

WITNESS STATEMENT

Criminal Procedure Rules, r27.2; Criminal Justice Act 1967, s.9; Magistrates' Courts Act 1980, s.5b

Statement of: DEVANI, DILLES

Age if under 18: Over 18 (if over 18 insert 'over 18')

Occupation: FIRE OFFICER

This statement (consisting of 11 page(s) each signed by me) is true to the best of my knowledge and belief and I make it knowing that, if it is tendered in evidence, I shall be liable to prosecution if I have wilfully stated in it anything which I know to be false, or do not believe to be true.

Signature: DILLES DVANI

Date: 08/12/2017

Tick if witness evidence is visually recorded (supply witness details on rear)

This statement refers to the time I attended the Grenfell Tower fire on WEDNESDAY 14th JUNE 2017.

This statement is an account of an audio recorded interview I gave to PC Kennedy OMADOYE and PC Terry SOUSTER on MONDAY 4th DECEMBER 2017. Also present during the interview was John MOGURTON from the Fire Brigade Union (FBU). During this interview I referred to my contemporaneous notes that I made on 14/06/2017 and exhibit as DDE/I. I also referred to a map which I have marked with various details relating to the incident and also used for directions that I exhibit as DDE/2.

I have been a fire fighter (FF) for coming onto 11 years and classed as competent. I have always been attached to Wembley Fire Station, station code G30, Red Watch which has 2 fire engines to attend all fires, car accidents, people shut in lifts, and flooding. I am trained in the use of the Extended Duration Breathing Apparatus (EDBA) which is a twin cylinder set that gives extra time and air depending on working conditions. I am also trained on the Fire Rescue Unit (FRU) which is a specialist truck that we have at Wembley and there are about 15 dotted around LONDON that take on various responsibilities. This truck allows us to deal with Road Traffic Accidents (RTA) in a more complex manner, people who may have fallen beneath a train or jumped. I am also trained on the use of the Aerial ladder Platform

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(ALP). Within the last few months I have received training for firefighting in a high rise block of flats in some capacity which includes lectures.

I will be referring to a number of people in my statement who are: Watch Manager Peter CLARK (WM) who is in charge of the fire station, Watch Manager CARDY (WM), Firefighter Mark BEER (FF), firefighter Enrico BELTRAMI (FF), firefighter William BOLTON (FF), and firefighter PITT (FF). I will also mention the one casualty I saw on the staircase inside Grenfell Tower as I made my way up the building for Search & Rescue (S&R).

I have not been to Grenfell Tower before and was not aware of any pre-prepared plan for firefighting for Grenfell Tower.

That night, TUESDAY 13th JUNE 2017 I got to Wembley Fire Station at approx. 1900 hrs to get ready for the start of my shift at 2000hrs. I started to prepare for my duty by checking my Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) before the roll call at 2000hrs where 4 senior officers are present. That night I didn't parade in full kit as the roll call was done in the Watch Room.

After the roll call (FF) PITT and I checked the equipment on our fire engine which we were both assigned, G301 along with (FF) BOLTON, and (WM) CLARK. My posting on the fire engine was riding the back of the 135 pump ladder (13.5m). I was aware there was a problem with the computer that the Crew Manager is responsible for to confirm postings within 10 minutes of watch change. I then spent most of my time on the 1st floor in the mess area watching TV. At approx. 0110-0115hrs a shout came out for the Command Unit which is when the bells sound and 'mobilise-mobilise' is heard followed by a tannoy announcement that indicates which fire engine/s are required. The bells mobilise which tells you which vehicle will mobilise. I was in the Watch Room at this point with (FF) BELTRAMI and so went to the terminal within the room and acknowledged it call by pressing the big red button. I believe the information on the terminal said it was a 4 pump fire and gave the address of Grenfell Tower saying it was a high rise which I then tried to find on the map as it was off our ground. I then called on the internal phone to let the Command Unit know as they attend any incident when 4 pumps, (fire engines) or more mobilise. They are incident management and at this point no fire engines were mobilised. Once I found where Grenfell Tower was on the map I gave directions where best to go and the Command Unit left. At

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this time the rest of us at the station were waiting for Crew Manager Jason HUNTER (CM) from NORTHOLT to arrive as Remote Mobilising Control (RMC) had to be informed of one of our Crew Manager's having to leave due to a personal issue. (CM) HUNTER arrived at approx. 0115- 0120hrs after the Command Unit had left and was now in charge of pump G302. As I showed (CM) HUNTER to his room a shout comes out for G301 which I was riding with (WM) CLARK, (FF) BOLTON, and (FF) PITT confirming that we were attending the same scene as the Command Unit and was a 15 pump fire at this time.

