

WITNESS STATEMENT

Criminal Procedure Rules, r27.2; Criminal Justice Act 1967, s.9; Magistrates' Courts Act 1980, s.5b

Statement of: THATCHER, NICHOLAS

Age if under 18: (if over 18 insert 'over 18')

Occupation: POLICE OFFICER

This statement (consisting of 10 page(s) each signed by me) is true to the best of my knowledge and belief and I make it knowing that, if it is tendered in evidence, I shall be liable to prosecution if I have wilfully stated in it anything which I know to be false, or do not believe to be true.

Signature: A/INSP NICHOLAS THATCHER

Date: 27/06/2017

Tick if witness evidence is visually recorded ☐ (supply witness details on rear)

On 13/6/2017 I was on duty working as the night duty Duty Inspector for Kensington and Chelsea Borough police. At about 0115hrs I heard a call on the radio to assist the LFB at a six pump fire that they were dealing with in Grenfell Tower, Notting Hill. This statement refers to the events that took place as part of dealing with this incident. I am fully trained in the management of major incidents and have 23 years experience as a police officer. The last 7 acting in the Inspector rank, I have been public order trained since 1997. I was unable to keep a decision log or IML at any point during the course of the night, due to the immense scale of the incident and the speed at which decisions needed to be taken. These management decisions were taken whilst I was also conducting basic police duties such as cordon management and partner liaison. In place of such a written record I activated my body worn video very early on after my arrival to record events in context. I have attempted to start this statement a number of times since the incident took place. I can't explain why but on each occasion I have been unable to force myself to concentrate in detail upon my experiences that night, I am certain that the events are fresh in my mind despite the time elapsed. I have not refreshed my mind through the use of my body worn video for the same reasons. The following evidence is unlikely to be in the correct chronological order, even as I am typing I am remembering glimpses of that night which I cannot place nor put in to a context. I was called upon to make a great many decisions that night. I am unable remember all of them. I can remember those decisions that were significant. All of my actions and decisions that night were taken against the back drop of imminent death, all the time I was within the area that was eventually cordoned I fully expected the building to collapse resulting in my death and the death of the officers and public around me.

Signature: A/INSP NICHOLAS THATCHER
2018

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In the same vein I was mindful of lessons learned as a result of the Twin Towers collapsing in New York. I accept that that incident was far greater in scale than Grenfell Tower but the lessons were still relevant. Fortunately I was already in a vehicle and mobile when the initial call for assistance came out. I noted that response units swiftly accepted the call and were on their way. As ever is the case I did not know from which parts of the borough those units were travelling. Given the nature of the call I also made my way.

It is not uncommon for London Fire brigade (LFB) to request assistance at 6 pump fires, nor is it unusual to have a fire in a residential block of flats, indeed we had dealt with a similar request the previous week at a different location. I was not overly alarmed at hearing the call as I made my way from Chelsea towards Grenfell Tower. PC119BS SANGHA and PC621BS REES were the first officers on scene. PC Sangha quickly began to relay a situation report using his personal radio (PR), he described that a flat on the 3rd floor was alight; it was unknown if there were people trapped, that evacuation of the building was required and that sections of the building were falling to the ground. PC SANGHA is an experienced, competent and capable officer whose judgement I trust. He quickly declared that Grenfell Tower fire was a critical incident. This significantly raised my concern. At this point I was travelling at speed, under blue lights on Holland Park Avenue nearing the junction with Ladbroke Grove. Detective Superintendent WARNETT, who was the on duty senior officer and also the local Superintendent contacted me via the PR asking if I was going to declare the fire a 'Major' incident? There is a significant difference between 'Critical' and 'Major', with this in mind I told Mr WARNETT that I was yet to arrive on scene and would make my decision when I was in full possession of the facts. As I was within seconds of being able to see the Tower, I believe this was reasonable. I turned onto Ladbroke Grove, heading North. I went through the red traffic light and progressed to the top of the hill. I looked to my left and saw the Tower, flame was clearly emanating from about the third floor of the South Eastern corner. As I watched the flame shot further out, changed direction going directly up the side of the building as far as the roof. This took roughly 2 seconds. I immediately transmitted to the control room that this was a 'Major incident' and that no police officer was to go into the building. I made the decision to call a 'Major' incident because it was immediately clear that all the blue light emergency services would be called to respond in special pre-defined ways relevant to their role and the incident would involve a massive number of people. I directed that no police officers were to enter the building because I believed that LFB were already on the scene with 6 pumps, that MPS personal protective equipment was not designed for infernos such as I was

Signature: A/INSP NICHOLAS THATCHER
2018

Signature witnessed by:

witnessing and that each blue light service has clear a role to play in support of each other. I was still about a mile away from the scene. As I drove towards the flames I again used my PR to ensure that the local authority, Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea (RBKC) were called immediately and refuge shelters were opened for displaced residents of the Tower. PS BLONDELL undertook this task for me. PC SANGHA transmitted that the safest route in was via LADBROKE GROVE, then CLARENDON ROAD on to BOMORE ROAD I followed this route parking on BOMORE ROAD outside a sports centre. By this time the fire had spread significantly, the top two floors were now alight. I took a moment to assess the situation. The Tower was to my left about 80 metres away. The sports centre was to my immediate right. There was a patch of open ground between the two structures, paved nearest the sports centre going to grass as you approach the Tower with the ground sloping away. To my left was a small block of flats, TREADGOLD HOUSE, constructed in an 'L' shape covering about three floors. Across the open ground opposite me there was what I believed to be a sports hall. I realised that I did not have resources to set cordons wider than my current location and that this space afforded access and space for LAS to work as well as a large public building we could use. As a result I set the inner RVP as BOMORE ROAD and asked for LAS to attend. I circulated all injured survivors were to be directed to BOMORE ROAD for LAS. I could see a number of people in the open ground, no more than about 40 all either stationary staring up at the Tower or slowly moving towards it. I saw PC106BS ABDULKHADIR running towards me shouting 'we need tape', I retrieved a roll of tape from my vehicle and went forward throwing the roll to A/PS 282BS HANDLEY for deployment. I also saw PC157BS MCGOWAN trying to stop the public going forwards. I think I shouted words to the effect of 'get these people back now'. I could not see PC SANGHA or PC REES and I had not heard them on the radio. I was afraid that they were in the building. The fire had spread so quickly that the side facing me (South) was completely alight. There was a constant rain of burning objects coming from the top and sides of the building, some looked small, some seemed to be large and rectangular. It looked as if the building was melting, as I am writing I have just remembered the roar and crackle of the flames. To my left down the grassy slope I could see two fire engines with a number of fire fighters at work. They were parked on GRENDFELL ROAD at the base of the Tower adjacent to the entry foyer. I hurried down there to find the two constables and try to speak with the LFB officer in command. I saw PC REESs just inside the glass front of the foyer. Behind him I remember seeing fire fighters standing in an orderly file going up the stairs. They were standing to the left of the staircase, to the right I saw a few of the residents making their way down to safety and other fire fighters. I remember saying to PC REES 'What are you doing?' He answered 'I'm helping'. I told

Signature: A/INSP NICHOLAS THATCHER
2018

Signature witnessed by:

him that he was 'not a fireman and that was their job and his job was up on the cordons'. I pulled him physically away. He reassured me that PC SANGHA was with the other officers dealing with the public. PC REES was wild eyed, he was not in a panic but he was shocked. I did not want him going straight into confrontation with the public on the cordons immediately, as confrontation was always going to happen so I told him that I needed him to go around to the opposite side of the building and inform me of the picture that side. This was a valid reason but I also did this to give him breathing space. I then became aware that the building immediately adjacent to the Tower, BARANDON WALK and GRENFELL WALK had many residents standing at their windows and on the first floor walkway all standing staring at the burning Tower. I have a vivid memory of a lady in the corner flat sitting on a chair with tea cup as she watched the horror unfold. The LFB were clearly too busy to speak to me. I did not have enough resources to clear the balcony of the public who were clearly in danger of the Tower collapsing upon them and more so from falling flaming debris. As they were clearly not approaching the tower I decided to leave them alone and return to the public near the sports centre who were moving towards the building. I was asked about casualties by the control room. I could only see one or two people who were walking but coughing, this was worrying as I should have seen hundreds of people. At this point my priorities were to save human life, both inside and outside the Tower. To prepare the ground for 20 LFB, 20 LAS and as many police units as possible. Once this was done I had to maintain a strategic overview of the incident and direct resources to where they were needed acting upon information received from multiple sources and my own eyes whilst updating the control room with events. My log would have to be the CAD message and by body worn video as there was no time to complete the regular documentation. I think it was at this point as I made my way back up the way I had come I noticed a huge flaming object impact just behind me over my left shoulder. remember thinking 'thank God I kissed the girls goodbye'. was certain the building was coming down. When I reached the others more officers had arrived and had formed a loose cordon as they very quietly and politely asked the public to move back. They were not moving. I would expect this polite engagement in normal circumstances however this was not normal circumstances. I shouted at the top of my voice words to the effect of 'Constables use your voices, you are all quiet'. Addressing the crowd I said words to the effect of 'That is a 400 foot building, when it collapses it is going to collapse on you and you are all going to die. Get back'. This shocked the officers in to action and with a renewed vigour the crowd were pushed backwards to the line of the sports centre splitting into two sections going to the left and right of the building. During this push an Asian male, about 6' 3" tall wearing grey pyjamas, aged about 60 years and crying refused to move saying something

Signature: A/INSP NICHOLAS THATCHER
2018

Signature witnessed by:

like 'that is my home'. I asked him again to move and I think I tried to physically lead him away. He dodged around me and took two steps towards the Tower. I pulled him backwards by the shoulders and pushed him towards BOMORE ROAD. He fell to the floor and curled up crying. I picked him up and gave him to two officers to get him away, he again tried to go back but this time it was for his flip flops that had fallen off. I used my common law power to save/protect life in the circumstances. Had he gone in to the Tower he would be dead, had he stood near the Tower he would probably be hit by flaming debris and die or the Tower would collapse upon him. Had he attempted to gain entry he would have impeded the work of the LFB and others would have died. I believe that any force I used that night, no more than pushing and shoving, was reasonable in these circumstances. At this point I believe I was joined by Mr WARNETT and his runner A/PS 295BS LOGUE. We had a brief conversation the detail of which I cannot remember. Mr WARNETT wanted the crowd further back, as did I. By nowother officers had joined us, I think just about all my response team. Again I shouted to the crowds 'I need this space for the ambulances, the ambulances cannot park here because you are blocking the way get back to beyond the blue lights' I repeated this several times until the crowd had retreated to the other side of BOMORE ROAD behind the parked police cars. The crowd were stunned and horrified to the extent that none of them had taken out a mobile telephone to record events, which seems to be the public's first reaction to anything these days. They just shut down. Mr WARNETT, A/PS LOGUE and I then returned to under BARANDON WALK leaving PS4BS VALENTE and A/PS HANDLEY at the cordon. It was about this time I heard that PC SANGHA was receiving survivors from the Tower. I nominated CLARENDON ROAD as the outer RVP as this is a very long straight road, with multiple access points located close to the scene but beyond the impact zone when the Tower fell. I made this decision remembering the number of emergency service vehicles and people that were lost in New York because they were too close. This was going to be a significant logistical problem. I nominated PS15B5 PAAAJRVI as BRONZE parking and told him to marshal as many officers as needed as his success was critical given the narrow residential streets and the large numbers of emergency vehicles arriving. I was satisfied that the cordons near the sports centre were holding, I was awaiting an update from the North side of the Tower from PC REES, I did not know how the cordons covering the fire engines on GRENFELL ROAD were coping. I made my way to that location, officers had attempted to put in an absolute cordon on GRENFELL ROAD junction BOMORE ROAD, about 20 metres from the rear of the fire engines which were now parked along both roads. As I made my way there I had to turn back members of the public who were heading to the Tower, I remember one man who was talking on the telephone as he came towards me. I told him to

Signature: A/INSP NICHOLAS THATCHER
2018

Signature witnessed by:

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Statement of: THATCHER, NICHOLAS

Form MG11(T)

Page 6 of 12

go back to which he answered "My family are in there". I reassured him that we would get them out and turned him back. At this point realised how important the cordons would be, if it were my family in the Tower I would not be stopped from going in. These people would be the same. There was however only one way in or out, the LFB needed this. If the cordons failed there would be chaos and increased death. I cannot remember exactly how many officers were there or who they were. The cordon was not effective, a constant flow of the public were heading towards the Tower from the direction of BRAMLEY ROAD, some were compliant when they were asked not to go forward, others were reluctant whilst a number just wanted a fight with the constables, some were on their telephones, I guess they were talking to loved ones in the Tower. I assisted the constables, again they were very quiet, each having individual conversations rather than addressing the crowd. I decided that as before unpleasant honesty was required, this approach had worked earlier. I shouted words to the effect of "People are going to die, your friends and family are going to die because you are not doing what you are told. We cannot help them because we are here arguing with you, get back" I repeated this several times, it seemed to work for the majority of people, some young males then rounded on me, one large black male wearing a grey sweatshirt physically squared up to me. I can't remember exactly what he said except for the fact he read my name badge and said he was going to complain about me. That was the least of my concerns. Looking behind him it looked as if people were listening to the constables, for now. The male huffed and puffed but did not go forward. Three other [REDACTED] males then went to go past me up BOMORE ROAD I stopped one who I now know to be Michael PERKINS I started to tell him to go back but he said he had keys for a hall which he wanted to open up for the residents. I thanked him and let him through. He was walking up BOMORE away from the Tower and I needed a place of refuge for survivors. I believe it was now that I started to push the message to the constables that they needed to be forceful but not to start a riot because we would not win. On the balance of probability I believe that this was the most dangerous time, if just one person had thrown a punch from either side significant public disorder would have followed, resulting in chaos and more death. I think it was now that I found the LFB command unit parked just up BOMORE ROAD I made first contact with LFB command. It was a brief conversation about what they needed The chief concern was that the LFB working area was not sterile, some members of the public were still in the way. I explained what our situation was and that we would be able to clear the area once more resources arrived. He accepted this. I pulled PC428 from the nearest cordon and tasked her as the conduit between police and LFB. I did think that this would have been a logistical role, however it evolved into a critical role as she guided LFB to trapped residents. I went back up to the RVP on BOMORE ROAD by the

Signature: A/INSP NICHOLAS THATCHER
2018

Signature witnessed by:

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RESTRICTED

Statement of: THATCHER, NICHOLAS

Form MG11(T)

Page 7 of 12

sports centre. I received a call on the service mobile offering me two coaches to be used as temporary refuge points and assist with moving survivors. Initially I did not see the value in these given the close proximity of a high number of public buildings and Church Halls. I agreed to them on the basis that it was better to have them and need them than need them and not have them. This incident was so far beyond anything I had experienced or trained for I decided I needed all options immediately available. I sent them to CLARENDON ROAD and warned PS PAAJARVI they would be arriving. I do not have a clear memory of my movements then other than I checked the initial cordons and answered a never ending number of questions on my radio. I was aware that my service telephone was ringing but I could not answer it due to the demands made in person or over the radio. I considered nominating a runner but could not justify taking an officer from the cordons. PC REES was now asking for help on the Northern side, I was aware that PS VALENTE and A/PS HANDLEY had taken some officers to assist. London Ambulance Service had now set up triage points on the flat areas either side of the sports centre. Survivors were being taken to them. At some point PC REES asked for LAS to attend the North side. I told him to direct walking wounded to the sports centre, he told me that they could not. I trusted LAS to direct their own resources and PS VALENTE to let me know if I was needed. The next thing I remember is going back down to the base of the Tower which was now an inferno, I was certain it was a case of when it was going to fall rather than would it fall. All manner of flaming debris was peeling off it and falling to earth. I met with Mr WARNETT we agreed that we needed to clear the balcony of BARANDON WALK to safeguard the public that were standing there in the open from the debris that was falling. We took a number of constables up there. I cannot remember exactly who except PC44OBS HaART and PC412BS COLLINS. We cleared the balcony without too much trouble and told those residents on their private balconies to go inside. I remember that the public had been pointing out people standing at windows in the Tower, saying things like 'he's flashing his light' and 'there are children'. I have memories of people, some individuals and some family groups standing at the windows at roughly the same level as the balcony looking at us imploringly. I remember one little girl with long dark hair wearing a white vest just standing there. I'm not sure if it is real, I hope not. I don't know if they escaped, I posted a constable at the wider northern end to stop the public returning, because it was wider he was able to be further away from the debris. I also put one officer in the single person stairway the other end, he was able to stand in the stairway with hard cover above him. noticed that he was from CW borough. I realised that resources were arriving at the RVP. Mr WARNETT had taken some officers to look for a person who had jumped from the Tower and landed nearby. I went to head back to the RVP to direct

Signature: A/INSP NICHOLAS THATCHER
2018

Signature witnessed by:

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resources when I remembered that there are a system of tunnels under the Tower used for garages. I think it was at this point I went down in to the tunnels to make sure nobody was taking refuge there. It was only a short distance and I was only there a brief time but this was the most afraid I was the whole night. The tunnels were eerily silent and empty. I returned to the RVP.

The rest of the night I spent at the RVP directing the arriving resources to wherever colleagues were calling for help. It seemed that as a problem became apparent another serial would arrive ready for instant deployment. My briefings were not great but they were accurate and honest explaining the problem, the location, the fact that I was not sure what they would be facing but to deal with what is in front of them and not to start a riot. I remember PC COLLINS saying to me that we needed the keys to the sports centre, I agreed and said words to the effect of "I'm getting close to saying just do the door if it takes much longer". I dealt with another matter and when I looked again I saw that PC COLLINS had taken me at my word. He was right to do so. We now had a morgue to protect the dignity of the dead, light and power for the emergency services. All around were exhausted fire fighters laying on the grass, LAS paramedics and other fire fighters completing CPR and treating survivors. It was like a scene from a Hollywood movie. I saw a constable handing drinks to fire fighters. On the grass, by a low wall near to BOMORE ROAD I saw the dead, blackened body of a female, she was laying on a black tarpaulin. I remember wondering why the tree I was by was not bending in the strong wind I could hear. Then I realised it was not the wind but screams from all around. I met with Mr WARNETT again, LFB wanted to clear the front section of BARANDON WALK as thermal imaging cameras showed that the roof of that building was heating up. As luck would have it a TSG serial arrived and were so tasked. The RBKC duty officer arrived and told me of the rest centres they were setting up. I took him to the LFB command point and told him to stay there. Throughout the night there were hourly command meetings chaired by LFB in their command unit, I attended as police SILVER with Mr WARNETT as GOLD. These were immensely useful. I will not record the decisions made there as the meeting were minuted by LFB and recorded on my BWV. I was reassured eventually that the building was not expected to collapse but concerned that a structural engineer was still needed. The Tower was not meant to catch light like this either. There is no way I can remember all the decisions I took that night, I think that between Mr WARNETT and I we covered everything. Including ensuring the A40 was closed. I know Mr WARNETT was as equally busy as I on his telephone dealing at a higher level than me. The night progressed in this vein, the public stopped trying to force the cordons as we grew in numbers and as dawn broke, many of those who had been disruptive became helpful, sourcing shopping trollies full of bottled water for the

Signature: A/INSP NICHOLAS THATCHER
2018

Signature witnessed by:

LFB and consoling each other. The officers on the cordons then had the terrible task of trying to pass information to the LFB through PC528 about which flats were occupied. Some officers spoke to people in the building, some were spat on and verbally abused for their apparent inaction. I am immensely proud of the way those officers coped. This went on for hours as the sun rose, the fire was remorseless I remember Mr WARNETT telling me that LFB needed protection from falling debris even to get to the building and wanted to use out public order long shields. I put out on the radio for long shields to be brought up. Very quickly supplies arrived Mr WARNETT and I agreed that in these circumstances it was reasonable. We saw a TSG section nearby and told them to kit up and help. They did so without question. As they were doing so I am aware that officers such as PC NEAVE took shields up just in their beat duty uniforms to allow LFB the option of using them straight away I transmitted that no officer was to go in to the building. I am sure that there were many others in the MPS making decisions which made my job easier, not least the arrival of the salvation army refreshments tents. Serials were clearly self relieving for breaks as they saw fit. I did not interfere as it was working. During the 0320hrs command meeting the LFB decided that they could no longer go in to rescue those residents of the Tower who were still trapped. They had been having problems from about the 12th floor for a while. At the end of this meeting Mr WARNETT made our way to the grassy area between the sports centre and the Tower. The fire was raging everywhere, I could still light small lights waving on the top floor of the side of the building to my left, there was a makeshift rope made of bed sheets hanging from the lower floor facing the balcony of BARANDON WALK. I heard over the radio a police officer on the cordons ask the control room if we were still telling people to stay in their flats and await LFB? I knew that LFB were not coming. I brought this to the attention of Mr WARNETT, we both agreed that we needed to change the message. This was a huge call, given the look of the fire from the outside and the LFB reports from the inside shared at the command meeting, we knew that this was a death message. Mr WARNETT wanted to double check that this is the correct course of action. He did so quickly and then used his PR to inform the cordon officers and CCC staff that any residents making contact should be told to self evacuate. It felt like everybody paused and looked at the Tower and all those people. We then got on with our jobs. I saw members of my team intermittently through the night as they completed tasks and returned to the RVP for directions. It was clear that they were very tired but more emotionally exhausted, so I gave them easy tasks to focus their attention upon such as guarding shields, erecting forensic tents and so on. The radio remained busy all night so I used runners for logistical tasks. I sent PC COLLINS and PC RIGGS to tour the footprint and ensure sufficient resources had been allocated. I am not sure how long they were but when they

Signature: A/INSP NICHOLAS THATCHER
2018

Signature witnessed by:

returned the reassured me that they had solved the one gap we had. I was now able to try and put in place a reserve unit. During the command meeting held at 0430hrs LFB informed me that they had called for another 20 pumps to assist and that these vehicles would be arriving in 45 minutes. I decided to use LADBROKE GROVE between OXFORD GARDENS and BLENHEIM CRESCENT this is a wide road which would have had few parked vehicles to obstruct the LFB, it had multiple off roads which could be used to access the Tower. The length of the section would allow for manoeuvring of engines. This would also have the added benefit of widening the outer cordon. Again as luck would have it a serial arrived. I sent them directly to PS PAAJARVI for deployment and informed him of the plan. Sometime later Mr WARNETT informed me that LFB now wanted to completely clear BARANDON WALK due to safety concerns. We briefly discussed the problem as we knew there were some residents who would not want to leave to the extent that they would not answer the door. We were faced with the situation that the fire was so strong that the heat alone was heating up adjacent buildings, if the wind changed the flaming debris would land on these buildings and we still had no absolute reassurance that the Tower was not going to collapse and if so in what direction? With this in mind we decided to call for extra 'enforcer' battering rams and directed officers to force every door in BARANDON WALK under S17 PACE to 'save life and limb'. Using the same reasoning TREADGOLD HOUSE was also under threat so we did the same there. Officers were posted to guard the insecure flats. It was now light, we had control of the cordons, the public were compliant, LFB and LAS were able to perform their duties. I sent PC HART and PC RIGGS to tour the cordons, note the locations and required resources in preparation for handover. I had already sent night duty CID DC McCARTHY Notting Hill Police Station to commandeer the wall mounted maps. Once the officers had returned they annotated the map which I spread out over the bonnet of the police car I had arrived in. The press began to arrive shortly after dawn. I set a press pen outside the cordons one junction up KENSINGTON PARK ROAD where they could see the fire but not the emergency work. I was made aware that some photographers had gained access to one of the cleared blocks courtesy of the residents and were photographing the LFB and LAS. As we had not even started to identify who was saved, injured or dead this had massive implications to the investigation and public order. If news of a deceased loved one was given by the media things could easily flare up again. I sent an inspector to see the LALO and get his authority as owner and manager of the building to treat those photographers as trespassers. They were removed. I became aware that LFB were again trying to reach trapped residents in the lower floors, guided by the police helicopter and members of the public who were gathered at the cordons. Everybody was shattered, I tried to keep moral up by checking individuals were alright. I

Signature: A/INSP NICHOLAS THATCHER
2018

Signature witnessed by:

transmitted over the PR on two occasions for supervisors to monitor their constables and give any who needed it a sympathetic posting. I remember agreeing with everybody I spoke to that this matter was on an unprecedented scale, I said more than once 'this is so big we can't get it wrong'. A regular enquiry became where the rest centres were? I relayed the ones I knew of according to the LALO, but this was made more difficult with the number of impromptu halls and private addresses being opened by the community, on balance this was a good problem. I remember posting officers to the centres to mind the press and report numbers towards the end of the night. At about 0730hrs I started to hear early turn serials booking on and start making their way to us. As they would be arriving piecemeal I delegated the task of posting the relief serials to PC HART and PC RIGGS, I directed that they do so on a like for like basis so serials are not split. I checked with the control room on the number of serials arriving and checked the number required on the map. We would be alright. I checked on them periodically, they were doing well but had omitted the parking serials which were the last to be relieved. I thanked as many of those that had come to help us personally but to be honest I think I missed many more. There was a direction over the radio that all officers that had been on duty through the night were to attend KENSINGTON POLLICE STATION for debriefing and OH input. I made sure all my team were accounted for and told the last four officers to head off whilst I attended the last command meeting. At the conclusion I was touched to find they had waited for me. I tried to conduct a hand over with BRONZE cordons, but he did not seem interested and was intent upon walking the cordons immediately. I let him do so. I have revisited my actions and decisions on the night, many times since, I don't think I would have done anything different In the same circumstances. I believe that this is the finest example of team work I have ever experienced, at one point I remember asking the control room after I had just deployed a serial "Is the box empty" he replied Yes'. I have never known the MPS run out of officers. I am sure that time and hindsight will point out my inevitable errors but I am satisfied that as a result of the way the MPS responded to the Grenfell Tower tragedy the LFB and LAS were able to safely do their jobs and no people died outside the Tower from falling debris or by gaining entry. I was the last night duty officer to leave.

Signature: A/INSP NICHOLAS THATCHER
2018

Signature witnessed by:

RESTRICTED

Statement of: THATCHER, NICHOLAS

Form MG11(T)

Page 12 of 12

Signature: A/INSP NICHOLAS THATCHER
2018

Signature witnessed by:

RESTRICTED