



London Ambulance Service **NHS**
NHS Trust

Statement in response to the Rule 9 request from the Grenfell Tower Enquiry, 2 May 2018

Paul Woodrow, Director of Operations
June 2018

Contents	Page
1.0 Introduction	3
2.0 My Current role and experience	3
3.0 Specific issues raised in the Inquiry's Rule 9 Request	3
4.0 Further information	30
5.0 Annexes A to F	31

1.0 Introduction

1.1 I am the Director of Operations at the London Ambulance Service NHS Trust (“LAS”). I make this statement in response to the Rule 9 Request from the Grenfell Tower Inquiry (“the Inquiry”) dated 2 May 2018.

1.2 This statement is structured as follows:

- A brief outline of my current role and experience;
- The points (a) to (d) that the Inquiry has asked that I address in particular;
- Attached as annexes to this Statement are documents that I have referred to within the Statement which I consider may assist the Inquiry.

1.3 In preparing this Statement I have had regard to the commitment of the LAS to assist the Inquiry so far as it possibly can with the important work that it is undertaking.

2.0 My current role and experience

2.1 I have worked for the LAS for 27 years and have been a senior operational manager within the Trust for the last fifteen years. I have held the position of Director of Operations at LAS for two years. Before commencing this role I was the Director of Performance. In my role I have responsibility for delivering the operational response across the Trust. This includes the line management of all frontline services. The Portfolio also includes two 999 Emergency Operations Centres and one NHS111 Operations Centre. I am also responsible for the delivery of our Emergency Preparedness, Resilience and Response (EPRR) function within the Trust, and as such am the Trust’s Accountable Emergency Officer (AEO) as required by the NHS Act 2006 (as amended) which places a duty on relevant service providers to appoint an individual to be responsible for discharging their duties under section (252A).

2.2 In making this statement I have drawn on information and documents generated and held by LAS.

3.0 Specific issues raised in the Inquiry’s Rule 9 Request

a) The chronological account of the response of the London Ambulance Service (“the LAS”) to the fire during the period from midnight on 13 June until 8.00 am on 14 June 2017, identifying those who were in positions of responsibility in relation to the attendance at Grenfell Tower

3.1 In preparing this chronology reference has been made to the detailed contemporaneous logs that were completed on the night. Inevitably some of the precise timings recorded in the logs differ. We have endeavoured to record this information as accurately as possible to assist the Inquiry.

3.2 The chronology records the most significant events which made up the response by the LAS to the fire. It does not record, for example, the dispatch and arrival of every ambulance resource that was sent to the scene. We do however include a table of the resources deployed at the end of the chronology.

3.3 Finally, the chronology should be read in conjunction with the answer (b) which sets out the procedures governing communication.

3.4 Between 00:00 and 08:00, the London Ambulance Service NHS Trust (LAS) received twenty eight 999 calls relating to the fire, three of which were calls were from flats within Grenfell Tower itself. Below is a table summarising the twenty eight calls and their origin, with further details provided in the detailed chronology that follows:

Table 1: Summary of the 28 calls and their origin

Call Type	Number of calls	CAD reference	Call Connect Time
Calls from London Fire Brigade (LFB) to the fire	1	247	01:29:06
Calls from Grenfell Tower Occupants	3 (2* being from 1 patient)	392 448* 486*	02:39:09 03:00:56 03:18:43
Calls from nearby properties and witnesses	8	246 264 265 310 336 484 577 584	01:31:31 01:39:24 01:39:38 01:58:36 02:12:46 03:18:36 04:17:13 04:20:20
Calls generated for patients of the fire at other Locations	7 (3* relating to 1 patient)	275* 381* 413* 433 531 752 768	01:45:48 02:35:03 02:45:29 02:52:40 03:45:27 06:28:53 06:33:22
Calls from Hospitals (not patient related)	2	322 431	01:56:25 02:54:17
Calls from other agencies (Metropolitan Police Service (inc. Casualty Bureau/British Transport Police)	7	424 496 500 551 781 837 943	02:49:58 03:23:55 03:30:27 03:55:35 06:38:48 07:07:11 07:52:24

Table 2: Chronological timeline of the LAS response to the fire at Grenfell Tower

In this timeline I refer to a number of acronyms and other terms which are commonly used by the LAS. I have sought to explain these the first time they are used, however for the assistance of the Inquiry I also attach as annex (F) a full glossary of relevant terms.

Time	Comment
01:29:06	<p>First 999 call connected to the LAS. This call was assigned a Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD) reference of 247.</p> <p>This call was from the London Fire Brigade (LFB). The call handler noted that the LFB were responding to a 20 'pump' persons reported fire where people were reportedly trapped.</p> <p>The location was correctly provided as Grenfell Tower, Lancaster West Estate, London W11 1TG.</p> <p>The call handler had difficulty locating the tower after incorrectly entering SW11 [REDACTED]. The postcode SW11 [REDACTED] which was selected incorrectly recorded the location as [REDACTED] Off St. John's Hill, SW11. It was after clarification from the LFB operator that the LAS call handler entered the correct postcode, W11 1TG and identified the correct location.</p> <p>Towards the conclusion of this call, the LFB updated that it had increased to a 25 'pump' fire.</p> <p>The call handler selected Protocol 8 (Carbon Monoxide / Inhalation / Hazchem / CBRN) to triage the call. As a result, upon the selection of the responses to the questions asked in this protocol, the call received an MPDS determinant of 8D4 (Multiple Victims), which is classified as a category C2 call with a national response time standard of 30 minutes.</p>
01:31:31	<p>The second 999 call (CAD 246) was connected to the LAS regarding the fire.</p> <p>This call was from a witness at a nearby property who reported that they could see a fire from their flat, 3 stories up. The address was given as Clarendon Walk, W11.</p> <p>The call was closed as the caller requested the LFB stating they had come through to the LAS in error, and no further instructions were provided.</p>
01:33:13	First Incident Response Officer (IRO callsign IR61), a single responding clinically trained manager was dispatched to scene.
01:33:28	First Ambulance callsign TN82 dispatched to scene.
01:34:01	London Air Ambulance Trauma Team (LAA) staffed with an emergency medicine consultant and two paramedics was dispatched to scene by road.
01:34:04	4 x Hazardous Area Response Team resources (HART) were

	dispatched to scene.
01:34:26	Second IRO (IR51) dispatched to scene
01:37:37	EOC log entry that the LAS have informed the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) of the call to the fire. The MPS provided their reference number CAD 412.
01:37:52	Third IRO (IR71) dispatched to scene
01:38:07	Second Ambulance (N131) dispatched to scene
01:38:49	IR51 was cancelled for a nearer responding officer.
01:39:24	<p>The third 999 (CAD 264) call relating to the fire is connected to the LAS.</p> <p>This call was from a member of public reporting there was a major incident at Grenfell Tower and that the emergency staircase was alight. They reported that nobody could get in or out. The call was not triaged through MPDS but completed as a duplicate call and as such no closing instructions were provided.</p>
01:39:38	<p>The fourth 999 call (CAD 265) relating to the fire is connected to the LAS.</p> <p>The caller provided the location as Avondale Park Road, W11 and reported that Grenfell Tower, a large tower block was on fire.</p> <p>The call was correctly triaged through Protocol 7 and the call was completed.</p>
01:39:47	Third Ambulance (F231) dispatched to scene
01:40:20	Advance Paramedic Practitioner (APP callsign AP60) was dispatched to scene.
01:40:58	Fourth IRO (IR11) dispatched to scene
01:41:04	IR71 had identified a vehicle problem and was cancelled from the call. This vehicle was taken out of service for the fault to be rectified by an engineer.
01:41:10	<p>CAD 247 is declared as a significant incident by the Emergency Operations Centre (EOC) owing to the nature of the 999 calls being received and the information that had been reported.</p> <p>As a result of this declaration, and in line with the LAS Incident Response Procedures (attached at annex C) EOC ensured that the</p>

	minimum pre-determined attendance (PDA) was deployed to the scene, and consideration was given to the opening of the LAS Specialist Operations Centre (SOC).
01:43:38	EOC records: unable to get hold of LFB - spoke to HART responder Y251 (enroute to the call) they will look at using the nearby leisure centre as a Rendezvous Point (RVP) and report back to EOC upon arrival.
01:44	Specialist Operations Centre (SOC) is opened.
01:44:46	Message sent from SOC to all attending resources to change onto the dedicated Resource Radio Channel.
01:45	4 X further HART resources dispatched.
01:45:02	The first LAS resource to arrive on scene of CAD 247 was Y251 (HART).
01:45:31	Advanced Paramedic Practitioner AP60 arrives on scene.
01:45:48	<p>999 call (CAD 275) connected to the LAS.</p> <p>The caller stated that the patient had been evacuated from a nearby fire and that they wanted to go to St Charles Hospital. The call disconnected and attempts were made to call the informant back. After a voicemail was left, a further call back was answered by the original caller, the patient's friend. They reported that the patient had left the location and was thought to be with ambulance staff at the nearby incident.</p> <p>CADs 381 and 413 are both connected later to the LAS and are relating to this patient.</p> <p>CAD 381 reported that the patient was on 4th floor, has escaped from fire with smoke inhalation but it was unknown where the patient was now.</p> <p>CAD 413 was a call from the NHS 111 Service located at St Charles Hospital. The patient is understood to have been brought there by a relative. The call was clinically assessed by an LAS paramedic clinical advisor based in the EOC and an ambulance was dispatched. The patient was conveyed to St Mary's Hospital, Paddington.</p>
01:47	Command Support Vehicle (CSV) is mobilised to collect the EOC Command Support Team (CST) and attend scene.
01:49:32	The on scene command structure was put into place by IR61 upon their arrival on scene, where IR61 assumed the role of Bronze Medic.

01:52:56.	The LAS updated the LFB by phone that the LAS had declared a significant incident.								
01:54	HART resource Y251 advises that fire vehicles are blocking access. AP60 reports that LAS vehicles are currently some way from the Tower, and they will update with access information and their METHANE report shortly.								
01:56:25	<p>999 call (CAD 322) connected to the LAS.</p> <p>This call was from St Mary's Hospital with an enquiry regarding the fire. The hospital was advised there was no information relating to patients yet.</p> <p>This call was closed as a duplicate.</p>								
01:58:35	A 999 call (CAD 310) was connected to the LAS. This call was from a nearby property reporting a fire nearby. The call was completed when the caller informed that the LAS were already on scene.								
01:59	<p>IR61 provides METHANE report. Confirmed from scene Significant Incident:</p> <table><tr><td>"Significant declared</td></tr><tr><td>Location as given</td></tr><tr><td>Massive fire engulfed outside building, ? Superficial,</td></tr><tr><td>20 storey - northern side engulfed, all levels, debris falling</td></tr><tr><td>Access triage centre - Leisure Centre, Avondale Park Road</td></tr><tr><td>All ambulance crews to Leisure Centre entrance, HART to entrance to building</td></tr><tr><td>? Number of patients, multiple 999 fire calls in progress</td></tr><tr><td>LFB trying to enter building".</td></tr></table>	"Significant declared	Location as given	Massive fire engulfed outside building, ? Superficial,	20 storey - northern side engulfed, all levels, debris falling	Access triage centre - Leisure Centre, Avondale Park Road	All ambulance crews to Leisure Centre entrance, HART to entrance to building	? Number of patients, multiple 999 fire calls in progress	LFB trying to enter building".
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02:03	<p>AP60 (allocated with the role of Bronze Clearing) records a joint decision made by LAA and HART to re-locate the appointed area for Casualty Clearing from the base of the building to a site further back at the side of Kensington Leisure Centre.</p> <p>AP60 updated SOC: casualty clearing had been created and the access point was at Silchester Road, W11.</p> <p>SOC log: Information is heard via the [REDACTED] (emergency services interoperability radio channel) that the MPS helicopter has gone over the scene and reports people hanging out of windows.</p>								

02:04	<p>IR61 Bronze Medic provides an update from scene with their Bronze role allocation:</p> <table><tr><td>"LFB still fighting fire, multiple platforms, unknown number of patients, casualty clearing at Leisure Centre".</td></tr><tr><td>IR61 - Bronze Medic</td></tr><tr><td>IR11 - Bronze Sector</td></tr><tr><td>AP60 - Casualty Clearing</td></tr></table>	"LFB still fighting fire, multiple platforms, unknown number of patients, casualty clearing at Leisure Centre".	IR61 - Bronze Medic	IR11 - Bronze Sector	AP60 - Casualty Clearing
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IR61 - Bronze Medic					
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AP60 - Casualty Clearing					
02:09	<p>EOC Silver on call mobilised to LAS Headquarters by EOC Watch Manager.</p>				
02:10:20	<p>SOC recorded an update passed via [REDACTED] radio channel from the MPS: Top 6 floors looking out to south and west - people leaning out of windows, fire reached roof level.</p>				
02:12:46	<p>999 call connected to the LAS.</p> <p>This call (CAD 336) was from a member of public; reporting they had been in contact with residents within the Tower. The caller reported there were people still trapped but alive on the 23rd floor. The caller was distressed as they asked for an update.</p> <p>This call was completed as an Estimated Time of Arrival (ETA) and as a 3rd party call did not require any pre arrival instructions to be provided.</p> <p><i>(The LFB were updated with this information at 02:21 – entry made later in the chronology)</i></p>				
02:13	<p>Two hospitals were requested to be put on standby, St. Mary's Paddington and Chelsea Westminster by the EOC General Manager.</p>				
02:20	<p>SOC Manager records:</p> <p>Incoming calls into EOC regarding patients on 25th floor. Dispatch Distribution Sector (DDS) asked to inform the LFB and then transfer the call into the dedicated Major Incident sector in SOC.</p>				
02:21:41	<p>DDS desk inform the LFB of CAD 336 and information relating to patients alive on 25th floor.</p>				
02:22	<p>Command Support Vehicle (CSV) with a callsign YC34 arrives on scene. Vehicle in position and staff member, a clinical team leader assumes the role of Bronze Parking upon their arrival.</p>				

02:23	IR61 Bronze medic provides a scene update: "Relocating LFB Command now - will update 20 storey? Unknown number of occupants Engulfed in flames 2 minor injuries currently being triaged YC34 is on scene now and attending casualty clearing".															
02:25	Major Incident declared by LAS Bronze Medic. SOC Manager calls in additional SOC team staff upon declaration of a Major Incident.															
02:26	SOC recorded Major Incident declared after receiving the information from Bronze Medic.															
02:26:41	SOC log entry is made stating 'upper levels eastern aspect and northern aspect - alight and engulfed and roof level' after an update was received by the LAS via the radio channel [REDACTED]															
02:28	Bronze Medic allocates Rendezvous Point for Ambulances as Clarendon Rd at the junction of Cornwall Crescent, W11.															
02:29:12	SOC records: Walmer Road blocked by LFB.															
02:31	Red pager message sent by EOC received by Gold group. Bronze Medic reports an update to SOC: Updated METHANE report; "Confirm Major Location as given, Grenfell Street, 25 storeys Debris falling, multiple LFB inside Access RVP Clarendon Road @ Cornwall Crescent ? Number of patients, over 40 inside, 2x P1 unconscious children, 1x P2 & 1x P3 IR61 at Command Point 7 - Officers to go to LFB Command Point 7". <table><tr><th>Terminology used</th><th>Priority</th><th>Description</th></tr><tr><td>P1</td><td>1</td><td>Immediate Treatment within 1 hour</td></tr><tr><td>P2</td><td>2</td><td>Urgent Treatment with in 4hrs</td></tr><tr><td>P3</td><td>3</td><td>Delayed Treatment can be up to 4hrs and</td></tr><tr><td>P4</td><td>4</td><td>Expectant</td></tr></table> An LAS Emergency Support Vehicle (ESV) YE34 is dispatched to scene by SOC.	Terminology used	Priority	Description	P1	1	Immediate Treatment within 1 hour	P2	2	Urgent Treatment with in 4hrs	P3	3	Delayed Treatment can be up to 4hrs and	P4	4	Expectant
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02:34:26	IR51 is reassigned to CAD 247 and dispatched to the scene.
02:35	<p>SOC Manager asks for Hospital Liaison Officers (HLOs) to be arranged and dispatched.</p> <p>Gold Doctor requests EOC to page the on call Medical Emergency Response Incident Team doctor to attend the scene. Gold Doctor advises they will request two LAA trauma teams to each of the Casualty Clearing Stations.</p> <p>DM50 Dr Fey Probst activates to scene.</p>
02:35:03	999 call (CAD 381) connected to the LAS. This call was related to CAD 275 as described earlier in the chronology.
02:36	Bronze Medic records an LFB request for carry aids for multiple casualties. The request for carry sheets is passed to SOC.
02:37	SOC receives casualty Update from AP60: 4 x P1 (2 in Cardiac Arrest), 1 x P2, 2 x P3
02:37	Mass Casualty Vehicle callsign YM32 is mobilised to scene.
02:37:28	999 call connected to the LAS. CAD 390 was from the LFB declaring a Major Incident.
02:38:40	Log of CAD 390 updated with information from the LFB stating this was now a 40 'pump' fire.
02:39:09	<p>999 call (CAD 392) connected to the LAS. This caller reported there were 5 people stuck in the house that was on fire. Whilst the call handler placed the call on hold to liaise with the call taking manager, the call disconnected. Although the call was correctly completed through Protocol 7 of MPDS, the call handler did not attempt to call back the origin number and complete the call or provide any closing instructions.</p> <p>The call was correctly duplicated to CAD 247 by the controlling dispatcher responsible for resource allocation.</p>
02:40	<p>Bronze Medic provides update to SOC: Information from LFB - 58 Adults and 16 children trapped in Tower. Bronze Clearing records – Temporary mortuary location established, and the records detail this position as the side of Kensington Leisure Centre.</p>
02:43	<p>Three Hospital Liaison Officers (HLO) dispatched: S197 – Sent to Kings College Hospital EC97 – Sent to St Mary's Hospital, Paddington</p>

	N398 – Sent to Chelsea and Westminster Hospital
02:45	Additional HLO (NE97) sent to the Royal Free Hospital.
02:45:29	999 call (CAD 413) connected to the LAS. This call was related to CAD 275 as described earlier in the chronology.
02:49:58	999 call (CAD 424) connected to the LAS. This call was from the MPS asking for crews to attend an RVP a Bomore Rd, W11 for patients suffering from smoke inhalation. The information was duplicated to CAD 247.
02:52	Gold Doctor recorded that the on-call LAA consultant is enroute and advised they have asked that one LAA trauma team remain in position at the Royal London Hospital to provide resilience to the rest of London. LAA trauma team aware of the plan.
02:52:40	999 call (CAD 433) connected to the LAS. This call was from the MPS to outside Latimer Road Underground Station for a patient with smoke inhalation from the nearby fire. Police were on scene and LAS HART attended the patient.
02:54:17	999 call (CAD 431) connected to the LAS. This call was from the site manager at Chelsea and Westminster Hospital making an enquiring regarding the fire. They passed their contact information and were transferred to the EOC manager.
02:55	Command Support Team reported to SOC that the incident had now been sectorised by Bronze Medic: Sector 1 – Leisure Centre Sector 2 – Walkway by side of building LAS command vehicle in position Second ESV being deployed
02:58	The Emergency Support Vehicle (ESV) YE34 reports on scene.
02:59	SOC Manager is informed that there are enough resources on scene.
03:00	LAS Gold suite is opened.
03:00:56	999 call received from a resident within the Tower, CAD 448. The caller reported they were on the 15th floor and were stuck in the flat alone. They advised there was smoke but couldn't see any flames. The call was correctly triaged on Protocol 7. The call handler remained on the line with the patient until the line disconnected before any other instructions were provided.

	The call handler provided reassurance throughout the call and asked if the patient was by the window.
03:06	SOC advised 2 x operational Sectors: Sector 1 – Latimer Road Leisure Centre Sector 2 – West Side of Grenfell Tower
03:06:17	SOC log entry: Y132 request assistance at Latimer Road, have 8 patients. Require oxygen and two resources required.
03:07	SOC informed 8 x patients at Latimer Road Basics Doctor DM50 arrived on scene
03:10	On scene 'Silver' meeting takes place between, LFB, MPS and LAS Incident Commanders.
03:15	N997 relocates the temporary mortuary to inside the Kensington Leisure Centre and LAS resources assisted them with the movement of the deceased.
03:18:36	<p>999 call connected to the LAS.</p> <p>CAD 486 was from the same caller as CAD 448. This patient asked for an update and stated they couldn't breathe. The call was triaged through Protocol 6 – Breathing Problems, and although a priority symptom, Protocol 7 would have been more appropriate.</p> <p>The caller advised that they had tried to go outside but the smoke was too thick, they were able to see and that they had fallen. The call handler phoned the call taking manager and the 999 call disconnected prior to any closing instructions being provided. The call handler attempted to call back and got a voicemail. No message was left.</p>
03:20	<p>Bronze Clearing records: LAA trauma teams are attending and RVP at Latimer Rd as patients are presenting at that location. Kensington Leisure Centre has been designated as the Survivor Reception Centre. The temporary mortuary has been re-located to inside the leisure centre.</p> <p>Gold Doctor arrives in Gold Suite LAS HQ.</p>
03:22	<p>IR51 reports to SOC that they have 1 x Paediatric P1 (10 Year old Hypoxic Arrest), 6 x P2s being treated. Bronze Medic assigns Bramley Rd as Sector 2 Casualty Clearing Area.</p> <p>Bronze Parking - Requests an additional 10 ambulances at the new</p>

	casualty clearing station. They also report a 10 year old in hypoxic arrest on Bramley Road.
03:23:55	999 call (CAD 496) connected to the LAS. This was a call from the British Transport Police (BTP) requesting more oxygen cylinders at the location. This call was closed and duplicated to CAD 247. The ESV is requested from SOC.
03:24	SOC updated by Bronze Medic that Sector 2 Casualty Clearing Area was in operation at Bramley Rd.
03:26	YE32 (ESV) dispatched to scene.
03:27	LAS Gold Communications had received an update from LFB Communications that 200 firefighters were at the scene.
03:28	Critical Incident Loggist updated: IR71 report – Oxygen Masks to Bramley Rd Station Walk Bronze Parking reports 3 x paediatric P3, 1 adult P3 to and 1 x adult P2 patients have been conveyed to Chelsea and Westminster Hospital and 2 x paediatric P2s have been conveyed to St Mary's Hospital, Paddington. Bronze Sector 2 (IR71) requests an additional 10 ambulances to Bramley Rd. 6 x P2, 1 x P1 paediatric patients to St Mary's Hospital, Paddington.
03:28	LAA Doctor callsign Medic Four (DM04) mobile from Royal London Hospital to scene, estimated arrival time provided of 20 minutes. SOC Reports Mass Casualty Vehicle (MCV) dispatched from Fort Street, E16 to scene.
03:30	Gold Doctor informs LAA trauma team, no further LAA resources required at scene.
03:30:27	999 call (CAD 500) connected to the LAS. This call was from the MPS advising the LAS that the A40, at the junction of the A3320 was closed. This information was broadcast over the radio channels of nearby ambulances resources that could be affected.
03:32	MCV (YM33) dispatched to scene by Tactical Advisor
03:35	Gold Medic request mutual/border aid from neighbouring ambulance services.
03:37	London Air Ambulance Trauma Team update: Up to 100 people trapped on top 3 floors

	<p>Bronze Medic notes: Crowd Issue Structural issues with the Tower, reported that smoke/fire has burnt through. 2 x double buses at Clarendon Road. L120 attending the Leisure centre SRC Recorded 150 people located at the Harrow Club on Freston Rod Additional SRC open at Bellushi's Public House – 100 people with British Red Cross in attendance.</p>					
03:40	<p>Gold Meeting takes place at LAS Headquarters, chaired by LAS Gold Medic. Notes made:</p> <p>25 storey, 2 sectors Patient numbers 10 St Mary's P1 x 2, P2 x 1, P3 x 4 =7 Chelsea and Westminster 2 x P2 Royal Free 1 x P2 1 deceased. 3 patients conveyed to St. Thomas's Hospital. HLOs at 4 hospitals (St Mary's, Kings College Hospital, Chelsea and Westminster and Royal Free) Gold Doctor notes a decision that Kings College hospital was declared as opposed to St Georges Hospital in order to provide diametric cover. Further 10 ambulances requested. Mass Casualty Vehicle being sent.</p>					
03:43	<p>Bronze Medic update SOC:</p> <table><tr><td>"Crowd issues - Police dealing with agitated crowds,</td></tr><tr><td>Structural issues, debris, fire, smoke, building burning through as unable to fight fire,</td></tr><tr><td>Sector 2 is Bramley Road</td></tr><tr><td>No further patients are in Sector 1 (Clarendon Road)</td></tr><tr><td>2 double-decker buses are waiting at the Survivor Reception Centre".</td></tr></table>	"Crowd issues - Police dealing with agitated crowds,	Structural issues, debris, fire, smoke, building burning through as unable to fight fire,	Sector 2 is Bramley Road	No further patients are in Sector 1 (Clarendon Road)	2 double-decker buses are waiting at the Survivor Reception Centre".
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03:45:27	<p>999 (CAD 531) call connected to the LAS. This call was for a patient who was suffering from chest pain and smoke inhalation as a result of the fire. The patient was located at a nearby address and was attended by LAS staff. The patient was conveyed to St Mary's Hospital, Paddington.</p>					
03:47	<p>East of England Ambulance Service accept the request for assistance with 999 calls on their borders if required:</p> <p>Formal mutual aid was not requested, but border support arranged. During the course of the response to the fire, the LAS also requested resources from neighbouring ambulance trusts to be placed on mutual</p>					

	aid standby to support core business, should the assistance be required. The neighbouring services were requested to assist with border calls, if needed.
03:54	South East Coast Ambulance Service accept request for assistance with 999 calls on their borders if required.
03:55:33	<p>999 call (CAD 551) connected to the LAS.</p> <p>This was a further call from the MPS advising that the A40, near to the incident was closed in both directions.</p> <p>This information was broadcast over the radio channels of nearby ambulances resources that could be affected.</p>
03:56	Bronze Sector 2 updates SOC that numerous patients were coming out now. Records 2 x P2 patients.
03:59:26	<p>Bronze Sector 2 requesting additional carry sheets from SOC.</p> <p>SOC updates Bronze Sector 2 that YE34 is trying to get through to them but having difficulty with access and delivery of the carry sheets and oxygen.</p>
04:00	Bronze Clearing records 3 x P4 located at the temporary mortuary.
04:00:22	SOC is updated: Bronze Sector 2 reports building is becoming very unsafe - asking for advice from LFB. Asking for info from LFB commander.
04:03	SOC informs Bronze Medic that Sector 2 is requesting an update from the LFB in relation to the structure of the building. LFB advise that their safety officer is wearing a yellow tabard.
04:04:46	<p>SOC records an update: NE97 reports capacity details of the Royal Free Hospital. Resus -2 Beds, Majors - 8 Beds, 3 Beds in Paediatrics and their assessment rooms are available.</p> <p>Bronze Equipment – updates that they have checked with sector, all oxygen deployed, carry sheets and bottled water and whether they need to move. Requires more water and more oxygen masks. Informs that YE32 - will move to Latimer Road.</p>
04:06	Gold Doctor advises that Care UK and LCW (NHS 111 providers) to be contacted by Clinical Support to Gold. NHS 111 providers will be told to minimize, where possible, the transfer of calls to LAS. Hospital notified of the major incident to be advised they are not closed to all other patients.
04:08	SOC notes that LFB Audible whistles have been heard from LFB

	meaning they are evacuating the site. A General Broadcast is made via the radio channels to all resources in attendance of this information.
04:10	<p>Bronze Clearing records that the SRC is to be relocated to Freston Road, Harrow Club.</p> <p>N997 is requested by MPS to move the temporary mortuary from inside the Leisure Centre to a tent situated on a grassed area near an electrical substation at the location. 3 deceased patients are moved to this new location.</p>
04:17:13	<p>999 call (CAD 577) connected to the LAS.</p> <p>This call was from a member of the public reporting a building opposite Latimer Road underground station, Grenfell Tower was on fire.</p> <p>The call was handled as a duplicate call once it was ascertained that there was no particular information relating to patients of the fire.</p>
04:20	MCV YM33, arrives on scene
04:21	Silver Medic is advised by Gold Doctor that there is an aircraft available at RAF Northolt to convey burns victims if required.
04:24:24	<p>SOC records an update:</p> <p>Bronze Loading Sector 1 reports all vehicles blocked in by LFB vehicles 1 x P2 7 x P3. 3 x ambulances to go to Sector 1.</p> <p>EP07 asking if CST is on scene. SOC advised yes but are updated they are currently in a Silver meeting.</p> <p>EP07 asking for additional radios from the CSV.</p>
04:31	<p>On scene 'Silver' meeting takes place between, LFB, MPS and LAS Incident Commanders.</p> <p>Update from Bronze Medic:</p> <p>LFB are at level 13 (of 20) of the flats with people still trapped. LFB state they are happy with the structure of the Tower, but aware of Structural people being brought in. Next silver meeting planned for 05:50.</p>
04:32	On call Welfare Support Officers contacted for EOC call handlers
04:33:17	<p>SOC receives a message: LFB report LAS blocking Bramley Road –</p> <p>Requires LAS ambulance to move back to Clarendon Road</p>
04:38:18	<p>SOC records a number of vehicle movements:</p> <p>Ambulance B331 - on route to survivor centre, Harrow Club, Preston (stet) Road</p> <p>Ambulance L331 - on route to Bellushi's Pub, Shepherds Bush Green</p> <p>Bronze Triage Sector 1 - requesting HART operatives – Reports of a person who had jumped was located on a 1st floor mezzanine.</p>

	Advises HART sent to this location after their request.
04:40	LAS Emergency Bed Service to contact National Burns Bed Bureau for bed availability in the South East.
04:47	<p>Gold Meeting convened and update noted: Silver Medic updates on potential structural collapse – silver meeting on scene, LFB and Structure Engineer report 100 inside, not verified. Moving people back due to ash falling Conveyed – Confirmed left scene – KCH – P1x2, P3x8 CW – P2x2, P3x3 SMH – P1x2, P2x2, P3x4 RFH – P2x1, P3x3 + 3 Dead No further P3 to SMH and KCH +3 P1x1, P2x2 went to St Thomas’</p> <p>Report from scene: LFB committed to 13th floor. Believe structure is safe currently 25 pumps on scene + 20 pumps en route Likely to run to tonight Lots of communications teams arriving Reports sufficient staffing on scene Next gold group planned for 0600.</p>
04:49	Bronze Medic is informed by Bronze Safety Sector 2 that they cannot locate the LFB safety officer.
04:54	Bronze Medic reports that Sector 2 do not require any further resources.
05:00	Bronze Clearing records that although there are enough resources to manage the P3 patients, requests an additional 5 ambulances in the event they have more P1 and P2 patients brought to them.
05:01	<p>Strategic Meeting (Conference Call) chaired by NHS England, attended by LAS (Gold Team), LFB (Gold and Communications), NHS England, MPS, Transport for London, Kensington and Chelsea Emergency Planning.</p> <p>Notes:</p> <p>LFB first call 00:55 2nd – 24th Floor 100 people 40 pumps and anticipate O/S 30 pumps relief 14 Fire Rescue Units + OSU</p>

	<p>U/A to gain access above 15th floor</p> <p>Kensington and Chelsea confirmed that two current survivor reception centres were open with the potential for three more.</p> <p>MPS update that 200 officers were on scene, standing up resilience.</p> <p>Reports of some disorder at cordons but was being managed.</p> <p>Next meeting planned for 06:30.</p>
05:04	Bronze Sector 1 request for further equipment. On scene tactical advisor requests ESV to be taken from Wimbledon Ambulance Station to scene.
05:15:26	SOC records an update from Ambulance C430 - still stuck at the RVP with P2 patient. Blocked in by LFB and Thames Water vehicles also. They advise they will be conveying their patient to St. Mary's Hospital Paddington.
05:25	<p>Bronze Clearing records a vehicle reorganization. New RVP for access to be established.</p> <p>Bronze Sector 1 requests ESV to move to Sector 2.</p>
05:26	Medical Advisor to Gold Doctor advises Hammersmith Hospital, Ducane Rd to be used as a holding zone for all resources.
05:30	YM31 (MCV) mobile from Croydon Ambulance Station to scene
05:31	SOC records that the LFB have updated that potentially 75 people are in the building.
05:31:49	<p>SOC receives an update from C430:</p> <p>Police have managed to clear most of road but their vehicle is still currently blocked in.</p>
05:43	<p>Casualty Figures passed from Bronze Medic to SOC:</p> <p>6 x P1, 9 x P2, 35 x P3.</p> <p>Sector 1 have no further patients</p> <p>Sector 2 reports a few P3 patients only.</p>
05:46:43	SOC records that C430 have upgraded the priority of their patient to P1.
05:48:45	<p>SOC records updates:</p> <p>Emergency Planning states 15 ambulances are located at Latimer Road. Advised to leave 5 there and move the other 10 ambulances to Hammersmith Hospital. Bronze Sector 2 advised.</p> <p>Bronze parking confirms 15 ambulances on scene at Latimer Road. They are checking who is 'x-ray' (a term defining the crew staff end of shift). SOC advises them to send 10 of these resources to</p>

	<p>Hammersmith Hospital.</p> <p>HEMS and LFB state further P1 patients expected so doesn't want to release their ambulances to Hammersmith Hospital.</p> <p>Bronze Sector 1 advised that all ambulances to go to one place - they have people to treat on scene - requested to have vehicles sent back to Sector 1. Command Radio Operator advised that ambulances can be sent very quickly to scene from Hammersmith Hospital.</p>
05:49:57	HEMS desk in EOC updated the log with information: Medic 3 - at Leisure Centre, Medic 4 at Latimer Road, Medic 2 is in the Silver meeting.
05:57:27	SOC records an update from HART – reports of another fatality as a result of jumping. Patient located in the car park. HART attending this location.
05:57:49	SOC receives an update from the HLO at the Royal Free Hospital – They have received a total of 9 x P3 patients
05:59:21	SOC receives an update from Hospital HLOs: St Mary's Paddington: 2 x P1, 8 x P2 Chelsea and Westminster: 2 x P1, 5 x P3 Kings College Hospital: 3 x P1, 2 x P2 and 5 x P3
06:00	On scene 'Silver' meeting takes place between, LFB, MPS and LAS Incident Commanders. Update: Bronze Medic reports LFB stopping at 12 th floor as unable to get water any higher. Casualty Bureau opened by MPS, with reports of 115 people unaccounted for. Next silver meeting planned for 07:10.
06:01:42	C430 is recorded by SOC as arriving at St Mary's Paddington with their patient.
06:02:24	Bronze Sector 2 advises SOC that they have opened the Harrow Club as a Survivor Reception Centre (SRC).
06:10	NHS England Gold (NHS01) Conference call held: Hospital capacity update provided and recorded LAS updates NHS01 with current LAS position and information known. NHS01 advised of reports of patients still being in the building.
06:10:12	SOC records the update from Bronze Medic: Silver meeting LFB now stopped at floor 12 unable to get water any further up. Approx. 116 unaccounted for, query inside or already out. Surrounding buildings evacuated Structural integrity of the building - waiting for surveyors Casualty Bureau telephone number has been set up by police.

06:15	<p>Silver Medic records current casualty figures transported by LAS crews:</p> <table><tr><td></td><td>Kings College</td><td>Chelsea/West</td><td>St Mary's</td><td>Royal Free</td></tr><tr><td>Patient Priority</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>P1</td><td>3</td><td>0</td><td>4</td><td>0</td></tr><tr><td>P2</td><td>1</td><td>2</td><td>5</td><td>1</td></tr><tr><td>P3</td><td>8</td><td>11</td><td>4</td><td>15</td></tr><tr><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Totals</td><td>12</td><td>13</td><td>13</td><td>16</td></tr></table> <p>54 in total, plus Charing Cross Hospital received 2 patients, St Thomas's 1 x P1 and 2 x P2.</p> <p>In addition to the above figures, 6 patients deceased.</p>		Kings College	Chelsea/West	St Mary's	Royal Free	Patient Priority					P1	3	0	4	0	P2	1	2	5	1	P3	8	11	4	15						Totals	12	13	13	16
	Kings College	Chelsea/West	St Mary's	Royal Free																																
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P1	3	0	4	0																																
P2	1	2	5	1																																
P3	8	11	4	15																																
Totals	12	13	13	16																																
06:28:53	<p>999 call (CAD 752) is connected to the LAS from a member of the public. Caller reported around 25 people needing medical attention in relation to major fire incident. Caller states the patients are from Grenfell Tower they have been taken to the Rugby Club, Walmer Rd, W11.</p> <p>An ambulance crew was sent to the location but reported difficulty accessing the location due to the roads being closed by the MPS. They proceeded on foot and once access was gained to the building, were able to assess the patients.</p> <p>CADs 768 and 837 received connected later to the LAS are related to CAD 752.</p>																																			
06:31	<p>LAS gold meeting takes place, Silver Medic reports casualty figures and scene status. EOC general Manager advises the EOC SOC team are currently in the handover period. CST relief being sent to scene. Hospital capacity remains OK.</p>																																			
06:33:22	<p>999 call (CAD 768) is connected to the LAS.</p> <p>This was a further call received relating to CAD 752, the Rugby Club on Walmer Rd, W11.</p> <p>The caller reported that patients had been brought there from Grenfell Tower and needed assistance. The caller reported there were a lot of people in shock, including a diabetic with high blood pressure.</p> <p>This call was duplicated to CAD 752.</p>																																			
06:38:48	<p>999 call (CAD 781) is connected to the LAS.</p>																																			

	This call was from the MPS enquiring which hospitals were in use for the conveyance of patient from the fire. The call was transferred to the EOC manager.
06:47	<p>Notes from Gold Meeting recorded in SOC:</p> <p>Sector 1 x 2 patients. Sector 2 x 4 patients.</p> <p>Silver meeting update: Up to 14th floor, Going down to 12th floor.</p> <p>Unable to get any higher or get water any higher.</p> <p>115 people unaccounted for.</p> <p>Casualty Bureau being opened. Next Silver meeting at 07:10.</p>
07:07:11	<p>999 call (CAD 837) is connected to the LAS.</p> <p>This call was from the MPS and was related to CAD 752. The MPS were advising that they had no-one to attend the location to assist with access (reported on CAD 752). This call was closed as a duplicate and information only.</p>
07:11	<p>Gold receives an update from LFB:</p> <p>LFB fire 4th – 23rd floor. Partial collapse inside. No reason to believe the building will suffer a catastrophic collapse. Helicopters coming to evacuate people from roof.</p> <p>MPS – ISO officer relief. Mass Fatality plan will be activated Confirm police will now take responsibility for deceased figures Coroner on call.</p>
07:52:24	<p>Last 999 call (CAD 943) connected to the LAS before 08:00.</p> <p>This call was from the MPS reported a patient in a nearby location feeling unwell.</p> <p>The call was triaged by the EOC using MPDS and the patient was referred to NHS111 after it was assessed that an emergency ambulance was not required at that time, but they did require a further assessment.</p>
08:10	SOC records a P2 patient at Sector 2.
08:15	Patient is brought out of the building to LAS crew by LFB.
08:16	SOC records a P1 patient being conveyed to Kings College Hospital


LAS ambulance response to the fire at Grenfell Tower

Table 3: The volume of resources activated by type to the incident, and the number of personnel assigned to each resource type

Resource Type	Number	Personnel
Ambulance	66	143
Advanced Paramedic Practitioner	2	2
Clinical Team Leader	14	14
Fast Response Unit	15	15
Incident Response Officer	10	10
Hazardous Area Response Unit (Specialist Assets and Tactical Response)	9	24
London Air Ambulance Trauma Team Response Cars	4	12
Major Incident response vehicles	7	7
Emergency Planning Resilience Officer	5	5
Senior Manager (where assigned to a specific CAD reference)	3	3

3.5 Incident Command Structure

- 3.5.1 Each individual incident will, by its nature, determine whether one or more tiers of the structure are implemented. The command structure is designed to work on three levels – Strategic, Tactical and Operational. On the majority of occasions, needs will be determined from an operational level and then move onto Tactical and finally on rare occasions the Strategic level.
- 3.5.2 Section 4.4 of the LAS Incident Response Procedures details the specific command roles when an incident is declared.



GOLD – Strategic level.

This is the senior tier of management usually based within the LAS Gold Suite at our Headquarters. On occasions a Gold representative (Gold Level Commander) may be based with senior officers of the other emergency services or the health authority, for

example at New Scotland Yard or the designated Strategic Co-ordination Centre (SCC).

SILVER – Tactical level.

The Ambulance Incident Commander will normally be located in the Incident Control Room and will direct the overall management of the incident(s). The role of Silver is to determine priority in allocating resources, planning and co-ordinating tasks and obtaining other resources as required.

BRONZE – Operational level.

Those staff who are managing the operational work at the incident site. Each bronze functional role will concentrate on their specific task within their areas of responsibility as directed by the Ambulance Incident Commander.

The tables that follow show the staff who were in positions of responsibility in relation to the LAS attendance at Grenfell Tower between 00:00 and 08:00.

GOLD Command Structure

Role	Named Personnel
Gold Medic	Stuart Crichton
Staff Officer to Gold Medic	Peter Rhodes
Strategic Advisor to Gold Medic	Liam Lehane
Gold Doctor	Fenella Wrigley
Clinical Advisor to Gold Doctor	Mark Whitbread
Gold Communications Officer	Anna Macarthur

SILVER– Specialist Operation Centre Command Roles

Role	Named Personnel
Silver Medic	Bill Arkell (Athar Khan from 07:00hrs)
Tactical Advisor to Silver Medic	Alan Palmer
Tactical Co-ordinator	Nick Bell

Specialist Operation Centre – Control Roles

Role	Named Personnel
SOC Manager	Angela Henderson
SOC Allocator	Emma Johnson

Operational Command Roles

Role	Named Personnel
Bronze Medic	Laurence Ioannou
Bronze Sector 1	Paul Hammond
Bronze Sector 2	Thomas Gleeson
Bronze Triage Sector 1	Andrew Gould
Bronze Triage Sector 2	Simon Woodmore
Bronze Parking Sector 1	Stuart Matthews

Bronze Parking Sector 2	David Barnes
Bronze Clearing Sector 1	Peter Appleby
Bronze Clearing Sector 2	Maria Conyers
Bronze Loading	Robert Henson
Bronze Safety	Graham Barwick
Bronze Equipment	Chris Reeves
On Scene Tactical Advisor	Geoff Long
On Scene Incident Support Officer	Colin Pinnington

(b) The procedures governing communication between the LAS, the London Fire Brigade (“the LFB”) and the Metropolitan Police Service (“the MPS”) in response to an incident such as the Grenfell Tower fire and how they were implemented in response to the fire there on 14 June 2017

- 3.6 The overarching procedures governing the communications between LAS and the other emergency services during a major incident are set down in the London Emergency Services Liaison Panel (LESLP) Major Incident Procedure Manual (“the LESLP Manual”) and the Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Principles (JESIP) Joint Doctrine; the interoperability framework. Copies of both documents are attached at annexes A and B respectively to this Statement. In addition to this protocol there are local LAS procedures about communications between LAS and the other emergency services during a major incident and these are set down in the LAS Incident Response Procedures which is attached at annex C to this statement.
- 3.7 Section 4 of the LESLP Manual refers to the key principles for effective multi-agency working. I would refer in particular to paragraphs 4.1 to 4.3 which set out those principles, the Joint Decision Model and the assessment of risk and development of a strategy.
- 3.8 Section 8 of the LESLP Manual contains detail on the communication systems and the position of LAS is dealt with specifically at paragraph 8.8. Finally, I would draw the Inquiry’s attention in particular to paragraph 14.2 which is concerned with joined up communication between the emergency services.
- 3.9 The LAS Incident Response Procedures, at section 4.4, sets out the complete Incident command structure available for the management of an incident. Section 4.4.4 describes the operational command structures at the scene of an incident and the role of the Joint Emergency Services Command and Control Centre (JESCC) and the use of multi-agency co-ordination meetings (referred to as “Silver meetings”). The procedures also set out the responsibilities of the Specialist Operations Centre (section 4.6.1) and the procedures in respect of airwave radio communications (section 4.6.6).
- 3.10 The Inquiry asks in its question how these various procedures were implemented in respect of the fire. I have tried, in the detailed chronology in response to question (a) to set out what actually happened. From the perspective of the LAS I would make the following points.

- 3.10.1 Taken as a whole, the communication between LAS and LFB and the MPS followed the established procedures for a major incident referenced above.
- 3.10.2 As might be considered inevitable in an incident of this nature, there were areas that could have worked better. I am specifically thinking of some instances where the timeliness of communication of information between the emergency services could have been improved. However, given the unprecedented nature of the incident this cannot be regarded as unexpected. Furthermore, I should stress that I have no reason to believe that any outcome for a patient was affected.

(c) The procedures governing the treatment and removal of casualties from Grenfell Tower and surrounding dwellings and how they were implemented in response to the fire there on 14 June 2017

- 3.11 The Inquiry asks first about the procedures in place to govern the treatment and removal of casualties in an incident such as Grenfell Tower and, secondly, how these procedures were implemented.
- 3.12 I should stress at the outset that the removal of patients from a fire such as occurred at Grenfell Tower is not the role of LAS. The reasons for this will be self-evident to the Inquiry. For completeness I should point out that the HART teams that were deployed to the fire were equipped with specialist Personal Protective Equipment. However the guidance in the relevant National HART Standard Operating Procedure 04 (attached at annex D) is explicit in making clear that the Extended Duration Breathing Apparatus issued for the use of LAS HART staff is not to be used in an Active Fire (see page 5). Furthermore, this section of the SOP also stipulates that HART staff must not enter any area where:
- The risk of combustion of fire gasses cannot be eliminated;
 - Full structural fire-fighting apparel is required; or
 - Where there is a known risk of entanglement by fallen cables.
- 3.13 The environment at Grenfell Tower during the fire met each of those criteria and the position was therefore beyond any doubt that HART staff should not enter the Tower. I will consequently focus in that Statement on the treatment of casualties from Grenfell Tower. I will also comment on the role of LAS in respect of the establishment of a temporary mortuary for those who died in the fire.
- 3.14 *Procedures governing treatment*
- 3.14.1 Section 3 of the LESLP Manual attached at (Annex A) sets out the main functions of the emergency services and other agencies in responding to a major incident. The primary areas of responsibility of LAS are listed at paragraph 3.4. The procedures in respect of casualty clearance are described in section 9 of the LESLP Manual. I would draw the attention of the Inquiry, in particular, to paragraph 9.3 which deals with injured casualties and the priority descriptions given to types of casualty.

3.14.2 During a major incident casualties are assessed using the triage system described in the LAS Incident Response Procedures attached at (Annex C section 4.8). It will be noted that, as well as making provision in respect of the principles of triage, these Procedures also contain policies about the treatment of the deceased (see paragraph 4.8.6).

3.15 *How these policies were implemented in respect of the treatment of patients in response to the fire*

3.15.1 The detailed chronology provided in response to question (a) describes the extensive response of LAS to this incident, including the resources that were dedicated to treating patients and, where appropriate, conveying them to hospital.

3.15.2 In respect of the treatment provided to survivors of the fire by LAS, this treatment was in accordance with the procedures referred to above. I should add that, notwithstanding the very serious nature of the incident, the number of patients that actually required treatment and conveying to hospital by LAS was sixty eight, this is not, when compared, to other major incidents over recent decades, exceptional. Consequently there was no requirement to depart from the standard procedures that apply in major incidents.

3.16 *Movement of temporary mortuary*

3.16.1 As explained above, there are procedures in place which refer to the appropriate way to treat those who have died in a major incident. During the fire, a temporary mortuary was established at 02:40 to the side of Kensington Leisure Centre. As the incident developed the mortuary was moved to inside the Leisure Centre at 03:15. LAS staff were responsible for moving the three bodies that had been placed in the original location to the revised location. At 04:10 the temporary mortuary was further moved from inside the Leisure Centre to a tent situated on a grassed area near an electrical substation at the location. Three deceased patients are moved to this new location.

(d) Communication of messages to and from those in Grenfell Tower at the time of the fire including, in particular contact (whether direct or otherwise) and liaison between the LAS, the MPS and the LFB in relation to the management and communication of 999 calls

3.17 The contact between LAS and those in Grenfell Tower at the time of the fire was limited. Three 999 calls were made to LAS from the Tower during the fire. These represented two calls from the same individual and one further call. It seems to me important that the Inquiry is fully aware of these calls so that it can see the way in which they were dealt with. We have therefore prepared a table setting out the details of the calls which is at the end of the response to this question and I also attach the full transcripts of those calls at (Annex E1, E2 and E3). From these transcripts the Inquiry will be able to have regard to the way in which these calls were handled.

- 3.18 It follows from the above that I only have a limited amount to say regarding the overall management and communication of 999 calls between the emergency services at the time of the fire. I do, however, want to address the issue of the passing on of information from LAS to LFB following the receipt of calls from those in the Tower.
- 3.19 While in general terms it is my view that any relevant details received by LAS following a 999 call from someone in the Tower should have been passed on to the LFB (and if appropriate to the MPS), there was no advantage in LAS receiving detailed information about each call received from the LFB. More broadly it was, of course, important that LAS was kept informed about the details of the LFB operation and this happened on the night in question.
- 3.20 The details of the three calls received from those in the Tower at the time of the fire by LAS were not, in fact, passed on by LAS to LFB. While there is no existing policy that covers this situation, with hindsight it is clear to me that this information should have been passed on. I regret that this did not happen.
- 3.21 I should add that, as can be seen from the chronology, LAS staff did pass on information to LFB following a 999 call from an individual not in the Tower who had been in contact with someone on the 23rd floor (see the entries in the chronology at 02:12:46 and 02:21:41. Please note that the reference to the 25th floor in the second entry was in error).

Table 4: Summary of the three calls received from inside Grenfell Tower

Time	Comment
02:39:09	<p>999 call received from a resident within the Tower, CAD 392.</p> <p>The caller reported that there were 5 people stuck in a house that was on fire.</p> <p>While the call handler placed the call on hold to liaise with the call taking manager, the call disconnected.</p> <p>Although the call was correctly completed through Protocol 7 of the MPDS, the call handler did not attempt to call back the original number and complete the call or provide any closing instructions.</p>
03:00:56	<p>999 call received from a resident within the Tower, CAD 448.</p> <p>The caller reported they were on the 15th floor and were stuck in the flat alone. They advised there was smoke but couldn't see any flames. The call was correctly triaged on Protocol 7.</p> <p>The call handler remained on the line with the patient until the line disconnected at approximately 03:05 before any other instructions were provided.</p> <p>The call handler provided reassurance throughout the call and asked if the patient was by the window.</p> <p>The call handler has recorded that they spoke to the call taking manager but no records can be found of this being done via the correct process, using the telephone. There are no records of calls back to this caller's number by the call handler.</p>
03:18:36	<p>999 call (CAD 486) connected to the LAS.</p> <p>CAD 486 was from the same caller as CAD 448. This patient asked for an update and stated they couldn't breathe.</p> <p>The call was triaged through Protocol 6 – Breathing Problems, and although a priority symptom, Protocol 7 would have been more appropriate.</p> <p>The call handler placed the caller on hold and phoned the call taking manager. As they did this, the 999 call disconnected prior to any closing instructions being provided.</p> <p>The call handler attempted to ring back but got the voicemail message. No message was left on the voicemail and as a consequence of the phone call disconnecting, no closing instructions were provided.</p>

4.0 Further information

- 4.1 I have endeavoured in this statement to cover the issues raised by the Inquiry as comprehensively as possible. If, having considered this statement, there are additional matters that the Inquiry would like me to address, then, of course, I would be happy to try to assist.

4.2 This statement is true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Paul Woodrow

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Paul Woodrow', with a long horizontal stroke extending from the end.

Director of Operations, London Ambulance Service

5.0 Annexes

Annex A London Emergency Services Liaison Panel (LESLP) – Major Incident procedure manual version 9.4 (2015)

Annex B Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Principles – Joint Doctrine

Annex C LAS Incident Response Procedures

Annex D National HART Standard Operating Procedure 04

Annex E Transcripts of 999 calls

Annex F Glossary of terms