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Statement of: ROE, ANDREW

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WITNESS STATEMENT

Criminal Procedure Rules, r27.2; Criminal Justice Act 1967, s.9; Magistrates' Courts Act 1980, s.5b

Statement of: ROE, ANDREW

Age if under 18: Over 18 (if over 18 insert 'over 18')
OFFICER

Occupation: ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER FIRE

This statement (consisting of 18 page(s) each signed by me) is true to the best of my knowledge and belief and I make it knowing that, if it is tendered in evidence, I shall be liable to prosecution if I have wilfully stated in it anything which I know to be false, or do not believe to be true.

Signature:

Date: 16/08/2017

Tick if witness evidence is visually recorded (supply witness details on rear)

On Monday 24th July 2017 I was interviewed on audio disc. This is a summary of the information I gave during the interview with DC Lou Jones at the Headquarters of London Fire Brigade, Union Street. For the full details, I rely on the information I provided in that interview.

I was paged on 14th June 2017 at about 0136 hrs for a 25 pump fire at Grenfell Tower, Lancaster Gate, W11. I was at home at the time. I immediately rang the officer of the watch in our control room. They explained they were taking an incredible volume of calls to a very significant high rise fire. They couldn't tell me who was in charge but did confirm I had Andy O'Loughlin en route as Deputy Assistant Commissioner (DAC) and Richard Welch en route as a Group Manager (GM) GM's Mick Mulholland and Matt Cook were attending as the operational review team officers. I confirmed I was mobilising to take over as the incident commander.

At 0141 hrs I rang Adrian Fenton, the duty DAC, and asked him to set up the Brigade Command Centre (BCC.) This was due to the size of the fire and although not yet declared a major incident it would have implications for pan London LFB resources. I requested this be at Stratford which would also enable support for control who were under immense pressure due to the volume of calls. Station Manager (SM) Gareth Cook, who was at the scene, sent me some photos by email. They showed 100% of one side of a

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significant sized tower block was alight. I sent these to Assistant Commissioner (AC) Richard Mills, DAC Adrian Fenton and GM Keeley Foster (Commissioner's staff officer.) I got in my car and proceeded to the incident on blue lights.

At 0145hrs I rang AC Richard Mills who was AC2 and asked him to become AC1 as I was mobilising to the incident. I shared the information I had at that time and said I felt we had what sounded like a major incident on our hands. I asked him to take the pan London lead for the London Fire Brigade (LFB) and to set up the support structures and agreed lines of communication into the incident. He reassured me he would take care of that.

At 0159hrs I tried to call DAC Andy O'Loughlin to confirm where he was and the situational awareness.

GM Matt Cook, who was at the scene, confirmed that there was a very significant fire involving the majority of a 24 storey tower block. This was at about 2am. I explained I would be taking over on arrival and asked whether they needed to consider making it a major incident. I then contacted Richard Mills and gave him the details of my call to Matt Cook.

At 0204 hrs I heard Richard Welch take over on Command Unit 8 (CU8) and make pumps 40. This means 40 fire pumps were required at the scene. I contacted Keeley Foster and verbally updated her. She confirmed she was en route with the Commissioner to the scene. At 0206 hrs CU8 confirmed a major incident. Matt Cook gave me a situational update regarding the scale and rapid spread of the fire. I told him I was 20 minutes away and that the Commissioner was on her way.

At 0216 hrs I rang Richard Mills. He was aware of the major incident and 40 pump make up. He also let me know he would represent LFB at GT/SOR when it got set up. BCC was being set up at Stratford and Dan Daly was coming in to support the Commissioner's Group.

At 0229 hrs I arrived on scene, parked and rang Adrian Fenton at Stratford to book me in attendance. He advised that control were under incredible pressure from the volume of fire survival guidance (FSG) calls. I rigged in my fire gear and began to make my way towards the block. It was 400m away and clearly

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100% alight on two sides at that point. It was difficult to get there due to the very large numbers of people on the street and the traffic congestion. As I got closer to the tower, I began to encounter small groups of very agitated friends and family of those in the tower. More than one group told me their relatives or friends were trapped and were on the phone to them. The mood of these groups was fairly heightened and at times aggressive. As I got closer to the base of the tower it was clear small groups of Police were preventing members of public entering the tower but they were in danger of being overwhelmed by the numbers.

As I passed the base of the tower it was clear significant debris was falling from it. Some pieces being metres wide. The volume of noise was incredible, along with the sound of falling debris there were screams of people at the windows trapped in the tower and their relatives and friends shouting up to them. The block was 100% alight from what appeared to be the third floor to the top floor, with fire showing inside many windows. I saw hose lines going into the building and firefighters running in avoiding the falling debris wearing breathing apparatus (BA.)

Near the base of the tower I came to the first command unit CU7. On it I found GM Tom Goodall and a CU crew of 3 watch managers (WM's.) I didn't know them but I recognised them. I told Tom I was here as Incident Commander and asked him what his role was. He briefed me that he was responsible for Fire Survival Guidance (FSG) I asked him how many FSG entries he had in total but at that point he was unable to tell me as they were adding to them constantly, his estimation of the number of people who had called to say they were trapped was over 100. I was more than happy with the system they had in place, I asked they take photographs of the board as it changed so we maintained a record and praised them on their work. I then left for CU8.

I was prevented from getting to CU8 by a group of 3 men. They told me their mother was trapped in a flat. One tried to hand me the phone to speak to her but I explained I couldn't as I had to take responsibility for everyone at the incident. I asked a nearby Police officer to take the details of the woman's location including flat number and floor number and take it immediately to CU7.

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The first person I saw on CU8 was an acting MPS Inspector, Nick Thatcher. I told him we were on the verge of civil disorder which he agreed with. Nick had very limited resources at the time but he had requested anyone who was available to attend the scene. I requested the cordons be pushed back so we could operate effectively. We were on the verge of very serious public disorder and the fire was the most significant I have ever seen in my career.

At 0244 hrs I told DAC Andy O'Loughlin, GM Steve West, SM Jackie McConochie and a CU crew of 3 whom I did not know by name but only by sight, that I was taking over with immediate effect. This was communicated over the radio. I asked Jackie to act as my logist from that point onwards noting all key decisions and recording the minutes of any tactical command meeting (TCM's.) Andy, who had taken over for a short time, gave me a brief. He confirmed that Grenfell was alight from the 3rd floor to the 24th floor, with multiple people trapped inside. GM Richard Welch and Pat Goulbourne had fire sector, which encompassed the entire building. Dave O'Neill the safety sector and asked for BA main control to be set up in front of the leisure centre opposite the block. We had BA crews rigged in the block who were progressing rescue efforts well up into the building.

At 0247 hrs I asked CU to contact control and ask them to stop giving stay put advice if they still were. This was based on the fire spread in the building and the number of persons trapped. At the same time control asked for the same thing. I agreed and asked them to now advise people to make best efforts to escape.

At 0252hrs I asked CU to request BA support vans from the Protective Equipment Group (PEG.) Shortly after I asked Andy to become my operations commander with responsibility for the fire sector, FSG operation and BA main control. Safety and command support would answer to me but work closely with him. I confirmed Steve West in command support would be responsible for keeping the fire sector sourced with BA and equipment needed via BA Main control which was acting as a supply conduit into the operational sectors. There was external firefighting with officers directing activity which I would

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establish more formally. I explained to Andy I had two priorities for him. The first and most important was to work with Dave O'Neill to establish safe access / egress due to the significant amount of debris coming off the building, which presented as great a life risk to our crews as the fire itself. The second was to drive the rescue effort as hard as possible - focusing on saveable life. I confirmed I would be asking for another DAC to attend, Lee Drawbridge, to take on the command support role, with Steve staying in that sector to support Lee in that role. The final part of my brief to Andy was CU would set up channel 2 as a command channel on the fire ground radio and that my immediate priority was to get the police to secure the cordon. I was going to hold a quick tactical command meeting JESIP style (Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Programme) with the other partner agencies at the earliest opportunity.

At 0257 hrs I requested Positive Pressure Ventilation (PPV) / Specialist Entry Recovery Team (SERT) via the duty DAC. My reasoning was we might be able to use to fan and high pressure lance technology in some way. Channel 2 would not work so we reverted back to channel 1 and mobile phones / runners for contact. I asked the unit to get a better map but they confirmed the command support system wasn't working.

