Page 1 of 19

WITNESS STATEMENT

Criminal Procedure Rules, r27.2; Criminal Justice Act 1967, s.9; Magistrates' Courts Act 1980, s.5b	
Statement of: PEGRAM, DANIEL	
Age if under 18: (if over 18 insert 'over 18')	Occupation: FIRE OFFICER
This statement (consisting of 17 page(s) each signed by me) is true to the best of my knowledge and belief and I make it knowing that, if it is tendered in evidence, I shall be liable to prosecution if I have wilfully stated in it anything which I know to be false, or do not believe to be true.	
Signature: DANIEL PEGRAM	Date: 28/12/2017
Tick if witness evidence is visually recorded	(supply witness details on rear)

My name is Daniel PEGRAM and I am a Fire Fighter (FF) based at Heston fire station G38.

On Tuesday 5th December I was audio interviewed and it was conducted by DC ROBERTS and PC HARRIS. I give this statement voluntarily and it is an account of my involvement as a search and rescue officer at Grenfell Tower on Wednesday 14th June 2017.

The people I shall mention in this statement are my crew members, Crew Manager (CM) GRAY, Fire Fighter (FF) HISCOCK, Fire Fighter (FF) HUDSON and Fire Fighter (FF) HOLEHOUSE. Station Manager Pat GOLDBOURN who gave the briefing at entry control.

In this statement I will mention the M4 which was my last deployment before attending the Grenfell Tower. The external face of Grenfell Tower on our approach to the scene and our arrival on scene. I will mention the lobby area inside the tower and the staircase on route from the lobby up to 11th floor. I will mention the flats and lobby area I attended on 9th, 10th floors and the lobby area of 11th floor and finally the resting area.

On Tuesday 13th June 2017, I started my shift at 8 o'clock in the evening carried out our checks, tested our sets and completed other standard routines. At the beginning of every shift, an officer is named the nominated officer and on this shift FF HUDSON was the nominated officer for the shift. His responsibility is to answer the phone, log where everyone is on duty.

Signature: DANIEL PEGRAM Signature witnessed by:

2018





Page 2 of 19

At approximately 9pm there was a shout regarding a Road Traffic Accident on the M4 for us to attend to. FF HUDSON acknowledged the shout from the tele-printer, printed the call sheet with the address and handed it out to the driver and our appliance G386 left to attend the shout.

My crew on that shift were Crew Manager (CM) GRAY, Fire Fighter (FF) HISCOCK, Fire Fighter (FF) HUDSON and Fire Fighter (FF) HOLEHOUSE. Our years of experience range between 7 and 20 years as fire fighters. We have worked together for two or three years and some of them longer.

This call lasted for about 30 or 40 minutes and it was to remove someone from an HGV who was trapped with spinal injuries, once released he was taken away in the ambulance. Our crew returned back to the station, I had dinner and watched TV and went to bed about midnight.

At approximately 1 am, we were first woken up by G382 a pump being sent as standby at Chiswick fire station because there was a 20 pump fire going on. They mobilised at about 1:30, I stayed in bed and tried to get back to sleep but at approximately 2 am we were woken up and we were told that the pump requests were rising.

I knew we were going to be called at some point to attend because the pump requests were just going up and up. My thoughts at that point was this is something big, whatever it was it is very serious for needing so much personnel and resources. I would not have liked to have missed it, the adrenaline was pumping, and this was what I signed up to do.

Shortly after, we were told that we were attending and I got dressed in my fire gear which was boots worn to shin high, tunic and leggings, smoke hoods, breathing apparatus (BA) and helmet. I went down the pole and met the crew in the appliance bay and they told us that we were going to make FRU 10. We mobilised at approximately 2:20 am and at that point the ladder request had gone to 40 pumps. I sat on next to the window behind the driver.

At that point we did not have much detail but we knew the building was alight, there was big indication that it was massive because of the amount of resources being requested. We knew it was exterior fire spread and this was known through information on the radio but no further information was known at that time. We did not know at that time how it was spreading or how it was, until we got on the ground I have driven past the Grenfell Tower on my way in to London before and I am aware that the tower is big. I have never been to Grenfell Tower or had any familiarisation visit to the tower or been on the ground. I am familiar with the tower blocks on our ground but nothing as big as Grenfell Tower.

Signature: 2018

DANIEL PEGRAM





Page 3 of 19

The driver and the crew manage at the front normally plans the route and we will have a map at the back but on this occasion we did not use this. We had a member of our crew who knew the area, and once we got to Ladbroke Grove we just followed the convoy

On leaving the our station we turned left onto Syon Lane then right onto the A4 which then merge and becomes the M4, proceeded to Hammersmith flyover, come off the M4 and followed it past Hammersmith fire station, coming up to Sheppard bush Green we followed the road round then crossed over at White City Train station on the left before the roundabout and that is when I first saw the smoke, there was smoke in the area being late at night.

The visibility was still good as we glimpse it down almost towards the A40, and it was then I just saw the smoke and starts to smell it and then I didn't see it again until we got round the corner approaching Grenfell Road.

We then went along Holland Park Road, and our initial route was meant to gain entry onto St Anns Road, there was a road closure, the closure was at the top of the road from what I can remember.

The road condition is what you will expect at that time of the night, the road and traffic was clear and we made good progress until we got to the road closed, I believe there was gas works going on, so we took a detour round. The road from Shepard Bush Green to Grenfell Tower was clear but there were lots of appliances coming and we fell into a convoy.

We turned round and went down Ladbroke Grove, met up some other appliances and went into Lancaster Road. Other than the road works at St Anns we did not experience any other obstruction on our way to the tower. The journey from Heston to Grenfell Tower was approximately 20 minutes.

The first time I saw the tower on fire was at Lancaster Road, it was spotted through the buildings and from what I could see it was like the whole building was alight and I realised the severity of it. From looking at the exterior you could tell that the fire was spreading and at a rate much quicker than it should have done. The building was well alight and I knew we were going to struggle to get up to the tower. I turned to my colleagues and we all had the same thought that there will be no access to the top floors. From 4 floors up to the top flames rolling off of it and looking from the direction our pump was facing the whole building seemed to be alight the two exterior sides we saw all the way up. However, we knew people were still alive in it because there were FSG calls and it hit home. We heard on the radio that there was a family trapped on the 20th and 21st floors and Fire Survival was being implemented for this. Fire survival guidance is if someone is trapped in a building they will dial 999 and they will be asked if they can get out of that building and what the situation is if they say I can't get out because of smoke and

Signature: DANIEL PEGRAM

2018



Page 4 of 19

there is fire or flames, control keeps that line open giving the caller contact with someone on the outside. That information is then passed onto the command unit which is a machine that turns up and takes control of the incident, it has computers and the resources to deal with the FSG calls. The information will include the location, floor number, how many people are trapped and why are trapped, this information is passed to that command unit. The command unit then dish that information out the FF.

The information is passed to the command unit by our main stream radio. The command unit then pass it on to the incident commander. I cannot tell the name of the incident commander on that night. When we arrived we parked up on Bramley Road. On our appliance we carry line gear for abseiling, RTA gears, cutters, props, BA, winches, dry suits for getting into water. I produce the map as my exhibit DP/01. Our pump do not carry hose because we are not front line firefighting appliance. I believed we were called on for the extended duration cylinder because our sets last 45 mins

When I got out of the truck, I put my set on my back once we arrived, I was already rigged in my full gear, I carried a spare cylinder in one hand and I carry a TIC in the other. I had my personal radio, glove attached to my tunic and I had a personal issue torch. Our crew manager left us to go the command unit while we waited by the appliance. The command unit is like a box lorry, a portable office and they dish out the information on what is needed to be done.

There were lots of people shouting saying there were people up there and we need to do something but we had to wait to be instructed by our CM. After 3-4 minutes the CM came back and told us we need our cylinders, EDBA sets, TIC and first aid packs, and said we were going to the base of the tower to main entry control.

It was carnage on the streets, there were lots of people out, people shouting that people were trapped but our brief was to go to BA control so we had to ignore all that really. We stuck together as we knew we would be going up together.

We made our way on foot towards Grenfell Walk towards the entrance to BM main control, I think I may have looked at the tower once and saw it was well alight. I didn't want to look at it too much because there were people screaming at the windows and I kept my head down. I did not see any fatality on our way to the tower. From the time I first saw the tower it was about floor 4 to 6 that was alight all the way to the top, on looking at that angle I assumed that it was all the way round the building. I produce the map on route on foot as my exhibit DP/02

However, as we approached the tower on foot, the other two faces of the tower were not fully alight; the fire was maybe from the 12/13th floor upwards. I saw two ALP a branch set up to tackle the lower floors

Signature: 2018

DANIEL PEGRAM

DITTILL





Page 5 of 19

but the reach was limited. We got there and were told to standby mode which is face mask around our necks, full rig, and cylinder open and ready to go.

We were then moved to the tower and we moved into the building. We did not go into the lobby entrance we proceeded past the main entrance under riot shields and gained entrance through what I believed were windows which had been forced (floor to ceiling windows) went through the offices and then into the lobby. it was tight and our EDBA sets were larger, CM GRAY asked someone to cut the window next to it, so it makes it bigger entry and also escape if we need to get out.

We were then told to standby and that we will be going up shortly. We were deployed pretty quickly to the tower as they need EDBA wearer and it took us approximately 15/20 to get to the tower from the point of parking our vehicle.

On entry into the lobby there were lots of FF around, lots of people around all busy, lots of kits including axes, sledge hammer, FF gloves, torches, breaking in gears, first aid packs, about a foot of water on the floor which I believed was from flooding from the top and casualties coming out some in worse state that others being escorted by FF making their way out of the tower coming down and collecting their tallies. Whilst waiting I did not see anyone I knew, I did recognise faces of fire fighters but I did not talk to anyone else other that my crew. We then moved to entry control we were then briefed I believed by SM Pat GOLDBOURN.

By the time we were committed into the tower the bridge head was at the base of the tower in the lobby ground floor. Same word for entry control. The bridgehead will normally be set up two floors below the fire floor but because the fire was flowing down then they moved the bridge head to the ground floor. That was our last safe point we can be committed from.

We have our entry control board and the procedure is we hand in our tally, which has our names, how much air we have and that is how they determine our minutes, the telemetry board talks to our set so we know how much air we are using and what time. The tally is a yellow strip, it has your name and set number and the air pressure and the time you enter into the building

The instruction of what we were to do came from entry control, I believe SM GOLDBOURN. Our crew manager was in charge of our crew but we were all listening in to the instruction being given to us and ensure, when we go to a job it is not put on one person to listen to what we have to do. We make sure we understood what we were doing and where we were going and what we need.

The briefing was given face to face and our brief was to go the 9th floor for search and rescue. We were told not to take water, because there wasn't any jets, firefighting branches for us to take but we were told

Signature: 2018

DANIEL PEGRAM





Page 6 of 19

there will be SDBA crews on the way up, they will protect our egress and our in and out of the building because we need a safe way in and out and in that instant it was the stairwell which could not be compromise. If the stairwell is compromised it become involved in the fire, their job was to hold the fire back

I believe this was maybe because they were over running the dry riser and there wasn't water left for us to take. Dry riser is a pipe that runs up from the ground to the top of the tower, it has outlets on each floor, we could plug into, we then connect a hydrant to our appliance and we run lengths of hose and charge it to the riser which then fills the hose with water on each floor

I believe the pressure was low, I didn't try or use them because it was not in our brief but we were told there were people up there firefighting. I knew it was in use because it was charged on arrival at the tower and the amount of water coming down the stairs.

Our policy normally in high rise is we take water with us, take a branch up, in this case they were fighting against everything, where a fire is around you would have taken a branch with you to deal with it Policy is for the initial attack, you can send search crews in but this situation is not every day of the week with fire around you and it is spreading like it did you would have had something with you for protection, a fire fighting media

An officer, I think Station Manager Pat GOLDBOURN at entry control said we were told that we were out of policy, we are pushing up through the tower, we are pushing up the tower we are acting out of policy pushing the boundaries and don't know what he meant but I take it that we were taking a bit of extra risk. This decision may have come from the incident commander who would have pushed for them sending crews up without water to search.

Though we were told that we were working outside policy, I was always mindful about mine and my colleague's safety that kept me on my toes it kept me doing the right thing, also when you are with your crew, looking out for each other. Our focus remained that we have a job to be done and it is down to us to do it safely as possible. We used each other to push ourselves and fall back on training and our experience to push forwards

I was asked about the Stay put policy and if I had any involved of idea it being in place, I believed that the stay put policy was in place but I did not have any involvement relating to it.

My understanding of the stay put policy is that someone is not directly affected by the fire and they can't get out they should stay where they are to save congesting the stairwell, opening the doors and increasing the fire spread, the policy is to stay where you are in any other situation flat fire like that would not have

Signature: 2018

DANIEL PEGRAM



Page 7 of 19

spread to the rest of the tower block that quickly. Hence why they were enforcing but again that was control's decision. We dealt with the aftermath of getting these people collected

Officially I was not informed but I heard it on the radio, and I am aware of stay put policy from the past and know what the procedure is and I knew it was implemented from just people on the ground you were told during your brief or radio traffic. It was when I was back at the station that I heard that the stay put policy was withdrawn but I do not know who made the call and the time it was done

It is standard procedure for us to be paired up in two but when they told us what our task was and we were told to clear a whole floor we said we were going to stick together. As they were committing us, they wanted a crew of 4 EDBA but CM GRAY informed entry control that we had 5 all EDBA wearers and we were not splitting, we know each other and work well together we can look out for each other and we were not going to leave one person to go with someone else. CM GRAY had a quick chat at the bottom of the tower before we got in, saying just keep it cool stick together, look after each other and we got on with it.

I remember seeing mixed race gentleman, same age as me when he opened his eyes and realised he was in the lobby, sat back and prayed and you can see the relief on his face that he was out, and has like froze on the stairwell and he was quickly moved by FF coming down. Couple of young children carried out but completely unconscious, nothing there, they looked limp. We were pre-occupied among ourselves thinking about what we were going to do, not letting the emotion get hold of you.

We carried out our coms check with entry control and we took two enforcers with us and a TIC up to the 9th floor. We started up like normal, follow normal procedure, and check for leaks on our EDBA. On our way from the lobby up to the tower, I was in the middle. CM GRAY was leading at the front, I cannot remember the order but I knew FF HOLEHOUSE was behind me and maybe FF HUDSON in front. With the mask and helmet on you cannot see faces or smell anything. I did not see or know of any problems relating to the gas supply in the building, the gas is not for us to deal, it will be for gas board to isolate it and I am not aware of any instruction given in relation to gas. There were no communication relating to gas that I am aware of. We made our way through the first couple of floors through the lobby area to the actual stairwell, from walking up the first three or four floors there was fire fighter kit everywhere, breaking in gear, stuffs just all over the stairs.

From the lobby we made our way to the mezzanine floor, there was light, visibility was relatively good you can see very well, floors 3 up to the 5th floor there was nothing to account and you can see about a meter in front but this changed from the 6th floor upwards with no visibility, you cannot see your hand in

Signature: 2018

DANIEL PEGRAM



Page 8 of 19

front of your face. There was no smell as we were breathing through the tank and there was no fire at all on the stairs. At that point it starts to hit home, your breathing start to labour so we slowed it down a bit and that's when we had a 10 seconds breather at about floor 4/5 to compose ourselves. As a crew we counted it off and we stuck with it so we knew where we were and I think I glimpsed it about floor 8th, as I saw an 8 on the wall as it has been written on by a FF.

As we stood I cannot see anything, it was darkness, cannot take anything in because our aim was to get to the 9th. The conversation between FF HOLEHOUSE was for us to have a breather we were nearer the back and the gap was getting slightly larger and we knew that the others were pushing up, but we couldn't. It felt our heart was outside our chest and we were struggling. I had an enforcer which is approximately 14/15 kg over my shoulder making it harder to keep up. As a crew we had two enforcers between us which were picked up at the lobby on our way up.

We communicated with each other by shouting out loud, which is not great because of the BA set but we make it up. Somewhere from floor 7/8 definitely before the 9thfloor I remember seeing a casualty. The visibility on the staircase was very bad, I was guided by the hand rails going up and walking up right. The hand rails were cool to touch through my hand gloves. I was able to see the casualty because as I was midway up to the stairs looking ahead and caught sight of the casualty on the landing because the smoke density is lighter towards the ground level.

The casualty was on the landing in between the stairs going up, she was lying face down, chest on the floor, apparently dead there was no signs of life, I was maybe 4 or 5 steps down when I first saw her. By that point the crew had already passed her and I was aware there were casualties on the way up. My first reaction was to be careful not to walk over her my reaction was to move on.

I remember that on our brief we were told that there were fatalities along the stairs so I was not surprised. I believed it to be the photographer, the artist that passed away the black lady she was on the stairs face down, we knew she was not alive, we can tell we have been briefed, so I assumed a crew would have been up to check on her.

The casualty was located as the stairwell split, she was lying face down. I produce a drawing showing the positions of the casualty as my exhibit DP/05. We just carried up to the 9th because we were told people were alive there. I had not heard anything from the radio for a while and I can only assume that we were by the stairwell the coms were not working

On arrival at the 9th floor, I was three or four backwards so I am unable to tell if the door was opened or closed on arrival, if it was closed it would have been opened by CM GRAY who was in the front but I

Signature: 2018

DANIEL PEGRAM





Page 9 of 19

don't believe the door was shut. I didn't take notice of the door and cannot give any description or its status on arrival. The whole lobby was filled with smoke.

No one was holding the door to keep it open for me so I presumed it was wedged opened by a hose perhaps, but I can't remember. I knew I just walk straight into the lobby, located the door frame and walked in using the left hand wall. I knew if we stuck to the wall we will find the flats. On our brief we were told there were 6 or 8 flats per floor so we carried on from the door frame until we found the first door. We were crouched lower, maybe hunched over but not standing in upright position but not crawling which is a natural position we assumed in a situation like this.

On entry into the lobby it was smoke logged and the visibility was very bad, as we are trained we stick to the wall. We stuck to the left hand wall as briefed, we all knew where the wall was, placed my left hand on it and moved in a line in a single file so we know where everyone is. If you need to get out you turn right on the wall to find your way out. There was smoke particles on the wall as I can see the swiping hand motion of when people have been holding onto the wall, hand prints and scuff marks.

The brief from entry control was to search every flat on the 9th floor there was no direction to search a particular flat. I now produce a drawing of the locations of flats search as my exhibit DP/06. I cannot tell the flat numbers and for the purpose of this statement I will refer to the flat as 'Flat A'.

We found the door and our procedure is to locate the hinges and the handle, and the door either opens towards you or away from you. My colleagues at the front found that the door opens away from you. We checked the door for heat with the back of our hands, checked the handle to know what angle the door opens, the door felt cold to touch so we use the enforcer and break the door down. The door procedure is to check up the crews around you, check its temperature and check the way it goes, you want to keep that door intact. You locate the hinges and the handle and by the door trim you know which way it will open. Once checked the door was forced and open easily as there was a single lock and that was the unoccupied flat with no furniture. I can only describe the door as a standard wooden door, I was still about fourth in the line so the door was already opened when I walked through. I believed that door was forced open by CM GRAY using the enforcer. The visibility inside the flat was quite good and I could see the other side of the room. You can see the living room, no furniture, no carpet it was just a shell. No fire damage, just an uninhabited flat. Comparing the smoke outside the lobby and the fact that this flat is completely smoke free, I can only say that the seal around the fire door kept the smoke at bay.

We searched the bedroom, bathroom and living room. We all systematically searched together, I looked in the living room and the cupboard and I could not tell what the others had done. Though the room was

Signature: 2018

DANIEL PEGRAM



Page 10 of 19

light, we still stuck to the left had hand wall position in moving around, at one point I crossed over to the other wall, still maintaining visual with my colleague I was with and it was to look inside the alcove. As you walk into the flat and you are in the living room, looking directly across there was the window which I believed was facing the leisure centre, there was a small alcove to the left of the window, the bedroom and bathrooms were off from the left hand wall.

I can only see one window, I assumed there will be one in the bedroom as well but I did not go into the bedroom. Looking through the window I could see the start of day light but I cannot see any fire or smoke. There was a wisp of smoke inside the flat which I believed was from inside the building rather than from outside in. the windows were intact.

Having determined there was nobody there, we left 'Flat A' to search the next flat.

From leaving the front door of 'Flat A' it took us about 10 seconds to get to the next flat, which I will refer to as 'Flat B'.

Flat B again checked the handle and the location of the hinges, checked for the heat. I hit the door with the enforcer and it gave way on the first hit, so I believed this was a wooden door. The crew behind me went in and I followed.

We gave it a proper search with Thermal Imaging Camera (TIC) as part of our searching procedure and we found no one, no casualty. The only visibility in this flat was by the windows as we were getting a bit of light from outside. I searched the living room and bedroom and the other crew members search the rest of the house. This flat was packed full, I went through the corridor to the back of the flat and search the bedroom. The other crew members did systematic search of the rest of the flat.

During the search I did not move anything, not sure if the other did, but it would have been apparent if someone was inside the flat, no one was in the flat. We were in the flat for maybe one minute or two. Looking through the window was clear though the flat was smoky. The window was intact and the building was not alight outside from that flat. I assumed it was smoked logged from inside of the building rather than from the outside in.

The temperature inside the flat was cool, when compared to our experience higher up it was warm but nowhere near what we experience on the higher floors. I was quite comfortable being inside the flat. When comparing the fire that was raging outside the building against the feel of the temperature inside that flats on this floor. I would assumed that when you look at the building the fire damage appeared to come down in a V shape and I assumed that I was in one of those flats not affected or touched by fire outside.

Signature: 2018

DANIEL PEGRAM



Page 11 of 19

As we came out of 'Flat B' along the same line following the left hand along the wall on a straight line, this flat was in the corner of the tower, and I will refer to it as 'Flat C'. Upon leaving this flat I lost sight of the rest of the crew for a couple of seconds, but made my way back out on the left wall, we then moved out into the corridor and carried on the left hand wall. Caught another door handle, by this point I knew were overlooking the part of the park at the back, sector 2.

There was another flat opposite which the rest of my crew bunny hopped to search as FF HOLEHOUSE and I tried to get into flat C, instead of waiting for us to force the door open. Meanwhile the others have moved on to search the next flat to speed up our productivity. By that point I did not hear anything from my corns but CM GRAY had intercepted a message from entry control telling us there were fire survivals on the 11th floor and we have been redeployed there.

We made a hole in the door which was approximately down at 7/8 o'clock to the handle probably no more than 30 cm. I glimpse through it. From what I can see it was clear but I cannot see anyone or anything. I was looking through into the corridor. I glimpse in as we were turning to leave. This door was difficult to break into as I believed it was a new PVC door compared to the wooden doors on the other flats. I was focused on getting the door open and with the smoke in the lobby area I cannot give any description or colour of the door.

They others were able to get into the 'Flat D'. Of all the flats I was able to get into I cannot give any detail description of the windows, nothing grab my attention about the windows, all I could remember was seeing outside, I did not even go close to look out or orientate myself with that.

As mentioned I did not hear anything from my corns but CM GRAY had intercepted a message from entry control telling us there were fire survivals on the 11th floor and we have been redeployed there. He was told numbers and what I think what he said afterwards was that the message was broken up what he was getting but he knew that it was 11th floor.

CM GRAY was given three flat numbers but did not have time to relay that detail to every single person on the crew. I was not aware of how many casualties or their flat numbers. All I need to know was that we were going to the 11th floor. FGS calls meant that there is someone at the end of the phone and there is possibility that someone might have been at the end of the phone in one of those flats. There is so much information that we need to know as fire fighters if we get to a flat and we know there are four people, we will have to take all four out.

Once we got up there and realised we cannot get in because it was so hot, I believed CM GRAY would have passed that message onto entry control that we were unable to get into the flats. If he had signal and

Signature: 2018

DANIEL PEGRAM





Page 12 of 19

connection to talk to them. The coms in the building was bad we started experiencing problems with our radio when we were about 4th floor up in the stairwell. We could only pick up signal in a flat and hear a bit of chatter and I would assumed that when the signal is going up and round the building rather than from inside the building. I believed that CM GRAY was able to pick up signal and get the message for us to go the 11th floor when he was in 'Flat D' on the 9th floor. He came out of 'Flat D' and told us, so I will assumed he got a signal up whilst near the window. However, the details of the number of people in the flats and the flat numbers were not given to me. There is so much information that we need to know as fire fighter.

I believed that the instruction to go to floor 11 was given to CM GRAY by entry control, they have a radio that they use to talk to us to give instructions.

The chain of command would have happened downstairs, that message got to the base of the tower and they then told us at the top. This would have been communicated by our corns set. I had one but I didn't hear the call and again I assumed that was due to the side of the building I was.

Entry control would have said call sign Heston FRU you have been re-tasked to the llth floor, I believe Paul was told three flats numbers but this was not relayed to me. He did not need to all we need to know was that we had to get to the 11th.

From the 9th to the 10th stairwell, the visibility was getting progressively worse and it was getting hotter, you can feel the rise in heat between 9th 10th and 11th floor. The heat was coming all around as I could feel it at the back of my neck through the smoke hood. This forces me to get lower. So I kept lower down, not crawling but keeping our heads down and not standing upright.

We kept low were the visibility was a bit better, we went past the 10th and proceeded to the 11th lobby. Though all the top stairwells were smoked logged there was no open flames and no sprinklers. Between 10th and 11th floor there was a casualty, I am unsure if I am confusing the two, that the one I mentioned earlier. I now produce drawing showing the location of the casualty as my exhibits DP/03 and DP/04. But I am pretty certain there were two but I cannot say definitely. This casualty was large on the half landing in between the stairwells, facing down towards the 10th. I think the casualty was wearing a New Era or New Balance trainers, that's the only thing I can remember. I cannot tell if the casualty was male or female or any other description.

We did not go into the 10th floor lobby but headed straight through to the 11th floor as tasked and it took about a minute. On arrival at the 11th floor I was at the back of the line of our crew maybe fourth and I literately only got to the door of the stairwell to the lobby whilst the others were a bit further on closer to

Signature: DANIEL PEGRAM

2018





Page 13 of 19

the door on the 11th floor the door frame was on my left and I was tucked up against it and I was on my knees and I was sitting back on my heels in the doorway. From the 10th to the 11th floor, the journey took about a minute, we were going up pretty quick but by that time we were fatiguing and getting really tired, and the moment the heat hits you it gets worse. It take out of you 10 fold it really knock you out and we cannot continue on that floor. The doorway into the lobby was already opened, the other crews were ahead of me, I had three in front and one behind and at that point I felt the intense heat. We were crouching down very low, sitting on our heels. Felt the heat rising at the back of my neck and the crew inside realised that at that point as well.

The others were at the door way of the first flat on the left hand wall. I did not get further into the lobby. In the meantime, CM GRAY had found the first door we were briefed to go to and it was too hot, was at the front door and describe it as extremely hot and we knew we were not to be able to get in there and I knew it was not safe for us to be on that floor.

TIC was used to assess the heat. The TIC has a handle with a screen, about 4 inches across and it will show you a detail view of the room, it will pick up heat sources and there is function to select the hottest point of that

room. As it is moved around a red marker will indicate what the temperature is in that room and the location of hot spot in that room. It is also used in the event of smoke fill area, it will pick up the body heat of that casualty.

Footages are recorded on a rolling loop for 6 or 8 hours and then it will overlap and the fire investigation will download it if need be.

We had one possibly two TICS between us, which were picked up from the lobby, I know from talking to CM GRAY that he had one at one point, but it may have been passed around, I did not use one, The visibility was zero, we could not see anything.

I was thinking this is hot and we don't want to be out there without any water, without a jet or without any way to put out a fire, there was no point being up there. The risk outweighs the benefit of trying to push further to get into the flats without any water. From being there and starting to put doors in we would have just escalated it, it would have got hotter and hotter and we would not have had a way to deal with it and we will end up being trapped and could not get out. The flat they found was so hot that if anyone was in there they would not be alive.

CM GRAY's intention was to use the TIC to know what the temperature was but he could not make out the screen so it could be a number of reasons. It went white, the temperature on that door would have

Signature: 2018

DANIEL PEGRAM



Page 14 of 19

been intense. With the TIC not giving a guide of the temperature, he felt the heat from the door through the gloves. The Thermal imaging camera (TIC) give us the reading for the highest temperature in that area but it appears that it went that hot that you could not see any reading on it.

The TIC will not see through a door it will only look outwards and what is in front it. He would have held it towards the door and the temperature on the door just sent the reading off the screen and you cannot gauge anything off of it. That part of the visor being misted, low visibility and when tuned in it was just useless. The TIC was not broken, it was because of the environment it was in, it didn't want to work or we could not read the screen because the visor was covered in mist and steam and the visibility was that low. It either did not do what it was meant to do or it was unreadable and I did not have it in my hand but can only give my view depending on the circumstance we were in.

Without a TIC our training is to assess the temperature with the back of the hand and feel the door, if the door is that hot and you feel it through the gloves then you can't go into that apartment because it's too hot and in this instance especially when we do not have water. The risk of breaking the door outweigh the benefit of us getting into that flat, bec e anyone in that flat would have been far too hot for them to have survived and for us to go in there without any water we can't do anything anyway. If we had water, we may well have tried but again the situation would have deemed that at the time and what we would have felt and what we would have done.

By this point our masks had steamed up as well, CM GRAY touched the door through his fire glove and he just described it as extremely hot, at that moment we knew we could not break into that flat. The people in front did not hear any sound from inside the flats, but again by the time you have all the crew breathing you don't hear a lot. If we break into that flat with no water we would have done more harm than good, so we made a decision as a crew to go down to the 10th and continue with the searching as we thought while we are here we might as well go and search the 10th.

Mentally I was still adamant we were still going to do some good, I was still keen to carry on hence why we then said lets search the 10th floor. And that's when we came down and it became our brief for the next one.

The information that we did not rescue or was able to go to any of the flats on the 11th floor I believed was passed on by CM GRAY but whether it was received due to the radio difficulty I am not sure.

Nonetheless the message was handed over as part of our debrief with entry control.

We walked past the casualty and made our way down to the landing of the 10th. I did not check for pulse because we were told that there were casualty on the way up, so from our brief we expected to find people

Signature: 2018

DANIEL PEGRAM





Page 15 of 19

on the stairwell, we were told that there maybe two or three and we just assumed it was them. Routinely to check for signs of life we check the rise and fall of the chest or the back pending on where the casualty is facing, we will take our gloves off and check for pulse.

On the 10th we got into the lobby and visibility was zero, completely smoked logged and me and FF HUDSON and FF HOLEHOUSE were now at the front of the crew and it may have been him or myself through the door into the lobby of the 10th floor. The door into the lobby was propped opened. The visibility again was still shocking you cannot see a thing but through it all we heard screaming call for help. By this time we had a feel of how the lobby were and made it easier for us to move around. As I walked through into the lobby, We heard a faint screaming 'HELP' and we replied, 'FIRE BRIDGADE' we made our way along the corridor to where it was coming from and I could see the downside of the door a strip of light as the door was slightly ajar and I knew the noise was coming from there, and we made our way towards the screaming and upon opening the door we found 3 elderly Asian ladies, maybe Thai origin and a middle age gentleman maybe in his 40s. The ladies might be in their 60s and they had mobility issue.

As I went into the flat the visibility in the flat was quite good, they were stood on the right hand of the corridor against the wall behind the door, and the three ladies were first and then the gentleman. The demeanour of the three ladies was that of relief, they were still shaken with signs of shock because they were deep breathing, looked worried and scared. I walked past them to search the flat, confirmed with them that there were only four people in the flat, the other crew members pulled them Out of the flat on to the stairwell landing and that's when the man was told to just go down and he went down unaided, whilst the other three needed assistance.

We would have considered to check the other flats but because we had four causalities and they were not able bodied we had to take them out. We thought about splitting into to two teams for some to take the casualties down but we determined pretty quick they were going to need help and assistance to get down the stairs. And we did not want to send 2 fire fighters down with three casualties and then they have to carry them down the stairs. So we decided to stick together.

It was a joint effort to take them down. I remember propping a lady on our shoulder, at one point switching with FF HOLEHOUSE to assist one of the ladies down and he took the equipment I was carrying. I don't remember anything until I reached the lobby where I leaned over the balcony and said we have four casualties to which we were informed there was three and in hindsight what I found out was

Signature: 2018

DANIEL PEGRAM





Page 16 of 19

that the gentleman who is a bit younger had ran down leaving the ladies with us. I cannot remember any conversation as we make our way down the stairs.

I handed our casualties and they were taken away from us from the lobby onwards but I can't remember the name of the FF I handed them to. I cannot remember any details of our journey back down to the lobby a brief flash in my memory seeing a SM or WM at the stairwell looking up and the next bit was walking out into the mezzanine into the main lobby. I was probably one of the last out as the rest of the crew were already down.

Back in the lobby it was crowded but not overly crowded as you can move about easily. There was water still in the lobby, Fire fighters getting in and out, equipment everywhere as we left it. Breaking in gear, entry control boards, first aid kits, hoses going in and out.

I took a gauge reading and we had about 8 minutes to whistle and we made the decision not to go back up because we would not have got where we had got to. We were thinking of going back up but our gauge was low and we would have only gone halfway before the whistle would have gone. CM GRAY said we should go back up but Ben and I looked at each other and said we do not have enough air by our gauge reading. We were knackered, from being beaten up on the higher floors from the heat, forcing doors, carrying our kits and forcing doors we would not have been of any use going back up.

After handing over the casualty (I do not know the name of the FF), the procedure was to report to entry control, remove our helmet and gloves, and shut our air cylinders and collected our entry control board. We did know any flat numbers we did not have any idea whilst we were up there but we gave the best that we could. We have to shut our systems down to collect our tally and that tell them that we are out of the job and that we are safe.

Once I collected my tally, I felt relieved we had all come out and that we had done well as a crew of 5 and brought four people out that would not have been saved otherwise. We spent approximately 30 minutes on our deployment from the entry control up to the 11th floor and back gauging by my EDBA set which is 45 mins and considering we have been working hard and I came out with 10 mins left on my set. We went out through the same entrance via the window as you look at Grenfell Tower through the left hand side, the left face towards the park, but by this time now there was lots more debris, hoses everywhere and it looked like the building was falling apart.

We were originally to the green next to the park by the train line, they decided that was not safe due to falling debris and moved us down like a walkway. We made our way back out to BA main control in front of the leisure centre, were we bumped into by the rest of the watch and they helped us take our sets

Signature: 2018

DANIEL PEGRAM





Page 17 of 19

off, got us bottles of water, we then sat down. The condition of the area toward the BA main control was pretty much the same, lot of activity, screaming, crews trying to make their way into the building under the riot shield as we have done. I did not speak to any of the casualty on our way back to the command unit, I may have said hi to couple of FF I knew.

Once I have taken the kit off and had a drink, our sets were taken from us as there were shortage of sets, they were switching them by changing the cylinders, we were told to cool down and when we feel ready to go back in, take set from someone else. Environment whilst waiting to be redeployed was much slower, lots of FF lot of people waiting to get back up, they were not bring out casualties anymore and it seemed a lot firefighting orientated rather than search and rescue.

We were then told to standby in the holding area again, we moved to holding area in sector two, probably spent another hour or two. At this point we relaxed a bit took off our tunics. I did not see another set for about 2 hours due to the crew rotation. I eventually found, carried it out for A test which involved putting a cylinder to test as we do at the start of our shift, check the set has no leaks and everything fits and works. We were then told we were going to be recommitted and we were moved to the base of the tower, this time it was day light so a little bit different, in terms of seeing and having a feel of what was going on. Again we went under the riot shield and we spent the next two or three hours in the lobby waiting to go up. We waited for approximately 5 hours from the time we left the tower and waiting to be redeployed. We were not deployed and were relieved in the early afternoon about 2:30 3 pm by fresh EDBA crews from Wembley, and we were dismissed from the shift at 1830 hours.

We went back to Paddington, we were given food drinks and welfare chat and then did my notes which I exhibit as. I produce my notes as my exhibit DP/07. This shift lasted for approximately 22.5 hours and I was tired but the adrenaline still kept us going but I was relieved. None of my crew members were injured.

I can describe the casualty above the 9th so I can say between the 9th and 10th floor. The casualty was again in a very similar position like the other one. All I can remember about this casualty was a new balance trainers which I thing was white, I cannot give a sex or age or any other description. Somewhere from floor 7/8 definitely before the 9th floor I remember seeing a casualty. The casualty was on the landing in between the stairs going up, she was lying face down, chest on the floor, apparently dead there was no signs of life. I believed she was the photographer, a black lady. She was on the stairs face down. I cannot give any further description.

Signature: 2018

DANIEL PEGRAM





Page 18 of 19

I can describe the 3 elderly as Asian origin, maybe Thai and the middle age gentleman maybe in his 40s. The ladies might be in their 60s and they had mobility issue. They had towels over their heads but I cannot remember the colour, or any distinctive feature concerning these casualty and I will not remember them if I see them again.

My experience as a FF is as follows: I have been a fire fighter for 7 1/2 years. During this time I attended the Croydon riots years ago and consider myself competent in what I do. I am a driver and part of the Fire rescue unit FRU. I am trained in Extended Duration Breathing Apparatus (EDBA) which I was wearing on that night. They last 45 minutes whereas the standard SDBA last for 31 minutes. As EDBA I did a course about 4 or 5 years ago which is a one day course familiarisation. It is the same set as the standard BA wearer but just more air in it. Same set up and working pattern, and it works exactly the same way. I have never worn the EDBA operationally, Grenfell incident was my first, but we do use it in training without looking at the diary I cannot say when that last training was.

All five of my crew members that night were EDBA wearers and we were on channel 6 which is the BA Channel.

In my career, I had never attend any fire of this magnitude. I have attend jobs at towers with kitchen or bedroom alight but the fire had never breech that apartment or the flat. The last time I dealt with a tower block fire was about 4 years ago. The last time I received firefighting training for high rise blocks. We had done drills before full scale drills, we also so on smaller scales where we still work through procedures but I cannot tell when without looking at the station diary. We have time scales for training and within a year we have to complete x amount of training and x amount of time which is quite structured I am up to date. We do fire training but not in an actual high rise as we do not have a tower we can practice on. However we do have building we do use and normally stir towards base and procedure and other firefighting procedures. Though I am not trained in a plan to deal with fire in the event that it failed its compartmentation, we are trained to fall back on our standard BA procedure and apply them to that situation and deal with it as we find

it.

As a team we have high level of skill in road traffic accidents RTA, we are also line operations. I have had some good jobs and we are lucky to have a good watch here, we drill and we look after each other and we keep up to date with our skills. I was asked what could have made my job easier, in my opinion better corns would have made our job easier, it is nice for us to listen to what was going on downstairs.

Signature: 2018

DANIEL PEGRAM





Statement of: PEGRAM, DANIEL Form MG11(T)

Page 19 of 19

There was only one stairway. I remember seeing two lobby doors opened but I cannot tell which floor. If the doors are opened it compromise the stairwell but the doors need to open for people to get out.

Even though the CM informs us of what instructions, it is also important for us to be able to hear from our radios what is happening, people have said for a long time that the radio was not good.

Signature: 2018

DANIEL PEGRAM

OFFICIAL