

WITNESS STATEMENT

Criminal Procedure Rules, r27.2; Criminal Justice Act 1967, s.9; Magistrates' Courts Act 1980, s.5b

Statement of: PAYTON, CHRISTOPHER

Age if under 18: Over 18 (if over 18 insert 'over 18')

Occupation: FIRE OFFICER

This statement (consisting of 26 page(s) each signed by me) is true to the best of my knowledge and belief and I make it knowing that, if it is tendered in evidence, I shall be liable to prosecution if I have wilfully stated in it anything which I know to be false, or do not believe to be true.

Signature: C PAYTON

Date: 31/01/2018

Tick if witness evidence is visually recorded ☐ (supply witness details on rear)

This is a statement regarding my attendance to the fire at Grenfell Tower on Wednesday 14th June 2017. To make this statement I have referred to a copy of my notes which were typed on an Appendix A form. I began these notes on 15/06/2017 and once completed I sent them to DAC PUGSLEY on 20/06/2017. I exhibit these notes as CAP/1.

I joined the London fire Brigade in July 1988. I completed my training at Southwark Training Centre in November 1988 and I was then posted to Old Kent Road Fire Station on the Red Watch. While I was there, I became a driver and aerial operator on the turntable ladder (TL) before being promoted to Lead Firefighter in around 2003. In April 2007, I went to Southwark Fire Station on the Green Watch as a temporary Watch Manager (WM) and I was then promoted into that position in October 2007. I stayed at Southwark Fire Station until the it was closed in January 2014. I was then posted to Dockhead Fire Station on the White Watch in January 2014 and later became the temporary Station Manager (SM) at Peckham Fire Station in June 2014. Following this in October 2014 I was promoted to Station Manager and posted to Old Kent Road Fire Station.. Finally, I moved to Brixton Fire Station in June 2017, where I am currently based. I had only been in position at Brixton for a few weeks before the fire at Grenfell happened.

As a Station Manager, I am on a flexi-duty system. I work the same amount of hours per week as firefighters work but my shift pattern is different. The standard shift is a 9-hour shift the starts at 8 in the

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morning and finishes at 1700 hours. I can also do a 9-plus shift, which starts at 1100 and finishes at 2000 hours, and 24- hour shifts, which start at 2000 hours and finish at 0800 the next morning.

As a Station Manager I am responsible for managing Brixton Fire Station, where we have about 50 personnel in total over the four watches, which are white, blue and green, and red. We have two fire appliances - a pump and a pump ladder. They are both fire engines but they carry different equipment. The biggest difference between the two appliances is that the pump ladder carries a bigger ladder as the name would suggest. Generally, the Watch Manager, who is in charge of a watch, will ride in charge of the pump ladder and the Crew Manager will ride in charge of pump. I consider that my main role as Station Manager is to support my Watch Managers. I have a responsibility to make sure that the watches are performing as expected but I am also there to support them in whatever work they are doing. As much there is a responsibility to manage the station and the expectations that come with that, I have a broader role and responsibility within the borough which may involve liaising with Met Police, Lambeth council and other partner agencies.

As a Station Manager, I am also trained as a Press Officer and an Officer of the Day, which means that for a 24-hour period I can be a main contact point for the London Fire Brigade, for our officers and external agencies. I can also make decisions on behalf of the commissioner but only for a very limited 5 or 10-minute time period. I am also a Specialist Entry Recovery Team Officer and a Bulk Media Advisor (BMA), which was the role I performed at Grenfell Tower.

There around 30 BMAs in the London Fire Brigade, of my rank or the rank above. In our role we provide tactical advice to Incident Commanders on best use of the water supply at an incident, which can be achieved by various different means. This may involve implementing high volume pumps (HVPs), which can be used to move high volumes of water quickly over a great distance. I completed a week long training course as a high volume pump operator at Royal Docks which provided me with knowledge of what the crews can do with this piece of equipment and what it's capabilities are. This is national asset, which London have a number of, and it's a very good bit of kit. It can be used at widespread floods and it has a number of other applications within London. Such as providing large amounts of water to the fire ground at large scale, or remote incidents. Water can also be secured at incidents from a nearby open water supply such as a lake or swimming pool by means or we supply water by means of water relay. A water relay is used where the nearest hydrant might be some distance away from the incident ground. Therefore, in order to get water from that hydrant to the incident ground might involve having several fire

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appliances spaced out along that route, all connected from the hydrant by hoses running via each appliance. It's a means of moving water over a large distance. We have another appliance called a hose layer which will also do that role and we can also be mobilized to advise on the best use of that.

Quite often at any large incident, as was the case at Grenfell Tower, there is the potential for us to try to obtain as much water as we can from the localized water main. When we arrive at an incident, we will take a walk around the incident ground to look at what water supplies are available; we will liaise with Thames Water technicians if they are on site and we will speak with the crews to get an understanding of what water requirements they need. There are means within our role where we can perhaps assist crews on the fire ground by adjusting what they are doing and how they are doing it in order to get the best use out of the water supply that is available. In addition to this we advise on the use of foam. I completed a three-day course at the Fire Service College in Moreton on the Marsh on foam firefighting. This course is designed to give an understanding of how to apply foam, its limitations and its benefits as this is part of the BMA's role. However, at this incident that wasn't what I was there for. Foam would normally be a consideration for fire incidents where flammable liquids were alight, such as petrol or oil. Another application foam may be considered for would fire- fighting in basements or aircraft incidents. To the best of my knowledge, there would've have been no requirement for the use of foam at Grenfell Tower.

There are a number of modules that you have to complete over a 6-month period to train as a BMA, most of which I have mentioned above. You also have a few days of refresher training on how our various pumping appliances work. I think those were the main modules but they are listed only on my training record. I elected to do my training over a short period of time therefore I completed this within 3 or 4 months and I had been a BMA for 1 year before the fire at Grenfell Tower.

As BMAs we do regular continued professional development (CPD) days where we meet up as a team. The last one we did was a few weeks before Christmas 2017 where the BMA group went to one of the big reservoirs in Tottenham to practice using a HPV and try out some other new equipment. Prior to this we had a day at RAF Northolt using a HVP and its larger bore hose to supply an ALP with water. We also went through a whole range of different scenarios to upskill the team. At Grenfell Tower I sought advice from GM TREW, as he provided this input at RAF Northolt and it involved doing exactly what we were trying to achieve at Grenfell. We normally have 2 or 3 of these CPD refresher days a year.

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There are certain triggers within our mobilising system that will require the attendance of BMA.

Primarily our day-to-day mobilisations will be any large incidents, where 6 pumps or above have been requested to attend the scene, referred to as 6 pump fires. There is an expectation that will attend all incidents where 8 pumps have been requested. We will also attend any incident where the Incident Commander requires our assistance in securing water supply and specifically requests our attendance. I will sometimes ring the Command Unit on scene, notify them I have been informed of the incident as a BMA and ask them whether they are having any issues with water supply. More often than not they will say that they have a sufficient water supply and I'm not needed but on other occasions, such a recent incident in Stanmore that I attended, they will tell me that are struggling and I will make my way there as there is a potential for us to be able to make a difference there. As a BMA group we try to be as flexible and reactive as possible because not every incident needs the same thing.

