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WITNESS STATEMENT

Criminal Procedure Rules, r27.2; Criminal Justice Act 1967, s.9; Magistrates' Courts Act 1980, s.5b	
Statement of: MOORE, IAN	
Age if under 18: Over 18 (if over 18 insert 'over 18')	Occupation: FIRE OFFICER
This statement (consisting of 7 page(s) each signed by me) is true to the best of my knowledge and belief and I make it knowing that, if it is tendered in evidence, I shall be liable to prosecution if I have wilfully stated in it anything which I know to be false, or do not believe to be true.	
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(supply witness details on rear)

This statement refers to the 14 June 2017 when I was on duty at Red Watch at Bethnal Green as a firefighter who attended the fire at the Grenfell Tower, London.

I am Ian Moore, a serving Firefighter (FF) with the London Fire Brigade. I have been a firefighter for approximately 12 years. I have been at Bethnal Green for the last 3 years. I am a competent firefighter. I have been trained in high rise procedures. As a watch, we practice the procedures using outside high rise venues during strategic resource training days and with 'table top' exercises in a classroom environment at the station. During the strategic resource days, we walk through what we should do and use a mock building to practice our drills. This training is a good familiarisation of the equipment. During the table top exercises, we learn of any changes to policy and this training is more frequent. Policy changes a lot and I was last trained about a year before the fire. With high rise fires, I recognise that every high rise is different as there is combinations of old build high rise flats, like the Grenfell Tower, and new build high rise flats. We are trained that if compartmentalisation fails within a high rise fire, we use Thermal Imaging Camera (TIC) equipment. I have also taken training in use of the Fire Rescue Unit (FRU). This is a 3 week initial training course and you take this course if you are to work at a station with an FRU. The FRU at Bethnal Green holds heavy cutting equipment and we deal with road traffic collisions, incidents involving water, hazardous materials and animal rescues. As well as the initial FRU course, I have also completed specific, bolt-on courses for the equipment held on our FRU. The FRU may be

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Tick if witness evidence is visually recorded □

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called to attend specific jobs, predominantly outside firefighting. The FRU may go anywhere, even out of the county area if required.

In this statement I will be referring to the crew I was working with from Bethnal Green to be Crew Manager (CM) MURPHY, FF Craig EDWARDS and FF Tony WELDON. I will also be referring to FF HALL from the Heston fire station. He was riding in the Heston Fire Rescue Unit on the night of the fire and I was paired up with him after CM MURPHY was injured. I will also refer to Commander Pat GOLDBOURN who was in Entry Control. He briefed me to go to the 11th floor. I will also refer to a resident who approached me who informed me she was calling her niece and nephew who were in a flat on the 13th floor but the phone line had failed. I did not take the lady's name or the name of her family members. I did not speak with any residents in the Tower. I will refer to a black male who fell from the Tower onto myself and CM MURPHY. This male was deceased. I will also refer to a large female who was deceased in the stairwell on the 10th floor.

In this statement I will also be referring to the location of the fire to be the Grenfell Tower, London. I have not been to the Grenfell Tower previously and I had not heard of it before.

I was on night duty on the 13 June 2017 I was stationed at Bethnal Green and was assigned to ride in the FRU. I was riding this vehicle with CM MURPHY, FF EDWARDS and FF WELDON. We were having a fairly quiet shift until the early hours of the morning on the 14 June 2017 when we got the call at approximately 0245am when we were mobilised. When a call comes in, the driver of the FRU gets the call slip from the printer and hands it to the Officer in charge of your crew. It was a strange call because the location of the call was not a full address; it was a location, Lancaster Mews. As the FRU, we know that we could be anywhere across London depending on the different skills and attributes that are available on that unit. We were aware the call was off our ground and the address was not known to us. Luckily one of the crew on the FRU also is a taxi driver and he had an idea of where to go. The address that we were being given did not seem to match the map and when I looked at the map I couldn't find the location, we thought it may be a new build and that may be why it was not on the map. The call slip described the incident to be a major incident. When we got into the FRU, we heard on the radio traffic that we were driving to a major incident where 40 fire trucks were in attendance. This alerted us that it was something quite big. Regularly on the FRU we get a phone call from Control telling us to ignore an

