his flat (that you could not see your hand in front of you and that conditions were "terrible")?
- He confirms floor number. You did not ask for his flat number. Why not?
- You tell him to block the smoke out with "towels and things". Why did you not explore with him about possible escape routes given that his flat was apparently affected by smoke?
- He says, "I'll tell the rest". Who did you understand "the rest" to be? Why did you not ask for more information about who he meant by that?
- What did you do with the details from this call?
- b. At 02.54.21, you took a call from a friend of Mr Disson (LFB00000549). She told you that he was in flat 194 on the 22nd floor and that she could "watch him looking out of the window and the fire's all around him". You asked how many people were "stuck inside there [inaudible]". She said, "just him". You said, "Why isn't he ringing – he needs to ring 999, that's what he needs to do":
- Did you realise that, or consider whether, this was the same person you yourself had spoken to at 01.30.08?
- The caller said she could not get through to Mr Disson; her battery had died and she did not have his number. You said you were "asking people to leave their properties". The caller said she is "sure" he would have done that. You said that you would "tell them on the radio".
- What did you do with this information?
- Did you consider trying to call him back, given that the advice had changed and in light of her account that "the fire's all around him"?
- c. At 03.01.20 you speak to Mr Disson again yourself (LFB00000395). You ask for his flat and floor number: *This call was not brought up in the questions to Fox by CTI*
- Did you realise that you had spoken to this caller already? Did you realise that he was the person who the woman you spoke to at 02.54.21 had been referring to?
- You ask, "Are you able to get out of the property?" He says "No". You say, "You need to [inaudible] get yourself out." He explains that he cannot

because he cannot see. He seems to say that the fire is “next door” and “on the other side”.

- You ask, “Why can’t you get yourself out?” He says it is “too dark” and “too hot”.
- It is clear from the transcript that he felt that he could not leave independently. You simply state “You need to wrap yourself in sheets and a towel.” Why did you not seek to persuade Mr Disson to attempt to leave?
- According to the transcript, he asks you to “get them to come up”. You say, “they’re dealing with it at the moment”. What did you mean by that?
- The transcript ends with Mr Disson saying “Hello, hello, hello?”. Why/how did the call end? Did you make any attempt to call him back?
- Did you feel that you had conveyed to Mr Disson that help would not be coming for him?
- When the call ended, did you consider that Mr Disson had understood that his only chance of surviving was to attempt to leave?
- What did you do with this information following this call?

5.6 Flat 182 (El Wahabi, 21st floor)

a. Call at 02.43.54 (LFB00004790_0097 and LFB000000374). They say, “we’re dying”. You ask if they can get out safely and they say no. You then start to provide FSG advice and the caller goes off the line:

- Were you aware of the earlier calls that had been made from flat 182?
- Did you know that this was a family including children?
- Should you have explored further whether they could leave, and, if so, how they could leave?

6. CALLING PEOPLE BACK

6.1 Practice

- Automatic record all phone numbers from FSG callers?
- Where recorded? Accessible to who? On CRO screens?
- Jo Smith evidence. Agree/Disagree/add:
 - Do not as a matter of practice call callers back (T22/143/16-20); long custom and practice not to do so (T22/152/13-15)?
 - Recognises that other control rooms may do so (T22/145/6-146/6)?
- Although it is possible to call back, what are the circumstances in which you would?
- Policy 539, Emergency Call Management, paras 4.57 – 4.59 “An incomplete call is where the caller has cleared the line, replaced the receiver or left the line before a complete address can be obtained... If the level of detail is insufficient to make an attendance or is attended, the supervisory control room officer will:...
- “Instruct the control room officer to attempt to re-contact the caller. This will only be providing it can be established the call is not a fire call” (LFB00000737_0009-10);
- Why not call an incomplete fire call back? At least if you know the number is a mobile
- f. Any more specific or detailed policy on calling back?

g. Would change of circumstances change, including e.g. deterioration in conditions as evidenced by the Radio log [MET00013830_0021-22], be a justifiable basis to call back?

- Ditto: if there has been a change in advice (including stay put)?

h. Given the advice to everyone was to leave; was time not well spent by one party telling all callers (at least in the previous 15 minutes) to leave?

6.2 Calling back on the night

a. Are you aware of any examples of calling back during the night?

b. Was there any discussion in the Control Room to try and ring back previous callers when the mobile was given, in order to tell them that original stay put advice had altered?

c. How else would people know that the stay put advice had changed if they were not told?

4. CRO Yvonne Adams
<u>1 Training experience</u> 1.1(d) Did you have training or supervision that has ever focussed on how to build empathy and trust with people from different cultural/religious/language backgrounds?
<u>2 Control Room</u> 2.1(b) How easily could you see the whiteboard? 2.1(c) Could you read the details of calls recorded on it from where you were seated?
<u>3 Knowledge of Grenfell Tower</u> 3.1(a) Did you have prior knowledge of GT? 3.1(b) Were you unaware there was just one staircase? 3.1(c) Did you have any knowledge of how tall the block was or how many flats/residents there were?
<u>4 The Night</u> 4.1(c) Do you remember when Mr Oliff took control of the role of communicating with the Command Unit? 4.1(d) Do you remember him keeping pieces of paper? 4.1(e) Can you remember at what point Pamela Jones showed you photograph of the fire? 4.1(f) Did your approach to the incoming calls or the advice which you gave change, after seeing the photograph? 4.1(g) if so, how?
<u>4.2 Call to CU8 01.50.49</u> 4.2(c) CU8 ask for an idea of priority on the basis of what the smoke logging was like- Did you pass that request back to the other CROs?
<u>5 Individual calls taken</u>

5.1(e) Given those events, should you have been so unequivocal in your advice?
 5.1(f) Better to have said that she could get out if she felt that were possible?
 5.1(g) what did you do with the information that the caller (Naomi Li) could smell smoke on floor 22?
 5.3(e) what did you understand the Kent CRO to mean by the fact that they were unable to reach him (Mr Disson) and what did you do with this information?
 5.5(k) During the night, were you trying to take steps to mitigate the risk of being misunderstood or to confuse people who were not used to dealing with telephone calls to public services? (Choukair family)
 5.6(b) would you agree the El Wahabi family would in those circumstances have been scared, panic stricken and confused? Would you agree that the family may have needed guidance and encouragement to leave the flat and take a leap of faith into the unknown? Why did you not then ring back the Choukair family and give them the same advice to leave the building?
 5.7(a) Karen Aboud and her two sons. Did you assume you were talking to an adult? Were you aware of previous calls? Was the outcome of this call recorded and if so, where? Can you explain why this call does not appear on either the short or long incident log? Was CRO Fox on calls with you?
 5.8(b) Did you think crews would get to Hesham Rahman in Flat 204, Floor 23? Did you realise you had spoken to his child earlier on?

5. SHARON DARBY

Training and Policy Matters

(3) Did your training include an understanding of Fire Service Circular letter 10/93?

How were you and other CRO's trained on the principles of 10/93?

(9) FSG calls-policy 790, issued in Feb 2012, amended in Dec 2014 and reviewed in April 2017, were you and other control room operators updated on the policy when it was reviewed?

If so, how?

How were you updated on the amendments? Did you and other CRO's receive practical training guidance?

(10) Was Babcock responsible for updates?

