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## WITNESS STATEMENT

Criminal Procedure Rules, r27.2; Criminal Justice A	Act 1967, s.9; Magistrates' Courts Act 1980, s.5b
Statement of: KNAPMAN, DANIEL	
Age if under 18: OVER 18 (if over 18 insert 'over 18')	Occupation: FIRE OFFICER

This statement (consisting of 7 page(s) each signed by me) is true to the best of my knowledge and belief and I make it knowing that, if it is tendered in evidence, I shall be liable to prosecution if I have wilfully stated in it anything which I know to be false, or do not believe to be true.

Signature: D KNAPMAN

Date: 05/12/2017

Tick if witness evidence is visually recorded □ (supply witness details on rear)

I have been asked to provide a statement in relation to the Grenfell Tower Fire on Wednesday the 14th June 2017. I have been spoken to via digital media on Tuesday 5th December 2017 by DC David PEARL and DC Paula BARHAM at Heston Fire Station. Also present that day was the Fire Brigade Union Representative Nigel COX. I understand the audio evidence is my main evidence but this statement is a full version of what was said.

During the interview I referred to the following exhibits, my contemporaneous notes which I made on the 14th June. at Paddington Fire Station exhibit reference DAK/1, Google map of the area around Grenfell Tower exhibit DAK/2, Floor plan of the tower exhibit DAK/3 and a Grenfell Tower - Elevation Tower plan as exhibit DAK/4.

I joined the London Fire Brigade in 2008 and did my initial training at Southwark Training Centre for seventeen (17) weeks. We did in house training there using all the appliances (fire engines), training in using the ladders, Breathing Apparatus sets (BA) and Radiation and Haz-Chemicals. We also did training at outside venues like Park Royal (fire house) for example. The course is a pass/fail course so it is quite intense for seventeen (17)

weeks.

I am also trained in the use of Fire & Rescue Units (FRU) and these are used in Road Traffic Accidents. We use line gear to get people out from whatever predicament they're are in either at height or on the

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ground. We also have a boat that we use for rescues and I did a boat handling course a long time ago. We frequently use the boat for training at a place in Bedfont and we also have other specialized kit that we use at this fire station.

Following my training I joined the Red Watch at Heston Fire station in December 2008 and have been there ever since. We have regular training at Heston and I am trained in everything from FRU, line, water and boat whilst I have been based here.

At Heston Fire Station we have three (3) appliances a Pump, Pump Ladder and a Fire & Rescue Unit (FRU) and I am trained to ride all three (3) appliances (fire engines). Every fire fighter (FF) is trained to use the Standard Breathing Apparatus (SDBA) but Extended Breathing Apparatus (EDBA) is a specialist course, so if, you ride the FRU you would have to be trained in EDBA and every FF at Heston is EDBA trained. My initial course was a three (3) day training course for EDBA. The FRU course is a separate training course and you had the line course which was is also attached to that. I have a two (2) day SDBA course coming up next March so even though you have passed out we still have to train periodically and every FF has to do this course every two (2) years. The only difference between an SDBA and an EDBA is that the EDBA is heavier to carry and they last longer, the training is the same for all the BA sets, so when we train at the station we only ever use SDBA sets. BA drills are frequently run at the station just to keep us on top of our skills and we also use outside venues like the Stag Brewery in Hammersmith to train with our BA sets, the drills were scenario based and run by a Watch Manager (W/M). He would give us a briefing first on what the situation was and what tasks he wanted us to do. Borough Managers and Station Managers would also be in attendance on the day and oversee events. As a watch we have trained in high rise buildings and last week we had a training day at Twickenham. We familiarise ourselves with the high rise buildings on our ground so would go and look at them around once a year. We would also look at the PIP's, these are plaque's on a wall outside a high rise building, these plaques contain important information about the building that FF's would need to know like the dry risers, where the hydrants are, it would tell us how many lengths of hose would be required, we would look at the lay out of the floors and use the fire lifts to make sure they were in working order. The information on these plaques would have been put there by the fire safety officers once they had carried out a safety inspection of the building. These PIP's were put in high rise buildings following the Lakanal House Fire (tower block) in Camberwell in July 2009.

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In relation to training and fire-fighting in a high rise building we don't do that much as we only have Park Royal which is a fire house and we can set fires in there and train to put them out, but as it is only a two to three level building it would not be classed as a high rise building and is more house based situation that we would be training in. The training we would receive in relation to high rise buildings would be relevant when we were dealing with a real fire because a high rise is a compartment with different concrete boxes and the fire is going to burn inside of that so basically they are setting fires in rooms with the doors closed so the situation would be very similar however as FF's we would not be coming in from two (2) floors below you would be just coming in and working you're way round and putting out the fire.

On Tuesday 13th June 2017 I started my night watch at around 20:00 hours, we did the normal roll call and checked all the appliances, inventories and every one of the watch would have done all the checks on their own SDBA sets to make sure that they were in working order. Following the checks, we all sat down and had some food at around 20:30 hours. It was a fairly quiet night and by midnight we had gone to bed. After a little while we got called to be on stand-by at Chiswick Fire Station in case they had an incident on their ground as they had been called out to a job which we later found out to be Grenfell Tower (GT). Before we left to go one of our colleagues FF HUDSON was on a computer on the BOSS system and saw reports about a fire at GT so told us that there was a big incident (fire) going on in London. We left in appliance (G382) and on the appliance were FF Hall, C/M MARKS and FF DUNCAN. When we arrived at Chiswick we couldn't get into the fire station as it was locked and there was no one there, so I had to jump through a window to get us into the fire station. There was lot of traffic on the radios at that time and we heard that our ladder from Heston was going up at GT so there was a bit of confusion on the Mobile Data Terminal (MDT) in our appliance as we were not sure if we were meant to be at GT as well. Normally we would get a call slip from the MDT telling us about the incident we were attending but on this occasion we didn't get one so I'm not sure if the Crew Manager's pager had gone off buthe decided to call up the control room on the radio and was told that we were supposed to be at GT.

We immediately got back into our appliance and made our way to GT. On our way we could hear a lot of radio traffic coming through with regards to the situation at GT and the only information they gave us was the location of the RVP. I remember vividly hearing on the radio that there were flames on the 4th floor, then heard that it was on the 12th floor, then again heard that the flames were now on the 24th floor and at that point I remember thinking that is unheard off so I knew then that it was high rise building and it was going to be horrendous when we got there but as an appliance we were not given any specific

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information about the incident other than the RVP. I was scared for the people in the tower and scared myself because I knew that as a crew we had to go in rescue people and also fight the fire. There were a number of Fire Survival Guidance (FSG) calls coming through over the radio and further updates on how the fire was spreading, so whilst seated in the back of the appliance I could hear all this traffic coming through over the radio so thought oh my god the situation at GT is pretty horrendous. Our RVP was in Bramley Road but due to the amount of appliances there we couldn't park in Bramley Road and I have never seen so many appliances at an incident before. There were gas works so we couldn't get there so we had to do a u turn, worked our way round via Ladbroke Grove and did eventually get to park the appliance in Bramley Road. At one point I think all of the crew in the appliance were using Google maps on their phones to see what was the best route to take to get to Bramley Road, but when we saw the other appliances also trying to get there we got into a convoy and followed each other. While we trying to get there I was sat in the back on the side that GT was and when I saw GT alight I was just dumb founded and couldn't believe what I was seeing, one (1) whole side of the building the North East side was completely alight and from the traffic coming over the radio I wasn't surprised to see it alight and immediately thought how does a building like that go up in flames so quickly. I was bit anxious and worried as I didn't know how we were going to deal with the fire as it was burning from the outside and going into the tower.

I had already heard over the radio about the FSG advice was being given to the residents and I knew then that they were being told to stay in their flats so I thought that potentially we were going to have multiple casualties. The FSG advice and "stay put" policy was implemented following the incident at Lakanal House in Camberwell in 2009. In a high rise building when there is a fire like GT had that night and people are telling the control room operator that they cannot get out due to the fire they would give them advice on how to stay safe and what to do with the emphasis on staying put so that the FF's could come and rescue them. There would also be a dedicated command unit at the scene that would deal with these FSG calls via the control room. The advice that would have been given to a caller in relation to an FSG call would be to get to a window if possible but in this situation it may not have been the right advice cover any doorways to minimise the amount of smoke from coming into the flat and get somewhere safe. In my personal opinion when we arrived at the scene if I was in there I would have been thinking that I needed to get out of the tower I wouldn't have been wanting to stay in there because of the nature of how it was burning from the outside in and not contained in a compartment. It was burning out of the window and may be jumping a couple of floors because that's how it would work in a compartment but because it

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was burning on all sides and it was coming from the outside in as far as I was concerned you were a sitting duck waiting for the inevitable. But the control room had their own procedures for FSG calls they would tell people to stay put, give them advice and reassure them that the FF's are on their way to rescue them which was hopefully what was going to happen but on this occasion I don't think the conditions helped and that wasn't really going to happen but it did for some of them because I know some of them did get out.

So the process of dealing with an FSG call, would be to get as much information as possible flat no, floor no, no of occupants etc. This information would then be passed to the command unit at the scene and then relayed to a crew to try to get to that floor/flat and get those people out. The reasons for the control room operator telling the people to stay put may have been because they have told them that they cannot get out due to the fire. By staying in their flats it also assists the FF's as it enables us to get access to implement water supplies, set up a bridgehead to manage operation's inside the building and it's a policy that is in place as it allows FF's to do their job and rescue people.

From the back of the appliance the scene was horrific as all four (4) sides at some point were going up in flames so my immediate thoughts were off getting into GT and getting people out and trying to save as many lives as possible. The initial call to GT came out at around 00:55 hours and we didn't get called till around 01:45 hours so it was alight for around an hour and at that point I was thinking to myself that if people hadn't got out of the tower by now we were going to have multiple casualties to deal with and a high death rate.

We eventually parked up in Bramley Road by our FRU and waited to see what we were going to be tasked with.C/M MARKS and C/M GRAY from the FRU went off to see what resources were needed so were stood around the appliance for a little while. I could see the building from there it was on fire and there were other members of the public looking out of their flats at the burning tower. They were shouting out things to us as they could see the people in their flats in the tower at their windows as they were at a greater height than us in their own flats. They were asking us to do something and we felt useless as we had to wait there for the C/Ms to return.

He eventually came back and told us to gather our BA sets, First Aid kits and Thermal Imaging Camera. We followed him along Whitchurch Road, along Grenfell Road to get to the BA control holding area 1 outside Kensington Leisure Centre as this was the waiting area for anyone who was coming on duty and

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We were sat in a holding area by the Kensington Leisure Centre for just under an hour or so before we were tasked to go into the tower I remember a briefing being given by a Borough Manager or a DAC (Deputy Assistant Commissioner) about 45 minutes after we arrived. He came over to give us an update of what was going on and he did say at that point there that they were not doing any more FSG calls and were advising people to get out of the tower. He also told us that we were now going to be deployed and we were to go over and above and go outside of policy and do what we can to help. It was unprecedented event as you can all tell so go and do your best. I appreciated his honesty but we all knew that by the time we were tasked to go into the tower, so we knew that we were going to be doing things that we wouldn't normally do.

We were now joined by FF LANG who was with FRU unit (G386), I was crewed with the following officer's C/M MARKS and FF DUNCAN but before we all swapped our SDBA set's for EDBA set's with FF's who had just come out of the tower. The request was for FF's who were trained in EDBA equipment so as we were all trained in EDBA we were tasked to go in. I changed the cylinder on my EDBA set as there were plenty of spare cylinders in the holding area. I checked my EDBA set once I had changed the cylinder and did an A test to make sure that my new cylinder was working correctly. I started off by checking the Automated Distress Signal Unit (ADSU) to ensure that the pre-alarm and full alarm functions worked correctly. I then would have done an air leak test, so I put it into the air leak mode and then turned the cylinder off. I waited for a minute to see if the air had dropped and a symbol appeared to tell me that everything was okay and no air was leaking from the cylinder. I then turned the cylinder back on, put on my mask, turned the cylinder off and shook my head around to make sure that no air was

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leaking and it was working correctly I then had to breathe down to make sure that the alarms system (ADS) was working when I was low on air.

We made our way to the tower and were then held in another holding area 2 by the main BA entry control near the tower for some time. When we eventually went in we had to wait in the lobby area for some time and we were eventually tasked by a black officer who was in charge and told to go to the 10th floor and look for a Bethnal Green crew as they had lost communications with them. So our initial briefing was to try and locate them as they were running low on air as the BA boards in the lobby area were indicating to the officers in charge. We were to make sure that they were all okay as no one had spoken to them and to tell them to go back down. As a caveat to that we were also told that there was a very large casualty on the stairwell so we had to locate them, see if the casualty was still alive and if they were we were to bring them down. The casualty was around the 10th floor which is the floor where the Bethnal Green crew were meant to be so it was kind of a dual briefing. We made our way up and located, confirmed they were the crew from Bethnal Green (F26) firstly and then spoke to them. They told us that they had lost radio communication and subsequently we realised that, we had also lost radio communication around the 10th floor as we were trying to confirm with BA control that we had located them and they were on their way down. We started to look for the casualty and at our brief we told that the casualty had been there for some time hours rather than minutes and initially only two (2) of us had been tasked with dual briefing but when we found out that it was a large casualty we were given a few more FF's. We found the large casualty (I would say they were over 20 stone in weight) there were no visible signs of any burns and I wasn't sure if it was a man or a woman but they were lying face down between the 10th and the 11th floor, head pointing down the stairs and arms flailed out in the front of them. We were told that the person was presumed dead in the briefing but we checked the person over and there were no signs of life so we decided to clear the stairwell as the fatality took up a substantial amount of the stairwell and was causing an obstruction to the FF's and residents who were using the stairwell. So four (4) of us moved the casualty towards the hallway into the lobby area of the 10th floor from the stairwell, it was a struggle and at one point I had my feet up against the wall to assist me. The stairwell was chaotic as there was a lot of FF's going up and coming down. The stairwell was about a meter and a half to two (2) meters wide, so you would go up a flight of stairs, round the corner and up another flight of stairs before you got to a floor. Visibility on the stairwell wasn't good on the lower floors visibility was okay but as we made your way up around the 7th floor it got worse We couldn't really see the floor numbers as the blackness (soot) from the smoke obscured them so we didn't know what floor we were on. But on certain floors we saw

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the numbers so had a rough idea on what floor we were as a crew we were counting the floors ourselves as we went up. The floor numbers were ahead of you on the wall as you came up the stairs and I'm not sure if someone had written the numbers on the wall on the lower floors in a china graph pencil that we as FF's carry on ourselves. We had to make a decision what to do at that point as we still had air but didn't have any radio coms and had completed our dual briefing We had a discussion amongst ourselves and decided that we had enough air to go back down to entry control give them an update and get a further briefing and come back up and that's what we did.

We were then tasked and told to go to the 12th floor to search and rescue. The water went up to the 10th floor I think from my recollection but we were still told to get up to the 12th floor, search and assess the situation but we wouldn't have any fire-fighting equipment with us. We made our way up to the 12th floor, I was right at the front leading the crew but when I got to the lobby area I couldn't see a lot due to the heat and the thick black smoke. I could make out that there was a lift shaft in the lobby area right in front of me as I had seen a lay out of the floor I had seen a map of the floor while I was sat in the holding area 1by Kensington Leisure Centre felt a bit apprehensive but knew that the four (4) of us would look after each other. We started to work our way round the right hand wall to try and find the nearest flat door but ended up in the bin room but eventually worked out what it was. The next door along was a flat 6 (exhibit DAK/3 refers) and I took a step back so I decided to point the tick (Thermal Imaging Camera) in that direction to check to see what the temperature was in that flat. I couldn't tell you what the temperature was in there but it was very hot I tried the door to the flat and it just crumbled, the flat was in flames and had burnt through I had a quick look in and realised that if anyone was still in there they wouldn't be alive due to the flames and the heat. While we were in the lobby area some of the crew shouted out to see if there was anyone on in any of the other flats so we could rescue them but there was no reply. It was now very hot on the 12th floor by now and we decided that we had to get out, as we were getting very low on air so we decided to make our way down to the entry control point. If we had branches we could have stayed for a little while more and fought the fire on the 12th floor. We updated the entry control point as to the conditions on the 12th floor and what we had done. We then turned our EDBA sets off and left the lobby area.

We changed our BA sets and got ready to go again. I remember undoing my tunic for a little while as the conditions were strenuous due to the heat and the amount of trips we had made in the stairwell. We sat down had a rest for a period took on some food, water as we were all flagging and went back to the BA holding area. We were tasked to go in again and I went in with FF LANG, FF HALL and a FF MOORE

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from Bethnal Green. We were given another briefing and told to go to the 10th floor and untangle a load of hoses and try to get them to the upper floor so that the FF's could fight the fire. We got up to the 10th floor and found the branch that we were tasked to find, there was no pressure in the hose and was of no use to any FF. We also found a burst branch that was coming down from one of the floors above and the water was going everywhere it was like a waterfall in there. We decided to untangle the burst branch and get up as far as we could and got up to the 11th floor into the lobby area and FF MOORE who was holding the branch started to fight the fire. As we came onto the 11th floor FF MOORE went to his left into a flat possibly flat 1 (exhibit DAK/3 refers) and started fire-fighting in there but the next flat 2 (exhibit DAK/3 refers) didn't look as if it was damaged that much so I went in there and started to search but it was empty. It seemed fairly untouched, I can't remember the wall area but it seemed fairly intact in there from what I can remember. I do remember going through to the bedrooms and having a look around but there was no smoke damage or any burnt areas in there, compared to some of the rooms on the 12th floor where they were completely burnt out. The other FF's HALL and LANG also started to search the other flats on the 11th floor but none of us found anyone in any of those flats. We managed to put out whatever fire there was on the 11th floor and it looked like the flats didn't suffer much damage so we proceeded to the 12thfloor, by this time I had taken the branch from FF MOORE and turned left and went into the 1st flat, flat 2 (exhibit DAK/3 refers) as I got into the lobby area. There was what I believed to be a burst gas main in one of the rooms and there was blue/green sort of flame firing out where the mains had burst so I was trying to control that and fight the other seats of fire but by this point I was restricted by the length of hose that we had, I kept pulling on the hose but it wouldn't allow me any further. At one point I remember thinking to myself that it was a visible gas pipe, it was running through the height of the building and coming through the flat so we decided to manage the area around it. We decided between us to try and search the other flats on the 12th floor but by now the heat was unbearable and we were getting low on air so we pulled the branch back out and left the branch on the stairwell of the 12th floor but we might have handed it to another crew that had come up but I'm not sure. Before leaving I had a look in flat 5 (exhibit DAK/3 refers) from the front door and it was completely burnt out as well. The outside had completely burnt out the cladding and outside wall had fallen away and you could tell that the floor in that flat was unstable. Everything was charred and burnt but it was ventilated because the windows had been broken and parts of walls had given way and disappeared so the smoke at that point was fairly minimal due to the ventilation I would say. I couldn't explain why this would have happened it may have been down to the wind conditions on the night as the flat on the 12th floor where there was a burst gas main

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was completely gutted. I was annoyed and felt useless because we had the burst branch and not enough of hose, we hadn't accomplished anything and due to the shortage of air in our EDBA sets we had to go back down. We made our way down to the entry control point, debriefed the senior officer who was in charge and told him and the entry control officers on the Bridgehead about the burst gas main on the 12th floor. There was some discussion but I can't recall exactly what they were saying, but I think there was an issue as there may have been two (2) areas of shutting down the gas main and only one (1) had been shut down and not the other.

I don't recall hearing any fire alarms or seeing any sprinklers going off in the tower when I was in there. The dry riser was charged when we arrived at the tower and there was only one (1) route in and out of the tower and that was via the front entrance. I did not suffer any injuries and nor did any of the crew from Heston that were on appliance (G382). From the holding area 1 by Kensington Leisure we were taken along under Grenfell Walk (exhibit DAK/4 refers) to another holding area 2 on the West Side and taken into the tower by the ramp. From the West Side holding area we were escorted into the tower with the help of the police who held riot shields above us to stop the debris that was falling from the tower onto us. It was pretty scary, running around in all that equipment and in our boots but I don't recall anything falling onto us. There were spotters on each side of the tower who would advise us when it was safe to go into the tower.

We then closed down our EDBA sets and I returned them to other crews that were coming on duty but I can't remember what the time was by then but I didn't go back into the tower after that. I did not speak to any residents inside or outside of the tower or during the time that I was at Grenfell. I recall being told to go to Paddington that morning and I remember seeing blue watch from Heston arriving as we were getting ready to leave. The scene outside was still busy, there were crews being held in the BA holding area by Kensington Leisure Centre waiting to be tasked to go into the tower. Other crews were trying to put out little pockets of fire on the ground. An Aerial Ladder Platform (ALP) had arrived I think from Hampshire and was being used. The majority of the fire by now in the tower had been put out but you could still see little pockets of fire in the tower. We gathered all our equipment that we had brought with us from our appliance (G382) walked to our parked appliance in Bramley Road. We left and went to Paddington where I wrote my notes of what I was tasked to do in Grenfell Tower and then went back to Heston Fire Station.

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I would say that there should have been sprinklers in the tower and with the construction of the building there was only access point one way in and out of the tower and there was no fire escape. Better radio communication would have helped but that's been something we have wanted for a long time but other than that it's policy stuff. But that's all going to come out like the FSG calls and my thoughts as were on route as I said earlier I would get out but you can only deal with policy at the time and what you can and cannot see. I guess FSG is a good thing in some circumstances but it's just my personal opinion but I don't think the advice to "stay put" was good advice.

Following on from the incident a lot of the emphasis has been on counselling and we went to Wembley and had a discussion but I would say that I wasn't to affected by the incident and didn't feel the need to discuss the matter or see a counsellor as I had no issues It was just a surreal situation and even talking to you guys about it now it doesn't seem like it happened.

When we were tasked to go into the tower we knew that we were going to be doing things that we wouldn't normally do. Every Fire Fighter that attended the tower that night went above and beyond with some of the tasks they were given. I know one of our colleagues from Heston FF WILLIAMS and another FF from Chiswick as FF WILLIAMS was on standby at Chiswick. They were one of the first FF's to arrive and went all the way up to the top floor and managed to rescue two (2) people or a family. I think they got the children out and the one that FF WILLIAMS brought down survived but I don't think the other one did and I think the parents made a decision to stay put where they were. From a personal opinion I think Vince did a sterling job and I can imagine quite few other FF's did the same.

Normal procedure in a high rise building fire would be to set up a bridgehead two (2) floors below the seat of the fire and on the floor below you would connect a branch and take that in with you to fight the fire. On the floor of the fire you would then connect another branch to protect yourself so that would be the basic set up You would have a BA control board two (2) floors below with all the 1st aid equipment set up and the crew would then go up to the floor of the fire and connect into the dry riser and fight the fire. I would imagine that's what they were trying to do when the crews first got there, but because they thought that they were only dealing with a fridge fire on one of the floors and as far as they were concerned they felt that they had dealt with the matter but I spread to the outside and that's when all the problems started.

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Things we did as a crew outside of policy were radio communication, so if you lost your coms and contact with the BA entry board you are supposed to exit the building but crews we didn't do that. I didn't have any coms with the BA board because I didn't have a coms set so I didn't have a radio on me. Normally there are two (2) radios per appliance so there would be two (2) BA sets with a radio but I didn't have one. If you were in a crew someone would always be a designated crew member with coms. On both occasions when I went into the tower I was with a crew of four (4) and on both occasions I didn't have any coms and I didn't know who was in charge of the coms. On our second ware we went up to the 12th floor without any water so we were essentially going beyond the fire and with everything that was going on in the tower we had nothing to deal with it. As we were tasked to do a job we just got on with it and we tried to do what we could with what we had at the time We were also tasked to go and use a branch on the 10th floor that had no pressure and that was the branch we were told to use to fight the fire. But we were also told that there was a burst branch up there so we made a decision as a crew to do something as we were there and used the burst branch to fight the fire on the 12th floor. Policy states that we shouldn't do these things such as coms, use burst branches and if all failed we were in a fire compartment with no water. But because everything had burnt away within most of the flats the compartments were so ventilated.

A bridgehead is an area that is set up two (2) floors below the fire you would have a designated person that would take crews up to the fire We now have a high rise bag that contains everything (hoses dividing breaches for plugging hoses into dry risers, a branch, hose bandages etc.). On the 14th June we didn't have a bag so we had to carry all the equipment with us into the tower. On the night of the 14th June the situation was changing all the time, it was a dynamic situation and I know that the Bridgehead was moved on a couple of occasions to different floors. When I entered the tower the Bridgehead was on the ground floor at the bottom of the stairs but when I went in the second time it had moved but I couldn't tell you what floor it had moved to.

The BA sets are like Wi-Fi system, you've got your BA tally, so when you plug that into the board, that will transfer the information onto your body guard which forms part of your BA set and this in turn tells you how much air you have and how much time you've got left. Before going in I will show this to the entry control officer and they would check my name and the amount of air I have in my BA set, they would then tally that up and do a manual calculation. The tally gets plugged into the board by the BA entry control officer and it will do its own calculation and tell you the amount of time you have on any given job. I don't believe that this system was working on the 14th June so we had to check our sets

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manually, so as a crew we would check them regularly to see if we were within the limits. The BA sets also have a number of safety aspects and one of them is a thing called an ADS (Automated Distress Signal) so if a FF doesn't move for 30 seconds it will trigger the ADS and a warning sound will go off the FF then has to shake the ADS to stop the warning sound getting louder and the only way to silence it is by putting the body guard tally back in to silence the ADS alert. You then press a manual button on the body guard and it sounds so this silences it.

With regards to the large casualty that was found to be dead LFB policy states that you should leave them in situ for Coroners Court but due to the obstruction being caused in the stairwell by the body we had to move the body to an area where access to the tower wasn't being hampered. If we had to bring the body down it would have been a struggle for the four (4) of us due to the size of the casualty and we would have had to have a change of crew half way down as the crew could have sustained an injury due to the width of the stairwell.

I know a little bit about cladding a sandwich panel type thing with insulation but I didn't know about the particular cladding that they had on that building. In training we are not taught anything about cladding, when I am talking about sandwich panels you get big composite roof sheets which have insulation in them and they could cause us a problem or burns through or whatever you basically got two (2) sheets of metal and if that inside layer burns away then you've got two (2) heated bits of metal that are just going to collapse. I understand that some of the cladding would have been of that kind of nature but I couldn't tell you anymore.

Signature: 2018

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