(FF) BOLTON was driving with (WM) CLARK sat beside him in the front, (FF) PITT was sat on the offside and me seated behind (WM) CLARK. I couldn't see the Mobile Data Terminal (MDT) which is in the centre console at the front of the fire engine that has road maps on it and what we use to follow where we need to get to was telling us to take certain routes to get to where we had to get to but we didn't have a specific address apart from Grenfell Tower, it wasn't as if you had this particular number or road. I was still dressed in my 'civvies' as we all got into the vehicle and headed right onto HARROW ROAD just because looking at the map it looked too complicated to try and go down from the A40 and side roads trying to navigate it. We then went towards LADBROKE GROVE where we took another right. I first saw the fire as we went over a small bridge where there is a canal at LADBROKE GROVE about a mile away, approaching the incident from a NORTH/EAST direction and how much it was already alight which was shocking because it is not what we expected to see. Looking out of the window I saw huge flames engulfing one side of the building. We got to Grenfell Tower at about 0145hrs but you couldn't see all the floors in the dark. The flames were very, very orange, fully developed and 3, 4, 5 floors high at that point. It was very clear by the flames that it was more than one floor and possibly going around onto the NORTH side. (WM) CLARK was trying to guide (FF) BOLTON as close to Grenfell Tower as possible by using the MDT as there was no rendezvous point at this time. I believe we arrived at DULFORD STREET because we encountered a number of members of the public by the pedestrianised area shouting/screaming, "you've got to come this way" and trying to tell us where to go not realising that our vehicle could not proceed past a certain point because there were barriers up on the walk way which wouldn't have allowed us to get much further. They were metal barriers across the walkway stopping vehicles proceeding any further. We arrived at the back of the Leisure Centre which looks onto a certain part of Grenfell Tower. It was pedestrianised and there was so many people there we couldn't proceed further and it was felt to maybe take a right turn and come back left and around not realising that there

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was gas/road works which is when I lost sight of the tower because of other buildings. We then came back onto BOMORE ROAD where we parked on the corner 200-300 yards from the tower. The rest of BOMORE ROAD was clogged up with fire engines so we got as close as possible, G291 Park Royal Firefighters indicating to us to park where we were. All in front of us were fire engines, at least half a dozen. The road was too narrow for parking on both sides. There were dozens and dozens of local residents trying to get our attention to go into the tower. There were plenty of other LFB crews there with BA sets on their back that had arrived before us and were going to the holding area. My view of the tower at this time was obstructed. I was already rigged in my clothing, boots, leggings, tunic, and fire hood and listening to my radio. (WM) CLARK then said to give him a minute to let him find out what they want us to do. I was in shock at the situation as I waited for him to come back which was very quick, seeming like a minute and telling us to get rigged into our BA and go down to the end of the road, take a right past the Command Unit which is a more distinctive vehicle than a fire engine and we will be meeting there. From what I heard the first crews in attendance which would have been North Kensington, possibly Hammersmith, and I don't know who the others would have been. North Kensington crews went into the flat to put the fire out in the kitchen and it was after they had put the fire out in the kitchen that I believe they were informed that the fire had spread to the external.

The four of us then made our way by walking to the holding area where there was already numerous hose laid out and plugged into hydrants that were being used on the corner of the road. You had to be careful that you didn't trip as you couldn't see in the dark. There were dozens and dozens and dozens of local residents on their phones telling us that friends, members of their family were still in the building and to get them out. LAS and the police were there at this time. I was looking at the tower which was a huge inferno, 4th floor probably onwards, 4-5 alight, very very orange which indicates a fully developed fire from the outside. I could smell the smoke but it wasn't anything you wouldn't expect from a fire that was already developed. Certainly from the one side that I could see it was almost all the way across the building. It wasn't what you would just say was one flat and upwards, it was all the way across. You could see on arrival that it was on the other side of the building which you could only describe as the rear of the building. I then reported to the holding area opposite the tower which would have been to the SOUTH. There were 2 aerial appliances that have the ability to go up to 32 metres already positioned and operational to try and deal with the fire, one I believe was on the EAST side and the other on the SOUTH side. In the holding area there were dozens of firefighters with BA sets on ready to be committed, not under air as we call it which is when you have the face mask on. I was wearing a Standard Duration

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Breathing Apparatus (SDBA) which is approx. 300L and gives 31 minutes of air. I wasn't there long about 3-4 minutes before being asked by an officer wearing a white helmet to go and get as much hose and breaking in equipment as possible. Parts of the cladding were already starting to fall away from the building, maybe 15 metres away from the SOUTH side of the building. It was raining debris and I could smell strong smoke.

(FF) BELTRAMI and I then left the holding area and made our way back to GRENFELL ROAD where we checked approximately 4 fire engines for equipment. I remember getting hose from a fire engine on GRENFELL ROAD by the junction of BOMORE ROAD and from fire engines on BOMORE ROAD itself then taking it back to the holding area. I don't know how long this took but we then took the equipment to the holding area where a request was made by a senior officer, I believe the (WM) for the holding area to get the 135 ladder. I, (FF) BETRAMI and two other firefighters from a different station then managed to get a 135 ladder from the nearest fire engine. At that time we didn't know where they wanted us to put the ladder up, which face of the building as there was no indication of where it was to be used at the time although from a personal point and with hindsight it would have been worrying to put that ladder up with the amount of debris coming down from the building. I can only assume that he wanted us to pitch the ladder because of the people you could see trying to get our attention but there was far too much debris falling and it wouldn't have been safe. We then left the ladder at the front of the building to one side, on the SOUTH side which was also our entrance to the building and the exit point for any firefighters and residents.

I was waiting with (FF) BELTRAMI, (FF) BOLTON, (WM) CLARK, and (WM) CARDY to be told if we can enter the building, congregating just under the walkway or the concrete flyover bit that was on the left hand side of the building which was our little protection area and sheltered from any falling debris. I was looking up at the tower and there was tons and tons of debris falling. What you could see is that the fire was taking hold of the building externally and burning inwards as opposed to what we normally see is a fire that is inside a building that goes outwards. The control of firefighters being called into the building was being coordinated by an officer in charge, the Watch Manager telling us if it was safe to enter the building or not. We had to then run across into the main building through the front door which was probably 20-25 yards away. We were doing this in a fashion of if there were people coming out then they were the priority to get to safe air. The first of the guys I was with that went in first to the building were

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(WM) CLARK, (WM) CARDY, and (FF) BELTRAMI then there was a delay that seemed quite long before I managed to get in and join them in the lobby area. At that time there was one of the senior officers inside who was coordinating the committal of crews up to the mezzanine floor where they were then committing crews to our Bridgehead. There were a number of firefighters around and it was a little bit smokey but comfortable enough to breathe. There were about 15-20 firefighters behind us and compared to what was happening outside it was calm, the firefighters were calm and no mad panic. There was shouting when firefighters were coming down with casualties to alert those who were there that they were coming. The visibility was fine and the lighting in the building was on. I remained waiting in the lobby area for about half an hour due to the amount of persons ahead of us and if we proceeded it would have only congested the area. It was filled with firefighters. The conditions were worsening with more smoke downstairs now than there was when we first entered to the point that I, along with others had to use my smoke hood to cover my nose to try and make it easier to breathe as it was becoming difficult. Visibility was still good but the smoke was becoming much worse. I believe that because the conditions were worsening the Bridgehead was being moved two floors lower. I remember hearing someone say that the Bridgehead was moving. The Bridgehead should be positioned 2 floors lower than the fire floor which would have made it the 2nd floor. According to our policy and procedures that is how we should set it out. The Bridgehead then moved down to the 1st floor possibly or the mezzanine, I don't know.

A decision was then made by a (WM) in the lobby area to get a fan to get rid of the smoke that was inside the lobby to somehow ventilate it. There were approx. 40 firefighters in the lobby and it was getting quite congested. The lobby area was probably no more than 4-5 metres square. When the order was made to try and ventilate, I don't know who said it but it was said to break the lower window in the front door that was now closed which would then allow the air to come through and from that aspect it should help push the smoke back. They didn't want to open the front door fully because for fear of maybe people thinking that they can use it as an access out of the building and with the amount of debris falling they wanted to make that a safe area. We were then told that we had to move out of the lobby area because, (I think) of the amount of smoke built up to what would have been the WEST part of the building. There was a communal area adjoined to the lobby inside the building which is where we then went and the conditions were pretty clear. When we were told to go into that area someone said that what had been done or what was going to be done was kick the doors or windows in to the side on the WEST side of the building to allow us to use that as an access and exit area. There were two access points in the corners and we were

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told that we would need to move to a new BA holding area which was outside of the building and across the pathway where you had the play area to you right and I think it would have been the arches running along on the opposite wall.

It was maybe 50-60 metres away from the tower and that is when I first saw residents trying to get the attention of us. They were on floors 7, 8, 9, 10 and trying to get our attention. Flames had now taken the NORTH face of the building but I don't know how high. From what I could see the flames were making their way from NORTH to WEST. You could see it burning from the top, the highest points going around and you could see those particular floors which I can only imagine as being 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12. It just seemed like it was central to the building if you were looking at it from where we were positioned. It was fully engulfed, orange flames. It was now doing a 360. What you could see on some floors were blue flames, from my experience I would say that that was quite gas rich. Whether the gas mains had been isolated or turned off I don't know. If the mains hadn't been switched off there is a chance there was some gas still in the pipework basically fuelling the fire. There was a blue flame in a couple of flats and orange flames

There were various flats on the WEST side that were still inhabited by residents that had not made their way out. My guess would be anything from floor 8 to 12 but I don't know how many people but there were a couple that got my attention. Some with torches, torches on their mobile phone. One resident was waving a white shirt/towel or something but I could not tell who they were, the fire getting closer and closer to their flat. The fire was doing a 360 around the building at this point. They were on the WEST side but more specifically the SOUTH WEST side. I was at the BA area for about 30-40 minutes, the whole crew with me and I didn't have my BA set on at the time. There were dozens and dozens of firefighters ready to commit. We then managed to get the attention of a senior officer who was standing at the front and in communication with someone inside the building and informed him that there were five of us also Extended Duration Breathing Apparatus (EDBA) trained. We managed to get information while in the holding area that EDBA users were going to the 10th floor and above. Only EDBA crews were to be committed. Not including myself the EDBA trained firefighters I was with were (FF) BEER, (FF) BOLTON, (FF) PITT, and 1 other (FF) from my station who I can't remember the name of. I think it may have been (FF) BEER who spoke to the senior officer about us being EDBA trained and I believe that he said he would obtain cylinders for us and that we could take over the sets of the crews that had just

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come out in EDBA. About 10-15 minutes later I believe it was Chelsea firefighters that had exited the building with their EDBA sets and they had left their sets so we dismantled their cylinders and put the new cylinders on that we had received and done what we call a 'fire ground A test' which is a check to basically make sure it is working properly. It is not policy and protocol to normally take over someone's BA set simply because of any issues that may be with that set. We were then told to be ready for going into the building while waiting in the holding area. I had been waiting for about an hour now.

I was looking at the building and all I know is that the flat that I could see someone shining a light/torch was no longer visible. I had almost lost track of what floors people were on because the fire had made its way all the way across and round to the WEST face which wasn't initially there when we first went outside to the holding area. You could see it on the edges of what would have been the NORTH WEST corner.

We went in as a crew of four, (FF) BOLTON, (FF) PITT, and (FF) BEER back into the lobby area where the exit had been made on the right hand side of the building with the assistance of the police to shield us from any falling debris which they had done when we first exited the building. The Bridgehead was now in the lobby which was pretty busy, smokey, and very wet as water was coming down the stairwells, and pretty messy with a lot of firefighters. Our BA entry boards were on that floor now and we have Tally's that are inserted into our BA sets which are individual to each set and when you are committed into any incident under BA you have to give your Tally to the person that is controlling the board so they know exactly who has gone in because your name is on the Tally, how much air you have at the start and they write what time you went in. The Tally's are inserted into a control board and you could fit 12 in this particular board but there was more than one board due to the amount of people being committed into the building. We were directed to a crew that was monitoring the boards and one of the senior officers there was our (CM) Jason HUNTER from NORTHOLT who was in charge of the board we went to. It was manic. There was a lot of people and a lot of noise. You are trying to tell them what you were told by a senior officer that this is my task, my role, this is where I am going and you have got people coming down the stairs in various conditions because of the work that they have carried out. You are trying to take on board what you are going to do and where you are going with all kinds of distractions around. Not ideal for the work we were going to carry out. It was very smokey and visibility was worse than before.

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I handed my Tally over to (CM) HUNTER and then as a crew we fully rigged in our BA by putting the mask on and checking each other to make sure everything was Ok. Once ready we were confirmed and told to go to floor 13 and possibly 14 if we could make it which was initially told to us by an officer in the lobby area who was organising a methodical floor by floor search. We were told that because we were EDBA and our role was to go beyond the the 10th floor to carry out any search and rescue, however there was no water available for us as firefighting media- no hose beyond the 10th floor. This is not procedure. The procedure is that you do not enter any fire without any firefighting media whichever floor it is on. If you were to enter a compartment/floor your chances of rescuing them safely is limited. I didn't think about this, it wasn't a concern as I was going to a specific floor to carry out search and rescue and we just wanted to make sure that we could get there. With the Fire Survival Guidance (FSG), my understanding of the stay put policy is that control will try and advise anyone that is not effected on the fire floors to stay put to try and keep it more manageable when it comes to evacuating the fire floor itself. If your floor is not involved in the fire then you will be advised to stay put.

We then went into and up the staircase. I didn't use my personal radio while I was in the tower under EDBA. The traffic on the radio was non-stop due to people trying to communicate. The communication in general was impossible. I was at the back and don't know who was in front but there were three others. It was very wet with a lot of hose all laid out across the floor so we had to be careful of any trip hazard. It is now quite dark in there and the only lighting is the emergency lighting but it was still light enough to make out there were 4 of us there. We were passing other crews who were making their way down from other floors and our policy is that they get priority to make their way out. The stairs were very very narrow.

I didn't hear any alarms in the building while I was there. We were informed at the beginning during our briefing that there was a large casualty on one of the floors that we were to ignore because our brief was to carry out a specific task. The assumption is that other crews will be dealing. We were also told that there wasn't a firefighter's lift and the only way that you would be entering the building was from the main stairwell. I wasn't aware of any lift and don't believe there was one in the building. All high rise buildings have a dry riser which is set into from a hydrant externally, it's twinned so you are getting water from the hydrant outside and it allows you to obtain water on whichever floor you want to fight the fire on in a high rise building. That would normally be a locked cabinet which we have keys for. They may

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have a leather strap which is holding the valve in a closed position which is ideally what you want because if you were to charge the mains from outside and that tap is open, it will just be gushing water and impossible to control it when you have to try and put a hose into it to actually work from. The hose would be charged one floor below the fire floor itself so if the fire floor is the 4th floor then we would be charging it on the 3rd floor if there was a dry riser available. If it wasn't available then we would go to the floor below and that should be enough for us to obtain the water that we require.

It was getting darker and definitely getting warmer as we progressed up. I could feel the heat coming through the top half of my fire gear. It was bearable to work in and my breathing was fine. We were told there were no signs for floors so we were doing our own count and confirming. It is part of our training as we are taught to count certain things such as floors you have progressed up and pass that message down. We knew that the entrance to the flats after going up the first couple of flights was always on the right hand side. Every time we saw a doorway you knew that you were on a floor. My estimation is that the casualty was on the 8th floor because we still had reasonable light on the stairwell because it wasn't that smokey there. We were told during the briefing that there was large casualty on the stairs that we were to progress past. The casualty was right in the middle of the stairs lying face down with head pointing down towards us. There was no movement from the casualty and we had no contact. I don't know if the casualty was male or female, ethnicity or what they were wearing, only that there was large casualty in the stairwell that we had to safely get around.

We then got to what I believe was the 10th floor and that is where you noticed that the light was almost non-existent. There was no more hose to fight fire with beyond that floor so as far as progressing upwards there was no trip hazard as far as hose goes. We then progressed to the 11th floor which was much darker and either the lighting had failed or it was that smokey that you couldn't make out any light in there. It was pitch black. I had a thermal imaging camera that was our eyes and safety. We were moving along as simply and safely as we could and I was using the camera from the back and saying when there was a door coming up. It was now very quiet and would be fair to say that we were the only crew on that floor at that particular time.

I can remember someone saying that this was our floor when we reached the 13th floor. We were close enough to each other to communicate and touch. The door was on the right hand side and we proceeded

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to follow the right hand side wall to carry out our task. I believe we were in the lobby area. You couldn't see anything, it was pitch black. You are now only going by your instinct and we were told that there are 4 flats on each floor and to check as many as we could. Following the right wall led us to a door that led to a small corridor which transpired to be the bin area. (FF) BOLTON said that this was the bin area and to go back. We then came back out and stayed on the right side conducting a methodical search. (FF) PITT and (FF) BOLTON said they had found a door. I remember (FF) BOLTON banging on the door shouting if anyone is in there saying it's the fire brigade. I don't know what the flat number was. (FF) BOLTON or (FF) PITT had the breaking in equipment, using an enforcer which is a very heavy metal tool with two handles, one at the front and one at the back. I don't know who it was but either (FF) BOLTON or (FF) PITT were hitting the door, 4 or 5 times that was hit and miss as they couldn't see. I was looking at the thermal imaging camera and telling them where to hit. All I could hear was, "oh fuck, oh fuck" because whoever was hitting the door was getting tired. (FF) BOLTON and (FF) PITT were alternating to try and get the door put in. I was banging on an adjacent door and saying it was the fire brigade. (FF) BOLTON then took the camera off me to guide (FF) PITT.

Once the door was open it was extreme heat, the heat intensity was massive. They entered the door fractionally as I was outside and I could hear one of the crew shout out if anyone was in there. I panicked because of the amount of heat and no water to help stop the fire. It just made you think in a very quick way that if I could feel that amount of heat then anyone inside would have stood no chance. The intensity was 2-3 times hotter than outside. That was the only time it dawned on me that I had nothing on me to protect my colleagues. Both (FF) BOLTON and (FF) PITT were breathing heavily. The heat now created caused (FF) BEER and I to make the judgement call to say we need to exit due to (FF) BOLTON and (FF) PITT breathing and safety. I believe (FF) BOLTON wanted to break into another flat but we were trying to explain to him that he had already used too much energy. When the door was open you couldn't see anything, I can only recall (FF) BEER saying, "Guys we need to get out of here." We then made our way back to the doorway that leads to the stairs and stayed on the left side. Because of (FF) BOLTON and (FF) PITT's breathing rate (FE) BEER was at the front and I stayed at the rear as we hadn't exerted ourselves as much. It was still very dark but as we were going down it was more bearable and comfortable. When we got to the 10th floor you could now see a little bit of light from the stairwell lighting but it was still very dark. There were crews still working on various floors who we passed in the doorways leading to the flats. It was still very smokey in the stairwell and dark. The casualty we passed

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on the way up was still in the same position. The duration of going up to the 13th floor then back down was about 30 minutes.

We then made our way back to the Command and Control where we got our Tally's back and confirmed with (CM) HUNTER that we got to a particular floor but we only managed to break into the one flat before it got too difficult. We then made our way back through the lobby area which was still very manic and full of firefighters and officers. It was very smokey and wet, visibility Ok and lighting still on. Now in the lobby area I took my BA set off. We then exited the lobby area on the WEST side where we again had the assistance of the police with riot shields because of the debris, but what I did notice is that it was now daylight. We went back to the BA holding area where we were told to relax ourselves and cool down. Looking at the tower I could still see the flames and it looked completely burnt out but still alight on the WEST side because that is all I could see on floors 8/9. It had now gone fully across that WEST side from left to right. You have got this building that is smoking from certain floors and you have got fire still burning but because of the daylight it was not as clear as in the dark that I would describe as a charred building from a certain point upwards. There were still crews being committed from where I was and all I can remember thinking is that anyone still in there they don't stand a chance, as in residents. If we have just come out of there having gone up to the 13th floor and we felt that amount of heat in our protective clothing, a resident in normal clothing or whatever they tried to do to protect themselves would not have had a chance.

We were resting in the BA holding area for quite a while, maybe an hour/hour and a half. There was no pressure on us. We just sat there and we were told that there was water available to keep ourselves hydrated. At some point someone came over with cans of Coke and Mars bars, it was there and available for you to just take it. We were then told that we needed to take our sets, SDBA/EDBA whoever had what to the BA main control that was near the front of the leisure centre. I'm not sure of the exact route taken but we eventually got there which took about 15 minutes walking from WEST to EAST. There were a lot of members of public there, a lot of upset people. There were a hell of a lot of media crews that we were passing and ignored. With the members of the public it was very difficult looking them in the face, but I don't think they had any animosity towards us. LAS were there and police as well. At this point I was about 100-150 metres away from the tower and I could see that there was an Aerial Ladder that was still working on the tower and throwing water onto the East side of the building and you could see that where

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they were throwing the water that the building was still as it would be but everything above was black, my guess would be that this was around floor 8. The roads surrounding were absolutely packed with resident's cars, fire engines, ambulances, and I think you had people who had just left their cars in situ because they could not get any further down the roads. It was just road blocks everywhere.

The BA control was in an open area on the footpath at the front of Kensington Leisure Centre and firefighters were using the grass verge area to disassemble their sets and it was where you could drop off your cylinders and where you could get new cylinders if that is what you needed and I think that is what they were doing as crews were being made available to either go in who did not have BA sets and this is where they were made available to get them. There were dozens and dozens of firefighters there doing something in one capacity or another whether they were changing their sets over, disassembling them so someone else could take it over. You had the crews who were responsible for BA main control helping out by bringing cylinders over and taking used ones away and they were coordinating with senior officer to just let them know that we've got crews here who have got EDBA sets or SDBA sets and they are available if you have anybody who can be putting this on the sets are here and we have cylinder covers, whatever they needed.

When we got there what they wanted was to have the actual main plate of the set that you put on and the cylinder covers ready for anyone who wanted to put it together and go in again, and that is what we did. We then left them there in situ and were told to rest which we did for about 10-15 minutes and I saw colleagues who were maybe walking back in the area which I can only describe would have been the SOUTH side of the building but on the adjoining roads and it very much looked like the Salvation Army truck was there and if you were hungry you could get something to eat and a cup of tea. I went to the Salvation Army truck for a cup of tea with a couple of firefighters from different stations. I then met with (FF) BEER and (FF) PITT who were just in the area and they said that they were going back towards the main BA holding area but just to where a couple of our vehicles were parked which is near TESTERTON ROAD and we just stayed there with other people from different stations. We stayed there for maybe a good hour because we were then just meeting members of the public that were there.

After this and from a personal point we didn't have much more to do as we were told that we didn't need to wear BA again and commit ourselves into the building. It was down to us whether we felt fit enough to

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do that however there were plenty of other firefighters to do that as well. This was something that we had heard from a senior officer in the BA main control area. No one was being forced into having to go under air with a BA set on again. If you chose to, it was your decision. I was just unsure personally. I don't know, after being in there once and having a better picture of what we encountered whether I wanted to put myself through that again because we were only going to go to further floors than we had initially gone to. The understanding was that floors up to 8 to 10 had been checked and covered and it was only going to be EDBA crews going beyond floor 10. So having already been up to the 13th and encountered the heat that we had there I just didn't know whether I could do the right thing to the best of my ability to go beyond knowing what I had seen throughout the evening. I probably had far too much time to process what was going on by now.

After being in the congregated area with a couple of colleagues and firefighters I went back to BA main control just because that is where everyone seemed to be and the chances were that if I wanted to find somebody they would be there. I went there to find my colleagues and (WM) CLARK to find out what we were going to be doing now/what needed doing. I was there until we were told that as a truck G301 we were able to leave the incident which was probably about 1 130hrs which was told to me by (FF) BELTRAMI. The tower was pretty much as I saw it when I first went to BA main control which was that it seemed reasonably intact below floor 8 and downwards and beyond it looked like a burnt out cinder. We didn't leave until about 1230hrs in the end with the same people I had attended the incident with, but had to go to Paddington Fire Station to do our debrief arriving at about 1300-1315hrs because of the traffic. We then probably arrived back at Wembley Fire Station at 1600- 1630hrs.

From a personal point I just wish that I could have done more. We were there and prepared to do whatever it was in any capacity but felt as though we failed. At the end of the day there were 70 deaths and there would have been numerous other people who maybe could have got out with some kind of assistance. I didn't have much thought for my personal safety initially if I'm totally honest. It wasn't until I had that panic moment when the heat came at me after opening the door to one of the flats. I felt a little bit scared as to whether we would get out of here without anyone injuring themselves.

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