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incident we have been assigned to but on this occasion we didn't. We knew the area of the call was in West London so we thought if we headed west then we would hopefully receive more clarity over our radios as we approached the destination. I recall we drove through Old Street and I looked at an Atlas. The grid references did not seem to make sense and the Grenfell Tower was not visible on the Atlas. We were on the road with our sirens sounding and using blue lights. We approached Grenfell Tower from the A40. I was sitting on the nearside of the FRU in the rear of the vehicle behind CM MURPHY. On the A40 I could see the Tower in the distance to my left. Initially I thought the fire was pyrotechnics. I thought it may be similar to a fire I had previously attended near Victoria Park on BETHNAL GREENS's ground where the image of the fire was being reflected off another building with glass panels. In my experience, this sometimes happens and this makes a fire seem bigger than what it is. Not knowing the Grenfell Tower, I thought this may be the design of the building. As we got closer to the building, I could see the smoke and one whole side was alight. I do not know from which direction I was looking at the building when I saw this but one side was alight. As we got nearer, I could see the fire had gone around the building. It was a disbelieving, shocking sight to see the flames light up the dark sky at that time in the morning. I did not know the roads we drove along to get to the Tower but I think we had to drive past the Tower to get nearer to it.

We arrived at the Grenfell Tower and we had to park the FRU a way back as there were a lot of buildings surrounding the Tower. A number of fire brigade vehicles were already there and lots of members of the public were in the vicinity. We left the ERU with our breathing apparatus sets as we thought that we would need these straightaway. CM MURPHY walked to the Command Unit to inform them that we had arrived and then as a crew, we made our way to a holding area that was situated quite close to the Tower. It was on a grass verge near a Community Hall. From there, I could see the magnitude of the call we had attended. On the side nearest the holding area, it looked like the flames had taken over the whole building. There was a bit of waiting around as there was a lot going on. I could see people, the residents in certain flats, were at the windows. I could see a crew already there trying to fight the flames as much as they could. I could also see debris was coming down from the Tower. We obviously knew there was a fire but we did not know what had happened. With a lot of news in the press of terrorist attacks and the like, I didn't know what was going on and didn't know what to expect. I noticed there were Police Officers from the Territorial Support Group (TSG) present with riot shields. With a fire that size, it didn't seem to be a normal flat or building fire and I hoped it wasn't something more sinister. At first, I thought the Police

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were present to control the crowds but when I saw the riot shields, I realised they were there to help us to get into the Tower. I recognised some firefighters who were already there from courses I had previously done. They looked shocked and not 'with it'. It felt like we were waiting around for a while before being told what we were required to do. An Officer then approached the holding area and got a few of us together, including my crew, telling us they thought there was going to be an instruction that we were going to enter the Tower. A Control Point had been established in the lobby of the Tower. The firefighters who were already there were wearing Standard Duration Breathing Apparatus (SDBA) which supplies air for a working duration of 31 minutes In the FRU we carry Extended Duration Breathing Apparatus (EDBA) which provides us with a supply of air for a working duration of 47 minutes, it could last up to 50 minutes. I got the impression and from what was relayed to us that the firefighters wearing SDBA could only do so much and now what was needed were Officers with EDBA. We needed to get to the lobby to the Control Point and were told the Police would be assisting us to enter the building. The plan was for us to go to a safe area, wait for a bit and then we would enter the building.

As we made our way to the safe area which was a concrete car park or concourse, I could see an aerial appliance was being used to discharge water onto the building. The holding area was a grassed area in front of Grenfell Tower. CM MURPHY was told take us to the holing area and I presumed it was to have new, fresh crews in the holding area. I could see objects falling including pieces of cladding and windows that had given way from the building. In training firefighters are told to expect objects to fall off a high rise building but seeing that Grenfell Tower was a concrete building, I believed the fire to be really hot for debris to fall from it. Outside it was noisy. The roar and crackling of the flames was noisy and the bang of objects as they fell was noisy. I could feel the heat of the fire. The area surrounding the Tower was heavily developed with more residential areas. Waiting in the holding area was frustrating; some did not know what was going on. From the holding area, I could see people in the flats in the Tower on the, I believe, 11th or 12th floor. We were eventually told to enter the Tower and that the Police would assist us. The route we were going to take from the safe area, if you were looking at the Grenfell Tower, we were to walk up to the Tower and turn left to the entrance alongside the Tower's walls. The Police's riot shields were going to be used to cover us as we approached the Tower. The four of us in my crew stayed together but the riot shield was only large enough to cover two firefighters and the Police Officer and any one time. I was going to go into the Tower with CM MURPHY. The Police Officer was between us holding up the riot shield, CM MURPHY was in front and I was at the back. We took 2 or 3 paces into the open

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air to approach the Tower but then something fell onto us as we were under the shield, the front of the shield took the full force. CM MURPHY felt the full impact of what had hit the shield and fell to the ground. I grabbed the left side of his tunic pulling him back under the riot shield, bringing him to his feet with the Police Officer to move him to a safe area. That was when we saw we had been hit by a body that rolled in front of us. The body was a BLACK male and I could see his LEFT leg was missing, it had been cleanly severed off. The male was wearing boxer shorts and a t-shirts that was in shreds. I believed this was a body that had come down from the building but I am unsure if they jumped or fell. We took CM MURPHY back to the safe area. He was dazed as he had been hit on his head. He was seen by the London Ambulance Service for treatment. I went straight back out with the Police Officer with the riot shield to the Tower and continued to the lobby. As we walked, I had to look at the ground as there was concrete, water and debris underfoot.

In the lobby there was a bit of pandemonium but I thought this was due to the scale of the job. We entered through an entrance to the Tower that felt like a tradesman entrance. There were a lot of firefighters working, there were firefighters were using the small staircase to bring down casualties into the lobby, there were crews like us who had just entered the lobby, I could see there was stuff on the walls; Officers were trying to understand which flats had been searched and what casualties had been rescued. As CM MURPHY was receiving medical attention, we reported in as a fresh crew of three. In the lobby, we were standing in water that reached up my ankles. I thought this was not a normal working environment to be in and thought something did not appear to be right as I could see water cascading down the stairs. We were told by one of the Officers that we would be going up and our major task would be the Fire Survival Guidance (FSG) calls where control takes a call from someone who is unable to leave, keeps them on the line until firefighters reach them. This is part of the 'Stay Put' policy and is normal advice that is given to flat residents when there is a fire. The idea behind the advice is to keep the residents safe as flat fires are usually contained to the flat where the fire is or the respective floor. That was going to be our task as lunderstood a lot of crews were doing rescues on the stairs but with the floors, they had been held back by the heat of the fire. I think there had been trouble with the water as well.

The other members of crew were paired up with another pair of firefighter from another station. I was on my own waiting and crews were attending, working together and entering the Tower. A Senior Officer entered the lobby and I approached them asking them to create a crew so we could enter the Tower and

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help. I knew this was against Policy. I crewed up with some firefighters from another station, Heston, one of which was named FF HALL. The normal process at Entry Control is to receive a face to face briefing from the Commander, who on this day was Pat GOULBOURNE, and to checks the radio communications. We were briefed by Mr GOULBOURNE to go to the 11th floor where there had been some FSG calls, namely to go flats between numbers 80 to 84 and 85. Our priority was to make contact with flat 82 who Control had had contact with minutes before we had arrived but then the phone call had terminated. As a crew we did not take any firefighting media with us and we were advised by Mr GOULBOURNE 'Don't be heroes, if it's too hot, get back down'. We walked up the one staircase in the Tower. Everyone was using this staircase, it was noisy. There were residents coming down, firefighters coming down as well as going up and everyone has their own respective tasks. You had to go up the staircase to a mezzanine level before we even got to the floors. The air in Entry Control was clear, what firefighters call 'safe air'. As soon as we left Entry Control, we ensured as a crew we were using EDBA. Once we were in the staircase climbing the Tower at approximately the 3rd or 4th floor, there was wispy smoke which made the visibility really poor. Although there were lights on in the stairwell, we were not able to see the markings on the floor that informed you what floor you were on. I later understood the floor number signage was obscured by the floor light. We had been warned of the possibility of life extinct bodies in the stairwell when we were briefed. Where we were ascending the Tower, we-saw another firefighter crew who had been assigned with a different task. We tried to talk with them but communications were difficult anyway as we were all wearing breathing apparatus (BA) and radio communications had failed. I encountered one deceased body on 10th floor I think. The person was large and I was unable to tell whether they were male or female but from there, we believed we were near the floor we had been tasked to attend. The body was lying on a hose that was on the ground and to progress up the Tower, we had to walk over the body.

When we got to the 11th floor, we opened the door to the floor and I recall feeling the strength of the heat, it was unbearable. I was feeling the concrete wall on the floor and it was so hot it felt like my hands were burning. The Thermal Imaging Camera (TIC) we were carrying as a crew went funny, possibly due to the extreme temperatures. We had no water as from the Control Point we chose to take and enforcer up with us to aid our entry into flats as well as our EDBA and TIC. The enforcer is a heavy piece of equipment so carrying water was not an option at the time, I knew this was against the Fire Brigade's policy but we took the equipment we needed. On the 11th floor, the conditions were pitch black, you

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could not see anything due to the smoke. When I entered with the crew, we all kept as low as possible. My colleague had the TIC camera but I did not know the layout of the floors and where the flats were, that was an issue. I don't think the information was reaching the lobby fast enough to inform the new crews going up the Tower. Another problem we had was with the communications to pass onto other crews. I was unable to hear anything from the radio I was holding and one of the firefighters I was with could not hear anything from their radio. We have 'leaky feeders' that help improve radio communications and I think I saw one leaky feeder as we were walking up but if it had been kicked, it wouldn't have worked. There were no radio communications. On the 11th floor, we came to the first flat as we turned left out of the staircase. It was difficult to identify the flat numbers. At this door, the TIC registered a white glow all around the door frame and we knew that behind that door it was very hot and there would be fire present. From my experience, I thought is there was anyone in that flat, they were probably deceased. It was difficult to communicate to the people I was working with at that point as wearing BA makes communication difficult anyway but I had only just met this crew in the lobby and I was concerned that may not think in the same way as me. I felt the back of my neck was burning from the heat and thought that I did not have the right clothing on even though I was in full uniform. We were keeping low as we are trained to do but the heat caused us to lie on the floor as we navigated to the flats. When we reached each flat, we tried to make as much noise as we could but we were receiving no response. In our crew, we had a quick chat and decided to withdraw out of the lobby through the door as it was becoming so hot and then reassess what we could do. We felt a bit defeated as we did not have any water with us to fight the fire. We decided to go to the 12th floor to see what the conditions were like up there and see if anything could be done.

We got to the 12th floor and the TIC was not registering as much heat as floor 11. The first flat we came to on our left as you entered the floor had its door open; there was no response from anyone in this flat. We felt for the next flat and the door was locked. This was flat 93. As a crew, we were tired and we believed there were other crews following us but I felt like we had failed in with our original task and we wanted to come back to Entry Control with a result. We used the enforcer to open the door to see if there anyone in there but this was a crucial decision we as a crew had to make as there is always a concern that you could let air into the flats, make conditions worst and cause a backdraft. We entered flat 93 and again there was no response from anyone in that flat The conditions in the flat did not appear to be as bad as the floor below but I could see there were pockets of fire and burning embers present in the flat. The flat felt

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like it had an open plan layout and the ceiling was exposed. We searched this flat and saw the bed was made; it looked like nobody was present. We came out of this flat and decided to walk back down to the Control Point. We briefed the person in charge update them of what we had done and what we couldn't do as we were unable to use our radios. We then, as BA procedure, retrieved our BA tallies from the Entry Control Officer (ECO) following closing down our BA sets. After this, we exited the Tower to cool down and have a bit of a rest. The riot shields were still being used to protect us from falling debris as we left the Tower. Outside I serviced my EDBA set completing a firefighter A test where I change the air cylinder and face mask. We do this to ensure the BA set is fit and well to wear and use again. I also had some refreshments.

After a short time, I walked back to the Tower with the Heston crew to await our next task. With this crew, I retraced the safe route back towards the Tower but this time we entered the Tower through an entrance on the other side, the back of where I had previously entered. There was not so much debris coming down as much now. I entered a different room with firefighters in it and I could see water in the room on the ground. As a crew we were told that we would be going back into the Tower so we went to Entry Control which had now moved from the lobby to the 4th floor. Again it was very cramped in Entry Control and I do not know why the decision had been made to move. We were briefed to go to the 10th floor where some hoses to fight fire had been laid out for use. We were to search the flats on the floor and clarify whether there were any casualties. We were told to ignore any bodies present unless there were any signs of life. I believed at this time, a search was to be attempted of all flats on the floor rather than concentrating on the FSG calls. We were told one of the hoses had burst in the stairwell and there were crews going up to deal with that. Once that was cleared then we would ascend to floor 10. When we did go up, I could see the management of the laying out of the hoses was horrendous, as it would be in the dynamic situation we were in but the hoses were all tangled. We found the burst hose; the hose had gone up the floors and then doubled on itself. Another firefighter shouted up to us to tell us the hose had not been changed and I could see and feel a lot of pressure in the hose. This was possibly the reason why it had burst. It was also entangled with another hose so we decided to use this hose to fire fight. The body we had seen in the staircase earlier on the 10th floor was still present and obstructing the hoses by lying over the hoses in the staircase reducing the space available for the number of hoses there. I wasn't sure where the hoses were plugged into to receive water. Normally the hoses are plugged into a dry riser outlet in the building, which is fed from a riser main. This is externally fed from an appliance and water hydrant

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outside. On a staircase, you should have a sufficient length of hose to reach the fire floor to fight fire. Ideally the entry point for the hose would be in the lobby within clean air so you could test the hose and branch, The entry point on this occasion was outside and was well protected. It is not normal for hoses to break.

The 10th floor was smoky. We searched one flat on the floor but there were no signs of life within and it was completely charred. I saw the windows in the property had blown. We did not see any bodies. I opened the door to another flat and I could see it was completely ablaze. We put water onto the fire to extinguish it but as soon as you stopped, the flames grew again. The water was having no effect and was almost acting like an accelerant. We resorted to just opening doors to have a looking inside the flat as we were unable to go in any further as we were restricted by the hoses being tangled on the stairwell. One of the firefighters I was with went into another flat but again, the conditions in the flat were bad and without a hose that could reach, we were unable to fight the fires in the flats. Again, we had no radio reception so we decided to go back to Entry Control to relay our findings. We were unable to completely check the 10th floor due to the restriction of the hose. As a crew, we were fire fighting for approximately 20-25 minutes and at no point did the alarm sound on our BA informing us we were low on air.

At Entry Control, we were told to rest and we were unable to use our EDBA sets again as were had already entered the fire and used the EDBA twice, this is the maximum amount of occasions you can use it before it needs to be fully cleaned. When we left the Tower, it was now daylight, the sun was breaking through. I later found out the large deceased person in the stairwell was moved to a doorway by a different crew, I do not know who they were. I was told this person was a female but I couldn't tell. I left the Tower between 1st -2nd and I was in the FRU where everyone was told to write notes of the incident at Paddington fire station. It was the first time I had been required to do this. I have never made notes in a decision or incident log. I did not know where CM Murphy had been after his injury. After this writing my notes, I returned to my home station in Bethnal Green. I finished my duty at 5pm and I returned for my next shift, another night shift, at 8pm.

After the event I, with other firefighters were told what had happened, but not at the time. The information being passed to the crews was minimal and there seemed to be a lot of concentration on EDBA to replace SDBA. Everything happening was away from Policy and it seemed to be an 'off the

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cuff operation. In both the flats and the communal areas of the Tower, I did not notice any fire alarms, there were no bright lights, there were no floor plans on show of the floor layouts and nobody shared any information of the floor layout. There were smoky conditions in the stairwell but we were unaware at the time where the fire had started. I heard after the event that the initial fire was dealt with properly but I do not know why the fire developed how it did, Grenfell Tower was the way the building was. I believe it was pointless to move Entry Control to the 4th floor. It was all beyond my previous experience. I didn't feel like a hero, I think we all felt like we had failed as it was a struggle to fulfil your task. I received no injury and did not require any medical treatment.

I have handed my original notes to DC Deamer and I exhibit them as IKM/1.

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Ian MOORE

