

WITNESS STATEMENT

CJ Act 1967, s.9; MC Act 1980, ss.5A(3)(a) and 5B; Criminal Procedure Rules 2005, Rule 27.1

Statement of **Cmdr Neil Jerome**..... URN:Age if under 18 **Over 18**..... (if over 18 insert 'over 18') Occupation: **Police Commander**

This statement (consisting of: 17 pages each signed by me) is true to the best of my knowledge and belief and I make it knowing that, if it is tendered in evidence, I shall be liable to prosecution if I have wilfully stated anything in it which I know to be false, or do not believe to be true.

Signature:

*N Jerome*Date: *8th October 2018*Tick if witness evidence is visually recorded ☐

(supply witness details on rear)

Introduction

1. I was the senior officer responsible for the police response on the night of the fire at Grenfell Tower and subsequently. The tragedy that occurred that night, the loss of loved ones and the impact upon the community has had a profound impact on those of us who have taken the oath to protect and preserve life. My thoughts, and those of everyone in the Metropolitan Police, are with those for whom Grenfell Tower was home, those who are grieving and the local community.
2. I am providing this statement in response to a request from the Grenfell Tower Inquiry, to explain the police response, addressing specifically:
 - (a) the chronology of the MPS response to the fire from midnight to 8am on the 14th June 2017, including the number of officers deployed from time to time and identifying those who were in positions of responsibility in relation to events in the area of Grenfell Tower;

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- (b) the procedures governing communication between the MPS, LFB and LAS in response to an incident such as the Grenfell Tower fire and how they were implemented in relation to the fire on 14th June 2017;
- (c) the procedures governing the evacuation of residents, visitors and casualties from Grenfell Tower and surrounding dwellings and how they were implemented in response to the fire on 14th June 2017; and
- (d) the communication of fire survival guidance to those in Grenfell Tower including, in particular, contact (whether direct or otherwise) and liaison between the MPS, LFB and LAS regarding the management and communication of 999 calls.

3. This statement is drafted from my own knowledge, apart from where I indicate otherwise.

Career History

4. I joined Kent police in 1990 serving throughout the county as both a detective and uniformed officer. In 2016 I transferred to the Metropolitan Police Service on promotion to Commander having passed the Strategic Command Course for Chief Officers of Police. I have been a firearms and public order commander and have been trained in commanding multi-agency incidents. I have commanded a number of multi-agency incidents including severe weather events and events declared as emergencies under the Civil Contingencies Act.

The role of the police at a major incident

5. The role of the police when dealing with a major incident will vary according to the circumstances of the incident and its nature. The first priority of the police when responding to an incident is to save life, either directly where possible, or facilitating the saving of life by other responders. It was clear from the outset that police officers were neither trained nor

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equipped to enter a burning building and the role of the police would be to support the activity of the LFB and LAS in the saving of life.

6. The police response has to be flexible to allow for the differing situations that will be encountered as well as how an incident will change over time. However, the role of the police will always be to save and prevent further loss of life working with the other emergency services, prevent the incident from escalating, co-ordinate the response phase of the incident, establish a Strategic Co-ordinating Group (SCG) to allow responders to co-ordinate their response and communicate at the appropriate levels, secure, protect and preserve the scene, provide traffic management to allow responders access and egress to the incident, investigate any criminal offences, collate and disseminate casualty information, co-ordinate the provision of public information, recover, identify, reconcile and repatriate the deceased on behalf of the coroner and prevent and detect crime.

Events of the 14th June 2017 - The initial MPS response

7. On the evening of the 13th June 2017 I was the on-call chief officer for London. The on-call chief officer is undertaken by those holding the rank of Commander or Deputy Assistant Commissioner. This role ensures there is a chief officer available for significant events and authorisations across the Metropolitan Police and is organised on a rota basis for 24/7 coverage. Outside of normal hours the on-call chief officer would be at their home contactable by telephone. I was asleep at my home address when I was awoken at 02:10hrs on 14th June 2017 by Chief Inspector BARRETT, the senior officer responsible for the Metropolitan Police control room. When to notify a chief officer of an incident is a question of judgement for the control room senior officer. They need to have sufficient information on which to undertake a briefing balanced against making a timely notification. They will also be leading the control room's response to an incident, providing support to officers at the scene of the incident, redeploying resources, liaising with other agencies and ensuring that the policing response for other incidents across London are responded to. I would expect to be notified between 30 and 60 minutes of an incident coming to police attention. CI BARRETT informed me that the

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emergency services were responding to a block of flats alight at Grenfell Tower, Kensington. The night duty Superintendent responsible for the area, Superintendent WARNETT, was due to provide a situation report shortly and I was told that I would be contacted again when this situation report was available.

8. To assist in providing this overview statement, I have read the statements of Detective Superintendent Paul Warnett (dated 04/07/2017) and Acting Inspector Nicholas Thatcher (dated 27/06/2017). I have also seen the original CAD (computer aided despatch message) number 482, which was created from the LFB request for police assistance at 1.16am, and a summary of all the related police CADs, provided to me in order to prepare this statement. I can see that there are caveats in the statements of Superintendent Warnett and Inspector Thatcher in relation to timings and the ordering of events. I have not had the opportunity at this time to view Inspector Thatcher's body worn video, which might assist in this regard. Subject to those caveats, I confirm that the main features of the initial police response were as follows.
9. Inspector Thatcher was the night duty Inspector for the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea (RBKC) on the 13th June 2017. At approximately 01:15 he heard a request for police assistance from the LFB over his radio. It appears that this was the first call to the police. Inspector Thatcher was mobile in a police vehicle at the time. At that point, it appeared that the LFB were responding to a 6 pump fire at Grenfell Tower. He made his way to the scene to assess the situation.
10. PC Sangha and PC Rees were the first officers on the scene at 01:22. They had responded to an initial call for police assistance, received by them at 01:18. PC Sangha could see that there was a fire on what he thought was the third floor of the Tower and relayed this information to Inspector Thatcher over his personal radio. He also reported that it was unknown if people were trapped, but that evacuation of the building was required, parts of the building appeared to be falling from the exterior of it and that it ought to be declared a critical incident.

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11. Whilst he was driving down Ladbroke Grove, Inspector Thatcher could see the Tower to his left. He has recorded that he saw that the south eastern corner, at what he thought was the third floor was alight. He also saw flames coming out of that floor and rapidly travelling up the side of the Tower to the top floors.
12. At that point, he contacted the control room and declared a major incident. He also ordered that no MPS personnel were to enter the building, because the Fire Brigade were believed to be on scene and dealing with the fire itself.

Categorisation of incident and command structure

13. In this context there are two types of incident declaration that can be made, a critical and a major incident declaration. A critical incident is defined as any incident where the effectiveness of the police response is likely to have a significant impact on the confidence of the victim, their family and/or the community. The consequences that follow from declaring a critical incident include recognition amongst police officers and staff that the incident is significant and out of the ordinary. In addition, it prompts the establishment of a command structure to help manage the incident together with senior officer oversight.
14. I exhibit a document entitled "The London Resilience Partnership Strategic Coordination Protocol" as **NAJ/1**, which at paragraph 1.4.7 defines a major incident as follows:
- "A major incident is beyond the scope of business-as-usual operations, and is likely to involve serious harm, damage, disruption or risk to human life or welfare, essential services, the environment or national security."
15. The declaration of a major incident recognises that special arrangements need to be implemented by emergency services to deal with a range of serious consequences by one or more emergency responder agencies. In essence, a major incident is focused on the response to

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an incident and working together with other responders whereas a critical incident is focused on managing the impact of an incident on a person or persons from a police perspective. Any member of any emergency service can declare a major incident, and this can occur at different times given the different priorities of the emergency services and the number of staff involved. We have learned from other incidents not to assume a major incident has been declared by another emergency service and that we ought to consider declaring a major incident if in doubt. This may lead to multiple declarations of a major incident.

16. The declaration of a major incident will trigger a multi-agency conversation between the emergency services to share information and create a common operating picture of the nature of the incident and the emergency response. It will trigger the establishment of a strategic co-ordination centre and strategic co-ordinating group to support the multi-agency response to the incident. For this incident this was established at the police special operations room in Lambeth. The circumstances of this incident meant the declaration of a major incident also triggered the establishment of the mass casualty fatalities plan and the casualty bureau.
17. Once a critical or major incident is declared, a command structure is put in place to provide a clear process for making decisions and dealing with an incident both on the ground and at a wider strategic level. There are three levels to the command structure within policing; bronze, silver and gold. The gold commander is responsible for setting the strategic direction of how the incident is to be dealt with, making policy decisions and securing resources. The gold commander assumes and retains overall command for the incident. The silver commander is responsible for implementing the strategy through a tactical plan and the allocation of resources. The bronze commander, of which there can be many, is responsible for the delivery of the tactical plan at an operational level. A bronze commander might be responsible for a geographical area or be role specific. For example a bronze commander for cordons would be responsible for ensuring the integrity of cordons was maintained and officers appropriately briefed and deployed. There is no set list of bronze command positions as these would be allocated according to the nature of the incident.

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Continuation of Statement of **Cmdr Neil Jerome**.....**Resources allocated to the incident**

18. The command and control system shows that during the course of the first hour of the incident, 226 MPS officers were deployed to Grenfell Tower. In addition, officers from the British Transport Police were deployed as well as pan-London armed response officers. At 04:00 a further 6 sergeants and 36 constables were deployed to the incident. At 07:00, when the early turn shift came on duty, a further 6 inspectors, 18 sergeants and 108 constables were deployed.

Events of the 14th June 2017 - Action taken by MPS officers

19. Whilst he was on his way to Grenfell Tower, Inspector Thatcher made arrangements for RBKC to be contacted to arrange for shelters. By the time he had parked on Bomore Road near the Tower, he could see that the fire seemed to have spread to the top floors of the building.

20. A rendezvous point, ("RVP") was established at Bomore Road and Inspector Thatcher asked for the LAS to attend.

21. Paul Warnett was the night duty superintendent covering south London, which incorporates Kensington and Chelsea. He travelled from Kensington Police Station, arriving at the scene at 01:45. He had been in liaison with Inspector Thatcher via police radio.

22. At that time, there were 15 – 20 police officers at the scene and more were required to discharge the key police functions of facilitating the LFB operation, while keeping members of the public at a safe distance. There were serious issues about maintaining cordons, which made it difficult for the LFB and LAS to save life.

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23. Inspector Thatcher and Superintendent Warnett met at the scene and at about 01:50 Superintendent Warnett appointed himself gold commander and Inspector Thatcher as silver commander for the incident.
24. Superintendent Warnett liaised with the special operations room through the 'Met Grip' chief inspector, who was Chief Inspector Barrett, to determine what MPS resources were available to deal with the fire. The Met Grip chief inspector is based at the central command complex and is responsible for maintaining an overview of operational policing activity, resourcing levels and incidents presenting risk across the Metropolitan Police Service. They will flex resources at a pan London level in response to incidents and ensure the different command units are linked together.
25. Within about an hour of his arrival at the incident, Superintendent Warnett believed police cordons had been established where they were necessary. Both Superintendent Warnett and Inspector Thatcher have explained that the police role was not to go into the Tower to save life, but instead to assist the LFB and LAS to fulfil their respective roles.
26. The primary role for the MPS officers at Grenfell Tower and the surrounding areas throughout the incident was to ensure the cordons were established and maintained so the LFB and LAS could safely perform their roles. The sheer number of fire engines that needed to get as close to Grenfell Tower as possible meant that roads had to be closed and a sterile area established so that the firefighters could get on with their work as efficiently and safely as possible.
27. In addition, the cordons needed to be established and maintained to make sure that members of the public were safe. From an early point in the incident, the falling debris from Grenfell Tower itself presented a significant risk to any person in the immediate vicinity of the Tower and there were also concerns that if the Tower were to collapse, hundreds of people would be at risk of harm.

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28. As well as that, a number of members of the public at cordons were on the telephone to loved ones trapped within the Tower and so police officers had to support those individuals and, on some occasions, prevent them from trying to enter the Tower to rescue their relatives. This would have presented the very real risk of them losing their lives and hindering the rescue efforts of LFB.
29. The MPS officers deployed to the incident had established rendezvous points and routes of access and egress to allow for the significant number of emergency vehicles attending, an evacuation of the area because of the risk to life from the Tower should it collapse, and the risk from falling debris. In the early stages of the incident the Homicide Assessment Team were deployed to the Tower to provide early investigative advice to the officers at the scene. Whilst the incident was in its early stages and causes of the fire were unknown, given the fact that people had lost their lives it was clear there would be an investigation required into their deaths and early investigative advice is crucial to ensure evidence is seized, protected and preserved.
30. Specialist resources were also deployed to Grenfell Tower. The Territorial Support Group was deployed. These officers are highly trained in a range of skills, including the rapid entry to buildings, and they have additional protective equipment that would be unavailable to response officers. These officers were necessary in order to provide an option to enter rooms quickly should this be required but in addition the shields and helmets they carry in their carriers (police vehicles) were used to protect firefighters entering the building from the falling debris. These officers placed themselves in considerable danger as there were fears the building may collapse and the volume of falling, burning material was considerable. The officers were acutely aware of people trapped in the burning building, the distressing circumstances in which they were trapped and the expectations of the crowd to help the rescue. In addition firearms officers were deployed as these officers have the skills and training to enter rooms quickly should they be required.
31. As the morning progressed the response remained focused on the Tower, but there was additionally a focus on trying to establish where evacuees were and which hospitals the

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casualties had been taken to so that the Casualty Bureau could run effectively. Officers also had to assist with the provision of accurate and timely information and the wider consequences of the incident, for example the impact on wider residents and the community and the support arrangements required. This information would be relayed to those responsible for providing humanitarian assistance.

32. MPS officers did not assist with any aspect of the evacuation of residents from the Tower itself, given that the LFB were, quite rightly, the lead emergency service for that aspect of the incident.

Fire Survival Guidance (FSG) calls and information

33. I am aware that throughout the incident there was a high volume of 999 calls from members of the public trapped within the Tower. To assist the public inquiry, the transcripts of the 999 calls handled by MPS call handlers and the statements of the police first responders have been scrutinized to see what FSG (if any) they provided. A summary of that evidence has been provided to me in order to prepare this statement. The relevant 999 calls are listed in the attached schedule to this statement, which I exhibit as **NAJ/2**. The relevant police statements are listed in the further schedule attached to this statement, which I exhibit as **NAJ/3**. The initial advice from the LFB was that residents should stay within their flats. I am aware that this is commonly referred to as "the stay put policy". I can see that officers at the scene were following that guidance from the LFB when they were being approached by members of the public seeking advice.

34. I have read Assistant Commissioner Roe's statement dated 16th August 2017 and am aware that he made the decision at 02:47 that people within the Tower should be told that they should seek to evacuate themselves from the building.

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35. I exhibit CAD 482 to this statement as exhibit NAJ/4. This shows that at 03:08 a message was received by the MPS control room from the LFB stating that Fire Safety Guidance had changed, and that those inside the building ought to escape by any means possible. My current understanding is that that message was communicated across the airways to officers shortly before 03:10.
36. From the schedule of witness statements NAJ/3, I can see that a number of officers at the scene recall hearing a message at approximately 03:00 and passed on that guidance when required to do so. From the schedule of CAD calls at NAJ/2 I can see that the advice prior to the change in guidance was a mixture of stay put or to get out if safe to do so via the fire exits. After the FSG had changed I can see the advice was to self- evacuate from the building.
37. I can see from his statement that Inspector Thatcher tasked PC 428 Alice Jacobs to act in a liaison role with the LFB, and she passed information on to them about trapped residents.
38. As described by both Inspector Thatcher and Superintendent Warnett, there were hourly silver strategic meetings at the scene, chaired by LFB Assistant Commissioner Andy Roe, who was running the LFB operation at the scene. They focused on the LFB response and updates on casualties and fatalities. The first meeting that Inspector Thatcher and Superintendent Warnett attended was at 03:30. Representatives from the LAS, LFB and the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea were also in attendance. At that first meeting, AC Roe sought formal reassurance that the police would protect the LFB firefighters, which reassurance was given.
39. At that meeting, AC Roe informed those in attendance that he had already departed from fire safety norms in terms of the safety of LFB personnel entering the Tower and that call handlers and officers on cordons needed to circulate the message that it may no longer be possible for persons still inside the Tower to be rescued, and they should try and escape. As a result, Superintendent Warnett contacted the MPS special operations room (call sign 'GT') to ask them to pass on the LFB message that anyone trapped should try to self-evacuate. On page 24 of

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exhibit NAJ/4, this call is recorded at 03:58. I also exhibit the CAD summary referred to at paragraph 8 above as exhibit **NAJ/5**, which also records this call.

40. Inspector Thatcher and Superintendent Warnett continued to coordinate and manage the police presence at Grenfell Tower as described above and in their statements throughout. Both officers also attended the strategic meetings at the LFB Command Unit held at 03:30, 04:31, 05:47, 07:12, 08:45 and 10:13 before they finished their tour of duty and left the scene at approximately 10:45.

Personal involvement in the incident

41. I will now continue to set out my own involvement that night in responding to the fire.
42. After the initial call at 02:10, I was contacted again at 02:30 by Chief Inspector Barrett, who advised me that a major incident had been declared and that there were multiple casualties being reported.
43. Declaring a major incident is a significant declaration which by its very definition is infrequently used and, therefore, has a significant impact when it is. Upon hearing this information, I decided a full multi-agency response would be needed, requiring the activation of a strategic co-ordinating group (SCG) of senior representatives from the agencies involved in line with the joint emergency services interoperability principles (known as 'JESIP'), the activation of the London Resilience Forum who would support the establishment of the strategic co-ordinating group, the activation of the casualty bureau function and the activation of the special operations room at the Lambeth Metropolitan Police control room to provide the facilities to effectively co-ordinate the multi-agency response. I exhibit a document entitled "Joint Doctrine: The Interoperability Framework" as exhibit **NAJ/6**, which incorporates JESIP, which together with exhibit NAJ/1 (the London Resilience Partnership Strategic Coordination Protocol) provide the principles that govern the inter-agency response to a major incident.

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44. I tasked Chief Inspector Barrett with the activations described at paragraph 43 above, recognising they would take some time to implement, especially given the hour of the day. It was important that these were set up at an early stage. Having made these decisions, and concluded the call I got myself washed and dressed in preparation to make my way to the special operations room at Lambeth ("GT") from my home address. Whilst I was doing so the police response was being commanded by Superintendent Warnett as the gold commander. I called my staff officer, who lives nearby and has access to an MPS vehicle. I authorised him to collect me and drive me to GT, using blue lights and the vehicle two tones siren to facilitate my arrival from my home address in Kent.
45. I was not in command of the response at this stage, as the command protocols state transfer of command should be undertaken when the commander has knowledge of the circumstances and available intelligence, the ability to communicate, appropriate tactical advice available and a suitable environment from which to exercise the command function. I anticipated being able to transfer command from Superintendent Warnett to myself once I had arrived at the special operations room and had been appropriately briefed. I would then become the gold commander for the incident. It would not be appropriate for the gold commander to make their way to the scene of the incident as they would be likely to be drawn into tactical decision making and, therefore, would not be able to provide the strategic command of the incident.
46. I arrived at the special operations room at 04:10 and was briefed by Chief Inspector Barrett. The command protocols for a major incident do not state the timescales for a chief officer assuming command, however the protocols for a terrorist attack give a 60-90 minute window for the transfer of command to a chief officer and my arrival occurred within this window following the conclusion of my telephone call with C/Insp Barrett. He briefed me on the nature of the incident, the command structure put in place, the resources being deployed, and the current status of the activations initiated on my earlier call.
47. Chief Inspector Barrett informed me the initial call came to the police at 01:16 and was designated as a 6 pump fire. The LFB have a predefined response for different types of fire and

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it is not unusual for there to be calls to fires in blocks of flats, nor for the police to be called to assist.

48. I was informed that the first police unit on the scene was a local response unit for the borough of Kensington and Chelsea containing two officers arriving at 01:22 (as set out above). Chief Inspector Barrett further informed me that we had deployed 210 police officers to the incident with further resources being mobilised. At that stage, there were at least 4 people deceased, the LFB were encountering difficulties in advancing up the Tower and casualties were being taken to 4 hospitals across London. The fact that fatalities had been confirmed was a significant development. Initially, the incident had appeared to be a residential fire, but the existence of multiple fatalities escalated the seriousness of the incident.
49. Chief Inspector Barrett further informed me that he had deployed the MPS control room staff onto 999 calls. This meant that there were no callers waiting for their call to be answered. A temporary flight restriction zone had been established due to the plume of smoke and material emitting from the building. The National Police Air Service were requested by the control room to provide assistance. Emergency services are allowed to deploy into such temporary flight restriction zones to help assist with dealing with the incident in accordance with the rules laid down by the Civil Aviation Authority. The surrounding roads, including the A40, had all been closed. The underground had been suspended on the line approaching Latimer Road station. Owing to the nature of the fire there was a fear that the Tower would collapse and, therefore, a wide evacuation area had been established.
50. Once I had arrived at GT and received the briefing from Chief Inspector Barrett at 04:10, I was of the view that command could now transfer to me. I undertook the role of gold commander at that point. The special operations room (callsign GT) is established to provide operational and administrative support for the command and control of a major incident. It co-locates on a single floor all of the functions required for the management of an incident. Across the floor of the special operations room are a number of individual pods where officers and staff would sit to operate their respective radio channels, make telephone calls, update the command and

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control system and liaise with other pods. Other partner agencies would be allocated their own pods. There are separate rooms to the side of the floor which house support functions as well as the silver and gold commanders. The main floor and commanders' rooms have banks of screens showing CCTV images, where these are available, of an incident. The silver commander has access to a radio whereas the gold commander does not. This is because the gold commander is not directing tactical activity whereas the silver commander does. The gold commander is kept updated by the silver commander.

51. The special operations room was becoming busier as more people arrived following the call out activations (as referred to at paragraph 43 above) and I was aware colleagues from the LFB and the London Resilience Forum were present. Personnel from other agencies sit within the special operations room in designated pods in line of sight of each other. The London Resilience Forum was introduced in 2004 following the Civil Contingencies Act and provides the means for those involved in emergency preparedness to collaborate at a local level.
52. This group comprises 170 organisations and co-ordinates pan-London activity. Its role during an incident is to activate the plans available, provide advice and guidance and ensure agencies have the necessary support in responding to the incident. The emergency services work jointly in accordance with the Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Principles. These were introduced between 2012 and 2014 to improve the way in which the emergency services work together when responding to major multi-agency incidents.
53. The five principles are to co-locate commanders, communicate using plain language, co-ordinate the response, and have a joint understanding of risk and a shared situational awareness. I have been trained in multi-agency incident command having attended the nationally accredited multi-agency gold and incident command training at the national fire service college.
54. The first meeting of the strategic co-ordinating group took place at 05:00. This initial meeting was focused on ensuring there was a common shared situational awareness of the incident and

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was largely concerned with each agency providing a situation report of their response and putting in place an initial multi-agency strategy. This first meeting was chaired by the London Fire Brigade Commander at the special operations room, Richard Wills, as it was considered between us that given the nature of the incident at that stage and the purpose of the first call and his continuity of being involved it would be appropriate for him to chair this first meeting. A record of this and subsequent meetings was maintained by the London Resilience Forum, I exhibit these as **NAJ/7** and **NAJ/8**. In addition to these I have maintained a record of my decisions and considerations, I exhibit this as **NAJ/9**.

55. I chaired a further strategic co-ordinating group at 06:30. The change in chair from the LFB to myself as police gold commander was effected because the focus of the SCG would move from establishing a shared understanding to co-ordinating the multi-agency response which would sit more readily with the police and is in line with the established guidance. This meeting reviewed the multi-agency strategy, provided key updates from agencies and decided on key activities. Paragraph 1.3.5 of exhibit NAJ/1 states:

“The SCG should be chaired by the most appropriate agency, depending on the nature of the incident. This may change as the incident progresses.”

56. Following the conclusion of the 06.30 SCG, the activity within the special operations room was focused on ensuring we had sufficient resources in the right locations, for example at hospitals, maintaining cordons and assisting the establishment of reception centres to ensure the effective management of the incident. I was also briefing the spokesperson for the MPS on the key issues to ensure he was appropriately briefed before undertaking a media briefing. In addition planning for a protracted deployment was being undertaken to ensure there was command and officer resilience moving forwards.

57. The tragedy at Grenfell Tower is unprecedented in my policing experience. The loss of life from those who were yet to take their first breath to those who had witnessed many generations of life is incredibly upsetting. I am overwhelmed by the bravery of police officers who responded to

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the incident and the very real belief in their minds that they may lose their lives trying to save others and the fact they did so without hesitation or regard to themselves. I am mindful many staff within the control room were on the telephone to people within the Tower and they would have been the last voices many people would have heard. This is incredibly humbling.

58. If I can assist the Inquiry further, I will do so in whatever manner would be most useful.

Signature: *N. Jerome*.....

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Witness contact details

Home address:

Postcode:

Home telephone number Work telephone number

Mobile/pager number Email address:

Preferred means of contact:

Male / Female (delete as applicable) Date and place of birth:

Former name: Ethnicity Code (16+1): Religion/belief:

Dates of witness non-availability**Witness care**

- a) Is the witness willing and likely to attend court? **No.** If 'No', include reason(s) on **MG6**.
- b) What can be done to ensure attendance?
- c) Does the witness require a Special Measures Assessment as a vulnerable or intimidated witness?
No. If 'Yes' submit **MG2** with file.
- d) Does the witness have any specific care needs? **No.** If 'Yes' what are they? (Disability, healthcare, childcare, transport, , language difficulties, visually impaired, restricted mobility or other concerns?)

Witness Consent (for witness completion)

- | | | | |
|--|------------------------------|-----------------------------|------------------------------|
| a) The criminal justice process and Victim Personal Statement scheme (victims only) has been explained to me | Yes <input type="checkbox"/> | No <input type="checkbox"/> | |
| b) I have been given the Victim Personal Statement leaflet | Yes <input type="checkbox"/> | No <input type="checkbox"/> | |
| c) I have been given the leaflet 'Giving a witness statement to police — what happens next?' | Yes <input type="checkbox"/> | No <input type="checkbox"/> | |
| d) I consent to police having access to my medical record(s) in relation to this matter:
(obtained in accordance with local practice) | Yes <input type="checkbox"/> | No <input type="checkbox"/> | N/A <input type="checkbox"/> |
| e) I consent to my medical record in relation to this matter being disclosed to the defence: | Yes <input type="checkbox"/> | No <input type="checkbox"/> | N/A <input type="checkbox"/> |
| f) I consent to the statement being disclosed for the purposes of civil proceedings e.g. child care proceedings, CICA | Yes <input type="checkbox"/> | No <input type="checkbox"/> | |
| g) The information recorded above will be disclosed to the Witness Service so they can offer help and support, unless you ask them not to. Tick this box to <u>decline</u> their services: | | | <input type="checkbox"/> |

Signature of witness: Print name:

Signature of parent/guardian/appropriate adult: Print name:

Address and telephone number if different from above:

Statement taken by (print name): **Sam Saunders 841ZT** Station: **Sutton**

Time and place statement taken: