

WITNESS STATEMENT

Criminal Procedure Rules, r 27. 2; Criminal Justice Act 1967, s. 9; Magistrates' Courts Act 1980, s.5B

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Statement of: T/CI Graham Winch

Age if under 18: Over 18 (if over 18 insert 'over 18') Occupation: Police Officer

This statement (consisting of 10 page(s) each signed by me) is true to the best of my knowledge and belief and I make it knowing that, if it is tendered in evidence, I shall be liable to prosecution if I have wilfully stated in it anything which I know to be false, or do not believe to be true.

Witness Signature: *Graham Winch A/c* Date: 24th October 2018

Background

My name is Graham Winch and I am a serving police officer in the Metropolitan Police Service. I joined the MPS in November 1993. I have worked in Territorial Policing, Specialist Protection, Special Branch, National Counter Terrorism and MetCC. I was initially posted to MetCC in 2012 and again in 2017. MetCC is the department responsible for answering all emergency and non-emergency phone calls in to the Metropolitan Police Service, as well as despatching calls to and answering incoming radio transmissions from police units across London. I currently hold the role of Temporary Chief Inspector Service Delivery, Centre Support Manager and MetGrip cover.

I have been asked to provide a statement to the Grenfell Tower Fire public inquiry.

Command and Control within the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) is provided by three control centres at Hendon, Bow and Lambeth. This Command and Control model started in 2004/2005 and replaced 32 borough control rooms and one central call centre for 999 calls at New Scotland Yard. Each of these centres has 10 or 11 separate pods which deal with the communications for each local authority area. Overseeing all this at Lambeth is Pan London Operations. This deals with all main MPS radio channels as well as providing supervisors that maintain an overview of all critical incidents within the MPS. The despatchers within Pan London control units that are not assigned to a specific borough, such as dog units and the Territorial Support Group (TSG), have supervisors who work directly to the MetGrip Chief Inspector.

How an Emergency Call is Handled

When a 999 call is made to British Telecom (BT), the emergency operator will find out which emergency service the caller requires. They will then connect them to that emergency service. If someone does not specify which emergency service they require, or the connection is cut before they have done so, the default position is that those calls come to police. With the Metropolitan Police Service our Time of Origin (which includes the time we start our charter response times, i.e I, S or E – explained further below) is shown as the time we answer the call from BT.

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When the call is connected, the BT operator will introduce the call by reading out the telephone number that is being used to call and whether it is a landline or mobile phone. Once this information is given the operator will begin speaking to the caller.

If a call is made to 101 (the police non-emergency service), the call does not go through the BT operator. It goes to the relevant local force call centre direct. The service provides a number of automated options, which the caller can select to take them to the appropriate place to handle the call.

How the Command and Control Systems Work.

There are two systems which handle calls in the Metropolitan Police Service, the Call Handling System (CHS) and Computer Aided Despatch (CAD).

Call Handling System (CHS)

Calls from the BT operator that are directed to the MPS (either by the request of the caller or by default) come into the CHS system. It is used only to answer calls into the control room and record the initial information from the caller. Calls are dealt with by someone in MetCC First Contact (which staff member might be based at any of the three MetCC sites). CHS was initially introduced in late 2006 with a view to replace the CAD system in answering calls. CHS has a number of benefits over CAD for answering calls in that it is a bespoke application which allows greater functionality, such as the automatic population of an address from a fixed line phone, i.e a house phone; automatic population of the phone number into the phone field; automatically setting the map to the location of a fixed line call or to the nearest mast location for a call from a mobile phone; automatic phone answering and the ability to search a post code on the associated mapping software. The CHS has a number of fields to fill in such as name, address and phone number. It also has a remarks field that makes up the bulk of the CHS message and then it has a Demand History section which records what has been done with the CHS record and when.

Once a CHS incident has been 'passed' it will become a CAD that will be handled within the unit that deals with any despatch of officers (see below re passing a call).

Computer Aided Despatch (CAD)

CAD was introduced to the Metropolitan Police Service in 1984. Initially CAD was used to answer all calls from the public and to despatch officers to calls. Although CAD is a mature application and has been updated many

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times, it lacks a number of the automatic features that the newer CHS has. The operator is required to identify where the caller is, whereas on CHS this is automated (at least to a general area), the operator needs to enter the telephone number manually as opposed to the automatic entering on CHS.

