

WITNESS STATEMENT

Criminal Procedure Rules, r27.2; Criminal Justice Act 1967, s.9; Magistrates' Courts Act 1980, s.5b

Statement of: ALLDAY, JASON

Age if under 18: Over 18 (if over 18 insert 'over 18')

Occupation:

This statement (consisting of 16 page(s) each signed by me) is true to the best of my knowledge and belief and I make it knowing that, if it is tendered in evidence, I shall be liable to prosecution if I have wilfully stated in it anything which I know to be false, or do not believe to be true.

Signature: JASON ALLDAY

Date: 06/11/2017

Tick if witness evidence is visually recorded ☐ (supply witness details on rear)

I, Jason Matthew ALLDAY, make this statement in relation to the Grenfell Tower Fire which took place on 14 June 2017. Prior to this incident, I had no knowledge of Grenfell Tower and had never attended the site.

Background

1. I am an employee of Cadent Gas Ltd ("Cadent") and I was part of the Emergency Response and Repair team who attended the fire incident at Grenfell Tower during the 14 and 15 June 2017.
2. I am a Level 7 Network Engineer in Repair and my Repair Network Manager is TonyDAY.
3. I am EUSR registered and I have provided details of my qualifications to DC Michelle HART. I am also a Competent Person ("CP") and Authorising Engineer ("AE") on all Routine Operations ("RO") and CP on Restricted Non- Routine Operations ("NROs").
4. I started working for National Grid as a Repair team leader in 2000. Prior to that, I was contracted to work for National Grid as a gas engineer for 3 years.
5. I worked as part of the Contract Management and Control team between 2013 and 2016. This role

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involved managing the GDSP contract with resource and supporting the Repair team. I then moved back to Operations and was appointed a Level 7 Network Manager in July 2016.

6. I have a wide range of engineering experience, I have been a Repair Team Leader for 12 years, Replacement Supervisor, Construction Engineer for 5 years and Contract Management for 3 years. In addition, I have spent the last 18 months as a Network Engineer in Repair.

7. Cadent operates four of the UK's national gas networks. One of those networks is the London Network. Each network that is operated by Cadent has an Emergency Response and Repair capability ("ER&R"). James HARRISON is the Head of Operations and he manages both the Emergency operations and the Repair operations.

8. Cadent also operates the gas emergency number for all the gas distribution networks and other UK transporters through the Gas Emergency Call Centre, meaning that we are the first port of call to help anyone in the UK that needs help with their gas supply.

9. The Emergency team operates a team of First Call Operatives ("FCOs"). They are the frontline responders and attend all gas emergencies and incidents that are reported to the Gas Emergency Call Centre.

10. When the Emergency team attend an incident, they will investigate the situation and make it safe or, if necessary, will request a Repair team to attend. The Repair teams are usually called to incidents which involve the gas network, rather than the internal pipework within a customer's property. They effect a Repair to the gas network which usually involves excavation work to isolate the gas mains and valves within the network. The Repair team are also responsible for carrying out non urgent repair work on the gas network.

11. A Repair team is usually a team of two people; the Repair team leader and an assistant who supports the work of the team leader. The Repair teams are managed by Network Supervisors (Level 6), who report to Network Engineers (Level 7), who report to the Repair Network Manager (Band C).

The morning of 14 June 2017

12. All operational managers who work within the London network operate a standby rota from 16:30 to 08:00am. If you are on standby, you can be contacted by either Cadent's Dispatch Centre, who manage jobs initiated by the Gas Emergency Call Centre, or by members of your team to either provide advice in

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relation to an incident or to attend an incident if required. An operational manager would usually attend the site in situations where there are, for example, significant amounts of residual gas in the ground, or where properties have been evacuated, or there is a substantial gasescape.

13. I was not the Level 7 manager on standby on the morning of 14 June 2017. My colleague Robert BENN was the Level 7 manager on standby. As I was not on call that morning, I would not expect to have been contacted about the incident. However, I would have expected Robert BENN to have been contacted by either the Dispatch Centre or the men on site and I understand that the Dispatch Centre did contact him to inform him of the incident.

14. On the morning of 14 June, I was due to go to Hinckley for a planning meeting with Tony DAY. I woke up at around 05:30am and turned on my television and that is when I saw on the news that Grenfell Tower was on fire.

