

WITNESS STATEMENT

Criminal Procedure Rules, r27.2; Criminal Justice Act 1967, s.9; Magistrates' Courts Act 1980, s.5b

Statement of: MILLS, RICHARD

Age if under 18: Over 18 (if over 18 insert 'over 18')

Occupation: FIRE OFFICER

This statement (consisting of 11 page(s) each signed by me) is true to the best of my knowledge and belief and I make it knowing that, if it is tendered in evidence, I shall be liable to prosecution if I have wilfully stated in it anything which I know to be false, or do not believe to be true.

Signature: R MILLS

Date: 12/04/2018

Tick if witness evidence is visually recorded ☐ (*supply witness details on rear*)

This statement relates to my involvement in the Grenfell Tower Fire during the early hours of Wednesday 14th June 2017.

I am an Assistant Commissioner with the London Fire Brigade (LFB) responsible for Operational Policy. I joined the London Fire Brigade in 1992 as a Firefighter. I completed a number of promotions up to, and including, the rank of Watch Manager (WM) on fire stations in the Eastern Command of the LFB.

As a Watch Manager I was posted to the Special Operations Group at Brigade Headquarters specialising in urban search and rescue in collapsed buildings. It was in this (WM) role that I also became the Staff Officer to Assistant Commissioner Ron DOBSON, who subsequently became the LFB Commissioner.

Following this I was promoted to Station Manager at Leytonstone Fire Station and, subsequently posted to the Training Directorate within the Incident Command Training team and later became the temporary Group Manager for Rescue Skills Training. I was subsequently promoted to the rank of Group Manager as Borough Commander for Haringey.

My next role, on promotion to the rank of Deputy Assistant Commissioner, I held responsibility for the North Eastern Command. This role covered management of operations for 9 London Boroughs. I was

Signature: R MILLS
2018

Signature witnessed by: K SHANAHAN

subsequently promoted to the rank of Assistant Commissioner heading up Operational Policy for the LFB, which remains my current post.

The role of the Operational Policy (OP) Department is quite varied, holding a significant amount of the organisation's policies. These documents relate to and or take into consideration National Fire Guidance, changes in legislation, operational trends, Improvement Notices and developing a prevention of future fire death strategy, based on reported fire deaths and incidents.

My Department conduct reviews of policies within a standard 3 year period or sooner where significant recommendations are identified. The Department also supports the maintenance of National assets that provide national support in responding to chemical, biological, radiation and nuclear (CBRN) incidents, Urban Search and Rescue, High Volume Pumping as well as other National response arrangements, such as large scale flooding.

These capabilities support the LFB and Nationally our response in dealing with incidents involving specialist response.

The Department has 5 separate work streams that support the LFB;

- (1) Integration of National Operational Guidance (NOG) team
- (2) Hazardous Materials Response, Respiratory Protection and Incident Communications Team
- (3) Medical Emergency Intervention Capability - Immediate Emergency Care (IEC) Team
- (4) Fire and Operational Support Response Team.
- (5) Technical Rescue Capability Team.

Supported by the Administrative Support Team to the Directorate

The Department contributes to a number of national working groups and boards, which serve to advise the National Fire Chiefs Council and National Resilience Boards on developing trends and policy. The department are also coordinating the integration of National Operational Guidance within London to align

Signature: R MILLS
2018

Signature witnessed by: K SHANAHAN

operational practice within the LFB. This in a corporate project and in the developmental stage.

The Department also manage a number of projects that examine and identify new or replacement equipment to enhance firefighting practices. This includes for example the review and testing of new Command Units and fire appliances that are trailed against operational need. As a result of the Grenfell Fire, I have brought forward an ongoing project looking into the replacement and upgrade of Breathing Apparatus (BA), and technology that supports the operation of BA equipment. This project has been brought forward 12 months earlier than planned as a direct consequence of the fire.

