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## WITNESS STATEMENT

Criminal Procedure Rules, r27.2; Criminal Justice Act 1967, s.9; Magistrates' Courts Act 1980, s.5b	
Statement of: NUTTALL, RICKY	
Age if under 18: OVER 18 (if over 18 insert 'over 18'	Occupation: FIRE OFFICER
This statement (consisting of 20 page(s) each signed by me) is true to the best of my knowledge and belief and I make it knowing that, if it is tendered in evidence, I shall be liable to prosecution if I have wilfully stated in it anything which I know to be false, or do not believe to be true.	
Signature: R NUTTALL	Date: 25/02/2018
Tick if witness evidence is visually recorded	(supply witness details on rear)

This statement refers to a 'call out' when on night duty in the early hours of Wednesday 14<sup>th</sup> June 2017 to 'GRENFELL TOWER' GRENFELL ROAD, LONDON, W11 1TQ.

I joined the London fire brigade on the 1<sup>st</sup> February 2005 and have held the rank of firefighter for all my service of about 13 years. After my initial training I started my career at Hillingdon fire station then moved onto Knightsbridge and finally to Battersea were I am currently stationed as a fire fighter on 'Red Watch'.

My annual first aid training comprises of a one-day course, with a three day course every three years and if you miss this a five day refresher course is required. I am trained in and part of a Fire Rescue Unit (FRU), which is a month's course consisting of extended duration breathing apparatus (EDBA), and hazardous chemical's (HAZCHEM) training. I am part of a rope rescue team and represent the LFB in rope rescue competitions. I have completed a water rescue course which is also an annual refresher. I have a Royal Yachting Association Pilots Licence which allows me to drive the emergency rescue boats. The training we receive with regards to fires in High rise blocks of flats is an ongoing development in the diary. You have to hit certain targets and complete training on different things. There is a particular package to complete for high rise flats and likewise for compartments. Your training dates are logged with the administration department and would have to be in date within a calendar year. I would say I am a confident and competent fire fighter.

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I have not been to Grenfell Tower before but have attended many high rise fires where 9 out of 10 are just small fires or false alarms, but the procedures are still the same getting everything in place before you go into the compartment. We also use these calls to practice our drills and procedures.

On Tuesday 13<sup>th</sup> June 2017 I started my night shift watch at 8pm and after completing my operational duties the watch retired to bed. My crew consisted of Nico SANCHEZ, Adam YAMIN, Leon WHITLEY and Stuart BROWN our watch manager (WM). I think it was about 1.30am when the watch was woken up by the 'call out' alarm. A normal shout is out of bed, get dressed and go down stairs. I don't remember if someone tannoyed it was a fire or we saw the message in the watch room. The message stated it was a 'High rise fire' and was a 'Make up 'in the Kensington area needing 20 pumps which means there are already a number of pump's there and now requesting more to make it up to 20.

As I was getting dressed I was thinking 'What kit I was going to use?' and it was something big as you don't request those sort of resources on a false alarm only on a call that needed those resources. Also it was multiple flats involved, so I was thinking it was highly unlikely it wouldn't be contained to one flat and then I started going through High rise procedures in my mind and normal things we do on way to a shout like, 'what we would do on arrival'?, 'What am I going to?'

We had left the station and were travelling along Este Road and then turned right into Falcon Road. I remember we were getting changed in the back of the truck as normal and then things changed very quickly. I heard over the radio saying it was in excess of 100/140 Fire survival guidance calls in progress (FSG)'s for short. Now this told me the seriousness of the incident and a FSG call means there is someone contained in the flat and for whatever reason couldn't get out. It could be they are injured, it's too hot and smoky or any other reason.

What happens next is the control person taking the call stays on the phone and gives the caller Fire Survival Guidance advice (FSG) i.e. 'block the bottom of your door' 'get to an open window, shout for help' Can you get to a safer area in your flat? etc.!

If you have 3 or 4 calls coming in you know it's serious as potentially there could be 20 people need rescuing from areas where they can't get out of themselves. So when you hear there is in excess of over 100/140 you think 'Holly Shit' this is serious, a massive, massive fire. I remember immediately feeling nervous on the back of the truck thinking this is going to be the biggest fire I've ever been to. But in the back of my mind which was tainted a little bit by excitement as this is what we do, there's some real work to do and people to help, let's crack on, let's do our job.

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I'm not sure if it was on the way there or on our arrival but I heard someone say the fire had gone to a 40 pump fire and I'm thinking now that's a request for another 20 machines, which makes you think 'Holly shit this is massive'.

As we approached the Tower from opposite the leisure centre I could see the front face of the Tower, there were about ten floors high with flames going up the front of the building. There were people running everywhere and shouting for stuff. I was not really sure how to approach or deal with this stuff it was chaos, but organised chaos. I was thinking it was unusual to see flames going up the outside of the building. Normally you would see fire coming out of a flat window or several windows, but this was different flames were going up the exterior and cutting back inside the building and then across, then coming out of another side which was very unusual.

We parked the truck nearby I don't know exactly where but it was about a 3 to 5 minute walk, it wasn't far but, far enough to walk and stare at the building and think 'Shit'. The guvnor told us not to take any equipment with us in case it wasn't needed otherwise it would have had to be dumped and we would lose our BA (Breathing, apparatus) and they would end up being in the way.

Together we went to the nearest command to establish what equipment to bring and where we would be needed. A request for SDBA (Standard Duration Breathing Apparatus) equipment was given so we returned to the truck and collected our equipment.

The equipment included a 'TIC' (Thermal imaging camera) which reads the temperature and records on a loop. A heavy duty enforcer (Door opener) a 'BRANCH' to connect to the dry riser and a reel of hose pipe. I had my required and prescribed LFB protective clothing which comprised of a helmet, a hood, a tunic, a T shirt underneath, a pair of leggings, boots and leather gloves and was carrying a SDBA. There are EDBA's (Extended Duration Breathing Apparatus) which are carried on the FRU's or brought up on request for anyone who is capable to wear them.

On my return I was standing about a metre from the building near to the main entrance on the right and I could see a lot of burning debris falling from the tower some of it was floating down and drifting about three metres away from the building or even further if the wind took hold. There were larger heavier pieces travelling quicker, some pieces where landing close to the building and others were hitting an Ariel appliance parked near to the tower. As the fire spread the fall of debris changed drifting further away or landing in a pile in the playground area.

I wasn't aware of any distinctive noises apart from fire fighters shouting and debris falling. Although people have mentioned alarms and screaming I can't remember any of that. I can normally tell the

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difference between electric or carbonised fire but this just smelt like a normal fire which is hard to describe. You also get to know the strength of the fire as you travel towards it by how far away you smell the smoke although this is not an accurate way of telling you, it told me it was big as we could smell the smoke very early on as we approached the area.

The appliance being hit by the debris was an aerial appliance, I'm not sure if it was a turn table ladder (TL) or an aerial ladder platform (ALP) which has an extended ladder with a platform at the top and a water cannon which can reach up to seven floors. For a high rise fire that would be on the Pre Determine Attendance (PDA) and I believe that would have been there from the start. The water from the cannon was running off the cladding panels as it is designed to do and not making much effect. I helped to move the already connected hoses which were charged (full of water) as the truck was reversed back away into a safer position.

I was also watching out for people in the area warning them about the debris falling. There wasn't a lot of public about like you would see at a normal fire as I think people who had come out of the building just wanted to get away and those that where there didn't want to get too close. Nico was also helping with hoses and Fergie (FERGUSON) a fire fighter from Chelsea I know was putting out debris on the floor so it wouldn't catch and spread. Adam had been helping out with first aid and resus outside and hadn't been allowed back in because his helmet was inside the lobby. Stu (Stewart BROWN) was doing his management stuff but told us not to go anywhere without him knowing and generally looking after us. We eventually all moved back out of the way of the falling debris and a cordon area was set up. No one was allowed into the inner cordon unless you were going to access the building and you had all your safety equipment on.

We then helped to ferry a little bit of equipment into the tower, people were calling for more branches (nozzles) and BA boards know as ECB (Electronic Control Board).

The boards are used where you go out of line sight or into a fire using BA equipment you have an electronic tally which is attached to your BA kit and handed in when you go into the incident or fire. This is plugged into the electronic board and allows the control to see how much air you have left, the rate of oxygen being used depending how hard you have been working and in what areas. The sets have a whistle on them and BA procedures are that you have to be out of the building before the whistle blows. I think they have a 12 minute buffer to allow you to get of the building before the air runs out. If it goes off inside the building it's not the end of the world, but it's not ideal.

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We were eventually told to go into the building as more BA wearers were needed, this would have been sent either by radio or the message shouted down and you would be called in.

I was with my colleague fire fighter (FF) Leon WHITLEY and together we entered the building from the right hand side in our BA. As you entered the building into a lobby area there was thin wispy acrid white smoke which was not strong enough to switch on our BA but enough to make your eyes sting and water. You wouldn't switch on the BA as you didn't want to waste your air before you went up the stairs. There was a wall on the left hand side which was being used to record the FSG's as they came in. Straight in front of you was a door which led you into lift lobby area and one on the left which led you out into the back and into a kitchen area I think for staff. If you looked up you could see the mezzanine area where we were queuing.

We then continued up a couple of small square spiral sets of stairs with glass panels on either side and onto a mezzanine area. I thought this was the first floor as there were flats and a lift area. The area was over populated with FF's and we joined a short line waiting to reach the front to receive our orders. At this point there wasn't many people or casualties coming out of the building so we had to wait in line. I thought there should have been more people coming out for the size of the fire. So then I started to think maybe this wasn't as bad as I thought and the fire was just on the outside and people were being told to stay inside as they should have been safe.

Other FF's who were coming out of the building looked like they had been working fucking hard. Normally you would be buzzing, tired but excited saying "that was hard' but smiling about it. These guys were not smiling they were in shock and looked exhausted. One FF said to me as he looked straight into my eyes "Please be fucking careful in there" and it was a serious 'Please be careful'. It was just another thing which emphasised the gravity of the fire and how dangerous the situation was.

Some casualties started to come out then maybe three or five I'm not sure, but there was always a sense of urgency as they came out with FF's putting equipment down to help convey them down the line. I saw a small naked adult female casualty being carried out by two fire fighters holding her under the arms and legs on her back. I think she looked about fifty to sixty years old with long her and a light tanned skin not sure what her nationality was. She was not conscious or breathing with black smoke all around her nose and mouth and visibly in a bad way I think she was dead. There was a couple of children I think female again aged about eight or nine in pyjamas were passed along too. There was a bit of a scramble going on people asking for IEC Pack's which are our first aid kits containing defibrillator, resuscitation equipment and general first aid stuff. A few of the lads dropped their BA to help and pass the casualty's along the

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chain to the end and then take them out to a safety/first aid area by the last in the que. I believe Adam YAMIN did some resus on one of them and they came to, enough to say thank you to him which was nice.

Sometimes it went quiet and you were just waiting around to go in, I was getting frustrated as the nerves were kicking in as you just wanted to get going just like the start of a race. The more you were waiting the more you thought how hard it was going to be as the fire was still spreading so it's going to be more smokier and hotter with the conditions getting more dangerous all the time. Also how many and what condition the casualties would be in as you came across them. So to be there for about fifteen or twenty minutes waiting was very frustrating.

At one point we were asked to move back down as it was getting congested on the stairs. We did this for a short while but it didn't really make any difference, it was a very busy area. I think they were trying to keep an area clear for the causalities coming down between the mezzanine and what I call the first floor. On this floor it was being supervised by two managers Pat GOLDBOURNE and Richard WELCH, I think. They were organising who was going where and when and what equipment they were taking in. There were people running around calling out for equipment still, it was a very confused and chaotic situation. We ended up with a Tic, enforcer, and a length of rolled hose 45mm thick but without a handle. I made the judgement call to get one without a handle as I didn't want to be in a dark area in the heat and have to take off my gloves to unlock the handle from the ratchet strap.

We then moved around and up to the 3<sup>rd</sup> floor where there was an (IEC) first aid a' Bridge Head 'and an entry' control board 'had been set up by the lifts. It was a small floor with maybe two flats on and definitely not a full size floor. This is the last point before entry were you then need the BA switched on to enter the building after handing in your tally.

On a high rise block of flats LFB procedure is for example:-'If the fire was on the 5<sup>th</sup> floor you would hand your tally into the' bridge head' on the 3<sup>rd</sup> floor and take a couple of lengths of hose rolled up, a branch, and breaking in equipment. You would connect to the dry riser n the floor below and charge your hose, then making progress up with water you would then tackle the fire in question and into the flat to put out the fire.

