

**WITNESS STATEMENT**

Criminal Procedure Rules, r27.2; Criminal Justice Act 1967, s.9; Magistrates' Courts Act 1980, s.5b

Statement of: EVANS, RICHARD

Age if under 18: (if over 18 insert 'over 18')

Occupation: FIRE FIGHTER

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This statement (consisting of 11 page(s) each signed by me) is true to the best of my knowledge and belief and I make it knowing that, if it is tendered in evidence, I shall be liable to prosecution if I have wilfully stated in it anything which I know to be false, or do not believe to be true.

Signature: R EVANS

Date: 12/12/2017

Tick if witness evidence is visually recorded ☐ (supply witness details on rear)

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I provide this statement in relation to the London GRENFELL Tower W11, fire incident I attended in the late hours of Tuesday 13<sup>th</sup> June 2017 until the early hours of Wednesday 14<sup>th</sup> June 2017.

I am a fire fighter (FF) who is based at London Lambeth fire station working for the Red Watch. I joined the London Fire Brigade (LFB) as a FF on the 12<sup>th</sup> October 2009 and I do not have a specialist role. I was based at Heathrow Fire station for three years, Feltham fire station for four years and one year at my current fire station as detached.

In this statement I will mention, Assistant Commissioner Andrew ROW, Watch Manger Paul SADLER, Crew Manager Ben MCALONEN, Watch Manager LUISA DE'SILVO, Watch Manager Helen CHRISTMAS, FF Gemma BLOXHAM, FF Tristan DOWD and FF HILL.

Before qualifying as a firefighter, I initially received seventeen weeks training. This training was a combination of various sections and skills to prepare a new firefighter on dealing with everything they might need form road traffic collisions (RTC) using ladders, pumps and pumping as well as the correct use of equipment and brigade policies. It included studying standard duration breathing apparatus (SDBA). This is a cylinder of compressed air that holds 300 bar and will give you approximately thirty-five (35) to forty (40) minutes of use depending on the task and how hard you are working. The BA set has a Bodyguard (BG) unit attached that allows you to see your remaining air and time to whistle. The time of whistle is the time at which you should be exiting the incident as it indicates your air is becoming

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low. The BG also provides a function that if you stop moving it will go into a pre-alarm and start making a noise this is this can be stopped by shaking the BG, however if this is ignored the BG will go into full alarm and this cannot be stopped without the BG key being inserted, this key is held at the entry control attached to your BA tally. This is so if you pass out inside an incident the noise can help oncoming teams to locate you.

The BA set has a Telemetry attachment included in it that links it to the entry control board (ECB). This means that the information on the BG such as your time to whistle and remaining air can be seen by the entry control board operator. The entry control board allows the entry control operator to monitor how the BA wearer is doing in relation to their air consumption as well as being able to send an alarm to inform the BA wearer to exit the incident.

This training involved getting hands on the equipment and using them correctly, how to do it safely and following policy. The training was initially based at Southwark for a portion then Satellite training centre in Harrow followed by Moreton in Marsh fire Service College for my final assessment. The final assessment was to go through everything learnt, including doing your real fire training.

My mandatory training consists of attending lectures, cutting up a car once a year, putting up ladders, using the equipment during drills. For high-rise buildings my training includes the brigade lectures and taking part in high-rise drills. These can be done on station at a local venue if suitable or at one of the Babcock training facilities at Park Royal or Beckton. The practical training involves making a bridgehead two floors below the fire floor which is the staging area. This floor is where a crew manager, ECB and ECB operator would be and where a BA team would start to go under air. Once they are ready the BA team would go to the floor above and plug the hose into the dry riser then go up to the fire floor and fight the fire. Another BA crew would then go up behind them plugging hose into the dry riser on the fire floor so they can act as a safety crew for the crew that is committed into the fire by protecting their egress.

I have not attended a high rise fire as a firefighter before the Grenfell tower fire and at the time of the Grenfell incident I was up to date with my training.

As part of our mandatory training we do Real Fire Carbonaceous BA refresher courses. They are either one or two day courses and are held at Park Royal or Beckton Training centres. These are delivered by Babcock. During these courses, you are assessed throughout so they can check that your skills are up to standard. During the course, you will go into a purpose build building where a house fire will be

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simulated by the trainers. This is done by putting the same amount of wood you might find in a domestic kitchen in a corner of a room and setting fire to it. This is done so we know how much water to use, the effects different amounts of water have on the fires behaviour and how it affects the visibility and your ability to search for casualties.

From experience, it is possible for a fire compartment to fail and they can fail for various reasons and example would be gaps in the walls between compartments. If a fire compartment fails you may request another crew to deal with the other affected area if you know about it and the location of the failure and fire spread.

I have completed section 7.2.d visits as a FF. For these we attend specific buildings and carryout familiarisation with that building and any risks associated with it. Any changes to the information we have is updated and any new risks are entered into the system on return to station. I have not completed one of these visits for Grenfell Tower.

On the 13<sup>th</sup> June 2017 I was on duty at Lambeth Fire Station. We started our shift at 2000 hours and were given our riding positions. I was detailed to drive (call sign H222) Lambeth's Pump. It was a quiet night shift I think, we completed our inventories and checks as normal.

We then had something to eat and continued with more work before I went to bed in the small male dorm room at Lambeth fire station.

I was asleep when the lights came on and the call bell sounded to inform us that we had a shout. The system stated both call signs for Lambeth's fire engines H221 & H222. I am unsure what the time was exactly but it was night time and it was dark outside. The two call signs are attached to the appliances H221 is the Pump Ladder and H222 is the Pump.

I was deployed on H222 Lambeths Pump as the Driver with CM Ben MCALONEN in charge of the appliance and two other fire fighters in the back, I cannot recall who it was on the back on the truck with me.

All brigade Fire engines are specified as Dual Purpose Ladders (DPL) as they could all carry the same equipment but what is carried depends on the fire station its based at. At a multi appliance station some of the equipment is spread over the two appliances instead of being carried all on one as it would at a single

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appliance station. For example, a Pump Ladder (H221) would have a Watch Manager in charge and will carry the thirteen-and-a-half-meter ladder, where as a Pump (H222) would have a Crew Manager in charge and will have the nine-meter ladder. Both truck would also both carry items like BA, throw lines, life jackets, first aid kits (IEC), Thermal Image camera (TIC), etc.

We immediately got dressed and went down the pole to the appliance bay and then into the watch- room and I collected the call slip from the printer. The call slip stated twenty fire pump fire, which indicated to me it was a major incident that required a lot of resources. The call slip also listed Grenfell Tower, the full address, call signs and numbers of other appliances attending as well as the specialist units.

I did not know where Grenfell tower was so I used my mobile phone to navigate. My main priority was to drive as safe and quickly as I can and did not think too much of how major the fire was. I drove through Lambeth Bridge, Chelsea Embankment and made my way to Grenfell tower W11. When I got to the Grenfell Tower I found it difficult to assess the area as it got very congested. There were a lot of other blue light vehicles, ambulances and police cars all trying to make their way. I tried to go the best route according to the directions on my phone, as we got closer there were a lot of other emergency vehicles that we could see all trying to get to the incident some I think followed us, others would be going across the junctions ahead of us going a different way to it.

Driving up the traffic was alright until you got really close to the Grenfell tower. The way the cars were parked it made the streets very narrow and I cannot tell you how long it took from the fire station to get to the Grenfell Tower.

I was not familiar with the area therefore cannot recall fully, however I think I parked on the truck on Sirdar Road.

I managed to park my truck behind Chelsea's fire engine, where I saw one of Chelsea trucks but not sure which one it was. There were other fire engines parked behind one another. At that point I got out of the driver's seat and heard someone shout out take your BA sets. This command would have come from either the Watch Manager Paul SADLER or crew manager Ben.

I was wearing the full fire kit, which was a t-shirt, workwear trousers, firefighting leggings, fire boots, firefighting tunic, helmet, radio, BA, torch and gloves.

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Walking from the fire engines towards Grenfell this was the first time I could see the Tower with a large area of the outside of it on fire. I could not see the back however I knew the fire was spreading from looking at it. it was coming up from the north-east corner towards the south. I am not sure at this point if I saw the bottom of the building but I could see a lot of flames. I felt apprehensive but the adrenaline had kicked in and we were ready to get to work. At that point I could not count how many floors there were.

There were at least eight of us from my crew at Lambeth plus those deployed from other fire stations. We congregated at the south east corner where a larger group of firefighter in BA were forming, approximately thirty of us at that point were stood waiting for instructions. My view remained from the south east however my view of the tower was restricted by the concrete walkway above us and the aerial appliance located to the south east of the tower. I cannot remember if this appliance was being used or not. See exhibit RJE/2.

From where I stood I saw debris falling, ash and panels falling down like a massive leaf. I was quite focussed on the people I was with and was waiting for instructions, however I did hear lots of engines running, loud talking and shouting I don't remember if I could hear fire alarms but these noises are something firefighters are used to and we try and block them out to remain focused on the task.

I was paired with FF BLOXHAM and before we all started making our way to the Grenfell tower we were told nobody is allowed to enter the building unless instructed and we need to have the correct equipment, which were the breaking-in gear and it consists of a Halligan bar, an enforcer, crow's foot which is a spreader and hoses. I took with me an enforcer and a halligan bar, BA set which is approximately fifteen kilograms and my total equipment weight was approximately thirty kilograms. FF BLOXHAM was carrying a Thermal image camera, a length of hose, a branch (which is a nozzle that goes at the end of the hose) in case we had to fight the fire.

While we were stood with the group of firefighters waiting for the commands to enter we were told that we needed breaking in gear with us before we would be allowed up to the bridge-head. At that point I took the breaking in gear that I saw on the floor in front of the crew stood behind us. This meant that there were now six of us correctly equipped and ready to enter. We approached by walking from the south side of the building, through the ground floor doors and crossed the lobby area. There were stairs located to my right-hand side that lead up to the mezzanine level and on the left another door that looked like it was another exit.

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As we entered I think there were other people inside the building, however I was focused on getting to the bridgehead area I did not give my full attention to who was there.

I noticed debris falling outside on the outside east of the building and my view was restricted from the south side due to the structure of the walk way and I could not see the fire at that point.

The five other firefighter and I walked through the lobby and to the right going up the stairs to the third floor mezzanine level above. We joined the other firefighters on this level, it looked out and down onto the large lobby area but the mezzanine area it's self wasn't very big. The atmosphere was tense but what I would consider normal for a fire situation. The building lights were on at this time.

Walking from the stairs to the doorway on the mezzanine level the wall was on my right and the lobby was down below on the left. On my right hand side on the floor along the wall were rolled up lengths of hose. On this wall there was a basic floor plan drawn out in china-graph pencil, we were told by an officer to have a look at the map and then if we could have a quick look at one of the lower floors if we had the chance to see the layout. From what I remember the drawing was a floor plan with just a stairwell in the centre with one door off of it that lead to the flats. Information was relayed that it was a twenty-four-floor building with the last flats being on the twenty-third floor.

Shortly after we made our way up to the bridgehead area which was the third floor and stood just by the doorway where it got very tight. I came across with a female officer who was a Chelsea watch manager, who I now know to be Louisa DE'SILVO and there were other FF's who I did not recognise their faces.

A Bridgehead is our staging area for high-rise fires. It would normally have, an officer to oversee the bridgehead (the rank depends on the size and type of incident), an entry control officer ECO (FF) they run the entry control board ECB. It the job of the Entry control officer to take your BA tally's and enter them into ECB so they connect the telemetry between the board and the BA set when you go into a fire, they also write your brief and BA team call sign on the ECB. There may also be a communications operator to monitor the BA teams radio channel. Because of the size of the incident this was why WM DE' SILVO would have been there to oversee the bridgehead. I cannot tell you for sure how many boards were running at the time I got there but there must have been at least two boards running because it was so big with so many people involved and with so many FF were being committed into the incident. There would have been a ECO for each one of the ECB that were being used.

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When we initially walked into the bridgehead area we were verbally briefed to go to flat number seventy-fire (flat 75) then we were told to wait with no other information given. We were then told that the bridgehead was going to move up to the fourth floor, so we took our kit and moved up a floor. I think at that point someone was talking to the WM however so much was going on that I am not sure what was said. After this there was a change to our brief. We were now told to go up to the twenty-third floor, flat two hundred and five. My brief was now multiple people in flat two hundred and five (205) on the twenty-third (23) floor, no further information was given.

I then followed procedure by repeating the brief back and quoted, "flat two hundred and five (205), floor twenty-three (23)", I then turned to FF BLOXHAM relayed the information and quoted "flat two hundred and five (205), floor twenty-three (23), everything alright?", where she responded, "yes".

Once the brief was relayed we were told to start up, so getting on our masks, covering ourselves up, having the right gear and to go to entry control and give our tallies and call signs.

The information our tallies have written on them are, our rank, our name, the amount of air in bars we have in a BA cylinder at the point the tally is given over to the ECO. The tally is entered into the board and this links the board and the BA set via telemetry so that the ECO can see information like how much air we have left, this is as long as there is a good signal between the ECB and BA set.

The brief FF BLOXHAM and I received as a two (2) person BA team meant we were the only two (2) people going up to that flat on the twenty-third (23) floor at this time. We were initially delayed going up the stairwell because of the amount of people coming down the stairs carrying casualties. I remember seeing two FF's carrying someone down the stairs one holding the arms and the other the legs carrying them down head first. FF's were in BA sets so their faces were covered and it was hard to recognise anyone so it was just bodies being carried and the people carrying them down the stairs.

Going up the stairs we would do pressure gauge checks to check the amount of air we had left in our BA sets. I was trying to remain focussed, remember my training and reminding myself of what I needed to do. I was looking out for identifiable landmarks like floor numbers to keep track of where we were.

That was the first point I remember thinking "fuck! this is big, this is dangerous". However, I knew what my brief was, I knew my training so I knew what I had to try and do whether or not we complete it, as it was so far on a standard duration set and it is quite a task and at that point you just cannot know if you can or not, you just try.

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The stairwell was mayhem, so congested and so small we could not get out of that doorway until people came down.

FF BLOXHAM and I made our way up the stairwell and I think it was when we got to the seventh (7) floor that the visibility got hazy, I remember it having a yellow-ish hue to it and as we went up it got progressively darker until visibility was zero. All I can really hear is my breathing due to the loud sound the BA mask makes so you need to shout to hear each other. I remember hearing and feeling people coming down the stairwell but not a lot if anything was said to each other.

I was trying to check for floor numbers but not every floor was numbered, those that were had the number in the middle of the wall. We were just trying to count the flights of stairs to get to where we wanted. We were not briefed to go and check if the doors were open or closed but the ones I passed were shut and I did not see any fire inside the building.

We were aware of the demands going so far with so much equipment would have on our air consumption and the air left in our BA sets so we were going at a steady pace, going too fast would use more air and restrict how far up the tower we could go. Carrying all the gear was tiring but there was so much adrenaline it wasn't a problem I was focused on the task and my BA partner. I would count the flights of stairs check with FF BLOXHAM that we had the same number and then continue up. It wasn't until you got out of the building that you feel the full strain.

I think it was about floor nine (9) that the smoke got so thick and dark that visibility was zero (0), this did improve at some point though. However, I cannot say which floors had more or any smoke as it changed at different stages. I guess this was from where the smoke was at the time and which doors had been opened and closed or left open. However, this can vary because it was an enclosed stairwell and the smoke could have accumulated from anywhere, more so depending on whether there was an extraction system. If there is one (1) it could pull the smoke up and make it hard to read the smoke from the stairwell like we would normally at a fire. The way we read the smoke can tell us about how the fire is behaving.

I am aware of the stay put policy. This is based on the assumption that the building regulations are in place and a compartment is built hold a fire within it for a set period of time. When I looked at the building from the outside I did not know whether or not the compartments had failed, it looked like it was the cladding.

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I did not consider what I expected to see inside, but focused on the task in hand. This meant considering what is in front of us, consider if we were both okay to continue at that moment and then continue to judge all this as you go along. At this point we still had enough air so we kept going and there was no reason for us to stop.

Up until this point the only conversations I had with FF BLOXHAM was for reassurance and confirmation. Such as to check if she was ok, gauge checks to monitor our remaining air and to confirm our count of the floor we were on. The hose FF BLOXHAM was carrying had started to unravel so I told her to ditch it and she left it behind. I think this was because of the amount of equipment we were carrying and it is hard to get a good grip on the one FF BLOXHAM had as it did not have a handle so anyway you tried to carry it was awkward, especially when you are also trying to carry other things. We could not see our feet but I did feel stuff other people had left on the stairs, however I could not tell you what it was.

I would say that this incident was the one time in my career so far that I thought, "this is really serious!" Being the more experienced of the two crew members I was also thinking I needed to make sure FF BLOXHAM was alright and that I needed to get her through this, [REDACTED] and ultimately, we needed to come out of this situation alive but at the same time knowing we were there to do a job and had to rescue people. It was all playing on my mind but I was focused on getting as high up the building as we could.

As I was going up the stairs the radio did go quiet at some point but I cannot recollect the stage. I did hear some communication during my way up, however unless it was my call sign I was not focused on it and cannot say what conversation had gone on.

We continued going up the stairwell and the visibility remained restricted. I cannot recollect if I heard any alarm or saw sprinklers as the helmets restrict your hearing. I think it was between eighteen (18) and twentieth (20) floor we reached when FF BLOXHAM tapped me and pointed out two casualties. One being a female in her forties, [REDACTED] looking I suppose, long slightly curly dark hair, small thin build and did not speak English very well, the other casualty was a male, younger look, same ethnic appearance, tallish, slender skinny build.

I could not see the two casualties properly due to the smoke so we took them from the stairwell in through the floor lobby doorway and sat them down against a wall, as smoke will accumulate from the top of a

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room meaning lower down you are the air has less smoke in it. Once we sat them down the only information we could get from them was that "there were an unspecified amount of people on one of the floors above" there was no information on where those people were or which flat they were from. See exhibit RJE/1

My rational and decision making was that I had a duty of care to them, my crew and myself. I had two casualties who had already inhaled a lot of smoke and it was highly likely that if we left them to continue going up they may not have made it out by themselves. I know this was reasonable as the female casualty became unconscious while we were taking them out.

When we stopped to speak to the casualties I was aware of mine and FF BLOXHAM'S BA air consumption and our remaining air levels, I thought that now we've stopped we would be putting ourselves and the casualties at unnecessary risk if we were to start going up to another floor to look.

It would mean leaving them there to wait for us or telling them to find their own way out. These two casualties were already there and we didn't know how long they been in the thick smoke so chances are if we had gone on we could have left the son stranded on that floor with his mother or let's say we went up and there were another five people on that floor would they be alive and mobile? If they were and we found them we start down with them plus the two we already had and then one or more of them passed out, what do we do then? We wouldn't be able to carry them all, so that's why I made the decision that with the air we had remaining in our BA sets we should not go on up any further and that we should go back down with the two casualties we had already found as these live as casualties come first, they were both mobile, conscious and breathing at this point. I relayed this decision to FF BLOXHAM who agreed and confirmed "yes".

My radio was working when I initially checked it before going up. Once I and FF BLOXHAM agreed to take the casualties down I tried to radio my decision through the BA radio couple of times and this was through channel six, which is a dedicated BA channel. I went through a message as if coms were receiving on the other end. I quoted my call sign, "H222, two mobile casualties found, we are going to bring them out and another crew need to be sent to twenty third floor flat two zero five". However, I had no idea if coms were receiving the message. I can say the channels are not always great and the sets are quite old. We also use channel one where everyone can speak as long as the distance is not too far from the each other and the operator.

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I think the casualties had their clothes on and I seem to remember they held something against their mouths but I cannot remember what it was.

Before taking the casualties down I told the male to hold onto me and this was possibly my shoulder, so I lead going down whilst FF BLOXHAM was with the female following us. As we went down two flights the male pushed me and I landed on my back between my Coccyx and BA Set. This happened early on and I think it was the panic. At that point I may have said to him, "you need to fucking calm down we are going to get you out just bear with us".

We continued going down the stairwell and we came across the Chiswick crew who were located on the eleventh floor carrying out a rescue. I recognised FF Tristan DOWD who handed over FF HILL's helmet. I took the helmet, however I was confused and I did not why the helmet had been handed over to me until he came into view very shortly around that stair. I turned around and noticed FF BLOXHAMS's female casualty had passed out and FF HILL was there trying to help FF BLOXHAM carry her. At that point I handed over my male casualty to the Chiswick crew and they made their way down.

Just before we made our way down the stairwell I said to FF HILL "what are you doing here? Here is your helmet, I'll take the casualty." FF HILL did not have a BA partner with him and I don't remember seeing him with a BA set on his back. At this point I knew we had to get everyone out as quick as we could. I positioned myself going down the stairs backwards and I think I had the casualties' hands with FF BLOXHAM holding her legs, I would say that the casualty was big enough for it to be hard work carrying her. At that point FF HILL was just behind FF BLOXHAM following us down the stairs.

The stairwell was still smoky however there was some visibility, rating it five or six (6) if zero (0) was pitch black. I do not remember seeing any sprinklers or hearing any alarm at that point, however I do remember a lot of background noise but nothing in particular. As we went down we did not check the casualty for any sign of life because we were trying to get to the clean air as quickly as possible. At that point I did not know where the bridgehead was, or it had moved, so we continued going down until we got to the bridgehead. I came across someone with a white helmet, who took over from FF BLOXHAM and told her to take FF HILL to supply oxygen for him whilst I remained with the casualty. The handover was very quick so me and the person with the white helmet continued taking the casualty down to the lobby area and the situation with her had not changed. As we got to the lobby someone came and took the casualty from us.

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That was when I heard someone shout out, "she is from flat two zero five (205)". I did not speak to anyone at that point until I went back up to the bridgehead area to shut down my BA, which is to turn off the cylinder, take off the mask, purge the set and take the tally in.

When I went back to the bridgehead I remember seeing FF's queuing to go up and as I was walking past one someone said something that really annoyed me, which was something like, "why is your set going off, why have you not shut that off?" and I just remember being annoyed thinking, "because I just been to the top of this and now I have come down and I was just trying to get past him to get to where FF BLOXHAM was.

I managed to locate FF BLOXHAM and FF HILL where we had to wait for a long time to get out because it was a less priority to get out than let other FF's in. I sat on the floor and took off my helmet and gloves and emptied the remaining air on the BA set. It was smoky enough that it was making me cough. I think it was at that point when I said, "we got two (2) people but we need someone to go back up to two zero five (205), we did not make to floor twenty-three (23)". This was to a general group of entry control FF's and an officer but I cannot remember who I briefed or the exchange of conversation.

I do not know if anyone was tasked to go up to floor twenty-three (23), flat two zero five (205) after us but normally you would hand over to an ongoing crew, it would not be necessarily that crowded. You would have time and you would have been in clean air so you would not be choking after working that hard. You would be taking deep breaths trying to recover and it is not like you are stood still.

I then got my stuff, FF BLOXHAM and FF HILL and went downstairs. As we went down it was busier than how it was when we arrived and I did not know the time of the day.

Once we reached the lobby entry point we were directed to exit from another door which opens up to another area and this was due to falling debris. The door was located to the right as you come down the stairwell. I smashed a big double glazed window to get out as someone else was trying to break through the door. Other doors were already open on the lobby area so it was already a vented area. A colleague told me to use an axe to go through the windows however the door was already broken by the time I smashed it. It was me FF BLOXHAM, FF HILL and group of others who had exited from that exit point.

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We went to the south-east corner and heard the “firefighter emergency” message come through our radios for the missing FF. We then heard someone say “that’s him” pointing at FF HILL who was wondering up the hill area which is the back area leading up to the leisure centre where everyone was waiting.

We got to the grass area in front of the leisure centre where Heston’s Watch manager Christmas came out and said, “take your sets off you are not going back in”.

I was drenched and sweaty so I tried to drink as much water as I could. I took the tunic off and sat there and waited for ages.

At that point I was facing the east side of the Grenfell tower and I saw the large aerial ladder firefighting squirting water to the side of the building. Just as that was happening I was aware of a person coming in and out to the window. I could not see if it was a male or female from that distance. The ladder was squirting water on what appeared to be the cladding around it so it stops spreading towards that window. The fire was sort of all-around it but not that section. I think somebody told me it was the eleventh floor on the east side and I believe this person was rescued.

The day was getting slightly lighter however still quite dark and everyone was very busy. Debris, embers and large bits, stuff were falling down and was just a mess really.

I smelt fire and smoke on myself. I was tired and it was quite, bit of chit chatting but nothing important. People talking about that bloke making sure that people knew he was there and trying to get to him.

Whilst we were waiting I got cup of tea, water and food from the Salvation Army. At one point we were told to take oxygen cylinders from the trucks to the London ambulance service (LAS) and I think it was during this journey that a woman tried to give me her phone to speak to someone still inside the tower but I passed her over to a police officer.

When we returned back I saw people who had been in were re-doing their sets, what we call an A test, which is to put on a new cylinder and go through the safety check on it so it is ready to use again.

I remembered that I had left my gloves on the bridgehead area so I searched some fire engines to find a pair that would fit me. I also had to look for a new BA set as the battery for the telemetry in mine had gone flat. Once I found them I went back to the grassed area and put on a new cylinder followed by an A-

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test. I think we then sat in the holding area in front of the leisure centre, this was later designated BA MAIN CONTROL.

After some time waiting we were told that fresh BA wearers had now arrived, which meant we were no longer needed after this we did not get used for anything else.

We left the scene and went to Paddington fire station, where brigade asked us to do notes. My notes the time as eleven thirty (11:30) AM.

The only injury I sustained from this incident was to my lower coccyx from when I was pushed down by my male casualty. It hurt for few weeks or maybe couple of months after the incident.

This incident was terrible and by far the worst fire I have ever been to.

It was after when we said the coms was awful and I cannot remember if I mentioned if anyone heard my radio, possibly when I was relaying the information once I reached to the bridgehead.

Wherever you looked everyone appeared to be doing something and this incident was managed well. Sometimes you get frustrated in this job when stuff is not getting done but that was not the case this time and in other fire incidents you would get held back from your senior officers, however with this one you were getting in and doing stuff. At some point AC ROW gave us a talk outside and said, "we are going to ask you all to go in again and do stuff we normally would not ask you to do but we need you to go in, there are still people in there, we need you to go in and do more". For example, if you had a wear you would not normally go back in and also go above fire floors, searching without extinguishing media where there are FF's on every level when the whole building was on fire.

I was not aware if any policy had changed during my time inside the Grenfell tower. I did break a policy by going beyond the fire level. It was a dynamic risk assessment and decisions were made there and then. This is what you get trained and paid for and you have your own moral value to go and do it. You always try to read the situation and weigh up your own and the fire condition and what you have been told to do, whether it is achievable or not.

The one thing I regret and wished I had done differently was to have pushed harder to try and have another BA wear and get back into the building to help more people.

Signature: R EVANS  
2018

Signature witnessed by:

**OFFICIAL**

Statement of: EVANS, RICHARD

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I now know the casualties I and FF BLOXHAM rescued to be Ms Flora NEDA and Mr Farhad NEDA who are mother and son. They were the only survivors from the twenty third (23) floor.

I have three exhibits referenced, RJE/1 (example floor plan), RJE/2 (map), RJE/3 (photocopy of initial notes), which I have referred to during this statement.

Signature: R EVANS  
2018

Signature witnessed by:

**OFFICIAL**