The CAD has a number of fields to record pertinent information, such as name, address and phone number. It then has a remarks field where the operator will record additional information which forms the bulk of the CAD message. There is also a Previous Actions Field which in essence provides an audit function of what action has been completed with a CAD and when.

Officers and staff will use the term CAD to refer to the system itself but also to an incident record from the CAD system, e.g. "send me that CAD please."

'Passing' a Call

When a call is received by First Contact, the only person who will be aware of that call is the call handler dealing with it until that call is 'passed'. With an emergency call the call handler needs to obtain the minimum information necessary to identify where the police or emergency services are required and an idea of the type of incident being reported (the exact minimum data required is a location, one type code and the urgency). In order to despatch units to a call the call handler needs to 'pass' the call as soon as possible once the minimum information necessary has been obtained. When a call handler passes the incident it automatically routes to the borough pod on which the identified address for the incident is on. The call handler can also decide to pass the incident elsewhere. For example a road traffic accident could be also be passed to Traffic Control (TC), a serious incident could be passed to the Supervisor Information Room (SI) and an incident on the River Thames could be passed to the Marine Support Unit (MSU). These additional locations are known as 'routings' in that they route the CAD incident to a predetermined place. These routings can be selected or deselected by the operator in CHS and manually entered in CAD.

The call handler will ordinarily remain on the call obtaining more information and adding this to the incident record after the call has been passed.

When the incident is passed a one line notification will queue at the bottom of the screen where the incident has been passed to, for example the dispatchers' screens on the Newham pod, for a call within Newham. The one line notification will show the CAD number, the time of the call, the grade of the call, the opening code of the call (such as 01 - violence against the person) and the location police have been called to. This will indicate a call is

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waiting. The despatcher is required to click on the one line notification and then acknowledge the CAD, by pressing F8. Once the despatcher acknowledges the CAD it records their identification number onto the Previous Actions field of the CAD.

CAD and CHS both have a separate reference number for the same call. At midnight these numbers reset to zero and begin increasing as new calls come in.

Grading the Urgency of the Call

All calls require the call handler to decide on the correct urgency grading for that call. The options for response are:

I - Immediate, respond within 15 minutes

Emergency Contact - Those calls where the immediate presence of a police officer will have a significant impact on the outcome of the incident. If the officer is not required immediately then the S grade should be applied.

S - Significant - respond within 60 minutes,

Priority Response - The majority of calls requiring a police response within an hour will attract this grade. These are priority calls and this grade must be considered before the I grade is used.

(This grade will also be used to meet our pledge commitment "When responding to non-emergency cases involving vulnerable victims and witnesses or agreed priorities we aim to get to you within 60 minutes".)

E - Extended, up to 48 hours to respond

Scheduled Response - Any call that requires a police attendance that can be scheduled will be dealt with by appointment that will be agreed with the caller and take place on the day of the call or the day following it to ensure that an appropriate response is made within 48 hours.

R - Referred - police will not respond to the call.

Resolution Without Deployment - This grade is applied to calls received that do not require the attendance of police.

If a number of calls are received to the same location, the first call will be graded as appropriate in the circumstances presented to the call handler. Further calls to the same location will be graded either according to the circumstances that are presented to the call handler or if the call handler believes it is a duplicate call which we are already deploying to, they grade the Incident as R - Referred.

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It is often the case that police will receive more than one call to a large incident. When this happens one CAD, often the first, will be chosen as the working CAD for the incident. This is where operators will record their actions and updates on. The remaining CADs, if they have been graded as referred, will be scanned for any pertinent information and will then be placed in the section of the Open Incident list (OI) for the Controllers attention who will then complete the Incident (CM) This is when the incident will leave the Open Incident list. These later related CADs will be linked to the working CAD.

Radio Communications

Every borough in the Metropolitan Police Service has a main channel - known as Despatch one and identified by its borough code. On the night of the incident the officers' main working channel would have been BS (Kensington and Chelsea) Despatch 1. This is the main channel that is used by the control room to despatch

calls on. It is always monitored by the control room and recorded 24 hours a day. Officers will default to monitoring this channel on borough. Communications on this channel are heard by all officers monitoring the channel.

