

WITNESS STATEMENT

Criminal Procedure Rules, r27.2; Criminal Justice Act 1967, s.9; Magistrates' Courts Act 1980, s.5b

Statement of: WILLIAMS, ANDREW

Age if under 18: OVER 18 (if over 18 insert 'over 18')

Occupation: FIRE OFFICER

This statement (consisting of 16 page(s) each signed by me) is true to the best of my knowledge and belief and I make it knowing that, if it is tendered in evidence, I shall be liable to prosecution if I have wilfully stated in it anything which I know to be false, or do not believe to be true.

Signature: A WILLIAMS

Date: 26/03/2018

Tick if witness evidence is visually recorded (*supply witness details on rear*)

I am the above named person and my details are known to Police. This statement is in relation to the fire at GRENFELL TOWER that occurred on WEDNESDAY 14 JUNE 2017.

I did not make any notes of the incident at the time or immediately afterwards, therefore do not have any notes to refer to whilst making this statement. I will make reference to the following exhibit in this statement:

Whilst providing police this statement I drew a plan of the area around Grenfell Tower which I exhibit as AWI/01 — Plan around Grenfell Tower.

My name is Andrew WILLIAMS and I am employed by the London Fire Brigade (LFB) and I am currently ranked as a Station Manager (SM). I joined the LFB as a Firefighter twenty-one (21) years ago. I was initially based at Silvertown Fire Station as a Firefighter, then Bethnal Green Fire Station for nine (9) years as a Firefighter. I was promoted to Crew Manager (CM) and moved to Clerkenwell Fire Station; then I had various temporary posts whilst acting up in promotion. I was based at Kingsland Fire Station and Clarkerwell Fire Station again, then I went to Plumstead Fire Station on a transfer as a Crew Manager. I was also at Bexley Fire Station as a Crew Manager. I then was a temporary Watch Manager (WM) at various Fire Stations, and Promoted to Watch Manager at Lewisham Fire Station. In 2015 I was promoted as a Station Manager and was in charge of Dowgate Fire Station. On 1st April 2017 I began the role as Staff Officer to Assistant Commissioner (AC) Dominic ELLIS, and I am currently based at Union Street, LFB Headquarters. I have been competent in my status as Station Manager since 2015.

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2018

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My role as Staff Officer to AC Dominic ELLIS is to support the Assistant Commissioner. The AC's are very busy in their role and a Staff Officer ensures their workload is manageable by addressing the less important tasks. A lot of the work done for the AC is under their guidance. The work we do is varied and dependent on what the AC's needs and requirements are, The shifts I work are the usual Station Manager shift pattern which includes twenty-four (24) hour days, 9 duty, nine (9) minus and nine (9) plus.

Whilst I was a Firefighter, Crew Manager and Watch Manager I was regularly assessed in training such as Breathing Apparatus (BA). As a Station Manager you do not wear BA so this training has expired, as you are not required to wear BA for the role. I was trained in Extended Duration Breathing Apparatus (EDBA) and had regular training in EDBA up to my role as a Watch Manager. I was trained to ride the Fire Rescue Unit, and was for around ten (10) years.

Senior Management training includes incident command training. An incident command course needs to be passed by individuals to become promoted to a Station Manager. There are generally yearly refresher training courses for incident command to ensure you are competent in the role. This training includes mock scenarios, the person being trained will be in charge and competency of the individual is checked. I last did this training in 2016 before the fire at Grenfell Tower and I have also done it since the fire.

Incident Command training is simulated training which is made as realistic as possible. There are role plays and you are put under pressure to see how you deal with realistic incidents. You may have to go outside of policy during the training and this is based on your perception on risk / benefit. Feedback and guidance is also given following the training.

Other training includes health and safety, IT and management courses, these include refresher training courses. Additional responsibility roles I also do includes being a tactical rescue advisor, mass casualty retrieval and press liaison. The tactical rescue is to advise incident commanders and crews, oversee the rescue by applying policy and my experience. Most of my work time is spent at UNION STREET Headquarters, and around 10% of my time is spent outside of the office, for example incidents, training venues and also at other various Fire Stations. This is to build relationships with the crews based at Fire Stations.

