

WITNESS STATEMENT

Criminal Procedure Rules, r27.2; Criminal Justice Act 1967, s.9; Magistrates' Courts Act 1980, s.5b

Statement of: NIBLETT, MARK

Age if under 18: Over 18 (if over 18 insert 'over 18')

Occupation: FIRE OFFICER

This statement (consisting of 11 page(s) each signed by me) is true to the best of my knowledge and belief and I make it knowing that, if it is tendered in evidence, I shall be liable to prosecution if I have wilfully stated in it anything which I know to be false, or do not believe to be true.

Signature: M NIBLETT

Date: 07/02/2018

Tick if witness evidence is visually recorded ☐ (supply witness details on rear)

On Friday 5th January 2018 I was interviewed on audio recorder by DC Chris BAILEY and PC Sam HALL at Lambeth Fire Station. The content of this statement is the summary of the interview.

This statement refers to my experiences and role at the GRENFELL TOWER, LONDON, W11 fire on Wednesday 14th JUNE 2017.

The officers that I rode with that night were WM Tony PARKIN of the CBRN [REDACTED] WM Richard VANSTONE of CBRN [REDACTED] and WM Amanda MORRISON also of the CBRN [REDACTED]

I've been in the Fire Brigade now for 23 years and started at Manchester Square as a fire fighter before moving to Soho. In 2000 I completed my leading hands training course, which is training aimed at leading fire fighters, I completed this at Euston Station and stayed there for about 5-6 years. In that time, I attained the qualification of Fire Rescue Unit (FRU) so I was an FRU and then I completed a USAR course which is the Urban Search & Rescue Course. I then moved on from Euston and transferred to Lewisham on the Green Watch carrying out the role of Crew Manager. Then about 18-19 months ago I came up to [REDACTED] the CBRN team, which is like the chemical rapid response team. It's basically a hazmat team that the fire brigade put out a bit like the DCU for the police. I got made up to Watch Manager but it's actually classed as a Watch Manager Specialist, I'm currently in development for this role. For the Watch Manager development, we complete a book and my book was finished in February, but I believe there was an issue with the way the station manager has signed the book off or something to that effect. The book is ready to be signed off, so I'm still as you say in development and I

Signature: M NIBLETT
2018

Signature witnessed by:

haven't been signed off, but as far as I know I've completed my side of the development process. We're watch managers but we don't have the ops part of the book, so If I go back to a fire station it's all up in the air and I'll probably go back as a sub officer due to our rank structure changing. I'll probably go back as a sub officer and I'll have to develop my part of the book so I'll be on development. Either that or I'll go back as a Watch Manager A, but I'll be on development for certain bits of it, but at the moment I'm a Watch Manager Specialist which means that I am a Watch Manager but in a specialist role.

The training we receive on this unit is basically chemical based, so hazmats , hazardous material incidents and terrorist related incidents like CBRN incidents. Our day to day role here is not firefighting its hazardous material incidents. We get specialist training in how to resolve chemical incidents, for instance I've completed a hazmat officers course. You get trained on different bits of equipment, like gas monitoring equipment for example. We are classed as the DIM team. We detect, we identify and we monitor different types of gases and stuff like that. The training like with everything in the fire brigade, once you've learnt you have to have continuation training on it. We don't complete fire fighter training anymore but we do wear EDBA (Extended Duration Breathing Apparatus) which is like what the FRU crews have got. We use exactly the same breathing apparatus, and we have to do the same BPA's (Best Practice Assessments) on the breathing apparatus. The only difference is when you come [REDACTED] to the CBRN team we don't do the compartment firefighting side of things. My last BPA for the BA was approximately 6 months before I joined the CBRN team but I can't remember the exact date. When we're operational we go out and assist the fire crews and stuff like that so we wear BA but as a rule we don't wear it in fire situations, we wear it in hazardous environments. So we'll go in where we believe there is a hazardous release and we use the breathing apparatus just like in a fire, because of the hazardous smoke. In terms of training for dealing with fires in high rise blocks my last training package would have been just before I come up to the CBRN team around June or July 2016. It would have been around that time because at the fire station high rise buildings are one of the main things we train on. So obviously when we come [REDACTED] that's when you don't do it because in normal circumstances we wouldn't be firefighting. In regards to the training I received there are training packages that you do that the fire brigade have actually issued us to go through, so you'll have table top exercises which are theory based classroom training. Then you will have drills in the yard where you simulate a high rise incident on the tower at the back of your yard. Then you just practice high rise procedure knowing where the bridgehead is and getting the dry riser set in, so you practice it. A bridgehead is like our forward operation point, it's where our entry control is set up, and we're normally two floors below where the fire is so we don't have

Signature: M NIBLETT
2018

Signature witnessed by:

to wear BA. If the fire is on the 10th floor our bridgehead will be on the 8th floor, so we'd walk up to the 8th floor and start up from the 8th floor, so it's basically a forward operation point. I can think of one where we simulated Sienna House I believe it was at Lewisham, we actually simulated a high rise incident, so it's practical and theory based learning we then also practice it out at external locations at actual high rise incidents. The training itself is as realistic as you can have it without having the actual fire obviously, so all the procedures are put in place, it's as realistic as a training scenario can be I would have said, without actually setting the building alight. I was also at LAKANHAL HOUSE fire when I was serving at Lewisham, so that was a notable incident for me. In terms of the equipment that we use, we use the same PPE as firefighters but we ride a different kind of vehicle. The vehicles we use are not fire appliances they're [REDACTED] with a lot of equipment on, they've got no firefighting equipment on board, no hose and no pumps. It's a specialist vehicle carrying detection and monitoring equipment. We normally ride 3 persons in these vehicles but if we have enough we also ride 4. On the night of the fire itself we started our shift at 2000hrs at [REDACTED] FIRE STATION and the mobilisation for the fire came in the middle of the night around 0230-0300hrs. We're a bit different here to a fire station in so much as we don't get mobilised by a call system, we get mobilised by pager. Everyone in the CBRN team has a pager as rule, [REDACTED] which should theoretically all go off at the same time but sometimes they don't. We get mobilised and the pager message will give an incident and then we ring our control room. We will then get some more information about the incident and then we can either monitor the incident which is basically waiting for information to come back to see if we're needed or alternatively deploy. We would then attend as a specialist unit to help firefighters. We received a page that there was a fire going on, so we conducted our procedure where we ring up control for more details. I was in charge of [REDACTED] that night, we've got [REDACTED] machines that we normally use. [REDACTED]

Signature: M NIBLETT
2018

Signature witnessed by:

[REDACTED]

After we received the page we all got up, I rung control and they said they believed it was a 50 pump fire, it shocked me how much, because I didn't realise we had that many machines left. I believe we only get paged for fires of more than 8 pumps but that's normally only if cylinders are involved and stuff like that, as a rule we don't normally get paged for fires. It's got to have a cylinder or a chemical element. I was asleep in my room before I got paged, I don't know who I spoke to at the control room or what position they held but our control was under a lot of pressure. Obviously they were under pressure as FSG's were coming in. Our collective thinking was that the last thing people need when they are fighting fires is for a chemical truck to turn up and say "WHAT DO YOU WANT US TO DO", I think they were busy enough at the time. The initial assessment was that they were busy enough and they don't need us there. When I was speaking to control after they paged us because it was such a big job, I said "ARE THERE ANY CHEMICALS INVOLVED" and they said "NO IT'S JUST A FIRE", first of all I said we will monitor it because obviously we're a CBRN team. Then as we're monitoring it, which we do via the radio and we've got a BOS system where we can see all the information coming through, we put the tele on and we could see how bad the actual fire was. My thoughts after putting the tele on and seeing how in depth the incident had become was wow, my thoughts were that I haven't seen a fire like this ever basically just from the pictures. At this point we were thinking ourselves was there anything we can do. In relation to monitoring the incident although I'm the team leader at this time, we do a round robin on [REDACTED]. We've got one actual substantive Watch Manager called Tony PARKIN at the moment but he wasn't at the time. When the pagers go off we all get up and monitor it as a vehicle. For Grenfell both machines [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] were in the office monitoring the fire.