This incident was very different as by the time we had committed from the 3<sup>rd</sup> floor pretty much every floor had fire on it. So it was completely impossible, or practicable to say 'get water now' and make your way up the building as you would have to connect 30 lengths of hose all charged with water to get up the building which was physically impossible you can't do it. We were all immediately aware that we would

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be going into the fire without protection and had to make our way through fire without water to make progress to different floors and deal with the fire or hot gases without being able to effect gas cooling stuff. All the technique's we were taught in BA training and drummed into you went out of the window straight away.

So this then gave me an element of how fucking bad this was. The first thing I thought of when this happened was 'how fire fighters were going to die in this fire 'and no two ways about it they were going to die. You just then go into the mode of, 'well I'm going to make fucking dam sure it's not me'. I was teamed up with my best pal Leon and were assigned to two different rescue areas, when this was queried (i.e. going to two locations), we waited for a short while before it was finally confirmed not to go to either of those, but go to a new location on the 15<sup>th</sup> floor, gain access to flat 122 where a 'FSG' call had been received from a 999 call to rescue the occupant.

I was then told to take a 'branch' with me, but I didn't have one so had to wait for another five minutes before I received one. We have branches on the truck but I didn't want to leave the que and get one as I would have had to join the back and wait again. The equipment is just passed in from the back as it arrives and we ended up taking kit up with us which was not ours. So bearing in mind I was wearing my SDBA and had been under air for a while I was already aware that I didn't have enough air to complete the task in hand and was really pissed off. I was thinking even if we put the fire out in the flat and effect a rescue we wouldn't have enough air or protection for the occupier to go down through all the floors below us in dense smoke and fire. So I pretty much knew from the outset it was an impossible task but, you do what you can do.

Before we went up we were shown a brief layout of the landings on a wall I think, to make ourselves familiar with the landing layout where the flats, lifts, stairs, bin chute room and dry riser were. They told us to go up onto the next floor where there was no smoke or fire and check out the landing. We did this and came back out onto the stairwell but from the 5<sup>th</sup> floor upwards there was dense smoke and we couldn't see much. On a scale of 1 to 10 I would say the density of the smoke was an 8 or 9 very thick and to explain the visibility using our torches, if you have white wispy smoke the torches reflect back and makes it harder to see like in fog when you put the main beam lights on in your car. The visibility is better to have the torches off but, in thick dark smoke areas have them on.

As we entered the stairwell, the bottom floors were congested and blocked with hoses as more and more hoses were laid up. Normally they would be stored to left or up the centre for more access to higher floors. It was a bit like the 'krypton factor' trying to get a foot hold in between the tangled charged hose

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and climb over things without visibility. It was difficult from the outset. At each level where the hose was required the door to the landing would have been propped open by the hose as the FF went along the landing dealing with the fire. The doors would have been trying to close as designed but unfortunately in the circumstances this would have been unavoidable. I think the hoses stopped about the 7<sup>th</sup> or 8<sup>th</sup> floor and beyond that hoses were plugged into the dry riser. There was a lot of people traffic up and down with fire fighters and people being rescued. There was lots of shouting going on and if someone had tapped my shoulder to be escorted out I would have helped, but that didn't happen.

When we were climbing up the stairwell we stayed to the right hand side using the concreate wall to help us guide our way up. So if the middle or handrails collapse you wouldn't fall down. At this point Leon and I were thinking this is too much like a 9/11 disaster. It was too easy to get lost, too easy not to achieve our objective and too easy to get hurt, injured or even killed. We were in a bad place.

We made our way up a few floors and I remember it was dark not sure if the lighting had gone off or was just not good enough to see through the smoke. We were told to count the steps as there were insufficient numbering on the walls. Because of the black soot and the floor numbers being in black, it was impossible to see them even with our torches on. We tried to wipe the walls and to count the steps, but with everything going on we couldn't remember what floor we were on. Some of the lights had been fitted over the numbers and we couldn't find them.

The numbers by the lifts were incorrect as the numbering was out of sync, say for example you were on the 5<sup>th</sup> floor but in effect on a completely different one. You could have been 3 or 4 floors out which caused lots of confusion. It wasn't on every floor but this made it more difficult as you couldn't remember which floor you were on. I believe the building had been refurbished and they had changed the numbering of the floors. It used to be ground floor and mezzanine walk ways which then changed to floor one up to the fourth floor which was the old first floor so that didn't help and it wasn't done sensibly or effectively for our purposes.

We felt our way up and again we were told by FF's coming down to find a safe landing with less smoke on to familiarise ourselves with the landing layout as got it worse as you went up. It was very hot and we were carrying heavy hoses and stuff and working really hard to make progress. I said to Leon let's come off the stairwell and go onto the landing area and try and find a door number to familiarise ourselves with the flat's, landing layout and see how far we had left to go to the 15<sup>th</sup> floor.

We both agreed and came off onto a landing area. In normal circumstances you would 'poke' your hose in and that's all you're going to do. The difficulty we had was that we were on a floor we didn't know and

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were not familiar with and, it was full of thick black smoke and was getting very hot. There was lots of noise and commotion going on, I think we were on the 7<sup>th</sup> or 8<sup>th</sup> floor landing when we got lost feeling our way around for numbers like trying to read brail with thick leather fire gloves on. I started to panic a bit thinking I was going to be the 'arse hole' that would have to be rescued. We couldn't see or feel any numbers or floor indicators but thankfully Leon found the doorway and we made our way back to the stairwell. I did a quick gauge check and thought were going to run out of air. In any case Leon and I had a quick chat and I said to him "this is fucked up, we have to do whatever we can, let's just barrel up a load of stairs to wherever we can get to and come off onto the landing and see where we are". So that's what we did and started to climb up. It was very difficult with hoses still on the stairwell and very dark. I think it was still around the 7<sup>th</sup> floor that I stood on what I thought was a hose but in fact it was a body. It didn't occur to me that it was a body until I had gone passed it and I wouldn't have been able to help them as it was a big set person. Sad as it was, I still wouldn't have gone back down as they would have been too heavy to lift. I later found out it was a heavy set women and she was in effect buried under the hoses. I assumed the hoses had been placed over her to gain access further up, to extinguish the fire and try and reach people who needed rescuing. I wasn't aware of anyone being told that person was there before I started to climb the stairwell and made the assumption that the decision had been made to leave her there and don't waste time trying to move her.

As we climbed higher it suddenly went very quiet and I mean there was a deathly silence, there were no alarms ringing, no shouting or screaming just an eerie silence. It occurred to Leon and me that we were high up and on our own as we never saw anyone or any causalities.

We continued up the stairwell and came off at a landing and found ourselves on the 11<sup>th</sup> or 12<sup>th</sup> floor. We did another gauge check and could see we had enough air left to go up to the 15<sup>th</sup> so I said "let's just get there". At this point Leon and I had had an argument as I had brought the hose with us but I had taken one without a handle which keeps the hose together. Unfortunately, ours had now become tangled up and we were carrying it between us in our arms as well as the other equipment. I got annoyed with Leon at this stage and was shouting at him as the hose was catching on a door handle and other stuff and he kept pulling it. I was now really pissed off as the only bit of equipment we had to protect ourselves was now all knotted up and in a mess. I was thinking we are going to be on the 15<sup>th</sup> floor and we can't even get water, or do anything when we get up there, what was the point? I was really getting wound up, I was tired and exhaustion was creeping in. Leon bless him turned round to me and said "Rick we've got this,

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this is what it is, let's just get there, we will work it out", which is what I needed a little bit of reassurance, because we are such good friends he managed to calm me down and we pushed on.

On this landing it was very hot with thick black smoke and I couldn't see any visible flames, but I now know from watching the time line footage that the floor was completely engulfed in flames. It was really weird, it's the only time you could be in a building and not know it was on fire apart from the heat and smoke. From the outside people would be thinking there's no way anyone could be in that building as it looked far worse on the outside than the inside, as far as the landings and stairwells were concerned. I know all the sets have been downloaded, but I can only tell you of my recollection of what I remember which may be in contrast to what the sets have said. First of all the radio communications (comms) were an absolute nightmare. To start with the ear piece doesn't give a good seal around your BA masks. If you move your head a certain way you lose air. In this situation you need every bit of air you've got. With the size of the incident going on and the amount of radio traffic in your ear you couldn't send or receive an accurate message as you kept getting interrupted or couldn't get in to send the message and by then you realise you've moved up the stairs and couldn't remember what floor you were on. It was just a ball ache and in the end I just gave up. I left it on in case there was a FF emergency as I would have tuned in then and listened otherwise it was on but I wasn't paying any attention to it. Although I was ignoring it, it was buzzing in your ear and it was a distraction. You are aware there could be important information coming over like emergency evacuation (EVAC) or someone's body guard (personal body alarm) going off then I would tune in and deal with the call.

I could hear 'ALPHA' control (entry point for the BA's) very clear as they were in my ear, and not speaking through a BA mask. If I was trying to speak or listen to other FF's through our mask's it was difficult to communicate or hear them and yet this was the most important time if we were searching rooms and they needed your help and you couldn't hear them.

I know there's better equipment out there and I understand it's all about cost but in this situation cost shouldn't come into it. I know other FF's were complaining that their 'comms' going down and were not working. My set was working Ok I was still receiving a signal and the battery life was fine so I can't complain about that.

As we continued up the floors the heat was getting more intense and it became more difficult and hard as we were getting tired. I was carrying a 20 kg enforcer off my wrist and the hose was uncomfortable to carry. It was no one's fault just shit circumstances.

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When we eventually reached the 15<sup>th</sup> floor I dumped the hose on the floor as I was out of breath and my heart rate was pounding. I keep myself fit and I knew my heart rate was in 190's. So I knew I had to slow down even though your brain is telling you to be quick do your job and get out it was difficult. I said to Leon "Here's the end of the hose I'm going to wait here with the bundles I will try and pass the bundles out to you as go" and he went to find the dry riser which was off to the left somewhere I then began to roll the bundles out and straighten the hose as he went to find the riser, again we had zero visibility. When I was waiting for Leon to find the dry riser I looked through the thermal imagine camera (TIC) and saw through the smoke some orange flames flickering down the corridor so I knew there was some exposed fire down there. We have a term called 'fire gas explosion' as well as 'flash over and back draft'. We are trained to do 'gas cooling' where you put pulses of water into the hot gases, which in effect is unburnt fuel, because if they reach a hot enough temperature they can ignite. So the idea is you take the heat out of them so even if the flames are exposed to them they won't ignite and this keeps you safe. So when you have a bundled up, knotted and tangled hose and you can see flames flickering down the right hand side of the corridor with thick black smoke around you that is the worst type of scenario we could have been in. It was dangerous because if the gases had ignited we would have been injured if not killed. I took a temperature reading on the Tic, but had to wipe the front of the lens with my glove to 'unclagg' (unclog) it, as it was covered in soot and it was showing somewhere around 550 or 555 degrees centigrade. That was hot and I knew inside the flat it could be in access of 1,000 degrees. It's a good bit of kit as it records as well and they are nice and clear. For example if you're in a room in the dark without smoke or heat you can see all the layout and furniture. So with the Tic I could see that there were no visible signs of fire so it must have been a reflection from an open door to a flat. I also knew we had very limited time on that landing

We managed to connect the branch to the 'dry riser' after smashing the door to gain entry with the enforcer. I told Leon to stay where he was, to plug his end in and to not touch anything until I could sort out my end out. Then he could turn it on. I just prayed we had some 'fucking water'. I knelt down and found the other end of the hose. I don't know why but I closed my eyes as I was feeling down the hose to unravel the bundles. It was dark, very hot and I was panicking a bit. It was a good panic, a real sense of urgency not the fact that I had lost the plot. I managed to sort my end and shouted to Leon to turn the water on and 'charge 'the hose (fill with water) thankfully we had water. We now had everything in place to access the flat. We had found the flat and at this point our whistles blew on the BA set which meant we should have been out of the building by now. Immediately I became aware and thought "fuck me", we are

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on the 15<sup>th</sup> floor and there are about 12 minutes left which still allowed us to get out. We are going to have to fight our way back down the stairs and could come across anything or people wanting to be rescued.

I had a quick chat with Leon and a decision was made between us that we couldn't risk entering the flat in case there was an elderly or multi occupancy inside, although in my head I had one male which must have come from the FSG report but I can't remember. If there had been kids in there I might have kicked the door in and grabbed them and just done what I could. Either way we wouldn't be able to help them in time to get out and down the stairs safely. Also we were leaving ourselves vulnerable and at risk of dying if we stayed there any longer and this would cause other FF's to come and rescue us and other people. The decision we made was obviously a very difficult one as the state of the building was in when we got there, meant by the time someone got back to them they wouldn't make it.

To make any decision who to rescue and evacuate is made with great difficulty. The decision making goes hand in hand with who you choose and how you are going to get them out. It would be easier to carry out a baby then help a 25 stone man for instance. To help them down the stairs safely I would have put them on the left hand side to protect them from any dangers. I might ditch my equipment or walk down backwards to guide them or put them over my shoulders but as the stairwell was too narrow I wouldn't have done that in case I smashed his head off the wall. I wouldn't like to put a time on the evacuation as it depends if they were alive, awake or unconscious and on the age, size, and fitness of the causality. Also there's an unwritten rule in the brigade for example if I knew I could get someone out to be resuscitated at the other end with a chance to live but ended up breaking his arm or something on the way then I would take that chance.

So before we left we made sure the hose was straight and the equipment was safe to leave near the landing so it would be found. We would go back down and report to the entry control what we had achieved and then they could send someone straight up the 15<sup>th</sup> floor they wouldn't need any equipment just their BA kits and effect the rescue.

We then made our way back down the stairs, and when I say made our way it was like doing a big childish thing like when you ran down blocks of flats as kids, putting one hand on the rail and one on the wall and flinging yourself down missing out 8 steps as a time, that's how we flew down at high speed and it took us about five minutes. The visibility was still poor with thick smoke until we were about one floor from the entry control point.

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We got to the area were the bundle hoses and other stuff was being stowed and encountered other crews there. I told them we were coming out, there was shouts from people with casualties and I shouted over to someone don't know who that we were coming out as we hardly had any air left (I don't know how many minutes I had) and we needed to get out, again there was hardly any visibility but a space was made and we bundled our way out.

As always when you have been wearing BA like any other job when you come to close down for me anyway it hits you really quickly and hard, you have been working very hard, your heart rate is pumping, you're breathing heavily, you're overheating and all you want to do is just tear the face mask off your face and get the fuck out of the building.

We finally got down to the third floor were the entry control point and bridge head should have been to give our debrief. It was important to give them the information to go back up to the 15<sup>th</sup> floor with the hose. I was told it had been moved and to go downstairs and give our information there. I couldn't understand why as this was the entry point where we should be closing down and why did I have to go downstairs. I couldn't remember if the control point had been moved or we had handed our tallies in here or closed down there. I do remember being in an open foyer area to the main entrance of the tower were we closed down our sets and took off our masks. I think I saw a Crew manager (CM) from red watch at Fulham (after research on face book I can confirm it was Glyn WILLIAMS). What had started to happen was the wall was being used as a forward information board (FIB) which came about from the LAKANAL HOUSE fire and is basically a manual board which gives the floor and flat layouts and you can tick people off if they have been rescued from FSG calls etc. Because of the size of the building the wall was being used, as a normal board would have been too small and not practicable. A tick meant the occupier had been rescued or a line through their name meant the line went dead. Information was being passed back from the control to people outside who in turn passed the information back into the poor guy who was keeping record of the updates on the wall. I don't know but I would think it was impossible to have collected that much information accurately. I tried to give him the information but he said to me "I not doing do that I'm doing this" he was one person doing all of this and there was lots going on. He just didn't have the time to call people up and tell them about the 15th floor, because there was over 50 or so calls coming in to collate and pass on to people.

We managed to leave the building via the back entrance which was different from the one we came in and the circumstances outside had changed with lots of debris falling. We had to have the police (TSG) to help us in and out of the building using their riot shields as cover. Cordons had been put in place. I'm not

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sure if our information was dealt with. I tried to give it to someone else outside, to another CM who was standing under a cover by some garages near to the front. They were collating FSG information and again I was told "I can't take this" and was passed on as they were gathering pieces of paper with the information from the FSG's and then taking them up to Glyn to put up on the wall. Later on I helped them out and did this for a little while when I was on a break. It was a case of everyone mucking in and helping where they could. There was a lot of this going on and no one's fault, just the magnitude of the job. There was just too much information, too much radio traffic going on, too many people with too much to do. It was very difficult to collate all the information. I saw a watch Manager (WM) near to this location, I don't know who he was, and just said to him "guvI have to give you this information about the 15<sup>th</sup> floor" so I did and he said he would deal with it.

I will call the side of the tower with the main entrance on it, the front of the building. We walked over to the grassy area to the right hand side of the tower, near to the leisure centre were we dumped our gear by the wall. We did our tests (Fire ground 'A' test) on the BA set and changed our cylinders ready to go back in if we were required.

At this point Leon and I had a little chat and I reassured him as much as he did me and just said we have done everything we could and that was the hardest thing physical and mentally I had ever done in my life. Outside we sat down for about 20 minutes as I was feeling dizzy. My head was just steaming as I've got no hair to cover it up. Every time I went to stand up or move around I felt dizzy and thought I was going to pass out I was just exhausted. I saw a paramedic I knew from the Hazardous Area Response Team (HART) who had been on a rope team rescue course that I had been on. He asked me if I was ok. I told him no I was fucked, and he went to fetch a bucket of water to do some radial cooling treatment by putting my hands in the bucket to cool my body temperature down which helped a lot. I wrung my T shirt out which was wet and full of sweat. My head was still steaming I was so hot. I took some water on board and just sat there watching what was going on, with crews turning up with BA on etc. My guvnor had spoken to me Stuart BROWN and he realised I was knackered and told me to sit there for 30 minutes or so and get myself together as I was no good to anyone at that point as there were loads of new guys with BA sets on.

I was about 20 metres from the building and I could see the fire had spread and the condition of the building had changed a lot since we had been inside. I was looking up and I could see people at the windows with mobile phones in their hands with the torches on flashing them like a Morse code doing a SOS or waving clothes trying to attract attention to themselves. There were people from the top four or

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five floors down to the tenth and maybe even a couple lower again. The fire had spread in a real random pattern on the outside, it had spread high then across. The burn pattern was odd too in the sense that it had gone thorough flats or around them and down. I think there was a blind guy rescued at 7.30 am in the morning his flat was surrounded by burn marks as the fire went up passed it and then back down around the bottom. If the fire had gone inside the flat he would have been dead. I know the 'stay put' policy has been questioned but this shows it works. It really does work but with this fire for different reasons it didn't. If that fire was just internal, those people would have survived.

I got up and started to help running the FSG info in and out with a TSG bloke giving us protection using his shield. I did this for a little while until I was called away but I can't remember what for, but during this time a black African man was holding a mobile phone in his hand and was shouting and arguing with some LFB staff. He wasn't aggressive just annoyed and I took him to one side as I had the time and calmed him down. He was explaining his sister or sister-in-law was in the building and didn't know what to do. He was telling her to come out but she couldn't. If she was on a lower floor I was thinking I would break the protocol and tell her to get out, but she was on the 13<sup>th</sup> or 14<sup>th</sup> floor. I looked up and saw the fire was all round that area and thought she isn't getting out. I didn't tell him that of course but explained to him to keep her there as I've been in and it was very smoky and she wouldn't be able to hold her breath for 10 floors to safety. You cannot tell her to try and escape otherwise she will die but, to stay put and we will get to her. I calmed him down and told him to stay on the phone and he moved away with the knowledge of telling a FF outside the cordon if circumstances changed. That was the last time I saw him and I assumed looking at the condition of the fire and building at that time she didn't make it.

The information was in the system and the FSG guys knew about her, he was just panicking trying to get her out which is understandable.

After about 30 minutes I went to the rear of the building by the playground, which had now become a BA holding area and I waited there for a task. I was on my own at this point and had lost my crew, things were still a bit hazy and I was still feeling tired. It must have been about 5 or 5.30am as it was now light and I thought how quickly the time had gone between my 1<sup>st</sup> wear and 2<sup>nd</sup> wear (tasks). FF's were talking to each other and giving each other advice. They were excited and nervous about going into the biggest fire that they have had to deal with and being able to help or rescue someone. You had no idea what it was like inside, how bad the conditions where which is why FF's coming out were stressing to us to be careful in there it was dangerous. I was half waiting to hear on the radio if FF's had gone missing and I'm

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amazed that no FF's had been killed I really am. I would say that had to be down to the training we receive and the equipment we were using and also the management on the night.

After sitting around chatting to other FF's from different stations I went in for my 2<sup>nd</sup> wear with a guy who I hadn't met before. All I can tell you about him was, he was white, clean shaven, late twenties and had a bald head. I didn't know what station he was from but he became my wearer (partner).

We went in and again we didn't really achieve much we got onto the stairwell which was very busy with FF's. The 2<sup>nd</sup> wear is all a bit blurred and hazy. It was so hazy I didn't even put that in my statement at Paddington as I didn't think it was relevant. I don't know what floor we went to, there was lots of smoke and I was just helping ferry people out down the stairwell. We weren't in there long and I don't know why we came out, I don't think we were low on air, or whether I was tired or my colleague was, I'm not really sure.

We came out and closed down our BA and I went to get another cylinder and go back round to the holding area as I felt I hadn't done enough on the other wear and I felt capable of doing more work. I became a bit frustrated as there were lots of people getting rescued and to be honest with you I sort of felt I hadn't achieved anything as I hadn't pick up anyone and carried them out. So I felt I hadn't achieved anything I wanted to do and wanted to go back in.

Unfortunately, a guy I know very well Paul MERRICK a CM (Crew Manager) was in charge of the BA holding area and knew I had been in twice and was looking for fresh wearers. He refused my entry and we chatted for a while as I harassed him trying to get back in. There were about 100 fresh FF's and some hadn't been in yet so he was completely correct in telling me I couldn't go in.

Also at this point the system had been changed and EDBA's were now going in to the top floors because of what had happened to the likes of Leon and I in the 1<sup>st</sup> wear and the SDBA's were going into the lower floors. This was because the way the fire had changed and with the condition of the building, most of the people that had to be rescued on the floors had been and most of the task's achieved.

The priority at this point was the upper floors and FRU's were being called in from everywhere and more EDBA sets. I knew I wasn't going to get back in wearing an SDBA set so I went and changed this for a new EDBA set as I was also trained in using them. It became apparent that most of the batteries on the new sets were flat. So it was a case of trying them out, and seeing which worked. If they didn't I ditch it, I tried about six in total. I don't know why or what the issues were behind getting them. I moved away and tried to get a set with a working battery and I was more than likely moaning about the equipment until someone shouted over they had sorted them out and charged batteries were available back at the

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container. After I found a new set with a working battery I checked my kit and made sure everything was intact and working correctly.

To help explain the set, the body is separate from the cylinder. The body is your back plate with shoulder and waist straps, and your hoses have a mask which is joined together. We have a body guard which is an electronic sensitive device which is attached to an extension of your air hose. So when you switch your air on it registers your air pressure digitally and also acts as an alarm, If you don't move for a prescribed period of time it starts to pre alarm and bleeps, but if you move it will cancel. If you continue to stay still it will go into full alarm mode and will let the people know at entry control that you are not moving. It's a safety mechanism in case you get hit on the head and are knocked unconscious. It also has a manual button so if you find yourself lost and need help you can activate it and set off the alarm. All this needs a battery which is kept in the back of this unit and is recharged on the truck. They should have been on trickle charge in storage and come out to the incident already charged but for whatever reason a lot of the batteries were not working or defective.

To emphasise the importance of the equipment I was moaning to some manager of rank don't know who he was about the delay in getting the stuff here and the fact half of it wasn't working. He was a down to earth guy anyway and I think rank went out the window on the night as everyone was feeling sad and upset by the incident.

During the time we were sorting out our sets and waiting to go in, another senior manager Andy ROE who is an area commander (AC) sensed there was an air of discontentment amongst the FF's. We were all sitting around frustrated watching the tower burning like an inferno and knew people were dying inside and we wanted to go and rescue them and we couldn't. That's our job and it was very frustrating and people were getting the hump. (Annoyed) He came over and called everyone together and I can only describe his speech as a motivation morale pre battle charge chat which completely sorted everyone out. It was perfect, brilliant, just what we needed and he addressed all our issues and frustrations. He then went on to explain the reasons about the delays and how it was difficult to get people into the building and it all made perfect sense.

He could have just come over and told us all to sit down and shut up and get on with it, but he didn't it was a great piece of management.

I then went back to the holding area as I knew now they would want to use me. I then found out they were not going to let you in without a cylinder cover. If you are an EDBA you have an orange cover on the cylinder but these had not been delivered I don't know why. So you then had to go up to other FF's

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coming out and get their cover by stripping the set down and put it on your own, and then try and find the same person when you came out to give the cover back so they could go in. It was a complete fuck up! I managed to do all this and get back round to the holding area where I found all of my crew and it was really chilled at this point.

We were sitting around for about an hour behind the back of the building waiting to go back in, it's not as if we didn't have nothing to do, but I just couldn't think of anything else that would have made a difference. So we chatting and laughing and just releasing the stress which is what we do. Had I known that people were in the building dying it would have been different because I really feel awful about that. I know I keep going on about the gravity of it all, but it's really weird, as whilst I understood the size of the fire and how dangerous it was and all of those things. The major the thing I didn't understand at the time, but didn't hit me till later on, was the scale of the tragedy which was taking place.

On the 3<sup>rd</sup> wear I felt I could do more and eventually we were sent to another holding area for EDBA wearers which was inside the building on the ground floor and through to a lobby area by the lifts. I remember the floor being flooded as the hoses going up the stairs had been damaged and water was escaping running down the building. The 3<sup>rd</sup> wear wasn't much different from the 2<sup>nd</sup> wear with people saying it was shit in there and we had no water and you weren't getting any water! We were put into groups of four instead of two as there were lots of EDBA wearers turning up and it was safer in a group. I was with Stuart and two others from our watch but I don't remember who they were. We were then given a search and rescue task by the BA control Paul MERRICK to go to the 11<sup>th</sup> & 12<sup>th</sup> floor with no water. I presumed anyone above those floors were either dead or couldn't be rescued.

As we went in they were saying" stay dry in there" So I'm thinking wet feet puddles etc., but fuck me" on the way up there was water cascading down the stairwell and splashing over the floor levels like a waterfall. The lower floors from about the 5<sup>th</sup> up to the 10<sup>th</sup> were the worst it was like a water park theme slide in places the water was running down so fast. I didn't see were the water was coming from whether it was a burst main pipe, a hose come loose or had been burnt and damaged. We are supposed to stay dry as the water turns into steam with the heat and rooms being up to 1,000 degrees C our uniforms become a like sauna and we can get burnt with the hot steam. By the time I got to the 12<sup>th</sup> floor I was soaked through to my skin. You shouldn't be going into a fire like that, it's just dangerous and again we had no water it was just insane.

On the way up we came across the body which had been left on the stairway during the 1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> wears. The person was female and clothed with jeans on. I can't remember what she was wearing on top. She

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was a large build and I think she was facing down the stairs. It was light now and we could see her lying there so we tried to walk round her respectfully.

As we began searching the flats I quickly realised that most of the windows had been blown which meant the fire had been spreading external and internally. This actually helped the conditions as a lot of the smoke and heat had gone out the rooms and the visibility was good. Although there were pockets of debris on fire about a metre high, the heat was going out to the open window as well as towards us. There was still heat in the room the equivalent to standing close to a bonfire. You could feel the heat through your body, but it wasn't unbearable as we could stand up and weren't on our knees.

We continued to search the flats opening wardrobe doors etc. In some rooms where the fire doors had protected the rooms it was a matter of a full search looking into cupboards and drawers and turning the place upside down. It was sad really as my trainer had told us to look into drawers as part of our training as people do weird things in a fire and place babies in small places. I was thinking what a ridiculous thing to be doing at 7 or 10 am, I had lost track of time it was light now but then part of you was saying what if? So you have to give it a really good search just in case.

We didn't find anything, only one thing which stood out a bedroom which looked in good condition and when you opened the door there had been slight fire damage but the rest of the floor was gutted and had been cremated. It was really airy and you sort of realise that it was weird, as we go round doing safety checks and tell people to close their doors at night time and this proves it works. If you shut your doors you might have half a chance. Some 12 hours on and there was no smoke or fire in that room and everyone else was dead. It really hit me. The real sad thing for me was, as we walking around searching and we opened the bin chute fire door and on every floor the insides had not been touched. There was a plastic 'Sainsbury's' bag full of rubbish inside one of them and it had not melted. That's because the fire door had a really good intumescent strip around the door and no smoke, flames or heat had got in. It's just sad and I know in hindsight you would never tell anyone to go in there as it's a dead end, but if one person had opened the door and saw it was safe to go inside then maybe at 10.30 am we might have found a room full of people that were ok. It was a real sad, sad thing you know, but who knew it was safe to go in there?

We continued to search around the rooms, there were pockets of fire in the middle of the rooms where the inside partitions had collapsed but we didn't try and put them out as it wasn't necessary the fire wasn't going anywhere it had burnt everything so we left them and saved our energy. The hoses that were left

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were too short to reach the landings. Some of the ceilings inside the flats had bowed and the rebar was sticking through. I looked at the construction and thought is this building going to stand up? Without over dramatizing it I thought 9/11 this building might collapse. Other FF's were coming out saying the same thing. You know going up the stairwell without hose, water, and no protection in a dark narrow area I was thinking 'Fuck' this could really be it. If this building comes down where not getting out and all of us would be killed. You know it was a tough one to call.

I was with my guvnor Stuart BROWN and after consulting with him he made the decision to finish the searches as we were not really achieving anything else, and to go back down. I wanted to stay as I had enough air to go up one more floor just in case there was someone there but we have to stay as a team. It wasn't a bad call as for all I knew someone could have been struggling in the group and if that was the case we all go as you don't force anyone to stay.

We left the building and were closed down and did our hand over. I think Stuart did that and that was it for us then. I remember looking up at the building and noticed how smoky it looked on the outside compared to before when it was a light as there were a lot less flames. You could hardly see the building it just looked like a chimney and again because of the burn pattern you could see more smoke coming from the 3<sup>rd</sup> 4<sup>th</sup> and 5<sup>th</sup> floors with some windows visible from the top it was like a big giant plume of smoke bellowing out.

As we walked over to the Salvation Army refreshments van, I suddenly realised the time and I borrowed a phone to call my girlfriend. It was then I realised the scale of the tragedy as I spoke to her. When I said it's me she burst into tears as she had been worried as there had been reports of fire fighters injured and hundreds of people dead including children. I repeated the word hundreds? I told her children had died and wasn't sure about FF's. I started to get emotional and we both burst into tears at the relief I was safe. We walked back towards the truck and members of the public came up to us and were thanking us, giving us food, drink and hugging us it was emotional, really emotional. It was probably the hardest part, I didn't, and most of the team didn't, want to leave but we had been there since 2am and it was now 11 or 11.30am. We were told to go to Paddington station to have an emergency hot counselling meeting, a de brief and make our notes about the fire/incident. I think this was a snap shot to see whose heads were messed up and might need more counselling like a triage effectively. I thought it was a bit point less as you hadn't had any time to process things. I was very chilled at this point but have struggled with it since. I understand why they have to do it but there was nothing normal about it from the outset even down to

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doing that little imposturous statement. When we've attended other serious incidents or murders we haven't done a statement straight away, so there was a real air about 'the shit had hit the fan' on this one. All the kit used at the tower came back with us. Unfortunately, we don't wear body cameras. The TIC which was used, was handed in so the images and data could be downloaded. I think it shows the date and time, and they would be able to find out from which truck and what FF had used it by the brief and locations of the images. It would be difficult to find out who actually took the pictures but with the timings, scale and spread of the fire and the condition of the building inside you should be able to work it out.

I think the reason that FF's didn't get killed in there was "we did a fucking good job" which is the bottom line. I think we approached it the right way and as FF's we realised how dangerous it was. I think the training we get is brilliant and the equipment we use generally speaking is good. We didn't take any unnecessary risks and again that comes down to training and also in fairness the management side of things was brilliant on the night. When you consider the size of the task from the first WM to turn up and how quickly the circumstances changed at the scene to when all the other WM's and even up to the chief took control they did an amazing job. Usually when more WM's turn up the worse it gets but, these guys did everything they could and I think they did all the right things. It would have been easy for them to do everything by the book and withdraw every FF and work our way up the building slowly and everyone would have died. They would have been well within their rights to do that you know. So they effectively left it to us to make our own dynamic risk assessments and throw the policies, health and safety out of the window. This was a case of either you want to help us or you don't. You can help or you can't. I went back to the Tower two days later as I am trained in Urban Search and Rescue (USAR) and part of the rescue team I assisted British Transport Police (BTP) and the Disaster Victim Identification (DVI) teams to allow safe access to the building for body retrieval. We were looking after their safety and generally keeping an eye on them as they worked through the building in a different environment they wouldn't have been in before.

From a USAR perspective going back was tragically eye opening I would say, seeing things we didn't see on the night, like you could piece together stories of how people had tried to survive by where bodies and skeletons where found. There are some sad stories to come out of it and it just underlines what little chance these people had to survive. It was a shame and really sad to go back there and see how people had died. It was nice in a sense though to help the DVI guys and a couple of which I know from previous courses and stuff to help them do their job. I think some people got some closure out of it as well by

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seeing the scene again. There wasn't anything really pivotal I wouldn't say from going back there that changed anything for me.

With regards to access to the building and physically parking and getting into the building with an incident on that scale you can't have enough parking for the amount of fire engines that would be needed. It really didn't matter, you parked where you could and just got there. With the equipment we needed I think it was irrelevant where you parked as there wasn't that much kit needed or what was needed had to be carried anyway.

With regards to access to the building there's only one staircase which made the access difficult and that's the way it was. I presume one of the lifts was a fire lift but I didn't use them so I don't know. We had no issues with the dry riser as and when we attached the branch to it we had water.

There is one thing I want to add, I know there was a smoke management extraction system installed for the building and I'm pretty sure it didn't work on the night. I know this as the whole building was full of smoke. The stairwell and landings should have been clear of smoke and they weren't. Also when I went back with USAR, I overheard two people speaking and what I heard said was this, that on each floor where the smoke extraction system switch was situated and it hadn't been melted you could see what mode it was in.

This was 'auto' which was the correct setting. So if the switch hadn't been switched on or if it did come on it failed for whatever reason. If it did work it certainly didn't work well enough to extract the smoke. The system should start to work as soon as the fire alarm activates on whatever the floor the fire is which then opens up the vents to allow the smoke to exit or uses a pressure system to force the smoke out. This is to protect the staircase and keep the area clear for people to exit the building.

My understanding is if there is only one staircase this should have been protected to allow this to happen. I appreciate that we had doors partially open by hoses and doors opening and closing with people exiting. But the extraction system should be able to cope with that limited distribution. Then again you have to accept the way the fire spread so quickly and is there any system designed to deal with that? In answer to your question are there any features that may have promoted the fire and smoke spread throughout the building. I would say in my opinion there has been enough evidence document since the fire and taking that away from the LFB it all points to the cladding. I understand the process of the cladding but at the time I didn't know how the cladding had been fixed to the building. I didn't know the structure or its composition. Having seen information since and learning from this, it's become abundantly clear to me now and ties up with what I saw at the time I arrived. That is how the fire had

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spread up the building at a ridiculous speed from the bottom to the top. I saw it burning vertical, horizontally, around and through the building. I had not seen it from a diagram or read it from a magazine, or paper I saw it with my own eyes. I found the information out later on why it spread like that from seeing diagrams and reading in magazines. So yes I saw it happen and 100 percent the composition of the outside of the building was a factor to the fire spreading so quickly.

There was only one direct bit of firefighting going on while I was there and that was from the ladder on the outside. I think there were multiple reasons why not much firefighting was going on much to the expectations of the public.

There is only one main means of escape from the building and that was from the stairwell. There was the bin chute but you can't count that as a proper escape and I didn't see any sprinkler systems inside the building.

The incident commander changed several times throughout the whole incident from the initial WM turning up who was from North Kensington I don't know his name. It would change as more senior managers and pumps turned up. The higher ranking officer would be in charge, I know Andy ROE, Pat GOLDBOURNE, and Richard WELCH had been in charge at one point along with other WM's but I think it ended up with Dany COTTON.

In relation to the 'stay put' policy my understanding is that in a normal fire spread in a concrete building, is that you stay inside your flat to prevent the building being flooded with people trying to get out and to allow FF's to use the stairwell to gain access to the floors to bring in equipment and extinguish the fire. It could be a small cooking, or small contained fire. I don't think there is anything wrong with this policy and on the night I don't know who was in charge of making the decision to stay put or leave. I wouldn't have thought there would be an expert on scene during the fire to assess the fire as it was spreading that would have been far to organised.

As far as I am aware the windows were just standard PVC windows but a lot of them had been burnt out when I went back on the search and rescue.

What could have helped us on the night were sprinkler systems potentially but with how ridiculous the fire spread on the outside they wouldn't have been any use to us until the fire went inside. If you're going to put highly inflammable material on the outside of the building at least have a drenching system from the roof. More than one staircase, proper emergency lighting, correct floor numbering in both the lobby and stairwells. The radio's which I want to emphasises again, as this has been and ongoing problem not just at Grenfell Tower. If were to go below ground like down into tube stations etc., we would be cut off

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from the ground level. We have to roll out cables to get a signal which is ridiculous in this day and age where there is better technical equipment available.

At Paddington Fire Station during my de brief I was asked a series of questions in relation to the Grenfell Tower which I exhibit as RKN/1 seal No:- MPSZ13111214

Since my interview I have been asked on email the following two questions:

- 1 Whilst attending the scene what issues if any did your witness have in relation to gas supply to the building.
- 2. What is the witnesses knowledge of cutting the gas supply to the Tower including any actions, decisions, communications, arrangements or otherwise, if any"

I sent the following answers:

- 1. I had no knowledge of any gas supply issues until I overheard other firefighters saying they had ruptured. This was later on in the incident but before my third visit into the building.
- 2. I have no idea if the gas supply was isolated at all or if it was, at what time that took place.

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