As BMAs we also have a degree of flexibility in electing to attend ourselves. If I see any incident that has 4 pumping appliances and then an aerial appliance I will take an interest in that as there could be quite a high demand on that fire ground for water. Certainly if it's a 6 pump fire where they then elect to put an aerial appliance on it, I will probably decide to attend because invariably you will encounter some sort of demand on the water supply on that fire ground and we find, as a BMA group, that it is beneficial to attend earlier rather than later. There are certain parts of London that we know as group have a particularly poor water supply so if I see an incident in one of those areas I will probably take an interest in it and elect to attend, as historically we know that whenever we've been there before one of the main issues that we've had is water supply. As a BMA group we try to be quite proactive.

I had been a BMA for about a year before the Grenfell Tower fire and in that time I think I had attended about 10 or 15 incidents in this role. These were various 6, 8, 10, 12 and 15 pump fires. The tasks that I've been requested to do as a BMA vary from implementing or improving a water relay, recommending the use of aerial appliances and advising firefighters on the best means of using the water supply that they've got. I thoroughly enjoy this role as we get to attend to a variety of incidents. As a BMA I've been to at least two or three high-rise incidents in East London, West London and South London. However, BMAs are not automatically mobilized to attend high-rise incidents. The predominant trigger for a BMA to be mobilised be the number of pumping appliances that have been mobilised to an incident as I stated above.

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As a Station Manager, I have regular incident command training at the training centre at Beckon which will involve table top exercises and we also now use computer system to replicate the sites we might attend. As an Incident Commander you have regular refresher training courses. My next one is on February this year. We have one and two day courses where we go through different incidents, some of which will be high-rise. My station is what I would call a high-rise station, as we have lots of high rise buildings on our ground and a large number of the fires we attend occur in towed blocks. I can't say when I last did high-rise training but I've only served in areas where there have been high-rise buildings so I make sure that I am up to date on high-rise procedures and my knowledge of this is as good as it can be, as this is predominantly the type of incident that my crews are called out to. However, I did not know anything about the risks concerned with cladding panels or how they could be involved in fire before the incident, as I had not had any input on this.

I think the training we do in how to deal with high-rise incidents is realistic considering the limitations of what have currently within the LFB. It could always be better and the fact that they are going to building a new training site in Croydon which will reflect our ability to do this type of training. We are lucky to have a drill tower at Brixton Fire Station that is 7 or 8 floors high, which is larger than some other stations, however this can't fully replicate a high-rise building. Despite this, our crews improvise and make the best of it that they can. We do make use of outside training venues when we can but they are not too common, as you have to persuade someone to let you use their building for training purposes.

The previous high-rise incidents that I've attended as a BMA don't compare to the Grenfell Tower Fire. Our expectation is always that compartmentation will be the biggest factor that will help us in high-rise firefighting and that we will always have at least an hour of protection or compartmentation at a fire in any high-rise building that we go to. It is very unusual for a fire to spread in a high-rise block. There will be an expectation of some spread of fire upwards, as that is how fire behaves, but not to the extent that we saw at Grenfell Tower. That is something that I've never seen before. I think that the high-rise fires I have attended previously have been contained within the flat of origin with minimal amount of spread upwards and possibly laterally, but nothing on the scale of Grenfell. We therefore have a policy on compartment firefighting and high-rise firefighting but I don't think it goes into detail about how to address a failure of compartmentation as we have an expectation that compartmentation wouldn't fail on the first place. I'm sure that now there are plans to review this.

In this statement I will mention several of my LFB colleagues as follows. I was made aware of the

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incident by Group Manager (GM) Richard WELCH, who was my line manager at the time and Borough Commander for Lambeth. I also worked for him previously when I was the Station Manager for Old Kent Road and he was the Borough Commander for Southwark, so I have worked for GM WELCH for quite a while. I also spoke to GM WELCH at the incident with GM Pat GOLDBOURNE, who I've attended numerous incidents with in the past 3 or 4 years. At the incident I reported to Assistant Commissioner (AC) Andy ROE. I know AC ROE well as I used to work for him previously when he was the Station Manager at Southwark Fire Station. I also reported to DAC DRAWBRIDGE who I've known for most of my career as he's worked at fire stations adjacent to those I've been posted. Prior to his promotion to DAC he was also a part of the BMA group and one of the most experience members of this group. I have therefore attended BMA CPD days with him. I spoke to SM Gareth COOK as he was the Water Officer at the incident. I also knew him before Grenfell as he got promoted to Station Manager at the same time as me therefore we've been on a few training courses together. I liaised and worked with WM Matt PERRY from Surrey Fire and Rescue at the incident but I did not know him before this. Finally, I consulted with Group Manager (GM) TREW at the incident who is one of the more experienced members of the BMA group and he has been a BMA for a number of years, certainly since the BMA group was established. He was also the officer who provided the input on aerial appliances at the CPD day RAF Northolt that I attended prior to Grenfell.

The incident concerned in this statement happened at Grenfell Tower. I had never been to Grenfell Tower before this incident and had no prior knowledge of the building. I therefore have no knowledge of the pre-prepared firefighting plan for Grenfell Tower however, the crews at any Fire Station are expected to ensure that they have the right and relevant information for the buildings within their ground. Any crews coming onto our ground can then access this information via the mobile data terminal (MDT). Since the fire at Grenfell Tower, we have reviewed the information that we hold for buildings on our ground and identified new buildings that have since gone up. The crews on our ground are already in the middle of a programme of visiting either the new premises or revisiting our old premises to make the sure the information we hold is as accurate and as up to date as possible. My main responsibility is to make sure that our crews are identifying and risk assessing the buildings that we are responsible for within our area and I'm sure that every other station is doing the same with theirs. I am aware that should I want to I could turn up an incident I can access information using the MDT on one our fire appliances and access information on a particular building but ordinarily the command unit will have done that once they set up as well.

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On Wednesday 14th June 2017 at about half past 1 in the morning I was off duty, at home, when I got a phone call from GM Richard WELCH. For him to ring at that time in the morning when I'm at home, it made me think that there might be an issue at Brixton Fire Station however he then told me that he was on route to a fire at a tower block in West London. He said that at the speed that the job was escalating, he believed it might be along a similar line to the Lakanal fire. This was a fire that occurred in Camberwell in 2009 where 6 occupants died. I could hear his radio and sirens on in the background as he was driving to incident on blue lights. We had a very brief conversation but I think he said it had been made a 20 or 25 pump fire at that time and that we were going to need a lot of people to come to this job, probably more than that. He therefore asked if I wanted to try and book myself back on duty and come back in. I was due to book on at 0800 hours that morning to start the first of 2 24-hour shifts so I told him to leave it with me. We attend 20 pump fires on a reasonably regular basis and we have to have 30 pump fires but less often. I have been to a 30 pump fire and a 40 pump fire in the past but 40 pump fires are very rare. For high-rise buildings in particular, it is exceptional for 40 pumps to be requested.

