

WITNESS STATEMENT

Criminal Procedure Rules, r27.2; Criminal Justice Act 1967, s.9; Magistrates' Courts Act 1980, s.5b

Statement of: WRIGHT, ANDREW

Age if under 18: OVER 18 (if over 18 insert 'over 18')

Occupation: FIRE OFFICER

This statement (consisting of 10 page(s) each signed by me) is true to the best of my knowledge and belief and I make it knowing that, if it is tendered in evidence, I shall be liable to prosecution if I have wilfully stated in it anything which I know to be false, or do not believe to be true.

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Date: 15/12/2017

Tick if witness evidence is visually recorded ☐ (supply witness details on rear)

On Monday 13th November 2017 I was interviewed at Islington Fire Station. The interview was conducted by Detective Constable Ben ROUSE and Detective Constable Tom MUNDAY and the interview was audio recorded. Also present was Richard WHITE, Station Manager and Micky NICHOLAS who is part of the Fire Brigade Union. This interview was in relation to a fire that occurred at Grenfell Tower, W11 on Wednesday 14th June 2017.

In this statement I will refer to the following people; Station Manager Pat GOULBORN, Crew Manager Tim CUTBILL, Fire Fighter Steve BOLTON, Fire Fighter Andy VANGO and Fire fighter Suzanne PERRY.

I am currently based at Islington Fire Station as a Fire Fighter however prior to this and on the night of Tuesday 13th June 2017 I was based at Edmonton Fire Station on the Red Watch. I have been a Fire Fighter since 2001 however in 2015 I took a sabbatical for eighteen (18) months and returned to the London Fire Brigade on 1st December 2016. I had been at Edmonton on The Red Watch for about six (6) months prior to the Fire at Grenfell Tower.

On Tuesday 13th June 2017 I was on a night shift which began at 2000 hours. I was assigned to a crew which consisted of Crew Manager Tim CUTBILL who was in charge, Fire Fighter Steve BOLTON who was the driver. Fire fighter Andy VANGO and I were in the back and the usual procedure would be that we would wear a SDBA (Standard Duration Breathing apparatus) if an ordinary fire was to occur. This provides a working time of twenty (20) minutes up to approximately thirty (30) minutes. If an EDBA (Extended Duration Breathing Apparatus) was requested then the four of us in the crew would all wear. I

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2018

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am qualified to wear an Extended Duration Breathing Apparatus as I am Fire and rescue trained following a specific course I completed back in 2004. The Extended Duration Breathing Apparatus provides assistance between forty five (45) minutes to an hour. It is designed to work in situations where stress is caused by heat especially as an Extended Duration Breathing Apparatus supports Fire Fighters working for longer periods of time. I had never worn EDBA in a real life situation. My knowledge and previous experience has all been from Drills Practiced at the Fire Station and I would say that this would have been the case for most Fire Fighters on the night.

I cannot remember the exact time of the call but I believe it was around 0300 hours when we as a crew received a message of 'make pumps forty (40) available'.

The message came through on a TIP Sheet which provided the location of Grenfell Tower and the details of the incident which was a fire. The TIP Sheet also had details of various specialist units that had been requested. It is usually the job of the senior officer to deal with the TIP sheet. Upon receiving the call I remember thinking that this was something that was totally different to what I was used to hearing. In sixteen (16) years of being a Fire Fighter and working at busy stations I have never been to something this big. It is almost unheard of. We sometimes deal with industrial buildings alight which may be make pumps twenty (20) but never to the scale of make pumps forty (40). Grenfell Tower was on the TIP sheet so I assumed from the name that it was a high rise block. Maybe disused but regardless of this fires in flats do not usually spread over one (1) or two (2) floors. I decided to look on BBC news as I was sure that something of this scale would be on the news and the headline was something along the lines of 'Massive Fire in West London. Hundreds of Fire Fighters attending'. There was very little information other than this. There were however a number of pictures of the block alight and Fire Engines in attendance. I showed Andy VANGO the photos and we both couldn't believe that we were going to a fire of this scale.

At the time I remember feeling nervous but also a little excited to be involved in potentially the biggest fire London has ever had. I continued to think that we would not be allowed into the block but at the same time if we were to go in we would be retrieving casualties and bodies. I looked around at the rest of the crew and whilst I hadn't worked with them for long I felt confident as we had conducted a number of drills and dealt with other real life incidents together. I was mentally preparing myself for the events that we would be dealing with. The Communication on the Radio appeared extremely noisy however I Couldn't quite make out what was being said other than various units calling control asking where they should go.

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2018

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The route that Fire Fighter Steve BOULTON took on the night was via the A406 and it was from there and from some distance that I could see Grenfell Tower in the distance. It appeared that floors eight (8) upwards were all alight. I was starring in disbelief and started to feel more nervous. Everyone in the crew became silent. It looked really bad however I still believed that we would not be allowed in as it looked far too dangerous. The fire was rising from the outside therefore in my opinion it would be impossible to fight the fire from the outside. A comparison to 9/11 was being used during the incident and there were fears that the building may lose the integrity of its structure and collapse as well as losing Fire Fighters however for me personally I did not believe that the building would collapse.

An RVP was given to us and although I cannot remember the location I do remember initially thinking that it was a long way away from Grenfell Tower. This was confirmed when I looked in a map book which we keep in the fire engines. We were then given a further RVP which was for EDBA crews but again I cannot remember the location. Like with the first RVP it was too far away. The Crew Manager tried to make contact with control to obtain a better location however he didn't manage to speak with anyone so he decided to call any other Fire Rescue Units who were also making their way. He did speak with someone however I cannot recall who. I do know that they had also ignored the RVP and got as close to the Grenfell Tower as possible so we also proceeded closer to the Tower before driving into approximately twenty (20) parked fire Engines on Walmer Road which was about half a mile away. Even though this was still a fairly long distance away from the Tower we parked up and decided to make our way on foot. The Fire Engines do have an MDT (Mobile Data Terminal) which would have a map facility on it however this was being operated from the front of the Engine. I did not operate it on the night. I was wearing full standard kit which every Fire Fighter has along with my Extended Duration Breathing Apparatus. I also had a Thermal Imaging Camera with me. All of the Kit would weigh approximately thirty (30) kilogrammes. We were directed by members of the public towards the tower as we had no prior knowledge of the area. I have exhibited AWW/1 and AWW2 which are maps of the area surrounding Grenfell Tower. I have marked on AAW/1 A346 which was our call sign on the night. This is shown on Walmer Road and I have marked the route taken by us as a crew. The route led us into a Police Cordon where we were met by a Police Officer whose name and rank I do not know. The officer escorted us into the Holding area where more Fire Fighters were present. I have marked on AWW/2 the route taken to the holding area. I can remember walking under a covered walk way and seeing a turntable ladder with hoses and a lot of water. We then proceeded around a corner and into the holding area. The North East side of the Tower appeared to be worse. There was a lot of falling debris which did consist of

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2018

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cladding. Some of it was alight. I do recall seeing Paramedics from the London Ambulance Service treating a casualty who I believe had jumped from the Tower. This was the information I had received at the time. Whilst inside the cordons I did not see any members of public other than those being treated by The Paramedics. Whilst in the holding area we continued to wait for about thirty (30) minutes whilst engaging in conversation with other Fire Fighters. I still at this point did not expect to be sent in even though I wanted to get in and assist those inside.

Eventually a station manager whose name I cannot remember came over to the holding area and would select groups of Fire Fighters to be escorted into the Lobby area of the Tower. This would be done with the assistance of a Police Officer who had a riot shield to assist them. The ratio would be one (1) Police Officer to two (2) Fire Fighters and this system would work in escorting two (2) Fire Fighters out of the building at a time. The police officer was holding the riot shield above us to protect us from falling debris. The area inside was extremely wet and the water levels were up around ankle height. I would describe the area as being heavily populated with Police Officers and Fire Fighters. Our Crew was then joined by Fire Fighter Suzanne PERRY of Heston Fire Station. She had been separated from her crew and was now with us. She was also EDBA. We proceeded down the corridor. Situated to our left was the Lobby area for the lifts and to the right was the stairwell area. The areas contained Fire Fighters preparing to make their way up and there were also Fire Fighters who had just made their way down. I would say approximately fifty (50) fire fighters in total. I was also aware of Fire Fighters going up and down assisting with communications as there had been struggles with messages being passed to senior officers. There were also a number of Fire Fighters on the stairwell assisting with hose management. After approximately twenty (20) minutes of waiting in the lift Lobby area Station Manager Pat GOULBORNE gave us a brief which was that a crew of four (4) was needed as a crew from Bethnal Green could not be located It was going to be our role to go up and find them. I am not sure as to the reasons why the crew from Bethnal Green could not be located but I can only guess that they were experiencing problems with their radios. We began to get ready to go up and after exiting the lift lobby and into the main lobby we were told that we can stand down as they had since been located. Within a minute or two we were then quickly diverted by Pat GOULBORNE. He briefed us again and our instructions were to go to the eleventh (11th) floor and bring any casualties down.

I then conducted checks on my crew members making sure there fire kits were properly fitted and Breathing Apparatus were working. I then proceeded to The Entry Control Point which is the area where you present your Tally from your Breathing apparatus once the oxygen is turned on. It then goes into the

Signature: A WRIGHT
2018

Signature witnessed by:

entry control board. This is how the entry control officer can see the amount of air is left inside a breathing apparatus.

We then proceeded as a crew into the stairwell which appeared extremely narrow especially with all of our kit on. The stairwell on the first four (4) floors appeared to be slightly wider than the stairs going further up. As we began to make our way up, there were crews coming down. Some of the Fire Fighters appeared to be without their Breathing Apparatus which was a surprise to me as the procedure is that you never go past the entry control point without BA on however they were conducting hose management so they did have a specific role and it was being carried out on the stairwell. I did not see any of those Fire Fighters engaging in any Fire Fighting. It seemed on the night that some procedures did take a side step. Between the Entry Control Point and the tenth (10th) Floor I noticed four (4) Fire Fighters without Breathing Apparatus and roughly two (2) crews with Breathing Apparatus however I cannot recall if it was SDBA or EDBA.

There appeared to be a lot of water coming from the hoses which made me realise that I needed to be careful when making my way up. It would have been quite easy to slip. I remember getting quite wet. I also noticed a number of other items such as Breaking in Kits, hoses and first Aid kits on the stairwells. Visibility appeared to get worse as we made our way up to the tenth (10th) floor due to the smoke. However with some emergency lighting and our lamps we were able to see. The walls were concrete but we could not see any signage to point out the floors. We were having to count. I expected there to be floor markings however I quickly realised from the lower floors that this was not the case.

From the Ground Floor to the (10th) it took us around five (5) minutes maybe slightly longer to get up. I remember it being a hard task walking up with our kit on. When we arrived on the tenth (10th) floor there was still five (5) of us together. We came across a casualty on the stairwell and as we had no prior knowledge of the casualty we had to deal with it as we came across it. The casualty appeared to be a woman however visibility was dark so we were unable to do any identification checks. I do remember the casualty being approximately thirty to forty (30-40) stone in weight having dealt with large people in previous Fire Rescue situations. She did not appear to have been burnt therefore I would say that she would have collapsed due to smoke inhalation whilst potentially trying to make her way down the stairs to get out. I cannot say which floor or flat she came from. Whilst making our way up I remember that due to her size we were unable to step around her and unfortunately had to step on her to get past which I wasn't happy with. One of the crew checked for vital signs of life and it was at this point I noticed that the smoke and visibility appeared to get quite bad and this was due to the way the casualty had fallen. By

Signature: A WRIGHT
2018

Signature witnessed by:

falling she had managed to open the door to the tenth (10th) floor lobby causing heavy smoke and unburnt gases to move into the stairwell area. If the unburnt gases are exposed to an ignite source this can potentially lead to a flash over or backdraft. Whilst the doors to the lobby area don't completely stop the smoke and unburnt gases coming through they certainly limit the amount which also assist in containing a fire to that specific area and this is often why we tell people in fires to shut a door as this can contain a fire to that area. We tried to move her into the stairwell but she appeared to be extremely heavy. I made clear that prior to proceeding up the eleventh (11th) floor we needed to move the casualty out of the door way and into the stairwell otherwise the area would only get worse with smoke. I tended to the casualties head which was inside the lobby. The area was extremely hot and whilst the lobby door was open the hot smoke was able to travel out into the stairwell and up so between the crew and with about five (5) moves we were able to move the casualty out of the door way and into the stairwell allowing us to close the lobby door. Using my Thermal imaging camera I was then able to check the Floor to see if there was anyone else present. It was extremely dark inside and it felt like a front door to a flat was open with a window within also open as I could feel the smoke and heat 'whooshing' past. There wasn't anyone inside the lobby so after a few seconds of looking we continued to speak about trying to get the casualty out of the building and it was our decision to continue to make our way up to the eleventh (11th) floor to search for more casualties leaving the female in situ. Moving the female casualty would have been extremely labour intensive and more likely impossible to get her down and out of the tower. Upon making our way up to the eleventh (11th) floor I was the second Fire Fighter up and there didn't appear to be anything that caught my attention. Upon reaching the eleventh (11th) floor the door procedure was conducted which is checking with the back of the hand. I opened the lobby door where the heat didn't seem to be as bad as it was on the tenth (10th) floor. With the Thermal Imaging Camera I checked to see if there were any bodies on the floor. Fortunately there wasn't. We proceeded into the Lobby where there was a flat to the left hand side. The door was shut. There was another flat further along on the left with the front door open. There was another flat on the right hand side. One of the Fire Fighters began using his Breaking in equipment to force one of the doors. Crew Manager Tim CUTBILL came over and instructed that we should not be breaking into the flats as we don't know what is on the other side and we don't have any Fire Fighting equipment. Entering could also cause a flash over with the unburnt gases. It was decided that we would just check the flats that were open. I went into a flat that was located on the left if you entered the lobby in a clockwise direction and it was the second flat. I entered alone with my Thermal Imaging Camera. The flat lead out to clean air so the windows were either open

Signature: A WRIGHT
2018

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or had come off. There were a number of things alight inside of the flat. I noticed on the right hand side as I entered there was a bathroom which was dark. I used my lamp to check for any signs of life but this was clear. I did shout "Its Fire Brigade. Is anyone in here?" I had no response. It was noisy due to things falling from the building and other Crews working but again I couldn't locate anyone inside. I then went into the lounge which had an open planned kitchen attached before making my way into the bedroom area. Using my Thermal Imaging Camera I conducted a quick search but again could not locate anyone. I then made my way out of the flat as Crew Manager Tim CUTBILL stated "it's time to go". It was also at this point my Request to withdraw button had gone off yet this was not the case for the rest of the crew. I tried to radio through to control however I couldn't get through. Up until this point I did not have any knowledge of the radio not working as the only people I needed to communicate with was my crew and they were with me. I still had 150 Bar of my EDBA which would last around 10 minutes and the warning whistle which goes off at around 140 bar had not yet gone off. At this point I would say that from entering at the entry control point up until now I had been inside and working hard for around twenty to twenty five (20 to 25) minutes.

Following Crew Manager Tim CUTBILL'S instructions to get out I said that we should at least check the immediate vicinity before leaving. This involved the stair area and lobby area of the next floor which would have been the twelfth (12th) floor and it was then that we came across the next body. I would say the casualty was a woman and was unconscious even though we couldn't do any checks so prove this. The casualty was slim and I believe was black. The casualty was lying face down on the stairs. One of the crew stopped off to check vital signs. I made my way passed with the Thermal Imaging Camera and went up to the lobby area where I quickly opened the lobby door and checked to see if there were any other casualties. The Lobby was dark with no visibility. It was also warm. There wasn't any casualties so I checked the next bit of staircase going up where there were also no casualties. Crew Manager Tim CUTBILL again expressed his decision that we needed to make our way down. He was worried about how long we had been inside and the fact that my request to withdraw button had gone off. I was notified at this point that the casualty had no signs of life and from this is expressed that I would like to bring the casualty down however we are trained to leave them if there are no signs of life.

We made our way down and on getting to the fourth (4th) floor I noticed that visibility started to get better. I saw another crew conducting hose management and Crew Manager Tim CUTBILL instructed that I continue to make my way to the Entry Control Point. He and the rest of the crew were to assist with

Signature: A WRIGHT
2018

Signature witnessed by:

the hose management and he stated that they would be right behind me. Upon getting to the entry control point I was joined by the rest of the crew no more than ten (10) seconds later.

We then closed down our EDBA sets and let the remaining air out. I got my tally back and then put it back into my set. A senior officer whose name I did not know came over and Crew Manager Tim CUTBILL gave him a brief. Tim explained what we had done and how the floors had not been comprehensively searched. There were a number of flats that doors were still shut and that we had no Fire Fighting media. I then waited with my crew before being escorted by a police officer out to clean air. The system of two (2) Fire Fighters to one (1) Police officer was still in place and we walked out and along the undercover walk way before getting to Lancaster Green as shown on exhibit AWW/1.