The second channel monitored by the control room is the Support Channel. Officers will change to this channel to request non-urgent support, such as Police National Computer checks on vehicles and persons, more information about an incident or a vehicle removal for example. This channel is also monitored and recorded 24 hours a day. Officers will move from this channel back to the main despatch channel when support has been provided.

Officers that are attached to a borough also have access to the main despatch channels from all of their surrounding boroughs and a number of other channels that are specific to their own borough. The additional channels are not normally monitored or recorded and would include the Spare Channel, the IBO channel and the Event Channels. Officers will sometimes move to one of these channels to discuss something that would be too lengthy to discuss on the main despatch channel as it would impede the prompt despatching of calls.

The radio officers have also gives them the ability to use the radio as a phone and call normal phone numbers, but also as a person to person 'walk-talky' where the conversation is heard only by the officers involved in that conversation. These calls are not recorded.

Liaison with other emergency services

The MPS have a CAD link with the London Ambulance Service. This allows call handlers and dispatchers to send a CAD incident to the London Ambulance Service via CAD and this removes the need to make a phone call which can increase the time taken. This facility is independent of 'passing' the CAD incident, so an ambulance could be called before the incident is passed or after the incident is passed. The LAS do not receive the whole

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call record, only the preformatted dialogue box completed by the call handler or despatch operator which includes the address, the caller's name, the phone number of the caller, an assessment of the medical condition and a remarks box.

The MPS does not have the equivalent of a CAD link with the LFB. This is probably just due to incompatibility of systems. MetCC communicates with the LFB by phone and most usually through the unit called DI/10 (sometimes referred to as the Contact Desk). DI/10 is located in Lambeth, within Pan London. During a protracted major incident involving LFB, blue light partners, including colleagues from LFB will most usually co-locate in the special operations room in Lambeth (SOR), which happened on this occasion.

Scheme of communications for the Grenfell Tower fire

I was not involved with the immediate response to the fire but came on duty the following morning. However I am aware that from MetCC's point of view, the incident started with a call from the LFB at about 01.16 hours

reporting a 6 pump fire at Grenfell Tower. This led to CAD 482 being opened, which was then used as the working CAD for the first few hours of the incident. I understand that CAD has been exhibited to a statement by Commander Neil Jerome, who took over as Gold commander of the major incident, having been called by the MetGrip Chief Inspector Barrett.

Due to the scale of the incident, and the number of 999 calls made as a result of it, the MPS inevitably received a number of calls in to MetCC, which were dealt with by call handlers. As stated above, calls came in to the MPS when either police were the emergency service requested, when no particular service had been specified, or for abandoned calls. I understand that only a small number of the calls handled by police were from persons within the tower itself. All of these 999 calls to police that were referred for a deployment decision would have been given their own CAD numbers, which become 'linked' CADs to the working CAD. The calls that dealt with advice to persons in the tower have been exhibited by Commander Jerome (his exhibit NAJ/2). I will try below to explain in a little more detail how some of the call handling for these worked.

Almost all the information on a CAD is entered by either a call handler or a despatcher. Once a CAD is opened the input of information is all manual. Once an entry is created then it is automatically given a time but that is the time the information is inputted, not the time that event occurred necessarily.

In addition to the call handling, and any communication with other agencies by telephone, such as the LFB, MetCC were also listening to the main radio channel for the incident. Within MetCC certain roles will be listening to the radio. Initially this event was dealt with by the local channel for Kensington and Chelsea, channel 1. Once

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a call is with the local pod, those despatchers will be listening to the relevant radio channels and deciding what to enter in to the related CAD. At 01.42 hours the incident was passed to Command Support within Pan London and then all radio transmissions were transferred to Pan London event 8 radio channel. From this point on the radio channel would have been monitored and used by those staff, who would have then been able to input comments on to CAD 482.

CAD 482

I have been asked to flag up some of the key entries on the working CAD. The numbering of CADs is sequential starting from midnight, so this was the 482nd CAD opened since midnight on 14th June 2017. At 01.23 hours there is an entry from PC 119BS, who is PC Sangha. I understand that he was one of the first officers on the scene. This entry has come in over the radio. The message is that there was going to be a massive evacuation due to fire. I am unable to say from this entry whether this was his own opinion or whether he had been told that by someone else. This is how the despatcher on the borough pod within MetCC has recorded his transmission.

At 01.26.36 the incident is declared as critical. This is attributed to Inspector Nick Thatcher (BS1N). At 01.32.27

he declared it a major incident. It appears from the previous entry that this was either before he had arrived on the scene or immediately he arrived on scene.

At 01.30.04 the incident has been passed to NPAS by someone from MetCC, probably by the despatcher from the borough pod. Their pay number appears on the CAD next to the entry. The CAD then shows helicopter call sign NPAS44 confirming on the radio they are lifting for overview and scene management.

The CAD confirms that the incident moved from the local pod to MetCC Pan London at 01.42.14. The entry shows the direction for everyone to change radio channel.

At 01.45.25 the CAD reflects the first situation report from the helicopter. At 01.53.48 the command structure is confirmed as Superintendent Paul Warnett as Gold and Inspector Nick Thatcher as Silver. They were both on scene. Best practice is for Gold to be at a remote location so they have the event oversight but Paul Warnett remained as Gold at the scene until Commander Jerome took over from SOR. He then remained as the most senior officer at the scene for several hours, effectively as a bronze commander for the incident.

The entry at 02.38.24 shows that an additional radio channel was set up to deal with all radio traffic about displaced residents from the tower and surrounding area. This was to keep the working channel free for the

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operation and ensure clear information passing about arrangements for residents. This message came from DI/9,
who are command support within Pan London.

At **03.08.27** there is a message received from LFB, probably over the radio from the scene (i.e. through an MPS officer passing on the message). If it had come from a phone call it would probably have shown as coming from DI/10. LFB were confirming that their instructions to persons still in the tower was to escape by any means (i.e. 'get out'). At **03.10.56** that message has been repeated on the radio. The person that has recorded that message has recorded that it was also said that persons should not stay inside the flats.

At **03.58.03** a message has been broadcast from Gold Paul Warnett which repeats the same message, i.e. to try and self-evacuate.

After **05.14.18** there is a break in the entries on this CAD. Single CADs can only be sustained up to a certain size, so at this point I understand that a new CAD was opened to continue as the working CAD for this event. There are a number of entries on this working CAD in relation to persons reported trapped in the tower. These appear to be coming from officers at the scene. For example at **03.31.07** there has been a radio transmission from PC591HT relating to flat 133. This entry has been put on the CAD by a MetCC staff member, having heard it over the radio. My understanding is that there were liaison officers at the scene responsible for ensuring the LFB command team in the command unit were aware of this flow of information.

Call backs

As I have specified above, BT refer abandoned 999 calls to the MPS. The MetCC standard operating procedures ('SOP') for abandoned calls (ref 300) provides flow charts for abandoned calls in a number of situations. I attach as my exhibit **GNW/1** the two flow charts that are primarily relevant to this incident, namely the policy for dealing with abandoned calls from landline and mobile phones. The basic instruction is to attempt to call back on at least two occasions. A call handler would then need to refer the matter to the controller to decide whether to close the CAD or deploy to the call. Where a call back is reflected on the related CAD, the time shown is the time that entry is keyed in. If there has been a delay in entering the call back, I would expect the entry to reflect the time the call back was actually made.

Guidance to MetCC staff on dealing with fire incidents

There is no specific training provided to MetCC staff about how to respond to emergency calls relating to fires. Such calls do sometimes come in to us, possibly because a caller has requested police, or because of an abandoned call. Police deal with so many different types of incidents from 999 calls that it is not possible to have incident specific training or guidance for everything. We do have specific guidance for terrorist-related incidents

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but not fires. I attach as **GNW/2** a single page SOP reference 643 which relates to incidents where fire, gas or electricity is an issue. This is essentially a check list or aide memoir that is accessible to all MetCC staff. You can see the reference to it on page 1 of CAD 482 (reference 2 by 'Opening' comments).

This document refers to 'LBCs', which are location based comments that might be available for an address. They would usually flag up any particular risk, for example an unsafe roof. The document also refers to an SMF (standard message format) relating to fire risk. I exhibit that as **GNW/3**. MPS staff are not trained to provide 'FSG' to callers in a fire situation. MetCC staff would not understand 'stay put guidance'. We do not have a practice of confirming with the LFB what advice they are providing and disseminating that to all police staff dealing with calls. However clearly the police command team would want to know what the LFB position was and would be informed by that. It is fair to say that a fire of this scale, with the amount of calls it generated, has not happened in living memory, so we did not have a tailored response available for it.