(11) What training do you and control room officers receive on updated/new IT systems?

What training did you and other CRO's receive on using the VISION system?

Did you consider it to be adequate?

(12) What guidance are CRO's given in the skills – listen, talk, record, think and make decisions?

These emergency call handling skills are found in the Emergency Call Management Policy 539. Has the training changed in the past 13 years?

If so, how?

High Rise Fires and Cladding

(14) Have you and other CRO's ever heard of high-rise fire spread resulting from cladding prior to GT?

Lakanal House Fire

17(a) At conclusion of inquests into Lakanal Fire, coroner made a number of recommendations to all parties concerned in his prevention of future deaths report/regulation 28 report. Were you and other CRO's aware of this campaign?

17(b) Were you involved in this campaign?

Merton and Fall Back in Stratford

<p>18(a) Was the establishment of a central control room in Merton the result of the closure of other control rooms across London?</p> <p>18(b) Has there been a decrease in the number of CRO's directly as a result of the closure of control rooms? If yes, how are emergency calls and messages from incidents now being handled?</p> <p>18(c) Are they being outsourced to untrained BT handlers who have no training in FSG?</p> <p>18(d) When was Stratford established as the fall back control room?</p> <p>18(e) What would have happened before the control room was moved to Merton, in case of routine maintenance of a control room, would other London control centres have taken emergency calls? If this is so, would this have been the case on 14 June 2017?</p> <p>18(f) You mentioned being beside Peter Duddy and Angie Gotts, were you able to hear the calls being received by them and the advice given?</p> <p>18(g) Angie Gotts mentioned that the red phone (BT call line) rang incessantly on the night of GT. Would these calls have been picked up by control rooms that are now closed- and would they have been handled by CROs trained in FSGs?</p> <p>18(h) What were the capabilities and capacities of the other control rooms across London compared to Stratford- with reference to staffing levels and equipment?</p>
<p><u>Your role on the night</u></p> <p>20(a) What did the rapid make up time tell you?</p>
<p>20(b) How was Angie Gotts recording the FSGs coming through?</p> <p>20(c) How was she passing it on to the incident ground during the first hour of calls?</p> <p>In batches? Or each call as it came in?</p>
<p><u>Live TV news feed</u></p> <p>23(a) If the incident had been received at Merton, would the live television news feed have assisted your understanding of the dynamic changes of the fire at GT?</p> <p>23(c) Would the visual update of fire spread on live news feed have put the calls being received into context?</p> <p>23(d) How would this have assisted you and the CROs assessment of the FSG needed?</p> <p>23(e) Would you/control room have been better informed to advise the incident/CU of the need to evacuate at an earlier stage?</p>
<p><u>Downlink of the heli teli</u></p> <p>The control room at Stratford had no access to pictures from the downlink of the heli tele meaning you had no images of how fire was escalating</p> <p>24(a) is this a common problem across the LFB or was it limited to the fall back centre at Stratford?</p> <p>24(b) If the incident had been received at Merton, would CROs have had the download link of the heli tele? If not, why was this? Was this an ongoing problem with IT systems? Was Babcock responsible for the provision and maintenance of this system?</p> <p>24(c) If the control room had access to the heli tele, how would this have assisted your assessment of the FSG needed?</p> <p>25(a) Knowing what you know of the fire spread now, if you had the visual updates from the news TV feed as well as the heli-teli updates –would the updates to the incident and the FSG advice to residents have been different by 01:30?</p> <p>25(b) If yes, what would the FSG have been? If it would not have been different by 01:30, would it have been different by 01:46:18 – when Control received is 97th call from GT [through MET critical call line] – flat 133 on 16 floor – caller reports being stuck in their kitchen with smoke coming under the front door [LFB00000326] – operator (CRO Adams) says it's manic with some many people stuck in their flats. CRO advises that it's probably best to stay in the flat and make sure that the smoke doesn't come in your windows and ring us back if it gets worse. Control received a call from flat 203 GT at 02:05:25 [LFB00000340] – the caller reported smoke coming into the flat and asked control whether the fire</p>

was going up the building and the CRO response was that he/she didn't know and advised the caller to remain in the flat and they would update the FFs with the call and they would come and get them.
26(a) How would the advice have been different if the control room had the visual updates from the news TV feed as well as the heli teli updates?
26(b) Would the updates to the incident and FSG advice from the control room have changed by then?
27 Why was there no DCT at Stratford? Is this an ongoing problem? Is this system managed/ serviced by Babcock?
28 In relation to the malfunctioning of the MDT you say this: I relayed the locations of the rendezvous points but there were cases when messages were not reaching the mobile data terminals (MDTs). In such circumstances I relayed them via the radio. Was this a common problem with the MDT on appliances across the LFB?
30 Was there a centralised system which would have alerted all fire services of the nature and scale of the incident at GT and the FSG being given?
Essex received several calls during the night including one from flat 193 at 01:48:00 – the operator reported that the call would be sent back to London.
31 (a) Would a centralised have allowed Essex to give appropriate FSG?
31 (b) How would this call have been sent back to London?
CROs have reported ongoing problems with the IT system Visions – CRO Christine Howe reported – we currently use a system called Vision. It is not a great system – we have problems with the address and searches. The addresses it holds are not always correct which causes problems for the attendances of appliances.
33(a) Do you experience a similar problem with Visions.
33(b) Are Babcocks the provider of visions?
33(c) Are they also responsible for servicing this programme?
33(d) Did the problems experienced with Visions affect the CROs response the GT?
33(e) Did you experience a problem with the IT system STARS? How did this affect Control Room's response to GT?
34 CRO Christine Howe reported that the CAD system failed, did this affect your / the CROs response to GT?
<u>FSGs and Communications with the incident and CU</u>
36(i)FSG policy 790 para 3.1 specifies that Control should manage all FSG calls in accordance with FSG Circular 10/93 using the 4 principles of escape, assess, protect and rescue as set out in the Emergency call policy number 539.
Given the lack of updates from the incident (including no visual images of the fire spread) were CROs able to apply these 4 principles to the advice given throughout the night? If not, what are the factors that affected your ability to do so?
<u>BT Critical Line</u>
Angie Gotts recalls the red phone ringing incessantly – she says that it was BT advising that there were calls outstanding.
38 Were you aware of the BT ringing incessantly? If yes, at what stage did the BT calls start coming in – before 01:30/ after 01:30/ after 02:00?
39 Angie Gotts also mentions that there were "calls outstanding" on the BT line? What was the arrangement for taking BT calls ordinarily? What happened on the night?
40 BT call handlers are not trained in FSG guidance – Did you take any of the BT calls? How were the calls from them being dealt with?
<u>Calls to Kensington and Chelsea Council</u>
42 Do you recall whether you or any other CRO attempted to contact the council for a plan of GT earlier in the night? Would such calls from FF on the scene be routed through the control?

Change of Stay Put

44 Given the reports of fire spread from residents that were being received by control, should there have been such a discussion and should this update have fed into the of the dynamic risk assessment of the IC?

45 Was a failure to update the command with the details of the reports in the FSG in any way affected by a failure in the communications?

6. CRO JO SMITH

Training and Policy matters

2 Did you complete mandatory continuing education?

3 If yes, over what period of time, how were the training sessions delivered to you and what were the particular areas of focus?