15. I immediately called Tony DAY who was the Band C manager on standby that morning. He was already aware of the incident and told me that we had been called by the London Fire Brigade ("LFB") to the incident to assist and that we already had people on site. He also informed me that the fire was not gas related, that is to say, not caused by gas. Both Tony and I agreed that we would make our way down to the site as soon as possible.

16. The Level 6 Network Supervisor on call that morning was Neale MILAM. He was already aware of the situation and was also on his way to the site. I spoke to Neale about 05:30/06:00, he had already had contact from the Dispatch Centre and had organised for a Repair team to head to site.

17. Grenfell Tower is situated in the West of London. I know the area well having worked on this network for over 21 years. My team and I had in fact been working on a medium pressure gas repair in the area just before the fire. The repair work was completely unrelated to the Grenfell Tower incident, however, the road where we had been carrying out the work had been closed. The repair work was carried out on Bramley Road, near Whitchurch Road. I attach as my Exhibit JMA1 a map of the local area and the gas mains that supply the tower. The street where the repair work was carried out is identified at point 1 on the map. I understand that it was reported in the media that this road closure blocked the emergency services' access to the tower. I worked closely with the LFB throughout the incident and did not receive any reports from the LFB or any other emergency services that this road closure was causing them difficulties. Cadent had reported the road closure to the Highways Agency and the emergency services would have had knowledge of this road closure prior to the incident.

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18. Having learnt about the incident, I left my house at approximately 06:15am. Tony DAY had told me that Dave EDWARDS, the Level 7 Network Engineer for Emergency, was already on site so I called him on my way to the site for an update. Dave explained that the whole block of flats was on fire and that there were multiple emergency services on site. He told me that a Repair team was already on site and explained that he had been to the LFB command unit to confirm our presence on site at around 04:45am. The command unit was located on Bramley Road near Grenfell Tower (point 2 on the map at JMA1). I understand that the LFB co-ordinated their rescue operation from this command unit. The fire officers inside the command unit had asked Dave EDWARDS and the team to standby in the local area and await further instructions.

19. Although I was familiar with the local area having carried out repair work on the gas network, I did not have any information about the internal pipework in the building and I wanted to find that out before I arrived on site. I therefore contacted Patrick KELLY who is a contract manager and focuses on multi-occupancy buildings (MOBS) within London. Cadent had, through our contractors, been engaged in carrying out work inside the tower and I knew that Patrick KELLY was involved in that work as the contract manager. Patrick KELLY confirmed to me that there was gas supplied within the building via four internal gas risers and that there were valves on the risers in the sub-basement of the building, albeit that they were at a high level.

20. I arrived on site at approximately 07:20am. The main road leading into Grenfell Tower, the A40, had been closed and I therefore drove to the site via Oxford Gardens. As I was driving from Hangar Lane, I could see the smoke, I had never seen such a devastating fire. When I first pulled up, I could only see the top third of the building which was on fire with debris coming off it. I could not believe what I was seeing and spent the first couple of minutes after I had arrived just looking at the scenes around me.

21. Dave Edwards had told me over the phone that he had established a muster point for all Cadent personnel which was situated outside Dover House. I made my way there to meet the team. I asked Dave what our involvement in the incident was so far and what we had been asked to do. Dave explained that the LFB knew from the information provided by him and the first FCO to arrive on site that a Cadent team was on site and that we were standing by on the direction of the LFB. The LFB had our contact details and had told Dave EDWARDS that they would contact us.

22. I understood that we had been called by the LFB to the incident to assist the LFB. I had recently attended an incident management course which was run in conjunction with the Fire Service College and designed to provide us with the knowledge and skills to be able to manage an incident on site and work

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with multi agencies. During the course we learnt about the role of outside agencies and how we could work effectively with them. I understood that we were Category 2 responders to the Grenfell Tower incident and that we were there to work with and support the fire service's rescue operation. The LFB were the lead responders and they had primacy on site.

23. I knew that there was gas being supplied into the tower and as soon as I saw the fire, I realised that we would need to turn off the supply of gas as soon as possible. When I arrived on site, we could not get anywhere near the tower. The flames were still burning, debris from the building was falling to the floor and the police were keeping everyone away from the tower. As soon as I saw the fire, it was clear to me that we would not be able to approach the tower to operate any service isolation valves and that we would therefore need to disconnect the supply of gas by isolating the mains in the network.

24. Dave Edwards had already obtained plans of the gas mains that were in the vicinity of the tower. Our Field Force Engineers carry portable laptops with them at all time and the laptops have a map application which displays the gas mains in the local area. Neale MILAM, one of the Repair managers, had also driven to the site via our Fulham depot where he stopped to collect copies of the gas mains plans. I reviewed the plans to see what options were available to us. The instruction from the LFB to our FCO, Jason KNIGHTLEY, and the Level 7 Network Engineer, Dave EDWARDS, earlier that morning was clear; we should wait for further instructions. However, I decided to go to the LFB command unit to speak with the fire officers to ask whether they wanted us to disconnect the supply of gas. At approximately 07:45am I went to introduce myself to one of the LFB fire officers, who I think was called Julian, in the command unit and asked whether they wanted us to disconnect the supply of gas. He confirmed that they did. At that stage, the Incident Commander was aware that Cadent had not started the operation to disconnect the supplies of gas to the building.

Isolating the supply of gas

25. Generally speaking, the gas supply to a building can either be disconnected by turning the valves off on internal pipework within a building or service isolation valves outside the building and then by carrying out isolation work on the mains in the network or by isolating sections of the network, located outside the immediate building vicinity.

26. The service isolation valve can be operated by accessing a chamber which is usually identified by a metal cover.

27. The process of isolating the gas mains in the network, rather than carrying out work on the internal pipework or operating the service isolation valves, involves a Repair team firstly carrying out an

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excavation to remove the ground to uncover the gas mains. In order to locate the gas mains, the Repair teams use the maps of the gas mains. Many of the gas mains have been in the ground for a number of years and, as other service pipes have been inserted into the ground, the location of some of the gas mains have moved over the years. As a result, it is acknowledged that the maps are not always entirely accurate but certainly give a good indication of where the gas mains are. In recognition of the potential inaccuracy of the maps, Cadent have a process in place whereby if, during a Repair operation it is discovered that the location of a gas main is not as would be expected, there is an obligation to report this so that the maps can be updated and corrected. The Repair teams can also use equipment to help them locate the gas mains. The equipment (which can generate a signal through a cable which is then detected by a cable avoidance tool) is usually used within a congested network to assist the Repair teams to locate the gas mains.

28. Once the Repair teams are satisfied with the location of the gas main, they start excavating the ground. Machinery such as JCBs and vacuum excavators are usually used to achieve this. Once the main has been located, a routine or non-routine operational procedure will be carried out allowing the Repair team to stop the flow of gas. There are a number of options available to stop the flow of gas depending on the type, size and configuration of the main. For example, the use of inflatable bags in metal mains, squeeze off of polyethylene mains, or the operation of a valve if available. A non-routine operation is generally required if the main is low pressure and greater than 355mm polyethylene or 12" metallic, or any size medium pressure.

29. The supply of gas can also be disconnected by isolating sections of the network by turning off the valves known as "governors" but which will cut the gas supply to much wider areas. The governors are located in the networks and are designed to reduce the pressure of gas in the local distribution zones before the gas is distributed to consumers. A small village may be fed by one single governor and the supply of gas to that village could be isolated relatively quickly by turning off that one governor. However, to help achieve a continuity of supply of gas to customers, there are several governors feeding the integrated network in the London area close to Grenfell Tower.

30. Tony DAY and I reviewed the plans of the mains to establish what the best option available to us was. We could not approach the tower to turn off the internal valves or operate the service isolation valves. Even if we had been able to approach the tower to locate the service isolation valves, it is not unusual for those valves to be covered over and our teams would have had to excavate the ground to access the valves. That would never have been possible under the circumstances. The foot of the building where the service

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isolation valves would have been covered with debris, and debris was still falling from the building causing a risk to life.

31. Tony and I therefore considered where the best locations were to isolate the gas on the mains. It was critical that we chose isolation points that were close enough to the tower so that we could isolate the supply of gas quickly, but far enough from the tower for it to be safe for us to work there.