In the same way that MetCC staff are trained not to provide medical advice, they are also trained not to provide specific safety advice. So in the situation of a fire or other presenting risk, the call handler would ensure that the LFB were aware of the person trapped and would be expected to use their common sense to explore the risk factors present (e.g. visible fire, smoke) and to get to a safe place if they feel able to do so. This generic approach can apply to most situations where there is a threat that is being described by a caller but where the call handler has neither the first-hand information to be able to provide reliable advice nor the specialist knowledge that may be required to assess that risk. This approach is not delivered in any documentary format but has over the years been good practice that we have provided in coaching sessions to MetCC staff.

I have been asked about the transcript for MPS CAD message 801 and a related call back to Mr Nigel Dilley at **02.32.31**. I can see there is a conversation about the best way for Essex Fire and Rescue Service to find out what to advise the people they have on the line. Looking at the call back information left on Mr Dilley's voicemail a few minutes later, this appears to me to be most likely the result of the MetCC call handler having spoken to an MPS supervisor. I say that because that would be consistent with how I would normally expect MetCC to deal with this situation. This does not to me indicate a change in policy at that time coming from the LFB but I have not approached the individual call handler to verify this.

Advice given by MetCC call handlers

I have been asked about the way that a number of 999 calls were handled by MetCC call handlers. One call handler advised the caller to evacuate (CAD 533), another to leave the building if they wanted to (CAD 611). One call handler patched the call through to the LFB for them to advise direct. The LFB advised the caller to stay put

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(CAD 578). I have been asked to confirm which approach was consistent with the training and advice given to MPS operators. I consider that the call handling for each of these three calls, and any in similar vein, were consistent with the MetCC training and guidance to call handlers and despatchers. As I have stated above, they are taught to use their common sense, ensure the LFB are aware of persons trapped by fire and to give generic safety advice in a situation where they have neither first- hand knowledge nor expertise. In relation to CAD 578, the caller informs the call handler that they have already tried to escape but felt it unsafe to do so and returned to the flat. In that situation it was a reasonable course of action to get the LFB involved to provide specialist advice direct to the caller.

Communication with LFB

As stated above, there is no SOP that requires the MPS to find out from the LFB what fire safety advice they deem appropriate to a fire, and to get the MetCC call handlers to deliver that FSG. This is because in the normal course of events, any calls the MPS receive related to fires are usually dealt with appropriately by ensuring the LFB are already aware and on their way to a fire, or already on scene and dealing. Grenfell Tower was different due to its scale.

It is apparent from the documentation I have seen to date that there was some liaison between MetCC staff and the LFB to try and clarify what advice LFB were giving. I have been asked about a specific conversation reference LFB00000341. We can locate no record of a call back conversation between supervisors. That does not mean it did not happen but if the call was by mobile phone it would not be recorded. However the job of MetCC is to receive information and consider whether police need to despatch as a result of that call. It would not be expected of a call handler to gather information from other sources. They deal with a call and respond accordingly. This was not an incident where the police were the lead response agency. This was a fire, and so the LFB were the lead responder. This is not to say that it would be wrong for a call handler to try and get a steer from the LFB prior to providing advice.

It is clear from a number of CADs that information about people calling from specific flats or floors within the tower, or about persons believed to be trapped, was passed on to the LFB. An example is CAD 828, which is

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one of the calls on Neil Jerome's CAD list NAJ/2, where the CAD shows at 02.46.56 that the LFB were called and advised of a person trapped in flat 152 (see LFB00000541). This informing the LFB was just one action taken by the call handler. The route they have used is to refer the CAD to DI/10, who are the contact desk who liaise with the LFB. I am not aware of any instances where information about persons trapped coming from 999 calls was not passed on to the LFB, but could research it if there is material which it is believed to indicate this.

I am not aware of any specific discussion between control rooms as to what information should be passed to the LFB. MetCC liaised with the LFB according to the established contact lines between the two agencies, and naturally passed on information to them about persons who might need rescuing. If the LFB had considered we were providing too much or too little information, they would have been able to tell us that but I have not seen anything to indicate that was the position.

I do not understand that MetCC staff actioned information coming from the scene on the radio about persons trapped. My understanding is that was actioned by liaison officers at the scene.

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