5 Are you required to undertake continuing education in this role? If yes, does this include awareness and updates of the phenomenon of external fire spread fire, management of major incidents and fire survival guidance?

6 If yes, how was this delivered and by whom?

7 Has your training/ continuing education included a power point presentation on Tall Building Facades [dated 13 July 2016] LFB00003521.

8 If yes, when and to whom was this training delivered?

Control Room Operations, FSG Training and Updates

Fire Survival Guidance Calls – you say in your statement: *the 'Dear Chief Fire Officer' letter 10/93 (the prelude to the FSG document) the FSG is a guidance document that was first implemented in 1993 and is specific to Control Room staff. Before specific documentation was published, staff would work from their own experience of incidents to give advice. to members of the. public over the. phone. Since the publishing of the document staff receive specific annual refresher training centred on four key principles: assessing the situation, offering advice.*

15 How were CROs updated on the new policy when it was introduced?

The Emergency Call Management – **policy 539** (which deals with emergency management call procedures and the control room) was issued in November 2007, reviewed in March 2017 and amended in April 2017.

16 How were you and CROs updated on the policy when it was issued in 2007?

17 How were control room operators updated on its amendments?

Policy 790 – was issued in February 2012, amended in December 2014 and reviewed April 2017.

19 Were you and control room operators updated on the policy when it was issued in 2007?

20 If so, how were you and control room operators updated on its amendments? Did you/ CROs receive practical training guidance?

21 Was Babcock responsible for updates?

22 The role of a CRO is based around computer systems – What training do control room operators receive on updated/ new IT systems? The system used for taking emergency calls is VISION – which was introduced about 2 years ago [Debbie Real MET00007696] – what training did you and CROs receive in this system? Did you consider it to be adequate?

High Rise fires and Cladding

23 Had you and control room operators ever heard of high-rise fire spread resulting from cladding prior to GT?

<p><u>Lakanal House Fire</u></p> <p>At the conclusion of the Inquests into the Lakanal fire in 2013, the Coroner made a number of recommendations to the London Fire Brigade, Southwark Council and the Department for Communities and Local Government in his prevention of future deaths report/ Regulation 28 report.</p> <p>28 Were you and CROs aware of this campaign? Were you and CROs involved in it?</p>
<p><u>Merton and Fall back in Stratford</u></p> <p>29(c) Has there been a decrease in the number of CROs across London as a direct result of the closure of control rooms?</p> <p>29(f) What would have happened before the control room was moved to Merton, in the case of routine maintenance of a control room, would other London control centres have taken emergency calls?</p> <p>29(l) Having regard to your answers to the above), did the closure of control rooms across London affect the ability of the other CROs to deal with the FSG calls from GT on 14 June 2017?</p>
<p><u>Live TV News feed</u></p> <p>30(a) If the incident had been received at Merton, would the live television news feed have assisted CROs and those in the control room's understanding of the dynamic changes of the fire at GT?</p> <p>30(b) When you spoke to Peter May, would this have informed his update to you of the incident?</p> <p>30(d) Would the report of visual update of fire spread on live news feed have put the calls being received into context?</p> <p>30(e) How would this have assisted your and the CROs assessment of the FSG needed?</p> <p>30(f) Would you/ control room have been better informed to advise the Incident / CU of the need to evacuate at an earlier stage? 30(g) In light of the above and having regard to the FSG in policy 539 – Emergency Call management, your experience of Lakanal, would you have been able to assess the development of the fire en route and advise the staff and Oliff to change the advice sooner?</p> <p>30(h) If the TV in the control room was on at the time of your arrival at 2:15, bearing in mind the updates you had been receiving of residents being unable to evacuate, would you have changed the advice from stay put sooner?</p> <p><u>Downlink of the heli teli</u></p> <p>Knowing what you know of the fire spread now, if CROs had the visual updates from the news TV feed as well as the heli teli updates –</p> <p>32(a) would the updates to the incident and the FSG advice to residents have been different by 01:30? If yes, what would the FSG have been?</p> <p>32(b) If it would not have been different by 01:30, would it have been different by 01:46:18 – when Control received is 97 th call from GT [through MET critical call line] – flat 133 on 16th floor – caller reports being stuck in their kitchen with smoke coming under the front door – operator (CRO Adams) says it's manic with some many people stuck in their flats. CRO advises that it's probably best to stay in the flat and make sure that the smoke doesn't come in your windows and ring us back if it gets worse.</p> <p><u>Dynamic Control tool</u></p> <p>34 Why was there no DCT at Stratford? Is this an ongoing problem? Is this system managed/ serviced by Babcock?</p>
<p><u>Other IT and problems</u></p> <p>CROs have reported ongoing problems with the IT system Visions – CRO Christine Howe reported – <i>we currently use a system called Vision. It is not a great system – we have problems with the address and searches. The addresses it holds are not always correct which causes problems for the attendances of appliances.</i></p> <p>39 Do you experience a similar problem with Visions? Are Babcocks the provider of visions? Are they also responsible for servicing this programme? Did the problems experienced with Visions affect the CROs response the GT?</p>

40 Were there reports of problems with the IT system STARS? How did this affect Control Room's response to GT?
41 CRO Christine Howe reported that the CAD system failed, did this affect your / the CROs response to GT?
<u>Calls after 2am</u>
51(b) Are you able to recall the specifics of calls taken from any flats after your arrival or the reports of calls received, in particular calls taken from callers in Flats 201, 92, 194, 175, 115, 204, 193 (which are recorded on the board and relate specifically to our clients). Do you recall any specific reports about calls received from these flats and the conditions reported by CROs whether you took any of the calls from these flats? Do you recall the order in which the calls were being recorded on the board?
<u>Prioritising Calls</u>
55 How did the sheer volume and rapidity of the calls affect CROs ability to prioritise FSGs? Control room was not receiving any updates of the fire spread from the FF, why was this? Was this your experience in other cases?
<u>Specific client Questions</u>
When you arrived you listed to the 2 longest calls. We will ask you question on this specifically concerning Jessica's call at 01:29:48. LFB00001914_0050. This call was taken by an Operator Sarah Russell. MET00007698_0001. Ms Russell was on the phone to Jessica a 12 year old child, for 54 minutes. It became apparent early in this call that Jessica was not in her own flat 176 on 20th, but in flat 201 on the 23rd floor. Ms Russell was most likely still on the call when you arrived at Stratford.
57 Was this one of the calls that you listened to on your arrival?
58 Jessica Urbano was a 12 year old child, without her parents or immediate family, should her call have been treated as a priority?
59 If so, what would that actually mean?
60 As a priority call, what system was in place for providing FFs and or the CU with updating information for priority callers? FFs were searching for Jessica on the 20 floor. They were ascending the tower sometime after 01:30 (Badillo and Secrett telemetry chart).
61 During the call to Jessica or when Ms Russell ended the call, was any information passed onto you from Ms Russell or to your knowledge to anyone else in the control, to say that the 12 year old child was not in her flat, but on 23rd floor flat 201 with other people?
62 If yes, was the message that Jessica Urbano Ramirez was trapped on 23 floor passed from the Control Room to firefighters at the fire ground?
63 Was this information passed onto the Command Unit and or Bridgehead?
64 If not, why not?
65 If an Operator is on the phone for a long time, is there a system in place for that Operator to update colleagues of changing circumstances for the caller and significant changes in information, so that the information can be passed urgently on to the fire ground and or CU?
<u>Denis Murphy</u>
68 Was there any system in place by which the Control Room were updated by the CU of instances where residents had been moved from one flat to another by FFs?
69 Would you agree that it would have been important to be able to "track" callers who had moved either by their own volition or by FFs?
<u>Calls to Kensington and Chelsea Council</u>
70 Do you know (from your discussions with CROs, the LFBs internal review and debrief) whether you any other CROs attempted to contact the council for a plan of GT earlier in the night? Would such calls from FF on the scene be routed through the control?
<u>Change of Stay Put</u>
75 The Grenfell Tower – Control debrief IMPD Outcomes recommends under the heading Development that – The fall back facilities located at Stratford should replicate those situated at the LOC Merton, what were the details listed?

77 Do you know whether FF Oliff discussed changing the stay put advice with FF Meyrick or others in CU7 before your arrival?
Request for PPV
81 The debrief notes record: 0257 – PPV requested from the incident – no current mobilising protocols in place for this request – LFB00003113_0006. Why was this and what was the consequence of this?

7. CRO ALEXANDRA NORMAN

QUESTION ASKED
TRANSCRIPT
REFERENCE

Topic a) TRAINING

Training of Control Room Staff and Officers

3. Did your training include an understanding of Fire Service Circular letter 10/93? How were you and other CROs trained on the principles of 10/93?

6. You describe leadership training with Babcock – how is this delivered? Is it computer based?

Question: Before Babcock took over the training, was training delivered by the LFB? Did the LFB training include guidance and training on the roles?

12. FSGs are dealt with at Appendix 3 of [Emergency Call Management] Policy 539 – *if a call is received from a high rise building where fire, heat and smoke are not affecting the caller LFB would advise that: you are usually safest to remain in your premises unless affected by fire, heat or smoke. If the situation changes, you should leave your premises and dial 999 if you need further assistance.*

(a) Did you and other CROs receive practical guidance on this policy and advice to be given to callers affected by a fire in a high rise building?

13. **Fire Survival Guidance Calls** – policy 790 – was issued in February 2012, amended in December 2014 and reviewed April 2017.

Were you and other control room operators updated on the policy when it was issued in 2007 [ASKED]? If so, how? How were you and other control room operators updated on its amendments? Did you/ other CROs receive practical training guidance?

14. Was Babcock responsible for updates?

15. The role of a CRO is based around computer systems – What training do you and control room officers receive on updated/ new IT systems? The system used for taking emergency calls is VISION – which was introduced about 2 years ago [Debbie Real MET00007696] – what training did you and other CROs receive in this system? Did you consider it to be adequate?

16. **Emergency call handling skills** – [Emergency Call Management policy 539] lists the following skills required of a call room officer – listen (not to make assumptions)

talk (maintain a dialogue)

record (key the relevant details accurately in the appropriate place on the mobilising system)

think – what information is/is not being given and what information is required

make decisions – is this call appropriate from the brigade to attend and if so what attendance is required

What guidance are CROs given in the above skills? Has the training changed in the past 13 years (since you joined the LFB)? If so, how?

Page 12, Line 20;

Page 10, Line 15; Page 11, Line 4

17. Given your experience as a CRO are you able say whether BT and MPS calls handlers who receive emergency calls – where there is a problem in connecting calls to the Brigade or where there is wide scale communication failures (as was experienced during GT) - receive training in emergency call handling skills? If yes was this in line with para 16 above?

Topic b) HIGH RISE FIRES AND CLADDING

18. Had you and other control room operators ever heard of high rise fire spread resulting from cladding prior to GT?

Lakanal House Fire

(b) Were you involved in the control room debrief following Lakanal?

(c) If you were involved in Lakanal did your experience of Lakanal alter your understanding of the advice to be given?

22. In June 2017 the LFB control room was located in Merton and Stratford (a much smaller control room) was the “fall back” control room.

(a) Was the establishment of a central control room in Merton the result of the closure of other control rooms across London?

(b) Has there been a decrease in the number of CROs directly as a result of the closure of control rooms?

(c) If yes, how are emergency calls and messages from incidents now being handled? Are they being outsourced to untrained BT handlers – who have no training in FSG?

(d) When was Stratford established as the fall back control room?

(e) What would have happened before the control room was moved to Merton, in the case of routine maintenance of a control room, would other London control centres have taken emergency calls?

(f) If this is so, would this have been the case on 14th June 2017?

(g) Angie Gotts mentioned in her statement that the red phone (BT call line) rang incessantly with outstanding calls on the night of GT. Would these calls have been picked up by control rooms that are now closed – and would have been handled by CROs trained in FSGs?

Communication with the Incident Before 02am

23. You describe calls coming in from Grenfell Tower at a rapid rate after 01:19 with reports of fire in the building and being affected by smoke and you further state that all the information from the calls were passed to the crews on the ground via radio transmissions.

Summary of call below:

LFB00000308 – taken at 01:25:16 duration 3 mins 57 secs. *Caller reports he lives at 111 on 14th floor - caller tells operator that the fire is coming past his window from next door - operator tells caller to stay inside - there are 8 fire engines there and another 2 on the way - caller says there's no smoke in the flat but can smell burning - operator says if there's no smoke coming in the flat you're safe - will let the crew know where u are and they will come and check you - stay put for now and if anything changes call us back - hears to alarms going off and says smoke is coming into my flat now from the landing - operator says put something in front of the door to stop the smoke coming in and will tell crew where you are*

(b) [please show Ms Norman entries of the short incident log 01:54:04 – which would have been made after receiving Dennis Murphy's call] however it doesn't report the call from Mr Murphy. Did you pass this and the other calls you took from callers to other CROs for transmission to the incident ground?

(c) If you did how were they transmitted and where would they have been recorded?

25. You go on to say in your statement that you were passing information to the command unit via the telephone - I instructed my Assistant Operations Managers Peter May and Debbie REAL to not answer calls, concentrate on mobilising all resources required, and to assist me with the management whilst I was passing information to the Command Unit via the telephone. [page 6]

(e) Was it a single continuous call to CU?

Mobilisation of SM Jo Smith

27. CRO Smith mobilised to Control at 01:40 and she gave evidence that she was in communication with control as she was en route.

(a) Did you speak with her whilst she was en route?

(b) If no, given the nature and volume of the calls, why not?

(c) If yes, did you discuss the nature of the calls coming in and advice being given?

(d) Did CRO Smith speak to you or Peter May about her understanding of the fire spread prior to her arrival?

Arrival of SM Jo Smith

IT AND EQUIPMENT

30. If you and other CROs had visual updates of the fire spread throughout the night – would the advice have remained stay put? Would there have been the decision taken in the control room to advise the incident ground of the need to change stay put?

31. In the absence of Jo Smith at control could you/ someone else have advised the command that given the nature and number of calls residents should be advised to evacuate?

33. Down link of the heli teli – the Control Room at Stratford had no access to pictures from the downlink of the heli tele meaning you had no images of how the fire was escalating.

(b) If the incident calls had been received at Merton would CROs have had the download link of the heli teli? If not, why was this? Was this an ongoing problem with IT systems? If it is an ongoing IT problem, was Babcock responsible for the provision and maintenance of this system?