At this point more Fire Fighters had arrived. I began to strip my set down which is a procedure where I refit a new cylinder, check to see if there is enough air inside and conduct a full sequence check which checks if warning alarms are working and that the set is breathing through ok. This is a standard test that we do every day at the start our tour of duty. Due to a shortage of EDBA covers we had to give them over to other crews who were preparing to go into the Tower. An hour had passed where in this period I had drunk some water and managed to get some rest. A crew then came out of the Tower and we as a crew were able to get their EDBA covers and put them onto our cylinders. The covers are important as they keep the heat off of the cylinders and offer protection but also differentiate between SDBA and EDBA. The process of replacing the cover takes roughly thirty (30) seconds to a minute.

Whilst waiting near a wall and waiting to be redeployed into the tower, Fire Fighter Suzanna PERRY had left our crew and made her way back to her original crew. I did not see her for the rest of the night. There was a queue system in place for Fire Fighters to get back into the Tower however we decided to skip the queue as we knew there was still a lot more work to be done and we believed that we hadn't done enough the first time around. The tower was still alight and I still was hearing stories of people still inside. We then made our way through to the undercover walk way area and back into the holding area where there was a lot of crews both SDBA and EDBA. Easily fifty to seventy (50 to 70) Fire Fighters. We remained there for an hour or so before I remember hearing "Casualty! Casualty!" I saw Some Fire Fighters moving out the way whilst paramedics were preparing to deal with the casualty. I then saw a male possibly of oriental decent but definitely Asian and of a rough age of fifty (50) wearing what looked like Pyjamas being carried out by Fire Fighters before being placed onto a stretcher and taken away by the paramedics. He was breathing and conscious and this was the first casualty I had seen being brought out. I would say that the time now was between 0900 and 1000 hours.

Signature: A WRIGHT
2018

Signature witnessed by:

I remained with my crew for a further half an hour to an hour where we continued to rest before being sent back up into the tower. I remember speaking amongst the crew about what we had done and our experience of going up into the tower. On request of a station manager whose name I did not get, we made our way into the Lobby area where an EDBA crew was needed. We put ourselves forward and we were instructed by another officer (whose name I do not know) to go to the eighth (8th) floor as this is now where the entry point was. This is also known as the Bridgehead. Through prior experience I would say that the Entry Point was now on the eighth (8th) floor as the floors below had been systematically cleared and was in safe air. One of the flats had been taken over and the Entry Control Point was in the lobby again. This is where I handed over my Tally. We made our way up to the eighth (8th) floor where we entered the unknown flat where we sat around on beds waiting to be sent up. An Officer came in a short while later and deployed myself and Crew Manager Tim CUTBILL. This time we were sent up in crews of two (2). Our brief was to go up to the twelfth (12th) floor and continue with the systematic search. We were the first crew to be sent to the twelfth (12th) floor to conduct this search. All floors below had either been searched or were in the process of being searched. We were instructed to take Hoses, branches and other Fire Fighting media as it was unclear if there was any Fire on the twelfth (12th) floor. I believed at the time that when we first went up in the tower a few hours before the situation was extremely chaotic and whilst systematic searches could not be done we were now in a position to do this and try to bring any casualties out. We were under strict instruction to go to the twelfth (12th) floor only. Our task was to Fire Fight and once our task was done we was to report back to control. I remember taking up with me a sledgehammer, thermal imaging camera, two (2) lines of forty five millimetre (45mm) hose and a branch which is used as a nozzle on the end of the hose. This equipment was all found on the lobby floor as by this time there was equipment and kit everywhere.

On the way up to the twelfth (12th) floor I do remember seeing the large casualty still in situ. I cannot remember if she had been moved or even if she was still in the same place as she was earlier on. I noticed that efforts had been made to mark floor numbers on the walls in chalk. I did not come across the second casualty again as we only went as far as the twelfth (12th) floor and the second casualty was on the staircase beyond that. I remember the air in the stairwell being a lot cleaner and visibility had improved. There was also a lot of water which resulted in us being soaked by the time we got to the twelfth (12th) floor.

On arrival at the twelfth (12th) floor there were hoses everywhere. We connected a hose from the floor below. There was minimal water coming out so we attempted to untangle the hose. I then connected one

Signature: A WRIGHT
2018

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of the forty five millimetre (45mm) hoses to the dry riser along with the Branch but again there was minimal water coming out. We decided to have one hose going on the right hand side and one going on the left hand side. Visibility was good as you could see out through the flats and into daylight and the air seemed cleaner. It was still warm however. We decided that I would do the left hand side and Tim would do the right. We maintained contact with each other just by shouting. We did not need to use the radios. The walls between the flats were still intact but inside the flats you could not see the partition walls and you could not make out what room had been what. It seemed like everything had burnt through to the outside leaving about a foot of ash. I pulled the hose in and squirted some water around to try and cool it down. Things were alight but it appeared that it was just deep seated ash which was retaining a lot of heat. I noticed a gas pipe leaking which lead to either a cooker or a boiler. It was letting by. You could tell by the colour of the flame that it was gas. The gas was coming out of the pipe and was lit. It is safer to have the flame than just have the gas coming out as if an ignition source catches the gases then we would experience more problems or possible explosions. I did make a note of this and passed this information on to an officer when we exited later on. With a normal fire the flame would be a steady flame usually yellow or orange in colour. This flame from the pipe was a violent flame, blue in colour. It looked like a flame thrower similar, to a Bunsen burner. The water pressure was low and this was due to us being on the twelfth (12th) floor therefore you had twelve (12) floors of outlets below being used. I did however expect this. Whilst I was in the flats on the left hand side I was damping down with the minimal water I had. All of the falling debris had retained heat which also made it difficult for me to see if there was a casualty underneath. I was undertaking this about ten (10) to fifteen (15) minutes and within this period I did also check on Tim every now and then to see if he was ok. One of the flats I went into appeared to have clean air, however, upon entering I realised very quickly that I could not go in any further as the temperature inside was too hot. My fire kit was wet and I could feel myself beginning to burn so I had to retreat to the doorway. The radiated heat from the concrete walls, floor and ceiling made it feel like I was inside an oven. My fire kit usually prevents heat between six hundred to eight hundred (600-800) degrees but in these circumstances and for the first time as a fire fighter I felt like I needed to get out. Regardless of this I still believed that I would get out of the Tower safely as visibility was good and the lobby was clear. I then spoke to Tim who was experiencing the exact same problems and stated that he was really struggling with the heat and needed to go. I then said to him that I would check his side and he would check mine making sure we hadn't missed something. Tim and I did this very quickly due to the heat. We were satisfied that we hadn't missed anything and then decided to withdraw. We had been up on the floor

Signature: A WRIGHT
2018

Signature witnessed by:

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at this point for around twenty to twenty five (20- 25) minutes and whilst we both had enough air left in our sets Tim was really struggling with the heat. The fact that this was also our second time up in the Tower meant that we were both tired.

We made our way out into the stairwell and down to the entry control point leaving our hoses on the floor. This is something that is regularly done as crews that will be making their way up will have the necessary equipment to work. Upon getting down to the entry control point I closed my EDBA set down where a Station Manager whose name I cannot remember came over. We explained to him that the flats had not been comprehensively searched as there was a lot of debris and that we would need shovels in order to turn the ash over to properly extinguish the fire. We were then told by the station Manager that we could then make our way out of the Tower. We waited to get out for a while but again we were assisted by the police when getting out of the Tower. I would say that from the time of entering the Tower and Leaving the Tower for the second time we were inside for about an hour and a half to two hours. The other two Fire Fighters in our crew Steve BOULTON and Andy VANGO were not with us at this point as they had their own specific jobs to be doing. We next saw them when we had exited the Tower.

Once outside I noticed fire fighters from Blue Watch had come on duty and had arrived. I used to be on blue watch and know a lot of the Fire Fighters that were turning up. I remember seeing a BA control point who were taking our sets from us and preparing them for the next crews who were going up into the Tower. I knew that this was going to be our shift finished as we had worn EDBA twice now due to the extreme circumstances which also meant we had been inside the Tower for some considerable amount of time. I felt by this point that there wasn't much more I could have done having been up on two separate occasions. I was shattered. I had no concept of time but after taking my kit off my t-shirt was soaked with sweat and water. I was also really dehydrated which I remember lasting for days after the fire. I saw that the leisure centre which is located a very short distance away from Grenfell Tower was now open which had toilet facilities and this was the first opportunity I had to go since first arriving at Grenfell Tower. A Salvation Army van had also arrived which meant we were able to get tea and coffee. Whilst resting and waiting one of the fire fighters: Steve BOULTON had damaged his ankle so he was being seen by paramedics. He was subsequently taken to St Charles Hospital. Eventually Crew Manager Tim CUTBILL was told by a command unit that our crew was able to take our Fire Engine and head to Paddington where we would complete paperwork relating to the fire. Unfortunately we didn't know where the key was for the fire engine and we thought Steve BOULTON had it. After some clarification, the key was located

Signature: A WRIGHT
2018

Signature witnessed by:

inside the Fire Engine. By this point Steve BOULTON had been discharged from hospital so we made our way to St Charles Hospital and picked him up before making our way to Paddington Fire Station. When we arrived at Paddington we completed our paperwork which was answering a series of questions. Whilst I did not write the questions down, I noted the question number and wrote the answers next to them. I exhibit these notes as AWW/3. There was a booking in system in place whereby an Officer would call up each crew and this is where you would hand in the notes. Once we all had finished our notes we were dismissed where we made our way back to Edmonton. It was a nightmare of a journey. It took around two hours due to rush hour traffic and by the time we got back to Edmonton it was about 1700 hours.

At 2000 hours that night I was due back on duty for my next night shift. I did have the option to go home and have an 8 hour gap before returning however I just wanted to get back to work and back to Grenfell Tower to assist. There seemed like there was still a lot more work to be done so for me personally I was more than happy to go back. I then got unchanged and had a shower before having a lay down for about an hour where I and the rest of the crew got ready for our next shift.

My next shift was a busy one however I was not redeployed to Grenfell Tower. I was on the Pump as opposed to the rescue unit. I dealt with a Road Traffic Accident, a flooding [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] I believe I came off duty at around 1100 hours.

Since the incident I have been contacted by a counselling service who have been extremely supportive in offering support. The contact has been offered by telephone and also by letter. The telephone call often come through from an unknown number and I know this as since being Fire and Rescue trained I have encountered and been involved in many Road Traffic accidents which have resulted in support being offered to me. I did not follow through with the counselling service however I am still aware that such support is still very much there for me if needed. The time of the Fire was quite a significant time for me as that was my last tour at Edmonton Fire Station before moving to Islington Fire Station on the second day shift of the next tour. Therefore I was not there to be amongst them whilst they were being supported by the Watch manager; it sort of passed me by. Having said that I do still chat to the Red watch at Edmonton quite regularly and I have had a number of chats with some of the Fire Fighters about the events on the night.

Having been heavily involved in the biggest Fire London has ever seen, this was the first time that I have ever been involved in something of this scale. Whilst I am trained in dealing with high rise block fires, this was the first time I have put my training to use. The training I have goes back to when I began my

Signature: A WRIGHT
2018

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career as a Fire Fighter at training school in 2001 and ever since I have conducted and been in many drills at Fire Stations using the Towers at Fire Stations. This also involves using Dry risers which are also at Fire Stations. This is all to replicate going to a fire at a high rise. As well as physical and practical training there is also classroom based training which cover a fire fighters actions, thoughts, things to look out for and also what to do to improve things when arriving at a high rise fire. Training for High rise fires in a fire station is a tough drill as depending on what floor the fire is affects the drill as our high rise appliances don't go that high. Such fires can be drilled and practised over and over but in reality they can differ so much. In terms of the fire at Grenfell Tower we arrived later on and did not have to think about the Fire Fighting aspect of the fire. We had no dealings with the initial fire in the block inside flat sixteen (16). I would not even be able to say where that was. I had no previous knowledge of Grenfell Tower. The training I have received does link in with the stay put policy. Nine (9) times out of ten (10) it is the best advice. Most people do not have the best knowledge around fire and the effects of fire and smoke. If someone is in a room that isn't on fire or smoke logged they are advised to shut the door and open a window. That address or premises will then have fire fighters there within ten (10) minutes. At Grenfell Tower this was a very difficult one to call. Especially for the control officers because every flat was different and the fire affected each floor differently.

In this statement I have referred to two maps of the area surrounding Grenfell Tower. I have also been able to refer to the notes I made on the morning following the fire. I exhibit them as follows:

AWW/1 — A map of the area surrounding Grenfell Tower.

AWW/2 — A map of the immediate area surrounding Grenfell Tower.

AWW/3 — Notes made by Andrew WRIGHT following the Fire at Grenfell Tower.

Signature: A WRIGHT
2018

Signature witnessed by: