WITNESS STATEMENT

Criminal Procedure Rules, r27.2; Criminal Justice Act 1967, s.9; Magistrates' Courts Act 1980, s.5b	
Statement of: TREW, PAUL	
Age if under 18: Over 18 (if over 18 insert 'over 18')	Occupation: FIRE OFFICER
This statement (consisting of 8 page(s) each signed by me) is true to the best of my knowledge and belief and I make it knowing that, if it is tendered in evidence, I shall be liable to prosecution if I have wilfully stated in it anything which I know to be false, or do not believe to be true.	
Signature: PAUL TREW	Date: 30/11/2017
Tick if witness evidence is visually recorded \square	(supply witness details on rear)

On Tuesday the 7th November 2017 I was interviewed by DC Paul Slaymaker and DC Sally Daniels, this was Audio recorded at the LFB headquarters Union Street, SE1. Below is the information and account I provided to police around my involvement in the Fire at Grenfell Tower on and after the 14th June 2017.

I am currently a Deputy Assistant Commissioner (DAC) with the London Fire Brigade (LFB). I have Twenty Three (23) years' service to date. I am currently based at LFB headquarters, Union Street, SE1 and my main responsibility is the LFB's Property Department. I have recently taken up this role on promotion. I started my service as a Fire Fighter (FF), completing the compulsory training and then spending four (4) years at a fire station before being confirmed as Competent. Throughout my service I have been promoted through the ranks into the officer ranks and completed many different roles and responsibilities within the LFB.

At the time of the Grenfell tower incident I was a Group Manager (GM) and Borough Commander responsible for The Borough of Havering, I was based at Hornchurch Fire Station where I had an office. I was responsible for all the Fire Fighters and Watch Managers and the LFB response to the Borough of Havering. I was not on duty on the evening of the 13th June 2017. I was however on duty on the morning

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Page 2 of 12 of the 14th June at around 7am and in my office at Hornchurch in a meeting with my Superior at the time DAC Alan Perez who was Area Commander of the North East. Whilst in this meeting we had the local radio station on I think Capital FM, they were talking about a fire at Grenfell Tower. This was the first I had heard of this fire and didn't appreciate at the time the severity, but it seemed from the information provided that this was a large fire and a serious incident.

Shortly after hearing this DAC Alan Perez received a phone call from DAC Adrian Fenton who was in the Brigade Coordination Centre (BCC) in Stratford. They were discussing the severity of this fire at Grenfell Tower and the amount of resources that were present on scene. He asked DAC Perez to attend the BCC to relieve him and take responsibility for the running of it. I offered my assistance and stated I was prepared to book on shift early and go wherever is necessary to assist. It was agreed that I should attend the scene at Grenfell Tower. I cannot be exact with my timings but I would suggest I left at around 0720hrs.

Generally on the day I would have been in my office in Hornchurch and looking after the borough of Havering. When you are on duty the way the LFB setup is that you are a London resource and can be dispatched anywhere to assist.

All senior officers have their own vehicle which also has the ability to respond on blue lights. Once I was required to go to the scene, I was advised that I was "mobilised", this gave me the direction to travel on blue lights. The only other direction that can be given would have been "relief" which generally means you don't travel on blue lights. I was on my own in the car and put the postcode that I had been provided into my Sat Nay as I did not know the area I was going to. I then followed the Sat Nay to the destination. I do not remember the name of the road I parked in but can tell you that it was an approximately five (5) minutes' walk to the Command Unit. As I did not know the area I do not know from memory where the Command Unit was sited, however I can describe it as being next to what they seemed to call the finger flats. DC Slaymaker provided me with a map of the area which I now exhibit as PT/1. On this a one (1) has been marked on where I believe the Command unit was situated, this location is on Stoneleigh Street. The roads coming in were quite busy but I had been driving within the rush hour and do not know the area to confirm if it was busier than usual.

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Once I parked my vehicle up, I exited the vehicle and proceeded to put on my Fire Gear, this was my Boots, Leggings, Tunic, Helmet, Lamp, Radio and Gloves. This is standard fire clothing and equipment for all fire fighters at a scene. I can confirm that I was not in possession of any Breathing Apparatus (BA), and would not be required to need access to any in my role. From where I was parked I could not see the tower. Although I don't know what road I parked in it would have been in one of the roads to the bottom right on the map that I have exhibited. I then took the five (5) minute walk towards the Command Unit.

As I got near to the Command Unit I saw Grenfell Tower for the first time. The tower was approximately four (4) to five (5) hundred metres away. The entire tower block appeared to have been fully involved in the fire, there was still fire present and a significant amount of smoke coming from the building. I walked over to the Command Unit, which is like a mobile office. Within these vehicles they have computers providing access to various information such as building plans, policies and access to the internet, it also has white boards which are used for various different things depending on the incident. You can get access to Heli Tele from within, helping you see what is happening from above. This unit is used to run the incident and would usually house the Incident Commander (IC) and various other officers to assist the IC. The IC is the person in overall charge of the incident. I did not enter the Command Unit, there is a window on the side where I handed over my Nominal Role Board to an officer, I do not know who this person was. A Nominal Role Board is a board that indicates I am now on scene and deployable. As it was a very busy incident there were a lot of people waiting outside the Command Unit waiting to be briefed by the IC. There were about ten (10) people in total and I only knew two of them, GM Steve Norman (Borough Commander of Barking and Dagenham) and Steve Dudeney (Borough Commander of Tower Hamlets), the other people were of various ranks.

After a short period of time the IC who was Assistant Commissioner (AC) Andy Roe gave us an overview. He said this is an extremely dynamic incident and up until a few moments ago they were still rescuing people from inside and someone had just come out alive. There was a number of people still to be rescued. They were looking at the structure of building going forward, and had urban search and rescue to monitor the structure. He then said before I assign anybody he wanted to have ten (10) minutes to review where staff were and stated that he wanted to replenish the officers that had been at the incident a long time with us. I asked AC Roe for permission to complete a walk around to get my bearings and see where things were located I completed this walk around on my own and this is a normal procedure when

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Page 4 of 12 officers attend an incident and this is what we train new officers to get a mental picture of the scene and where the resources and rendezvous points are. I started to walk nearer to the tower and after only a few minutes on the green area in front of the tower I could see two (2) Ariel appliances one being an LFB appliance and one being a slightly larger appliance from Surrey. It appeared that they were swapping over the appliances and I couldn't see anyone coordinating this. The area where the Aerial appliances were has been marked on the map with a number two (2). I went straight back to the AC and made him aware of the fact this was not being coordinated and volunteered to take this role on as I am trained as Bulk Media Advisor, which he agreed. I didn't make any further observations of the building on my walk around.

The Aerial appliances are basically a big Cherry Picker, that has a cage on the end and the boom/arm is manoeuvrable so you can bend it over things such as roofs. They are used for rescues, for observation towers and for firefighting. It has a hose that goes right up to the cage and water is pumped to the top via a standard fire appliance (fire engine). It can be controlled from within the cage or from the ground the appliance has hydraulic legs that come out to stabilise it. The LFB Aerial appliance can reach to around 100ft which is around eight (8) to Ten (10) floors. The surrey appliance is the same machine but is slightly bigger and can reach eleven (11) to twelve (12) floors and if you fired water upwards you could reach up to fourteen (14) floors, this is the reason that the appliances were being swapped over. The reason that we were going to setup and fight fire on this side of the building was that the other sides of the building were not at this point showing signs of fire breakouts.

At around 0810hrs I went back over to where the Aerial Appliances were and spoke to the officer in charge of the Surrey Appliance, to advise how I wanted the swap to happen. I was aware that the LFB and Surrey may have slightly different policies around this and as it was on LFB ground I wanted to make sure this was done to our policies and procedures. We do however work closely with local fire services and do cross border work. Surrey fire brigade were happy to assist in any way possible. I then spoke with the LFB crew on the Ariel Appliance, Firstly I told them what a good job they had done and thanked them. I then stated I needed them to get out of the way as quickly as they could and finish packing up there equipment once away from the scene. I asked this as I know it can take some time to pack this appliance away and there were still fires breaking out so I needed the Surrey Appliance up and running ASAP. There was also limited space and access was tight so the LFB vehicle had to leave before the Surrey Appliance could get in. Surrey had also provided a pump vehicle to provide the water to their

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Ariel Appliance.

I have marked on the map a three (3) this is where the DVI team were setup. There were also some LFB vehicles parked here, this needed to be moved to get access to the area for the Ariel Appliances. The drivers were located and the vehicles were moved. The whole process took around an hour until the Surrey Appliance was operational, the Ariel Appliance was in front near to the tower and the Surrey Pump had driven in behind. There was room for other vehicles but they were not allowed access. The Hydrant was across the road and hoses were coming from it. There was also no need for anyone else to need access to this area. The whole setup ran smoothly and I think just after 9am the Appliance was operational.

On the day this appliance was only going to be used for Fire Fighting using the hose that is attached to it. There would not generally be any firefighter in the cage and it would be operated from the controls on the appliance. Our objective was to look at the side of the building for any fire breakouts on the building or within the windows. On the side of the building we were concentrating it was clear that fire at some point during the night had gone from the third (3rd) or fourth (4th) floor right up to the top of the building. The map that I have exhibited as PT/1, I would describe this as the West Side the nearest to the grass area where we had set up. I would generally be looking at the building and spotting the fires but the fire fighters working under my command or any other fire fighter could also spot fire and alert me. I would then request that the Ariel Appliance move over towards the area of the fire and await my instruction. I would then need to use my radio to communicate with my colleague inside the building Group Manager (GM) John Graham who was in command of the Fire Fighters inside the building coordinating rescues and firefighting from within, to confirm if there were Fire Fighters in the area of the fire in question. If there was Fire Fighters in the area fighting that fire we would generally leave it to them to put the fire out, as they could clearly see the fire and would be more accurate in putting it out. If there was no one in the area, I would then give the order to put water onto the fire from the Ariel appliance. We were spotting pockets of fire all day so the operation continued throughout. What we would see

shortly before a fire broke out, would be some smoke build up in an area and then see a fire shortly after. This is when we would complete the above procedure. I cannot tell you how many fires we put out, where the Ariel moved to exactly, however I can say that this appliance continued fighting fires even after I was relieved at 4pm. I can say however the fire were more often breaking out between the eleventh (11th) and

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Fourteenth (14th) floors. There were no issues in putting the fires out throughout the day and the Ariel seemed very effective at tackling the fires and we could move to different areas of the building quickly to put these fires out rapidly.

The Surrey Fire Crew consisted of six (6) to Eight (8) staff and they were the same staff there all day with me. To operate the pump appliance and the Ariel once set up only needed two Fire Fighters, one would be in control of the Pump Appliance, making sure water and the correct pressure was coming from the hydrant and getting to the Ariel Appliance. The other would be by the Ariel Appliance moving the cage to the area of the fire and opening up the monitor at the top to fire the water onto the area of the fire. The Surrey crew took it in turns to complete these duties so that all could rest in between completing these tasks. I would at times take a short break and would leave the Station Manager from Surrey in charge, and made sure he had a LFB fire fighter next to him with a London radio so he could still communicate with the GM inside the building.

I was relieved at around 4pm but don't know who by or even what rank they were. I made my way to by car and drove straight home. I was only responsible for this particular operation on the day and did not make any other decisions or take responsibility for anything else whilst at Grenfell Tower. Whilst on my way home I called DAC Perez who was still in the BCC. He advised me that he would be returning to run the BCC tomorrow, I volunteered to go in and assist him if required which he accepted.

On the 15th June 2017 I left my home address in my vehicle and arrived nearby the BCC at around 7am. I had some breakfast then attended the BCC at 8am. The BCC is part of the LFB's strategic response arrangement. It is not always open, the Commissioner, Duty Brigade Manager or Director is responsible for authorising it to be opened. This is used to assist in generally major incidents and is designed to provide operational management support to the duty AC or Gold Commander, higher than normal day to day incidents. There are three sites that that the BCC is opened at and this would depend on if some were already in use or the best location for the incident. The Strafford BCC was the one chosen for Grenfell Tower. For Grenfell Tower a DAC was in charge of the BCC and he would have a GM assisting him. There would then be Station Managers (SM) sitting in each cell making sure everything is coordinated as required. These cells would consist of whatever the incident required. For Grenfell Tower there was a resource cell a Communications cell, Planning Cell and Operations Cell. The BCC would complete any

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actions that came from either the commissioners group or the scene at Grenfell Tower.

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At 8am DAC Alan Perez was present with me along with other SM's we were all coming on duty to take over from colleagues that had been there throughout the night. I firstly received a hand over from the GM that I was taking over from which consisted of the sequence of events throughout the night, and the others took a hand over from who they were replacing. After that DAC Perez, myself and all the other staff that were going to be working with us had a briefing on what was required. I could see that there were whiteboards within the BCC that had key decisions on them. I don't remember the names of any of the officers that we took over from. From this briefing as far as I was concerned there were no real changes from when I had left scene the day before. My view of this was that the scene was becoming more of a police scene as the Disaster Victim Identification Unit were taking more of a lead. Within the BCC we had sky news on a television and I could see from this that it was evident the fire was out.

The handover took around twenty (20) minutes. Now that the fire had been put out LFB resources had been scaled back at the scene and we now only had a small amount of LFB appliances and crew at the scene just in case fire reignited anywhere. We also now had the specialist LFB units on scene assisting DVI with the recovery phase which is our Urban Search and Rescue Team (USAR). Our main role now in the BCC was to look at what vehicles and other equipment was at the scene and relocating these back to their locations. This was important as this equipment may have been needed for another incident in London. One of my requests was for two Fire Fighters from a local station nearby to go to the scene and start to recover the various mini buses that were still there and take them back to their correct locations. The day was very steady and there were no real issues, I would describe it as trying to get the LFB back to normal and my role was just supervising this.

There was no further requirement to keep the BCC open after the above was completed and at around 4pm the BCC was shut down. I then took photos of all the whiteboards before they were wiped down and emailed them to DAC Alan Perez who I know has exhibited these to police since. This is a normal procedure to do this and email it to the person in charge just in case they needed this in the future. From the BCC I then went straight home. On this day I was on a duty that we call a twenty four (24) hour duty. This means that I would normally come on duty at 8am from my office and work unit 5pm, I would then be at home on call should I be needed. This is worked out on a ROTA basis so there is always enough

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cover of specific rank at any time. I was at home and at around 7pm I received a call from the LFB control room mobilizing be back to Grenfell Tower to take over from the IC who at the time was DAC Sabrina Cohen-Hatton. I believe that a decision had been taken that during the day a DAC would be IC and throughout the night a GM would be IC, this was due to less things happening throughout the night. I left my home address and made my way to Grenfell Tower and got there around 8pm. I had a hand over from DAC Cohen-Hatton and she stated that, I would need to move the Command Unit as the police wanted to shorten the Cordons and open some roads. She didn't tell me a new location for the command unit. I took a look around the area and decided that the CU should be relocated to Sillchester Road near to the Railway bridge, my thoughts around this was that Sillchester road was still within a police cordon, it had good access to the main scene of operation, the road was quite wide giving it good access for officers and appliances to attend. Before moving the CU to the new location I discussed this with the most senior police officer on scene, I don't know his name, and he agreed that this was fine to proceed with, IT is quite simple to move a CU, all the staff in it had to do was retract the large Ariel's on the top and then drive the vehicle to the new location. There were two crew that worked in the CU by this time and they were there to assist me. At the time of me taking over of IC I was aware that there were six (6) pumps in various places around the scene and they were there just in case any fire broke out from within the building. This pumps appliances were relieved around every three (3) hours. At around lam I made the decision that as the pumps were being swapped all six pumps could stay at the same location as the CU. There were no issues throughout that night and I was relieved around 10am on the 16th June 2017 and made my way home.

The only other involvement I have had with the Grenfell Fire was on Saturday the 17th June 2017, this was in my capacity as a Fire Safety Officer. I reported to Union Street in the morning. I was asked to attend Grenfell Tower with a contractor and the Tenants Management Organisation (TMO). I met with them there and they were wanting to block off some of the access to the flats next to the tower, I had a look and discussed this with them and we came to an agreement that would meet fire safety regulations. I was there around one (1) and a half (1/2) hours before leaving scene.

I am unable to make too many observations in regards to the fire at Grenfell tower as by the time I arrived the fire was under control and not spreading out and around the building like it had been in the early hours. I do remember asking questions around the stability of the building I do not remember who to. It

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had been confirmed by the people checking the building that it had been assessed and it was okay. I was told that if anything did happen it would likely fall the other side of where we were working. As far as I was aware this was being constantly monitored and that if anything change we would be evacuated. During the time I was on scene at Grenfell Tower, the IC and other officers including the Commissioner were regularly walking around the scene, getting updates and providing any further information that may be necessary. As far as my role nothing changed and no further instructions were given to me, I was aware that if I needed anything or to relay information I would report directly to the IC.

In regards to my training whilst with the LFB. I completed my initial training when I first joined which consisted of learning about equipment Fire Fighting, safety etc. Once you completed that training you would then be sent to a fire station and would have to show for the next four (4) years that you can do the job before being signed off as competent. I was confirmed as competent after the four (4) years. Whilst you are a FF you have regular training when you are on shift, this would include powerpoint presentations, practical exercises including using the tower in the yard. As an officer the training is much more around Incident Command and organisation at Major Incidents and I would have completed some of this training within the last six (6) months prior to Grenfell Tower Incident. This would have been with my Rota Group. It would have been a one (1) day or three (3) day exercise where we would use a mock up Command Unit and take control of a mock incident as Incident Commander. As an officer I would not receive any specific FF training on High Rise other than the training received above, however when I was a fire fighter you would have training on the theory side and arrival tactics for high rise buildings along with the practical side usually completed on the tower. Within your Borough you are responsible for you would sometime have High Rise flats being knocked down, the management would try and get authority to use these for training exercises. I remember when I was Borough Commander of Barking and Dagenham we used the flats within the Gascoigne Estate when they were being knocked down. I have not had any training in regards to cladding or any issues with it and also up until Grenfell was not aware of any dangers of cladding.

At a small fire up to four (4) pumps a Watch Manager (WM) would normally be in charge. At a Four (4) to Six (6) pump fire a Station Manager (SM) would take charge. From Six (6) to Ten (10) pumps a Group Manager (GM) would take charge and Ten (10) and above to fourteen (14) pumps a DAC would normally take charge and an AC above that. For all reasonable sized Incidents the IC would also have someone

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from the rank above them monitoring them. You would also generally have an Operational Review Team on scene to make sure the incident it being run correctly in line with policy, they would be a mixture of rank and experience and would generally link in with the monitoring officer on the scene.

Up until my attendance at Grenfell Tower I had no previous knowledge of this tower and had never been there before. I have also never been on a Section 7(2)d Familiarisation visit to Grenfell Tower as this would be completed by FF's working on the Borough. These visits give FF's an indication of the layouts and potential issues if a fire was to break out in the building. This information should go onto the Mobile Data Terminal (MDT) for any FF to see if going to a call at that particular location.

In my career with the LFB I have been posted to the Fire Safety Department but not for anything to do with Grenfell Tower. I would describe the fire safety department to be the police for the regulatory reform fire safety order 2005, we will go out and Audit business's and work places, looking at means of escape, fire alarms etc. My role was an Inspection Officer to go out to these premises and inspect the above. This was a voluntary role and I used this also to assist in being promoted as it became a specialism before becoming an officer. In my career I went from Fire Fighter to Leading Fire Fighter, then to Sub Officer. I then needed a specialism, so I applied and was successful in becoming a fire safety officer. After this I went out to a fire station to do an operational element of a Fire Safety Role. I was then successful at the next rank so also became a Senior Fire Safety Officer, which means I would go out and advise IC's at incidents about fire safety in that particular premises. Also when Inspectors go out and find buildings unsafe they would call me out to inspect. This specialism is something that is part of my role and has been for some time, I no longer work in the fire safety department, but could take on a role there in the future. At Grenfell Tower there would have been a Senior Fire Safety Officer but this wasn't my role there.

The role of the Bulk Media Advisor (BMA) at an incident is to provide the incident commander with a plan to utilise brigade equipment to provide large or additional water supplies to an incident. This will include the use of pumping equipment, hose layers and high volume pumps (HVP). They will assist in identifying relevant water supplies for the incident. In the event of flooding the BMA will identify the suitable use of HVPs including the siting of the equipment, planning for laying of hose and identification of suitable water discharge points. The BMA will also be able to provide advice and guidance on the delivery of bulk foam at an incident including the relevant use of brigade foam making equipment including the bulk foam unit, the foam compound requirements for the incident and methods of delivery.

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The BMA may also be asked to provide advice and guidance within the brigade's strategic response arrangements, the provision of a tactical plan to incident commanders and advice, guidance and support at the operational level. BMAs are expected to undertake a minimum of three CPD events throughout the year. These events may include exercise involving the requirement for bulk media and specific training events, seminars and lectures related to the use of bulk media. In the case of Grenfell the BMA was utilised in the delivery of a large quantity of water via the aerial appliance.

Throughout my career as a Fire Fighter I have attended many High Rise Fires. The last time I was actively involved would have been around the year 2000. In my opinion flat fires are not that different to fighting house fire, as instead of connecting the hose to the Pump appliance and going into a house, we set up a bridge head. Then connect a hose to the pump appliance and plug into the dry riser, this will pump water into the dry riser. Fire fighters can then connect hoses to the dry riser on the relevant floors and fight the fires within the flats. The only slight difference sometimes is access.

My understanding of the Stay put Policy is we have fire survival guidance calls (FSG), which the control operator will take and ask a series of questions to the person calling that is within the building on fire, they will advise to stay put in there flat if appropriate. The reason for this is buildings should be designed to contain fire within their unit. Rather than have a large number of people coming onto stairwell where fire fighters are going up and also causing them more injury to go past smoke. That is the policy and that is what is advised. On the night of the Grenfell Fire incident I did not know or hear anything to do with the stay put policy for this incident. In regards to compartmentation this should be in place to keep a fire in a particular room for around an hour this should not be compromised and should not fail. The problem may be that over time work is completed on buildings and holes are drilled into walls and not fire stopped.

Whilst present at the scene on the 14th June 2017 I noticed drones flying around the scene I believe this was to do with the press, this is something I have never seen before at an incident and found unusual.

From being present on the day of the incident I would say that the Firefighters and the offices stepped up and went above and beyond to try and help in any way they could.

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