

STATEMENT PRINT

Surname: HART

Forenames: MARTIN

Age: Date of Birth:

Address:

Postcode:

Occupation: POLICE OFFICER

Telephone No:

Statement Date: 19/06/2017

Appearance Code:
Height (From):

Build:
Height (To):

Hair Details:	<u>Position</u>	<u>Style</u>	<u>Colour</u>
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Left Eye Colour:

Right Eye Colour:

Complexion1:

Complexion2:

Glasses Worn:

Glasses Use::

Accent Details:	<u>General</u>	<u>Specific</u>	<u>Qualifier</u>
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This statement refers to my attendance at a Major incident declared at Grenfell Tower, Grenfell Road, W11 in the early hours of Wednesday 14th June 2017. During this incident, I recorded over four hours of footage on my Body Worn Video camera (BWV), which I have viewed in part but not in full prior to completing this statement. This statement is my recollection of the events of that night and are accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief. I am completing this statement having not conferred, collaborated or otherwise discussed the accuracy of its contents with any person.

In my statement I will refer to a number of buildings situated in the Lancaster West Estate of North Kensington, which for reference are as follows; Grenfell Tower, a

twenty-four-storey housing block situated South of Silchester Road W11 and East of Bramley Road; Barandon Walk, a low-level housing block situated approximately 20 metres to the South of Grenfell Tower and stretching for approximately 150 metres to the south; Testerton Walk, a low-level housing block situated approximately 20 metres to the West of Barandon Walk; Hurstway Walk, a low-level housing block situated on Bramley Road next to Latimer Road London Underground Station; and Kensington Leisure Centre situated to the south-east of Grenfell Tower at the junctions of Bomore Road and Avondale Park Road, W11.

On Tuesday 13th June 2017, I was working a night duty shift beginning at Kensington Police Station, with a duty rostered from 2200hrs on the 13th June until 0700hrs on Wednesday 14th June 2017. On Wednesday 14th June 2017 at approximately 0045hrs I was on duty in full uniform and posted as the driver of marked police vehicle unit BS801N accompanied by PC Rigg 192BS. At this time an emergency response call was circulated from Met Control for a unit to attend Grenfell Tower, where there were reports of a fire being attended by the London Fire Brigade (from herein to be referred to as LFB). I heard PC Sangha 119BS accept the call as marked police vehicle unit BS21N. I knew from our briefing at the start of the shift that PC Sangha was accompanied by PC 621BS Rees. I was patrolling in the Southern area of Kensington and Chelsea and heard Met Control circulate that the incident at Grenfell Tower was a "six-pump fire" which I understood to mean that six fire engines were in attendance. When PC Sangha arrived at the scene he requested that further units attend and I drove to the scene using audio and visual warning signals, making use of police drivers' exemptions in relation to speed, keep-left signs and automated traffic signals. While I was travelling to Grenfell Tower, which is a journey of approximately 3 miles, I heard PC Sangha declare that the fire at Grenfell Tower was a critical incident, and then a short time later I heard Inspector Nick Thatcher declare over the radio that this was a Major incident, which immediately triggers a minimum response from police, the LFB and the London Ambulance Service (from herein to be referred to as LAS). I approached the scene from the East as this was the best route as stated by PC Sangha, and as I turned left from Ladbroke Grove onto Lancaster Road and proceeded west I saw Grenfell Tower ablaze for the first time. I could see that the external eastern aspect of the building was on fire from the lower floors up to the very top of the tower, mostly to the right of the aspect. What I saw caused me great surprise and some upset as I grew up in the area and am familiar with the communities there. I was also surprised at the scale of the fire as the initial call had referred to a six-pump fire at the tower, not a multi-floor fire of the scale I was witnessing. When I arrived at the scene I left my vehicle on Bomore Road immediately at the junction with Avondale Park Road, which is a pedestrian access point to the Kensington Leisure Centre and has a wide footpath that leads straight to Grenfell Tower approximately 100, - 150m away. As I left my vehicle I could see a large number of people walking and running towards Bomore Road and a number of other people walking on the same footpath towards the burning tower. I ran along the footpath and was met by colleagues including Inspector Nick Thatcher and PC Abdulkhadir 106BS. It had been circulated on the radio that Superintendent Warnett was in charge of the police response to the incident and that the second in command was Inspector Thatcher. I could also see A/PS Mark Handley 282BS was present. Either Inspector Thatcher or A/PS Handley, I do not recall which, ordered a cordon to