The Department conducted an impact review of the High Rise Policy a few months after the Grenfell Tower Fire. We examined the policy in conjunction with the Regulatory Fire Safety Department, and other Departments of the LFB. We put in place a number of immediate interim measures.

These measures included an increase in Pre-Determined Attendance (PDA) increasing the number of appliances and Firefighters responding to a high rise incident. Tasking of local Firefighters to conduct assessments on high rise cladded buildings in their Boroughs. Review of internal messaging and corporate communication to all LFB personnel when responding to high rise incidents. Reviewing of existing high rise operational policy, around equipment and deployment; an example being the 'high rise bags' placing equipment usually required at high rise incidents in a bespoke equipment holdall on all appliances. The Operational Policy NOG team consulted a specialist to utilise a risk based mapping software, to identify whether it could be used to identify any issues linked to high rise buildings and to consider whether any gaps existed. Firefighting in high rise buildings is part of a national operational guidance review that is still ongoing, which we will take into account once published.

As a Department, have invested heavily on staff to equip them to undertake research and review operational equipment and practices to improve our operational response, equipment and assets in order to meet operational objectives. OP have applied operability, cost analysis and, fitness for purpose, of various items that are available or, in development around the World to inform and shape our response.

With regards to my operational background, I have served in an operational capacity at all ranks of the

Signature: R MILLS
2018

Signature witnessed by: K SHANAHAN

Fire Brigade. I have responded to a range of emergency incidents, some relating to high rise buildings. During the course of my career I have been subject of continuous assessment and development training which, includes operational command for a range of these incidents including, high rise buildings emergencies.

Our training provider Babcock, delivers command training for managers that is subject to continuous review and development, based upon operational learning. I have taken part, overseen and chaired the performance reviews of command process (PRC) to share and promote best practice and identify any issues that may require organisational or individual learning. Part of my Department's remit will shortly be to subsume the Operational Review Team (ORT) who review command policy and training for Incident Commanders, testing candidates suitability for further progression based on their operational learning.

I am qualified as a tactical Incident Commander, having successfully completed the command training modules resulting in promotion to Assistant Commissioner. A rank I have held for 20 months. I had undergone an extensive selection process prior to my promotion to Assistant Commissioner, which from recollection includes high rise scenarios forming party of my Group Managers and Assistant Commissioner's assessment test.

I have successfully completed a 'Gold' Command Course (Multi-Agency Gold Incident Command-MAGIC) in November 2017 and the National CBRN (e) Strategic Gold Course in January 2017 enabling me, to act as a strategic representative for the LFB in the management of major incidents that require multi-agency involvement. I am also in the process of working with ORT to extend the level of Command training within the LFB to identify and support the next level of operational management, going forward.

On Wednesday 14th June 2017 I was contacted at home by phone and pager, I believe the time was around 1.45am. I spoke with Assistant Commissioner (AC) Andy ROE who informed me (before Control pager message was received) that he had been mobilised to a large high rise fire. The incident was progressing rapidly, reported to be a 25 pump response which is a significant incident for the LFB. He (AC ROE), was to act as Incident Commander as part of our on-call strategic command response arrangement.

Signature: R MILLS
2018

Signature witnessed by: K SHANAHAN

I was able to detect that AC ROE was under a degree of stress and pressure, as he was speaking very quickly. I got out of bed and immediately made my way downstairs switching on my LFB (Airwave) radio. I could hear that a major incident was occurring, the radio traffic indicated that a number of Fire Survival Guidance (FSG) calls, and messages, were being managed by Brigade Control. Whilst listening to the radio I was also speaking with AC ROE.

During the conversation we discussed setting up Brigade Coordination Centre (BCC), mobilising the Duty Brigade Manager and, putting into place the Strategic Response Arrangements (SRA) which, would involve the setting up of Commissioner's Group (CG). This is the strategic leadership group that responds to, and oversees major incidents that occur within the Brigade area.

AC ROE made reference to the Brigade Commissioner Danny COTTON mobilising to the scene of the incident. As a consequence we had a conversation regarding the attendance of, AC Dan DALY in the role the Duty Brigade Manager at Brigade HQ.

I sought to contact the Commissioner's Staff Officer, Group Manager Keely FOSTER, without success. I did manage to contact a second Staff Officer, Group Manager Rob DAVIES. I briefed him on the incident and informed him that I was initiating the SRA and establishing CG at Brigade HQ.

AC ROE sent me an image of the building via email from his phone. The image was slightly blurred, but I could see a fire on one side of the building travelling up and along each side of the windows. On speaking with AC ROE, I was made aware that Brigade Control was located at its fall-back position at Stratford, and they were operating calls from there. We agreed that BCC should operate from that location. At approximately 2am I contacted Deputy Assistant Commissioner (DAC) Adrian FENTON the Duty DAC, ordering him attend the BCC and take up command of that role.

DAC FENTON had pre-empted my decision and had self-mobilised, he was almost at Stratford when I spoke with him. I informed him that I was initiating SRA, setting up CG and outlining to him the management structure as I saw it, at that time. I subsequently requested that DAC mobilise 2 Officers to HQ to operate in a support function as I anticipated I would be acting in the role of LFB 'Gold' and would be working from the Special Operations Room (SOR) at Pratt Walk, Lambeth, as a major incident

Signature: R MILLS
2018

Signature witnessed by: K SHANAHAN

had been declared. I would be expected to form part of the multi-agency 'Gold' Group.

At 2.14am I contacted AC Dan DALY who was Duty Brigade Manager which is not normal protocol as it would have normally been a Staff Officer who notified him, and informed him of the arrangements in place, so far and asked him to come in to undertake the BM role.

I then received a phone call from the Brigade Duty Press Officer, Vicky HARDMAN, who was looking to identify a press trained officer at the scene. I explained to her the severity of the fire and the ongoing LFB response and that the incident now involved 40 pumps attending the scene. At 2.30am I spoke with DAC Lee DRAWBRIDGE requesting he started to make his way and attend the scene initially, to act as the potential press lead in preparation to being paged and formally mobilised.

I attempted to contact the Director, Steve APTER and then contacted his Staff Officer, Nick NEWMAN (02:34 hours) and explained the situation and asked him to Contact Steve on my behalf. Whilst putting these command structures in place I continued to monitor my radio.

I subsequently received a call from AC ROE was seeking to set up the measures I had already initiated. I informed him that the necessary measures were in place and that he should concentrate on the matter in hand whilst he was on route. I was also aware that continuous FSG calls were taking place with Control.

At this point I got dressed and prepared to make my way to Brigade HQ. On route I was contacted by Director Steve APTER. I gave him a brief update of the incident and told him of the arrangements I had put into place, also informing him that AC ROE and the Commissioner, were on route to the scene. Steve told me he was making his way into Brigade HQ.

On arrival at HQ I saw AC DALY and shortly after, 2 Staff Officers followed by Glen SEBRIGHT (Head of Communications) and Steve APTER. AC DALY and I discussed the command structure needed to respond to the incident. It was agreed that I, was to act as the LFB 'Gold' and locate at the SOR. Given Director APTER had come in and recognising his seniority, it was agreed that AC DALY would support Steve APTER as Brigade Manager and act as a conduit for me and other CG associated functions when necessary. I would be the link between other partner agencies the CG, BCC and the Incident Commanders, in order to update and appraise the Strategic Coordination Group (SCG) of events on the

Signature: R MILLS
2018

Signature witnessed by: K SHANAHAN

fire ground and deliver actions.

Whilst we (AC DALY and myself) had an initial conversation providing an overview of what was understood so far, it was agreed that I hold an urgent SCG meeting by phone and that Group Manager (GM) Ian FROST, London Resilience Team LFB Representative, set up and establish the initial contact with other 'Blue Partners'. I Chaired, the initial SCG telephone conference at 5am. This had been pushed back from 4.30am to ensure all key attendees, were available. The key attendees were the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS), the London Ambulance Service (LAS) and I believe the local authority, Royal Borough of Kensington & Chelsea, utilising the dial-in facility.

I utilised the London Strategic Coordination Protocol Agenda. I was able to provide a brief outline of the incident, using the information I had at the time (a 40 pump incident, with numerous FSG calls). I informed SCG that a major incident had been declared and I formally requested for the SOR to be established. This was agreed by other partner agencies. In preparation for the dial-in meeting I tasked one of my support Officers Station Manager (SM) Nick McCALLUM to prepare a situational update and set out the LFB strategic objectives, which were drawn directly from the LFB's SRA Policy. The key objectives of the LFB being:

- To save life.
- To prevent escalation of incident/event.
- To continue to maintain normal services at an appropriate level.
- To inform the public.
- To protect health, safety and welfare of Brigade staff.

I tasked my second support Officer SM David YATES to go to SOR and make contact, and establish links with my Police 'Gold' counterpart. It was agreed that the next SCG would take place at 6am in the SOR. I briefed GM FROST to speak with his Police contact(s) informing him that the incident was of such magnitude that I would appreciate that the Police 'Gold' Chair the next meeting owing to the wider involvement of other partner agencies. Although the Police were chairing it, I stated that LFB would need to have primacy of the incident at this moment in time. GM FROST informed that this was agreed and the necessary arrangements were in place.

Signature: R MILLS
2018

Signature witnessed by: K SHANAHAN

I had during this period (engaged in setting up SRA) received a number of phone calls from DAC FENTON at the BCC. He informed me that he had gone to Control and they were becoming overwhelmed with the volume of FSG calls being received. He had consequently decided to re-assign his BCC staff to support the coordination and logging of FSG calls, ensuring that the necessary information was recorded. At some point, it was either then or whilst in the car on the way to HQ I, was made aware that the FSG had changed, from 'stay put' to full evacuation of those individuals making FSG calls. I cannot recall precisely when this occurred.

On the occasions I spoke with DAC FENTON he sounded under a lot of pressure, he was speaking very fast, and I reaffirmed that I supported the decisions he was suggesting and making. He told me that off-duty staff were seeking permission to come in and support his team, he sought authority to make this happen and I authorised this.

During multiple conversations in quick succession, DAC FENTON was seeking or reaffirming my permission to authorise a range of issues in line with procedure. I told him the incident was of such significance, severity, and speed that he, would not need my authority to initiate actions he deemed necessary to ensure the Brigade could continue to operate and utilise whatever resources he required at that time to ensure Control and BCC could maintain operational effectiveness.

I then made my way to SOR, Pratt Walk, Lambeth, where I met with Police 'Gold' Neill GEROME at SOR, and thanked him for agreeing to Chair future SCG meetings.

At 6am the scheduled SCG took place. The meeting utilised the London Strategic Coordination Protocol Strategic Objectives from the document to revise the LFB strategic objectives to meet all multi-agency requirements. I regularly provided a scene situational update and was able to maintain contact with AC DALY to secure scene updates, along any requests from the fire ground for external support from agency partners.

Whilst at SOR, I was in communication with both AC DALY and DAC FENTON, and where necessary the fire ground, regarding resources required at the scene and across the Brigade. I needed information on

Signature: R MILLS
2018

Signature witnessed by: K SHANAHAN

what was ongoing to update and, devolve actions to other 'Gold' partners. AC Dan DALY was clear that the fire ground was to be fully supported as best they could through the CG and BCC. Any information obtained or actions required, were provided to partners via the 'Gold' and 'Silver' Command structure at SOR.

The structure of SOR was coordinated with CG and BCC to ensure that the needs of the incident were met. Utilising the resources of all partner agencies responding to the incident. Some examples being; Traffic management, the closure of the A40 and, Underground rail lines close to the scene. Information was available stating debris from the fire had landed on both sites, presenting potential hazards that required attention. Discussion at SOR addressed these issues which were actioned by other partner agencies.

I also recall the requirement for a Dangerous Structures Engineer to attend the scene, owing to the concern around the building's structural stability and the risks this presented. Another issue being the potential of air support and the deployment of helicopter support from the Maritime Coastguard Agency (LFB partner for air support) regarding unconfirmed reports of, casualties trapped on the roof. Additional examples of requests from partners ranged from, MPAS portable link to be provided, asbestos data provided to the scene, cross referencing of rest centres names and locations against search plans requesting fire crew transportation.

Later that day, a request was made for a representative from the Fire Brigade to attend COBRA. Prior to this meeting a question had been raised regarding the potential failure in the dry or wet rising main of the building. I believe the question had been initiated by the Home Office (via the London Resilience Team) which was subsequently raised at COBRA. Roy WILSHER the National Fire Chief's Council, Chair, attended the COBRA meeting, I undertook the role by telephone conference, feeding back the outcome to CG and SCG of the discussions. It transpired, a discussion had taken place between the Commissioner, Steve APTER, and Roy WILSHIRE, regarding the performance of the dry riser, which became an interest for COBRA.

Later during my time in SOR, a point was reached at the scene where the operational focus had changed from a rescue operation to one of recovery. This adjusted the strategic objectives of the LFB to include

Signature: R MILLS
2018

Signature witnessed by: K SHANAHAN

partner agencies (forensic and body recovery teams) taking into account their safety and welfare, expanding responsibility for the building from LFB to include other agency responders. AC DALY and myself, started to coordinate a relief process of senior LFB Commanders identifying specific replacements where appropriate and ensuring the transition of scene management in the knowledge that key personnel had been involved in the incident for an extensive period of time. This process was completed, along with a relief process of Fire Crews who attended the scene at an early stage.

By late evening, the situation at the scene had sufficiently stabilised. I was advised by AC Dominic ELLIS (AC ROE's replacement) who had walked the scene and stairways of the building. He provided a general outline of the building stability, the number of victims (deceased) located in communal areas, reported casualties from the scene known at that time, and that a number of fires in the building upper levels had been, extinguished.

The situation around the reports of collapsed floors in the building remained unclear, it was at one point suggested employing the services of demolition experts this was unfortunately, misinterpreted. Creating concerns around body recovery efforts being frustrated by the demolition of the building.

This was not the case, the suggestion was the employment of specialist demolition engineers that have skills in building stability, to secure their advice in stabilising the building sufficiently, for detailed body recovery to take place. This shifted the emphasis to the local authority to coordinate this, as the building owners. At this stage the strategic objective had been adjusted and ratified, to focus on recovery rather than, response.

The FSG Policy has been introduced to provide to Firefighters and Incident Commanders at the scene greater awareness of those persons trapped in a building due to the presence of fire or smoke. Information is provided to the Incident Commander by Control who are in contact with a trapped resident, thereby allowing the Incident Commander to prioritise and target resources in order to save life. The Policy provides additional resource to attend the incident. This allows the Incident Commander to exercise a greater level of command and control, using information secured to apply a tactical search and rescue operation, whilst tackling the fire.

Signature: R MILLS
2018

Signature witnessed by: K SHANAHAN

Information provide by Control is populated in the early stages via the Control Information forms onto Forward Information Boards (FIB) at the Bridgehead or other scene of operations to enable an Incident Commander to map the number of persons trapped. Where they are located in a building and, the resources tasked to affect their rescue.

The FSG process is managed by a separate Command Unit who coordinate the process for the Incident Commander utilising the Casualty Information poster held on the CUs. This is a live procedure, where those requiring rescue maintain contact with Brigade Control. In general terms, most trapped residents are advised to 'stay put' in line with National Policy. Control will advise the caller to seek a place of safety away from smoke and or, fire. Control will also secure an assessment of the conditions the caller is experiencing, this will determine the situation for those assigned to affect their rescue. Control have a 'script' that gathers relevant information from an FSG caller that supports the rescue activities.

The LFB position is, in most high rise incidents, to advise residents to 'stay put' if they are not directly involved. This was reviewed after the Lakanal Fire but is still deemed to be appropriate advice. The time we (LFB) look to change the advice is in situations where a resident is directly affected by smoke or fire within their compartment. If this is the situation, we will advise the resident to get out safely. If the conditions affecting the resident safety changes, we will change the 'stay put' advise to evacuate, if circumstances permit this.

A building that complies with building regulations offers a level of protection from fire and smoke travel. The risks of mass evacuation can create hazards by introducing residents into smoke filled areas, or impede the Brigade's efforts to effect rescue by obstructing stairways or, points of access. It is not possible to be specific as you questions asks, as it is difficult to generalise or speculate on FSG advice. It is dependent on the type of building, time of day, level of occupancy, and the extent and behaviour of the fire itself. Post Grenfell, human behaviour changed. Most people will now self-evacuate, whatever the advice given.

The scale of the FSG calls being received at Grenfell was the issue. In normal circumstance, Control would not be dealing with the number and speed of the calls coming into them. This level of demand was unprecedented, so many calls in so short a period of time, challenged the capacity of those to deal with it.

Signature: R MILLS
2018

Signature witnessed by: K SHANAHAN

The resourcing of the incident involved at one point 60 appliances, most appliances have a minimum of 4 and a maximum of 6 Firefighters on board. We deployed 8 Command Units (crewed by 2 Watch Managers), along with significant officer numbers. The Brigade's Fire Rescue Units (FRU) fleet of 14 vehicles were deployed at the incident, as Firefighters attached to the FRU are Extended Duration Breathing Apparatus (EDBA) wearers. We mobilised other specialist units for example; the Operational Support Units, and the Respiratory Protection Equipment Group to support the function of breathing apparatus provision.

I was assigned as the Incident Commander the following day 15th June 2017, and was able to examine and assess, the working environment of the building. The conditions were challenging, the stairways were narrow and dark. I can only imagine the intense heat described by many Officer and Firefighters, as I was not present at the scene during the fire. I am experienced in the wearing of BA and can relate to the impact of wearing this equipment, when tackling a fire. It was June, and London was experiencing a heatwave, for days afterwards, dehydration was an issue for a number of Firefighters. The conditions encountered by all Officers and Firefighters on the night must have been physically and mentally exhausting.

Standard Duration Breathing Apparatus (SDBA) is the general equipment that is utilised in most residential fires which, would include fires in high rise buildings. In normal conditions, Firefighters deployed to a fire in a high rise building usually operate from 2 floors below the reported fire. A Bridgehead (entry control point) operates from a point of safety below the reported fire. The challenge at Grenfell was that the entire building was alight, on all floors, other than, the ground lobby area. Deploying Firefighters in BA, to climb numerous floors, carrying equipment in extreme heat, restricts Firefighters operating in SDBA, to short distances from the fire Bridgehead. This placed many Firefighters in a challenging and, difficult environment pushing themselves to their limits.

It is very difficult to comment on the scene, as I wasn't there and have not had any extensive conversations around the firefighting tactics employed.

There has been a shift change in how we operate as a Principle Officer group, to strategic response

Signature: R MILLS
2018

Signature witnessed by: K SHANAHAN

arrangements as a result of this and other high profile incidents last year.

My aspiration would be to examine how we as an Officer Group, structurally mobilise and support large scale incidents. How do we equip our Officers in relation to how they take charge, when Officers are currently dealing with an incident and how they can manage a situation before a Senior Officer arrives by preparing for the next level of command requirements. I also think how we resource protracted incidents needs to be considered.

Within my Department there are some challenges around the resourcing of additional projects, with the aim of clear deliverables around equipment to Firefighters. An example would be looking at replacement BA, communications, the use of drone technology, the LFB are looking for external funding either from sponsorship or, through the Mayor of London to deliver some of these improvements. I am hopeful this will equip Firefighters with the latest technology for the future.

We are seeking to escalate a programme of equipment upgrades by bringing some of these projects forward, such as the Respiratory Protection Equipment (BA replacement) project.

I personally, would like to see supervisors receive training on the next level command modules, progressing training input to higher levels as required. Equipping them to make decisions, logging those decisions and, setting out a rationale for doing so. When we talk about operational discretion and FSG management, I would like to review how we record and document decision making at scenes. I believe the organisation is receptive to my suggestion. Although officer development, doesn't sit within my Department but I have made this a suggestion to consider.

The overall impact of the incident has been considerable for all of us (LFB) and has had a fundamental influence on all of us as professionals. I am aware of colleagues directly affected by their experience in being involved in this incident, and those involved in the ongoing work of body recovery in the subsequent days after the event. A number of my staff have been off sick, or temporarily removed from some duties as a result. The incident has, I think, fundamentally changed our environment. Many of my fire colleagues and myself have had issues of self-doubt, asking themselves if they could have done more in the circumstances. In our day to day operations, as sad as that is, we do lose people in fires and, other

Signature: R MILLS
2018

Signature witnessed by: K SHANAHAN

emergency incidents we respond to. However, never on this scale or magnitude and nothing can prepare you for that.

Speaking to Officers, Firefighters and Control Officers I know, many are trying to cope with the impact of the incident mentally and physically. On the night it was a matter of their best human endeavours. Many of us will ask what could I, we could have done, to change things, not only by those at the scene, but all those in functions behind the scenes dealing with calls and supporting the incident, and those in the subsequent days.

To summarise where we are at present when responding to high rise incidents; we have reviewed, and changed, our pre-determined attendance increasing the number of resources as part of our response to this incident type. Operational Policy are reviewing operational tactics on the weight of attack on a fire, deploying from different floors if circumstances permit along with the delivery of broader communications message to all Brigade Staff. Local familiarisation and inspections of cladded high rise buildings have been instructed to take place by local crews to support the work Fire Safety Regulation are undertaking. Updated information on those buildings with cladding that formulate our 'increased attendance' information are being held on appliance Mobile Data Terminals.

We have shared our initial policy review and fire safety findings with the NFCC and National Fire Operational Guidance, setting out our interim measures in the immediate aftermath of the Grenfell Fire. My Team continues to work with our internal Grenfell Team providing them with input and updates of operational policy reviews as and when required.

As an experienced Commander I have never encountered an incident of such scale and magnitude in my career. I have experience of coordinating and managing large scale incidents, Grenfell was, in many ways unprecedented, due to the size and volume of the incident.

To be visibly confronted with an incident of that scale, and deal with it, was a huge challenge for those dealing with calls and those at the scene. I am aware many individuals went beyond operational policy in an attempt to save. A significant number of people made incredible personal sacrifices, enduring the incredible heat and tackling the dangerous environment both in and around the building at the risk to their own personal safety. I have huge respect for all those who took part, as well as those partners who

Signature: R MILLS
2018

Signature witnessed by: K SHANAHAN

OFFICIAL

Statement of: MILLS, RICHARD

Form MG11(T)

Page 15 of 15

assisted us, as it brings into focus the incredible role we all play. I hope this is, a once in a lifetime incident for us all, and is definitely a once in a career incident.

I produce a copy of my notes that were constructed from my personal recollection of events and a review of my mobile phone log, which I can no longer access. The notes are marked as item (RMM/1).

Signature: R MILLS
2018

Signature witnessed by: K SHANAHAN

OFFICIAL