

WITNESS STATEMENT

Criminal Procedure Rules, r27.2; Criminal Justice Act 1967, s.9; Magistrates' Courts Act 1980, s.5b

Statement of: BRODRICK, MARK

Age if under 18: OVER 18 (if over 18 insert 'over 18')

Occupation: FIRE OFFICER

This statement (consisting of 16 page(s) each signed by me) is true to the best of my knowledge and belief and I make it knowing that, if it is tendered in evidence, I shall be liable to prosecution if I have wilfully stated in it anything which I know to be false, or do not believe to be true.

Signature: M BRODRICK

Date: 24/05/2018

Tick if witness evidence is visually recorded ☐ (supply witness details on rear)

I am the above named person and my details are known to Police. This statement is in relation to the GRENFELL TOWER fire that occurred on WEDNESDAY 14th JUNE 2017.

On MONDAY 14th MAY 2018 I was interviewed by CI Martin PORTNOY and DC Nav JOHAL at HAMMERSMITH FIRE STATION. Below is a detailed summary of my account. I was able to refer to notes I made of the incident whilst providing this statement to Police.

I will refer to the following items in this statement, which I exhibit:

- MAB/01 - Notes made on 14/06/17 re: Grenfell Tower attendance
- MAB/02 - Map of area around Grenfell Tower

I am employed by the LONDON FIRE BRIGADE (LFB) as a Firefighter, and my pay number is [REDACTED] 8X. I have been a Firefighter since I was [REDACTED] years old, I joined the LFB on 14th APRIL 1989. I did the initial twenty (20) week training course at LFB's SOUTHWARK TRAINING CENTRE as a new recruit. After this training course I completed a six (6) month test and then a test after a year, then a four (4) yearly test before you I became fully qualified and classified as a 'competent' Firefighter. I have been a Firefighter for twenty-nine (29) years.

After my initial training I was posted to FULHAM FIRE STATION where I spent eight (8) years before moving to HESTON FIRE STATION. I spent fifteen (15) years at HESTON FIRE STATION. Here I was

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trained to on the Fire Rescue Unit (FRU) and for around eight (8) or nine (9) years whilst on the FRU I saw everything you could imagine as a Firefighter. At the time there were only around six (6) FRU's in the LFB so this was a quite a specialist role. The appliance had cutting machinery on it which could be used at car crashes and I attended a number of car accidents. I saw a lot of deceased people whilst in this role and this role on the FRU had prepared me to see deceased people whilst in the job. During my time at HESTON FIRE STATION and in the FRU role I would be training daily, including at the fire station and out, for example on a boat on the Thames, for rescues in the water/river. The training we had at the time was practical, not computer based as we do now. Training was constant and I was at a stage in my career where I wanted to move closer to home and so I moved to HAMMERSMITH FIRE STATION when I had the opportunity. I have been based at HAMMERSMITH FIRE STATION (G36) for around seven (7) years and this is where I am currently based, on RED WATCH.

At HAMMERSMITH FIRE STATION there are three (3) appliances: Pump (G362), Pump Ladder (G361) and a Scientific Support Unit (SSU). The Pump Ladder has a larger ladder than the Pump. There are only two (2) SSU's in the Brigade. This is an appliance which is like a mobile laboratory. I am not trained to use the SSU. HAMMERSMITH is quite a busy fire station to work from.

Training is regularly done and this is led by a computer system. We are always out doing training including drills and using the different machines that we may need to use for jobs. The training we do is continuous as we need to know what we are doing for jobs we are going to. This includes training for high rise incidents and using the equipment we would for high rise incidents. We did a training drill around two (2) years ago in GREEN DRAGON LANE, BRENTFORD. There are a number of tower blocks there, similar height and size of GRENFELL TOWER, along GREEN DRAGON LANE. A number of different stations got together for this drill and we went through where appliances would be sited and the different roles. This would be taking into consideration safety aspects. We have done real fire training at SOUTHWARK TRAINING CENTRE. Around twenty (20) million pounds was spent on a Fire House for training. Here fire would be created, including smoke, the fire spread and real fire training would be carried out. This facility is no longer used for real fire training due to the plastic materials used for the site melting and being destroyed.

Having being based in HAMMERSMITH and other WEST LONDON boroughs I have attended a lot of high rise calls in my career as a Firefighter. Around six (6) months before the fire at GRENFELL TOWER there was a fire in SHEPHERDS BUSH GREEN. This was a twenty (20) pump fire in a tower

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block. Quite often after attending incidents we would have a debrief back at the station, these could be an informal chat amongst us, or more formal via a performance review. It would be dependent on the call.

I am familiar with GRENFELL TOWER as I have been out on many calls/shouts there. As HAMMERSMITH is a neighbouring borough to KENSINGTON & CHELSEA we get called out there and I think I must have been there around three (3) or four (4) to calls over the years. I know there was a boxing gym in the basement of the tower and Firefighter Dan BADILO from NORTH KENSINGTON used to go to that boxing gym. From my previous experience of attending GRENFELL TOWER I already knew that the access to the tower was bad for the appliances. I knew the layout of the tower and information such as where the dry risers were. This was from attending the tower, although I do not remember having attending to put out a fire at the tower. It may be false alarms from alarms going off. I cannot recall details of any specific calls to GRENFELL TOWER. I did know having attended the tower that it was bad if we got something at the tower due to the access restrictions to the tower. I have not been involved in any familiarisation visits at GRENFELL TOWER as it is not my ground. I am not aware of any pre-prepared firefighting plans for GRENFELL TOWER.

On TUESDAY 13th JUNE 2017 I was on duty at HAMMERSMITH FIRE STATION (G36) and I was on a night duty which started at 2000hrs. It has been almost a year since the incident so I cannot remember all details of the incident. I was assigned to the Pump Ladder, call sign G361. In my crew was Watch Manager (WM) Paul WATSON. I cannot remember who was driving and who else was in the crew. There would have been four (4) of us. I think there were four (4) people on the Pump, so eight (8) of us in total working that night shift on the two (2) appliances at HAMMERSMITH. As I was not driving I was wearing Breathing Apparatus (BA) and one other person would also have been wearing BA. We had Standard Duration Breathing Apparatus (SDBA). The amount of air that SDBA gives is dependent on what you are doing, if you are sat around it can give you half an hour, if you are working hard then it would be less.

I believe at the time of the call I would have been in bed, I think the crew would have been in bed on a rest period given the call came after 0100hrs (WEDNESDAY 14th JUNE 2017). Our pump was mobilised, this came out on the tannoy. The tannoy would state what appliance is being mobilised. I believe at that stage the call was to a four (4) pump fire. Within a minute or two (2) of the Pump being mobilised the Pump Ladder was mobilised. We were being mobilised to a six (6) pump fire. Although it was likely we were going to the same call, at that time I was not certain. I got out of bed, went

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downstairs, down the pole to the appliance. I would have been wearing my usual uniform and I got my fire ground gear on, and got my BA ready, although I did not have it on at this stage.

I got into the rear of the Pump Ladder. I was sat behind WM WATSON, so rear near-side of the appliance. I was told the call slip said it was a six (6) pump fire to GRENFELL TOWER. The call sign would have had details of those mobilised to the call, it may have already had G362 on the call slip but I cannot remember now. Also in the appliance would have been the other BA wearer and the driver, so the four (4) of us. We are an experienced watch, we assumed it was just another call to a fire, we did not expect anything else.

On route WM WATSON would have been able to access the MDT, I do not have access at the back. We knew how to get to GRENFELL TOWER as it is not far from our ground and it is somewhere we had been before. I cannot remember any specific messages on the radio. I have my own personal radio and the appliance would have a main set. It did not take long to get to the incident ground, around three (3) minutes. We drove under blue light conditions and drove via Shepherds Bush Green, Holland Park Roundabout, and left onto St Anne's Road and then towards Grenfell Road. There was no traffic getting to the incident and we had no issues getting there.

It was here I first saw GRENFELL TOWER from the window whilst sat in the back of the Pump Ladder. I saw one (1) flat alight, the fire was punching out from inside the flat. From where I could see it I thought it may be the 5th or 6th floor of the tower. I now know it was a flat on the 4th floor which was first alight. WM WATSON must have seen the fire too and told us in the rear to get our BA sets on. We started getting our sets on whilst getting to the incident. At this stage in my head was it was a flat fire, and that was all I saw at that time. It still seemed like a normal job.

We saw Crew Manager (CM) DAVIS on GRENFELL ROAD, he was on HAMMERSMITH's Pump. He told us not to continue down GRENFELL ROAD as it was a narrow road and it was too narrow for the appliances. We parked the Pump Ladder on BOMORE, junction with GRENFELL ROAD. I have marked this location with 'A' on MAB/02. I have marked MAB/02 with 'B' where CM DAVIS was when we spoke to him. I have marked MAB/02 with 'C' for what side of the tower the flat I initially saw was alight. This was on the East side of the tower. Once the appliance was parked and with my BA set on I got off the appliance. We were talking about what to take and we picked up some equipment. I cannot remember now what we were picking up, it could have been a hose and a branch.

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We started walking and then I turned and saw the tower again, probably a minute or two (2) after I had first seen it. I was shocked by what I saw. The side of the tower I could see was 90% alight, this was the East side of the tower which faces the green. It did not look real, the fire was spreading really, really quickly. I could see it spreading. I remember thinking and saying 'fuck, fuck, that's really, really quick'. The fire was licking up the side of the tower. I could see the fire whizz up the side of the building, go sideways and back down the side of the building. I thought this was bad. In a minute the fire had gone from one (1) flat to 90% of one side of the tower alight. I had never seen anything like this before, never seen a fire behave in that way. Walking up to the tower I was around twenty (20) foot away watching the fire spread. I could hear people screaming, I could see people at the windows, they were screaming. I could see people running around outside. The scene was chaotic. I wanted to get into the tower and get people out of the tower.

WM WATSON saw the WM from NORTH KENSINGTON, I cannot remember his name. I heard WM WATSON say to the NORTH KENSINGTON CM to make it pump twenty (20). This WM would have been the most senior officer on scene and so would have been the incident commander at that stage. I cannot tell you who was the incident commander later on during the incident or where they were based.

We walked towards the main entrance of the tower, I have marked this as 'E' on MAB/02. I am not aware of any other entrances to the tower. I walked through the main entrance and then up to the mezzanine floor. On the entrance level the lights were on. I could hear a lot of screaming, I am not sure if this was from inside or outside of the tower, or both. I could not hear any alarms going off, I did not see any sprinklers in the tower. There was no smoke in this area or the mezzanine area. The area was chaotic, with LFB personnel and with members of the public. There was around ten (10) to fifteen (15) LFB personnel in the lobby area. On scene were the two (2) crews from HAMMERSMITH, crew from NORTH KENSINGTON and crew of KENSINGTON.

From the ground floor there is a staircase to the right which leads up to the mezzanine floor. At the mezzanine floor we were told here by the officer, I cannot recall who, it was an officer from KENSINGTON, to go to the floor above the fire to firefight. This officer was the Watch Manager for KENSINGTON Red Watch. This was the first task I was given. I was in a crew with FF BRODERICK and CM SEPHTON. CM SEPHTON is from HAMMERSMITH FIRE STATION and FF BRODERICK is from KENSINGTON. There was a BA board on the floor. I cannot remember if I put my tally in here. This usually goes where the Bridgehead is when you go past Entry Control. The officer had told us to put

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on our BA there and go under air, but I disagreed with him and I told him that we would out BA on further up. We would have wasting air putting it on there and then walking up so we decided that we should go under air up a few floors. Where we were the visibility was good, there was no smoke and it was fine to breath. I was made aware the fire was on the 4th floor. So our task was to go to the 5th floor.

I could still hear screaming and I saw people coming down the stairs. There were not lots of people coming down, maybe five (5) or six (6) people. Male and female, I am not sure if there were any children, I cannot give details of any of the people I saw. I knew from previous experience of being in the tower of the main staircase. I remember thinking when on scene and making our way up that this could not been the only staircase. It was so narrow, you could not fit two (2) Firefighters in BA side by side. At this stage the main stairway was clear. I could still hear screaming and there was also shouting amongst us about what we were doing. The whole scene was chaotic.

The three (3) of us; myself, FF BRODERICK and CM SEPHTON, went under air and made our way up the 5th floor. At the lobby door from the stairwell to the 5th floor I saw FF Wayne ARCHER walking out, he was covered in black soot. He was shouting at me that it was red hot in there and he could not see because of the roaring fire. I could see thick black smoke coming from behind him from the doorway so I grabbed him and pulled him out so we could close the door to smoke the smoke getting into the stairway FF ARCHER wanted to go back into the 5th floor lobby area as his colleague was in there, we got him out to, who was behind him. They had a hose in the lobby area, as we came out the hose was through the door, this compromised the door and so there was thick black smoke coming out. We closed the door to stop this smoke compromising the stairway which should be smoke-free as the only exit route.

FF BRODERICK and CM SEPHTON and I then went into the 5th floor, there was a hose and branch on the floor which we took. I believe we had a thermal imaging camera (TIC) with us but I do not know who had it of the three (3) of us. A TIC is a camera we can use in heat, but they are not a good piece of kit. The hotter it gets the less effective they are as the screen goes white when it gets too hot. I cannot tell you what happened to this TIC as I do not remember. FF ARCHER had told us that we could not see in the lobby area due to the smoke and that we should follow the right hand wall around. That the second door would be a front door to a flat. I think the lobby door was a self-closing door but I cannot be sure. I cannot tell you if any of the flat doors were self-closing. Whilst in the lobby I could hear people making their way down the stairs, I could not see anyone as we were in the lobby area. The stairwell was behind me and this is where I could hear people coming down the stairs, I could still hear screaming.

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The three (3) of us were in the 5th floor lobby feeling our way round and we got to the 2nd door on the right which was a flat door. The lobby was full of black smoke so we could not see anything. The flat door was open, I believe this was the flat above the flat where the fire started on the 4th floor. We went into the flat and the heat was intense inside the flat. The internal doors in the flat were closed. We were trying to pull the hose into the flat but could not pull it in far enough. It could have been stuck or tangled up. We did not open the doors inside the flat to get to the rooms as we did not have the hose, and so did not have firefighting media to fight any potential fire behind the doors. The heat was so intense and opening the doors would have been dangerous.

CM SEPHTON said lets go to the floor above, 6th floor, to check the layout above to familiarise ourselves before heading back to the 5th floor. So we felt our way back out of the 5th floor and into the stairwell, and up to the 6th floor. The visibility was okay here and we had a look at the lobby layout. I do not think we went into any of the flats on the 6th floor. I cannot remember if the lobby door to the 6th floor was open or closed, or whether it was a self-closing door. After looking at the layout of the 6th floor we back down the stairwell to the 5th floor. The stairwell was now filling up with smoke. There was hose on the stairwell, I think one (1) 45ml jet from another crew.

Back on the 5th floor we took the hose and were trying to firefight but there was problems with the hose. We wanted to get into the flats to put the fire out but we could not pull the hose there. Walking into the 5th floor lobby I knew there was a bin shoot first door on the right and then a flat. We knew the fire was on the outside of the tower and we wanted to get into the flats to put out the fire but the hose issues was preventing us from doing this. Due to this we could not do much about the fire and we could not open the internal doors due to the risk behind the doors. I cannot tell you how the water pressure was due to the fact we could not actually use the hose due to the problems we encountered. The hose was already charged.

Our air was getting low and CM SEPHTON said we needed to get back down so we walked back down the stairway. We must have collected our tallies, but I cannot remember doing this. But we must have as our alarms did not sound. We then walked back down to the mezzanine. I saw residents coming down the stairs, still not a lot. In my mind I was thinking there must be a lot of residents living in the tower but not a lot coming down the stairs. I could still hear screaming. By now there was a lot more crews about, lots of Firefighters in the tower and the scene was chaos. WM WATSON told me to draw a picture on the wall of where had been to show what we had done. I got a chinagraph and drew a layout of the flat we

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were in. It was not great detail as we only went into one corner of the flat but people would have added to it with what they did when they went in later. We were in the tower around twenty (20) to thirty (30) minutes, less than that maybe under air. WM WATSON was doing a million things and information on what we had done was passed onto him.

The three (3) of us then went outside of the tower. I saw that a Turntable Ladder was now on site. It has been reversed up towards the tower and was under the covered area near the tower. I have marked the location of the Turntable Ladder on MAB/02 as 'F'. I looked at the building and I saw that the whole side of the building was alight. I was watching flat after flat becoming alight. I could see the flames moving up the tower, across and flats going up in flames. I kept thinking it looked like a film set, it did not seem real. The scene was chaotic with people everywhere. I was sat down on a grassy area, I was shattered, and I was watching the fire. I am not sure if the fire was inside the flats at this stage, it was definitely on the outside. There were lots of Firefighters around now, they looked in shock and were looking at the building fully alight.

I was sat there for around two (2) to three (3) minutes, I am not sure where the rest of my crew had gone. An officer from FULHAM, Mark (I do not know his last name) he was on a Command Unit, I have marked the location of the Command Unit as 'G' on MAB/02. He asked me to go with him and that he needed a favour, that he wanted me to help a Watch Manager (WM) out. The WM was from LAMBETH Red Watch, I cannot remember his name. He was under the covered area. I saw that the WM was dealing with Fire Survival Guidance (FSG) calls. Fire Survival Guidance (FSG) is all down to building construction and keeping people their flats. The stairs should be protected. Those people inside would call 999 and a machine/appliance would get sent for that call. BA crews would then go in and get the people out safely. There were a lot of bits of paper on the floor and the WM appeared under pressure. The WM explained to me what he was doing. He showed a photograph on his mobile phone which had details of flats. There were loads and loads of flats on there and numbers of people. We needed to transfer this information from the photograph onto paper, on the FSG forms.

At first we looked at around thirty (30) or so flats. We were sat on the floor under the covered area filling out FSG forms with the information we had. We put completed forms to the side. Looking at the information on the forms I was seeing things like, '5 people trapped in a flat' and thought 'they are fuck'. We were writing out the forms and then giving the slips to runners to give to the Bridgehead. The forms have two (2) parts to them which have the same information, we kept one part and the other part goes to

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the Bridgehead. I cannot tell you how many forms we completed, maybe thirty (30), forty (40), fifty (50). Then we got another bit of paper which had a different list. We carried on completing the FSG forms, there was so much paperwork. We got a board for the paperwork. I put the board on top of a bin and that then became our desk. We had easily written down around one hundred and fifty (150) people, the numbers were getting larger and larger. People would have been moving around inside the tower too, so then numbers of people in flats would change. There were hundreds (100's) of bits of paper around.

Whilst we were doing this there were people running around, members of the public, the scene was still chaotic. I could not tell you how many people were around and what people were doing, we were concentrating on what we were doing with the FSG slips. One (1) man came up to us to tell us his brother was trapped inside. I saw another two (2) black males, probably around mid-twenties (20s) who kept on going back and forth. They were telling us that they could see people in the tower and that we needed to get the machines to the tower, get a ladder up there and get the people trapped out. They were screaming at us, saying people were hanging out the back and why couldn't we get to them. I grabbed one of the males and told him that we were doing what we could. They were trying to get into the tower themselves and I said that they could not go in, they would not be able to get back out. Although there was a Police cordon in place now somehow there were still some people inside the cordon.

I remember one (1) man was behind me and he gave his mobile phone to CM Chris BACHELOR and asked him to talk to her. I could hear them speaking and realised that CM BACHELOR was talking to the man's partner, who was mother of their child. CM BACHELOR was on the phone for a long time, I do not recall how long but remember it being a long time. From what I was told the mum was screaming, the baby had died in the tower and she was screaming. Then it went quiet and then the phone then went dead. This man was the baby's dad and he was behind us during this time. There was man that tried to get into the tower, it could have been this man. He was a black male, in his 40s. He was saying my family is in there.

Looking at the tower I could see the tower still burning. I saw people at the windows, I could not tell you how many people I saw. I remember seeing the light from torches from inside the tower and people hanging clothes out of the windows to get attention. I was thinking the tower is going to collapse and I had images of 9/11 in my head. The tower looked it I could have been moving. Even with the thought of the tower collapsing firefighters were still desperate to go into the tower to try and rescue people. There was debris coming down. There was loads and loads of debris around the tower. The amount of debris

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falling was intense at stages. The debris was things such as insulation and foam cladding. I could not see the base of the tower due to the amount of debris that had fallen. I remember seeing a pair of legs by the door of the tower, this was in the debris. I do not know where the body that belonged to the pair of legs was. I cannot describe whether it was a male or females legs, or what colour or description, I just know it was a pair of legs. There was a body under the tarpaulin behind us, the body was covered up so it was not visible. Someone had said that a lady dropped her baby from a window to get the baby out of the tower. This is not something I saw myself and what I heard from someone.

We were still under the covered area, this area was where the bins were kept near the tower. Where there were entrances to the garages, and near the front of the tower opposite the entrance. There was Police with shields who were assisting Firefighters in and out of the tower, and residents out of the tower. Before the Police were doing this there was an officer, I know an officer rank from LFB as he was wearing a white hat, who was keeping a look out for falling debris and shouting out 'go' when Firefighters could enter and leave and when they could bring casualties out. The debris falling became more intense when the Police were assisting. I remember seeing around six (6) to eight (8) casualties come out of the tower whilst I was in this area. I cannot describe the people now but I do remember seeing a baby in a Firefighter's arms, the Firefighter passed the baby to someone else outside the tower.

We were dealing with these FSG calls for a couple of hours and as we were doing this the work was slowing down gradually. It was slower and slower and then the calls stopped. There was no one left to call, I thought the people left in there must now be dead, that is why the FSG calls had stopped. There were so many calls and I did not see that many people leave the tower, I was tallying up the numbers in my head and thought they must be so many people left inside. The WM I was with was saying we need to do this properly, so was I, we needed to check things tallied up and he was saying that this will be going to court. This was the first time I have done this FSG job before.

Whilst it was quiet the WM went to the other side to the tower to find out what was happening. He went to see if he could get further information for the FSG calls, and whether we could tally up residents with the information we had collated. When he came back he said it was chaos with hundreds of people around, emergency services and residents. I am not sure where he had gone, he did not come back with any further information. When it was quiet in terms of FSG calls I thought they must be dead. I had all this information about people being inside the tower and it felt horrible. There must have been loads of people in the tower, and I thought at least half of the FSG callers must be dead. When the WM came back

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I said what are we going to do now? He said to get the paperwork together and let's go to the Command Unit. I picked up the FSG paperwork, it must have been around four (4) to five (5) inches thick of paperwork, and we walked to the Command Unit on GRENFELL ROAD, location 'G' on MAB/02. I went into the Command Unit, there were around six (6) to eight (8) officers in there. I spoke to one of them and told him that this is the FSG paperwork we had and I gave him the FSG paperwork. He was very grateful for the work we had done and told us thank you, that we had done a brilliant job. I do not know who this officer was, he was a senior officer. He thanked us for the work we had done and took the paperwork from me. We then left the Command Unit, I do not know what Command Unit it was, I just know the location of it.

I had my personal radio on me but I did not use it. I did not need to for this incident and it was too big a job for me to use it. There was already a lot of traffic on the radio with updates from officers. I did not know when I first entered the tower that the fire lift was not in use but afterwards I was told by someone that a guvnor stopped people using the lift as it was full of smoke. I also know that a crew was being sent to the top of the tower, to the roof, to set a line up, it was an FRU crew that were being sent to do this. So they would have been EDBA wearers. This line is a rope system for line rescue. This was also stopped by WM WATSON, probably because it would not be safe.

Outside on the fire ground there was fire gear everywhere, all over the road. Equipment, helmets, BA for example. I went back to the grass area, I have marked this as 'H' on MAB/02. I could see two (2) sides of the tower completely alight, the South and East side. Knowing what I knew about the number of FSG calls I knew it was not good news about the number of potential fatalities. I was shocked by what I was seeing, I was still thinking this was like a film set. I was also thinking about the people left in the tower. In that area opposite the sports centre there were around a hundred Firefighters. Some were waiting to go in the tower, others had been in, others sorting equipment. There were hundreds of emergencies personnel around, LFB, Police, LAS. Different ranks, different appliances, lots of equipment. I saw tents being put up. There were people everywhere. Press were around too, I saw press cameras. I did not speak to anyone from the media. Nor did I take any photographs of the fire, I did not have my mobile phone with me, it was back at HAMMERSMITH Fire Station.

By now I was very thirsty, I had been there a number of hours. I knew there would be a Salvation Army van there as they usually come to any incident six (6) pump and over. I went to look for this to get a drink, and I found the van on BOMORE, I have marked this location as 'J' on MAB/02. Around the

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Salvation Army van were a few other Firefighters, including some from my station. We were talking about the job, I cannot remember specifics. From here I could see the East side of the tower. It was still alight, the fire was roaring. I grabbed a drink and something to eat, and we checked with each other we were all okay. There was a helicopter around now and daylight was approaching. The whole building was still roaring with fire. On the East side I noticed there were a few flats at the bottom that appeared untouched by the fire, and one other side to the tower too. Some of the flats were more alight than others, I thought it must be the gas, the gas must still be on. The fire was all colours, yellow, red, it was changing colour.

I walked to a couple of hundred metres from the tower and sat on the ground waiting to know what we were going to do next. There was a rumour going around that we would have to go to PADDINGTON Fire Station to complete a statement. There was a cordon up and at the cordons people were giving out food and drink. We then got told we could leave and to go to PADDINGTON. We knew we had to go there but we were tired and wanted to call our families. We could not leave the area straight away as it took ages to move some appliances out of the way. Our appliance was still parked in the same location and some others were blocking the way out. Some appliances were left unlocked and we could move them but others were locked and so it took a while to get machines moved so we could make our way from the incident ground.

We then drove to PADDINGTON Fire Station, I cannot remember what time we left the scene, I know it was daytime. At PADDINGTON there were a lot of machines there, at least ten (10) to twelve (12) appliances. We were told to go to the offices on the top floor and our Watch was taken into one room. We were knackered by now and half asleep. We were given pens and paper and senior officers were there reading off a sheet. There were around four (4) or five (5) senior officers there. The statements took ages to complete as we were tired and we were told in another room we could go for a counselling service. We were told it was up to us whether we walked to go to speak to them. I did not use this service, I felt fine; I still do. I did not receive any injuries as a result of the incident either. We were also told here that we could take that next night duty off but as a Watch we decided we would go back to work.

I think we got back to HAMMERSMITH Fire Station around 1500-1600hrs. I got my mobile and saw I had hundreds of messages/calls. Even from people I had not spoken to in years, they were checking I was okay. I called my parents and I told them I was okay. They told me that they were told about a Firefighter being injured, I told them I was okay. I spent a couple of hours on my phone responding to people telling

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them I was okay. I then showered, we all ate and then the Watch went back on duty for 2000hrs start. To the best of my knowledge the same crew were on duty the second night.

As a Watch were taking about Grenfell and quite early onto the shift the bells went down. We were going back to GRENFEL TOWER. This was a little after 2000hrs and Blue Watch were back with the appliances. Our same crew went back to the incident and this time we were tasked to go to the other side of the tower, so the North end. From there I saw this side had been alight too, it was the first time I saw this side of the tower. We were tasked to watch the back of the building, we did not go inside the tower or firefight. There was a digger on scene and it was from the gas company. I was told by someone that there was eight (8) lines of gas going into the building and that digger was digging up the last line to close that off and cap it.

Around ten (10) flats were still alight in the tower, in various locations. When the last gas line was switched off it was like a switch, the fires in the tower went out.

Whilst on scene that night in my head was all those FSG calls, around one hundred and fifty (150). I did not see that many people leave the tower. That shift I do not recall seeing any bodies, although someone did say that there were a couple of bodies in the playground near the tower. I remember an appliance from Richmond being embedded into the grass and there was a Pump Ladder there with hose going into the tower. There were a couple of jets from a Pump Ladder going into the building. That night I had a walk around and I saw that all four (4) sides of the tower were burnt. That night we did not do anything but watch, we did not go in or get too close to the tower.

There was still lots of equipment around. Someone mentioned that a member of public had put on a firefighters tunic and helmet and tried to get inside the tower to get to his family. The person was stopped. It is not something I saw, but what I heard from people. Around midnight, 0100hrs, we were relieved from Grenfell and the crew went back to HAMMERSMITH Fire Station. I did not return to GRENFELL TOWER again.

I have never seen a fire spread like that before. It was shocking. One of the main issues with GRENFELL TOWER was the staircase. There is only one and it is very narrow. In addition the access to the tower for emergency vehicles is tight. I was not aware of the risks around cladding prior to the fire at Grenfell. LFB's equipment is miles behind others due to budgets. Perhaps if we had better equipment it could have

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helped, we did what we could with what we had. Some sort of hood for members of the public to protect them from breathing in so much smoke could have given them some chance. Better radios are required, our radios are rubbish and do not work properly. This means that communication will not be as effective so better radios are needed.

The rising main/dry riser use is where a crew will connect water from a hydrant to the dry riser, go into the building with a hose, plug into the outlet and use this water for firefighting. The stay put policy is something in place as if everyone tried to leave at the same time this would not work. The stay put policy is in place as the staircase protected to enable firefighters to get people out. With older flats they were properly built but with new builds they are not so well built and therefore there are more risks. When a fire gets bigger then more resources are required, more units are requested. A Command Unit will also be requested. Information is collated when initial crews arrive and this information about the incident is placed in a wallet. When the Command Unit arrives they will take this wallet to get information about the incident, they would also take nominal role boards to see who is on scene. The Command Units have computers on board, more information, maps, the senior officers go on the Command Unit and they will run the incident.

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