I briefed Steve West, who was the sector commander command support but due to my having Jackie directly reporting to me he was to concentrate on end to end resourcing to ensure there was a continuous supply of material to the operational sectors. I explained his priority was that the BA main control was kept supplied with kit and people as that was where all the BA crews were being marshalled prior to entry into the tower and that system seemed to be working. I confirmed we had 40 pumps either at or coming to the incident and that Steve needed to get control of those resources with marshalling officers. This would never be truly achieved but I asked him to make best endeavours to ensure BA resources in particular were sent directly to the holding area located with BAMC. He was to let me know if we were reaching the point of needing more.

He confirmed the two RVP's, he had CU1 at Latimer Road to run his function out of and when DAC Lee Drawbridge came he would take over the sector. Steve was coping well and calm. He left.

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At 0309 hrs I asked CU to order DAC Lee Drawbridge onto the incident so he could be my SCCS. At 0310 hrs CU confirmed we had a possible firefighter emergency having lost a crew in the building. I asked them to investigate but that it was to be resolved via the Ops Commander and not control due to them already being overloaded. Shortly afterwards they confirmed the crew had been found.

I stuck my head outside the unit and saw the same police officer I had earlier asked to take the details of the trapped person. He confirmed he had taken the details to CU7.

At 0315 hrs I asked CU to request the urgent attendance of a dangerous structures engineer.

At 0320 hrs I chaired the first Tactical Coordination Meeting, details are recorded in the decision log (exhibit ADR/2). In summary this included the use of the TSG to deal with a deteriorating public order situation, the safety of partners within the inner cordon and no one should be moving independently of the fire service within it, cordons, casualty handling areas and the temporary mortuary - expecting very high casualty numbers, possibly in the hundreds. I requested plans from the Local Authority, which I did not get. TCM's would be held at hourly intervals whilst the incident was so dynamic.

At 0339 hrs Matt Cook and Andy O'Loughlin got onto the unit and gave me an update face to face. They explained that Pat Goulbourne had moved the bridgehead downwards due to the fire compromising it and Extended Duration Breathing Apparatus (EDBA) was being pushed up to the 4th floor. There was a heavy turnover of EDBA and Pat wanted an EDBA makeup. I asked for an update from the BCC on EDBA resources pan London with a view to establish where they were and then bring the whole lot in. Dave O'Neill came in on the end of the brief and he made it clear that access egress was extremely hazardous due to the enormous amount of debris coming down, some of it alight. Matt and Dave had started using the TSG shields to partially protect crews as they ran into the building, this wouldn't have protected them from the larger heavier debris but is was some mitigation. I decided I needed to go to the tower lobby and make a decision as incident commander as to whether the continuing rescue effort was tenable in the face of such significant internal fire spread and such a significant external risk of partial

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collapse and the resulting debris.

The Commissioner arrived on the unit and I briefed her. Dany agreed she did not need to take over as she would have to deal with the wider political and media environment and pan London picture. She was happy with the structure and how I was running the incident.

I then went onto the incident ground accompanied by Matt Cook and Andy O'Loughlin. I noticed more police presence and the mood of the crowd seemed strangely a lot calmer despite the fire worsening. It was on all sides of the tower and clearly inside many of the flats.

As we passed CU7 I stepped in and took a short brief from Tom Goodall. He told me over 100 people were involved in fire survival calls at his best estimate - this was changing by the minute. I was happy with their orderly system so I then moved to BA Main Control. SM Dan Kipling and Nick Saunders were running the holding area and main control. Despite the tempo of the incident this was also calm, well-ordered and they clearly had a grip on ensuring enough resources were being pushed into the lobby to service the main operational sectors.

I then went to the base of the tower to the lobby where I was briefed by Dave O'Neill. There were still people visible at the windows with those trapped inside screaming. The debris was becoming more and more significant and we had a spotter advising when the best time to run in would be, using TSG shields to help. As I finished talking to Dave a male member of public jumped from the tower and hit the firefighter standing about 6 inches in front of me. The male appeared to be Middle Eastern or North African and was dead on impact, his leg had been ripped off by the force of it. The body narrowly missed Andy O'Loughlin and Matt Cook as it fell. I instructed two firefighters to drag the body away so crews would not have to keep on passing it. The fire fighter did not appear to be seriously hurt having been helped to his feet but I asked another crew member to get him off the incident ground and to be assessed by the LAS. I then got under a riot shield and ran into the building.

Upon entering the lobby my impression was that whilst the tempo was very high there was clearly a crew ordering, briefing and entry control system. The forward information boards had been dispensed with as

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they did not have enough capacity and Fire Survival Guidance information was going up on the wall in china-graph due to the volume. I undertook two mass briefings of BA crews detailing that despite the significant danger posed we were going to continue operations as we had a moral duty to those trapped in the tower.

I reminded them about personal responsibility to themselves and each other due to us asking them to operate outside of what would be the normal limits of our procedures.

I received a quick update from Pat Goulbourne and Richard Welch who were running the fire sector between them. They told me they had cleared as best as possible up to the 8th floor and were having to fire fight hard to get beyond that but had crews earlier in the incident well up beyond that to possibly the 20th and 21st floors. They were both calm and focused with an immediate aim to fight through to the 12th floor despite having intermittent issues with water supply due to burst branch / hydrant lengths as a result of falling debris or hoses getting burnt through. Pat confirmed we needed more EDBA and I explained I had asked for every EDBA asset in London. We discussed the stability of the building and at that point we had received no reports of issues with the concrete superstructure columns or floors.

Communications was still an issue. I confirmed I supported the decision for crews to wear standard duration breathing apparatus (SDBA) and EDBA outside of policy in relation to number of wears but that meant having to keep a close scrutiny on the physical condition of those they were committing. I informed them I would be back with the hour to check on progress.

I got back under a riot shield and ran back to the external sector. External firefighting was proving meaningless due to the whole building being alight but it was protecting surrounding buildings. I stopped at CU8 and briefed over 100 firefighters.

At 0406 hrs on CU8 I found that every EDBA set in London had been ordered by the Commissioner with an RVP. She had also asked that it was logged that EDBA could be worn on more than one occasion which matched my assessment. Lee Drawbridge had arrived in my absence and was focusing on resourcing as I had planned. I gave the Commissioner a full situational update from the incident ground. I

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asked Jackie McConochie to record my decision to commit crews to save life despite the extremely dangerous environment they were operating in. I felt justified to do so in the context of our duties laid out in 2004 FRSA (Fire and Rescue Services Act) and the Human Rights Act. I was satisfied that the superstructure, particularly the core was holding. I had briefed the safety officer and sector commanders to withdraw crews if anything changed. I also had Jackie record my decision to allow SDBA and EDBA to be re worn outside of the normal limits.

At 0411 hrs I was told Lee Drawbridge was working up a resourcing plan. The Commissioner was handling all the wider political and organisational communication back into the Commissioner's group and working up a media plan. I made my way to CU1 where I met Lee. I briefed him that his immediate priority was to get an understanding of what we had on the incident ground and how we were using it. He was to liaise directly with Andy O'Loughlin as to the rates of BA usage and determine what sort of relief we needed. Steve West was working with him and some other officers. Lee had set up an airwave channel to use for resourcing which Andy and I would use.

I walked back to CU8 via the tower. Little change had occurred and crews were continuing to work hard to progress inside the building.

At 0420 I went back inside the tower to the lobby. I was briefed by Pat and Richard. I asked them to start using SDBA to follow behind the EDBA crews to make best use of resources. There were continuing issues with water pressure, burst hose lengths and the very hot internal working conditions. BA crews were now up to the 12th and 13th floors. I praised their work and confirmed the structure was holding. There was one WM who was writing up FSG information on the wall. He was close to tears and tried to apologise for doing so. I put my arm around him and gave him reassurances. On the way back to CU8 I stopped and checked on BA control. This continued to work well. Firefighters were resting where possible and there was plenty of bottled water. I could see crews from PEG unloading multiple cylinders into an Equipment dump. I briefed about 100 firefighters again, praising their work and asking them to work outside of the normal limits of our operating procedures due to the moral responsibilities we had to those who were trapped. I reminded them to look after themselves and others.

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At 0435 hrs I got back on CU8. The Commissioner had started the TCM establishing the priority as safety. I took over having been briefed that Dany had ordered a 20 pump relief, the DSE was en route and Keeley had gone out to take command of the external sectors for Andy O'Loughlin. I asked Lee be briefed to this effect along with the RVP. I confirmed that with the arrival of the relief we would have 61 appliances on the incident ground. I then chaired the TCM (as per incident log) this covered safety again for the debris, police were going to close Ladbroke Grove to facilitate 20 new appliances arriving, rest centres had been set up by local authority (LA) but they could not provide much details, I asked the DSE be blue-lighted in as I had waited 2 hours for their arrival, police were evacuating Barrington Walk, and I asked the press be corralled in one location by MPS and LFB would be lead on press lines. Meeting concluded at 0450 hrs with another one scheduled for 0550.

At 0451 hrs UKPN presented at the CU. I asked them if there was any particular electricity hazard associated with the building and they told me there was a substation in the basement that supplied 3 other blocks as well. I decided as it was not involved I would keep it on to assist with lighting for crews working in there. UKPN advised if needed they could isolate it within 3-4 minutes, we took the direct number to enable that. They also advised me if they couldn't get remote isolation to work it would take 30 minutes to isolate it at street level. I asked CU crew to brief the command team on the incident ground via Andy O'Loughlin

I was then told DSE had arrived and was making an assessment of the building. Mick Mullholland got on the unit and provided an update as to the rate of use of EDBA and SDBA and that we had EDBA up to the 12th floor and SDBA to the 7th.

I asked that PPV be used to clear the lobby of smoke and I also asked Mick if we had the space now to get an aerial ladder platform (ALP) in or whether the debris fall and pressure on water supplies was still too considerable. He said he would pass it back to Andy O'Loughlin and get me an answer. I asked CU crew why we still didn't have plans of the building and they confirmed again there were none on ORD (mapping system) but there were meant to be a set in a premises information box in the lobby of the tower according to the ORD entry. I asked for this information to be relayed to the fire sector and made a note

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to ask for a set from the LA at the meeting again.

At 0520 hrs I had a face to face update with Andy O'Loughlin. He told me there was a bariatric fatal on the stairs blocking progress and that a considerable amount of casualties were still coming out, with persons seen at the windows. Visibility was ok until the 5th floor from which point on it was smoke logged even in the central core. I asked if the wet riser was up and running, he said it was but that the water supply was not at the pressure they wanted. I suggested they prioritised getting the bariatric out to enable progress.

I requested a full senior officer relief for 0800 hrs and let Lee know as he was still concentrating on consolidation of existing resources and the integration of the 20 pump relief. The Commissioner asked me to pass back via AC1 that no officers were to be on status 7 today.

The Commissioner and I agreed that due to the superstructure still holding we would continue to commit crews as there were still members of public trapped. She told me she was ordering DAC Rick Ogden on to help with press as there was now a significant media presence. She also expressed concerns about the welfare of firefighters being traumatised. Dany told me she was going to coordinate with Vicky Hardman the media and political response and communication.

At 0532hrs Dave O'Neill came onto the unit to give me his regular update as sector commander safety. They continued use long shields from TSG a senior dangerous structural engineer (DSE) had arrived John Allen who confirmed the building had up to 4 hours protection but that obviously the scale and ferocity of the fire may have compromised that. He told me John, like us, had no concerns about overall collapse but agreed that columns could fail and cause isolated partial collapse. Dave had briefed safety officers to focus on the stability of columns and had passed that brief to the lobby for BA crews. It was recorded that following the brief and my own professional judgement it was proportional and necessary to continue to commit BA crews into the building to save life.

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I asked for Tom Goodall to attend the next TCM to give an update on where we were with FSG. I heard fireground radio traffic relating to an issue with water supply and committing without water supply to recover a trapped person.

At 0540 hrs Mick Mulholland came back to the unit. I asked him to ascertain if we had many crews progressing without adequate water supply to known locations for rescue and to emphasise to Pat and Richard and Andy that wherever possible crews has to have a water supply ahead of them. Tom Goodall got onto the unit and informed me he had received reports of someone on Facebook streaming live trapped on the roof of the building. I asked him to verify this. I considered the possibility of requesting maritime and coastguard agency search and rescue (MCA SAR) helo support as London does not have a winch rescue capability. My reservations with this option were the 45 min minimum arrival time and the possible effect of downdraft on the fire whilst we had so many people trapped and firefighters inside.

0545hrs I asked Dan Daly AC1 to place MCA SAR helo on warning for a possible tasking. I did not want to deploy until Tom had verification. GM Charlie Pugsley the head of Fire Investigation got on the unit. Knowing he had led previously on major investigations and had drafted a major investigation policy, I asked him to instigate that policy and take an immediate lead for the investigation, putting in place whatever measures he required to capture and record evidence.