(d) Would you/ control room have been better informed to advise the Incident / CU of the need to evacuate / change stay put at an earlier stage?

35. Dynamic control tool (DCT) – the CROs had no dynamic cover tool (an electronic map linked to the mobilising system that shows overall cover in the LFB area dynamically. Not having access to this made maintaining fire cover difficult and very time consuming, as it necessitated using a large laminated map to work out the areas in London that required cover and to provide this in a strategic manner ensuring that it was evenly spread and that cover for watch managers was adequate – [Debbie Real MET0000769].

Why was there no DCT at Stratford [ASKED]? Is this an ongoing problem? Is this system managed/ serviced by Babcock?

Other IT and problems – MDT, Lync phone, ongoing problems with Vision, Stars, no centralised system

36. Several FFs reported malfunctioning of the MDT on the 14th June which affected their status to GT and location of GT.

Question: Was this a common problem with the MDT on appliances across the LFB?

37. FSG calls were picked up by other control rooms outside of London including, Surrey, Essex, Glasgow and the NW fire region and

Staffordshire west due to the number of overwhelming calls. There was no direct communication between London and the other services or no way for the other services to have a live update of the FSG given.

38. Question: Was there a centralised system which would have alerted all fire services of the nature and scale of the incident at GT and the FSG being given?

40. CROs have reported on going problems with the IT system Visions – CRO Christine Howe reported – we currently use a system called Vision. It is not a great system – we have problems with the address and searches. The addresses it holds are not always correct which causes problems for the attendances of appliances. Question:

- (a) Do you experience a similar problem with Visions?
 - (b) Are Babcock the provider of visions?
 - (c) Are they also responsible for servicing this programme?
 - (d) Did the problems experienced with Visions affect the CROs response the GT?
 - (e) Did you experience a problem with the IT system STARS? How did this affect Control Room's response to GT?
41. CRO Christine Howe reported that the CAD system failed, [MET xxx7763_0004] did this affect your / the CROs response to GT?

Change of Stay put

46. Given the reports of fire spread from residents that were being received by control, should there have been such a discussion and should this update have fed into the dynamic risk assessment of the IC?

47. Was a failure to update the command with the details of the reports in the FSGs in any way affected by a failure in the communications?

SCHEDULE OF CLIENT SPECIFIC QUESTIONS FOR ALEXANDRA NORMAN ON BEHALF OF THE CLIENTS REPRESENTED BY FIRMS IN THE G11 GROUP

1. Dennis Murphy – Flat 111 Floor 14 – firm Birnberg Peirce Limited

At 01:25:16 – you received a call from Dennis Murphy who lived in flat 111 floor 14 LFB00000308–(summarised) as follows: *Mr Murphy tells operator that the fire is coming past his window from next door - operator tells caller to stay inside - there are 8 fire engines there and another 2 on the way – Mr Murphy says there's no smoke in the flat but can smell burning - operator says if there's no smoke coming in the flat you're safe - will let the crew know where u are and they will come and check you - stay put for now and if anything changes call us back - hears to alarms going off and says smoke is coming into my flat now from the landing - operator says put something in front of the door to stop the smoke coming in and will tell crew where you are*

Question from the Murphy family:

(d) Given the stay put advice which was given to Mr Murphy and subsequent calls received from Mr Murphy and other callers (who made multiple calls) by CROs what was the position for dealing with repeat calls/ multiple calls from the same person/ same flat and advice given?

2. The Belkadi Family Flat 175 20th floor – firm Birnberg Peirce Limited

You received a call from the Belkadis timed at 01:30:02, transcript reference [LFB00000314] the call lasted 30 seconds and is summarised as follows: *The caller says that smoke is coming into my flat – you say best thing to do is to stay in flat unless it's safe to leave - I don't know what the stairwells are like – the caller reports that there are 5 people in flat - caller, husband 3 kids (1 baby) – you tell the caller -we've got 20 fire engines – you tell the caller don't open the windows because it could be coming up the outside of the building – You also tell the caller to call back if it gets worse*

(b) What were the provisions in place to deal with multiple reports from the same caller about the same flat?

(c) There was a call from control to CU 8 INQ00000194 updating CU8 with a series of calls received from the incident – this included the calls from 175 and Dennis – which is Murphy's call 111 – why were calls being sent through to CU / incident ground as grouped calls?

3. Rabia Yahya and children [REDACTED] Flat 152, 18th floor - firm Birnberg Peirce Limited

(1) When there are FSG calls in the context of a fire in a high rise block, is it standard practice to ask the caller for the number of the flat where they are trapped and the number of persons in the flat?

(2) Is it standard practice to ask callers to provide details of individuals trapped with them in their flats such as the number of individuals trapped, whether there are minors or not, their names, and possible hindrances to mobility such as pregnancy, and then to pass this information onto the fire ground? How do you consider that information as to the number of people trapped and their age/mobility might inform rescue efforts?

(4) Refer the witness to a message by the Radio Operator at Brigade Control at 1:36:01 (LFB00003055) to Golf 261 Acton's PL confirming the receipt of the messages regarding FSG calls on the 18th, 20th and 22nd floors and asking for confirmation of flat numbers.

Was any attempt made in the Control Room to confirm the flat numbers of the FSG callers on the 18th, 20th and 22nd floors at this stage?

(7) On the night of the fire, did you dynamically assess the immediate risk to callers' lives and did that risk assessment inform your advice to callers to stay put or to self evacuate even while the general stay put policy was still in place?

(8) Under what circumstances would you instruct someone to self evacuate even when a general stay put policy was in place?

(11) How are CROs trained to advise callers in relation to self-evacuation? Are they given any training in how to encourage callers to attempt to self-evacuate in conditions which most would find scary (thick smoke, poor visibility, etc)?

4. Mr Bonifacio Flat 83 Floor 11 – firm Hudgell Solicitors

You say in your statement that: *I was told that a blind man on the 8th floor was rescued and survived the fire. This was after receiving some phone calls from people outside the building which my control room officers dealt with. That to me is a miracle he was rescued.*

(a) Were you aware of the details of these calls?

(b) How were control officers dealing with the calls on behalf of Mr Bonifacio? Given his disability, how were these calls being prioritised?

5. Jessica Urbano Ramirez – flat 176 floor 20 [deceased in flat 201] – firm Birnberg Peirce Limited

c) What was your understanding of the purpose of the police helicopter on the night of the fire?

FURTHER CLIENT SPECIFIC QUESTIONS FOR ALEXANDRA NORMAN ON BEHALF OF THE RABIA YAHYA AND HER CHILDREN

(2) Between 1am and 1:40am, do you remember receiving from CROs about FSG callers trapped in flats on various floors, without flat numbers specified?

(3) Upon realising that CROs were fielding FSG calls and failing to request flat numbers, did you ask the CROs to get the relevant flat numbers going forward? Did you ask CROs to ring back any callers to confirm their flat numbers?

(4) Do you recall whether CRO Gotts told you that the caller had said on the call that she was pregnant and had 3 children? If she had given you this information, would you have passed it onto the fire ground?

(5) How do you consider that information as to the number of people trapped and their age/mobility might inform rescue efforts? How might failure to give this type of information hinder rescue efforts?

(6) Do you recall a message at 1:36am from Golf 261 Acton's PL to Radio Operator at Brigade Control confirming receipt of a message regarding FSG calls from the 18, 22nd and 20th floors and asking for confirmation of flat numbers? Do you know whether any attempt was made in the Control Room to confirm the flat numbers of the FSG callers on the 18th, 20th and 22nd floors?

(7) Are you aware of any CROs who failed to change their advice to callers to stay put after the decision to change this advice was communicated?

(8) How are CROs trained to advise callers in relation to self-evacuation? Are they given any training in how to encourage callers to attempt to self-evacuate in conditions which most would find difficult (thick smoke, poor visibility, etc)?

8. CRO PETER DUDDY

QUESTION ASKED
TRANSCRIPT REFERENCE

1. TRAINING AND POLICY MATTERS

Topic a) TRAINING. Training of Control Room Staff and Operators

1. Initial training: You have been a control room officer for the past 2 years. You say that your training was 9 weeks long but disjointed because of IT changes.

(a) Where was this training?

(b) Where was it delivered and by whom?

- (d) Please explain the challenges you experienced during training.
- (e) Were you familiar with Circular 10/93? Did the principles of this circular constitute your training?
- (f) Are you familiar with LFB Emergency Call Management policy 539 [ASKED] – in particular paragraph 5.19 [Fire Survival Guidance] and Appendix 3?

3. How are CROs updated on changes in policy? Lessons learned from incidents?

4. Fire Survival Guidance:

- (a) Did your initial training include specific training in Fire Survival Guidance [ASKED]? Was this practical training involving role play?
- (b) Fire Survival Guidance Manual - Have you ever seen the Fire Survival Guidance (Operator) Manual [please show Mr Duddy LFB00003542] and ask him whether he has ever seen this document before and whether it formed a part of his training?
- (c) FSGs are dealt with at Appendix 3 of [Emergency Call Management] Policy 539 – *if a call is received from a high rise building where fire, heat and smoke are not affecting the caller LFB would advise that: you are usually safest to remain in your premises unless affected by fire, heat or smoke. If the situation changes, you should leave your premises and dial 999 if you need further assistance.*
 - (i) After your initial training, did you and other CROs receive practical guidance on this policy and advice to be given to callers affected by a fire in a high rise building?
 - (ii) In practical terms on an application of this guidance, what was your understanding of the advice to be given to the occupant of a high rise building who reports being affected by heat or smoke?

6. Emergency call handling skills – [Emergency Call Management policy 539] lists the following skills required of a call room officer –

- listen (not to make assumptions)
- talk (maintain a dialogue)
- record (key the relevant details accurately in the appropriate place on the mobilising system)
- think – what information is/is not being given and what information is required
- make decisions – is this call appropriate from the brigade to attend and if so what attendance is required

Question: What guidance are CROs given in the above skills?

7. How practical is this training around the policy? Did you consider it to have been adequate training for responding to FSGs on the 14th June?

8. Did your training including ascertaining from callers whether they were responsible for young children, have mobility issues, a disability or other impairments that would affect their ability to evacuate, unassisted?

9. What is your understanding of the priorities to be given to children, individuals who were responsible for young children, or who had mobility issues or other impairment?

10. How is the guidance in appendix 3 taught? Is it computer based? Is there practical exercises?

Application of the FSG Guidance of Policy 539 on 14th June 2017

12. Are you able say whether BT and MPS calls handlers who receive emergency calls – where there is a problem in connecting calls to the Brigade or where there are wide scale communication failures (as was experienced during GT) - receive training in emergency call handling skills? If yes was this in line with para 6 above.

Duplication of Calls

13. During the course of the night you received many FSG calls – by 2am about 23 calls had been attributed to you ORRV2 and although the initial fire was reported at flat 16 – reports of the effect of fire and smoke were coming in from different floors and there were no specific patterns in the calls – given the lack of visual update from the fire ground, was there a discussion in the control room as to what was happening?

Topic b) HIGH RISE FIRES AND CLADDING

14. Had you and other control room operators ever heard of high rise fire spread resulting from cladding prior to GT? Did you receive training on advice to be given in case of external fire spread or breach of compartmentation?

Topic c) Lakanal House Fire

15. At the conclusion of the Inquests into the Lakanal fire in 2013, the Coroner made a number of recommendations to the London Fire Brigade, Southwark Council and the Department for Communities and Local Government in his prevention of future deaths report/ Regulation 28 report. One of the recommendations was that the LFB considered how to improve dissemination of fire safety information to achieve effective communication of residents in high rise residential buildings. In response to the Coroner's recommendation the LFB prepared a High Rise Communication setting out its plan to increase awareness in fire safety, particularly stay put advice given to people living in high rise building. The target audience included low income groups/those living in social housing and groups who don't speak English as a first language. This was to be done through a poll head campaign LFB0000275_0001.

(a) Were you and other CROs aware of this campaign? Were you and other CROs involved in it?

Topic d) THE CONTROL ROOM – CAPABILITIES AND RESPONSE TO GRENFELL TOWER

MERTON AND 'FALL BACK' IN STRATFORD

The Brigade Control is the hub of the Authority's emergency communications network providing emergency call handling facilities, mobilisation of operational resources and having a strategic overview of operations. [Emergency Call Management Policy 539 para 2.1]

16. In June 2017 the LFB control room was located in Merton and Stratford (a much smaller control room) was the "fall back" control room.

(a) When was control room moved to Merton?

(b) Was this as a result of the closure of other control rooms across London?

(c) Do you know when was Stratford established as the fall back control room?

(d) What would have happened before the control room was moved to Merton, in the case of routine maintenance of a control room, would other London control centres have taken emergency calls?

(e) Would they have been better equipped to deal with influx of calls from GT on June 2017 than Stratford was?

(f) (Having regard to your answers to the above), did the closure of control rooms across London affect your and the ability of the other CROs to deal with the FSG calls from GT on 14th June 2017?

IT AND EQUIPMENT

17. Equipment for live visual updates: **throughout the night the CROs had no visual updates from GT – no live TV news feed, no access to pictures from the down link of the heli teli.**

(a) We have heard evidence of CROs in Merton having 24 hour news updates from the large TV screens which are always on. We have also heard that there was a small TV at Stratford which was not turned on all night. So far as you were aware was this TV working?

(b) If you had the benefit of the live TV updates from the large TV screens in Merton, would you have continued the advice to stay put without guidance for its change from command?

18. Down link of the heli teli – **the Control Room at Stratford had no access to pictures from the downlink of the heli tele meaning you had no images of how the fire was escalating.**

(a) Is this a common problem across the LFB or was it limited to the fall back centre at Stratford?

(b) If the incident calls had been received at Merton would CROs have had the download link of the heli teli? If not, why was this? Was this an ongoing problem with IT systems? If it is an ongoing IT problem, was Babcock responsible for the provision and maintenance of this system?

(c) Had the CROs and control room been able to access the download link from the heli teli, how would this have assisted your assessment of the FSG needed?

(d) Would you/ control room have been better informed to advise the Incident / CU of the need to evacuate / change stay put at an earlier stage?

19. Dynamic control tool (DCT) – **the CROs had no dynamic cover tool (an electronic map linked to the mobilising system that shows overall cover in the LFB area dynamically. Not having access to this made maintaining fire cover difficult and very time consuming, as it necessitated using a large laminated map to work out the areas in London that required cover and to provide this in a strategic manner ensuring that it was evenly spread and that cover for watch managers was adequate – [Debbie Real MET0000769].**

Why was there no DCT at Stratford? Is this an ongoing problem? Is this system managed/ serviced by Babcock?