32. It was helpful that we had recently worked in the area as this had given me a good level of understanding of where the mains were located and how the network operated. Tony and I identified three isolation points where we believed we could carry out isolations to the mains. The first main was a 180mm main situated on Grenfell Road. The second main was a 4" main situated on Testerton Walk. The third main was a 12" main situated on Station Walk, near Latimer Road tube station. I have identified the three isolation points at points 3, 4 and 5 on the map.

33. We could have carried out the excavations further away from the tower. However, the further away from the tower we moved, the more cut and caps the Repair teams would have had to carry out. This would have complicated the operation and it would undoubtedly have taken longer for the Repair teams to disconnect the supply of gas to the tower. It was not just the space in the immediate vicinity of the tower that was impacted by the fire. The whole local area as far back as Bramley Road and Treadgold Street, which can be seen on the map, was congested. There was a huge volume of people present and when I arrived there were at least six fire engines parked along Grenfell Road and as many ambulances parked on Station Walk.

34. I did not consider disconnecting the supply of gas to the tower by turning off the governors. It was simply not a viable option. I knew that there wasn't one single governor feeding gas into the tower. My experience of how the network operates told me that if we had turned off one governor, the neighbouring governors would have pushed a supply of gas into the tower to compensate for the loss of supply. We would have had to turn off several governors to disconnect the supply of gas to the tower and this would have required excavation and physical isolation of several sections of the mains to prevent the back-feed of gas from other sources.

35. Both Tony and I were confident that the option of isolating the mains at the three identified points was the best option available to us and would ensure that gas was not supplied into the tower. The operation to isolate the gas.

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36. As the Level 7 Repair manager, I ran the operation on site. I briefed all the teams and was also the main point of contact for the LFB. The number of phone calls I had during the day was unbelievable. I recall looking at my phone around midday and seeing that I had already made and received around 200 calls. This was an incident like no other.

37. I was in constant communication and was supported throughout the day by Tony DAY. We agreed all major decisions together. Tony was feeding information back to James HARRISON and kept him updated on the operation. This allowed me to concentrate on the operation. When James was on site, we discussed the operation and engineering decisions with him. I had open and honest discussions with James. Some of the engineering decisions we made were contrary to our standard engineering policies and procedures. However, we knew that we had to isolate the gas quickly and we continually completed dynamic risk assessments throughout the incident. I believe that James had confidence in me to run the operation on site and had faith in my decision making process. I felt that there was clarity with the management structure during the incident.

38. At around 08:50am, I went to speak with the LFB again to discuss our proposed plan. It was difficult to speak with the LFB when we first arrived on site. It was clear that the focus was not on Cadent and that we were not, understandably, an immediate priority for them. I went through the proposed plan with the LFB and showed them the proposed isolation points on a map. They confirmed that they were happy for us to carry out excavations in the proposed locations. I liaised with the LFB Safety Officers at each of the proposed isolation points and communicated with the LFB constantly whilst monitoring each of the proposed isolation points.

39. Having identified the isolation points on a map, I wanted to see the sites for myself to ensure that it would be safe for the teams to work there. The LFB confirmed that I could walk around the site to locate the isolation points. Peter BAYNARD, the Level 6 Network Supervisor who was on site accompanied me. It proved harder than I had anticipated to identify the sites for all required excavations. The area around the tower was like a maze. There were walkways and tunnels which made it difficult to navigate our way around. We had to pass through several police cordons and obtain the police's permission to approach the area surrounding the tower. All the emergency officers were helpful and helped us gain access to the sites. We had to walk past tents which had been set up as temporary morgues and walked past one area where the victims had been placed in body bags. Peter and I struggled to locate one of the sites and we had to be assisted by one of the LFB officers who showed us the way. As he was walking

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with us, he told us not to look in one direction. I knew that we had an incredibly hard task ahead of us to isolate the supply of gas that day.

40. After we had identified the sites, I spoke with the LFB safety manager who confirmed that he was satisfied that our teams could work and carry out excavations at the proposed isolation points. We also requested network analysis to assess what the impact of the proposed isolation plan would be on the wider network. Network analysis confirmed that the isolations we were proposing would have a limited impact to the surrounding network and would not cause any risk to customers on the network.

41. By around 11:30am, I had identified all the excavation sites and had been given the go-ahead by the LFB that we could start moving our machines to the sites. I spoke with the LFB's incident controller, Julian, and he arranged for some of the fire officers to assist us. At this point, Julian was my main point of contact and we communicated by mobile phone or face to face. It was difficult to arrange access to all the sites because of how congested the area was. Some of the fire engines along Grenfell Road were supporting the aerial platform being used by the fire officers and were feeding water to their fire hoses. They could not be moved easily and we had to arrange for ramps to be placed over the hoses that were coming out of the fire engines so that we could manoeuvre our machinery over the ramps to the sites.

42. We also liaised with the paramedics to navigate our machinery around the ambulances to the isolation site that was near Latimer tube station. I spoke to Neil from the paramedics team to arrange for access to the sterile area as it was crucial that our plant and machinery did not block the ambulances' access to and from the site.

43. At around midday, I was at the Command Unit and initially told the LFB that we would be able to disconnect the supply of gas to the tower by around 19:00 to 20:00 that evening. They asked me if we could disconnect the gas any quicker and I explained what the operation would involve and why it was likely to take until at least 19:00 that evening. I do not think that we could have isolated the supply any quicker than we did. The LFB obviously wanted the supply of gas to be disconnected as soon as possible, but they understood that we would do our best to isolate the gas as quickly and safely as possible. I kept them up to date on our progress throughout the day.

Briefing the team

44. At around 12:30, I identified the Cadent employees on site and pulled all the men back to the Cadent muster point and I briefed everyone on the operation ahead. I allocated two Repair teams to each of the

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isolation points and ensured that there was a Network Supervisor allocated to work on each site. Each team consisted eight to ten individuals. I gave the teams a safety briefing and I tried to prepare the teams as best as I could about the environment they were going to be working in and what they might face and see when carrying out their work. I told the men that if any of them felt uncomfortable, or had any concerns that they should speak with me. I was their main point of contact and I told the teams that I would be walking around the three sites to oversee all the work and support the teams. I knew from past experience and training how important it was during an emergency incident that we worked as a team and that everyone knew what was expected of them.

45. The Emergency team supported the Repair team throughout the day. The Repair teams were carrying out physical excavations on one of the hottest days of the year, but we ensured that the men had enough food and water and we pulled the teams back to the muster points to be de-briefed and for a break wherever possible.

46. I kept a list of all the Repair teams that were on site working on the excavations and Dave EDWARDS and Peter BAYNARD kept a log of all personnel on site. We also had a customer liaison officer who logged people on and off site and fed the information back to our Dispatch Centre. During gas emergency incidents, the Dispatch Centre maintain an incident log to record site activity and how the incident is managed. My Level 6 Network Supervisor, Neale MILAM was feeding information back to the Dispatch Centre.

47. We were able to deploy our teams to the 12" main site relatively quickly (point 5 on the map). The Repair teams started excavating this main at approximately 13:30. However, we faced further delays reaching the 180mm main and 4" main sites (points 3 and 4 on the maps) because of the restrictions. Both of these sites were situated within the inner exclusion- safety cordon. Unfortunately, the keys to one of the fire engines, which had to be moved so that our machines could reach the isolation point, had been taken back to the depot when the fire officers were changing shifts. I escalated this to a male LFB incident controller at around 13:50 and he arranged for the keys to be returned to the site so that the fire engine could be moved.

48. Excavations on the 180mm main and the 4" main commenced at approximately 14:30. Despite our best efforts, none of our machinery could reach the site where the 4" main was located and the team therefore had to hand dig the ground to locate this main. The team working on the 180mm main had to start the excavations by hand because there were other cables identified in the network. However, they were able to introduce a JCB to complete the excavations.

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49. The teams working on the 12" main (point 5 on the map) used a mini digger to excavate the ground.

We had vacuum excavators on site which are normally used to extract the ground from the holes and transport the spoil away. However, they could not be used as we could not move them to the locations.

50. It was difficult to arrange access for our teams, plant and machinery to the isolation sites, and this did delay the start of the excavations, but it was unavoidable. However, the whole area was congested. It was not just the area in the immediate vicinity of the tower. It would have been as hard to arrange access for our machines had we carried out the excavations further away from the tower, because of the volume of people and emergency services in the area, the only difference being that we would have had to carry out more excavations because of the way the network is integrated.

Entering the basement of the tower

51. I continued to liaise with the LFB throughout the day. I worked closely with three officers in white hats, in particular, Andy, Julian and Sanghe. I think that Andy and Sanghe were working the same shift. Whenever they changed shifts, they would come to introduce themselves to me and handover so that I knew at all times who I should be contacting and working with. I developed a really good working relationship with the fire officers. They were working under incredibly difficult conditions but we worked well together and they did everything that they could to assist with our operation on site by arranging access to our machines, sharing information and providing a joint safe system of work wherever possible.

52. At around 14:00 Andy of the LFB asked me whether there were any valves on the gas risers inside the building. I knew from my discussions with Patrick KELLY that there were four risers in the building and that these had valves on them. Andy asked whether I would be prepared to go into the basement of the tower to attempt to disconnect the supply of gas by turning off the valves on the risers.

53. The fire was still burning at this point and I believe that the LFB thought that the gas may be feeding some of the fire inside the building. The LFB were becoming increasingly concerned about the structure of the building. I asked Andy if it was safe to enter the tower and told him that if his officers were prepared to go in, that I would follow them to assess the situation. I was not prepared to send my men into the tower until I had carried out a risk assessment. Andy understood that decision.

54. This was the first real push that I felt from the LFB for us to disconnect the supply of gas and the first time that they suggested that I enter the building. Prior to this point I had not considered entering the building.

55. There was some delay before I could enter the basement because the LFB could not locate the key and had to go back to the site office on Latimer Road to request a key. Before I entered the building, I carried

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out a dynamic risk assessment to satisfy myself that it would be safe for me to go in. I wore all my protective gear which included a helmet and dust mask. The police shielded us from the debris that was still falling from the building with riot shields and I carried out a carbon monoxide test before entering the basement using a hand-held gas detector.

56. I entered the basement via the side entrance accompanied by the LFB officers at around 15:50. In the stairwell, it was lit from natural light and the lights were on when we entered the basement. There was no smoke. When I walked into the basement, the water was up to my knees. The lights on the communal boilers were still on and the overhead lights were on. The LFB officer shone their torches inside the basement and I could see two of the four risers the 8" riser and the 4" riser. I could see the valves on the risers but could only see the spindles and not the valve keys. The physical keys are not always visible on the risers and they may have been located lower down the riser, or somewhere else in the basement. The valves were located high up on the risers and not immediately accessible. Before I could look any further, the LFB officers received a message via their radio control instructing us to retreat from the basement. I overheard the command "All out, all out, all out." and confirmed with the LFB officer that this meant that we had to evacuate the building. As I was coming out of the basement, I saw other LFB officers leaving the building and saw the third 2" riser and the gas supply to the communal boiler. I also saw that the electricity in the basement was still live and immediately retreated from the building because they were concerned that the building would collapse. All the fire officers who were in the tower at the time had to retreat from the building.

57. If we were to have isolated the supplies in the basement, we would have had to take ladders down to the basement for the team to reach the valves and disconnect the supply of gas through the risers.

Unfortunately, turning off the valves on the risers was not something that I could have done during the short period of time that I was inside the building. I estimate that it would have taken a team of approximately four men working inside the basement, with someone from the LFB to accompany the team, up to an hour to turn off the valves on the risers. Regardless of this, the live electricity and water in the basement was a real risk to life and I was not prepared to send any engineers back into the basement.

58. The instruction for us to retreat from the basement came because of further concerns to the structure of the building. I spoke to a structural engineer who informed me that there had been unacceptable movement in the building. The LFB had heard banging from upstairs and were concerned that the building was collapsing. After we retreated from the basement, the inner-safety cordon was moved further

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away from the tower and we had to pull our teams who were working on the 4" and 180mm mains away from those sites.

59. It was around 16:00 by this time and I was very aware that the men had been carrying out physical excavations since around 13:00 that afternoon and I therefore decided to pull all the teams back to the Cadent muster point. We made all the excavations as safe as possible before returning to the muster point where the men were fed and watered and I debriefed everyone.

60. At around 16:30, James Harrison arrived at the site. I knew that we had to be able to continue with the excavations if we were going to isolate the supply of gas to the tower. James, Tony and I went to the LFB command unit to ask whether we could carry on with our work despite the concerns to the building. The fire officers at the Control Centre advised us that they could not guarantee our safety if we worked in the vicinity of the tower and that the decision for our teams to carry on working would have to be based on our own risk assessment. We had a discussion with the LFB officers to decide how we could continue with the work and satisfy ourselves that we would not be putting our teams at risk.

61. The LFB officers agreed that they would strategically place officers in the vicinity of the tower who would survey the building for any further signs of movement. It was agreed that if the officers had any further concerns regarding the structure of the building that they would inform our teams working on the site. We worked in this location so that we had three agreed exit routes for the teams should they need to evacuate from the sites quickly. The LFB officers briefed our teams. Everyone was happy with the agreed safe system of work and the excavations recommenced at approximately 17:20.

62. At around 18:20, we received further information via the LFB radio that the building was unsafe and the teams had to retreat from the excavations sites again. I was feeling the pressure to isolate the gas quickly and knew that we needed to continue with the excavations to locate the mains. I discussed the situation with Tony Day. Tony could see that we were close to finishing the excavations, with approximately an hour's work left to complete, and agreed that we could continue with the work. The LFB was satisfied with this decision and we kept them updated with our progress and ongoing dynamic risk assessment.

63. The teams were able to isolate the 4" and 180mm mains by approximately 20:00 hours on the evening of 14 June 2017. The Repair teams secured the excavation sites and we released some of the men who had been working on site all day.

64. The supply of gas was still however being fed to the tower through the 12" main and work on this site continued. At around 20:15, Andy from the LFB contacted me and asked whether I would be willing to go

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into the basement again to try and turn off the valves on the risers. He informed me that officers inside the building could hear mini explosions' which I believed to be the gas meters failing and therefore releasing gas which would ignite, which was a concern. I knew that the electricity in the building was still live and had seen the water in the basement. I carried out a dynamic risk assessment with Tony DAY and we agreed that I could not go into the basement again because of safety concerns. I told Andy that I was not prepared to go into the basement that time and he accepted my decision.

65. By this stage in the day, the fire had been burning for over 19 hours and the LFB officers told me that they were extremely concerned about the stability and structure of the building. They had heard explosions from inside the building and were concerned that it was a sign that the building could collapse any minute. The LFB informed me that for every 20 minutes that the fire was still burning, it was having more and more of an impact on the structure of the building making it more likely that the building would collapse. There was still a supply of gas potentially feeding the fire and the LFB wanted us to disconnect that supply as quickly as possible.

Isolating the 12" main

66. Work continued on Latimer Road to locate the 12" main. The Repair teams struggled to get a good trace on the main. There was a brick wall near where we believed the main to be which made it harder to excavate and trace the main. The teams had to carry out five excavations before they were able to locate the main, this extra work extended the isolation time by approximately four hours. The main was located at around 21:20.

67. The main was located deeper than we had expected. Our engineering procedures state that for any excavations that reach depths between 1.2 and 1.5 metres, a risk assessment shall be carried out to establish whether shoring materials are required to secure the excavation and prevent the risk of ground collapsing into the hole and potentially injuring an engineer. The shoring equipment and materials are supplied by our strategic partners tRIIO. I assessed the situation and decided that the excavation was in safe and stable ground conditions, far enough from the wall, and that it would not be necessary to shutter the excavation.

68. When the team located the main, we discovered that it was in fact a 15" main rather than a 12" main as indicated on the map of the gas mains. The Repair teams are equipped to isolate mains that vary in size from 3" to 12". However, the operation to isolate a 15" main is considered a Non-Routine Operation.

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Engineers follow a different set of working procedures to carry out the work and our equipment was not compatible to carry out isolation on a 15" main.

69. Despite this, we knew that the LFB wanted us to isolate the supply of gas as quickly as possible. We had to take some time out to quickly think how we could isolate the gas flowing through the 15" main. A 12" main is usually isolated by inserting flow stopping bags into a hole in the main which are then inflated to stop the flow of gas. Once the flow of gas has been stopped, the engineers cut the mains before inserting caps to secure the isolation.

70. I asked the Repair teams to see if the 12" flow stopping bags could be overinflated. The men overinflated the bag, measured it with a caliper and saw that it could be overinflated to 14.5".

71. Using the 12" equipment on a 15" main was not standard procedure. However, the alternative option would have been to not do anything until our subcontractor's Pipeline Management Centre ('PMC') who are equipped with larger diameter bags and usually carry out isolations on 15" mains arrived at the site. We knew that it would have taken time for PMC to arrive at the site and that the priority was to disconnect the supply of gas to the tower. Having discussed the situation with Tony Day and James Harrison, it was agreed that we would use the 12" flow stopping equipment as an interim solution to effect a temporary isolation until PMC arrived onsite to carry out the permanent isolation.

72. The 12" flow stopping bags worked and we temporarily stopped the flow of gas to the building at 23:40. We watched the fire flames inside the tower diminish almost immediately and there was a huge sense of relief. The LFB were incredibly grateful and Sanghe, the officer I had been working with gave me a hug and thanked me. He told me that he could see the pressure that we had been under but that we had done a great job.

73. My team kept monitoring the situation and had a reserve bag on standby in case the first bag failed and we stayed on site to monitor the 15" main until PMC arrived at approximately 3:30am. I briefed PMC on the operation, everything had been set out for them to carry out their operation to permanently isolate and cut and cap the main. This was completed prior to me leaving the site.

74. I left the site at 07:15 on the morning of 15 June. Nicola WILKINSON had arrived on site and Tony DAY and I handed over to her. I walked Nicola around the site and talked her through each of the excavation sites. I also took her to the LFB incident command unit and introduced her to the fire officers that I had been working with.

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75. The gas had been isolated by the time Nicola arrived on site. However, it was important that we had a presence on site and Nicola was available to answer any queries from the LFB officers or other emergency services that day.

76. Our engineering policies and procedures had been at the forefront of my mind throughout the operation. Whilst during a normal operation, the paperwork recording the engineering decisions would have been completed in advance, we were carrying out the work in an emergency situation and I completed all the paperwork retrospectively.

77. I was on site for 24 hours and a number of the men had worked long hours. However, we knew that we would be able to complete the operation by the end of 14 June 2017 and I wanted to see the job through to the end given my involvement and knowledge of the operation. I think the adrenaline kept me going. However, had it been a much longer operation, we would have called for further resources and we would have changed shifts and handed over.

Reflections

78. I have attended a number of incidents during my career and have seen how my managers have managed and coordinated the Repair team's response to an incident. I have also managed some smaller incidents, but I have never had to respond to incident on the same scale as Grenfell Tower.

79. I would like to think that I dealt with the incident to the best of my knowledge, and capabilities. I drew on my own past experiences and from what I had learnt from my watching my managers co-ordinate a response to an incident. I had recently completed the incident management course that was run by the Fire Service College and that put me in a strong position and helped me understand what our role was and how we should assist and respond to the incident as Category 2 responders.

80. I knew that there would be nothing worse than having men walking around not knowing what to do and I ensured that I briefed the team regularly. Everyone understood what their role in the incident was and I believe that the relationship that we developed with the LFB was invaluable.

81. Upon reflection, I may not have gone into the basement had I known how dangerous the conditions were inside. However, I was aware that people's lives were at risk and I wanted to do everything within my ability to assist the LFB. Although we did not receive any indication from the LFB as to whether or not there were still survivors in the building, we have been trained to safeguard life and property and that was at the forefront of my mind at all times.

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82. Had the plans of the mains been more accurate, we may have been able to locate the 15" main quicker, and had we known that it was a 15" main, PMC would have been called to the site sooner. However, I do not think that either of those issues had a big impact on the operation.

83. I hope that I will never have to experience or witness an incident like Grenfell Tower again. However, if I was faced with the same incident today, I would make all the same decisions and would not change anything.

84. The welfare of the Cadent team was at the forefront of my mind throughout the day. I was conscious that I was putting people to work at the core of a major incident, but I had a great team of men working with me and I believe that we worked well as a team. It is a credit to the men that they managed to cut and cap three mains in the time that they did when working under that pressure. All the men who were on site that day felt proud to work for Cadent and were prepared to work in a very difficult environment to ensure that we got the job done.

I understand that the material I have provided to the Police may be shared with the Public Inquiry investigating the Grenfell Tower Fire. I am willing for any material handed to the criminal investigation to be shared with the Public Inquiry.

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