Following my conversation with GM WELCH, I then called our control room at about 1.30AM. I introduced myself to member of control room staff that I spoke to, made them aware of the skills that I have and told them that if it was a big incident I was more than willing to come back into work. I'm a recall officer so sometimes I'm mobilized from home to attend incidents. They asked me to standby but I then got a subsequent phone call from control asking me to come back in. I wasn't requested to come back in on blue lights; instead I was just told make my way back into London. I started driving back into London and received another phone call from the Officer of the Watch, who runs out control room. The Officer of the Watch explained to me that they were going to put me back on duty as available but to await further instruction.

I arrived back at Brixton Fire Station at about half past 3 or quarter to 4 in the morning. Both of our pumping appliances were out so I assumed that they had been mobilized to Grenfell and I confirmed this by looking at the printer. I made my way up to my office which is on the third floor. I have to go via an external balcony on this level to get to my office so I looked out over London in the direction of the incident and I could see a plume of smoke up in the distance. I then logged into my computer almost as soon as I got to the fire station around 4am. I accessed our LFB computer systems and followed the incident on our mobilizing system to build up a picture of the incident. I saw the messages being sent from the incident and the current status of it. By the time I logged on, at some time after 4 o'clock in the

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morning, there probably would have been informative messages but I can't remember what they were now. I also listened to the radio to get a view of what was going on.

I started to see the reports of the incident on Sky News around 0400 hours onwards. I was staggered by what I saw. Sky News were already there showing panoramic views of Grenfell Tower and footage of residents in the building who were trying to catch attention to our staff either using the lights on their mobile phones or by waving out of windows. They were also showing footage, which I presume was from earlier in evening, of the tower block fully involved in fire. I've never seen anything like that before.

At 0602 hours on 14/06/2017 I was mobilized via my pager to attend the incident as a bulk media advisor (BMA). I can't remember the details of the pager message but I know it contained the address of the incident. I had already looked at Google maps in preparation for being mobilized so that I knew how to get there. However before attending the incident I rang the control room again, as I would normally do, to see if there had any additional information to add that they couldn't include in the pager message. I spoke to the Officer of the Watch to confirm receipt of this message, confirm what my ordering was (that I had been mobilized as a BMA) and more importantly, due to the scale of this incident, where the current rendezvous point (RVP) was. After getting this information, I think I also asked if there was anything else I needed to know about the incident but was told to that it was just as per the details of the pager message. Control won't give detailed instructions as their role is purely to mobilize me as an asset to the incident. Once I had been given the information from control, I went down to the yard, got in my car and headed to the incident.

As I had been asked to attend as a BMA, I thought about the scale of involvement of the fire, considering the smoke I had seen and the reports on Sky News. I thought that we were going to be using quite a bit of water, therefore as soon as I got to the incident, I needed to make sure that we had secured water supplies.

I attended the incident on blue lights. My car is a [REDACTED] I do not have a MDT in this vehicle. I don't remember much of my journey to Grenfell Tower. As I have served most of my career working in the centre of South East London, I don't know the area near the tower and I was therefore paying quite close attention to what my SAT-NAV was telling me. I was thinking that my SAT-NAV would try to take me that fastest route but I knew that there would be road closures. In preparation for this I had looked at Google maps and my A-Z map before I left so that if I had to go a different way I knew how to get there. Traffic was reasonably light. I was predominantly paying attention

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to the road but I was also listening to my fire ground airwave radio. I was mainly listening out for any changes in the RVP but I wasn't necessarily taking a great deal in unless it was something aimed at me specifically or attending crews. I can't remember any particular messages I heard over the radio while I was on route.

I remember turning right after Kensington Fire Station and driving up to the incident this way. My notes state that I approached the incident via Holland Park Avenue into Ladbroke Grove. As I turned into Ladbroke Grove I couldn't see all of the Tower but I could see that there was smoke issuing from the upper floors that were visible to me and yellow/orange/red flames coming from various parts of the upper floors. This confirmed what I had seen earlier on Sky News. There was no vehicle traffic but I started encountering fire appliances parked up as I made my way along Ladbroke Grove. The crews that I saw didn't look they had been deployed, as their fire gear looked pretty clean and they didn't look tired. I was looking for my crews as I wanted to check they were OK but from what I know now I think they were already in the tower at that point. I believe part of Ladbroke Grove was shut by police officers at that point who were maintaining a cordon therefore I parked my vehicle just short of the RVP at the junction of Ladbroke Grove and Elgin Crescent, as I identified that this was the close as I could get to the RVP. I left my vehicle there for the rest of the time that I was at the incident.

I booked in attendance at the incident at 0630 hours and put on my fire gear, which is similar to what a firefighter wears except my helmet is white and has a band on it to indicate my rank. On my collar I also have rank markings there. I was also wearing a high-visibility jacket, which is orange and has "Bulk Media Advisor" written on the back of it to indicate the role I was attending in. As I did this I could see that there were other fire appliances and crews there being held at a holding point. I didn't see any members of the public where I parked and I couldn't see much Grenfell Tower at that point because of the build-up of the local area but as I began to make my way towards the incident ground I could see snapshots of all of the Tower between the surrounding buildings but I can't say which floors the fire was on.

While I was on route to the incident ground I saw a Thames water van quite close to where I parked my car. I knew that in my role as BMA for the incident, one of the first things I would need to establish was contact with Thames Water and that I would need to have discussions with Thames Water technicians on site, as they can help us in some way to identify whether there are any improvements that can be made to

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the water supply. It was fortuitous for me that I happened to bump into Thames Water as I was making my way to the incident ground therefore I thought I would make contact with them there and then.

I had a quick chat with a Thames Water technician, who was identified to me as Dean. I told him I was a BMA, which he understood as they work with the LFB quite a lot, and that I would need to speak to him again at some point. I asked him to give me his mobile number, which he provided to me as

██████████ I then asked him for information about the current situation regarding for water for the fire ground. Dean told me that at present Thames Water had increased the water pressure to the fire ground to their considered limit. To allow me to pre-plan, I asked Dean whether I could come back to him later if I needed to and get them to increase the water pressure locally. He couldn't give me a definite yes or no and cautioned me to bear in mind that as residents were getting up there would be higher demand on the water supply locally at that peak period in the morning, due to people showering and getting ready for work etc. As result of this, they were going to have to manage this for us locally. We agreed to exchange mobile numbers so that we could continue to contact each other with regards to local water supply status at about 0645 hours.

I then continued to make my way to the fire ground. As I got closer Grenfell Tower went out of my view as it was obscured by the other buildings. I reported to the Incident Command Unit, which was Command Unit 8 (CU8), to book my attendance at the fire ground and let them know that I was there. I can't remember my exact route but CU8 was parked just down from the Leisure Centre on Bomore Road near some bushes. I have marked on a map the approximate location of CU8 at the incident and I exhibit this map as CAP/2.