At 0550 hrs Tom Goodall came back and confirmed there was no verifiable report of anyone on the roof. I cancelled helo. He had been out onto the incident ground and into the lobby. He told me the wet riser whilst working was giving poor supply and an lightweight portable pump (LPP) had been set up to supply from the 6th floor but crews were committing with limited weight of attack even above the fire. I asked the CU to request another BMA to assist with improving the water supply.

I then chaired the TCM (as per decision log), covering water supplies, persons trapped from an FSG perspective, LA gave details of rest centres but it was clear they did not have either the control of them or

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accurate information coming from them, I asked for more effort in giving me details of numbers in them. We covered media and the Police advised me Casualty Bureau had been opened.

At 0610 hrs I had a series of updates from incident ground describing an issue with water supply. Based on the limits of exploitation they were describing I logged a decision to limit crews to the 12th floor pending reassessment and an improvement in water supply. I asked for this to go back to the fire sector supporting their assessment and validating their recommended decision.

I got an update from the DSE at 0613 hrs explaining he could not get back into the building safely but had assessed it was unlikely that the floor plates would fail leading to a pancake collapse. I asked him for plans and he said he would personally find someone in the LA to supply them. On the basis of the DSE's update I asked Jackie to log that I would continue to commit crews into the building but based on the reports from the sector would not push beyond 12th floor. Andy O'Loughlin was to review this decision continuously and if possible push beyond the 12th floor at the earliest possibility if water supplies were improved.

At 0615 hrs the Commissioner got onto the CU. She asked for the duty counsellor to be paged as she was encountering groups of severely traumatised firefighters on her walk round. I assured her that this had happened and I would ring Dan Daly as AC1 to ensure they started drawing together and attendance list for contact. The Commissioners presence on the incident ground had been very important in boosting morale and motivation. These were comments that had been passed to me and I reflected this back to her asking her to continue to engage and talk to crews. Dany had devised a press strategy with LFB Gold Comms and was shortly going to give a talking head to press but with no casualty numbers.

Charlie Pugsley came, back and gave me a detailed brief on how he was going to begin collation of evidence. He asked if I wanted to sign off the e-mail he was going to send out to all crews and officers attending. I authorised him to send it without me seeing it. I was aware of his experience. Charlie asked

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me to remind other agencies that at the next TCM of the need for all individuals attending to make contemporaneous notes. He said he would make contact with the police to establish primacy of investigation. I asked him to attend the next TCM as investigation lead.

At 0628 hrs I asked for a reminder to be sent out to the operational sectors that I wanted them to be pushing beyond the 12th floor as soon as it was possible, I asked they let me know so I could log the decision.

Matt Cook gave me a situational update at 0631 hrs. They confirmed initial clearance had taken place up to the 12 th floor and that they had additional BMA in attendance, Chris Payton. Water supply had improved so were going to push beyond the 12th floor with EDBA.

At 0635 hrs I was happy external sector 1-4 were now under control of Andy O'Loughlin with sufficient officers, with an ALP now working in 4. As a consequence I think it was about this time I asked Keeley Foster to work for Lee Drawbridge to implement the relief. Dany had got back on the unit and she let me know she had been in regular contact with the Mayor's office and had arranged wider GLA family support for C&W through the SCG. I think I rang Dan Daly at this point to give him an update for the SCG and to make the request for the attendance lists to go to C&W. Adrian Fenton rang me to confirm he was speaking directly to Lee Drawbridge from the BCC to support resourcing.

At 0642hrs BCC offered me a 42m aerial appliance from Surrey FRS, I accepted the officer and asked it to mobilise. This was with a view to replace our ALP which only has a 30m reach. Dany was concerned that there were a large number of people wandering the local area and asked me to raise it at the next TCM.

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I left the unit and, with Dany, had a face to face update with Andy O'Loughlin and the sector commanders on fire ground. Andy assured me the water supply had improved despite the major issues with the burst lengths. Chris Payton the additional BMA was there and confirmed this as well as the fact that Thames Water could not give us any additional pressure as it risked bursting water mains further back in their supply chain.

Dave O'Neill gave me a safety update, he did not feel there had been any substantive change to the structure of the building although debris fall was still considerable. He was liaising with the DSE to monitor this.