A Section 7(2)d is a premises risk assessment, and includes a scoring of the building. Not all buildings require a Section 7(2)d as it is dependent on the risk level. The level of risk may be classified as low risk so it may not be required. The information collated is entered onto the Operational Risk Database (ORD) and the hazards are looked at. For example if there are cylinders or chemicals. The Incident Commander would want to know this for formatting plans at incidents. Tactical plans is another area which is

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2018

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reviewed. This includes how many people are in the building, any sprinklers, alarms, parking reviewed including access via the best places to park, where hydrants are placed, dry rise mains. Phased evacuations for example is something the building owners would cover within their risk assessment. Floor plans are obtained and this would include locations of dry rise mains and hydrants. Electronic Premises Information Plates (ePIP) for high rises are also part of this. Information from a Section 7(2)d go on the Mobile Data Terminal (MDT) which can be found on all fire appliances.

Section 7(2)d's are completed by Fire Stations for buildings including high rise. When I was based at Dowgate there were lot of buildings that required Section 7(2)d's. Within my role as Station Manager I would review the input from Firefighters on Section 7(2)d's, it is a Station Manager's role to Q&A the Section 7(2)d's. Firefighters and crews would go out complete the information gathering for the Section 7(2)d based on their visit to the buildings. Then as a Station Manager I would review the Section 7(2)d and the information on it. If more information is required I would return this back to the crews to redo. If the information is okay then I approve the Section 7(2)d and send this to Union Street Headquarters. This is then reviewed again at Union Street and if it is approved by them the Section 7(2)d information is put on the system. If it is not approved it will go back to the Station Manager to ensure the detail is amended. I have never been to Grenfell Tower before. I have not been involved in any Section 7(2)d for Grenfell Tower. At the incident I did not arrive until later during the incident so was not involved in the Section 7(2)d for the incident. I have been based East London or South London whilst working for LFB, and more recently Central London. I have not been based in Kensington & Chelsea so I am not familiar with Grenfell Tower.

Training for high rise incidents includes the experience of dealing with the incidents, When the crew gets to an incident you establish water, the bridgehead and resources. The bridgehead is a platform from where you can work. There is policy in place for high rise incidents and this is followed. Training for high rise also involves requirement to read policy notes and procedures. We are expected to do this ourselves. I will read these when I need to. I cannot remember exactly the last time I read training notes on high rise procedures, however I do read these and it would have been within six (6) months of the incident and also in the last six (6) months.

I have never experienced a fire in a high rise like Grenfell Tower. Any large fire with a 40 pumps in attendance I would expect to me possibly a warehouse or similar. In high rise towers usually the fire is a compartment fire which should stay contained to that compartment. Occasionally the fire may come out of the window or attempt to travel up to the next flat but usually a fire in a high rise tower stays contained

Signature: A WILLIAMS
2018

Signature witnessed by:

within one (1) room. Fire personnel are training to deal with fire spread. If the fire does spread into the flats above then the incident is reviewed. The stay put policy would be reviewed however every building and incident is different and I still believe even after attending Grenfell that this is the safest option. The stay put policy is generally the safest way to deal with fires in a high rise building. This can be reviewed as the incident changes. Normally a fire stays contained to a room so staying inside would usually be the safest place to be. If you leave you could potentially be putting yourself in risk by going into a smoky environment, also people cause panic and can get in the way of rescue and firefighting. As well as the potential of panicking people being irrational. You would not expect a fire to spread out of the compartment as it did at Grenfell so the stay put policy is used as this is the safest place usually. We have a training package which is more of a case study. This includes a fire in Stevenage where two (2) Firefighters died. The case studies go through when compartmentation fails, there are also 'back to basics' training scenarios.

The night of the fire at Grenfell Tower I was on a twenty-four (24) hour duty so I was on duty and available if I was required. My call sign was OE59. I was asleep and at around 0330hrs on Wednesday 14 June 2017 I was woken up when I received a phone call from SM Richard TAPP, Brigade Control Centre (BCC), to my mobile. He called me on my work mobile to tell me about a forty (40) pump fire that was in progress and that AC Andy ROE was the Incident Command in charge at the scene. I was not aware of the fire at Grenfell Tower before this phone call as I was asleep. It is then my decision on whether I should tell AC ELLIS. AC ELLIS was off duty at the time and was due on duty at 0800hrs. AC ELLIS was acting up to Brigade Manager for that day from 08:00. I thought to myself that AC ELLIS would have a busy day when he started his shift and so I decided not to tell him then as he would be extremely busy when he took over at 08:00. However I spent an hour pondering over it whilst deciding on what to do.