I think control rung us again within 5 minutes and said "LOOK WE'RE REALLY SHORT IS THERE ANYTHING YOU CAN BRING?". I said "WELL WE'VE GOT EDBA", obviously we're not firefighters, we're not a firefighting team but we've got all the equipment to do the firefighting. Control said "WELL THEY'RE REALLY SHORT OF EDBA, THEY'RE RUNNING OUT OF EDBA" so we made the decision to attend. As soon as we knew we could help we went straight away, we booked on the job so we booked status two and proceeded to the fire. There was about 5 minutes between the first call and the second call from the control room, I'd say it was 10 minutes from the pager going off to us going out. WM PARKIN was driving. In the machine there are two seats in the front with the driver and one seat in the back. There was four of us that night. We have an MDT but we didn't use it, the MDT is in the

Signature: M NIBLETT
2018

Signature witnessed by:

back. We normally use the MDT when we get to an incident because we can look up chemical information, so when we get there it's got chemical data, so we use it differently to fire fighters. We got mobilised first and [REDACTED] came on afterwards as we're a [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

As a collective we approached the incident from the South using BRAMLEY ROAD, across the radio we heard that was the RVP. There were no difficulties in our journey, but it was very congested however as you got to the incident, we got a certain way up BRAMLEY ROAD but because of the amount of vehicles we couldn't go too far. It took us about 15 minutes to get to BRAMLEY ROAD on blues, where we parked there were fire appliances and ambulances and other vehicles there. There were also members of the public being treated on like a little island in the middle of the road. We parked about 200m from the incident and walked the rest of the way, the appliance stayed at that location for entire incident and didn't move. We saw the fire on route, my words were "THE WHOLE BUILDING IS ALIGHT", it looked like $\frac{3}{4}$ or $\frac{2}{3}$ of the building was alight completely. As we were going along HOLLAND PARK AVENUE turning into BRAMLEY ROAD as you're coming up to HOLLAND CIRCUS you turn you could see loads of orange flame all around the building. As we started approaching you could see the smoke but once we got into BRAMLEY ROAD you could see it was all alight. We entered along HOLLAND PARK AVENUE from NOTTING HILL, when we actually saw fire it would have been the Southern side of the building. We pulled up and got as close as we could get, our first thought was to book in and let people know we're here. I've got my role board at this time and we made our way to the building up BRAMLEY ROAD. As we made our way up BRAMLEY ROAD we could see the LAS treating a number of casualties, I would say about 20 on the ground. As we went round past the building we then noticed two fire fighters that were being treated also.

When we went up BRAMLEY ROAD and turned right, at the end of that road was where GRENFELL TOWER was, on the junction where we turned right was where the people who were being treated were. Once you turned right and went down about 20-30m, that's where the fire fighters were being treated on the right hand side on the pavement. I believe that road was about 40-50m away from the tower it was a fair distance.

Signature: M NIBLETT
2018

Signature witnessed by:

As we got to the crews where members of public were being treated WM PARKIN said "I'VE JUST BEEN TOLD THEY NEED IEC PACKS", we then ran back got IEC packs and then progressed past the members of public. An IEC pack is essentially a first aid kit, it contains items like a defibrillator, oxygen, and bandages, and it's the bag we carry. It's on every fire appliance and we've got them. We made sure that we got them together as we wanted to stay together as a team. We left our IEC packs where the fire fighters were being treated as we were told that's where they were needed, the LAS told us to move back but it took us a bit to move back because them being fire fighters we wanted to help them.

We carried on and I spoke with who I believe was a watch manager wearing a white helmet, but it could have been a station manager, we still hadn't booked in at this point. This was at the west face of the building where a holding area for fire fighters was located. I remember seeing the tower was a light from the top to the bottom and I remember having a feeling of shock when I was there looking up at it and the enormity of the fire. I remember getting to the front and there was a lot of fire fighters there and I think that was a kind of holding area. There was about 20 fire fighters in that area there as well looking up at the fire. We asked them where the booking in point was. He told us that the booking in point for us was round the other side of the building, so we made our way round to the other side of the building looking for the command unit. The first vehicle that we came to which I believed was the command unit was actually the FSG command unit. The FSG command unit told us that our command unit was a little bit further down round the way. We travelled round the tower anti clockwise to our command unit, we didn't go along the west way. We went back literally as if we were going back down where we'd come where our vehicle was parked but we turned left before then. I remember that we tried to stay as close to the road as we could. We followed our nose if you like. It took us approximately 5 minutes whilst running to reach the command unit. It was a very hot night and we were running to get to the command unit, we were wearing fire gear. We then booked in with our command unit, I gave my role board in with names of all the crew in the appliance and call sign into the command unit booking in officer. They then gave us the brief to go and get our EDBA and make our way to the leisure centre. The command unit was very busy, we had to wait about 3 minutes before we could book in.

We made our way to the leisure centre and booked in, they knew we were there. We then made our way back to the fire appliance and then two gentleman came up to us and told us that they were on the phone to a relative on the 14th floor. I believe it was the 14th floor but it was quite a dynamic situation at the time. WM VANSTONE and WM MORRISON went to get EDBA whilst I and WM PARKIN went to escort the two gentleman to the FSG. We took the members of public to the FSG officer to give the

Signature: M NIBLETT
2018

Signature witnessed by:

information over. I didn't realise at the time that it was one of many FSG's going on. We then met up with WM VANSTONE and WM MORRISON and went back to the leisure centre. We got our EDBA sets and then we went to a holding area by the leisure centre and we stayed there for a period of time. There were 3 EDBA sets in the van, I took WM PARKIN set I believe, I said "I FANCY DOING THIS", and he said "ALRIGHT I'LL LET YOU TAKE IT". WM VANSTONE and WM MORRISON already had sets allocated to them. I then did a fire ground A test and I took WM PARKINS set. I was the team leader of that appliance but I didn't have a set at that time. It is standard that the officer in charge of the appliance doesn't get a set if they're riding 4, if we're riding 3 everyone's got a set, but normally everyone's got a set. Other than EDBA we took no equipment.

At the leisure centre it was a holding area, loads of people were there waiting to be pushed on into the forward command point, there was a lot of activity. This process took about 15 minutes, we spent about 10 minutes in the holding area and then one of the holding marshals who was probably a station manager said "RIGHT EDBA WE NEED YOU TO GO TO THE FORWARD HOLDING POINT", so we were led to the forward holding point which was outside. We progressed to the forward holding area and walked under garages, down and underneath the covered walkway, we were escorted that way I believe. The forward command point wasn't under cover and we went in the same way as everyone else. The tower from here was about two thirds alight, it was still night so it was full fire orange flame, but it started to get lighter as we were committed. When we got to the forward command point you could see and hear loads of the facia falling to the ground which is why we had to go in with the police. I believe there was one police officer with a shield to each fire fighter ferrying us in and out, it wasn't a run and it wasn't a walk but we went as quickly as we could. We didn't run because of debris but we moved as quickly as you could safely. There were no near misses I can remember. Black lumps were coming down, and it was my assumption that it was parts of the facia. You could just see it hitting the ground you couldn't see where it was coming from. It was a variety of sizes but big enough to make a bang.

I could also see external firefighting happening at this point also, it's hard to say exactly but there was definitely external firefighting. Maybe one or two hose lines, I think there was an ALP as well or it could have been a TL. Thinking about it I could see three water jets being trained onto the building. I believe there was one ALP and two people manning hoses. An ALP is an Area Ladder Platform, or it could have been a hydraulic platform. A TL is a Turntable Ladder which has got a ladder on the front whereas an ALP has got a cage, basically with fire fighting towers we have three types with roughly the same effect. We spent about 10 minutes at the forward command point, there was a lot of SDBA there, and we were

Signature: M NIBLETT
2018

Signature witnessed by:

the only EDBA there at the time. The forward command point was about 30-40m away from the tower, so it was far enough away that it wasn't a problem with the debris

They put a call up and we were informed that EDBA was needed in the building. There were a lot of fire crews ready to go in, we weren't short of fire crews to go in. I think maybe an EDBA crew went in before us, I believe we effectively jumped the queue due to having EDBA because it lasts longer. We entered the tower via the south west corner and it was through a door I believe, but I don't think it was the main entry, I wasn't paying too much attention due to being ferried in by the police. We went into the building and it had a holding area at the bottom, we were escorted into the building by the police under their riot shields. We were in the holding area for about 30 minutes, there were loads of crews already in there. There were approximately 15 firefighters waiting to be committed within the building. Firefighters were bringing chairs into that room so that the BA crews could rest and reserve energy, it was quite an isolated room, and it felt quite quiet in relation to the circumstances. There was smoke in there but it was breathable, if it was any other job they would have relocated it. They tried some positive displacement pumps in that area but it only had the effect of drawing more smoke in so they had to turn them off. At this point we were not wearing our sets.

We were in this holding area inside the tower for about 30 minutes, this was about the longest holding area we were in, there was no shortage of crews there and we were literally in a line. It took about half hour to be needed. There was more than one committing officer in the bridgehead, a WM or SM came and said we need an EDBA crew of 4. There was only three of us so an FRU said "WELL I'LL JUMP IN WITH YOU". It was an FRU crew because they were EDBA, that's how we were committed. We went in and we got our brief in the lobby area, which I believe at the time was the bridgehead, that's where our entry control was set up. First of all we were appraised with what was going on, this was that there was a lot of FSG's above and a lot of calls coming in, and we knew that there was a lot of casualties in the upper parts of the building. At that point we were only at the 12th floor and we couldn't get any further. After that we then progressed to the entry control point, which is where our entry control ward is, that was where we received our brief to start up and be committed. To get there we went out the door and then turned a left and then you were in the lobby where the stairs went up so it was literally where the stairs were started at the bottom.

The first person who gave me my first brief was Pat GOLBORN, he was the one who gave us the information about the FSG calls and the brief regarding extending the hose. But then a second station manager came and gave us another brief and said "HOLD ALL OF THAT", information had just come in

Signature: M NIBLETT
2018

Signature witnessed by:

that we needed to get this guy out of his flat. We were just about to go under air to go in, and they were like "SCRAP THAT WE NEED YOU TO GO TO THE 10TH FLOOR" so our brief completely changed. Our brief changed from extending the hose line to conducting a search and rescue on the 10th floor at Flat 72. Pat GOLBORN briefed us in relation to a deceased person on the stairway leading up to the 10th floor, however it was very dynamic the brief. We were told that there were a number of casualties on the floor but I only ever saw one. We were given direction to leave all the casualties that were apparently dead. I believe a fire crew had tried to get them down but they couldn't get them down any further, we were told you will come across dead bodies but to leave them where they were. We were told in the brief by Pat GOLBORN that comms are pretty much non-existent, which was the radio. I personally didn't try my radio; I have thought of that since as even though he didn't say it we could have still tried. At the time I was carrying a hand held Maxon radio but we didn't have one in our set. I didn't hear anything come out of the radio. We were also wearing tabards that mark us as CBRN. At the time of the fire we were out of ticket for EDBA, we made the supervisors on scene aware and they said that they would bear it in mind but stated that we were still fire fighters. The decision was made to still use us. It was a decision made and I think the correct decision.

We made our way up the stairwell and it was smoky with visibility down to about 2m. The conditions got worse as we went up and there were fire crews in the stairwell a few floors up in there breathing it. In any other job they wouldn't have been there, there were fire crews breathing smoke. There was a lot of smoke in the stairwell. Lights were on in the stairwell when I was there. It was hotter in the stairwell so we were methodical going up. We were slow going up, we would go up two flights and rest because once you get up there and you're hot you can never cool down. It was quite taxing to get to the upper floors with your set on and the amount of smoke and how hot it was. We really took our time to not get too hot, as there was not much airflow in the stairwell. As we made our way up we saw a member of public face down on the stairs just as you led up to the 10th floor, and they were dead. We were made aware of the deceased casualty during the brief so it was no surprise that they were there as we were told that there was a casualty on the stairs. I believed the casualty to be a woman face down but I couldn't confirm that. There were no particular noises that I could hear as we made our way up the stairwell, I never heard any people or screams only firefighting actions. There was a lot of fire fighters carrying out various tasks. The stairwell was very narrow, the casualty took up most of the stairwell and it was difficult getting round the casualty. It was congested in there for sure, there was a lot of hose which was quite restrictive. You could only pass two at a time on the stairs. We were counting floors as we climbed but there may have been

Signature: M NIBLETT
2018

Signature witnessed by:

signs. Due to the importance of the task at hand every couple of floors I confirmed with all crew what floor we were on, e.g. "WE'RE ON THE 8TH NOW, YEAH YEAH", there was a lot of communication between the crews. It took us about 5-7 minutes to walk up to the 10th floor, we took our time. We would do a few floors, have a rest for 30 seconds to get our breath back purely because I didn't want us to burn ourselves out because we knew we were going to have to do work when we got there.

We moved past the casualty on the 10th floor stairwell and visibility was about 2m at that point, it was very smoky in the stairwell but as soon as we made our way into the lobby the visibility literally went to zero, and the heat increased. I made the decision to do a right hand wall search because the visibility was so bad to try and locate flat 72. We did ask for plans but I don't believe any were available at the time at the bridgehead so we didn't know where Flat 72 was. There was no reason why I went right or left it was a 50/50 call and everyone was happy with this. I was the one on the wall and then we spread out along the right hand corridor. Visibility was zero you couldn't see anything in front of your face. The door between the stairwell and the lobby was shut when we reached it, because if it was open all that smoke would have come into the stairwell. We normally work in twos, but we were a crew of four. I kept contact with the wall, we then fanned out in a line and slowly moved through the lobby. I reached an end and it seemed to turn right, that's when WM VANSTONE come and said the flat he was looking at was on fire. I got to what felt to be a right hand turn to another corridor believed to be to another flat but visibility was zero. It became apparent quite quickly it was very hot and we couldn't see anything, I believe WM VANSTONE made a call and said "I CAN SEE FLAME COMING FROM THE CORNER OF A DOORWAY", I've spoken to him since and he said "I COULD SEE THROUGH A DOOR", I couldn't where I was because I was on the wall and we were spread out. He came to the door and he said he could see flame all around it. He came back to us and said "IF HE'S THIS WAY I DON'T BELIEVE IT IS SURVIVABLE THIS WAY" so he made a decision to go back and to do a left hand wall search. We then carried on back to the lobby door and carried on doing a left hand wall search, WM MORRISON and the guy I don't know who made up our crew they stayed at the lobby to monitor conditions.

Myself and WM VANSTONE we went into the first flat that we came across, the door was shut but unlocked, it wasn't open but we didn't have to break in. My guess was that the people who were in there got out and left the door open. The conditions in that flat were better than the lobby, you could see more, it was very smoky but you could see about 2m in front, I could see WM VANSTONE and I wouldn't have been able to see him in the lobby. I didn't see if the windows were open however, WM VANSTONE said there was no one in the flat but he then said "I THINK I'VE JUST HEARD

Signature: M NIBLETT
2018

Signature witnessed by:

SOMEONE” as we were leaving the flat by the door, but I didn’t hear anyone. We had a shout but there was no one in there. WM VANSTONE searched most of the first flat and I was in the hallway trying to call him back to get together but he said there is no one in here, so then we made our way back out. We were shouting “HELLO FIRE BRIGADE” whenever we got to a door because we were looking for someone and we knew the gravity of the situation, we made a lot of noise banging and crashing. We left the flat and continued on the left hand side, it felt very quick that we come across another door. That was the door we banged on and shouted “FIRE BRIGADE CAN ANYONE HEAR US” and luckily enough the guy did and to our relief opened the door. As soon as he opens the door me and WM VANSTONE rush in and the close the door behind us because we know how smoky it is in the lobby. We didn’t know it was 72 at the time because of the visibility we couldn’t see any numbers. We asked the guy “IS THIS FLAT 72”, he replied “YES”, we then asked “ARE YOU ALONE?”, to which he replied “YES , IM THE ONLY ONE HERE” , I can only go on what he told me. His flat wasn’t even really that smoky, you could see all round the flat there was no fire damage or anything like that. It was quite surreal in the fact that you walked in and the guy was very calm and composed. We said “WE NEED TO GET YOU OUT” , his response was “I’VE BEEN TOLD TO STAY HERE” and we said “NO IT’S CHANGED WE NEED TO GET YOU OUT” . He was quite calm, he had a rucksack ready to go so obviously he’d been planning it. I think he put like swimming goggles on his face which I thought was a really good idea. He’d used a towel on the underside of the door to keep the smoke out and wetted it, so WM VANSTONE put the towel over his head and then we gave him a brief about what we were going to do. I told him to “HOLD ON TO RICHES CYLINDER AND I’LL BE BEHIND YOU, WE’RE GOING TO GO STRAIGHT OUT AND DOWN THE STAIRS”, he was alright with that. WM VANSTONES name is Rich, so we told him to hold Rich’s BA set and I would be behind him on his shoulders so that he would be in-between us. WM VANSTONE called out to WM MORRISON who was at the lobby door and said we were going to come out. We worked out the quickest route from the doorway to the lobby, then WM MORRISON opened the lobby door and kept it open. We told the guy what we were doing and ran him out through the lobby and then we just carried on down the stairs. We left the flat with WM VANSTONE leading and the guy is holding his BA set with me behind him holding his shoulders trying to steady him. I don’t believe we shut the door behind us. If it was on a self-closer, it would have shut but we just went straight out. I was at the back and I didn’t consciously shut that door. The door to the stairwell however was a self-closer.

Signature: M NIBLETT
2018

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We went straight down the stairs, and the guy couldn't see which was quite good because we had to navigate past the deceased casualty on the way down. We guided him past that and then got him down as quickly as possible. It was surprising how well the wet towel protected him, I think it protected his breathing for a little while but we were conscious that we didn't want to hang around. Especially on that 10th floor you wouldn't be able to stay there and survive you would have been overcome by smoke. It took us a couple of minutes to get down to the 4th floor, it was much quicker getting down. We weren't hanging around going down we were moving as quickly as we could with the casualty safely, he was walking himself down and was calm throughout. I was talking to him saying "MIND YOUR STEP", I do remember saying to him "OH JUST WATCH THAT SIR", and him saying "I CAN'T SEE ANYWAY". We did come across another fire crew who were coming up so we reverted to our procedures and shouted "CASUALTY COMING OUT" and they moved out of the way for us.

When we got to the 4th floor we handed over the casualty to fire crews not wearing BA, we didn't say much, but we said "WE'VE GOT A CASUALTY HERE HE NEEDS TO GET OUT". I believe we told the fire crews where we had rescued him from as we know the importance of FSG's. We told them "HE'S FROM 72 ON THE 10TH FLOOR", the comms weren't working so until he gets down they need to know where he's from. the conditions were smoky but it was bearable. Any other time they wouldn't have been in there but I believe they were there trying to pull hose up WM MORRISON and the guy I don't know I believe carried on to try and carry out the original brief which was to extend the hose lines. After we handed over the casualty me and WM VANSTONE still had air so we went back upstairs to try and carry on with our original brief which was to try and extend the hose line also. We went into the lobby area of the 10th and 11th floor but we couldn't feel any water, none of the hose lines were actually charged. So we were trying to find a riser and go into the riser but in that lobby at the time we couldn't find the riser due to the conditions and we didn't know where it was.

WM MORRISON came down and we agreed to try and trace one of the hose lines to get it charged. They must have traced it because it was a 45mm and it got charged, she went down with the other guy to follow the hose line. She traced the hose line down to tell the people on the ground floor to charge it. It wasn't a great jet but I do remember water coming out from that hose. We were not on the end of that hose other fire crews were. There was loads of hose line there, we had the end of a hose line but we didn't take any hose line up with us. The hose that had been taken up by others was laid out in a hap hazard fashion. It was bit of a mess up there and we were aware that there was no water up there at that time. Me and WM VANSTONE said we would stay there and try and plug in, which we did for about 15 min but we weren't

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really that effective. We couldn't find anything and all the hose line was jumbled up and we never found a dry riser. When we were looking for the dry risers we always stayed on the wall in a right hand way, not spreading out and searching as they were not in the middle of the room. We were up there for 15 minutes trying to find one and sort the hose out. I went up to the 11th, the 12th and then back down to the 11th trying to plug in. We weren't the only ones there either, there were other fire crews trying to do the same thing.

When I spoke to WM MORRISON I thought she was going to go down to try and trace the hose line and come back up, but as far as I'm aware she never came back up. That's when WM VANSTONE said to me "I'M REALLY STARTING TO FEEL IT NOW", so I said "RIGHT WELL I'LL SPEAK TO THE GUYS UP TOP" and I went up a couple of floors and then I started to feel it too. We had about 110 bar left, and then we realised that we weren't really achieving much and starting to become a bit of the problem not the solution. I started feeling light headed and a bit sick and I was thinking it's time for us to go, we made a decision and came out. We were also conscious that we hadn't seen WM MORRISON and the other guy, we were also pretty near whistle anyway to be honest. It took us about 5 minutes to walk down the second time, we didn't rush down as we were tired, I remember thinking this seems a lot further than I imagined it. We left the tower and then told the committing officer what we had done and what information we could give him.

At entry control we found out that WM MORRISON and other fire fighter had closed down and were outside the tower. We were happy to hear that they were safe as we believed they were going to come back up and join us after re-tracing the hose down the stairwell. I then spoke to Pat GOLBORN at entry control and gave an appraisal of what we had done, i.e. rescued male and tried to push on but couldn't find the riser etc. We got escorted out straight away passed the forward control point to the leisure centre, and then took out sets off. We sat down by catering van and took on some fluids. Our [REDACTED] turned up at that stage [REDACTED] so we liaised with them and rested for a little while and we also spoke to other people there. We spent about 20 minutes outside the leisure centre sitting and laying down, we were absolutely shattered, emotionally and physically. We milled around after that, I went and got something to eat and had a chat with other people. We talked about their experiences, you could still see the building. We moved our set but there was not much else to do. It was light when we came out, there was a lot of smoke coming off the building, it didn't look as intense as when I had first arrived, it was more smoke than flame. The Incident Commander Andy ROWE came down and got us together and said that we're working outside of policy and was thanking us. We then made our way to the command unit where Andy

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ROWE released us from the job at about 0830hrs. WM PARKIN I believe was helping out at the forward command point as a committing officer, I think he was relieved as well, we met up at the holding area outside the leisure centre. We then had to go to PADDINGTON to do contemporaneous notes, us and about 4 other crews were sat down and they got us to do hand written notes that morning. From there we went back to [REDACTED] FIRE STATION and we were past 0930hrs so our shift was finished, we handed back our sets and went off duty about 1030hrs, we incurred about an hour's overtime for the incident.

During the audio interview I produced a printed map depicting part of my route into GRENFELL TOWER marked with locations of prominent points that I can remember. I have exhibited this as MHN/1, Map of Area - Grenfell Tower. This has been referenced with police serial number MPSZ13134528. After being released from the incident I attended PADDINGTON FIRE STATION where I completed hand written notes relating to the incident, I exhibit this as MHN/2, notes made after Grenfell Tower. This has been referenced with police serial number MPSZ13134527.

I have also completed further typed notes created on 19th June 2017 which I exhibit as MHN/3, further typed notes for Grenfell Tower. This has been referenced with police serial number MPSZ13134522.

I took two photographs of the tower on fire which I exhibit as the following;

MHN/4, one photo showing the Grenfell Tower alight from a ground perspective, this has been referenced with police serial number MPSZ13134525.

MHN/5, one blurry photo showing the Grenfell Tower alight from a ground perspective, this has been referenced with police serial number MPSZ13134526.

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Page 15 of 15

Signature: M NIBLETT
2018

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