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be put in place and I returned to my vehicle, retrieved cordon tape and set up a cordon outside the main entrance to the Kensington Leisure Centre with assistance from colleagues. I remained at the site of the cordon for over an hour and during this time I recall looking up at the burning building and being surprised at how quickly the fire was spreading across and into Grenfell Tower. On looking up in the earlier stages I recall seeing people looking out of their windows in the top four or five floors of the building. While I was on the cordon I had a number of interactions with members of the public. I was approached by one female who stated that she was feeling unwell due to breathing in smoke; the female was walking and talking and I used my radio to request the location of the LAS. I was informed that the ambulances, which had not yet arrived, would be deployed to Bomore Road, which was the road closest to the cordon. Due to the scale of the incident and the fact that the female was walking and talking, I directed her to Bomore Road, a matter of metres away, and told her that this would be where the ambulances would arrive. There were a large number of people present so I called out loudly a number of times words to the effect of "anybody who is injured or has inhaled smoke make your way to Bomore Road where the ambulances will be arriving". In another interaction, I took hold of an Arabic male's arm in an ordinary-police hold before escorting him towards the cordon tape as he had refused to leave several times saying that he wanted to retrieve his slippers. After he failed to leave the cordon area I used force under the common law as I believed that were he to return to the site there was an imminent threat to his life and to those who were trying to get out, and he resisted. However, Inspector Thatcher retrieved the male's slippers and returned them to him at which point he left the cordoned area of his own accord. A number of people also approached me during my time at this cordon and told me that they were on the phone to relatives in the building. The official advice from the LFB, which had been circulated via the Met Radio, was for residents to remain in their homes and await evacuation by the fire service and this was what I told the people approaching me to pass on to their relatives inside. I did not believe it to be practicable for me to talk to those trapped on the phone individually as I had a duty of care to all persons coming out of the building, the advice given was clear and I had faith that the LFB were entering the building to conduct an orderly evacuation. During my time at this cordon my colleagues had created an outer cordon to our inner cordon closer to Bomore Road and members of the public were encouraged to move to this outer cordon. Once the outer cordon was implemented I remained on the inner cordon with PC Abdulkhadir and on a number of occasions I found myself in awe of what I was witnessing; I could hear people calling for help, I could see people looking out of their windows at different levels of the tower and I had the feeling that they did not have a way out as the flames were spreading further to the south across the eastern aspect of the building. I recall saying to nobody in particular "sweet Jesus" and "God help them" several times. The fire appeared to be so fierce and so hot that I wondered how long it would take for the building to collapse, and I noted that the rapid spread of the fire was strange because it was a clear warm night with no wind at all. What I was seeing was surreal and like nothing I have witnessed at any time of my life or career. I knew that people including children were likely dying inside the building as I looked at it, and I recall considering how many people including children may have suffocated in the smoke before the flames got anywhere near them. I remember starting to hear numerous reports over the radio by officers trying to pass on the locations of people at their windows; as I

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looked back up at the building and continued to be in awe of the scale and spread of the fire, I noticed that in some locations where I had previously seen people looking out of windows, there were now just frames with fire or smoke billowing out of them. After I had been at the cordon outside the entrance to the leisure centre for approximately one hour, perhaps slightly less, Inspector Thatcher instructed me to find the LFB front-line commanders and be a point of contact between them and the police air support helicopter (herein to be referred to as MPAS) in order to plot the locations of persons visible in the flats. I quickly made my way towards Grenfell Tower, becoming more and more aware of the sheer scale of the fire as I got closer, and asked a firefighter where his governor [referring to his senior officer] was. The firefighter directed me to an area under the walkway of Barandon Walk, situated immediately between the north side of Barandon Walk and the southern aspect of Grenfell Tower and told me to "look for someone in a white hat". I made my way to this location and found a number of LFB officers wearing white helmets, eventually speaking to one on his own. I was very aware at this time that burning debris, most of it alight, was falling from Grenfell Tower, which was only now approximately twenty metres from my position. The thought again crossed my mind that the building may collapse. I told the fire officer why I was there and used my radio to request that MPAS provide real time details of the locations of people they could see in windows while circling the building above. I was informed that this information was readily available to the LFB if they changed their radios to a specific channel, which they did, but MPAS gave me a real time update and provided the locations of a number of people on two aspects of the building; to the best of my recollection these were the southern aspect - which was visible from my position - and the western aspect which was not visible from my position. The details were provided non-specifically, for example as the "third floor down" instead of "the twenty-first floor". The fire officer wrote all of these details down, at which point another fire officer approached and told me that they needed to evacuate the walkway above the location, which is the entrance to Barandon Walk. I used my radio to request assistance however the fire was so severe that I believed any delay could cause harm to anybody upstairs in Barandon Walk and to myself. I went up the stairs to the northern entrance of Barandon Walk and there was a large group of people congregated, looking at the burning building and taking photographs. I made requests of all the people present to move away, and I specified that they should re-enter Barandon Walk and exit on the other side as this was the quickest way to create distance and also provided overhead cover from any falling debris; the other path taken by some was to the west which kept people close to Grenfell Tower with no overhead cover. I needed to be loud and firm in my directions here as the people were very close to Grenfell Tower and there was a reluctance among people to leave; I understood that some people wanted to help and that some would have lived in Grenfell Tower or known others who did, but I also knew that some people present were obstructive and had heard a number of issues with crowds being reported on the radio at outer cordons around the site. One male in particular, an IC3 male with red clothing and a dark bicycle, was loitering in the uncovered area outside Barandon Walk and did not move away until he had been asked several times, and I recall seeing this male again a short time later. It was very frustrating trying to encourage people to move back into Barandon Walk and go out the other side because it was my feeling that people were not taking seriously enough the gravity of the situation, which was clear to be seen; there were people with

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children and elderly who should have been prioritising getting to safety but were instead watching and in many cases taking photographs of the burning building on mobile phones. I was well aware of the sense of shock and awe that this experience would have raised in those present because I was still feeling it myself, but I could not understand why people would not move away from danger. I managed to encourage a large number of people to go back into Barandon Walk and move towards the southern exit and once inside I started knocking loudly on all of the doors in the building to evacuate the occupants. I got replies from some addresses and advised the occupants to leave the building, while at other addresses I received no reply. Due to the scale of the incident and the number of doors I had to knock on, it was not practicable for me to remain at the addresses to which I received no reply and I had to move on after reasonable efforts had been made. I encountered a number of difficulties when trying to evacuate residents from within Barandon Walk, most notably from an IC4 family of three females and young children. Despite my attempts to explain the gravity of the situation this family took a significant amount of time to leave the premises and were asking which of their relatives' addresses they should go to. This female spoke to me calmly but in a tone that suggested agitation and disgruntle at being asked to leave. I did understand that evacuating their home with children in the middle of the night was an inconvenience, however the potential for harm was great and increasing, and therefore the building had to be cleared. I was joined by PC Jacobs 528BS who also started knocking on doors and trying to evacuate as many people as possible. I encountered further agitation from a male whose mother was elderly and in bed, but required a wheelchair to leave. Again, I understood the inconvenience and difficulty posed to this male, however the risk was too great and I therefore affirmed that his mother must be evacuated. This male complied. Once I had knocked on as many of the doors as possible in Barandon Walk and I had cleared the building as best as possible to the south side, I entered Testerton Walk and again in company of PC Jacobs I started knocking on all doors loudly, with some success and some non-replies. I do not recall exactly how long I spent in Barandon Walk and Testerton Walk, but all people in the communal areas of the building eventually exited via the south exits as had many of the people who had responded to door knocking. I am aware that some people exited Barandon Walk and Testerton Walk via their respective centre exits, which lead to a green area between the two buildings. I did not attempt to prevent people from doing this because the green area leads to Whitchurch Road and away from Grenfell Tower, and I was aware that there is not a route from this area back to Grenfell Tower without going back into the respective buildings. A short time later while I was still in Testerton Walk and dealing with more members of the public who had started congregating, I recall hearing that somebody had jumped from Grenfell Tower; I cannot recall whether I heard this being circulated via the radio or if I heard it from members of the public or emergency services, but a few minutes later Superintendent Warnett came running through the building and shouted words to the effect of "one officer with me now" and continued running. My recollection is that I was at the North side of Testerton walk at this time and I started running after Superintendent Warnett. I turned to PC Jacobs and motioned for her to follow, which she did. I asked PC Jacobs to come as I did not know at that time what needed to be done and whether any further help would be available if it were needed. We ran down into the lower ground of Testerton Walk and exited into the aforementioned grass area between Testerton Walk and Barandon

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Walk. We ran north across the grass towards Grenfell Tower although there was no actual access to Grenfell Tower from that area. I ran behind Superintendent Warnett and to my recollection it was at this point he called out that the first person had jumped from the burning tower and that it was not known if he was dead or alive. I used my torch to illuminate our path and eventually we came to a door leading back into Barandon Walk on the north side, but this was shut and could only be accessed with a resident's fob or from the inside. Superintendent Warnett, PC Jacobs and I started making our way back across the grass area where Superintendent Warnett asked a lone male if he had a fob to access the aforementioned door. He did not, so we continued and found access to the underground service route area of Testerton Walk. As we entered this area I could immediately feel an uncomfortable increase in heat and could see smoke throughout, getting thicker towards the north side. I ran behind Superintendent Warnett until we came to an area with a high wall that stretched to the east. Superintendent Warnett ran east a short distance as if to check for access to the grounds surrounding the base of Grenfell Tower, which now was only 10 - 15 metres away, but I could see along the very high wall and there was no such access so I called out words to the effect of "we have to go around guy, I think it's the only way". Superintendent Warnett returned and we made our way around the wall, meaning we were now at the base of the southern aspect of Grenfell Tower under a small amount of overhead cover. I said to PC Jacobs twice "watch your head" as I was very concerned that debris would come down on us. A large number of firefighters were congregated in the area; I could see burning debris falling from above and I could see an orange glow in the otherwise dark area. There was a lot of smoke and a lot of heat. Superintendent Warnett spoke to a firefighter and was concentrating his attention towards a small park area on the west side of the tower, which I assumed was where the person who had jumped was located. PC Jacobs called my name; I turned around to face her and I do not know what she said or did that made me realise she was not going to come any further, but I said "it's fine don't worry" and turned back to Superintendent Warnett. [I later came to know that a short time after I was with PC Jacobs she was assigned as police liaison officer to the LFB operational command unit on Grenfell Road, where she remained until the end of our involvement with the incident]. Superintendent Warnett started running around the base of the southern aspect of Grenfell Tower and I followed; I recall looking up and realising that burning and non-burning debris was coming down and we had no cover over our heads. I looked ahead and followed Superintendent Warnett around to the western aspect of the tower. We stopped under a small canopy that provided some cover and I looked over into the dark park area where I could see what I believed to be a person lying motionless on the grass. I recall saying something out loud, which may have been expletive. Superintendent Warnett asked if I had a torch so that I could illuminate the person, which I did. I could not see any movement to indicate that this person was alive. Three firefighters who were wearing helmets went out into the grass area and pulled the person over to the area under the small canopy where we were standing and lay him on his back. I kept my torchlight on the casualty and at first glance I could see that the person was an Arabic- looking male of heavy build. His eyes were closed and he was wearing white underwear with what I believe were darker trousers that were torn. He appeared to have blood on his head and his mouth was hanging open revealing his teeth. His legs appeared distorted and his right leg was bent at the knee with the foot going across towards his left knee. I recall thinking that his legs must

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have been severely injured as he was clearly unconscious at the very least but his right leg remained in this position. I knew that if he was deceased it was too soon for rigor mortis to have set in. Superintendent Warnett checked the male's neck for a pulse and said that he thought he felt one. One of the firefighters leaned in but I did not hear what was said next. It was in these moments that thoughts of the unimaginable fear and sheer desperation that those trapped in the burning tower must have been experiencing really hit me. I considered the horrific choice so many people would have to make between burning to death and jumping to almost certain death; I thought about the possibility of parents being trapped inside Grenfell Tower and having to look at their children knowing that they could not get them to safety and praying for rescue. These thoughts made me feel sick and when I looked at the male on the ground in front of me I knew that what he had been through must have been unthinkable. I asked Superintendent Warnett "do you want me to commence Guv?", by which I meant should I commence CPR. I did not get a reply; Superintendent Warnett took hold of the male's right arm and one of the firefighters took hold of his left arm and they pulled him along the floor around to the southern side of the tower, where they stopped and lay him back down. I had tried to keep their path illuminated with my torch while they pulled him along and I could tell that he was a heavy man. Where we were waiting there was no overhead cover and we were only metres away from the southern aspect of Grenfell Tower; I knew that the aim was to get the male to the ambulance crews situated in Grenfell Road, but as I looked ahead of me I saw many obstacles in our path; there were firefighters running in all directions carrying all kinds of equipment, there were fire hoses laying across the whole area and large deep puddles where the water was being drawn from mains supplies. There were a number of fire engines parked up and there was still burning debris coming down from Grenfell Tower as well as intense heat and smoke. We were not under cover at this time. Almost at once Superintendent Warnett, firefighters and I lifted the male off the floor; Superintendent Warnett was holding the male's right arm, two fire officers were holding his left arm and his right leg respectively, and I was holding the male's left leg. I remember thinking as I lifted his leg that it appeared unnatural and out of place. Once the male was lifted off the floor we all started moving forward but then stopped again as if waiting for an opportune moment to go forward, when the truth was that there was not going to be such an opportune moment. The building was completely ablaze and debris was coming down; it was only getting worse as time went on. One of the firefighters then shouted "fuck it, just go!" and I ran carrying the male's leg while his body was limp. We ran across the firehoses and through the puddles of water, and I did not look up once because I did not want to damage my eyes if some debris did fall on me. We managed to carry the male between a fire engine and a wall which provided us with some cover however it was also a restricted space in which to carry a large person. As we entered this narrow gap I lost some grip on the male's leg and had to grab his trousers to prevent his leg dropping to the floor. I hoisted the leg up using the trousers and took a proper hold again, and we managed to place the male on an LAS trolley in Grenfell Road where paramedics started to look at him. Initially he was on the trolley on his side with his posterior facing me; I could see blood on his underwear and as he was placed on his side I could smell a pungent and putrid odour coming from him, which my career experience led me to believe was the male's internal bodily fluids and possibly excrement that had been exposed after he had suffered such horrific trauma. It was very dark at this location so

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I used my torch to illuminate the male from above as he was turned onto his back, but within a short space of time the paramedics covered the male up. It was clear to me that the male was deceased and no CPR or other life-saving treatment was started by the LAS in my presence. For a short while I stood with Superintendent Warnett and asked him where he needed me to be; after a short respite Superintendent Warnett and I walked to the inner-cordon I had helped set up after my arrival outside the Kensington Leisure Centre and we were met by Inspector Thatcher. By this time an LAS triage and treatment area had been set up next to the leisure centre on Bomore Road, which is exactly where I had directed the first casualties that came to my notice. The outer cordon had been pushed back to inside Avondale Park Road. I recall that it was at this time that I saw the deceased bodies of two victims covered up opposite the triage area and being guarded by PC Abdulkhadir. At various times when I was back at the cordon I looked up at Grenfell Tower and each time I looked the fire appeared to be worse; I saw flats completely on fire that earlier I had seen people looking out of and there were larger and larger pieces of debris starting to fall. Inspector Thatcher instructed me to walk around Bomore Road in the direction of Grenfell Road and meet with a representative of the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea (RBKC) who was with the LFB operational command unit. I was tasked with arranging the opening of a suitable site to be used as a mortuary for the deceased. I approached the RBKC liaison, who was with PC Jacobs and PC Neave 620BS, and asked him if this was possible; he stated that he was awaiting a call from someone and that as soon as the call came he could approve it. By the time I returned to the cordon some minutes later, officers had already gained entry to the Kensington Leisure Centre and I was aware that other officers had been tasked with assisting the LAS to move the deceased inside. I remained at the inner cordon and became reunited with PC Rigg, who was my partner officer that night but had been separated from me for some time having been tasked with other duties. It was while standing on this cordon again that I first heard a circulation of new advice regarding the occupants of Grenfell Tower; it was circulated that anybody speaking on the phone with residents inside the building should tell them that they need to self-evacuate where possible because the LFB could not guarantee to get in and assist them. I was next to PC Abdulkhadir when I heard this and there was a moment of silence; the reality of what had been said sunk in very quickly and looking at the enormity of the fire I believed then that anybody who was not already out of the building was probably going to die. I had said to PC Abdulkhadir and other officers in the night that it may come down to waiting for the building to burn through before the fire could be controlled; a thought that it seemed many people had. Although the official advice was carefully worded towards 'self-evacuation', I felt the reality of the statement to be "the fire is completely out of control, help cannot reach you, its everyone for themselves". I thought back to the people who had tried to hand me telephones with trapped residents on the other end of the line, and felt an enormous sadness at having told those people that I could not take individual calls and passing on the advice to remain in the building and await LFB, which had been the official direction at the start of the incident and what I would expect at such an incident. This change in advice also deepened my sense of shock with regard to the spread of the fire, recalling how it had been mostly alight to the right side of the eastern aspect when I arrived but had spread not only across all aspects but through the inside of the building leaving it completely incinerated. My next task at the scene was given by Inspector Thatcher and I was to walk around the

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site with PC Rigg and make a note of which officers were on each cordon. I was also to try and gauge the general mood of the bystanders at each location and determine where further units may be required to assist. The first cordon I checked with PC Rigg was the outer cordon located at the junction of Bomore Road and Avondale Park Road, which was satisfactorily and proportionately staffed in relation to the mood of the crowd, and this was also the case at the next two cordons located on the junctions of Bomore Road with Clarendon Road and Bomore Road with Walmer Road. Information was starting to be circulated via the Met Radio that persons were trying to breach the cordons and gain access to the Grenfell site; as PC Rigg and I walked through Verity Close, a small parking area off of Clarendon Road with a pedestrian alleyway leading through to Silchester Road, it became apparent that this pedestrian alleyway was being used by people going to-and-fro between the cordons. PC Rigg and I agreed that this alleyway needed to be staffed by officers and on reaching the cordon located on Silchester Road at the junction with Lancaster Road I asked two officers from TX (Hounslow Borough police), who had arrived at the scene but had not been given deployments, to move to Verity Close and do their best to prevent people running between the two cordons and causing disruption. These officers remained in this vicinity until the end of my on-scene involvement with the incident. PC Rigg and I walked west on Silchester Road, which was already closed to the public, and noted for the first time that the entire northern aspect of the building was ablaze and that a large amount of burnt and burning debris had come down here; parked vehicles were damaged, burnt pieces of the building were strewn across the road, debris was seen to be falling onto the railway line and settling as far away as the frontage of Whitstable House, which is another high rise residential building located on the north side of Silchester Road. The scene was chaotic and all the time the fire was still burning with no sign of stopping, more and more smoke was billowing out of the tower and more and more debris was coming down. When PC Rigg and I reached Bramley Road at the junction of Silchester Road we could see a number of LAS vehicles and fire command units parked in the stretch of road between there and Latimer Road Station; this was an awkward position logistically because Bramley Road was closed further to the south at the junction with Whitchurch Road and none of these vehicles could therefore deploy into Whitchurch Road, which leads directly into Grenfell Road and up to the base of Grenfell Tower. I also noticed a large number of people forming into crowds watching the building burn, and decided quickly that there were insufficient numbers of police officers to proportionately staff the cordons located at the junctions of Bramley Road with Silchester Road, Bramley Road with Blechynden Street and Bramley Road with Shalfleet Drive, all in postcode area W10. This information was passed to control and requests were made for the first assisting serials to be deployed to these locations. At the Blechynden Street cordon there was a member of the public becoming agitated because he could not get his vehicle out onto Bramley Road and away of the area; I heard the Sergeant at the cordon tell this person that he had to park the vehicle and leave it, then the Sergeant walked away. The male in the vehicle explained to me that he needed to catch a flight abroad to attend a funeral. He showed me the travel itinerary on his mobile phone and a program for the funeral service. It was unreasonable in the circumstances not to try and facilitate the request because Bramley Road was not closed Southbound although it was full of ambulances and fire command vehicles. I could see that there was a path clear enough for the vehicle to slowly make way South on Bramley Road so I directed the driver

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out of Blechynden Street and he removed his vehicle without further hindrance or incident. PC Rigg and I continued North on Bramley Road and took details regarding the crowds and numbers of officers at the Bramley Road junction with Whitchurch Road. We then continued on Whitchurch Road until we reached the southern end of Testerton Walk, and looking underneath the main building into the service route area it was clear that there was a large amount of smoke present. PC Rigg and I discussed the possibility of the fire spreading to Testerton Walk and we continued walking around to the grass area between the eastern aspect of Testerton Walk and the western aspect of Barandon Walk. There is no pedestrian access to Grenfell Tower from this area however there was a crowd of approximate 20 - 30 people standing at the North end of this grass area, looking up and calling out to people trapped in Grenfell Tower. I walked across the grass area with PC Rigg to advise the group of people that this was not a safe position to stand due to the possibility of debris falling there and the possibility of the fire spreading to the adjacent buildings. This group of males, particularly the person who appeared to be at the centre of the group, were vocal about not leaving and wanting to remain to try and help people trapped inside the building. The males appeared to be religious and referred to God witnessing what they were trying to do. Looking up at the south aspect of the building I could see the people that this group were trying to help; they were at windows of flats a number of floors up and I recall firefighters aiming their water hoses into these flats. It was clear to me that the group congregated there were not going to retreat for their own safety so I reiterated to them that I had advised them to leave and then walked back across the grass while requesting a serial to attend the location to assist. On reaching Whitchurch Road two officers from TX borough walked over and asked if they could assist; I therefore asked these two officers to stand by the small gate that accesses the green area to try and restrict the number of people entering. Once I had completed this circuit of cordon checks with PC Rigg I walked back to the cordon on Bomore Road outside the entrance to Kensington Leisure Centre and took up a static post here for an extended period of time. By this time it was starting to get light and I recall that the atmosphere was very different than it had been before; it was calmer and more sombre compared to the panic and agitation that had been present before. Looking up at Grenfell Tower was still a shocking site; the building was still heavily ablaze and the amount of smoke billowing out of the tower was huge. The colour of the smoke was different now; whereas before it had been a grey colour it appeared to be a brown colour. I do not recall who but somebody commented that this change in the colour of the smoke was likely to be due to the furnishings and all of the interior materials burning. I maintained this cordon for some considerable time until approximately 0600hrs when there were radio transmissions being circulated indicating that day duty serials were on their way to the area. Inspector Thatcher asked me to go back around to all of the cordons with PC Rigg and reconfirm which serials were where; I completed this without any incident of note and returned to the Leisure Centre where I used a borough map to list all of the units and their locations. I was then allocated as the point of contact for all day shift serials upon arrival, whereby I checked the number of officers aboard and relieved night duty serials accordingly. Once I had allocated approximately four or five of the day duty units Chief Superintendent Ellie O'Connor approached me and handed me four bereavement notices containing paperwork for confirmed deaths at the site, where the bodies had been left in situ. I passed these over to Inspector Thatcher a short time later for handing over to the day

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shift cordon Inspector. Chief Superintendent O'Connor then asked for two officers to go to the fire brigade command at Grenfell Road and assist the LFB. PC Rigg and I went forward and I handed over the allocation of day duty units to PC Abdulkhadir. We were met by a fire officer who appeared to be irate and said that members of the press had managed to get up onto the landing of Barandon Walk which was a very dangerous position due to the spread of the fire and the amount of debris coming down. I went up and asked the photographers to leave, which they did. I walked through the building from the north to the south because I could see other people making their way back in. I crossed between the buildings and came out on Bramley Road where I met the same Asian female resident who had been reluctant to leave when the evacuation had taken place. She was trying to get back into the building and I advised her not to but an Inspector who was on the cordon at this location informed me that the LFB had cleared the building as safe and that residents were being allowed back in. I knew that there had been extensive smoke under Testerton Walk and therefore advised the female that going back into the building with her child was at her own risk; I still had concerns that being inside these blocks adjacent to Grenfell Tower was not safe however since an Inspector had told me otherwise I had no cause to invoke a cordon or prevention under common law. I returned to the cordon by Kensington Leisure Centre and continued despatching the day shift units to relieve the night duty as they arrived. I remained at the scene until approximately 1000hrs when I returned to Kensington Police Station for the initial debrief.

This statement has been completed in several sittings due to operational need; I have completed this statement having viewed only short clips of my Body Worn Video rather than viewing the footage as I completed it. The full body worn footage is available and has been saved accordingly.

Signed:

Signature Witnessed By:

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