Usually a forty (40) pump fire would be a factory, when SM TAPP told me it as a high rise I was shocked and not sure why I hadn't been mobilised. I could not get back to sleep and I decided to go into Union Street Headquarters early. I was on duty in any case and I knew it would be a busy day. It took me around an hour to drive in. I arrived to the office at around 0500-0530hrs. I drove in my job car which is for my use. I listened to the news on the radio in the car and could hear on the news about the incident in Grenfell Tower. I cannot remember anything specific about what I heard on the radio.

AC DALY was already in Union Street, he was in the Commissioners Suite. I do not know if the Commissioner was in there at that stage. This was being used for Strategic Gold Command. I was not

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2018

Signature witnessed by:

involved in this so cannot give details about this, A few other people were at Union Street involved in the incident at Grenfell Tower, at this stage I was not involved. I started doing some of my usual jobs and tasks to include gathering details about the incident so that things were in order for when AC ELLIS arrived. The TV was on in the office and I could see the tower burning on the news. It was like tower inferno. Like nothing you could ever imagine and something I had never seen before.

I used a system called 'Vision' to look at information in relation to the incident at Grenfell Tower. This gave me information on units mobilised, in attendance, and messages. It gives a breakdown on what is going on at the incident. I knew I would probably be going so wanted to be prepared and also be able to brief AC ELLIS when he arrived. Messages are something you get at all incidents. At incidents informative messages to control are required, at an early stage in a dynamic incident messages can sometimes lack certain detail however at large incidents messages will be more precise and accurate. There were so many messages from the initial call, I went through the messages from the start of the incident.

At around 0600hrs I called the BCC, which was based in Stratford, and I asked that I do not get mobilised until AC ELLIS was on duty as I knew he would be required for the incident. There were now quite a lot of people coming into work, 0800hrs would be a start of duty. People were coming into work early. AC ELLIS usually gets into work early, at around 0600hrs and I believe he came into work around 0600hrs on that day. He went into to the Commissioner's Suite and was involved in that for quite a bit of the morning, I was not involved in that so I do not know what was discussed and occurred in there. . My role predominately was to assist the AC on the functions happening at the incident grounds, and to feedback to him as required.

At around 0930hrs I was told we were going to take over from AC ROE, Incident Command, at the incident ground. There was a lot going on in the office, I then got myself ready to go with AC ELLIS. We left Union Street at around 1030hrs this is when we were mobilised, and we went in our separate cars to the incident. We drove on the bells, so blue light conditions to the incident. I drove in front and AC ELLIS followed behind me. I had been told that the RVP was Ladbroke Grove and we drove towards the incident. I cannot remember the route I took to the incident, I drove through central London, towards Knightsbridge, possibly on the A4, but I cannot remember the exact route. There were Police cordons in place the closer we got to the incident ground. The streets were busy with people and vehicles. There was lots of congestion, it was a nightmare driving to drive through. We could not get near the RVP so parked outside the Police cordon on a residential street. I cannot remember the street name. AC ELLIS parked his

Signature: A WILLIAMS
2018

Signature witnessed by:

car next to mine. This was around Ladbroke Grove but I cannot remember the exact location. There was a Command Unit near there, there were several Command Unit's at the incident. I cannot mark our parking position this area on the map AWI/01 as it is outside the area shown on the map. I think it was to the East of Bomore.

As I drove closer to the incident ground I could see the tower and I could see it from where we parked and made our way to the incident. It was daylight and I could clearly see the burning tower, it was still alight and there was smoke coming from the tower. It looked like a scene from a movie, something you would never expect to see. The whole tower looked like it had been alight with still some fire alight. There were lots of members of the public about, I did not speak to anyone. In my mind I expected that we would be in the recovery stage of the incident, ie all persons out and the fire extinguished.

We arrived at the incident ground at 1130hrs. AC ELLIS and I walked towards the Command Unit that AC ROE was in, this was on Bomore junction with Grenfell Road, I have marked this location on AWI/01. When we arrived I realised that the incident was still highly involved and I was surprised that it was not the recovery stage and the incident was nowhere near being resolved. At the Command Unit were AC ROE, two (2) loggists (which were two (2) Stations Managers) and the Command Unit team.

A Command Unit is used for incident command. This was used for the incident commander to run the incident from. I cannot remember if there were any issues in the Command Unit, it is not a role I was involved in. The staff were very busy in there, doing their own roles, and it is not something I would interfere with.

AC ROE did a handover to AC ELLIS so that AC ELLIS could take over from him as Incident Command. This took around an hour and AC ROE said that there still may be life in the tower, that there was a risk but we needed to push on and do what we could. Firefighting was still going on when we arrived on scene. AC ROE had allocated a new loggist already, SM Peter COX, in his handover. This is a role that I would have done as Staff Officer to AC ELLIS but as a new loggist had already been allocated it was decided that SM COX would remain at the loggist. I would assist AC ELLIS with whatever else was required. The handover consisted of what was going on inside and outside the tower, and also included a walk around the incident ground. The handover was to ensure that AC ELLIS was fully aware of what was going on.

The handover included life, number of people rescued; including Fire Survival Guidance (FSG), this was being run by another Command Unit which I have marked on AWI/01 as 'FSG'.

Signature: A WILLIAMS
2018

Signature witnessed by:

From memory I believe it was possibly sixty (60) people accounted for, this was information from GM Greg ASHMAN who was at the FSG Command Unit. I was already aware that by the time I got to Union Street that the stay put advice was no longer being used. I had seen this from messages and from people talking. We needed to get everyone out of the building. I do not know the time the stay put policy was withdrawn at the incident.

AC ROE spoke about Operations; Sectors which I have marked as SC1, SC2 and S3 on AWI/01, I am not 100% sure of the location of Sector 1 and 3. Usually there are four (4) sectors but I cannot remember there being a sector four (4). Sectors also includes vertical and horizontal; and Command Structures. I cannot give you details of the handover as I did not make notes at the time and a number of months has since passed before providing this statement to Police. The Fire Investigation Team were on scene, AC ROE explained what they were doing. The press were at the incident, AC's have a big role to play and a press strategy would be discussed and also to discuss who had spoken to the press.

The walk around was with AC ROE, AC ELLIS, two (2) loggists, myself and a member of the Command Unit team, I cannot remember his name. AC ROE showed the entrance to the tower, crews were being committed into the tower. There was so much debris that had fallen. Around Sector 3 and 1 there was a lot of debris on the ground that had fallen from the tower so around this area it could not be used too much. The debris looked like sheeting from the tower, glass, window panels, cladding from the tower. There was a BA staging area and welfare area for Firefighters to drink and rest, I have marked this on AWI/01. Areas were hazardous to walk around due to debris falling, to get into the tower you needed to use riot shields that the Police were providing. Sector 2 included an underground car park area, here the BA teams were waiting in BA, and they were waiting to be told when they could go in the tower. I do not recall any casualties coming out of the tower whilst we did this walk through during the handover. We did not walk to the North of the tower as there was nothing going on there, and there was lots of debris falling so we walked back.

There was an aerial ladder platform (ALP) from Surrey that was being used, I have marked this location on AWI/01. And a few LFB appliances were in sector 1 but I do not think they were being used. About 90% of the tower had been burnt and it was still alright. I could see a triangle shape at the bottom of the tower from the fire.

I spoke to GM Greg ASHMAN who was on the FSG Command Unit as I was walking past. It was not a long conversation, it was more of an 'alright, how are you'. We then went back to the Command Unit,

Signature: A WILLIAMS
2018

Signature witnessed by:

and AC ELLIS formerly took over and was Incident Command, so AC ROE was no longer in charge. I am not sure if he left the incident at that time.

The handover concluded at around 1230hrs and there was a Tactical Command Group (TCG) meeting in Kenington Leisure Centre at 1300hrs. I have marked this location on AWI/01. This meeting involves different agencies that are involved in the incident, including LFB, Transport for London (TfL), London Underground, Met Police, London Ambulance Service (LAS), TMO, Local Authority Liaison (LUL), and Borough Surveyor. AC ELLIS chaired this meeting, and the loggist would have made the notes. These notes can be provided to Police by AC ELLIS, or the loggist or someone from LFB who has these records. From memory there was an update on the incident from LFB and the other agencies involved, There was an update on life, which includes life rescued, unaccounted, or deceased. There was firefighting continuing and discussion on any saveable life in the tower. I cannot remember the numbers quoted but I think it was around seventy (70) or so people either unaccounted or deceased. The meeting lasted about half an hour. I cannot remember much detail about the meeting but the detail would be in the loggist's notes.

After the TCG meeting AC ELLIS and I did walk of the incident ground again. It was AC ELLIS' decision to do this. The loggist may have also been with us but I cannot remember. During the first walk through we would have taken in a lot of information during the handover so another walk around the incident ground so that the AC could evaluate the incident. At the East side of the tower AC ELLIS spoke to the Sector Commanders and Firefighters, to get an understanding from their view point. Speaking to people directly and seeing first-hand the situation

From the handover and also from speaking to those at the ground information was provided that a lot of gas fires were going on inside the building. It was a gas fuelled building. The fire appeared to be out but because of the gas still being on, fires were lighting up inside the tower. AC ELLIS told me that we needed to try and knock off the gas, so turn it off. I called the Command Unit as they had the details for the gas company and I then liaised with the gas company and spoke to them about turning the gas off. Knocking off the gas is something that is usually done from within the building but due to the condition of the tower there were issues surrounding getting this done from inside the tower. The gas company said they were looking into turning the gas off from the outside but there were a lot of problems.

There were three (3) gas mains in the area which had gas supplying the tower, I have marked these three (3) gas mains on the map, AWI/01. All three (3) supplies needed to be turned off, which involved digging up the roads. The gas board said that the time frame to switch these three (3) supplies off was around two

Signature: A WILLIAMS
2018

Signature witnessed by:

(2) to five (5) hours. I told them that this was not acceptable and it needed to be quicker. There were vehicles in the way which meant that the gas company could not get their machinery to the three (3) gas sites, particularly the two (2) areas closest to the tower, South East of Grenfell Tower. The situation was dragging on and it took around an hour to get the vehicles removed to get the machinery in.

Whilst the gas company were trying to get the three (3) gas mains outside the tower switched off and getting machinery to the sites I looked at alternative ways to get the gas knocked off. The gas company said it could be done internally, I thought it was worth taking the risk. So I got three (3) Firefighters from Sector 2, the head gas contractor and someone from his team and we all went into the basement of the tower. Debris was still falling from the tower so we went in from Sector 2 via the walkway. We grabbed some Police shields that were on the ground at Sector 1 and used this to protect us from any falling debris. We quickly went into the tower without being hit by falling debris. I am wearing my Firefighting Personal Protective Equipment (PPE). I am not wearing BA or face mask but we all had on helmets. Once we got inside the tower we went down some stairs into the basement area of the tower. The basement area was vast in size. There was a lot of water there, around five (5) inches deep. I went into the basement, the 3 Firefighters and the two (2) from the gas company stayed on the stairs, advising us where the shut off valves were. The gas mains was quite high up and we needed a ladder to get to it. I was also wary of the water getting to the Electrical Sub Station that was there. There are wheels to turn to switch off the gas but the two (2) from the gas company were not sure which were the correct wheels as it was difficult to tell.

On the radio I informed the Operations Commander that we were inside the building, and that we were in the basement to turn of the gas mains. I used my handheld radio to do this. I was asked on the radio if I heard about the tactical withdrawal and I said I did not. The tactical withdrawal meant that the tower had been, or was in the process, of being evacuated. So we had to leave and by then a ladder had not arrived so that gas had not been switched off. We had to leave the tower straight away, we all left and went out to Sector 1. By the time we got out of the tower the tower had been evacuated of all the Fire Personnel that were inside, I think we were the last out.

I recall a discussion between AC ELLIS and GM Rick OGDEN that in GM Rick OGDEN'S opinion that there was no further life could be expected as crews had been on every floor. It would now be body recovery. AC ELLIS called officially that there was no further expected life following this discussion. The reason for the tactical withdrawal was that banging was heard and there was concerns that the building was about to collapse. Whilst in the basement I did not hear any loud bangs or noise. I informed

Signature: A WILLIAMS
2018

Signature witnessed by:

AC ELLIS that the gas had not been switched off. The gas company continued their efforts with the three (3) sites to dig up and switch off the gas supply to the tower. The tower had not collapsed so this meant that the gas company were able to work at all the sites including that closest to the tower. Firefighters were used as spotters whilst the gas company worked nearby as the area they were working in was within the hazard zone established by the incident commander (AC ELLIS).. I had cleared it with AC ELLIS that we used Firefighters as spotters and so he arranged for SM PRASAD to manage the safety in the area. SM PRASAD would have tasked the Firefighters and worked as a safety officer. I know when I left the incident that the gas supply into the tower still had not been switched off. I do not know when this was finally done. There was discussion later in the day about going back in the tower to turn the gas off but the gas company said it was too unsafe to send their people in so we could not try this again.

It was around 1730hrs, possibly a bit earlier, I then went back to the Command Unit, I was not doing anything specific. I spoke to people about what they saw and what they were doing. Nothing sticks out in my mind now about what I was told. I spoke to the crews and Fire personnel, no one outside of the Fire Brigade. I stayed around the Command Unit, AC ELLIS main area of work was the Command Unit as that is where the decisions are being made. AC ELLIS had a meeting with a lady who was an expert in structural engineering. The meeting was about the structural integrity of the building. I was not involved in the meeting as I was outside so do not know what was discussed.

Around three (3) to four (4) hours after the tactical withdrawal AC ELLIS said to me let's have a walk around the area. It was starting to get dark outside. We met GM Rick OGDEN and GM Darren MUNRO around Sector 1. AC ELLIS wanted to walk the whole tower, from the ground to the top, 23rd floor. AC ELLIS said he wanted to understand why the expert thought the tower was going to collapse. Her opinion was different to others, including Urban Search and Rescue (USAR), who did not believe the building was going to collapse.

The four (4) us went into the tower via the entrance near the walkway. We had on our PPE but were not wearing any BA. The building was empty due to the tactical withdrawal. There were no other fire personnel in there apart from the four (4) of us. We walked into the ground floor and went up the stairs, past the mezzanine and up the centre staircase. It looked like the bridgehead was on the fourth (4th) floor when the tower was evacuated. There was a large amount of kit from the ground floor to the 4th including BA sets. The kit in the tower was pretty much everything you could imagine from a fire engine, and it was everywhere. BA sets, hose, medical kit bags, breaking in gear, branches for example.

Signature: A WILLIAMS
2018

Signature witnessed by:

We walked through the central stairway, this was the only access up and down in the tower. We walked up to the 9th floor and I saw a body bag with a body in it. There were more bodies all the way up. I do not remember floor numbers, the walls were black so you could not see what floor you were on. I regret not taking notes now. I knew it was the 9th floor that I saw the first body as we were told about the large lady on the lobby of the 9th floor beforehand. There was a young boy curled up on around the 14th floor. I would guess that he was in his mid- teens, but it is difficult to work out the ages of people, he was curled up on the stairs on a landing. Another couple of flights up I saw a lady with a baby. I had to step over them. And another flight up I saw a young boy, or could have been young girl. I thought that maybe it was a family, the lady with the baby and the young child as they were close to each other. I saw an adult further up, I could not say whether it was a male or female. You could barely recognise the bodies due to the smoke.

We walked up every floor, and into every lobby area of each floor and looked into the flats from the lobby area. From a certain height there were no internal walls. There were no separation between the flats. The main walls were still standing but inside the internal walls were gone. There were more bodies in the flats. I remember seeing a bath tub in the 18th or 19th floor and there was a little girl next to the bath tub. It was actually the remains of a little girl, I think.

Going up to the 20th floor it was getting hotter. On the 22nd the heat was unbearable and on the 23rd you could barely open your eyes. There was ash everywhere from the 10th upwards. It looked like the building was still on fire, there was gas fires we saw inside the building. You cannot put out the gas fires as it is more dangerous to try and do this due to extinguishing the fires with the gas knocked off would create an explosive atmosphere.. That is why it was important to get the gas switched off, to stop the fire. I would estimate I saw around fifteen (15) bodies from what I can remember, a few stick out in my mind. Seeing it was a feeling of sadness. I think we were in the tower for around half an hour or so.

The stairway was a central staircase, with two (2) flights of stairs per floor, Up to the 9th floor there was loads of water streaming down, it was torrential. There was so much water I think it must have come from the water mains. There was lots of kit on the stairwells, including hose up the stairwell, The hose was in rolls in some places, I cannot remember it being rolled out. The water and the equipment made it more difficult to walk around. The stairwell width was roughly around 1.5metres wide.

The doors were in a bad state, including the stairway doors to the lobby area. Smoke should not come into the stairway, it should be protected. Fire doors can only protect you for up to one(1 hour depending on the door, we were viewing this approximately eighteen (18) hours after the fire started, it didn't seem odd as

Signature: A WILLIAMS
2018

Signature witnessed by:

the doors wouldn't provide protection for that long. Some of the doors including in the stairwell were 100% damaged by the fire I did notice some doors that were only smoke damaged, one in particular was a door to the bin shoot room, the room itself appeared unaffected by the fire/smoke. From around the 6th floor and above there was smoke and heat, There was no lighting in the tower, it was dark, we used out torches to see. The windows and glass was gone from most of the flats which had cleared some smoke. I could see windows were UPVC. I did not hear any alarms in the tower, there were no sprinklers. The smell inside the tower was the smell you get from a burning building, like an electrical fire, furniture, wood, it was a combination of smells.

The noise that caused the tactical withdrawal could have been rebar. When the concrete on the walls or floors expand, which is caused by the heat this causes the concrete to break and this could have been the bang that was heard. I saw this rebar effect on around the 8th floor of the tower.

When we came out of the tower AC ELLIS went to another TCG meeting at the leisure centre, I did not attend this meeting. I then went to the Command Unit and DAC Wayne BROWN was on scene, he was due to take over from AC ELLIS. We went into the tower again, myself, and DAC BROWN. It was now dark outside, around 2100-2130hrs. There were no LFB officers inside the tower due to the tactical withdrawal and the hazard zone still implemented.

We walked the staircase and DAC BROWN looked into the landing area. I did not go into the landing areas the second time I just went up. We went up to about the 20th floor. There was no lighting, it was dark, we used out torches again to see. The walk took around half an hour again. We went into the tower in our PPE, but without BA or respirators or masks.

The machines had stood down. The aerial ladder platform (ALP) appliance from Surrey was still up near the tower. LFB on scene had reduced in numbers, and there was still no one inside the tower. Internal firefighting had stopped when the tactical withdrawal was called.

When AC ELLIS came out of the TCG meeting he gave a full handover to DAC Wayne BROWN and we were released. DAC BROWN took over at around 2300hrs, we left the incident at 2330hrs. We walked towards our cars and past the Salvation Army canteen van and got tea and a sandwich. I have marked this location on AWI/01, it was on Bomore. From here I could tell the gas had not yet been switched off as there were still fires burning in the tower. In the past I have never experienced such an issue with gas where we have had to dig up the road to turn the gas off in several locations. It is usually done inside the building, but there were obvious issues with doing this at Grenfell Tower. We walked back to our cars which were in the same location we had left it and I went straight home from the scene.

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We were both on duty again the next day so had quite a bit to do the next day. This involved meetings. I cannot remember specific work or discussions in the meeting. After this I did go back to Grenfell Tower on Sunday 18 June 2017 in the early morning. I was in charge of relief for around four (4) hours. Our role was to manage the inner cordon for agencies on scene, this included USAR and Disaster Victim Identification (DVI) who were at the incident ground.

I did ask for notes and paperwork since the incident, this includes decision logs which recorded the decisions made by AC ELLIS. I wanted these to look at and so asked the command unit crew but I never got these. I do not know where the decision logs notes are. Usually decision are all logged and collated at the incident, These then usually come to Union Street. In my role if I wanted access I should get these should I request it. I acted as loggist for AC ELLIS at the Parsons Green terrorist attack.

I have never worked in the Fire Safety Department. Whilst working at Grenfell Tower I was not wearing a Thermal Imaging Camera (TIC) or body worn camera, I did not speak to any residents or members of the public. I was not aware of Firefighters using a fire lift, and it was not in use when I was on scene. I did not have any issues with radio communications and did not think it was that bad. I do not know anything of the dry riser use at the incident, I did not see if the rising main was plugged in. I believe it was AC ROE's decision to withdraw from the stay put policy and this decision should be in the notes and logged. The decision making is based on information retrieved. Decision making is the Incident Command job, he will get the advice and then the Incident Command will make decisions based on advice and information received. Operational tactics are determined based on a risk based approach. The command and decision making structure was already established when I had arrived to the incident, The chain of command was AC ROE when I arrived, then AC ELLIS and DAC BROWN took over when I left the incident. There were officers in charge of each operational sector and other roles supporting the incident called functional sectors. There were safety officers in every sector and someone would be in charge of the safety officer. The safety officers would be looking be keeping a look out for the spread of fire on the external walls of the building however their specific brief would be based on the risks within the sector remit

I do not think we could have done anything to deal with it differently. I have never seen a fire behave like this, this was an incident unlike anything I have ever faced before. I have seen death but not to this scale before, It was very sad, particularly walking through and seeing the bodies of people.

Signature: A WILLIAMS
2018

Signature witnessed by: