

WITNESS STATEMENT

Criminal Procedure Rules, r27.2; Criminal Justice Act 1967, s.9; Magistrates' Courts Act 1980, s.5b

Statement of: FARR, DAVID

Age if under 18: Over 18 (if over 18 insert 'over 18')

Occupation: PROJECT OFFICER, PEG

This statement (consisting of 19 page(s) each signed by me) is true to the best of my knowledge and belief and I make it knowing that, if it is tendered in evidence, I shall be liable to prosecution if I have wilfully stated in it anything which I know to be false, or do not believe to be true.

Signature: D FARR

Date: 11/04/2018

Tick if witness evidence is visually recorded ☐ (*supply witness details on rear*)

I am the above named person and my details are known to the Police. This statement is in relation to the fire at GRENFELL TOWER that occurred on WEDNESDAY 14 JUNE 2017.

I will make reference to the following exhibits in this statement:

- DMF/01 - LFB statement completed 16th JUNE 2017
- DMF/02 - Back 2 Basics training package — High Rise, one (1) disc
- DMF/03 — Map of area around Grenfell Tower
- DMF/04 — One (1) disc containing Performance Review of Operations (PRO) presentation
- DMF/05 — One (1) photograph of LFB equipment at base of tower taken on 14/06/2017
- DMF/06 — One (1) photograph of LFB equipment at base of tower taken on 14/06/2017
- DMF/07 — One (1) photograph of LFB equipment at base of tower taken on 14/06/2017

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- DMF/08 — One (1) photograph of impounded EDBA set taken on 14/06/2017
- DMF/09 — One (1) photograph of impounded EDBA set taken on 14/06/2017
- DMF/10— One (1) photograph of impounded EDBA set taken on 14/06/2017
- DMF/11 — One (1) photograph of major incident board taken on 14/06/2017

Whilst providing this statement to Police I was able to review my LFB statement which I completed on 16th JUNE 2017, exhibit DMF/01. I am currently employed by Hays recruitment agency, employed as temp/agency staff to the London Fire Brigade, working on the Integrated Equipment & Logistics (IE&L) Project based at PEG, Croydon. I joined the LFB in April 1987 and from Southwark Training centre started as a firefighter at Twickenham Blue Watch. Throughout these thirty (30) years I obtained numerous qualifications including Leading Firefighters, Sub Officers and Station Officers both written and practical examinations. I went through the various selection/ promotion rounds to achieve each rank. I served at Hammersmith Green Watch as a Leading Firefighter/Crew Commander completing both Personal Development Record and BTSM. I was promoted to Chelsea Red Watch as a Sub. Officer and completed the required Personal Development Record. Following on years of temporary promotions I was later successful in a selection process where I was promoted to Heston White Watch in the rank of Station Officer, this was prior to the LFB change from rank to role, now known as Watch Manager B. I finished my last ten (10) years as a Station Manager based at various locations performing different roles around the Authority. At the time of the incident at Grenfell Tower I was Station Manager seconded to the IE&L Project based at Protective Equipment Group (PEG), H31 Croydon.

During my years as a Station Officer, later to be Watch Manager B, I spent time in Incident Management Team as a Trainer. During this time I delivered training to both supervisory and principal officers throughout the LFB. I obtained numerous teaching qualifications including Preparing To Teach Life-long Skills (PTTLS) certification which allows me to deliver training to others both in and outside our organisation. This is a recognised teaching qualification. I am able to deliver training to Firefighters and Officers, both practical and/or theory sessions.

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Whilst in my role as a Service Standard Support Officer I wrote and delivered a training package for high rise training which was included in 'Back 2 Basics' training, this was delivered at Fire Stations throughout the LFB. Every year the focus would be on whatever was required in the organisation. Around 2015 and 2016 this training need included high rise and I created a training package which was both classroom based and practical. This training package was agreed by senior management and then it was delivered by trainers, including myself, across the organisation. I have provided a training package which consists of a PowerPoint presentation and practical scenario to police, exhibit DMF/02. The practical scenario included using the station tower in the yard at the Fire Stations. These are usually four (4) or five (5) floors high, so for the exercise Firefighters would have to imagine that, say, the 2nd floor was the 13th floor. Personnel, equipment and appliances were used for the mock training. This training was delivered to all stations, all watches, within in each borough across the LFB in February to April 2016.

Due to spells in training and a period where I worked in Operational Policy department I believe that I have a good knowledge of policy and procedures and I always refresh my own training knowledge. My role has included training so it is important that I am up to date with this. I have completed high rise training in my career and this included looking at policy and procedures, attending many high rise incidents so having the actual experience. Also doing command exercises regularly, every two (2) to three (3) years, as a Station Manager. This includes actual mock incidents. Whenever there is a change in policy I will read and update myself on this. I last completed training on high rise around two (2) years ago. This would have been when in my role as Station Manager Service Standard Support Officer I was required to conduct audits on Stations. These were specifically aimed at four areas:

- QA1 - Station H&S, Fairness and Dignity, and Finance
- QA2 - Ops Readiness and Ops Contingency Planning
- QA3 - Operations and Community Safety
- QA4 - Training and Development

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Regularly I carried out audits of stations this included stations such as SOHO and BATTERSEA both of which are heavily populated with high rise buildings. I feel I have a lot of experience in training myself, delivering training and past experience of high rise incidents. During my career I have attended a number of large incidents including fires at KINGS CROSS STATION and LADBROKE GROVE which were both major incidents.

Other roles I have done include being a Service Standard Support Officer (SSSO) for DAC Tom GEORGE. Within this role I would need to visit Fire Stations and carry out audits of the station to check it was to a satisfactory standard. I am a Senior Accident Investigator (SAI), I completed this qualification around six (6) to eight (8) years ago. For this role I would be required to be on a separate on-call rota. If there are any accidents/injuries at an incident then a SAI would be paged and informed of the incident. The SAI then decides whether he or she should attend the incident to complete a report and follow the procedure for this. There are certain incidents that the SAI has to attend. I believe I was the first available SAI on scene at the incident at GRENFELL TOWER.

Around three (3) years ago I was asked to move back to Protective Equipment Group (PEG) as an Operational Senior Officer part of Integrated Equipment and Logistics project (IELP). I had previously worked with PEG when I was seconded to a project to look at the feasibility of outsourcing the department or whether to keep this area in-house. This was the role I was in when the fire at GRENFELL TOWER happened. The PEG is based in CROYDON FIRE STATION, BABCOCK training is also at this site. PEG test, maintain and repair equipment used by LFB. Brigade Distribution Centre (BDC) is based nearby on Purley Way near the Lombard roundabout. The project involves moving both PEG and the BDC to a new site/base further down the Purley Way near to the old Croydon Aerodrome, Pegasus Road, Croydon. PEG deals with a quantity of diverse/complex and risk critical equipment managed, maintained, repaired and in some cases produced. This supporting the Authority's operational incident response obligations and safe systems of work for firefighters through the provision, development, maintenance and continuous (24/7) availability of PEG equipment, for example; 2500 x BA sets, 2000 x Gas Tight Suits, 6000 x Cylinders, 100 kilometre of Hose, Specialist Equipment — DIM & High Line Rescue.

Within the PEG the BOSS system is monitored and officers will look to see if they can assist at incidents,

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even before the PEG are requested. If we go to the scene with cylinders for BA then we can replace these at the scene there and then. They can be re-used without being taken away to be replaced. The PEG also has reserve equipment in stock, this is kept for incidents where additional equipment maybe required.

At the time of the incident I was the rank of a Station Manager so I would still be on-call to attend any incidents when required, as I was in an operational role. I would attend any incident that I am paged and required to attend. My current role is as a Project Officer and I am non- operational.

On WEDNESDAY 14th JUNE 2017 I was on light duties. I was recovering from a fractured femur. This had almost healed and I was due to be back on full duties soon, I had almost completed the treatment and recovery plan. I was able to walk and was mobile without restrictions. But at the time I was still technically on light duties so was not on-call as a Station Manager. My call sign was OE73.

I was at home in [REDACTED] when I first heard about the fire at GRENFELL TOWER. I was not on shift and was asleep. The radio is usually on at night, and I am a light sleeper, I think this is due to my role, as when on-call I would be available 24-hours. The radio was tuned into LBC when I went to bed and at around 0200hrs I heard in the background whilst I was asleep something about a large fire in the Kensington area. It was felt like quite soon after this I heard my work mobile phone ring. I knew in my mind it would be about the large fire I heard on the radio. I quickly got out of bed and I went downstairs to answer my mobile. It was my manager, Geoff AVIS, Head of PEG, who called me, I have this call as being made at 0303hrs, the early hours of WEDNESDAY 14th JUNE 2017. Geoff said there was a large tower block fire, I think at the time it was at twenty (20) pumps, and he asked for my help at the scene. He said it was a serious fire in a tower block, and was being made a major incident. Geoff asked me to meet him at CROYDON PEG to get the Respiratory Protective Equipment (RPE) support lorry, get as much Standard Duration Breathing Apparatus (SDBA) and Extended Duration Breathing Apparatus (EDBA) cylinders, and take it to the scene at GRENFELL TOWER. I told him I would leave straight away. It was a quick phone call.

There are always two (2) Respiratory Protective Equipment Liaison Officer's (RPELO) on rota. RPELO's are informed of any incident which is a 12+ pump incident. If they attend an incident then the second RPELO will be on recall for any other incidents. Geoff is a RPELO and was the RPELO on duty that

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night. Ben RICHARDSON was the support RPELO on duty. Geoff had asked me to attend as an equipment officer. Although I was not on duty Geoff requested me to attend due to the scale of the incident and my operational experience.

I know the area around GRENFELL TOWER as I spent a number of years working in HAMMERSMITH AND FULHAM Borough, this is the neighbouring borough to KENSINGTON & CHELSEA. When at HAMMERSMITH we would often get called out to assist in NORTH KENSINGTON. Although I have never been to GRENFELL TOWER I have been around the area and know the general area around the tower through my local knowledge. I spent a number of years during my career based in WEST LONDON.

I have a fleet pool car which is provided for by LFB due to then my role as a Station Manager. This was a [REDACTED] fitted with blue lights, sirens, and my hand-held airwave radio. It also has LFB markings on the outside of the vehicle. It does not have a Mobile Data Terminal (MDT). SM vehicles are driven solo so it would not be practical to have an MDT, as when your driving you cannot use the MDT to obtain information. I also have a handheld radio and have personal protective equipment (PPE) as I was in an operational role, and my nominal role board. I quickly got ready and left in my pool car and travelled to CROYDON PEG under blue light conditions. It took me around fifteen (15) to twenty (20) minutes to get there. There were messages on the radio but I cannot recall what they said.

When I got to CROYDON PEG the RPE lorry was being prepared to leave. It is always fully kitted out with equipment so that it can go straight to incidents. I checked over it with Steve CHALLIS, PEG Technician, and we may have added equipment to it. The equipment includes cylinders for SDBA and EBDA sets on trolleys in the lorry for transport around the incident ground. The RPE lorries are checked for stock every FRIDAY and an itinerary of the RPE lorry's are sent to RPELO so they know what is available. There are two (2) 7½ tonne lorries and one (1) smaller van. They are fitted with blue lights and sirens so can be used under emergency conditions on the road. Hose and line is not kept on the RPE lorry but are available and in stock across the LFB. These would be collected by an Operational Support Unit and delivered to incidents if required. OSU'S are situated in six (6) locations which are strategically placed to cover LONDON adequately. OSUs currently support BDC and PEG out of hours by providing and delivering risk critical equipment to keep appliances available. An OSU is requested for any incident

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above six (6) or possibly eight (8) pump. Most of these would have been ordered and utilised for the incident at GRENFELL.

Geoff arrived at CROYDON around the time I was getting the RPE lorry ready with Steve. We probably spent around five (5) minutes in CROYDON before we headed to GRENFELL TOWER. I travelled in the RPE lorry with Steve driving, he has an HGV licence, I do not so cannot drive the lorry. Geoff travelled in another vehicle with Alan GOSLING, and they left after we did.

Whilst traveling to the incident I was in contact with Ben RICHARDSON, RPELO, who was already at the scene. It was probably around 0330hrs whilst on route to the incident, when Ben sent a photograph to my mobile whilst on route, this was first image I saw of the tower and it showed that the fire was on the external facia of the building. So I knew before I got there that the fire had spread to the outside of the tower. Ben gave me an update of the incident and I gave him an ETA for us, I cannot remember specifics of what he said about the incident. The plan was for me to get to the incident and once on scene to sort out the resources with him. Ben told me there was parking available and where I should park; near to the leisure centre, next to the NHS centre. There is no MDT on the RPE lorry but my airwave and handheld radio were both on. I remember radio traffic and messages but cannot give details of what I heard.

I had to figure out the quickest route from CROYDON. We drove over Wandsworth Bridge, North End Road, Ladbroke Grove, Lancaster Road and Silchester Road. The RVP was at Silchester Road. We parked the RPE lorry adjacent to the NHS Trust building car park and Silchester Road and this is where it remained. Geoff had told me where the RVP was situated, prior to leaving PEG, Ben confirmed this whilst on route to the incident. We were travelling to the scene under blue light conditions.

At around LANCASTER ROAD I first saw GRENFELL TOWER whilst we were driving through. I have never seen a fire develop the way that it had. I could not see the bottom of the tower but I could see from around the 10th floor up, all the floors were alight on the side of the tower from where I was approaching. A few floors below that, from around the 7th upwards from what I could see had parts alight also.

I arrived at the scene of the incident at approximately 0340hrs with Steve Challis in the RPE Support

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Lorry. We parked our vehicle close to the incident next to Kensington Academy on Silchester Road, I have marked DMF/03 with the location. I could see when I arrived on scene that it was a difficult and dynamic incident, the scene appeared quite organised with a flurry of numerous activities going on around the building. It did not seem that panicked in terms of personnel, it appeared quite well controlled.

On arrival we were met by Ben RICHARDSON, nearby to where we parked. Ben had been tasked with assisting and supplying resources and equipment for BA main Control. Initially we were required to unload the RPE lorry of all its EDBA/SDBA cylinders into a resource area near to Main Control. I have marked DMF/03 with '1' where the 1st equipment area was. This was around twenty-five (25) metres away from the tower. Whilst taking the equipment from the RPE lorry and placing it on area '1' Ben said you may want a quick look at the incident. As we were walking up to see the best place to site the equipment I had a talk with Ben about the 1st equipment area being quite close to the tower and not within talking distance of BA Main Control. It was at this point we first met SM Nick SAUNDERS, responsible for setting up Main Control, and I instructed Ben and Nick where the best position was to place our resources and site Main Control taking into account the location of the fire, conditions, access and the best way to resource the incident. I got stuck in straight away with sorting equipment so did not report to a Command Unit until later. I believe that Geoff arrived on scene around half an hour after I did.

I could see bits of foam and other materials coming off the tower. The debris seemed to be blowing NORTH EAST so away from BA Main Control. Some of the debris was alight and I could see large embers, some blackened burnt pieces falling from the building. Much of the debris falling was the side of the railway. Quite a lot of debris had fallen. I saw what appeared to be a foam like material from around the windows and walls falling from the tower, and onto the ground. Everything on the tower from the 11th floor and above was alight. The fire had spread so quickly, across the building and up and all around the sides. I have never seen a fire develop in that way. The tower was glowing in the night. I saw a Turntable Ladder, from PADDINGTON, spraying water at the EAST side of the tower. This is marked on DMF/03 as 'TL'. It was on the grassy area near the tower.

BA Main Control was the first holding area for BA wearers. The equipment area should be a suitable

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distance from BA Main Control so that equipment could be restocked as required. As well as a staging area on our side, of the building near to BA Main Control, there was a second BA staging area closer to the tower where crews were held before they went to entry control. The BA Main Control area will have a board (Command Support System - CSS) with details of wearers and numbers. I do not know if this was electronic or a white board, we have the facility for both. This gives a greater control of the resources, a minimum of Station Manager should be in charge of Main Control. Personnel can be filtered through BA Main Control, from either the 1st or the 2nd staging area and into the tower. I could see BA wearers being lined up and sat around the grassy area waiting to be moved forward.

We decided to move our equipment area to a safer working area and closer to BA Main Control which was to a grassy area outside Kensington Leisure Centre. We moved to the other side of Kensington Leisure Centre, I have marked this location as '2' on DMF/03. This second area was forty (40) to fifty (50) metres away from the tower so a safer distance away from falling debris, and a cleaner area. It was near the leisure centre so that if required we could move indoors if the conditions outside changed and also to use the facilities there. The leisure centre doors were already open when I arrived. It was also close enough to BA Main Control so that communication could be done face to face without using the already busy radio. It would be easier to ensure that equipment was ready and stocked for BA Main Control from this location.

Equipment was being put in area '2' with the others from PEG, and we were servicing the kit. At approximately 0415 hours I was approached by SM Nick SAUNDERS who was setting up BA Main Control. SM SAUNDERS asked if I was able to assist with a distress to wearer (DTW) incident, in my capacity as a known Senior Accident Investigator (SAI). There may have been other SAI's on scene but they would have been busy with other tasks given the major incident. So then for the next hour or so I had two (2) different roles, one with PEG and the other SAI. Control were made aware that I was on scene for PEG and also for SAI role.

I was firstly led to an incorrect SDBA set which was laying on the grass near to entry control. I asked the REPLO Ben RICHARDSON to assist with the impounding of the SDBA set. The BA would be put in a DTW/ Equipment Impound box and be taken back to PEG with relevant paperwork that would be obtained at the scene. Then the BA would be examined and checked for any faults with the BA by

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qualified technicians. We quickly established that this was the incorrect set and located the correct SDBA (1269) on the grass nearby.

The SDBA belonged to FF Tom WELSH, from WILLESDON FIRE STATION. I was told that the wearer of the DTW was making rescue on the 11th floor of the tower when the whistle on his set went off as he got to the casualty. This would mean he is running out of air and had around five (5) to ten (10) minutes of air remaining. FF WELSH continued to make the rescue and was on the stairwell and after a couple of floors he ran out of air due to the level of work required. He removed the BA mask from his face due to the fact that he had exhausted all the air in his cylinder, he discarded his mask whilst he was on the stairwell of the tower. He then ran out of the tower. I believe that I was told that other Firefighters were able to assist with the removal of the casualty by this stage.

The incorrect SDBA was briefly examined on scene and I closed the cylinder down and looked at the gauge which was on zero. This did not seem right and I turned the wheel to turn the cylinder which showed it was open. The marking on the SDBA, all have an individual code, showed me it was not from WILLESDON. I knew this could not be the correct SDBA and then the correct one was located nearby. The alarm was going off on the set and it had the tally missing, once I inserted a tally key it silenced the alarm. This sets gauge was also at zero and quickly noticed that its facemask was missing. The cylinder valve was still open but the cylinder was empty. I have marked the locations of the SDBA's examined as 'A' and 'B' on DMF/03. It was quite dark in the area.

The correct SDBA was located and we obtained a DTW box from the RPE support vehicle and began the gathering of information and completion of relevant associated paperwork. There is a proforma that is to be completed along with a statement obtained from the wearer, FF WELSH. This was a short statement. FF WELSH was keen to get back into the tower. I told him he needed to get checked over by the LAS, he said he was okay. I must have seen him around half an hour after he ran out of air, he seemed okay. I told him to sit down, rest and then write the statement and once he did this he went off with other members of his crew, I did not see him again.

We were then asked by SM SAUNDERS to deal with a further impounded BA, this was EDBA set number 64. This BA set belonged to CM Shaun MURPHY. This EDBA set was located on the grass near

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to the leisure centre, which was taped off near a supermarket trolley. I have provided photographs of this, exhibits DMF/08, DMF/09 and DMF/10. There was a police officer saw next to the BA and trolley, guarding it. I spoke to the Police Officer and I told him my role and what I was doing. He told us that the set had blood and body parts on it. I had a quick look at the set and could see very little blood splatter, no body parts. I told the officer and he went to check if it was okay for us to impound. I explained that it would be protected in a box and sealed with security tags, then removed to our workshops, PEG Croydon. The Police Officer, I did not get his details, stated we could take the EDBA and then impounded this with the same process as the SDBA. We put both sets together, next to the trolley, prior to collecting two DTW/Equipment Impound boxes from the RPE support van.

I spoke with CM MURPHY and checked if he was okay and I told him he needed to be checked out by the LAS. CM MURPHY told me that as he was going into the tower using a riot shield for protection, that a leg hit his riot shield and went through, hitting him on the back of the neck. The leg belonged to someone who jumped out of the tower. CM MURPHY received a blow to the head as a result. He was trying to find another set to go back into the tower. I got the details required to start the investigation and asked him to complete a statement, then I told him to see the LAS. I have heard since that he went back into the tower wearing BA after this.

Ben and I impounded both sets and gathered as much information as we could obtain. The brief initial statements from the different two wearers, and paperwork were stored in the pouch within the different DTW boxes, and both boxes sealed with cable ties. At approximately 0500hrs both DTW boxes were removed to the RPE support vehicle by Ben and myself with all relevant paperwork attached. I do not have this paperwork anymore as each pouch on a DTW box contains aide memoires which must be completed for each Distress to Wearer. I completed the aide memoires for each DTW and along with statements and paperwork packed them away in their relevant pouch on the Equipment Impound/DTW box. This was also reported to the Command Unit and BA Main Control. Each set is individually marked with a number and a logbook. The logbooks are kept at the Fire Station. Printed log books were used at the scene. As Ben is a RPELO he is able to download the details from the BA set onto a laptop. This information is used as part of the investigation into DTW. Sometime whilst impounding the sets and resourcing Main Control I received a telephone call from GM Max DISSANAYAKE, Health and Safety. Max informed me that he had attached me to the incident as an SAI with Control and to continue

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gathering information until he and a team of SAI's arrived.

I went to the Incident Commander at the Command Unit, there were several Command Unit's on scene, I have marked DMF/03 with the location of two (2) I saw nearby, one (1) on GRENFELL ROAD and the other on BOMORE. I went to the BOMORE road Command Unit first and was told to go to the one at GRENFELL ROAD. I knocked and opened the door, stood by the steps of the Command Unit, I did not go inside; it was very busy in there. I saw AC Andy ROE, the incident commander and his loggist, SM Jackie MCCHONICIE and I told SM MCCHONICIE we had impounded two (2) sets and followed the procedure, that the wearers were both okay. I quickly recognised that they were very busy and I left shortly afterwards. I cannot not give you further information on what was happening on the Command Unit.

Another SAI then arrived and I was relieved of any further SAI duties, there were a number of SAI's turning up and a number of reports throughout the incident. There may have been around ten (10) SAI incidents during the incident. There was a couple of meetings that morning that I attended, this was within my remit in PEG and as an SAI. There was a SAI briefing at approximately 0800hrs, chaired by GM DISSANAYAKE, where I provided an update on the two (2) incidents that I dealt with. This briefing was held in the restaurant area of the leisure centre, and in attendance were around four (4) or five (5) SAI's. I gave a brief of my actions and a full hand over.

I then returned to my PEG duties required in supplying resources and information to BA Main Control. I returned to the equipment area where I sorted out washing facilities and an area for the servicing of BA sets. At the same time as doing the SAI role I was still sorting out the resources side of the incident, so I was on scene for a dual role. Tables had been set up for equipment, trolleys with cylinders, buckets and wash solutions and batteries set up for the BA sets. Before tables had been set up we were using salvage sheets laid out on the concrete path. We had all appliances attending the incident bring us any spare cylinders they had. There was over a thousand cylinders, they were getting used fairly quickly. The empty cylinders were being removed and taken to charging stations, the nearest being Park Royal. Firefighters are trained to change cylinders so they can do that themselves, we did a lot of the servicing to save time. Changing a battery is a PEG technician's job. Crews that were attending the maintenance/resources area were performing a change of cylinder, clean of set, fireground A test, then returning to BA Main Control

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staging area to be redeployed.

Throughout the morning, and on a few occasions, a male in the tower was being pointed out by staff. He was roughly on the or 10th floor and he kept on coming to the window and moving away and then back again. He was alive and he was there for a long time, I think he was still there when I left the scene that morning as I remember seeing him at around 0900hrs. I spoke to a crew and they said they knew he was in the tower.

When I arrived at the incident quite a bit of the tower was burning and it burned for a long time. I only saw the outside of the tower so cannot describe the fire from the inside. From many conversations with the crews they were frustrated due to the situation with the water pressure. The water pressure was low and this effected the strength of jets being used. I was informed that crews were going into the tower without water. This is against policy and procedure, going into a burning building without water and a means of firefighting. Firefighters do the job to save lives and they had to go outside of policy to try and save lives in this situation. Even at 0930hrs when I left the scene for the first time we did not have control of the fire. I did not stop to look at the building too much as I had other jobs to do. I also heard from crews that they had to keep closing down the jets to try and build up/increase the water pressure, so that they may have a decent water pressure for just a few seconds whilst they tried to search for people.

I left the incident at approximately 0930hrs with Geoff and returned to PEG. At this stage larger vehicles were finding it difficult to get near the incident. We left in Geoff's vehicle/car. We were required to get some more specific items of equipment, such as respirators, washing equipment, buckets, more batteries and Geoff had told me to take a break. We drove out of the scene. It did not take too long to get out and to Croydon. From Croydon I packed up my car, [REDACTED] with some equipment and I then drove home, had a shower and drove back to GRENFELL TOWER i.

At approximately 1215hrs I returned to the incident as Relief for Malcolm STANTON, PEG. Again my role was to assist resourcing and servicing of BA for BA Main Control. I did this until I was relieved by Geoff later that evening. Malcolm gave me a verbal briefing on what he was doing whilst I was away on equipment maintenance. We were still in the same location as were BA Main Control.

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The batteries for BA sets required replacing as after two (2) wears the batteries run down. Normally these BA sets would be replaced on an appliance where they would be recharged. It was rare for a BA set to have a battery run down at the scene of an incident as they are not usually worn more than once. We had collected batteries from CROYDON late morning so the batteries on the sets were replaced. As well as replacing batteries, we continued to change cylinders, clean the masks of the kits and carry out fire ground 'A' tests on the BA sets. We had a good system in place, servicing the sets and cleaning face masks so that the sets could be used again. The leisure centre assisted by providing us with hot water. Some of the crews also cleaned their own sets. From where we were situated BA Main Control could see where I had set up and marked a white board with the numbers of what resources were available.

I was the only member of PEG that could go inside the inner cordon as I was an operational Station Manager and I had the correct PPE. That afternoon I took some trolleys and I walked around collecting equipment that had been left lying around. During the day more PEG staff arrived and equipment. Geoff continued with the logistics of the collection and delivery of cylinders to be taken away to charging points, the closest was PARK ROYAL FIRE STATION, so that cylinders could be charged/refilled. As well as the incident at GRENFELL TOWER it was important that there was equipment available for any other incidents in LONDON. Whilst I was walking around the tower I could see the tower but I was focusing on what I was doing collecting equipment rather than looking at the tower burning.

I was walking along the pathway which ran alongside the railway track and debris and ash was everywhere. There was a playground on the WEST of the tower and this had a lot of debris from the tower covering it. The second time I went to collect equipment I took Matt HELM, PEG Technician, with me with trolleys to collect and deliver cylinders around the incident ground. Before leaving I explained that there was a chance that he may see some sites/things, such as bodies, that would not be nice, so as to prepare him. I asked if he was alright with this, which he acknowledged that he was Ok. As we approached from the south side, from the railway station side of Grenfell, we did observe what appeared to be a body in a body bag. At this time temporary morgues were being set up.

It was a busy area, there were a lot of Firefighters and officers around. At the 2nd BA staging area nearer the tower there were around twenty (20) Firefighters sat down wearing BA sets, waiting to go into the

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tower. On numerous occasions I had members of the press try to talk to me or crews whilst walking around the incident. Each time I would tell them politely not to obstruct us, to leave us alone as we had a lot of work to do. I am a trained Press Liaison Officer.

As well as the Turntable Ladder (TL), I also saw a crew on the ground near the playground firefighting. They were spraying the tower from the outside, this jet reached about four (4) to five (5) floors up. I believe this is the only other external firefighting I saw, I cannot comment on the inside. At some stage during the morning PADDINGTON's TL was replaced by a larger aerial from SURREY, LEATHERHEAD.

In the daylight the building looked different, the tower was blackened. It was still alight but not as much as when I first arrived on scene. There was still a number of fires on all sides of the tower. There were pockets of fire everywhere, different rooms were alight on different floors.

That afternoon at around 1500hrs I attended a briefing which GM Rick OGDEN chaired. This was in the reception area of the leisure centre. This was a meeting involving LFB personnel. During this briefing withdrawing crews was discussed, there was discussion with regards to a possible collapse on the 17th floor of the tower. My role in the meeting was to talk about equipment. I asked that if crews were withdrawn that they withdraw with equipment. The meeting concluded with the decision to withdraw and then reassess the situation, leaving the equipment in place. A lot of kit was left in situ, and as a result was badly damaged by the fire and debris from the tower. To my knowledge there was not a collapse in the tower and crews did re-enter later.

During the afternoon and early evening the demand for kit was less, the number of wearers being committed in BA and the demand for equipment decreased. There were less Firefighters around and the scene was quieter and appeared more controlled. There was a vast amount of equipment on site. The issue later would be how to get the kit away from the incident site. There were no issues with the equipment numbers for the incident, we could provide the Firefighters with what they requested. Half of the brigade's appliances were on site.

Geoff arrived around 1930hrs and I gave him a verbal handover, and I left the scene at around 2100hrs.

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When I left the scene there were still pockets of fire in the tower. The LEATHERHEAD aerial was still on scene and it was spraying the tower externally. All the briefings I had attended that day was only with LFB personnel, no external agencies.

I went back to GRENFELL TOWER the next day after the incident, and consecutive days after for around four (4) to five (5) days. This was to collect and organise equipment on site. There was still an LFB presence on scene and the Urban Search And Rescue (USAR) and Disaster Victim Identification (DVI) team were working on the scene.

On THURSDAY 15th JUNE 2017 I went back and organised for a different type of respirator to be ordered in and delivered from GERMANY. The USAR team were using full face respirators and these can be difficult to use, and it is hard to work in a full mask. Half-mask respirators were ordered and I arranged for a porta-cabin to be made available where we could set up a Porta count testing facility for the mask fitting. It was important to have an area where our team can work to ensure that all required, from all the services, to enter the tower had a face fit for the mask to ensure the masks fit properly. A team was organised for this and this face fitting began on FRIDAY 16th JUNE 2017. We went back to change filters on the respirators. On the THURSDAY the debris was still all over the ground. I collected the telemetry boards used at the incident, from the base of the tower (shown in photographs) a few days later, a couple were seriously burnt.

On the FRIDAY I went into the tower to collect equipment. The tower was swamped with equipment. This was the first time I went into GRENFELL TOWER. We collected hose, telemetry boards, anything BA related, FF WELSH's mask was found in the stairwell of the tower. It had been reported that there had been issues in the tower with signals from the telemetry board to the BA sets, If you lose radio communications you can still have contact via telemetry. I was later involved in tests, as part of the Grenfell investigation, to check the Telemetry signal within the tower. When in the tower I walked up the stairwell and went into some lobby areas to collect equipment. I did not go into the flats. I noticed that the stairwell was so narrow. Two (2) of us stood side by side and in full PPE and EDPA you could not walk past each other, I had a photograph taken of this but I do not have this now. Equipment was collected, washed, repaired. Around one hundred (100) lengths of hose were damaged.

To my knowledge/memory I did not talk to any members of public whilst at GRENFELL TOWER. I am

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not aware of any prepared firefighting plans specifically for GRENFELL TOWER, nor have I been involved in any Section 7(2)d familiarisation visits/plans for the tower. If/when compartmentation fails the weight of attack must be increased. This means that when you have severe fires as in this case your firefighting jets must be backed up by a jet protecting egress/access. This back up jet must be longer than the firefighting jet. High rise policy 633 states we must have two (2) jets at a high rise fire. To better explain this if the fire is severe and showing signs that may lead to backdraught, flashover or abnormal spread as in this case a covering jet and BA team must be present to protect the search and rescue team. This will mean an additional team with a second jet should be sent in to protect and support the first team. This second jet should be at least one hose length longer than the first teams. This affords the first team to be supported in firefighting allowing rescue of the team without endangering the water supply. This second jet will be connected into the Rising Main outlet on the fire floor. The first jet will be connected in the floor below.

I cannot say if I heard any alarms sounding from the tower the night of the fire. I do not remember seeing sprinklers in the tower when I went in on the FRIDAY. I did not have any issues with radio communication personally on the night of the fire, I did not use them as my main form of communication was personally face to face this was one reason we sited ourselves near BA Main Control. I heard that at the incident it was thought that the gas main had gone in the middle, and was informed that the gas took a long time to shut down. The roads had to be dug up and eventually it got shut down, but it took some time. I do not have a lot of the photographs that I had on my mobile as this mobile was given back at the end of last year as I had retired, and this mobile was for Station Managers. After the incident I sent a lot of photographs I had taken to Geoff as he requested these from me.

The notes I made on the night are the SAI notes which went with the DTW/equipment impound boxes. I cannot comment on any decision or incident logs. Safety Officers are appointed to do this important role and are given a detailed brief of what to be looking for, and what actions to take in response to their observations. This role will only be given to Crew Managers and above, usually appointed by Sector Commander Safety - responsible for all safety on the fire ground. Once appointed safety officers are to wear the safety officer tabard so as to be easily identified. Safety officers are positioned and briefed to keep a look out of the fire spread. I was not looking out for this during the fire as I was not appointed to perform this role. Crew Manages are trained in being Safety Officers.

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It is difficult to move around in built up areas of LONDON in large appliances, but this is an option that may need exploring going forward, larger aerials that have the ability to work in narrow streets, if these are available. I believe we worked well with the resources we had available. Sprinklers/Drenchers in the building would have helped, but to put sprinklers in all high rises is a huge cost, the question is who would pay. In terms of my role at the incident I do not think I would do it any differently. We had the resources we required to do our role and we could provide the Firefighters with what they needed at the rate that was requested. I was the main liaison with BA Main Control the night of the fire, and Main Control would update the Command Unit. The Command Units were extremely stretched. The fire behaved in such a way and the speed of how it spread alerts me to think that there was something drastically wrong with the building, as it was not a normal fire spread. I do not know if there were any fire safety measures in place in the tower. It appears to me that there was little to no adequate compartmentation within the tower. The fire spread from the outside in. The people inside stood little to no chance and the Firefighters are extremely frustrated with a situation that we could do little to stop.

The stay put policy is for occupiers, mainly related to flats. It also deals with Fire Survival Guidance (FSG) calls. If a person cannot leave due to smoke or fire then they should stay indoors, close the doors and gaps to prevent smoke and/or fire coming into the room. A FSG call is a call received into control where the caller believes that they are unable to leave their premises due to the effects of fire, the control officer remains on the line providing appropriate advice. The call continues until either the caller is able to leave by their own means, is rescued by the Fire Brigade, or the telephone line is cleared. They would be on the phone to control and should stay where they are and stay on the phone to control. The line is kept open for them. The fire ground will be informed where the occupant is so that they can be rescued. The stay put is usually a safe area, but if the occupier can get out safely then they should get out. I cannot comment on the stay put policy on the night of the fire.

I was very impressed with the Commissioner, Danny COTTON. She was at the scene early on and she considered the welfare of the troops, this is not something we have had before.

After the incident I put together a PowerPoint presentation to review the incident from a PEG perspective. This is called Performance Review of Operations (PRO). This was presented to PEG staff on WEDNESDAY 2nd AUGUST 2017. I have provided this presentation to Police, exhibit DMF/04. A PRO

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should be completed following any incident if we believe that it would be beneficial to those attending. PRO must take place following all make-up incidents and any incident that involve persons reported or trapped. Anything above a six (6) pump incident requires a Performance Review Command (PRC).

A number of months has passed since the incident and therefore it is a struggle to remember further details about the incident and the exact order of things. I have seen so many fatalities throughout my career as a Firefighter, my coping mechanism is to initially talk about the incident at a debrief with work colleagues then usually to put it to the back of my mind and not think about it anymore. I have done this throughout my career and it seem to have worked well in how I have coped with the number of deaths and serious incidents that I have seen.

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