A Command Unit is a large lorry, roughly the same length and size as a fire appliance, however on the back there is a mini office with access to the main scheme radio. There is also an on board computer system that allows them to bring up all the information that we have access to on our IT systems and a mapping system can be brought up onto a large screen, which allows for plotting of appliances or locating the incident. In addition to this there is a back-up whiteboard that can be used to display similar information. Command units are used for coordinating command and control at incidents and they act as a focal point for our staff and other agencies. We will use Command Units for tactical coordination meetings and silver command meetings. They will be requested to attend any incident that requires 4 pumps or more, any incident where the crew have identified that persons are reported (involved),

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incidents involving cylinders and a great deal of large scale incidents. Command Units are staffed by two to three officers of Watch Manager Rank.

I knocked on the door to the CU8 to report to the Incident Commander, who at that time was AC Andy ROE. I know AC ROE well and I feel comfortable talking to him but I waited to speak to him, as I believe he was busy talking to the Commissioner Dany COTTON when I arrived. There may have also been a few other command unit staff present on CU8 at the time. When AC ROE and the Commissioner had finished speaking, I introduced myself to both of them and I informed AC ROE that I had been mobilized to the incident as a BMA. AC ROE briefed me on the incident but I can't remember the details of what he said to me. He would have told me the current situation at the incident and what had been done so far. I remember he told me that a large number of resources (crews) were still actively involved in search and rescue within the building. I can't say for definite but I therefore assume that the dry riser was charged at this time, as they were firefighting within the building.

AC ROE informed me that I had been requested from the scene to assist with overseeing the water supply to the fire ground and assist the Water Officer, who at that time was SM Gareth COOK. His call sign was OG54. I knew this was my priority due to the firefighting and searches being undertaken. AC ROE also informed me that a request had been made to Surrey Fire and Rescue for attendance of their 42m aerial ladder platform (ALP) and that I would be required to assist in implementing its deployment.

London has 3 types of aerial appliances, most common types that we use are turntable ladders (TLs) and aerial ladder platforms (ALPs) but we still also have a small fleet of hydraulic platforms. An ALP is a larger fire appliance, similar to a cherry picker or a crane, that has a large series of hydraulic booms on the back of it and on the head of the main booms is a knuckle joint with an articulated boom that's got a metal cage attached to it. As it deploys off the back of the appliance the knuckle joint moves upwards so that cage is able to deploy to a building. In the cage there is also a monitor that provides water. This can either can be operated remotely from outside of the cage or by firefighters in the cage, as it can carry up to about 3 people, weight permitting. The ALPs that London currently have available will extend to a maximum of 32 metres but how far they extend will also depend on how close it can get to a building. TLs will extend to a similar height but they are different because as the name indicates it had a ladder, however the current TLs we have also have a cage attached as well. The hydraulic platforms are very much like a cherry picker.

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The LFB does not have a 42 metre ALP but someone had identified that Surrey had one and requested this. Although London crews will go to other brigades and vice versa on a daily basis, it is uncommon to request an ALP from another brigade, as we have such a large fleet within the LFB. I would imagine that before I arrived they had discussed the capabilities of the LFB's aerial appliances and whether a taller appliance beneficial, which is the 42m ALP was requested.

In many instances you get your briefing on the Command unit but on this occasion AC ROE asked me to accompany him on a tour of the fire ground so that he could highlight any areas where my assistance could be required. I think we walked into Grenfell Road, turned right up and walked towards the direction of Grenfell Tower. On our route we had a look at a hydrant in front of the Leisure Centre near the tower, which I have marked on map CAP/2, and had conversation about this. At this point I didn't really look at the tower as I was concentrating on my role. I was looking at the hydrant to see what the plate was for it, which tells me what size main it was and what sort of performance it could give us. The hydrant was being used to supply a pumping appliance, which I have marked on the map as pump, but I don't know whose appliance this was. There was lots of hose everywhere.

When AC ROE and I reached the location of Paddington's turntable ladder (call sign A213), which was parked underneath an overhang/walkway at the South East of Grenfell Tower, we then went along underneath this walkway to make our way to the entrance to Grenfell Tower. There may have been another pump there also but I can't remember. I remember seeing crews using ground monitors on top of this walkway above and thinking that ground monitors use a lot of water, therefore I needed to make sure we can facilitate this. As you go along the covered walkway you then get to an open courtyard and across this is the entrance to Grenfell Tower on the South side. I stood at the edge of the covered walkway area near the open courtyard and a Safety Officer who I believe was a CM said to me, "Governor, you've got to wait here. We're not letting anyone walk across it because of the falling debris", and I could see debris of all different types of building material in front of me. Something that will always stay with me is the sight of the Metropolitan Police Officers with longboards over their heads, coming out at their own risk to us. The officers who came over to meet us positioned AC ROE and I in amongst them and got us across the courtyard, holding their long shields above us. They did this to protect us and other crews they ferried over from falling debris. It touched me, as it something we wouldn't never have thought to do previous and the fact that they were willing to do that and put themselves in harm's way was very

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admirable. We were instructed to wait when we wanted to come back out and they would take us back again. I have marked the location of A213 and our route into the building on map CAP/2.

The entrance of Grenfell Tower was a glass door fronted lobby. I went through the main entrance of the Tower with AC ROE approximately 0700 hours and met GM Richard WELCH and GM Pat GOLDBOURNE on the right where the stairs come down into the lobby. That is as much as I know about the layout of the building as I did not go beyond this point. The lobby was clear of smoke and I observed nothing unusual. I was aware there was movement around me, noises of firefighters and officers coming and going and I could hear activity above me but I didn't pay much attention to that, as I was so focused on speaking to the two officers. I don't recall who else was there. I also don't know anything about the fire lift or smoke management system within the building and I didn't hear any alarms while I was in or outside the building.

My understanding was that GM WELCH and GM GOLDBOURNE, whose calls signs were E109 and F115 respectively, were overseeing the lobby sector and bridgehead at that time, organising firefighting actions within the building. AC ROE spoke with GM WELCH and GM GOLDBOURNE and they had both briefed him, I then asked if they had an adequate water supply. I was trying to build up a picture of the water supply at the incident and the most important area was where the firefighting was going on, which I why spoke to those two officers in particular. They told me that the water supply they had was sufficient for the work being undertaken at that time. They didn't go into detail about how the water supply was being used as I think it was understood without saying that they didn't need to as in my role I knew what they would be doing. It was also a busy area at that time and they had lots of things they needed to do so they didn't have time to give further detail. I didn't want to take up more of their time than necessary, however the adequacy of the water supply was an important piece of information that I needed to obtain from them to carry on with my role. Once they I had confirmed that they had what they needed, it then allowed me to focus on other areas however, I asked them to contact me via handheld radio should the situation change. We then left the building. This was the only time I was inside Grenfell Tower during the incident.

After we left the building, we then went over to Soho's ALP (call sign A245) which was pumping water onto the East Side of the tower and near that on a paved area was Soho's pump ladder (PL), call sign A241. These appliances were there when I first arrived before I went into the tower. I observed that Soho's ALP was unable to use it monitor, therefore instead the crews had a hose reel tubing running from

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their PL, which was lashed off to the ALP cage and supplying water. The PL was being supplied with water from a hydrant the (North) side of the Leisure Centre. I spoke with the Crew Manager in charge of Soho's ALP and he told me that they were using a supply from a hydrant but it wasn't sufficient to supply the ALP monitor. He said that they had therefore improvised by deploying a 22mm hose reel to ALP cage so that they were still able to supply some water for external firefighting. The 22mm hose is different our standard 19mm hose that we carry on our older fleets as it is larger in bore and it is identified in a different colour so crews know what is it. This hose allows us to deliver a larger amount of water through the hose reel, about 275 litres per minute. This is considerable improvement on what the standard hose can deliver which is about 174 litres per minute. It doesn't sound like a lot but when you see it in use it's fantastic. I think that by deploying this hose reel, Soho's ALP was able to get water up to around the 6th or 7th floor on the East side of the building, however I would have to look at photographs of the incident to be sure of this. This wasn't much higher than the height of the cage on the ALP, as they didn't have the pressure or volume to get the water much higher than this. AC ROE and I stopped by these appliances had a conversation about this. I told AC ROE that I would try to find ways to overcome this issue at the earliest opportunity, which I did later by speaking to Thames Water technicians.

At this point AC ROE also informed me of this plan for Surrey's ALP as he wanted me to be responsible for its deployment. AC ROE's plan was for Surrey's ALP to be located adjacent to where Soho's ALP A245 was currently located, on the Green in front of Grenfell Tower on the East side. He planned to locate the ALP in this area, as it was the only place we would get it to work due to the topography of the area. We had a conversation with Soho's ALP crew and later Surrey's ALP crew because this area was grass and wouldn't normally want put an ALP on grass. Ideally you want to ALPs or any our aerial appliances on hard standing ground and that area technically wasn't. However, we agreed that the ground had been so baked because it was in the middle of the summer, therefore it was rock hard and solid, and importantly neither the ALP or the support pump had been leaking water. If they had been leaking water, I would have had some concerns because there would have been potential for the ground to become sodden which would have been a big risk factor for us. However, we decided that as Soho's ALP had been therefore for a number of hours and not experienced any movement in the ground, we would put Surrey's ALP in there, set it up and assess the conditions. But the ground was literally like hitting concrete and no movement in it. Despite this, we agreed that if we felt at any point there were concerns we would cease operations because there was no need to put anyone at risk. AC ROE left it to me to

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organise the deployment of the ALP but there was nowhere else it could go than where he had planned to locate it.

I then accompanied AC ROE and began to walk back to the CU8, walking down the South West side of the leisure centre. Outside the Leisure Centre on the green there was anywhere between 80 and 100 firefighters and officers there. AC ROE stopped there and shouted for everyone to come closer. He wanted to have a conversation with all the staff that were there. He got them all together and said to them something along the lines of “you may not know who I am but my name is Andy ROE and I’m the Incident Commander. I just wanted you to all know, that I know I’m asking you to go into a building and perform tasks that are of extreme danger. But I just want you all to know that I’m so really proud of you and thank you all for what you are doing.” It was one of the most inspirational things I’ve heard on a fire ground. It’s not something you would normally hear. That is really a measure of him.

We then carried on back to the CU8. On returning he instructed me to make contact with DAC DRAWBRIDGE (call sign E8), who was coordinating resources on CU7 on Bramley Road, in order to ascertain what his requirements were.

I then made my way from CU8 to CU7. I didn’t want to walk through the fire ground to get to CU7 so I think I walked down Grenfell Road and possibly went via Whitchurch Road to get to Bramley Road. As I walked this route I encountered more members of the public around this area as I think this was still a means of access but I didn’t speak to any of them. I have marked the rough location of CU7 on the map CAP/2. When I located CU7 on Bramley Road I reported to DAC DRAWBRIDGE on the Command Unit and had a long conversation with him. He instructed me to locate SM COOK and confirm with him the current situation with water supply to the fire ground. DAC DRAWBRIDGE was previously a BMA therefore he instructed me to contact Surrey Fire and Rescue units to ascertain what specific water and pumping appliance requirements their ALP would need. This was what then lead me to contact them.

Whilst walking back to the fire ground to locate SM COOK I rang our control room at 0721 hours to request a phone number for Surrey and Rescue Services control room. At 0723 hours I called Surrey Fire and Rescue however the control room operator was unable to provide me with the technical specifications for their ALP. Instead they provided me with a mobile phone number for the Watch Manager attending with Surrey’s ALP.

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At 0726 hours I called the Watch Manager for Surrey's ALP from my mobile phone, Matt PERRY, who was riding in charge of the supporting pumping appliance attending with Surrey's ALP. We discussed the fire ground requirements they would need along with what their estimated time of arrival at the incident would be. WM PERRY told me that they were attending from Leatherhead Fire Station on blue lights and at that time they were just approaching the M25 from the South.

At 0729 hours I sent a text message to WM PERRY so that he had my mobile phone number, as he told me it had come up as unknown when I called him originally. At 0802 hours WM PERRY then called to tell me that they were approaching the approximate location of the incident and asked me for the directions as to the best route to take. He told me that their SATNAV was directing them to go a certain way but as I knew that the police had implemented certain road closures, I told him to hang on while I checked. At 0806 hours I text WM PERRY directions and asked that they approached via Ladbroke Grove before turning in Lancaster Road where I would arrange to meet them. At that location there was a number of Metropolitan Police officers who were maintaining a cordon. I informed them that at some point two fire appliances would be arriving and asked if they could let them through so I could then meet them further down the road.

At around about this time I located the Water Officer, SM COOK, somewhere on Grenfell Road. We had a very brief conversation we were both going off to do different tasks but I asked him if we had enough water for the fire ground, as he has been given this as a functional sector. He confirmed that there was now a suitable supply for the fire ground and bridgehead, and that everyone had what they needed with what was available therefore no further action was required at that time. This then freed me up to then continue making phone calls to Surrey Fire and Rescue to start coordinating getting their ALP on site. I'm not sure where SM COOK went after this.

I then located Wembley's ALP (G305) and Wimbledon's ALP (H345) on Lancaster road near the junction with Silchester Road. I have marked the location of these crews on map CAP/2. I spoke to the crews and asked what they had been tasked to do but ascertained that there was no role for them. Surrey's ALP was due to arrive imminently and wanted to use the location they were parked in to position Surrey's ALP and support appliance initially. I also didn't have anywhere to put them as there was no other viable place to get an ALP close to Grenfell Tower due to the surroundings of the tower. Anyone who has been to the site will know that there was the playground area on the West side of Grenfell Tower, which prevented an ALP being positioned there, and you couldn't get an ALP down the North or South

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sides of the tower either. The way that aerial appliances work is that further away you are, the less height you can get from it. You need to be as close as possible to make full advantage of its height. Therefore, in my opinion the green area on the East side was only suitable place to locate aerial appliances at the incident, in order for them to perform any meaningful task. A result of this I thought that it would be better for these ALPs to be available for the rest of London and sought permission from AC ROE to release these crews from the incident. This was granted and both crews were then given their respective nominal roll boards (NRBs), which list details of personnel on those appliances, and I informed the crews that they could return to their base locations.

At 0810 hours I was contacted by the original Thames Water technician, Dean, and provided with the new contact details of his colleague, Michael, who would be taking over. Michael's mobile number was

At 0819 hours I was notified by WM PERRY that he and his crew were at the cordon on Lancaster Road and I walked down to meet them there. I then escorted WM PERRY and his crew to the location of Soho's ALP (A245). I explained to them to the level at which Soho's ALP was currently reaching up the building and before deploying Surrey's ALP, I asked that they give me an idea of what their ALP could realistically achieve to improve on this. It was agreed that additional capacity of their 42m ALP would provide some advantage as it was a bigger appliance. It was probably only going to be an additional 10 metres but this would reach a further 2 or 3 floors and we thought that any improvement above what we were currently achieving was worth obtaining. However, I decided to seek permission from AC ROE before proceeding.

GM TREW (call sign F104) then arrived at the location of Soho's ALP at 0900 hours. As I mentioned above GM TREW is a very experienced BMA therefore I told him what we had, what we had done and asked for his advice about whether there was anything additionally that we could do with regards to the water supply issues that were affecting the supply of pump A241 that was supplying the ALP 245. We identified that there was only between 450-500 litres per minute being supplied into the pump ladder by the hydrant, by looking at the flow metre in the rear of the pump bay on Soho's PL. This was having an adverse effect on the ability for A245 to provide a monitor.

We were limited in the scope of what we could do but discussed a number of different approaches we could use to improve the water supply to the monitor. Firstly, we discussed dialling down the branch by

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adjusting the collar to reduce the number of litres per minute that it required. On the branch of a hose reel, or any of main jets that we use, you can adjust the collar on the branch to reduce the number of litres per minute that will go through it. This goes through a range through 130 to 475 depending on the branch, or the ground monitor can be run 600, 900 or 1900 litres per minute. By reducing the amount of water you are trying to bring into the system you are effectively trying to reduce the size of the hole, hoping that will allow us to get more litres per minute up there. But the height is going to work against us as it is a narrow bore, only 22mm. We were trying to improve the throw of this water, whereas normally pressure will allow you to do that. The best way to explain this is for example, if you had water running from a hose in your garden without anything on the end of the hose you won't get much water pressure and the water will just come out. However, if you then put your thumb covering part of the end of the hose, you might then find that water will then spray further down the garden. This is effectively what we were looking at trying to do with the hose at the incident by dialling down the branch, however as the branch and hose were already lashed off in the cage with the monitor we would have had to bring the cage back down to this. We therefore didn't elect to use this method in the end.

One of the other things I discussed with GM TREW, which we had tried previously at RAE Northolt, was to turn the system off, allow it to fill up with water and then turn it back on again, as this allows a body of water to build up in that hose. We could then try to match what we are able to bring into it against what is coming out of it. A good analogy to explain this would be turning the tap on at home with a to fill up a jug of water, then turning the jug on its side to let it empty out but at the same rate that the tap is filling it up with water.

From memory, in the end I think we tried to adjust the flow rate by stopping the system, allowing it to fill up and starting it again. There was so much demand on the local water system and we were limited in ways that we could try to improve things as a result. Despite trying this approach, we were unable to sustain a meaningful supply and there was only marginal improvement. However, the important thing to stress is that what we were doing was of secondary importance. There were elements of fire on the outside of the building, but we still had crews inside who were doing the primary firefighting at that stage and you can't have crews working in the same area as the ALP. A lot of what the monitor from ALP was doing was dealing with falling debris, therefore the urgency to make it work was no more near as much as it would have been if it was the primary means of extinguishing fire. I knew that it wasn't the most important thing that needed to be done. The most important thing was to ensure that the water

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supply that the firefighters were using internally was maintained and secured. The ALP was a secondary consideration that we were trying to do outside of this.

After trying these approaches GM TREW's assessment was then similar to mine in that, if that was all we were getting out of that hydrant, all we could do was to ask Thames Water if they could improve the supply. London's water providers tend to run London's water supply at about 1 bar, but flow and pressure are two different things. Pressure can depend on the bore of the main and what we were asking it to do but roughly you would normally expect it to be performing at about 1000 to 1500 litres per minute, although the standard for it 2000 or 2250 litres per minute. London Water providers tend to run that water at a reduced rate to safeguard against burst water mains. This is also why increasing the pressure carries a risk, as we are potentially asking Victorian parts of the water system to cope with pressures they were maybe not designed for.

At 1005 hours I contacted the new Thames Water technician Michael and we met to discuss what options were available. I think I phoned him initially to find out where he was and then agreed to meet him on the green area near the tower where the ALPs were located. Quite often you need to speak with the water technicians and bear in mind that hydrants are connected to each other by a series of ring mains and if we are connected together the same main if you increase the pressure in one area it might reduce it in another. For example, in

an old house if you turn the kitchen taps on and then turn the taps on in the bathroom, you will see the water supply reduce in the kitchen. That in essence is what we were trying to do on a hydrant main. As BMAs we need to liaise with Thames Water technicians to see if we can identify another independent main that we can start using so that we start drawing water from two different sources. Thames water did look at that however in that part of London its quite condensed. Although the water mains are separated in places they were not separated enough there for us to consider this tactic. We therefore had a conversation regarding whether they could increase the pressure for us and what it was going to take. I was informed that there may be a way to increase the pressure locally but that Thames Water strongly advise about pushing the supply too far as this could lead to a water main failing and a total loss of water supply to the fire ground. I had a responsibility to ensure that there was no loss of water to the fire ground and I couldn't risk the firefighters in the building losing their water supply so there had to be a balance. It was more important we had an uninterrupted water supply for the crews inside because at that time they were still doing active floor-by-floor firefighting and search and rescue and they were therefore my priority.

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The ALP was good if we could use it but was secondary to the firefighting inside. I think However, we agreed that if an improvement of 1500 litres per minute could be achieve this would beneficial. I was advised by Thames Water that action would be required remotely but may take some time because to allow them to do that they have to remotely operate control valves in different locations and divert water.

As these improvements may take some time, I decided at this time to seek permission from AC ROE to replace A245 with Surrey's ALP which was granted. We then began the process of changing over the ALPs at approximately 1045 hours.

The most important thing to do before changeover is to notify the Incident Commander and on this occasion the officers overseeing bridgehead. We needed to let them know that there was going to be a period of time where they didn't have an ALP outside. What then brought Surrey's crew onto the fire ground to show them where we wanted the ALP to go and check that they were happy with the location. Surrey's ALP crew elected to locate their ALP adjacent to A245 had been located. It then made sense for Surrey's support pump ladder to replace A241 in the same position 241 was currently located which would then relay water from the hydrant to Surrey's ALP. The process of changing over took a while as they are big machines and we had to disconnect Soho's PL, then disconnect Soho's ALP and then move Surrey's machines in place and set them up. At about the time we were trying to move a very big machine out of the fireground and another big machine in, Disaster Victim Identification (DVI) were also trying to set up at the side of the Leisure Centre. Our Respiratory Protective Group, who bring spare breathing apparatus and cylinders to large scale incidents, were also trying to set up and deliver equipment. This therefore took a bit of coordination and took about an hour to an hour and 15 minutes in total. I have marked their locations on map CAP/2 as DVI and RPG accordingly. During this process I provided CU8 with the NRBs for Surrey's crews so that we then had a means of knowing that Surrey's crews were on the fire ground and that they were accounted for.

We were hoping in the break, while we were changing over the ALP, that Thames Water would have been able to make the improvements in the water supply that we discussed. After our earlier conversation, Thames Water stayed in close proximity on a wall in front of the Leisure Centre. Thames Water technicians were using their laptops to look at the system and having conversations with people at remote control rooms to try and get this to happen. They kept me updated and would say they think it's been increased, do you want to try and see. There was bit of an improvement but in the back of my mind I was always thinking that I needed to protect the water supply to the firefighters so I wasn't going to push this.

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Before using Surrey's ALP, we set up an agreement on a safe system of working and evacuation signals, as we mindful that the handheld radios probably weren't compatible with ours with regards to radio channels etc. We therefore decided it made sense to keep their crews together, which is why their pump ladder was supplying their ALP. We were operating in a very small area on, the green, so we kept the crew together, GM TREW spoke with them all and said that we would effectively be their safety officers, as we have a vested interest in that area of the fireground anyway, and that there would always be one of us with their crews. That way if there was an evacuation on the radio, we could communicate that to their crews. One of the evacuation signals on the fire ground is repeated blasts on the whistles, which they would know anyway but we wanted to make sure they were always in contact with what was happening on the incident ground. Therefore, they wouldn't ever be in a position where they couldn't communicate with us, in case one of them had an accident for example.

Surrey's ALP then got to work at around 1115 hours. I think we gained an improvement of two to three floors in height by using Surrey's ALP and their monitor was probably able to apply water a bit higher than that due to the improvements that had been made in the water pressure. I remember looking at it on the news later and thinking that we had managed to achieve a bit of an improvement. I would have to look at photographs but I think the monitor was able to reach the 8th, 9th and 10th floors.

There were a number of pockets of fire present internally. We knew we had crews in the building and we don't normally use aerial monitors when there are crews in a building. This is because the monitor of an ALP can provide water at quite a substantial rate in terms of litres per minute and pressure. Therefore, if you introduce that amount of water into a compartment where fire crews are working it could firstly injure them, secondly it could affect the structure of the building internally and thirdly it can have an adverse effect on firefighting conditions. Consequently, we always make sure that we know where the crews are before we deploy any ALP. Crews would also be briefed that if there are aerials outside that we would never use them in the same time at the same location.

For these reasons, when we identified externally the areas that Surrey's ALP could get to, we sought prior permission to extinguish these areas of fire before putting any water on them from GM FROST (call sign F100), who was at the bridgehead. When we wanted to relocate the ALP, I contacted him using my handheld radio and told him the area of the building we could get to and he would inform me whether he had any firefighting crews in that area. If he did have crews in that area and they weren't in the middle of an important role, he would withdraw them; or if there was no one there, we knew we could then put

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water into that part of the building. Similarly, if GM FROST wanted to put firefighters into an area of the building, he would also check with me first via radio before deploying them and get us to move out of the way. I don't remember their any issues with the handheld radios during this time.

At 1156 hours I was contacted on my mobile phone by SM Dave NICHOLSON from Surrey Fire and Rescue, whose call sign was SS038. He told me that he was in attendance as part of the cross border liaison officer role for the Surrey Crews. This is normal practice as the LFB would also send a liaison officer if our crews are deployed out of London. I walked down and met SM NICHOLSON near to CU8 and escorted him to where Surrey's ALP was working. GM TREW and myself briefed SM NICHOLSON on all aspects of the ALP deployment and he remained with us overseeing his crew's deployment. Aside from him being there to support Surrey's crews, he was also able to start coordinating relief crews from Surrey to replace these crews.

I then continued to liaise with GM FROST to ensure there were no crews located at any location within the block when deploying the ALP monitor. Whenever any crews were identified, the ALP monitor was either withdrawn and relocated.

I remember that radio communications at the incident were busy but other than speaking to GM FROST I didn't really have a need to use to it as I wasn't involved in firefighting operations and I wasn't part of a chain of command or information sharing. I therefore don't know if there were any issues with the radios. I had my radio on at the incident in case they needed to contact me I think I called DAC DRAWBRIDGE from my mobile phone to his mobile phone when I needed to. I was also very close to CU8 later so I could walk over there to have a conversation if I needed to rather than using my radio.

I remained overseeing the deployment of the ALP until approximately 1400 hours when it was agreed between GM TREW and I that I would book off that incident as I was on the first of 2 days of 24-hour shifts and would need to be available for the remainder of the 48 duty. At that time, it was evident to me that we were going to need a brigade presence at the location for a considerable amount of time. After 1700 hours on a weekday, predominantly the duty cover goes to those who are on 24 hour shifts therefore I had to accept that I needed to have a break in order to prepare for being called back to the location later in the shift. However, I wasn't called back to the location again. I sought permission from Incident Commander to book off the incident, who at that time was Assistance Commissioner (AC) Dom ELLIS, call sign BM10. This permission was then granted and I left the incident at 1408 hours.

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When I left I don't think the condition of the fire had changed greatly externally. There would be pockets of fire either breaking out and disappearing depending on work was being done internally or externally. I certainly don't think it had gotten any worse as I think it had travelled any further as it already spread to where it going to spread. Externally we dealing with small pockets of fire on lower floors and the crews were still in there. The extent of it was certainly was nowhere near what I had seen on Sky News earlier at 4 in the morning. The crews did a brilliant job to deal with it as they did. I can visualize the damage to the building when I left but I can't really describe it however I only really saw the North and East faces of the building.

When I left the scene I contacted the Officer of the Watch who runs our control room. I explained to her that I had been up since half 1 that morning and that I knew I was to be available for the remainder of the 24-hour period. I also wanted to catch up with my crews as I had seen them sporadically while I had been there and I knew that they had been quite involved in the incident. They had also been released from the scene around that time, so I elected to come back to Brixton fire Station. I sought permission from Officer of the Watch to be shown unavailable for calls for a short period so that I could change my fire gear, have something to eat and chat to my crews to check that they were OK. We agreed that she would allow me to stay unavailable until 1700 hours as she then had an expectation that she would need sufficient officers available for the remainder of that duty. I drove back to Brixton and arrived at the fire station at about half past 3 or 4 in the afternoon. At that point, both of my crew were back here too. I spoke to my Watch Manager, John STEVENS, to check that he and rest of his crew were OK. In the scheme of things, they were alright but a bit tired understandably, as they had been up most of the night and they had been heavily involved in firefighting within the tower. However, at that time I didn't know what their involvement was other than they looked beaten up and needed a break as they were due back on duty at 2000 hours that night. WM STEVENS and I had a conversation about the welfare of the crew. I was already aware that we had received instruction from a senior officer that if crews needed a bit more time to have a break and sort themselves out, we had the ability at the change of watch to leave them as unavailable. I had a discussion with WM STEVENS and said that he should do whatever is right for the crew and that I had no expectations. He wanted to keep them all together as he thought it was better for them to all be together and start talking about it. I said let me know what you want to do at 2000 hours.

After this, I had a shower, got changed and sorted out my fire gear. When I am on a 24-hour duty I normally stay at a flat that I mobilize from during that time. I planned to go there but I then got a call

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from DAC Jane PHILPOTT to ask how I was doing. She asked if I would hang around until change of watch at 2000 hours, as she wanted me to make contact with all crews within the borough of Lambeth that had attended Grenfell. She asked me to speak with my crews here and those at Lambeth to make sure that everyone was all right, as I believe the Lambeth Station Manager was on leave at that time. I don't think Clapham or West Norwood crews attended.

At 2000 hours, I checked in on WM STEVENS and the Brixton crews. It didn't surprise me that the crew elected to go back on duty at 2000. They had a discussion as watch and that was what they wanted to do. I then drove to Lambeth Fire Station and spoke with the Officer in Charge there. I explained that if they had any watch members that were not ready to go back on the run they were quite within their rights to stay off and I didn't want them to feel that there was any expectation on them. Similarly, to the Brixton the crews, they chose to come back on duty.

I remember speaking to a couple of the firefighters, and I think for one it them it was the first fire she had been to. I explained to them that there were no expectations them however I think the mentally of the watches are that they wanted to be available but Jane was adamant though that they were to be told there was no expectations and to take the time that they needed.

After this I went to Old Kent Fire Station, as it was my previous fire station that I used to work at and I knew that the crews were at Grenfell at the same time as my crews from Brixton. I got there at around 2100 or 2130 hours. I spoke with the Watch Manager there, asked if everyone there was OK and again told them to take the time that they needed. They had not long come back so the crews were busy sorting everything out. I think I then either rang or emailed Jane and decided to go back to my call out base in Eltham. I think I got back there at about 2200 hours. I was only at home for an hour when I was mobilized to an incident over in Walthamstow at 2300 hours and didn't return until 0200 hours the next morning.

I started making my notes on the incident as soon as the following day, on 15/06/2017. I think I had a running draft that I kept referring back to and as thinks came back to me I then added to it. However, the date that I saved my notes and sent them to DAC PUGSLEY was the 20/06/2017. These were the same notes that I referred to while providing this statement.

While I was at the scene on 14/06/2017 I took 7 photographs using my mobile phone. These photographs show the deployment and set up for Surrey's ALP and support appliance at the Grenfell Tower fire. The

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reason I took these photographs was that the Grenfell Tower fire was the first time within London that we had ever deployed an ALP from a neighbouring brigade. The BMA group will share details of such incidents that we attend so that we can learn from this as a group. I took the first five photographs on 14/06/2017 between 1235 and 1238 hours respectively and I took the last 2 photographs at 1305 hours on the same date. I emailed these photographs to DC BENNETT on 04/01/2017 at 1512 hours. I exhibit these photographs respectively as CAP/3 to CAP/9. I have also provided these photographs to the LFB, as one of the instructions we were given regarding writing out statements by DAC PUGSLEY, was to provide any photographs taken at the incident.

I do not know anything about who made decisions in relation to the stay put policy at the Grenfell Tower fire and I did not hear anything about this policy at the incident. The stay put policy is based around the expectation that compartmentation will work in residential tower blocks. Our control room staff will advise any member of the public or caller that believes they are affected or in a building that is on fire that, unless they are directly affected by the fire itself, to stay put. This policy is used because our expectation that the 1 hour of compartmentation is true and that is sufficient time for us to get our crews on site and up to affected floors. The other reason that the stay put policy is the most sensible way of working is that if we were to advise people to leave, we then have an issue that you then have a large number of people trying to exit the building while we are trying to get our crews in and up into the building. In single staircase tower blocks, this could potentially affect our ability to fight fire quickly. I therefore think that stay put is a rationale piece of advice and it is appropriate but it based on a number of assumptions regarding the integrity and suitability of fire compartmentation within a building. You cannot generalise things as it depends on different buildings, different layouts, size and locations of fire and other factors.

I attended the Lakanal fire from the early stages however, nothing that I experienced then compares to scene that I encountered on arrival at Grenfell Tower. I've never witnessed fire spread that appears to have occurred at this incident and I don't think anyone that attended will have either. There was fire spread at Lakanal but not to the extent that I witnessed at Grenfell Tower and you can't compare the two because the scale of Grenfell Tower incident is beyond anything that I've experienced. Prior to this Lakanal, would have been the pinnacle of my experience. Grenfell Tower was like nothing I had ever seen. When I first saw pictures of it on my computer on Sky News, I couldn't comprehend what I was seeing.

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I want to acknowledge the efforts of the crews on Soho's ALP (A245) and pump ladder (A241). Despite the poor water supply to the ALP platform affecting the ability of the monitor they utilized the 22mm hose from the series 3 pumping appliance and deployed it to the ALP cage so that there was some form of water entering the building. For me that was a big thing because rather than just thinking that they couldn't get it working, they wanted to do the best that they could, as all the crews were doing, so they improvised. The relevance of this is that the series 3 pumping appliance was relatively new in service and one of the newest pumping appliances that we have. This demonstrated to me that as a station and a crew they had come to understand the capabilities of the new appliance, which to me showed a level of professionalism. Also the fact that they had identified that the hose reel is different to the standard hose that we use on other appliances and has a greater capacity which again showed that they really thought about what they did. I want that to be acknowledged, as I thought that was exceptional.

I also want to comment that the Surrey Fire and Rescue crews demonstrated the upmost dedication and professionalism at this incident. The crews ascertained the optimum position to deploy their 42 metre ALP to maximize the use of this appliance to the best of its ability. I consider it a privilege to have had the opportunity to work with them and our crews and officers throughout the incident. As far as I'm aware, it was the first time they had been deployed into London. They understood the gravity of situation yet there wasn't anything that they weren't willing to have a go at or try with their ALP. You couldn't meet a nicer bunch of people. We were lucky we had people with that attitude there.

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Statement of: PAYTON, CHRISTOPHER

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