I then saw Dany again who had been talking to some of the crews. Together we ran under shields into the lobby. Inside Pat Goulbourne and Richard Welch gave me a very clear brief. They were now satisfied with the water supply and were pushing up beyond the 12th floor with a view to getting to the 18th where they had last recorded live FSG call. I confirmed I was happy with the decision and would log that on my return to the unit. I could see no physical changes that would alter my perception of the buildings stability. I discussed briefly with Dany and she supported me assessment based on her own view of the situation.

0703hrs I got back on CU8 with Dany. She took a phone call and let me know that Roy Wilshire NFCC chair was going to brief the Home Office. Dany then left to make further phone calls into central and regional government and the Commissioners Group.

0708 hrs I asked Jackie to log that having received a full situational update I had not changed my position on the stability of the building and with improved water supply the crews should try and push up beyond the 12th floor again.

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At 0713 hrs I chaired the TCM (recorded on decision log) covering pushing beyond the 12th floor, police confirmed civil unrest had dissipated, LAS only had a couple of P3's on scene but requested them to maintain their resourcing level as we might get more survivors, anticipation of very large numbers of deceased, Charlie gave an update as to his priorities for investigation in particular emphasis on LAS providing details on where casualties being moved to, LA providing better update on numbers in rest centres but I now asked specifically for them to produce lists of addresses of those survivors so we could cross reference the information. I think it was at this TCM (although not recorded in the decision log) that Charlie explained all LFB appliances would be going back via Paddington Fire Station to be met by C&W and for crews to make a contemporaneous log. I once again formally requested plans from the LA who had not yet produced any. Ended TCM 0735 hrs, the next one scheduled for 0840 hrs.

I was beginning to get reports of Firefighters injuries and I asked the CU to send any details by phone to control and to ensure we had enough SAIs mobilised to investigate within the constraints of officers left available.

0735hrs I asked Matt Cook and Mick Mulholland to give Andy O'Loughlin some clear instruction to set up a strategy for systematic search of previously cleared areas as I felt we were now beginning to transition into a phase where the chances of survivability were less and less, although casualties were still coming out. I wanted them to also help Andy ascertain his likely EDBA use up to 1300 hours and then having agreed a level of EDBA relief with me, pass that information to Lee Drawbridge. We also discussed how we would affect an officer relief. All of us agreed that we needed to gradually withdraw officers when the 0800 officer relief came on to both maintain continuity and to allow initial officers to see the job through to a natural break for their own closure as long as they were making decisions effectively. Mail and Mick confirmed no SDBA was being used at that time.

0744 hrs I asked for an update from Lee Drawbridge who told me he was having a very difficult job getting crews away from the scene but was slowly trying to reduce the incident down to 20 pumps as per the relief. We discussed and agreed we would move to a pattern of 3 hour rolling 10 pump reliefs once the 20 was implemented, maintaining 20 on the ground.

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At 0755 hrs GM John Graham was my first relief officer on. I asked him to go and slowly take over from either Pat Goulbourne or Richard Welch, dependent on who needed it the most. Andy O'Loughlin had come onto the CU and was part of that discussion as was Dave O'Neill the safety sector commander who told me the 11th floor was like a furnace and that Andy Cane the new ORT officer wanted a safety officer in the lobby. I said that I felt having seen the lobby on a number of occasions there was a good control and that I didn't want John to do that role but rather take over from tired officers where possible. I sent Andy O'Loughlin and John Graham off the unit to decide which of the fire sector commanders to swap out first and to validate their decision.

At 0810 hrs MPS came on the CU and confirmed the Mass fatalities group had been established and all fatalities were to be left in situ.

National Grid (gas) presented at the CU having been requested as part of the major incident, I asked them to isolate the gas supply to the block. They explained they would have to dig up 3 locations to do so, one was inside the inner cordon. I gave them permission to do so and asked them to get started. They told me it would also isolate the gas to one other building, I felt this was acceptable as I was sure burning gas supplies in the flats were adding to the difficulties for firefighters.

I was given an urgent message at 0825 hrs from the incident ground that they had undertaken a live rescue of a man from the 11th floor.

At 0830 hrs I briefed John Simpson and Andy Cane the new ORT officers. I asked John to advise Lee and work with him to get crews reunited with their own appliances and off the incident ground to prevent further disruption to the wider LFB service. I asked Andy to advise the operational sectors but to be sensitive in how he provided that advice as officers were tired and had worked beyond normal limits of risk exposure to their utter credit. I agreed he could put an additional safety officer into the tower as we now had some additional relief officers.

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Dany was on the unit for the brief and then let me know she had let North Ken's crews walk back to their station as they were exhausted and their machine was pumping so couldn't be released with them. C&W were briefed to meet them.

Andy Cane wanted to get back into a policy framework. I explained that whilst this was absolutely an aspiration we had only just pulled out a live casualty so my emphasis was still on saving life even if we had to deviate from policy at times in a measured and considered way. I made the point quite forcibly that we would not be able to reach the upper floors if we did not maintain that stance and we had a moral duty to do so. I asked Jackie to record this.

At 0845 hrs I chaired the TCM (recorded in decision log) covering DVI (who were now present at the TCM) and the possible transition of body recovery, the recent survivor and the continuing push beyond the 12th floor, I did accept however that we were beginning the transition from pure lifesaving into a phase where there would begin to be a greater emphasis on recording the numbers of fatalities in preparation for the moment when we decided survival was no longer realistic. I asked Tom Goodall to gather this information. Systematic searches of the flats was to be undertaken and recorded from the ground up even if we had been there before. Charlie Pugsley wanted the occupants of flat 16 (flat of origin) traced and interviewed as a priority.

Charlie also confirmed Paddington Fire station reception centre was now established for our crews with C&W in situ.

After the meeting I spoke to Tom about how I wanted him to take responsibility on CU7 not only for the FSG information but to transition it into a location where for now we would begin to collect information on the fatalities to aid any passage of information to next of kin and to inform any investigation.

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I briefed about 15 relief officers outside the CU giving a situational update. I delegated a role to each and asked them to receive a more detailed individual brief from the officer they were taking over from.

At 0910 hrs Dave O'Neill the safety sector commander came onto the unit to give me his regular update. The crews were back down to the 12th floor due to a burst branch length on the 11th floor. This was soaking them meaning they were boiling themselves going past it. He told me it was getting resolved and then they would push past it again. We discussed the use of Urban Search and rescue (USAR) in the coming days and how when the building cooled they would have to work in conjunction with DVI to secure safe access for body removal.

At 0930 hrs I replaced some of the officers in the resourcing sector with officers who had arrived as part of the officer relief. I got a good update from Lee Drawbridge who told me he had managed to get 4 FRU's and 11 pumps away and was slowly persuading crews they had to leave despite their desire to continue.

John Allen (DSE) briefed me at 0935 hrs stating he wanted the cordons pushed back as he was concerned about the length of time the fire had been burning. He was not able to give me a clear reason for why the superstructure would collapse now and agreed that the core was most likely stable. I asked Jackie to record that I still considered there to be an outside chance of saveable life, I would not push the cordons back as it would be impossible to operate. I asked John to come to the next TCM. I also asked him, if possible, to get in the ALP to make a better assessment of the outer columns which were the area of highest risk. He also needed to think ahead as to how the LA might support the structure over the next few days as he needed to be prepared in my experieriice for considerable pressure to enable access to the building to search for fatalities to provide some closure to families. I asked Matt Cook to go out with John onto the fireground and get a consolidated view on the stability of the building prior to the next TCM.

Pat Goulbourne and Richard Welch were preparing to leave the incident and gave me a final sitrep at

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0945hrs. I told them both I thought they had been outstanding both in the context of their personal courage and as officers commanding the fire sector.

At 1015 hrs I chaired my final TCM at the incident (in decision log) this covered discussions about the buildings stability, if there was any chance of survivors we would continue aggressive internal firefighting operations. Due to the dynamic nature of the incident slowing the next TCM was arranged for 1300 hrs with AC Dom Ellis whom I was going to hand over to.

At 1055 hrs with reports of asbestos I asked the CU staff to contact the DSE and request the asbestos register as well as to ask him to confirm the asbestos location and type.

I replaced Andy O'Loughlin with Rick Ogden as Ops Commander at 1114 hrs. Rick having been on scene for some time to handle media and therefore having good situational awareness.

At 1135 hrs I began to hand over to Dom Ellis with a full walk of the incident ground, covering all areas recorded in the handover agenda on the incident decision log, this process took about an hour. The log was handed over to Dom's logist SM Peter Cox.

At approximately 1235 hrs I left the incident ground having handed over.

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