Other IT and problems – Lync phone, ongoing problems with Vision, Stars, no centralised system

20. GT FSG calls were picked up by other control rooms outside of London including, Surrey, Essex, Glasgow and the NW fire region and Staffordshire west due to the number of overwhelming calls. There was no direct communication between London and the other services or no way for the other services to have a live update of the FSG given.

(a) **By way of example with reference to a specific call which was received by Surrey Fire Service - 02:28:53 in relation to flat 194, 22nd floor [LFBxxx0649] – the operator reported that they were not aware of it and would need to ring London for an update and asked the caller to call back – by then the resident of flat 194 had been waiting to be rescued for over 45 minutes. Surrey then had to ring London 02:30:45 LFBxxx0357 with update of call them of the report received. There were subsequent calls at 02:45:45 received by Surrey which necessitated**

ringing London with update.

(b) Katrina Marshall (Essex) reported receiving a call at 01:57 hours from a Romaphoen (call that has no number attached to it) relating to a fire at Grenfell tower – the caller was not in a flat but could see a fire in the distance. Essex didn't have any details of the incident and had to look on google to see what was happening. Communication was difficult and they thought about making contact via the airwave radio MET00012848_0003.

21. Was there a centralised system which would have alerted all fire services of the nature and scale of the incident at GT and the FSG being given?

22. Essex received several calls during the night including one from flat 193 at 01:48:00 [LFBxxx0325] – the operator reported that the call would be sent back to London.

(a) Would a centralised system have allowed Essex to give appropriate FSG?

(b) How would this call have been sent back to London?

24. You and other CROs have reported ongoing problems with the IT system Visions – in your statement you say this:

The Vision system is our mobilising system. It can only be described as temperamental. It can be incredibly slow to load when required which is very frustrating when trying to find an address that a caller is referring to when in desperate need of fire brigade attendance. As a result I generally use Google Maps because it is so much quicker and more efficient.

CRO Christine Howe says in her statement – *we currently use a system called Vision. It is not a great system – we have problems with the address and searches. The addresses it holds are not always correct which causes problems for the attendances of appliances.*

Do you know whether Babcocks are the provider of visions? Are they also responsible for servicing this programme?

Did you experience a problem with the IT system STARS? How did this affect Control Room's response to GT?

25. CRO Christine Howe reported that the CAD system failed, [MET xxx7763_0004] did you experience a similar problem? How did this affect your / the CROs response to GT?

FSGs AND COMMUNICATIONS WITH THE INCIDENT AND CU

Calls received up to 2am

26. By 2am over 115 FSG calls had been received by the Control Room (Operational Response Document). Of these calls 23 are known to have been received by you. At this stage a considerable number of callers were reporting feeling the effects of smoke and heat. Having regard to the FSG guidance in Appendix 3 of [Emergency Call Management] Policy 539 – *...if a call is received from a high rise building where fire, heat and smoke are not affecting the caller LFB would advise that: you are usually safest to remain in your premises unless affected by fire, heat or smoke. If the situation changes, you should leave your premises and dial 999 if you need further assistance....*

Should callers who reported heat and smoke in their in their flat (from as early as 01:30:38) – 22nd floor LFB00000311 have been advised to

leave instead of being advised to remain?

27. The debrief records "info relayed to crews @ scene by radio" LFB00003113_0002 (FF Oliff was using his mobile to contact CU after he took over FSGs).

- (a) Was each CRO contacting the incident?
- (b) Was there difficulty experienced by you and other CROs getting through to the incident?
- (c) If yes, what were the difficulties experienced? Did this delay the transmission of calls from Control to the incident?
- (d) Was delay in transmission of the calls from control also caused by the number of calls received? Was the case that CROs would send through a batch of calls or report each call as it was received?
- (e) Did the process vary as the night progressed? If yes, can you explain how calls were being sent through (i) between 01:00 and 01:15; (ii) between 01:15 - 01:30; (iii) between 01:30 and 02:00 (prior to FF Oliff taking over the FSGs)
- (f) How were calls being recorded by CROs up to 2am?
- (g) Did you communicate directly with the CU and the incident? If yes, do you recall the details of who you spoke to?
- (h) Control room was not receiving any updates of the fire spread from the FF, why was this? Was this your experience in other cases where you have handled FSGs?
- (i) FSG policy 790 para 3.1 specifies that Control should manage all FSG calls in accordance with FSG Circular 10/93 using the 4 principles of escape, assess, protect and rescue as set out in the Emergency call policy number 539. Given

(a) The call made by Anthony Disson [flat 194 on the 22nd floor] received by you at 01:50:03: There was a delay in sending through a service request of an FSG call or none at all – in the case of Mr Disson's the call at 01:50:03 doesn't appear to have been sent by you to the Incident, could explain what accounted for the delay and non transmission?

(b) Policy 539 gives the general guidance to CROs to provide the following relevant information of the calls to be based to the incident ground [page 16]

- Number of persons involved
 - Names if known (by telephone only, not by radio)
- 11
- Condition of their location i.e. heavy smoke, thick smoke
 - Location of caller within premises
 - Callers proximity to fire
 - Latest FSG advice given by Control
 - Time of FSG call

Question: It would appear from the service requests that the details of the occupants of the flats, including stating where children were present, numbers of persons in the flat were not transmitted to the incident ground. Why weren't the details of the occupants in the flats being sent over the service request?

(c) Were you receiving information from the incident ground as to rescue efforts and progress of fire fighters? If yes, who were you getting these

updates from and where would they be recorded?

(d) If you were not receiving updates from the Incident, why were the following callers, including our Mr Disson whose family members we represent, told that fire fighters were coming to get them?

- LFBxxx0315 call timed at 01:34:50 Flat 192 on the 22nd floor where you told the caller believed to be Mr Hashim or Ms Jemal that you had people coming up to the 22nd floor.
- LFBxxx0328 flat 194 22nd floor Mr Disson at (01:50:03) was told that you had fire fighters coming up to the 22nd floor already.

(e) Did you experience difficulties in the messages being picked up on the incident ground?

Calls received After Jason Oliff took over FSG calls

28. SM Jason Oliff took over calls to the incident ground from control at 02:06 and started running FSG calls from the Control room to CU 7.

(a) Was there a discussion with you and other Control Room operators that this was to be done before he started running the FSG calls from his mobile phone to the incident ground?

(e) Please show Mr Duddy the bundle of papers retrieved from the Control Room [LFB00001965] and ask him:

- (i) whether he identifies any of the notes he made in relation to calls received in the bundle
- (ii) whether these are notes he passed up to Jason Oliff.

BT Critical Line

29. At 01:24:57, you took a call which came through from a BT operator. The call is summarised in the LFB ORR v2 as follows: Duddy at Brigade Control takes a call from a BT Operator. A female can be heard shouting very loudly in the background. CRO Duddy asks if the line is still open and the BT Operator explains that it is but that she is not getting any response from the caller except shouting 'Help, Help'. CRO Duddy asks the BT Operator if the caller states that her flat is on fire but the response is interrupted by the caller shouting. CRO Duddy explains that the Brigade are already in attendance and the female caller states that she cannot breathe and that the fire is in the kitchen. The caller then leaves the line. CRO Duddy confirms with the BT operator that the line is still open and says hello several times. He asks the BT Operator to keep the line open. Incident Number 76047, Call Duration one minute, 57 seconds (Source, BOSS Viewer, 999

You took another at 01:26:54 which is transferred from a BT operator in Nottingham.

- (a) What was the protocol and arrangement for taking BT calls ordinarily?
- (b) Please explain the process by which LFB emergency calls picked up by BT calls are passed to the LFB.
- (c) Are all BT calls which are FSG calls usually passed to the Brigade Control?
- (d) What happened on the night on 14th June 2017?
- (e) BT call handlers are not trained in FSG guidance – Did you take any of the BT calls? How were the calls from them being dealt with?

9. CRO DEBBIE REAL

QUESTION ASKED
TRANSCRIPT REFERENCE

Declaration of a Major Incident

02:42:38 - AOM Real at Brigade Control makes a call to the Royal Borough of Kensington which is summarised in the ORR v2 page 217 as follows:

(LBKC) to report the Major Incident declaration. The RBKC Operator says that they are aware and asks if the Brigade need anything from them. AOM Real explains that she is required to inform the Borough Duty Officer. The RBKC Operator gives the reference as T1585687 (Source, NICE, Adm in Phone Line Audio file: GTIRT18-00905).

(iii) Were you aware of the request from CU8 to Control at 02:16:58 CU8 for the attendance of Dangerous Structures Engineer, Gas and Electricity Board and Local Authority Liaison Officer [LFB00002423]?

(iv) Were you aware of the difficulties in getting assistance from the LBKC?

10.CRO AISHA JABIN

QUESTION ASKED
TRANSCRIPT REFERENCE

Question pertaining to Raymond Bernard

Should you have asked to speak to the other occupants at that stage and given them individual FSG advice?

EXAMPLES OF AREAS WHERE QUESTIONS WERE NOT ASKED OF FIREFIGHTERS	
1. G11 QUESTIONS TO DOWDEN AND JUNIOR FFS (e.g. CM Marc O'Donovan, WM Williams, WM Watson, WM O'Keefe) regarding training provided are not engaged with reference to Babcock. This was only done when senior fire fighters were questioned.	
2. G11 QUESTION NOT ASKED TO COMMISSIONER DANNY COTTON: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Guy Tillotson prepared a presentation with costings about smoke hood, were you aware of that? In his statement, CM Ben Gallagher said this about Mr Tillotson's presentation: MET00010083_0022: <i>"The governor and Guy carried out a whole presentation about how it worked, how much it would cost to implement, who the manufacturers were and put it up for consideration. From what I understand they were told we don't have a budget for it. It's not necessary and we wouldn't be getting them. They are small enough to sit in your pack, they are a bit like a carrier bags. You put them over the casualties' head and zip tie up. Casualties can then be brought through the smoke. This incident happened two months after the presentation. I know it would have helped if we had carried them. I know the French fire department carry them. we had an incident not far from here where people were trapped behind bars with smoke coming and we had nothing to put on them."</i> 	
3. Guy Tillotson's ideas and requests were rejected. Do you know by whom and the reasons for this? Again was this a matter of funding?	
4. <u>DANIEL EGAN (gave evidence on 3 and 4 July 2018)</u> <p><u>Questions relating to Elpido Bonifacio</u></p> <p>One example of a delayed rescue due to miscommunication of the number of floors was that of an elderly, disabled, blind resident of flat 83 – the 11th floor being mistaken for the 8th (the pre-refurbishment numbering). This resident was not rescued until after 8am. Would Mr Egan have expected to have received a list of the residents of GT? How would this have assisted his FSG coordination and response?</p> <p>-----</p> <p>(a) First call at 01:39:15 - Flat 204- Floor 23 caller had a disability but didn't report this in his call and wasn't asked</p> <p>(b) Call back at 02:36:07 — he reported that he could walk very well and needed help when to go down the stairs. – CRO response – was that the report would that he couldn't make the stairs would be reported.</p> <p>(c) He called back at - 03:10:34 – he was still waiting</p> <p>(d) 03:16:12 – he was still waiting – his son rang for an update and was told then that he needed to leave the building.</p>	

<p>(e) 03:20:31 – he called back and as he was still there waiting.</p> <p>(f) Call at 02:58:52 – Flat 83 – 11th floor - caller reported that her father in law was trapped in flat 83 - He's blind and disabled. He's old - he can't get out on his own and is it just him in there - his hearing isn't great. He wasn't rescued until after 8am.</p> <p>How should these calls have been prioritised? How in fact were they? were these calls prioritised?</p>	
<p>5. <u>GREGORY LAWSON (gave evidence on 10 September 2018)</u></p> <p><u>Questions relating to Elpido Bonifacio</u></p> <p>Outside the tower. The man on 11th floor. Mr Lawson we seek to explore these questions with you as our client Mr Bonifacio who was in flat 83 was seen at the window throughout the night until he was rescued sometime after 8am.</p> <p>(a) Are you able to say which ALP you were operating? There were ALPs from Soho, Wimbledon, Wembley and Surrey.</p> <p>(b) Are you sure it was on the East side of the building?</p> <p>(c) In relation to your description of the man coming to the window throughout the night, you refer to him smoking a cigarette, are you sure of this? Given the external fire spread and smoke from the building, could you have been mistaken</p> <p>(e) Did you know of the elderly, disabled blind, Asian man who was rescued from the 11th floor after who kept coming to his window throughout the night?</p> <p>(f) Were you referring to him?</p>	
<p>6. <u>PETE WOLFENDEN (gave evidence on 11 September 2018)</u></p> <p><u>Questions relating to Elpido Bonifacio</u></p> <p>In relation to Mr Bonifacio, who lived in flat 83, in your statement you say: I remember having a FSG on the 11th floor for a blind person. We sent two crews but heard nothing back</p> <p>(a) When did you receive the FSG in relation to Mr Bonifacio?</p> <p>(b) Can you assist with the details of the information that was passed to you?</p> <p>(c) You refer to two crews being sent – do you mean 2 sets of crews sent on 2 separate occasions?</p>	
<p>7. <u>DAVE O'NEIL (gave evidence on 2 October 2018)</u></p> <p><u>Questions relating to Elpido Bonifacio</u></p> <p>"You refer in your statement to being told by crew of a man who keep appearing and disappearing at the window waving a towel and that it was believed that he was on the 11th floor.</p> <p>(e) You mention trying to communicate with the man Bonifacio but that in the end you couldn't as it turned out that he was deaf and blind.</p> <p>(vi) Did you know that Mr Bonifacio's wife and son were on the ground at base of the Tower?</p> <p>(vii) If yes, did you speak to them?</p>	
<p>8. <u>THOMAS ABELL (gave evidence on 2 July 2018)</u></p> <p><u>Questions relating to Milad Kareem and Rebin Sabir</u></p>	

<p>2. The rescue he performed via the ladder of the middle Eastern male.</p> <p>(i) Would it have been possible to perform this on other facades of the building which were not yet affected if people could be told to go to their windows?</p> <p>(ii) This is quite a dangerous rescue operation on a high-rise tower</p>	
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